Кафедра політології
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Item Der ambivalente Aufstieg einer ukrainischen "unzivilen Gesellschaft" nach dem Euromaidan(2019) Umland, AndreasParteipolitischer Ultranationalismus war bislang in der postsowjetischen Ukraine – insbesondere bei nationalen Wahlen – ungewöhnlich schwach. Die drei wichtigsten rechtsradikalen Parteien "Freiheit" (Swoboda), "Rechter Sektor" (Prawyj Sektor) und "Nationales Corps" sind auch nach dem Euromaidan politisch marginal geblieben. Allerdings hat eine rechtsextreme "unzivile Gesellschaft" – die teils eng mit ultranationalistischen Parteien verbunden ist – im Kontext des anhaltenden Krieges mit Russland an öffentlicher Akzeptanz gewonnen. Die Aktivitäten dieser Nichtregierungsorganisationen und deren gelegentliche Zusammenarbeit mit staatlichen Institutionen verlangen nach sorgsamer Beobachtung durch ukrainische und ausländische Watch-Dog-Organisationen sowie Eindämmung durch die Kiewer Regierung.Item Between Frontline and Parliament: Ukrainian Political Parties and Irregular Armed Groups in 2014-2019(2021) Fedorenko, Kostiantyn; Umland, AndreasThe short-lived Ukrainian armed volunteer movement and its interaction with electoral politics, in some regards did, and in other regards, did not fit patterns observed in research into irregular armed groups (IAGs). The brief life span of most Ukrainian IAGs as more or less independent actors, and their swift integration into Ukraine’s regular forces during the years 2014–2015, were both unusual. They were also one of the reasons for the relatively low political impact of the IAGs as such - a repercussion that is in contrast to the partly impressive individual political careers of some IAG commanders in 2014–2019. There were various forms of interpenetration of parties with IAGs in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Certain parties, political activists, and MPs took part in the creation and development of IAGs in 2014. Some – to that point, mostly minor - politicians became soldiers or commanders of IAGs. Subsequently, a number of IAG members transited into the party-political realm, either joining older parties or creating new political organizations.Item Between Russia and the West: Prospects for Ukrainian Foreign Policy Choices(1998) Haran, OlexiyThe disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the newly independen states created a new geopolitical situation, not only in Eastern Europe, but on the global level a well. The West lost its main enemy, the Cold War is over, and many Americans believe tha there are no grounds for U.S. involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet Union. However, Russia remains a great power with a huge nuclear arsenal, and the future of economic and political reform is unclear, as its foreign policy, especially in the so-called “near abroad.” The conflicts in this region influence the domestic and foreign policies of Russia and destabilize the situation in Eastern Europe, providing new challenges for Western policy in this region.Item Changes in the Foreign Policy Orientations of Ukrainians after the Euromaidan: National and Regional Levels : [book chapter](2017) Zolkina, Mariia; Haran, OleksiiThe chapter of the book entitled "Constructing a Political Nation: Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas", edited by Olexiy Haran and Maksym Yakovlyev.Item Commentary: should Washington have pressed Kyiv into a compromise with Moscow?(2022) Umland, AndreasThis article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia's demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large-scale invasion of Ukraineearly 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high-intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions by Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in the Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis-à-vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation.Item Communism and De-communization: Study Of The Rise And Collapse Of Communism In Indonesia And Ukraine: A Comparison(2024) Rambe, Safriza; Chrisnandi, Yuddy; Haran, OlexiyThe rise and fall of communism have caught the attention of many observers, including Indonesia and Ukraine. It is interesting to observe that communism in both countries had received wide support during its revival, but ended in destruction in Indonesia and Ukraine, which used to be countries that had the ideology of communism and later denounced communist regimes and banned propaganda of its symbols. This study wants to compare the existence of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine by referring to aspects of ideology and people's acceptance, forms and ideologies adopted by the two countries, figures who propagated it, supporting organizations, and the collapse of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine. This study uses a qualitative method by prioritizing library research in data collection which then analyses and explains the meaning of the data or interprets it as accurately as possible.Item The Comparative Analysis of Regional Governors’ Approaches to Fostering Inclusive Political Institutions in Post-Euromaidan Donbas(2017) Romanova, ValentynaThis study is inspired by a theory-driven expectation of a co-author of Why Nations Fail Daren Acemoglu in regard to fostering inclusive political institutions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine despite the armed conflict in Donbas. I examine how appointing a civil society activist - the one who used to help the Ukrainian Army during the security operation in Donbas - for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors’ approaches towards the key conditions of inclusive political institutions: state capacity and power distribution. State capacity, namely its key dimension of monopoly over violence, is operationalized as control over the contact line in the armed conflict in Donbas. Power distribution is operationalized as holding democratic elections. I compare the approaches of three regional executives, including the one who was the civil society activist, towards state capacity and power distribution. I find that appointing the civil society activist for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors’ approach towards control over the contact line, but not towards holding democratic elections. The study contributes to literatures on inclusive political institutions by analyzing new empirical data in line with the conceptual framework of Acemoglu and Robinson tailored for its application in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast.Item Competing Discourses of 'Post-Colonialism' in Present-Day Ukraine(2018) Yakushik, ValentinPresentation speech at the 4th International Scientific and Practical Conference "Challenges of Postcolonialism: Philosophy, Religion, Education", (Kyiv, May 24-25, 2018).Item Constructing a Political Nation : Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas(Stylos Publishing, 2017) Bekeshkina, Iryna; Sydorchuk, Oleksii; Burakovskiy, Ihor; Zolkina, Mariia; Haran, Olexiy; Chabanna, Marharyta; Kermach, Ruslan; Haran, Olexiy; Yakovlyev, MaksymWhat effect did Russia’s attack have on Ukrainian society and on public opinion? And how, in turn, did changes in public opinion and in society influence Ukrainian identity and politics? This book, prepared by the School for Policy Analysis, National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy with the participation of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, shows that contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations, Russian aggression has in fact led to a strengthening of the Ukrainian political nation. The book covers national and regional dimensions of changes in the attitudes of Ukrainians during the war in the Donbas: identity issues, political and party preferences, approaches to decentralization and the conflict in the Donbas, economic sentiments, changes in foreign policy attitudes toward the EU, NATO, and Russia.Item Contemporary ukraine’s role in the caucasus(2012) Yakushik , V.This article examines various aspects of Ukraine’s policy towards the Caucasus region, in particular changes and continuity in that policy after 2010.Item Contentious Politics and Repertoire of Contention in Ukraine: the Case of Euromaidan(2014) Gomza, IvanThe article introduces the paradigm of contentious politics to study the Euromaidan events in Ukraine, describing the mechanisms of contention politics in the events of November 2013 – February 2014. Special attention is paid to the repertoire of contention, which remained rigid during 1991–2013, but has evolved after January 19, 2014 due to structural reasons.Item Crimea’s Annexation in the Light of International Law. A Critique of Russia’s Legal Argumentation(2016) Merezhko, OleksandrCrimea’s annexation by Russia violated a whole range of the fundamental principles of international law and international treaties guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, and security. By annexing Crimea, Russia also violated the estoppel principle of law and international morality. In light of the principles of contemporary international law, as well as in light of the Russian doctrine of international law, the arguments put forward by Russia’s President Putin, Russian officials, and international lawyers are untenable and in contradiction of the previous Russian doctrine’s approach towards the relationship between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity.Item Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War(E-International Relations, 2020) Kuzio, TarasThe goal of this book is to launch a discussion of the crisis in Russian studies following the 2014 European crisis and Russian-Ukrainian war which has yet to be acknowledged by historians and political scientists in Russian and Eurasian studies. The book analyses the crisis through five perspectives. The first is how Western historians continue to include Ukrainians within an imperial history of "Russia" which denies Ukrainians a separate history. The second perspective is to counter the common narrative of Crimea as "always" having been "Russian" which denies that Tatars are the indigenous people of Crimea – not Russians. The third perspective focuses on academic orientalist approaches to writing about Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian war. The fourth perspective downplays Russian nationalism (imperialism) in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and completely ignores the revival of Tsarist and White émigré Russian nationalism that denies the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Meanwhile, academic orientalism exaggerates the influence of Ukrainian nationalism in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. The fifth perspective counters the claim of Putinversteher (Putin-Understander) scholars of a "civil war" taking place in Ukraine through extensive evidence of Russian military aggression and imperialism. Finally, these five factors taken together show Russian studies will be unable to escape its crisis if it cannot come to understand how the source of the Russian-Ukrainian war lies in Russian national identity and its attitudes towards Ukraine and Ukrainians and why therefore the chances for peace are slim.Item The Demise of Ukraine's "Eurasian Vector" and the Rise of Pro-NATO Sentiment(2017) Haran, Oleksii; Zolkina, MariiaBefore 2014, the majority of Ukrainians did not view the goal of European integration as a "national idea". Even so, most Ukrainians had positive views about developing relations with and integrating into the EU. And even though former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to accept the idea of joining NATO, he officially maintained EU integration as a priority. In fact, the Yanukovych administration helped finalize and initialed the text of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Yanukovych’s sudden refusal to actually sign it, under Russian pressure, was the spark that set off the mass protests in late 2013 that would become the Euromaidan revolution. The success of the Euromaidan and the ensuing long-awaited signing of the Association Agreement signaled a shift among Ukrainians at both the national and regional level in favor of the EU. In addition, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukrainians came to favor joining NATO for the first time since independence. Simultaneously, support plummeted for Ukraine’s "Eurasia vector", i.e., joining Russia-led institutions like the Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).Item Dezentralisierungsreformen in der Ukraine 2014-2019: Erste Ergebnisse und künftige Herausforderungen(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019) Romanova, Valentyna; Umland, AndreasSeit 2014 durchläuft die Ukraine einen tiefgreifenden Dezentralisierungsprozess, der die Beziehungen zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie grundlegend umgestaltet. Eine kombinierte Gebiets- und Verwaltungsreform delegiert politische Macht von der nationalen auf die kommunale Ebene. Eine Reform der regionalen und subregionalen Verwaltung auf der Oblast- und Rajonebene steht noch aus.Item Disinformation against Crimean Tatars in Russian Social Media: Communication Dynamics During the First Year of Russia's Full- Scale Invasion of Ukraine(2024) Bidochko, LesiaThis article examines the persistence of Tatarophobia against Crimean Tatars in the Russian segment of social media during the first year of the full-scale invasion (24 February 2022–24 February 2023). A total of 4,435 posts from various social media platforms, including Facebook, Odnoklassniki, Telegram, Twitter, and Vkontakte, were analysed. The discourse predominantly echoes Russia’s imperial and Soviet-era narratives, along with xenophobic and oppressive rhetoric exacerbated by the full-fledged invasion. The propaganda seeks to cultivate a negative perception of Crimean Tatars as an ethnic community, manipulating cultural and historical aspects related to them. Additionally, it endeavours to construct an adversarial image of relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars, as well as of Ukraine’s current policies. Russian special services perceive the capacity of Crimean Tatars to self-organize, establish volunteer units, or organize blockades as a threat. The propaganda effort not only fosters harassment and hate speech but also encourages peninsula residents to view them as "unreliable elements" deserving of suppression.Item Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the U.S. Position on the Independence of Ukraine(1995) Haran, OlexiyIndependent Ukraine, with a population of more than fifty million, has emerged as one of the main players in Eastern Europe, and Ukrainian-Russian relations are crucial for the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The interest in Ukraine is increasing in Western capitals. This paper covers the period from 1989 to 1992. In order to understand the evolution of U.S. policy towards Ukraine, it is important to assess the position of the Bush administration, which was challenged by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. I intend to analyze the broad geopolitical background of American-Ukrainian relations, America's perceptions of Ukraine, and the implications for relations with Ukraine and Russia.Item Domestic and International Dimensions of Ukraine's Decentralization: Kyiv's Local Governance Reform and Post-Soviet Democratization(2023) Romanova, Valentyna; Umland, AndreasThis article examines Ukraine’s decentralization in 2014-21 in light of Russia’s initially hybrid war against Ukraine and the full-fledged military invasion since February 2022. While not a panacea for the social defects that have undermined Ukrainian political and economic development since independence, Ukraine’s local governance reform has improved the capacity of public authorities to deliver basic services; increased Ukraine’s cohesion and resilience; and supported the country’s ongoing Europeanization. Its cross-border diffusion potential makes the Ukrainian reform relevant for democratizing transitions in other states both within and beyond the post-communist space.Item The Drama of Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election: Opportunities Lost-Does a Potential for Stabilization Remain?(2010) Haran, Oleksii; Prokopchuk, DmytroThis publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.Item The EU and Ukraine's Public Opinion: Changing Dynamic(2022) Haran, Olexiy; Burkovskyi, PetroAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian society and political establishment chose a different path of transformation than Russia. Ukraine gained its independence peacefully and without internal conflicts thanks to an agreement between the national-democratic opposition and the so called "nationalcommunists". The West appreciated the facts that 1) Ukraine was the first state from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to re-elect both president and parliament in the 1994 democratic elections; 2) in contrast to Russia’s 1993 constitution, which established a model of creeping authoritarianism in that it placed massive authority on the president, Ukraine’s 1996 constitution was a compromise between the president and parliament; 3) again in contrast to Russia, political opposition in Ukraine was much stronger. In fact, only one president, Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) was reelected. The rest, except fugitive Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2014), lost elections to their opposition rivals. In parliamentary elections opposition parties defeated ruling rivals in 2006, 2007 and 2019. All Ukrainian governments also had to take the interests of the country’s different regions into account. Thus, this system was much more balanced than the Russian model. From the point of view of Western political science, "pluralism by default" emerged in Ukraine, i.e. unplanned and unintentional pluralism.