Том 09-10

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Browsing Том 09-10 by Subject "article"

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    The category of the otherness in Richard Rorty’s philosophy: the principles and mechanisms of the differentiation
    (2022) Meita, Kseniia
    This paper is an attempt to analyze Richard Rorty’s interpretation of the category of the Otherness in the context of the global project of liberal utopia – the society of the future, based on non-violence. The evolution of the understanding of the notion of the Otherness is reviewed in the context of the concepts of American pragmatist and French post-structuralist social anthropological practices, where the reasons for the alienation of particular individuals are explained on the mythological and linguistic background, and the people are solidarized shaping up the generalized other. The Other to a particular culture connects in him/ herself the functions of the scapegoat and the messiah at the same time. In Rortian approach, a variety of reasons for an individual’s marginalization on class, religion, gender, and behavioral basis is analyzed. Moreover, the method of sentimental education is promoted in developing the children’s emotional intelligence and raising the generations on the values of total inclusivity and empathy apart from general erudition, with the help of fiction reading. The Kantian moral imperative is criticized for the mechanical and legalist character. So, the moral principles based on a fellowship are offered instead. This fellowship should be based rather on the personal identity with a particular nation, class, or gender than on the birthright. The advantages and drawbacks of radical pluralism, the understanding of relative values of all ways of life, and its difference from postmodern cultural relativism are also reviewed. The result of the study reveals the secondary role of the people’s differences in their consolidation in Richard Rorty’s liberal utopia if they have in common the basic principle of intolerance to violence, whether it is direct physical violence or the passive-aggressive abuse in humiliation.
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    A methodological inquiry on compatibility of Droysen’s understanding and Weber’s counterfactuals
    (2022) Bakaiev, Mykola
    Gustav Droysen introduced understanding as the method of history. Max Weber analyzed what-if statements or counterfactuals as a form of causal explanation. Both scholars had a common interest in understanding and explanation. However, Droysen’s explanation was defined as method of natural sciences and served no use in history, while Weber’s understanding was focused on social reality rather than historical one. Still, precisely Weber’s idea of difference-making counterfactuals was later reinterpreted as defining for historical counterfactuals. In this paper, I determine what their methodologies say about understanding and counterfactuals, whether their views are compatible and whether historical research can benefit from combination of understanding and counterfactuals. To do this, I reconstruct Gustav Droysen’s views on understanding in the first part. Understanding here is a method that allows us to grasp events that are distant in time as contemporary ones through historical material and criticism. In the second part I review the tradition of counterfactuals of analytic philosophers (from Roderick Chisholm and Nelson Goodman to Julian Reiss) and Max Weber. Counterfactuals are conditional statements that contradict existing historical facts by changing or removing the causes of certain events, so that they can demonstrate the significance of these causes for historical events in case the counterfactual causes make a difference for the events. In the third part of the paper, I argue for compatibility between the methodologies, maintaining that understanding and counterfactuals can be beneficial for historical research in the following way: counterfactuals pinpoint the causes and main figures of historical events; knowledge about the figures improves our understanding of them; this understanding helps to see more counterfactual possibilities that can bring to light new causes, deepening our view of history.
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    Philosophical dimension of today’s educational technologies: framing ethical landscape of the smart education domain
    (2022) Mykhailov, Dmytro
    Although smart education is one of the most rapidly expanding technological practices nowadays, we still don’t know much about the consequences that new educational technologies might have on the future generation of learners. While smart education is often used as an ‘umbrella term’ which covers a wide variety of different trends and approaches in today’s education, it seems useful to narrow the definition of this term before going deeper into the ethical analysis of smart education more in general. Considering this fact, the present paper claims that the smart education domain consists of three main components, namely, smart pedagogy, smart learning, and smart educational technologies. Keeping this in mind in what follows I propose a description of the ethical problems from every component. In the case of smart pedagogy, I emphasize the issue of new responsibilities and new competencies that come with novel digital technologies. In the case of smart learning, I am showing how big data and AI solutions might raise significant privacy issues. Finally, in relation to smart educational technologies, I focus on AI adaptive educational systems which might provide highly personalized educational solutions. Although AI adaptive educational systems can strongly improve the efficiency and interactivity of the learning experience this technological system might also lead to unpredicted consequences related to students’ attention and other cognitive and metacognitive abilities. The present paper also stands in a deep relation to current discussion in contemporary philosophy of technology by questioning the ethical nature of the current digital artifacts. According to many contemporary philosophies of technology digital artifacts such as computer, AI systems and smartphones are not morally neutral. On the contrary, these digital technologies are actively changing our moral behavior, transform our responsibilities and ethical navigation more in general. As I am going to show in the present paper, digital technologies from the domain of smart education are not an exclusion.
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    Rationalism and relativism: an essay on John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott
    (2022) Wendland, Aaron James
    This essay creates an unlikely conversation between two 20th century thinkers: John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott. I say "unlikely" because apart from a few scant remarks in the writing of each the two did not directly engage each other. The essay begins by examining Oakeshott’s explication of "The Rationalist" and her tradition in the history of political thought. Specifically, the essay shows that rationalism in politics involves the belief that reason is an infallible guide to political activity and that the Rationalist seeks certainty and perfection in political affairs. The essay goes on to tease out the rationalistic tendencies in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, and then it analyzes Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and applies these criticisms to Rawls. Briefly, Oakeshott marks a distinction between technical and practical knowledge, and he argues that the principles that make up technical manuals like A Theory of Justice are abridgments of and no substitute for the understanding we gain through our practical experience and our participation in a given political tradition. While explaining Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and Rawls, the essay indicates some of the relativistic proclivities in Oakeshott’s appeal to political practices and traditions, and then it entertains objections to Oakeshott that a Rawlsian might offer. Here Rawls’ commitment to the liberal tradition and the relativity implicit in his explanations of "reflective equilibrium" and "reasonableness" are examined and Rawls’ similarities to Oakeshott are noted. Ultimately, this essay argues that the strength of Rawls’ work lay not in the fact that his principles of justice are established by rational agents in an original position, but in the fact that they are principles that emerge from and cohere with ideas deeply rooted in the Western tradition itself.