Знання як конструкт: до критики концепту "мовчазного знання" Майкла Полані
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Date
2017
Authors
Петруньок, Надія
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Abstract
Статтю присвячено з’ясуванню наукового потенціалу концепту «мовчазне знання», що набув розвитку в західній філософії у другій половині ХХ ст. Досліджено особливості його появи, значення та вживання в науковому апараті сучасної філософії та епістемології. Основну увагу приділено визначенню переваг і недоліків аргументації «за» і «проти» визначення «мовчазного знання» у когнітивних термінах. Із філософсько-наукових позицій запропоновано пояснення впливу ідей М. Полані на історизацію та соціологізацію пізнання, активізованих у 1960-х рр. Апелюючи до першоджерел і сучасного критичного дискурсу, автор роз’яснює співставність і взаємодоповнюваність «мовчазного» та експліцитного знання, вказує на перспективність апеляції до «мовчазного» компоненту знання в науці, а також розглядає виокремлення «мовчазного знання» як частковий випадок розширення концепції раціональності в сучасній філософії.
The article touches upon one of the crucial notions of the 20th century epistemology and philosophy of science: the idea of tacit knowledge. We describe this notion as one clearly embedded in nowadays philosophy by Michael Polanyi. Thus we operate with tacit knowledge as quite a plain but nevertheless outstanding phenomenon which used to appear in various philosophical and psychological studies after Polanyi’s introduction. The aim of the article is to specify the matter of the cognitive aspect of the tacit knowledge, and appeal to the generally critical attitude towards the “knowing” aspect of tacit knowledge. The idea we suggest consists in putting together tacit and articulate (as well as theoretical) faculties of knowledge. The result it gives shows that the “tacit” outlines an enormous sphere of the seemingly unknown for the current state of science, and gives a hint how it changes from generation to generation (i.e. passing some tacit knowledge from Galileo to Newton). By means of applying the notion of tacit knowledge into philosophy of science we let the door open for a broadened theory of rationality, which has actively developed in philosophy since the 1960s. “Tacit” means the outcome of what we know or might mention as knowledge but cannot describe as a procedure or a rule. Still, “tacit” meets the requirements of rational not as a JTB knowledge, but as a practical (procedure) knowledge (and knowing). It reflects ideas that have not been revealed yet, or that cannot be revealed at all. However, generally the tacit ingredient, as Polanyi stressed, shows human pre-linguistic advantages. It means, tacit empowers the explicit, and strengthens the capacities of the latter. This leads us to the interdisciplinary level where epistemology meets ontology and makes it more and more difficult to represent the construct of knowledge without its unlimited tacit component.
The article touches upon one of the crucial notions of the 20th century epistemology and philosophy of science: the idea of tacit knowledge. We describe this notion as one clearly embedded in nowadays philosophy by Michael Polanyi. Thus we operate with tacit knowledge as quite a plain but nevertheless outstanding phenomenon which used to appear in various philosophical and psychological studies after Polanyi’s introduction. The aim of the article is to specify the matter of the cognitive aspect of the tacit knowledge, and appeal to the generally critical attitude towards the “knowing” aspect of tacit knowledge. The idea we suggest consists in putting together tacit and articulate (as well as theoretical) faculties of knowledge. The result it gives shows that the “tacit” outlines an enormous sphere of the seemingly unknown for the current state of science, and gives a hint how it changes from generation to generation (i.e. passing some tacit knowledge from Galileo to Newton). By means of applying the notion of tacit knowledge into philosophy of science we let the door open for a broadened theory of rationality, which has actively developed in philosophy since the 1960s. “Tacit” means the outcome of what we know or might mention as knowledge but cannot describe as a procedure or a rule. Still, “tacit” meets the requirements of rational not as a JTB knowledge, but as a practical (procedure) knowledge (and knowing). It reflects ideas that have not been revealed yet, or that cannot be revealed at all. However, generally the tacit ingredient, as Polanyi stressed, shows human pre-linguistic advantages. It means, tacit empowers the explicit, and strengthens the capacities of the latter. This leads us to the interdisciplinary level where epistemology meets ontology and makes it more and more difficult to represent the construct of knowledge without its unlimited tacit component.
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Keywords
Полані, Фодор, Райт, Вітґенштайн, філософія науки, мовчазне знання, раціональність, Polanyi, Fodor, Wright, Wittgenstein, philosophy of science, tacit knowledge, rationality
Citation
Петруньок Надія Іванівна. Знання як конструкт: до критики концепту "мовчазного знання" Майкла Полані / Петруньок Н. І. // Наукові записки НаУКМА. Філософія та релігієзнавство. - 2017. - Т. 192. - С. 29-33.