Ukraine has experienced two popular uprisings in a decade (2004, 2013–2014), which took
place in four different circumstances. Firstly, the Orange Revolution began as a protest against
election fraud during an election cycle while the Euromaidan began in protest at the abrupt end
to European integration and was outside an election cycle. Secondly, whether the incumbent
was leaving office (Leonid Kuchma, 2004) or seeking to be re-elected and remain in power
indefinitely (Viktor Yanukovych, 2013–2014) had a direct bearing on regime strategies against
the protestors. Thirdly, Russian intervention was limited to finances, the supply of political
technologists and diplomatic support in the former whereas during the latter, Russia used its
intelligence, special forces and military to intervene in the protests, annex territory and invade
Ukraine. Fourthly, the type of leader which was in power (former Soviet nomenklatura versus
thuggish and criminalized Donetsk clan) had a direct impact on whether the authorities would
seek compromise and non-violence (Kuchma, 2004) or reject compromise and resort to violence
through vigilantes, Berkut riot police and the Security Service (Yanukovch, 2013–2014).