Запрет на ложь в этике поступка. Опыт прочтения эссе И. Канта "О мнимом праве лгать…" сквозь призму философии Х. Арендт

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dc.contributor.authorРогожа, Мария
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-13T14:43:58Z
dc.date.available2017-07-13T14:43:58Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.descriptionKant’s prohibition on lying is analyzed in the light of theoretical discussion on the sense of morality between Ruben Apressyan and Abdusalam Guseynov. The distinction between the spheres of individual and public morality makes it possible for different approaches to consider the prohibition on lying as the factor of the moral action. In the article Kant’s ethical and philosophical ideas are considered through the prism of social and political stance Hannah Arendt’s. Arendt proposed to consider three perspectives of human affairs in Kant’s philosophy: human species and its progress, a human person as a moral being and end in oneself, men in plural, whose true end is sociability. The Enlightenment provides a person with the opportunity to free oneself from superstitions and to follow Reason, and the moral law de估nes its demands. The moral law also obliges a person to act according to the duty; the prohibition on lying being one of its particular forms. At the level of Kant’s moral subject, the prohibition on lying is speci估ed in deliberated efforts of an actor to follow the absolute duty. In the case of the householder, to follow the duty means to not lie to the malefactor about the location of a friend. The alternative to such action is the recognition of personal moral failure as any other choice is inevitably de估ned by partiality, not by the moral law. However, absolute prohibition against lying in its ultimate implementation eliminates actor’s ability to recognize the good and the evil, while eliminating one’s responsibility and allowing to hide behind the moral law. In the sphere of human interaction, persons verify correctness of their actions by means of judgments. Under the circumstances of conen
dc.identifier.citationРогожа Мария Михайловна. Запрет на ложь в этике поступка. Опыт прочтения эссе И. Канта "О мнимом праве лгать…" сквозь призму философии Х. Арендт / М. М. Рогожа // Этическая мысль : научно-теоретический журнал. - 2016. - Т. 16, № 1. - С. 112-129.uk
dc.identifier.urihttps://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/handle/123456789/11751
dc.language.isoruuk
dc.relation.sourceЭтическая мысль: научно-теоретический журналuk
dc.statuspublished earlieruk
dc.subjectИммануил Кантru
dc.subjectХанна Арендтru
dc.subjectПросвещениеru
dc.subjectнравственный законru
dc.subjectабсолютный запретru
dc.subjectсила сужденияru
dc.subjectздравый смыслru
dc.subjectобщительностьru
dc.subjectобязательствоru
dc.subjectImmanuel Kanten
dc.subjectHannah Arendten
dc.subjectlyingen
dc.subjectlyingen
dc.subjectEnlightenmenten
dc.subjectmoral lawen
dc.subjectabsoluteen
dc.subjectстатьяru_Ru
dc.titleЗапрет на ложь в этике поступка. Опыт прочтения эссе И. Канта "О мнимом праве лгать…" сквозь призму философии Х. Арендтru
dc.title.alternativeProhibition of Lying in the Ethics of the Act Perusing I. Kant’s essay “On a Supposed right to Lie” in the Light of H. Arendt’s Philosophyen
dc.typeArticleuk
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