Податкова конкуренція і кооперація за світові корпорації
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Date
2018
Authors
Горбачук, Василь
Дунаєвський, Максим
Сулейманов, Сеїт-Бекір
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
Глобальне поширення інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій загострює міжнародну
конкуренцію, актуальну для України. Гетерогенність країн спонукає фірми до більшого рівноважного (за
Нешем) податку в (більшій) країні 1 (до податкової асиметрії), а відтак до звітування фірмами більшого
прибутку в (меншій) країні 2. Якщо країна 1 підвищує свою податкову ставку 1
t , то збільшує податкову
базу країни 2 і стимул країни 2 до підвищення своєї податкової ставки 2t , і навпаки: податки країн i = 1, 2
є стратегічними доповнювачами. Податкова конкуренція веде до втрати податкової бази країни 1. При
цьому (сумарний) звітний прибуток фірм у країні 1 перевищує звітний прибуток у країні 2, а фіскальні
надходження у країні 1 перевищують фіскальні надходження у країні 2.
The global proliferation of information and communication technologies aggravates the international competition, topical for Ukraine today. Heterogeneity of countries induces firms to a larger (Nash) equilibrium tax in the bigger country 1 (to a tax asymmetry), and therefore to corporate reporting of a higher profit in the smaller country 2. If the country 1 increases its tax rate 1 t , then it raises the tax base of country 2 and the incentive of the country 2 to hike its tax rate 2t , and vice versa: the taxes of countries i = 1, 2 are strategic complements. The tax competition leads to the loss of tax base for country 1. At the same time, the total profit reported in country 1 exceeds the total profit reported in country 2 while the fiscal revenues in country 1 exceed the fiscal revenues in country 2. A lower value of the parameter δ in the costs for profit shifting among countries stands for the lower tax rates in countries, a lower difference between the rates and a higher tax competition, the lower joint fiscal revenues = ttRttR 21121 ),(),( + ),( 212 ttR . This fact creates incentives for cooperation (fiscal harmonization) of the states. Then, at the absence of transfers among countries, those incentives may be sufficient for the inequality )1,1(),(i 21 ≤ RttR i holding at some threshold value of δ . At ],( ∈ δδδ 12 the country 1 has an incentive to cooperation while the country 2 does not. A potential advantage of the smaller country 2 is its lower equilibrium tax rate 12 < tt , implying growth of the profit reported on its territoty (its tax base) at the expense of the country 1. As cooperation eliminates this advantage, then at > δδ 2 the country 2 has higher propensity to tax competition than to tax cooperation. On the international capital markets a smaller country has a lower market power and therefore enters the tax competition, decreasing tax rate for capital on its territory: under competition the gain of country 2 is larger than that of country 1, and under cooperation the gains of countries 1 and 2 are the same.
The global proliferation of information and communication technologies aggravates the international competition, topical for Ukraine today. Heterogeneity of countries induces firms to a larger (Nash) equilibrium tax in the bigger country 1 (to a tax asymmetry), and therefore to corporate reporting of a higher profit in the smaller country 2. If the country 1 increases its tax rate 1 t , then it raises the tax base of country 2 and the incentive of the country 2 to hike its tax rate 2t , and vice versa: the taxes of countries i = 1, 2 are strategic complements. The tax competition leads to the loss of tax base for country 1. At the same time, the total profit reported in country 1 exceeds the total profit reported in country 2 while the fiscal revenues in country 1 exceed the fiscal revenues in country 2. A lower value of the parameter δ in the costs for profit shifting among countries stands for the lower tax rates in countries, a lower difference between the rates and a higher tax competition, the lower joint fiscal revenues = ttRttR 21121 ),(),( + ),( 212 ttR . This fact creates incentives for cooperation (fiscal harmonization) of the states. Then, at the absence of transfers among countries, those incentives may be sufficient for the inequality )1,1(),(i 21 ≤ RttR i holding at some threshold value of δ . At ],( ∈ δδδ 12 the country 1 has an incentive to cooperation while the country 2 does not. A potential advantage of the smaller country 2 is its lower equilibrium tax rate 12 < tt , implying growth of the profit reported on its territoty (its tax base) at the expense of the country 1. As cooperation eliminates this advantage, then at > δδ 2 the country 2 has higher propensity to tax competition than to tax cooperation. On the international capital markets a smaller country has a lower market power and therefore enters the tax competition, decreasing tax rate for capital on its territory: under competition the gain of country 2 is larger than that of country 1, and under cooperation the gains of countries 1 and 2 are the same.
Description
Keywords
конкуренція, кооперація, корпорація, асиметрія, гетерогенність, стаття, competition, cooperation, corporation, asymmetry, heterogeneity
Citation
Горбачук В. М. Податкова конкуренція і кооперація за світові корпорації / В. М. Горбачук, М. С. Дунаєвський, С.-Б. Сулейманов // Вісник Херсонського національного технічного університету. - 2018. - № 3 (66), т. 1. - С. 45-54.