Description:
This article presents an analysis of the early period (1911–1920) of works of one of
the founders of modern analytical philosophy, a guiding spirit of the Wiener Kreis
Moritz Schlick (1882–1936). In polemic with neo-kantianism and phenomenology from
the standpoint of ‘critical realism’, M. Schlick, before the days of Wiener Kreis,
represents on the basis of logical empiricism a program of acquiring knowledge as an
internally interrelated system of judgments which assert actual existence of relations.
The question of ontological status of these relations he had left open, restricting himself
to the subject-matter of epistemological inquiry which in its turn was determined by
the present state of natural sciences at that time.
Leaving aside our certainty of incompatibility in principle of metaphysics and logical
positivism, the article is an attempt to present a program of renewal of a general
modelling ontology for Schlick’s theory of knowledge. The central category of such an
ontology is relation that acquires its significance in what is factual. Also it is shown
there, to what extent such an ontology is general and can constitute the basis of some
other (meta-)theories which resolved mutual with those in the early Schlick’s
epistemology tasks at that time or later.
