

## **Communism and De-communization: Study Of The Rise And Collapse Of Communism In Indonesia And Ukraine: A Comparison**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The rise and fall of communism have caught the attention of many observers, including Indonesia and Ukraine. It is interesting to observe that communism in both countries had received wide support during its revival, but ended in destruction in Indonesia and Ukraine, which used to be countries that had the ideology of communism and later denounced communist regimes and banned propaganda of its symbols. This study wants to compare the existence of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine by referring to aspects of ideology and people's acceptance, forms and ideologies adopted by the two countries, figures who propagated it, supporting organizations, and the collapse of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine. This study uses a qualitative method by prioritizing library research in data collection which then analyses and explains the meaning of the data or interprets it as accurately as possible.

**Keywords:** communism; de-communization; Indonesia; Ukraine.

### **ABSTRAK**

Kebangkitan dan kejatuhan komunisme telah menarik perhatian banyak pengamat, termasuk di Indonesia dan Ukraina. Menarik untuk dicermati bahwa komunisme di kedua negara tersebut sempat mendapat dukungan luas pada masa kebangkitannya, namun berakhir dengan kehancuran di Indonesia dan Ukraina, yang dulunya merupakan negara yang memiliki ideologi komunisme dan kemudian mengancam rezim komunis dan melarang propaganda simbol-simbolnya. Penelitian ini ingin membandingkan eksistensi komunisme di Indonesia dan Ukraina dengan mengacu pada aspek ideologi dan penerimaan masyarakat, bentuk dan ideologi yang dianut oleh kedua negara, tokoh-tokoh yang mempropagandakan, organisasi pendukung, dan keruntuhan komunisme di Indonesia dan Ukraina. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan mengutamakan penelitian kepustakaan dalam pengumpulan data yang kemudian menganalisis dan menjelaskan makna dari data tersebut atau menginterpretasikannya seakurat mungkin.

**Kata kunci:** komunisme; de-komunisasi; Indonesia; Ukraina.

### **BACKGROUND**

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the appeal of communism as shown by Fukuyama and Huntington faded with the strengthening of

liberalism, capitalism, and democracy as world views (Fukuyama: 2006 and Huntington: 2007). But a century ago that was not the case when Karl Marx introduced Marxism. Marxism attracted many people who saw it as an ideology of

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liberation and an answer to the challenges of the times, especially for colonial countries such as Indonesia (formerly the Dutch East Indies) and Ukraine. The rise of communism in Russia (as well as Ukraine) became the starting point for the emergence of this ideology more than just a theory in the works of Marx and Friedrich Engels. It was Lenin who translated the thoughts of Marx (Marxism) into radical reality so that Marxism-Leninism became the standardization of the teachings of communism in XX century. Indonesia accepted communism from the Dutch Marxists. However, the socio-political situation that underlies the presence and development of this ideology in Indonesia and Ukraine is the same, colonialism and landlordism which created support for communism.

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which carries the ideology of communism, was the fourth largest vote-getter in the 1955 election, and in the Guided Democracy era under President Soekarno, it became a significant political force. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(B)U), which was part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), became the official party and the only one supported by the state. The era of the rise of communism experienced a turning point. In Indonesia, after 46 years (1920-1966) the ideology of communism was banned, and in Ukraine, after 98 years (1917-2015) these regimes were also condemned which was preceded by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and finalized with the issuance of the de-communization laws after Russia started the war against Ukraine in 2014.

This study wants to examine and compare the rise and collapse of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine in which, when examined closely, the socio-political situation that underlies them takes different forms. The research questions to be answered are: First, what is the form and ideology of the countries of Indonesia and Ukraine, where communism grew? Second, how is the socio-political background of the rise of communism seen from the aspect of ideology, the character who introduced it, the organization, and the people's acceptance of the presence of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine? Third, what is the background behind the issuance of the policy of denouncing the ideology of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine?

## **METHODS**

This study uses a qualitative method. Qualitative research is a method to explore and understand the meaning that comes from social problems. The process of qualitative research involves important efforts, such as asking questions and procedures, collecting specific data from participants or informants, analyzing data, and interpreting the meaning of data or data interpretation (Cresswell, 2016:4-5). In another view, Moleong said that the qualitative method is research that intends to understand the phenomenon of what is experienced by the research subject, for example behavior, perception, motivation, action, etc. holistically and descriptively in the form of words and language in a context (Moleong, 2011:6). In this research, the writers use library research in collecting data which then analyzes the data obtained and

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explains the meaning of the data or interprets the data as accurately as possible.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **The Rise and Fall of Communism in Indonesia**

Marxism was present in Indonesia (formerly the Dutch East Indies) brought by Hendrichus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet who arrived in 1913. At first, he worked in Surabaya as editor of Soerabajaash Handelsblad and then moved to Semarang to edit Semarang Handels Vereeniging. In 1914 Sneevliet founded the Indische Social Deemocratische Vereeniging (ISDV) which was the first Marxist association in the Indies. In 1917 following the division in the Netherlands, the socialist democrats separated from the ISDV by establishing the Indische Social Democratische Partij (ISDP) as a branch of the SDAP in the Netherlands (Rambe, 2010:93).

As a communist propagandist, Sneevliet realized that the spread of communism would be more effective if he recruited indigenous people into his ideological environment. The strategy developed proved effective in infiltrating the populist movement organization Sarekat Islam (SI), which in 1919 had two million members (Benda, 1985:65) with 192 branches spread across Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, Kalimantan which, when added with Maluku and Papua, then SI's influence is as wide as Indonesia today (Korver, 1985:226-230). Sneevliet chose the Semarang branch of SI and he gained a fanatical following there. The first to be recruited was Semaoen, who in 1917 became chairman of the Semarang branch

of SI. After that, several other people, succeeded in communicating, including; Darsono, Alimin, Moeso, Mas Marco Kartodikromo, and most confusingly Haji Misbach who tried to synthesize Islam with communism (Rambe, 2020:100). Tan Malaka, independent leftist figure who initially joined the PKI and had been its chairman replacing Semaoen, was different from other PKI figures who accepted Marxism while studying in the Netherlands (Poeze, 1988:79).

Communist infiltration and the Semarang camp's opposition to the leadership duo. Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim split SI. Communism with all its rivalries in various fields of struggle has become SI's toughest opponent in pioneering the world of movement. But communism is certainly different from Islam as the ideological foundation of SI, and when the two clash, the decision to discipline the party from membership dualism is enforced. In 1920 the communists were expelled from SI and founded their party, the United Communists in the Indies (PKH) which was the first communist organization outside the Russian empire in Asia to have communist qualifications (McVey, 1965:34-36). Supported by the revolutionary character of communism and the young people who became its propagandists, the PKI gained many followers, especially among the workers and peasants. Its mass base grew and the organization's radical character in fighting for its political platform immediately positioned the PKI against the authorities. Three times the PKI organised rebellions, in 1925-1926 against the Dutch

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East Indies colonial government and twice in the independence era in 1948 and 1965.

The PKI rebellion in 1925-1926 was recorded as part of the national struggle against Dutch colonialism when the conservative policy of Governor General Dirk Fock brought the PKI to an extremely radical course to revolt. December 1925 PKI rebellion broke out in Banten and January 1926 in Silungkang (Benda: 1960, Zed: 2004 and Williams: 2003). The rebellion failed and the colonial government arrested and exiled PKI figures to Boven Digul-Papua (Shiraishi: 2001). Throughout the late period of Dutch colonialism, the PKI was absent from the movement and chose to operate in an underground network so that its role was not visible during the preparation and discussion of Indonesia's independence. In contrast to the PKI rebellion in the colonial era, in the independence era, the rebellion against the government and the resulting horizontal conflicts caused deep trauma. The ideology of communism represented by the PKI showed complications when dealing with Indonesian nationalism. The PKI's claims and monopoly in controlling the word "people" which is translated as if only the PKI fought for the interests of the people, made the political atmosphere in Indonesia heated up. Soekarno's political philosophy which he wrote in 1926 to unite the three notions of "Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism" which was manifested in the Nationalist Religion and Communists (NASAKOM), instead of becoming a synthesis that glued the nation together, the opposite happened; the 1965 G30S/PKI rebellion (Soekarno, 1965:1-23).

After the failed 1948 Madiun uprising, the PKI, which was not sentenced to disbandment, managed to rise again. Old PKI figures such as Alimin were eliminated and slowly replaced by the younger generation such as Aidit, Lukman, and Nyoto who developed the PKI to become the fourth largest political force in the 1955 General Election. The PKI went on the offensive by developing infrastructure and extensive party networks, massive underground organizations were formed. With an estimated mass of 20 million in the 1960s. Along with the decline of Liberal Democracy when the PKI due to ideological differences was abandoned by other parties in the formation of the cabinet, the Guided Democracy era found its momentum. The PKI adapted to President Soekarno's leadership and became the party that benefited the most. Feith said that the PKI and the Army (AD) were the two main political forces in this era that were competing against each other and President Soekarno as a counterweight. The PKI needed Soekarno as a protector from the threat of the Army, but Sukarno, because of his revolutionary romanticism, needed the support of the PKI masses to support his radical nationalist programs. On the other hand, President Soekarno also needed the Army as a stabilizer from the threat of disintegration (Feith: 1964). However, the balance that President Soekarno often shouted "samenbundeling van all revolutionaire krachten" did not last long and fell apart.

Wilfred T. Neil, who saw the strength of the PKI under the auspices of the Guided Democracy regime, said that "the communists have secretly designated 1970

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as the year of the takeover of all of Indonesia" (Wilhelm, 1981:50). The revolt that began with the assassination of an Army general quickly sparked a reaction at the mass level. The G30S/PKI incident was not only a rebellion against the government but also a struggle at the elite level that spilled over to the masses. The rural mass base, which had been divided since before the 1955 elections, quickly became volatile. After the rebellion, the killing of PKI members and sympathizers was unstoppable and this caused deep trauma for the Indonesian people (Tornquist: 1984 and Mortimer: 1974).

After the G30S/PKI, the political constellation changed rapidly when the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) issued Decree No. XXV/1966 which became the legal basis for the prohibition of Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia. There are three things outlined by the MPRS TAP. First, the disbandment and prohibition of the PKI with all of its organizational apparatus as well as other organizations of the same age, taking refuge and taking shelter under it. Second, the spread of Marxism-Leninism in all its forms and manifestations is prohibited. Third, for the needs of education and teaching at universities, Marxism-Leninism can be studied in a guided manner to secure Pancasila. Since then the MPRS TAP has become the legal basis for the de-communization policy to this day. The discourse that promotes national reconciliation through the repeal of the MPRS TAP, which has been voiced by several parties, even by President Abdurahman Wahid (Budiawan, 2004:3-4), has not dampened this policy.

### **The Rise and Fall of Communism in Ukraine**

Marxism was present in the Russian Empire (including Ukraine) for the first time introduced by the Marxist economist, Mykola Ziber (1844-1888) who accepted it while studying in Western Europe. Since the introduction of the Marxist organizations began to emerge; Kyiv Commune in 1873, the South Russian Union of Workers in Odesa in 1875, the South Russian Workers Union in Kyiv in 1880, and the Marxist Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class in Kyiv in 1897. The "Communist Manifesto" appeared in Ukraine in 1880 in the Russian edition (the first Ukrainian translation was published in 1902). In the 1890s students and workers in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and Katerynoslav began to study Marxist literature. Marxist literature began to proliferate, especially in Odesa where the views of utopian communists such as Bogdanov became popular, also in the literary world such as the works of Panas Myrny's *Son (The Dream)*, published in 1905) and Volodymyr Vynnychenko's *"Soniashna Mashyna" (The Solar Machine)*, published in 1928) (Marcuse: 1958).

Communism spread to Ukraine after the Bolshevik Revolution erupted in October 1917. Previously, in February 1917 Tsar Nicholas II was overthrown and Lenin, who returned from exile in Western Europe in April, organized the Bolsheviks and other left forces to overthrow the democratic republic and installed the Communist/Bolshevik regime. (Magnis Suseno, 2003:5-7). What is interesting is that the Ukrainian communists were trying to build their traditions outside of Russian

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influence (Mace: 1983). In November 1917 the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) was created as an autonomy within "democratic Russia". Socialists of different kinds were the dominant force in the UPR, but Bolsheviks were in the minority. Soon Lenin sent the Bolshevik troops against the UPR, only after this open aggression the UPR proclaimed its independence from Russia in January 1918 but finally in 1921 it was defeated by Soviet Russia. The federation of the Soviet Union was established in December 1922 with four members the Russian Federative Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republic which by 1940 expanded to 15 members.

But the trick was that all these formally independent Soviet republics were ruled by a united Bolshevik/Communist party from Moscow and Lenin acted as the first leader of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(B)U) was founded only in 1918 by a local group association of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolshevik) (RSDRP(B)) in Ukraine. But all the Communist parties of Soviet republics did not have any autonomy, they were only local, territorial party organizations, The same was true for CP(B)U. There were smaller communist parties that tried to be independent from the Bolsheviks: the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists), UCP(b), and the Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP). They stressed the necessity of equal relations with Russia. Not surprisingly, they were pressed to merge with the Bolsheviks. After these mergers

national communists contributed a lot to the development of the Ukrainian language and culture in the 1920s but later most of them were killed as 'enemies of the people' during Stalin's terror.

Once the Soviet Union disbanded in 1991 and Ukraine gained independence, the political constellation changed rapidly, especially with the decline of communism. The process towards de-communization and de-sovietization has been going on since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. The first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, who was previously an elite of the Ukrainian Communist Party converted his political direction to nationalism and made some steps toward de-sovietization in the early 1990s. In the following years, although the process slowed down, the eradication of the symbols of communism and the legacy of the Soviet Union continued.

The annexation of Crimea, by Russia and the direct Russian military intervention in Donbas in 2014 meant the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. It was met with anger on the Ukrainian side. Ukraine responded by trying to eliminate things related to communism and the Soviet Union, to be replaced by a new Ukrainian identity.

De-communication and de-Sovietization since 2015 consist of four related laws: First, Law no. 2558 On Condemning Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Forbidding the Propagation of Their Symbols. This law regulates the prohibition of propaganda of communist and nazi regimes, including the removal of communist monuments, street names, as well as names of towns and villages

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(Kutkina, 2021). Second, Law no. 2538-1 On the Legal Status and Respect for the Memory of the Ukrainian Freedom Fighters in the 20th Century. This law pays homage, among others, to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstancha Armia/UPA) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which, historically, have opposed the power of the Soviet Union and supported Ukrainian independence. Third, Law no. 2539 On Commemorating the Victory Over Nazism In World War II. Fourth, Law no. 2540 On Access to the Archives of the Communist Totalitarian Regime Suppressing Agencies of 1917-1991, which opened the archives to the public (Shevel: 2016).

The de-communisation laws abolished the propaganda of the communist regime and its symbols left by the Soviet Union (Rozenas and Vlasenko: 2018). If in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved in Ukraine there were 5,500 monuments to Lenin, these monuments are slowly disappearing. By the end of 2016, thousands of street names, hundreds of residential area names, and dozens of district names had changed (Lazarenko: 2022). In villages, statues of Lenin are recycled into statues of non-communist historical figures. On the contrary, in the Russian-occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas the Communist symbols are promoted by the aggressor. The de-communisation laws became a door for the Ministry of Justice to revoke the rights of three Communist Parties to contest the general election (Ukrayinska Pravda 1 October 2015). But it reflected the general mood in the Ukrainian society. After the start of Russian aggression, the CPU known for its support of Russia did not overcome

the threshold in the 2014 parliamentary elections and for the first time in independent Ukraine was out of the parliament.

According to Oliinyk and Kuzio, the implementation of the de-communization laws was facilitated by the support of the political elite, the public, the regional political situation, and the deteriorating relations between Ukraine and Russia. President Viktor Yushchenko in 2006 gave support to the de-communization program through the establishment of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. The National Holodomor-Genocide Museum in the city of Kyiv was opened in 2010 to remind Ukrainians of the artificial famine (Holodomor) in the 1930s that killed at least three million people as a result of the deliberate food politics of Stalin's rule. More than 30 countries recognized Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people. Additional four factors; the Euromaidan revolution, the collapse of pro-Russian political forces which was represented in the downfall of President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014, the victory of pro-European political forces in the parliament, and the impact of Russia's military action that strengthened Ukraine's national identity. These four factors minimized opposition groups as well as energized groups supporting the de-communization laws (Oliinyk and Kuzio: 2021).

To strengthen the Ukrainian identity and make the values of freedom, justice, and democracy the foundation of the life of the state, on October 7, 2016, President Petro Poroshenko signed the Decree on the Celebration of Dignity and Freedom Day which will be

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commemorated every year on 21 November. The day is commemorated to honor the heroes who have fought for human rights and the future of Ukraine which is oriented towards Europe, concerning two important events, namely the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Euromaidan Revolution of 2014. After the Russian aggression in 2014, the public mood in Ukraine moved in the direction of distancing itself from the Soviet and Russian empire's narratives.

In this regard, the Verkhovna Rada on March 29, 2016, ratified the revision of Law no. 3359 concerning films, which prohibits the screening and distribution of Russian films produced after January 1, 2014, even if the films do not contain propaganda content. Previously, in February 2015 the Verkhovna Rada had banned the screening of Russian films depicting the glory and glory of Russia that were made after January 1, 2014. The Verkhovna Rada on March 16, 2017, also approved a bill that stipulates to increase the quota of Ukrainian language on existing television channels. The bill requires 75% of television broadcasts to be in Ukrainian. The same applies to radio stations.

President Poroshenko on October 14, 2017, also issued a decision on National Defense Day to replace the National Defense Day which was previously celebrated in the Soviet Union every February 23. If February 23 was the day of creation of the Red Army in 1918, October 14 was on the contrary the birthday of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstancha Armia/UPA 1942) which during World War II fought both with NAZI

Germany and the Soviet Union troops in Ukraine.

De-communization and de-Sovietization which are translated into several policies do not always run smoothly, but they also give rise to pros and cons. Some believe that the enactment of the de-communization law is positive for the formation of a new Ukrainian identity, but some state the opposite. In the past many events were viewed exclusively through the lens of communist propaganda. Therefore, these laws want to provide a sense of justice for the victims of the totalitarian communist regime and ensure that the Soviet identity disappears from Ukraine, thereby minimizing the threat of Russian aggression.

Of the four laws, the most frequently criticized is the Law on the Legal Status and Respect for the 20th Century Ukrainian Freedom Fighters. According to this law, veterans who are members of the OUN and UPA will be given benefits by the state. Their refusal or disrespect for their role in fighting for Ukrainian independence is seen as a violation of the law (Kutkina, 2020:163-165). The glorification of fighters led by Stepan Bandera caused some controversy. For Russia Bandera was accused of being a traitor because of his very short-term (1939-1941) cooperation with the Nazi army to fight Soviet troops in Ukraine during World War II. But more and more Ukrainians started to view them as fighters to liberate Ukraine from communist dictatorship. It may remind the position of Indonesian nationalists who during World War II wanted to use Japanese rule to prepare for the independence of their country. Since 1941 OUN fighters went

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underground and in 1942 UPA was created which fought on both fronts against the communist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (Haran, 2009:37-40).

### **Comparing the Rise and Fall of Communism in Indonesia and Ukraine**

It is interesting to compare communism and de-communization in Indonesia and Ukraine, which the authors think are different in the process of their revival and prohibition. From the results of the comparison, there are several findings that the authors get.

From an ideological point of view, Marx's view of historical materialism is that there are stages of human history, gradual phases that must be passed naturally. This approach requires that people who are in the feudalism phase must go through the capitalism phase before heading to the socialism-communism phase. In the capitalist phase, the internal contradictions of the capitalist system coupled with class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will destroy this system and lead society to the phase of socialism-communism. The problem was that Russia at that time was still in the phase of feudalism, just as Marx imagined that Britain and France would first become a communist state, not Russia (Noer: 1999). The production system of Russian society still relies on an agrarian society with its social stratification at the top layer being filled with the nobility and the bottom layer being the peasants. The two classes are separate and live according to the social system that forms their own class culture. So how could the feudalism phase jump to the socialism-communism phase? What is

certain is that Lenin interpreted Marx's teachings himself, and communism as we know it today refers to Marxism-Leninism. The same thing happened in the Dutch East Indies, when they accepted communism, they were still in the feudal phase.

Regarding the state as a veil for the bourgeoisie, according to Marx, the state and class will disappear (unstateless society and unclass society) when the historical stage enters the communist phase, but instead of disappearing, on the contrary, the state becomes stronger. Lenin himself introduced the concept of socialism in one country to consolidate Russian communism in a country encircled by the capitalist world. This was corroborated in the Stalin era by calling for the postponement of the dissolution of the state.

From an ideological perspective, it is also interesting to observe the relationship between communism and the spirit of nationalism that developed in Indonesia and Ukraine. Even if in Russia Lenin introduced the thesis of socialism in one country, Russia demanded that the communists of the whole world take the line of internationalism as called for by Marx (Marx: 2009). Especially after the founding of Communist International (Comintern) in 1919, which consolidated the world's Communist Parties and demanded that their allegiance be given to Moscow, not to their country. This is the difference between the international communist movement, which is bound by the brethren of the world's workers, and the national communist movement, which places love for the homeland. Moscow's position on the liberation movement in the occupied countries before World War II sparked heated debates that sparked the

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division of the international communist movement.

Efforts to contextualize Marxism with a national thesis have emerged, especially in the colonized countries. Contradictions arise through the big question that is often asked, can one be communist but on the other hand, discard internationalism and obedience to Moscow by taking nationalism as a way of struggling to bring communism? For the national communist group, the struggle for a classless society went hand in hand with political independence, including the freedom to determine its path of Marxism outside of Moscow's co-optation.

In Ukraine, because of its history of resistance to external expansion, some early communists chose the national path. They wanted to create a communist state with a national perspective by supporting the language, culture, and customs of the Ukrainian people, not the Russian communism that was imposed on them. They demanded full equality between communist Russia and the Ukrainian SSR and the Ukrainianization of not only social structures but also politics (see Grove: 1993).

The first Bolshevik to position himself as a national communist was Vasyl Shakhrai, the local communist leader of Poltava. In 1918 he wrote the pamphlet "Revoliutsiia na Ukraini" (Revolution in Ukraine) which stated that social problems should be solved together with national problems. A year later with Serhii Mazlakh, Shakhrai wrote "Do khvyli: Shcho diet'sia na Ukraini iz Ukrainoiu" (What happened in and to Ukraine) for the Russian-dominated CP(B)U to be replaced by the Ukrainian-led

Bolshevik Party (Palko: 2011). In 1919 a communist group under the leadership of Yurii Lapchynsky and P. Slynko was formed in Kyiv, they are known as the Federalist Opposition within the CP(B)U. They called for the Ukrainian SSR to become independent led by the new Ukrainian Communist Party. They wanted the local Bolsheviks to unite with local pro-Soviet parties, especially the Borotbists, which was a leftist faction within the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party (UPSR) to form a new Ukrainian Communist Party (UCP) (Maistrenko: 2019). The main basis for UCP was the left wing of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Mace: 1983).

From an ideological point of view, the UCP, which was founded on January 20, 1920, has an ideological orientation similar to that of Indonesian Marxist thinker, Tan Malaka, in developing its national communist tradition. In the 1920s the UCP was the most consistent critic of the Soviet Union's economic exploitation of Ukraine. The UCP was dissolved by the Comintern in 1925 and its members were allowed to join the CP(B)U. It was not only the disillusioned Bolsheviks who became supporters of national communism but other leftists who were disillusioned with the Ukrainian socialist parties. The Borotbists (UCP (B) favored the form of a federation with Russia but refused that Ukraine should be subordinated to Russia because they wanted the Ukrainian SSR to be led independently by Ukrainians (Maistrenko, 2019:266). The Borotbists wanted recognition as the official representatives of Ukrainian communism because the CP(B)U did not represent the revolutionary

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spirit of the Ukrainian people, was distant from the rural masses, and was the party that distorted and obstructed the revolutionary spirit of the Ukrainian people. Moscow rejected it and managed to disband the party in 1920 (Maistrenko, 2019:196-197).

In Indonesia, this also exists. Apart from the mainstream communist movement within the PKI, there were also national communist factions under the influence of Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka is an independent leftist who theoretically and practically developed his variant of Marxism, namely Murbaism. Tan Malaka was the second leader of the PKI in 1921 whose revolutionary life had become a myth. He was an agent of the Southeast Asia Comintern, whose international communist network had made him the most prominent figure in the Dutch East Indies PKI. Tan Malaka took part in the Comintern Congress in Moscow whose theoretical debates regarding nationalism and Pan-Islamism in the Dutch East Indies, had made his national communist view shaped since the 1920s. From an epistemological point of view, Tan Malaka is an independent Marxist who says that Marxism is not a dogma whose interpretation only follows a single interpretation developed by Russia. He said that the most important thing about Marxism is the analytical knife or method of thinking, not the result of the application of Marxism in Russia which is certainly different from Indonesia (Rambe, 2003:175). In 1920 Tan Malaka became Chairman of the PKI, then in 1927 he formed his independent Marxist party, the Indonesian Republican Party and in 1948 founded the Murba Party.

Ukraine we know today is a country that not only had a Communist Party but also when it was still in the form of the Ukrainian SSR and joined the Soviet Union, this country officially had the ideology of communism. The Soviet Union was the first communist state and a reference to the world communist movement. The Soviet Union was a model of government built on the power of the Communist Party which used the state and bureaucracy to drive social and economic change in society (Colton in Mas'ood and MacAndres (ed): 1991). On the other hand, Indonesia, even though the PKI had become the largest communist power outside the Soviet Union and China in the 1955 General Election, became the fourth winner with a claim to have a mass of up to twenty million people, but Indonesia is a country with the ideology of Pancasila, and the PKI has never succeeded in changing it.

Judging from the rise of communism in Indonesia and Ukraine, this can be seen from the figures who introduced, organized, and accepted the people's acceptance of communism. Communism in Indonesia was introduced by the Dutch Marxists including Snevliet, J. Bradsteder, H.W. Dekker, and Piet Bergsma whose cadre process was continued by Indonesian communist figures. While in Ukraine, Ukrainian national-communists were not foreign to the Ukrainian people. But Russian communists tried to dominate and after a short period of Ukrainization in the 1920s Russification policy returned to Ukraine (Mace: 1983). From an organizational perspective, in Indonesia communism was spread by the PKI but this was not the only Marxist party in Indonesia.

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After independence, apart from the PKI, there were two other parties with Marxist ideology; The Murba Party and the Young Communist Forces Party (Acoma). In Ukraine, the CPU was only a territorial part of the CPSU, without any autonomy, so it became the instrument of Soviet communism and de facto Russian imperialism.

In terms of public acceptance, even though Indonesia and Ukraine have similarities in the historical stages when they accepted communism, Indonesia and the Tsardom of Russia (which embraced Ukraine) also had differences in terms of public acceptance of communism. Communism for the majority of Indonesian people is seen as an "imported" ideology. Indonesia has never experienced a renaissance/aufklarung and even religious negation as the foundation for the development of Western civilization where communism is one of its derivatives, while Ukraine and Russia have more or less absorbed the Socialist spirit of this era (zeitgeist). As a consequence of the aspect of ideological acceptance, communism in Indonesia faces problems when it is associated with its ontological basis; materialism. Materialism which is a material way of thinking is difficult to accept when confronted with the religiosity of the Indonesian people. The toughest opponent of the existence of Marxism is religion (Islam) which is why efforts to dialogue the two have attracted the attention of early Indonesian Marxist leaders to spread communism.

This effort is to put forward the revolutionary character of Marxism in defense of oppression but to put materialism

behind it. It is interesting to observe the variant of Islamic Communism practiced by Haji Misbach and the emergence of communism in Muslim pockets, Banten and West Sumatra. Prohibition of the spread of communism in TAP MPRS No. XXV/1966 is said to be an effort to defend Pancasila where the first precepts contain "Belief in One Supreme God". This means that communism and the PKI are understood within the framework of the rejection of religion (Budiawan, 2004:2). The prohibition of communism in Indonesia formally refers to TAP MPRS No. XXV/1966 which is still valid until now. Whereas in Indonesia de-communization was preceded by the 1965 G30S/PKI prologue and horizontal conflict followed by mass killings, in Ukraine de-communization took a different path after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine in 1991.

Despite the fierce and horizontal conflict, the de-communization process in Ukraine was more moderate and did not lead to bloodshed. This can partly be explained by the peaceful conversion of the communist state to a nationalist state, as well as from the cultural and ethnic side of Ukraine and neighboring Russia. But behind the contradiction of cultural closeness, on the other hand, the factor that if in Indonesia the prohibition of communism is more due to domestic problems, then in Ukraine a long history of tragic relations with the Russian Empire, totalitarian Soviet Union, total support of CPU to pro-Russia dictator Yanukovych and Russian aggression since 2014 took a central position in stimulating the issuance of the de-communization law.

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Orientation to Europe or Russia has become one of the issues that has divided the Ukrainian people since independence. Most Ukrainians naively believed that it was possible to have equal relations with Russia. They believed they may have a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU in the same way they had it with Russia and other post-Soviet states. But under Moscow's pressure authoritarian and corrupt president Yanukovich suspended the signing of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, including the FTA. The paradox is that this Agreement was already fully agreed upon and even initialed under the Yanukovich government. Instead, Russia pressed Yanukovich to incorporate Ukraine into the Eurasian Customs Union headed by Russia. It sparked massive resistance by the Ukrainian people, leading to the Euromaidan Revolution which toppled President Yanukovich. De-communization and de-Sovietization of the Ukrainian regime after the Euromaidan Revolution can also be seen as a consequence of the choice to join the European Union. After the Euromaidan Revolution, President Petro Poroshenko requested that Ukraine be included in the European Union, and during the war President Volodymyr Zelensky urged that Ukraine obtain this membership as soon as possible.

De-communism in Ukraine must also be seen from the perspective of Soviet/Russian rule. Russian aggression since 2014 and then the full-scale invasion in 2022 only increased the support of Ukrainians to decommunization, deSovietization, and deRussification. In the face of Russia's war Ukrainians appeared to be united more than ever

(<https://dif.org.ua/en/article/how-the-attitude-of-ukrainians-to-decommunization-ukrainian-orthodox-church-moscow-patriarchate-and-nationalism-is-transforming-amid-the-russian-war-against-ukraine>).

Finally, in Indonesia, the presence of communism had an impact on political fragmentation and sharp horizontal conflict, which was by the ideology of class struggle adopted by communism. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, communism had an impact on the unification of Ukraine with Russia in the federation of the Soviet Union, but on the other hand, when Ukraine became independent, memories of its dark past with the former Soviet Union and the prolonged conflict with Russia resulted in the rejection of communism propaganda.

## CONCLUSION

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that although in Indonesia and Ukraine, the existence of communism is widely known and a Communist Party had a large number of masses, the process of revival and fall of communism in these two countries is different. The history of communism in Ukraine is more specific when viewed from the fact that its rise was defended by Russia but its denouncement was also accelerated by the Ukrainian conflict with Russia, because of that there were external factors that influenced it. The same thing happened in Indonesia where external factors existed when the ideology of communism was introduced by Dutch Marxist figures. However, compared to Ukraine, where the denouncement of communism was also due to an attempt to escape the shadows of its past in the Soviet

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Union era by adopting Western democracy and exploring Ukrainian identity as a new platform in the state, the prohibition of communism in Indonesia was more because of domestic factors, namely the PKI

rebellion which was followed by horizontal conflicts and massacres at the grassroots level, as well as the incompatibility of the teachings of communism with the state ideology of Pancasila.

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