

Reference list:

- Cassirer, E. (2010). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen: Zweiter Teil – Das mythische Denken*. Meiner Felix Verlag GmbH.
- Naddaf, G. (2006). *The Greek Concept of Nature (SUNY series in Ancient Greek Philosophy)*. State University of New York Press.
- Sedley, D. (1991). Is Aristotle's Teleology Anthropocentric? *Phronesis*, 36(2), 179–196. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182385>
- Stoppani, A. (1873). *Corso di geologia del professore Antonio Stoppani*. G. Bernardoni e G. Brigola.
- Usener, H. (2000). *Götternamen: Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung 1896*. Klostermann.

Thinking about how we think about the Other

Femke Caers

KU Leuven (Leuven)

In my essay, I wanted to experiment with tools of the analytic tradition while consulting and responding to a continental question: How do we think about 'the Other'?

The first tool is from philosopher of mind Peter Geach (1962), asking the memorable question: how do we think about thinking? Geach is interested in the relation of language to reality. In trying to understand how we think, we can understand how language responds to the mind – which gives us a fundamental insight in our relationship with the Other. I will adopt this approach of thinking about thinking about something in order to single out what this can tell about the relationship at hand.

After having explained the first part of the question "how do we think about thinking about the Other", let us turn to the Other: this matters because the Other is the counterpart relation where the level of the social exists. Language is a large part of the connection between these nodes of the social. Therefore, thinking about how we think about the other can help us understand language, and in turn how the other is constituted. This is an amalgam of continental and analytic traditions.

Third, in asking “how do we think about thinking about the other”, the syntactic nature of the phrase indicates that the self is always actively thinking, whereas the other is thought of in the passive sense. Herein reveals a paradigmatic relationship of responsibility; as the self is actively involved with a passive other, who calls the Self into action when forming as a thought. And is this not an essential and idiosyncratic source of wonder, which is at the forefront of all social linguistic developments?

Then, I would like to add some depth to how we think about the Other by reworking Durkheim’s two dimensions of society (1967). Although his model was famously to explain suicide on a sociological level (and thereby founding this discipline), these dimensions help us understand the essences of the social relationship. According to Durkheim these were two essential scales: social integration $S(i)$ and social regulation $S(r)$. Social integration is the degree to which one’s time is devoted to caring about the other. This includes all social events where the individual is defined with regards to the collective, examples of these poles can be on the one hand liberalism or hard individualism and on the other hand communism or fascism. Social regulation determines how detailed the rules are for the relationship between a self and an other. This concerns the degree to which the values of a community are shared.

Let us now transform these two axes into modes of the self and the other. Although there seems to be a high degree of similarity between S_i and S_r , I think they represent two dimensions irreducible to consciousness. On the one hand, S_i is the degree in which we can see ourselves in another, or in other words, the potency of empathy. On the other hand, S_r is the degree in which we can alter this relationship normatively. Here lies the power of individual thought linked to action. Both represent fundamental aspects of political and cultural groups: the degree of liberty among self-identifying in this group and the degree to which one can “think outside of the box”. I think this helps us make sense of the challenging position when it is unclear what to think of the other, thus it resolves it by then proceeding to ask how we are currently thinking about thinking of the Other.

Finally, I think bringing these pieces together helps us to

develop the basis for an ethical relationship with the other based on proactivity and responsibility, while not employing traditionally continental arguments (e.g., Levinas' argument of the Face, 1991). So next time, when a philosopher wonders about the relationship between the self and the other, with a specific challenge in mind: two questions arise by thinking about this thought. First, how much of the Other is there traced in myself and what do we have in common? Second, how much can I be free and original in my responsibilities towards the other?

Reference list:

- Durkheim, E. (1997). *The Division of Labor in Society*. (G. Simpson, Trans.). Free Press.
- Geach, P. (1962). *Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories*. Cornell University Press.
- Levinas, E. (1991). *Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence*. (A. Lingis, Trans.). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Russia as the Other. A Phenomenological and Pragmatist Take on the Current Events in Ukraine

Albert Dikovich

University of Constance (Constance)

The aim of my paper is to analyze the moral rift that underlies the current political rift between Europe and Putin's Russia. That there is such a rift is indicated by the fact that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought back war as a means of politics into the heart of Europe. Banning war as a means of conflict is the most fundamental aim of the European project. "Never again!": this catchphrase of the interwar pacifist movement has become the guiding principle of European Politics, the taboo on war demarcates the line between the politically justifiable and the unjustifiable in the relations of those who are part of this political and ethical community. In the past year, Europeans witnessed in shock how untroubled the Russian head of state seems in starting a spiral of escalation and destruction