the question of how the *impasses* of Otherness can be transformed in such a way as to facilitate an encounter with the Other, who thereby ceases to be other.

Structural Linguistic Injustice

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This paper develops a concept of structural linguistic injustice. By employing the so-called structural-injustice approach, it argues that individuals' seemingly harmless language attitudes and language choices might enable serious harms on a collective level, constituting what one could call a structural linguistic injustice. Section 1 introduces the linguistic-justice debate. By doing so, it establishes linguistic diversity as the context in which phenomena such as individuals' language attitudes, language choice, and language loss occur. Moreover, the paper illustrates why employing the structural-injustice approach might be beneficial for the linguistic-justice debate. Section 2 conceptualizes individuals' (certain types of) language attitudes and language choice as (objectionable) social structures. Section 3 provides a concept of structural linguistic injustice. Section 4 suggests one possible remedy for structural linguistic injustice. Section 5 concludes the paper.

Eastern and Western Ways of Transcending the Other as a Means of Overcoming Conflict

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The Question of the Other has been a source of considerable

philosophical interest and a source of historical, ongoing cultural and civilizational struggles and conflict. In my paper, I intend to demonstrate that ultimately in the interest of reducing antagonism, isolationism, prejudice, discrimination, sexism, homophobia, racism and conflict, it is important to diminish the concept of the Self-Other duality and ensure that neither pole in the relationship is permitted to predominate so that full human freedom is to be achieved. The path to this process is to first examine the concept of the Other in Hegel, later to play an influential role in the philosophies of Sartre and Levinas. The next step is to introduce the concept of the overcoming of the concept of the Other in the philosophies of Daoism, particularly in the person of Zhuangzi and Martin Buber. In the third phase of the paper, the movement from Hegel to Zhuangzi, a movement back in chronology, is indicated as a means of overcoming or at least reducing the possibility of aggression, conflict and isolationism. The method of reconciling conflicts as representing by the *Yijing* is introduced to demonstrate that Self and Other need each other in order to properly constitute a Self.

In Hegel, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and later in Sartre's *L'Être et le Néant* (Being and Nothingness), the recognition of the Other and by the Other is considered as essential to the development of the Self. We will concentrate more on Hegel than Sartre because Hegel is the *locus classicus* for the essential Self-Other distinction. In Levinas, the Other assumes an honorific status, which, in the eyes of the present author, is a more positive direction, but still leaves the Self-Other duality intact.

Heralding back to the early traditional Chinese philosophy of Daoism, particularly as it is reflected in the writings of Zhuangzi, the concept of the Dao is introduced as a condition in which there is an absence of contraeity. In the understanding of the overcoming of opposites in which one term of the opposition attempts to oppress the other, the concepts of Self and Other are transmuted into a unity in which each term of the duality is accorded respect. In the philosophy of Martin Buber, particularly in his *I and Thou*, the concept of dialogue between Self and Other is the central focus. The ultimate point to be reached in the dialogue is the state of the Thou in which any attempt to dominate and differentiate between

Self and Other is to be dissolved. In order to accomplish this, each party to the dialogue, both the Self and the Other must possess the intention of overcoming the duality without assuming any power relation or absorbing one into the other. This middle step of emphasizing dialogue is missing in Zhuangzi, but the ultimate outcome is the same.

The effect of the Daoism/Buberian concept of moving beyond the concepts of Self and Other is to end any possible conflict, prejudice, discrimination, sexism, homophobia, racism and antagonism. The paper projects that this a superior means of overcoming conflict as over against conflict resolution strategies that may harbor hidden resentments, pain, trauma and prejudices and tend, therefore, both to be fragile and only temporary in effect and also to hinder the proliferation of human flourishing that can be the outcome of understanding and mutual cooperation.

The Daoism/Buberian axis projects a very different future than a future that emphasizes identity politics. Identity politics possesses the effect of strengthening and solidifying the distinction between Self and Other. In the Daoism/Buberian movement beyond the distinction between Self and Other, no potential sources of conflict remain. Differences remain to retain the freedom, plenitude and joy of pluralism, but such differences are viewed as non-antagonistic differences. For example, whether the Sabbath day is celebrated on Saturday or Sunday is a non-antagonistic difference. Originally, both Jewish and Christian faiths celebrated the Sabbath on Saturday and it was the Papacy in the 4th Century of the Common Era that altered the Christian Sabbath to Sunday.

The Hegelian Self-Other dichotomy is a manifestation of the concept of the Hegelian dialectic in which one always maintains a conflictual relationship that requires a synthesis. However, the synthesis always posits a new thesis that will in turn generate a new antithesis such that a set of antagonistic conflicts will continue to exist *ad infinitem*. In the Daoist-Buberian concept, the ultimate goal is harmony, not a set of continuous conflicts. When Self-Other is transmuted to Self-Self, there is no longer any cause for conflict. Differences that exist, such as skin color differences and round eyes versus slanted eyes are considered as aesthetically enjoyable and beloved pluralities that reflect different examples of beauty

and do not represent any grounds for antagonistic and prejudicial differentiations. What is needed is the conceptual transformation from Self-Other to Self-Self in order to achieve pro-active cooperation, respect for, delight in and love of the "Other", and a mutually satisfying, flourishing, and lasting co-existence.

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Dwelling at war

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Over the last decades, research on war has focused on military power as the main subject. Analytic philosophy, which is a dominant trend in the West when it comes to studying war from a philosophical perspective, examines war as a subject of morality. The research on war appears in the works of analytic philosophers in the context of the state's right to take part in a war and the morality of the state's actions in war. Whether analytical philosophers are just-war theorists, radical or moderate realists, they reason on the conditions when a war is just, and do not consider the individual experience of people at war (McMahan, 1996). Even when some just-war theorists, especially deontologists and consequentialists give back agency to people at war in their theories, they grant with it only the leaders (Benbaji, 2018).

Since the direct experience of both people fighting at war and living in countries at war is left out of focus in analytic studies of war, there is a need for the use of another methodology that would explore such war experiences in detail. The use of phenomenology which describes direct experiences might be relevant. As a philosophical method, phenomenology has proved to be efficient in providing vivid descriptions of diverse human experiences. Moreover, phenomenology presents methodological potential in describing the direct experience of people at war in contrast to analytic philosophy which does not even think of noncombatants in other