RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND LOGIC:
THE CASE OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

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The present day concern with the question of religious tradition is based upon the widespread quest for the Other as for the means of return of the fragmented person lost in the fragmented world to the state of her or his original wholeness or individuality. Many people are in confusion while, facing the unpredictable challenges that come from everywhere, they ask for the reason why all this happens, what all this means, and what stands behind all of this. They ask for understanding of what is going on, and they *believe* that the understanding can come to them only from the source of all things, that is from God. This is why they turn to religion, and, in particular, to Judaism.

One of the most characteristic features of Judaism as religious tradition is its tendency to approach things in their concrete and unique wholeness and individuality, rather than in their universal applicability to some conceptual frame of thought, such as, for example, the concept of some transcendent universal measure to which all things have to be deliberately attached by a researcher, in order to discover their meanings for her or him. In this way meanings are actually attributed to things, not discovered *in* them. And what is being obtained in this way is a formal construction made of some meanings, not a deep perception of the essence of things, since this attribution, being of other origin than things themselves, is in fact detached from them, and from their sense.

Since this procedure of attributing or predicating meanings to things can also be described as a tradition, for it, as for any other tradition, the following question should be asked: what is the origin of this tradition? This is the question

of the Other of the tradition. Since the tradition in question is logic, the question is that of the Other for logic. My answer to the question is as follows. Logic as a tradition has been originated in some other tradition. This means that the point of departure for one tradition is in itself some another tradition, packed in a form different to it by its very structure in order to be abstracted from all its complexity which does not fit to the sieving needs of the tradition-"exploiter", and used by the latter just in a form of some (set of) concise judgment(s), assertion(s) or proposition(s), that is in a form of *meaningful expressions* that delimit its frontiers. In other words, every tradition, when used by some other tradition as its point of departure, is reduced by the latter to the level of some logical statement(s) (that is expressions with strictly outlined according to certain rules borders) which is (are) presented in it as its rather broad, unclear and axiomatic (set of) basic assumption(s).

There are as many logics (that is ways of expression designed to deliver according to certain rules of delivering the innermost essential structure in a meaningful form to certain audience) in the world as there are traditions. Philosophy, with its own logical means, gives us possibility to escape the infinite task of considering all logics and traditions as points of departure for each other, concentrating instead on special presentation forms used in logic and tradition and taken in their mutual relation. While the task appears to be tautological, because logic is to be considered here by its own means (the dimension of logic is to be applied or attached to it self), we will try to find an exit from the circle by referring to Judaism as a tradition that always resists to logical presentation of it.

Any tradition can be presented (perceived, conceived, interpreted) as *a repetition* of an entity and also as a *sequence* of many entities followed after each other or as a *multitude* or a *class of in a way designated and therefore counted elements* which again can be presented as an entity which then also can be presented as *many*, and so on.

In terms of logic, such a sequence appears as a set of arguments, or following the rules of argumentation, or a reasoning procedure, or a discipline of thinking which aims to achieve the true result that would be confirmed *really*, while in terms of tradition, a sequence appears as following a ritual or *ceremony*, that is as following the rules of doing certain things with the aim to achieve certain *real* result. So, both logic and tradition concern with the question of the way of

doing right and escaping the way of doing wrong. And they both see the aim to be achieved only through sticking to certain tradition of sequence, or following a fixed way of passing from one point to another considered as the direction of movement toward certain – real – aim, the scope of reality, the way things to be done, etc. That means that they both are concerned with the question of placing faculties within certain limits, considering the limits as against certain measure or dimension, in order to enlarge these faculties by this very reducing of their applicability to the confinement.

In classical logic, the place in which the faculties are to be accommodated is the *logos*, while in modern logic, since the time when Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege introduced his concept of *Bedeutung*, it is the *meaning*. And it could be argued that in logic *logos* and *meaning* correspond in a sense to the *sanctuary* and *piety* of religious tradition.

Both religious and logical traditions claim the faculties put within the limits of a place to make a concrete thing. However, when religious tradition is concerned "concrete thing" means something which is first of all perceptible and only then thinkable, while in the case of logic it, just oppositely, means something which first of all is thinkable and only then perceptible.

As a matter of fact, things can be perceived in *many* different ways, while there presumably must be just *one*, common, necessary and obligatory for all, way of thinking them as the truly coherent system. This is why the main difference between logic and religious tradition lays in that fact that the tradition does not tend to interpret the limits and what is put within them (the thing) as something *universal*, while logic does. Tradition is to be constantly, in a ceremonial way, connected with its sanctuary which gives it its meaning. Tradition is in restless concern of how to clear up its sanctuary and ceremony (the prescribed order of the actions to be made with piety about the sanctuary) from everything alien to it, trying *to exclude* everything other from being mixed to them. Logic, on the contrary, is aimed *to include* everything within its *logos* or, on the other hand, to expand its *meaning* on everything putting it as the reason for every thing's being unto everything. In other words, logic tends to put everything into the depository of one "universal" *logos* named, for example, *being* or *system*, or to put everything into the context of one common meaning named "the main value" (that is what is the most important, the most significant, the most inclusive, the

most capable to include in itself all the other), to which all other meanings are to be considered either as its particular parts or forms of expression, or as their derivations. That this task of logic is still not attained is proved by the very fact that there simultaneously exist many different logics which present different traditions of being logical which are, in turn, different ways of interpretation and application of the *logos*.

It is also important to note that while in logic things are regarded as invariables, deprived of their origin, in tradition, just oppositely, they are regarded as variables, original and metamorphic in their character.

This means that logic reduces things to the level of deliberately constructed objects, depriving things of their non-logical origin. What makes the reduction logical is that it is subjected to a strict order of reasoning. It could be noticed, however, that if reasoning would be replaced with originating, logic would be replaced with religious tradition, and *vice versa*.

Nonetheless, there is an abyss between a concept of reasoning and a concept of originating. Reason deals with impersonal entities considered as against a universal dimension, while origin implies persons or personalized entities each of which is to be considered as against some particular dimension. Thus, it is impossible to render tradition to logic without any losses, and *vice versa*.

Logical limits put on a thing make from it a phenomenon by applying to the thing a dimension the nature of which is inevitably different from the nature of the thing. It follows from this that logic does not deal with a thing as a whole; it deals only with some abstracted aspect(s) of it which form the content of *a notion* of the thing, not of the thing itself. By means of abstracting thing is divided or classified: every abstracted aspect is attached to a special dimension. In this way thing is subjected to the dimension, and instead of dealing with thing we deal with a notion of thing constructed from different notions combined in a thought-construction called "the thing".

On the other side, tradition deals with the thing's origin, ignored by logic. Such an approach is based on the assumption that a thing bears its origin and destiny in itself and that whatever happens with the thing is somehow determined by its origin (destiny). One might say that the thing approaches itself through its relations with other things. Things relate to or meet each other in their original limits. Tradition and logic reveal their original limits in relation

to each other. Tradition is the Other for logic in the sense that logic can reveal its limits only in its meeting with tradition. Logic and tradition are counterparts for each other.

The Other is the horizon that determines the original limits of the creation of the thing. In this sense, every thing ultimately is the product of its other. A thing as an object is what logic makes of the thing, but logic, as the producer of objects, is, in turn, what a tradition recognizes to be the explication of the thing relevant to the thing's origin. Any logic exists as far as a tradition recognizes it as logic.

The Other not just confronts the logical object as something *identical* to itself, but makes the object possible by approaching it *closer* than the object can ever approach itself. The Other fills the gap within the object split into many different ways of its identification (different logics). Filling the gap with itself, the Other makes it thus to be whole. The object is thus *turned* to itself as to the whole by filling its fragmented formal structure with its original content which it meets in the most extreme closeness to itself as its Other.

This is the process of making up the whole which consists in expressing of the fundamental structure-content within *many* of its revealing appearances.

In Jewish philosophic tradition it was Philo of Alexandria who first interpreted Jewish tradition of God's revelation in this, partly logical, partly symbolic, way. According to his doctrine, God reveals His design for the world as expressed through His *Logos* or the divine Law of expression of God's design *within* a *number* of combinations of symbols which are also considered by Philo as *numbers*.

Logos is God's design that consists in all the natural substances, while *logoi* are those particular creatures (things and words) in which *Logos* is consisted. *Logos* can be revealed only by using the allegoric method of interpretation which is one and the same whether one investigates the nature or the biblical text.

The Bible as the one (Jewish) branch of the genuine (divine) tradition, according to Philo, consists in decoding its words and images as *ethical symbolic meanings* that correspond to all the *basic* situations of the life of humans, while the Greek philosophy as another (Greek) branch of the same tradition consists in decoding things of the nature as *physical symbolic meanings* that correspond to all the *basic* situations of the being of natural bodies.

There is the fundamental structure of the basic ethical meanings which is substantially the same as that of the basic physical entities.

Logos as the divine means that convey God's design to its realization in *logoi* is to be discovered in these very *logoi* by interpreting them according to the allegorical method when every subject (*logos*) is to be understood as a symbolic creature which external appearances absolutely correspond to its innermost meaning structure.

Any human being, according to Philo, can improve her or his situation if she or he understands the language of symbols (*Logos*) created by God correctly[1].

Such an understanding is inseparable from the language itself. Understanding and using of language meet in one. And this is what we learn from *The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs* by Saadia Gaon.

Saadia's argument goes as following: Revelation is the transmission of divine knowledge. On the other hand, we may come to the knowledge by the means of human reason. The results of the *ways* of obtaining the knowledge must coincide. There must be a *meeting structure* between logic and tradition (of Revelation). As Eliezer Schweid points out, Saadia argues that "We must recognize that our reason is limited and liable to err. Therefore, even when we arrive at a conclusion that satisfies us, we ought to admit that we may have erred"[2]. Our reason is not a *reliable source* of knowledge. For Saadia, the reliable source of knowledge is to be found in Jewish tradition. However, the tradition also has to be validated as a *tradition* that is as a *way of transmitting truth from the source of the truth to the destination point*. Tradition is considered by Saadia as *the moving source*. The source does not give its truth over to some bearer which then would convey it to the destination point, but *comes itself* to the point. We can identify truth only by identifying it with its source. But we cannot do it by relying on our senses which make us to err. We have to rely on the source *itself* which expresses itself to us through that our way of articulation and thinking by which we express ourselves. This means that our expressions are filled up with truth to the extent they are identical with *the original expression* of truth which is *the ideal expression of truth and which is also the source of truth*. Actually, there is no truth without the ideal expression of truth. However, we err there where we decline from the ideal expression of truth. It seems that logic cannot indicate the limits of the ideal expression of truth because it tends to verify truth by some external criteria which originally have nothing to do with the ideal. However, logic can indicate the point where we have declined from the ideal. This means that although logic does not

provide us with knowledge of the structure of the source itself it traces the way we follow the source that is it provides us with knowledge of the structure of the *way* the source appears through our senses and thoughts. However, in Jewish tradition we have the very structure as revealed in many different ways. And comparing the ways we can discern the substantial structure that reveals itself in them. It is consisted in them to the extent they are structured according to it.

The tradition of revelation is transmitted in experience of revelation. Every one has to personally experience revelation which happens when she or he is involved, for instance, in the process of speaking. The very process of *spelling* sounds, *articulating* words, composing sentences, phrases, conceiving thoughts in traditional and at the same time original way is the process of revelation when the meaning transmitted by the source of tradition comes out from the material being spelled and composed in a certain way.

Therefore, assumes Saadia, presuming one does not err while speaking up in due or traditional way on the every stage of her or his work of putting together different kinds of articulation units, there will be no contradiction between the words of the true prophet preserved in the traditional text, and repeated again and again by those who were duly trained in reproducing it with using their sensory and mental capacities, and the certain conclusion of the intellect, because the sets of operations that stand behind each of the two processes, traditional articulating and logical (rational) thinking, are substantially the same and differ only in the material involved in each of them.

It follows from this that when we make mistakes there are two substantial causes that make us to do it: the first one consists in the fact that we do not fully, that is not in a due way as well as not in every detail, articulate our multilevel speech (that is we do not completely use the means of our expression); and the second one is that we also do not fully, that is not in a due way as well as not in every detail, think through our multilevel thought which is the means of our expression as well. We do these mistakes when we do not the work of matching together our way of articulation and our way of thinking that is the ways of our traditional expression and of our logical expression. Only matching of the two, the transmission of truth could be granted.

However, is tradition to be applied only to the sphere of thinking and saying? What about the sphere of deeds? This is the question asked by Judah Halevi who

starts his *The Book of Kuzari* from telling the story of the Khazar king who had a prophetic *dream* that recurred night after night and in which an angel appeared to him and said, "Your intention is pleasing, but your deeds are not pleasing". This *revelation* makes the Khazar king to look for the *right* tradition which would equip him with the means for the adequate expression of his right intention in his deeds.

This need makes the king to pass to the question of how to discern the right tradition from the false ones?

In the course of the discussion on the topic presented in the book it turns out that the right tradition is the tradition in which the substance of the tradition *does not contradict structurally to the historic and natural groundings of the tradition, as well as to the means of the transmission of the tradition*. That means that *the substantial structure of the tradition is to be identical with its historic and natural structures as well as with its communication structure*. Since the tradition in question is the tradition of *prophetic revelation*, the structure of prophetic revelation is to be identical with the structures of the historic and natural (the land of Israel, with all its geographic and physical specialties) groundings of prophecy as well as with the structure of the prophetic expression. All the structures must *meet* at one common structure.

To *accept* this tradition one has to liberate it from all the pervert forms of expression that hide its true structure. And, as it appears in the *Kuzari*, the way of the liberation is a *logical* one: there is a coherent critical examination of the philosophic, Christian, and Muslim presentations on the basis of strictly logical way of argumentation. This means that, according to Halevi, in order to *discover* the right tradition (of *revelation*) one needs to apply logical means of the discovery.

It is not clear, however, in what way logic, taken as a tool of intellectual discovery, can be *applied* to tradition. Intellect as a tool of discovery can work only when the cover which it is designed to remove is also of intellectual origin. This means that to discover the source of tradition one has first to distinct the intellectual frame by which it is covered. And this is exactly Moses Maimonides' view of what the task of philosophy is.

For Maimonides, the divine truth is revealed when one reaches such an *intellectual* condition as to be able to penetrate to the substantial core of divine truth through the set of so to say scientific gates which appears in front of scholar's

gaze after she or he comes to the end of her or his systematic and attentive study of the certain number of scholarly disciplines, such as logics, mathematics, physics, and so on. So, there is no intellectual or logical way to penetrate the truth, but there is a possibility by passing this way to come at the closest distance to it, and it is here that a revelation of the truth becomes for humans as possible as it can be.

However, as was emphasized by Baruch Spinoza, both the way of science and the way of tradition are not available to us till we will not realize *the true* orders of those ways. It appears that what becomes to be the first task is to discover the true orders, and this can be made only by the way of criticizing the ways the nature and the Scripture *presented to us*, the first by the scientists, and the second by the theologians. And we have to discover the true method both for science and theology which must *coincide in its substantial order* with the *method* by which *Deus sive Natura sive Substantia* is being revealed. This is not the case that, as in Maimonides, we first go the right way and only then get to the right place, since, according to Spinoza, once we *get* the right way we get the right place. However, neither existing sciences consisting in interpretation of nature, nor the existing interpretations of Scripture are the right ways to go. None of them is consistent in a strict logical sense and should be instead explained *psychologically* as a product of human *imagination* rather then logically as a product of divine revelation. The task is, therefore, to discover the true way of God's revelation which is both the way of production of things and conception of ideas.

Spinoza's critique of philosophers and theologians is based on the assumption that they

> "did not observe the [proper] order of Philosophizing. For they believed that the divine nature, which they should have contemplated before all else (because it is prior both in knowledge and in nature) is last in the order of knowledge, and that the things that are called objects of the senses are prior to all. That is why, when they contemplated natural things, they thought of nothing less than they did of the divine nature; and when afterwards they directed their minds to contemplating the divine nature, they could think of nothing less than of their first fictions, on which they had built the knowledge of natural things, because these could not assist knowledge of the divine nature" [*Ethics*, Part 2, Proposition 10 scholia].

It appears that the true order of philosophizing must coincide with the order of revelation and with *ordo geometrico* and, therefore, to be inscribed in our minds. As Richard Mason suggests, "One of [Spinoza's] most extraordinary claims is that 'God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all' [*Ethics*, Proposition 47 scholia]: nature is open and transparent to us"[3].

If that is the case, why, then, it is not so obvious and clear for all as to be readily accepted by them? Spinoza's answer is this: the false order of *presenting* the essence is being attached to the true order of *conceiving* it in that way that the last one being distorted on the level of the human cognition. The universal natural code is thus corrupted and can not be red adequately without a preliminary procedure of the emendation of it as it is traditionally presented in our mind is provided.

The corruption appears in those inadequate ideas we have. "[F]alsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas, that is, mutilated and confused ideas, involve" [*Ethics*, Part 2, Proposition 35].

What Spinoza seems to mean is that ideas give rise to falsity and product a false tradition when they occur (put in a random experiential order, *experientia vaga*) in finite minds in separation from the full causal order (of the true tradition) in which they stand in the divine mind. Our ideas (perceptions) are determined by our knowledge that we already have. If we have some privation in this knowledge, we have some breaks in our ideas also. Thus our present ideas depend on our traditional knowledge: they are based on it. Our knowledge does not prepare us to perception of truth, to revelation, as in Maimonides, but makes the basis for the true perception: the more complete, perfect is our knowledge, the truer is our perception (the more adequate are our ideas)[4].

So, the emendation of our intellect is the emendation of the tradition of our perception, or the tradition of our translation of the *experientia vaga* into the *more geometrico*. In other words, in Spinoza, *true* logic is the same that *true* tradition.

In Spinoza, tradition and logic *coincide* if and only if they have a common starting point which is *Deus sive Natura*. Then and only then the universal order of things and the universal order of ideas are the one and the same order of *concepts*.

However, referring to Spinoza's concepts of falsity and truth one might argue that Spinoza's order is the way without *direction*. Falsity here is not a false direction but just an incompleteness of the order which is totally imaginary and not real. But incompleteness of something must not necessarily mean its falsity.

Besides this, what criteria for *completeness* do we have? And where could they come from? Therefore, to the extent to which everything can be claimed to be imaginary, thing, nation, and individual person included, to this very extent this can also be claimed to be absolutely real. Is there a real subject matter at all, except a *law*, or a purely logical order to which all the rest is just what is attributed to it? Or, other way around, is there something absolutely fictional at all?

Ironically, conclusions that can be derived from Spinoza's thought are as strict as they are ambivalent. There are not criteria for the *right choice* in Spinoza's thought. Spinoza's reasoning could not be denied *logically* but it could not be accepted too: it is *too* logical and it leaves no legitimate place for *human belief*; therefore humans *could* not *believe* it and *this is why* they *could* not *understand* it *unequivocally* and without skepticism.

The reasons why understanding implies believing were explored in length by David Hume whose *skeptical* philosophy is as prominent as it is important. However, for our purposes the thought of Immanuel Kant seems to be more relevant, for it was Kant who powerfully divorced tradition and logic in their very natures.

In order to clarify this point, let us turn to Immanuel Kant's account on relation between existence of moral law and the reason why humans do accept it. Kant points out to the relation between the universal principle of existence of moral law and those particular conditions under which humans readily, while selectively, accept the law. It is in this point that Kant's question arises: Could the law exist as a whole if it would be not totally accepted? (Could the law exist as an object if there were not somebody to make the object by the very somebody's recognition the object as made by herself or himself?) In other words, the law can exist as a whole if it is universally applied. What are those criteria for the universal application? The law is universally applied when it fits to the total capacity of humans to accept the law. Thus the total subjective or transcendental capacity is the dimension that puts the definitive limits for the law as an object.

What is most important for us here is Kant's notion of totality, because it in this point that Kant's logic meets its Other, the tradition expressed in Moses Mendelssohn's concept of unity[5]. According to Mendelssohn (and Kant's explication of Mendelssohn's position is of great importance), the whole does not have any multiplicity in itself. For Kant, this means that the whole cannot be accepted partially. He does not agree with this because if it is true then there could not be such

objects as the universal moral law which is of crucial importance for Kant. It is here that the difference between Kantian *logical* view of law and Mendelssohnian *traditional* one have clashed, probably, in the most obvious way. It is interesting, because in his *Phedon*, the only Mendelssohn's work Kant interprets in his first *Critique*, Mendelssohn, as it is usually argued, has not yet expressed his Judaism. But is it actually true? According to Kant's logical view, the law is a *quantity* which as such can grow and decrease without losing its wholeness. For Kant, a real entity is multiple in a sense, while it does not mean that it is not whole, because he believes that the whole is not that which is not multiple in itself but that which can be accepted as a distinct entity which distinctness can be *measured* by making a comparison, based on the application of some universal measurement, between it and other entities[6]. What Kant calls the whole is in fact totality as sequentially summed complexity of the thinkable parts of an entity[7].

However, Mendelssohn does not regard the law as a quantity. The law is not an object subjectively constructed from subjectively thinkable elements differentiated from each other on the common ground of some abstract measurement decisively applied to them without an explication of any reasons for such a procedure being made except of mere reference to a logical *tradition*. The whole is what cannot be divided into parts. The law is a whole. Therefore, there cannot be laws, but just one law which penetrates all the life. This is why, for Mendelssohn, there is no essential difference between civil service and service of God[8]. The law is one, but it can be expressed in many different ways. The law is rational, in the sense that there are not contradictions within it, and so are the traditional expressions of it. This is why the traditional Jewish law is no less rational than the most rational modern constitutions, because rationality here is not deducibility of isolated elements from each other but fullness of expression of the highest sense of life. Rationality thus understood can be achieved only through a tradition as a channel connecting the law with those who pertains to the tradition. Judaism is the "revealed law (legislation)"[9] that means that for Jews the most proper way to accept the law in all its fullness is through the revelation of the law presented completely in Jewish tradition. Consequently, it would be rational choice for a Jew to keep commitment to Judaism.

Kantian contention to this could be stated as follows: In what limits, asks Kant, humans do really make their choice? They do it in the limits of the "bare

reason". Therefore, rational choice has nothing to do with tradition (taken by Kant merely as communal ritual) in which rational is always mixed with irrational.

The task to defend Jewish tradition against this challenge took on himself Samson Raphael Hirsch. Hirsch shares with Kant his idea that the sphere of human being is to be considered totally within itself, as transcendental sphere of purely rational human experience. And he believes that religious or moral principles are *a priori* confined to the sphere. Therefore, they are not logically derived consequences of physical processes, which are thus to be excluded from the sphere as irrelevant.

However, unlike Kant, Hirsch considers this sphere not as limited by faculties of human reason but as traditionally prescribed for humans by revealed commandments of God. What, therefore, now depends on human is not the (logical) *structure* of her or his transcendental sphere, which has been given beforehand by God's precepts, but her or his *decision* either to be disposed entirely within the sphere, putting aside all actual or possible outside engagements, or not. Hirsch regards life as the ceremony, and tradition as the scenario or prescribed or due course of performances the ceremony is subjected to. Every deviation from the course will end up with the life failure for the deviant.

If for Kant reason can expand the limits of the sphere by its very thinking of them, thus reducing the sphere to the limits of the thinking procedure applied to everything given in human experience; for Hirsch, humans must first to reduce their reason to the sphere of traditionally prescribed performance in order to enlarge it afterwards due to the obtained by them, in the course of their gradual circumscribing of their engagements with others, an inherently traditional capacity to discern the other as the limits for the self, not friendly or alien but stimulating the humans' self-productivity.

While Kant comes to the sphere through thoughts as acts of reason, which are logical judgments, Hirsch comes to it through the actions prescribed by tradition which meant to select the individual from everything that cannot be properly included into the sphere. As a result, the very nature of the sphere is completely changed. It is rendered by Hirsch from the sphere of human's making into the sphere of the making of human. And this is a traditional sphere, because before making a human, the proper ground for the origin of this human is to be made.

According to Kant, all that is made by human is disposed within the sphere of human's duty. Therefore, all human's relations are to be regarded within the transcendental sphere. Consequently, Kant's concern is with the very act of making of human duty as some universally accepted notion or concept: a human's behavior according to the duty is the consequence of the very putting by every human of this duty on herself or himself as in her or his regard of such a behavior as her or his very making of the duty for herself or himself. What makes the duty real is not the performance of the duty, which should be considered rather as part to whole, but the very human's regard of the duty as a product of her or his activity[10]. In contrast to this view, Hirsch sees human's duty as prescribed to humans in the revealed commandments. The prescriptions outline the sphere the limits of which humans must not overstep, for doing this would be the sin, and, since the sin was already committed, they must now *return* to the sphere by her or his freeing from all the (sinful) relations and attitudes she or he is involved into outside of the sphere. And these prescriptions determine the human's performance through which the human's whole and due attitude is realized[11]. Unlike Kant, who regards our performance as a consequence or our knowledge, Hirsch regards our knowledge as a result of our performance. By freeing ourselves from the attitudes and relations that are not prescribed to us by our tradition we confine ourselves to the tradition that is to the sphere of us. Only in this way one can reach her or his whole, to realize herself or himself as individual. With her or his individuality obtained with this return to the prescribed sphere, to the Torah, every new relation the person would make or deny she or he would already do *as individual*.

According to Hirsch, the traditional sphere of the revealed commandments is the Other whom person must rediscover for herself or himself as inherent limits of her or his whole, in order, by entering into the sphere as full as possible, to reach in this way her or his whole (individuality).

What is, however, the essence of the decision humans make in order to obtain their individuality? In Hermann Cohen's view it is the fundamental integral spiritual reaction to the external affections.

For Cohen, as well as for Hirsch, humans' capacity to react to the moral law does not mean yet that they do actually react to it properly. Proper reaction to affection is not just an affect, as Spinoza argued, but the precise re-enacting of the action that makes the affection. This means that Cohen regards affection as

transformation of the original energetic impulse into such a form of its expression that among all the possible forms it would be the nearest one to the full or ideal expression of the impulse. According to Cohen, the very process of this transformation and the proper expression of the transformed content is the essence of what he calls "idealization" or infinite proximity to God-idea, to the state of full perfection which can never be achieved by human but is to be always aspired to.

For Cohen, idea is the transcendent ideal that, inspiring humans via its traditional presentations, makes them aspire for achieving this ideal, maintaining in this way the process of idealization. The traditional external forms of expression of human love to the perfection of God-idea, such as language and lyric poetry, touching human soul naturally disposed to react properly to the affections, transforming in this way traditional spiritual energy, involve humans' inward capacities into integral activity aimed to reach the idea, in which humans act as individuals, maintaining in this way the tradition and spreading it out.

Cohen also believes that tradition is placed within reason, but not on the subjective ground of the ability to accept, as for Kant, but primarily on the objective action of transformation. Tradition is placed within reason as *the* Idea.

The inspirational tools by which traditional essence is transformed are not *applied* accordingly to the elements of human soul properly disposed to them, but are *recognized* by the soul as those akin to it. This is the process of approaching the idea as a mathematical function approaches its limit.

The transformation means that the traditional content that has been preserved in the traditional forms of its expression, now obtains new forms of such an expression in which the content is repeated. Tradition means here the repetition of the Torah (*mishneh Torah*), the repetitive deliverance of the message of the Torah as being every time sent and received in its very essence. The essence is the same that idea. The deliverance occurs in the process of transforming the means of the deliverance into the forms perceptible by the humans living in certain period of time.

The crucial point here is that there is just one transformative structure (idea). And the perfect expression of it, believes Cohen, is Judaism with its concept of monotheism.

The essence of this structure, the idea as such, is inherited in Judaism as a tradition of approaching the idea as God-idea. Cohen thus regards Judaism as the way or tradition of idealization. Idea is what penetrates everything, what makes

everything to be real. Idea is the Precise and in this sense perfect. Tradition (cognition) is the endless process of achieving the state of absolute preciseness (God-idea), that is the same that the state of absolute perfection. This is what prophetic Judaism is.

And this is what the whole world culture is. As Andrea Pomo notes, for Cohen, "…the Unique God of Judaism is… the inspiring idea of universal ethical culture"[12].

There is no general culture [Bildung] nor any European culture [Kultur] nor any ethics without the idea of the Unique God and the God of morality. There is no foundation and stability of culture without a scientifically grounded morality. For this reason the idea of the Unique God is necessary. Morality does not need other gods: but it does need the Unique God. Therefore there can be neither European culture nor ethics without the fundamental participation of Judaism[13].

God-idea is what *ought* to be achieved but what *is never* achieved and even *cannot* be ever achieved. In this sense, God-idea is the Other taken in the sense of the extremely beloved but inaccessible being.

According to Cohen, the essence of Judaism consists in the process of transformation of the traditional love to the Other idealistically understood as the ideal otherness or ideal poverty. The poverty symbolizes deprivation of any roots in this world, ideal, perfect otherworldliness through the love to which a human enters into the infinite process of achieving the state of perfection. This very idealistic transcendent position of the other as in regard to the world, as incumbent in my consciousness, is what inspires me to love a concrete person. With this love, as the traditionally inspired feeling, the traditional power, dynamism of the prophetic inspiration is being built into the very course of my life (while my life, in turn, is thus being built into Judaism as a traditional mode of life based on the ideal principle of love for otherness), making the definitive impact on my very *Bildung*, making in this way my life to be the life-in-tradition, as an idealization-life.

This turn towards the other is expressed in the praying one's desire (*Sehnsucht*) for God's nearness, as close as possible[14].

The (traditional) forms of prayer (presented in psalms), are expressions of one's spiritual attitude to God as to the Other. This attitude is built in the very

structure of the forms, which are those of "lyric poetry, which is the original form of love in longing"[15]. And the desire for God's nearness is induced by these forms that involve the inner structure of the praying one into that of theirs, restructuring it according to their structure, changing its disposition to the traditional one.

However, such an expression of the soul's attitude to the Other can be regarded as just a person's enterprise that does not have bounding or communicative power. In Cohen's picture, there are just inspired persons, not an inspired community.

What is absent in Cohen's concept of idealization, is presented in Edmund Husserl's concept of traditional communication realized through a tradition of logical explication, which was succinctly elucidated in *The Origin of Geometry*. "The whole cultural world, in all its forms, exists through tradition. These forms have arisen as such not merely causally…"[16] The content of tradition is the communal spiritual form which "is objectively there for 'everyone'", "accessible to all men"[17], first of all to those who understand the content and who are able to contribute to it by explicating in it a (some) self-evident ideal structure(s), which Husserl calls an "ideal objectivity" or an "ideal object" (*ideale Gegenständlichkeit*).

Husserl is concerned with the following question: How the content of tradition, "the ideal objects… proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?"[18] Husserl argues that it occurs within "the world we are constantly conscious of… whether we pay attention to it or not, conscious of it as the horizon of our life, as a horizon of 'things' (real objects), of our actual and possible interests and activities"[19]. The world-horizon or we-horizon or civilization[20] or life-world[21] "is a community of those who can reciprocally express themselves, normally, in a fully understandable fashion; and within this community everyone can talk about what is within the surrounding world of his civilization as objectively existing". It is only in this form-horizon of habitual communality taken on by a person's ideal structure that this ideal structure can become to be an ideal object.

"But the question arises again: How does the [ideal internal structure] in its 'ideality', thereby become objective?"[22] That is, how an internal ideal structure can take on the external communal form of ideal objectivity? It is here that into the traditional process enters logic.

Logic comes through feeling, namely through empathy. It is through empathy that "in the unity of the community of communication [a community of empathy and of language] among several persons" emerges "the self-evident consciousness of the identity of the mental structure in the productions of both the receiver of the communication and the communicator" without which there could not be the "actual transferring of what has been originally produced in one to others who originally reproduce it"[23].

However, on the next stage, the consciousness must be abstracted from the minds of the mortal physical bearers of it and put into another container, that of written texts. "The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual"[24]. However, in this form of preserving of the original mode of being of the meaning-structure it becomes passive, sedimented. To reactivate it, it has to be made explicit.

Husserl describes explication (*Verdeutlichung*) as the process of "extracting one by one, in separation from what has been vaguely, passively received as a unity, the elements of meaning, thus bringing the total validity to active performance in a new way on the basis of the individual validities. What was a passive meaning-pattern has now become one constructed through active production. This activity, then, is a peculiar sort of self-evidence; the structure arising out of it is in the mode of having been originally produced. And in connection with this self-evidence, too, there is communalization. The explicated judgment becomes an ideal object capable of being passed on. It is this object exclusively that is meant by logic when it speaks of sentences or judgments. And thus the *domain of logic* is universally designated; this is universally the sphere of being to which logic pertains insofar as it is the theory of the sentences [or propositions] in general"[25].

Tradition as a whole consists of logical explications of the origins of the tradition. However, tradition as a whole cannot be explicated logically, because it cannot be presented as a connection between its origins. The connection turns to be an infinite process of reactivation of that kind of self-evidence that pertains to this tradition, and the process, due to its infinity, cannot be made explicit enough.

Another attempt to approach tradition has been made by Franz Rosenzweig who turned to the problem of limit. His point is that in traditional process, contrary to logical procedure, there are not artificial or made-after-that limits. The

original limit of tradition within which it begins and ends is death or Naught. An exposition of death is in every feature of life. And life is the process of approaching death as the omnipresent limit for life.

On the other side, the dead as such is not *only* dead, because death is not just a form of pure reason or pure logic, it is filled with a living content, while, on its side, the living is not just a spiritual, it is filled with a dead content (of forms), so far as it is *conceivable* and thus recognizable within this or that particular tradition. For Rosenzweig, death as *living experience* of the humans and consequently, as *the* universal fact of human existence, as a universal *symbol*, and at the same time as something very *particular* in every person's life, as something very *personal* in its essence, is what takes over the role Cohen reserved for the idea, and Husserl for the self-evidence. In every fact of human experience the universal meets the particular, logic meets the tradition. Logic and tradition are involved in each other.

The process of dying, which has been exposed in all its symbolical acuteness in Rosenzweig's life during his last years, stands in his thought for Cohen's process of idealization, and one can also recall also Husserl's concept of explication (what was reserved by Cohen for the human mind, and by Husserl for the human consciousness, Rosenzweig transformed into the whole of human existence). Life (existence) as a whole is the process of approaching death, and as such it is the dying as progressive exposition of features of death. A person's life (existence) is the process of fulfillment of the person's essence. When the process is accomplished, and the essence is fully exposed, the person's life comes to the end. And as for Cohen the process of idealization is filled with the prophetic inspiration, for Rosenzweig, a person's existence is filled with a traditional way of expression of the person's experience. What is actually exposed as a person's essence is the tradition she or he pertains to, consciously or unconsciously. A person can perfectly express herself or himself only through the means of her or his tradition, through traditional for her of him way of expression to which she or he is to subject her or his life. This is why she or he *ought* to find her or his *authentic* tradition (way of expression). They are limited by this moral obligation which reminds of itself every moment they live. This moral obligation is a non-spiritual form to which a person's existence is confined and within which it becomes to be able to be filled with a particular *meaning*. And only turning independently to her or his traditional

way of self-expression, through traditional words, traditionally articulated in tra-
ditional sequence, and so on, through actions and detailed fulfillment of precepts,
and so on, a person can realize the essence of her or his existence. A person's
existence obtains its genuine meaning with the person's ability to *express* the
meaning by using traditional means of expression of meaning.

The traditional meaning is beyond the sphere of logic, since when the death
disposes itself *within* the life, the life loses the sense of logicality. Return (*teshuva*)
to tradition is withdrawal from the realm of logic. "…[T]he world is a beyond as
against what is intrinsically logical, as against unity"[26]. The world is not confined
anymore to the unity of logic as presented in form, law, validity, etc. Because
"the old concept of logic no longer rests on anything but that unity, which knows
nothing and acknowledges nothing outside of itself"[27]. The world is *pictured*
by the *logos* in its presumed by the latter likeness to it. "The unity of the logos
establishes the unity of the world-as-totality"[28]. Therefore, "he who denies the
totality of being, as we do, thus denies the unity of reasoning. He throws down the
gauntlet to the whole honorable company of philosophers from Ionia to Jena"[29].

Since the logos and being constructed in fact by the logos according to its
own image, are not unities but multiplicities, no one of them can fill the other's
gaps as to make it a whole. "With its intertwining of the two multiplicities, this
cosmos itself thus has now a unity entirely beyond itself. In itself it is not a unity,
but a multiplicity, no all-encompassing All, but an enclosed unicum, which may
be infinite in itself but not completed. Thus, if one may say, an excluding All"[30].

Being (existence), in order to appear in its unity, *ought* to be separated or
purified from reasoning. Being in its unity ought to be *redeemed* from the chains
of reasoning to which it is fastened like a painting that hangs on a wall and seeing
as would be it is deadly *attached* to the wall.

Death is as attached to life as the limits of logos are attached to the way of
tradition. Being attached is a beyond for living reality of the world. But the attach-
ment as such is just "the gate which leads out of the mysterious-miraculous light
of the divine sanctuary in which no man can remain alive. Whither, then, do the
wings of the gate open? Thou knowest it not? INTO LIFE"[31].

[1] For a more detailed account of Philo's exposition of the *logical* structure created by God, see Dymerets R. Komunikatyvno-mediatyvni aspecty vchennia pro Logos u Filona Oleksandrijs'kogo (Philo of Alexandria's Concept of Logos Considered in Its Communication And Mediation Aspects) / Liudyna. Svit. Suspil'stvo. Do 175-richa Filosofs'kogo fakul'tetu – 2009: Mizhnarodna naukova konferentsia (21-22 kvitnia 2009 roku). Kyiv, 2009. Ch. I. Pp. 18–20.

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[17] Ibid. P. 356.

[18] Ibid. P. 357–8.

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[25] Ibid. P. 364.

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Abstract (Ukrainian)

У статті представлено спробу аналізу підходів низки визначних єврейських філософів до визначення меж співіснування і взаємодії логічного та традиційно-релігійного способів вираження думки, її зв'язку з людськими діями, світом речей і Богом. Автор виявляє як спільну основу, так і особливості кожного з цих підходів.

Люди використовують два протилежні за сутністю, але водночас взаємодоповнюючі один одного способи мислення: логіко-абстрактний і традиційно-конкретний. Перший полягає в операційному використанні абстрактних понять, другий – в актах поєднання конкретних уявлень, понять або імен.

В єврейській філософії, представники якої від самого початку намагалися поєднати традицію Тори з давньогрецькою логікою, проблема узгодження цих двох способів мислення стала ледь не центральною. Різні (хоча, звичайно, не всі) способи формулювання та вирішення цієї проблеми розглянуто в цій статті, що являє собою одну з перших спроб поглянути на єврейську філософію з цієї точки зору. Запроваджений у ній підхід дає можливість розширити наше уявлення про принципи людського мислення, поставивши, фактично, на один ціннісний рівень раціоналістичне мислення й традиційно-релігійне.