



# **JOURNALISTS IN THE MIDST OF FULL-SCALE WAR — REPORT ON UKRAINE**

Dates of research: January-December 2022  
Prepared by Human Rights Platform

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An assessment based on UNESCO's Journalists' Safety Indicators

Dates of research: January-December 2022

### **Research Team:**

#### **Lead researcher:**

Ievgeniia Oliinyk, PhD, Program Director at Media Development Foundation

#### **Researchers:**

Tetiana Gordiienko, researcher at Media Development Foundation, PhD candidate at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Dariya Orlova, PhD, Associate Professor, Mohyla School of Journalism (National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy)

#### **Junior researchers:**

Buts Oksana, MA in Sociology, Researcher, Media Development Foundation

Severyn Shalaiskyi, researcher at Ukrainian Media and Communication Institute

Prepared by NGO Human Rights Platform (Ukraine)

#### **Peer review:**

Jennifer Adams, Specialist: Gender, Media and Digital Rights

Liudmyla Opryshko, Head of the Committee on Media and Advertising Law of the National Bar Association of Ukraine, Senior Fellow of the Institute for Information, Telecommunications and Media Law of the University of Münster (Germany), expert of the NGO "Human Rights Platform"

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The year 2022 presented unique challenges for the safety of journalists in Ukraine, primarily driven by the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022. Journalists and media workers faced escalating risks both while on assignment and in their daily lives, navigating an environment subject to continuous physical and digital threats.

This report, conducted based upon UNESCO's Journalists' Safety Indicators (JSI), and covering the period from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022, is based on a multi-faceted approach, combining stakeholder interviews with extensive desk research, and data analysis. It paints a picture of a Ukrainian media landscape profoundly affected by a number of challenges - all exacerbated by the incursion of a violent war - requiring ongoing adaptation, innovation and strategic international support to ensure journalists' safety and the preservation of press freedom in the country.

### Key findings:

- **Conflict-Related Challenges:** Journalists faced increased risks performing their professional duties and in their personal lives, given the constant physical and digital threats. Interviews have reported journalists as being targets for attacks, threats, arbitrary arrests, and abductions. UNESCO reported 11 killed journalists in 2022, making Ukraine the second deadliest country for journalists that year. Local monitoring organization Institute for Mass Information (IMI), also considering journalists killed off-duty and enlisted journalists, reports 43. Media organizations with team members in occupied territories face additional challenges, further compounding the difficulties they already encountered prior to the invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022. Specifically, news outlets based in the heavily attacked East and South of Ukraine have had to relocate, and this threatens the provision of reliable information to the population in those areas.
- **Obstacles to Press Freedom:** Newsrooms in Ukraine have faced urgent threats related to the invasion, as well as regulatory and legal challenges stemming from the imposition of martial law throughout 2022 and the imposition of Russian law in territories temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation. These challenges include a decline in public trust and corresponding threats to journalists' safety.
- **Newsroom Needs and Logistics:** The dynamic and unprecedented threats to media workers create a state of perpetual response, and a need for urgent adaptation by newsrooms and media organizations. In total, the IMI recorded 67 cases of threats reported against media outlets and staff during the reporting period, as well as the shelling of 16 TV-towers in Ukraine and the seizing or destruction of eight newsrooms by Russian forces.

■ **Legal Protection Gap:** Despite legislation regulating media operations in Ukraine, stakeholders noted a lack of synchronization between these laws and the bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes against journalists.

■ **Necessity of International Support:** With government and media resources directed toward the war effort, civil society organizations and international organizations provided substantial technical, financial, and psychological support, which remains very much needed, as well as assistance in relocating individuals and media outlets to safer environments.

■ **Lack of information and data:** The availability of reliable data and therefore, the full-scale of physical and emotional harm to journalists and media, remain uncertain due to limited access to occupied and war-torn territories. Data on gender aspects of violence against journalists – such as gender-based attacks – is largely missing, hindering detailed analysis of the specific impact of the war on women journalists.

■ **Gendered divisions:** The proportion of female journalists covering the conflict increased in 2022, partly due to male journalists joining the armed forces. However, the majority of security and justice-focused initiatives aimed at enhancing journalists' safety - both domestic and international - fail to incorporate a gender-focused or intersectional approach.

■ **Holistic approach:** In 2022, the provision of resources to enhance journalists' physical, digital, and psychological safety were a priority focus for all stakeholders studied in this report. Strategic collaboration to integrate international best practices and maintain a holistic security approach is necessary for the continued support of journalists and media workers in Ukraine.

## INTRODUCTION

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The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 has dramatically affected the safety of journalists in Ukraine. Over the course of 2022, UNESCO confirmed the killings of 11 journalists on active duty, the highest annual number ever reported for Ukraine. Aside from the killings of journalists, other types of violence have been reported, including enforced disappearances, torture, threats and psychological violence.

Systematically evaluating the situation of the safety of journalists over the course of the year 2022, including by assessing the threats faced by journalists but also by studying the systems and structures in place to protect them, allows for the formulation of evidence-based recommendations that can effectively improve the country's ability to guarantee the safety of journalists. By studying the role of different groups of actors, the report approaches the issue of the safety of journalists through a multi-stakeholder lens and implies that only through cooperation and the exchange of information, can a safer environment for journalists be achieved.

The Journalists' Safety Indicators (JSI) are a step towards the implementation of the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity (UNPA). This plan was adopted by all chief executives of United Nations bodies in 2012 and has since provided a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation towards better safety of journalists. The implementation of the UN plan involves different groups of actors, such as intergovernmental organizations, governments, the media, academia and civil society.

The assessment is based on the understanding that freedom of expression underpins other democratic freedoms. This highlights the relevance of providing journalists and media outlets with special protection, in order for them to operate freely and independently. Impunity for crimes against journalists leads to self-censorship, the inability of the media to act as a platform for public discussion, and in general, the building of a sense of insecurity in society.

### Methodology

This Report follows the methodology of the UNESCO Journalists' Safety Indicators (JSI), a tool to map "key features that can help assess the extent to which journalists are able to carry out their work under safe conditions, and determine whether adequate follow-up is given to crimes committed against them."<sup>1</sup> The research team working on this report was guided by UNESCO's JSI methodology (with some updates to meet the current context of events in Ukraine) and the practical guidebook to assist researchers while applying the JSI.

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<sup>1</sup> UNESCO, available at: <https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists>

In line with the overall JSI methodology, the report covers five categories (A-E) of indicators, including safety and impunity statistics (category A), as well as the actions undertaken by four key stakeholder groups (categories B-E) to promote safety; these stakeholder groups include the UN system, state and political actors, CSOs and academics, and the media and intermediaries.

This in-depth assessment provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis, combining a variety of research methods – primarily desk research and in-depth interviews. The assessment covers a period of 12 months, namely the year 2022. Over the course of three months, the researchers conducted 53 online interviews in Ukrainian and in English with representatives of the different stakeholder groups covered in this report (see Appendix 1). Information stemming from these interviews was complemented by extensive desk research, including on the websites and reports of international and national organizations, content published by media outlets, statements by political actors, case law, human rights law, academic research and other sources.

Data was collected via a variety of credible sources and in some cases, when data points varied due to different methodologies informing the data collection, the authors prioritized specific data sources. This is for example the case on data regarding killings of journalists, where UNESCO data was privileged in order to facilitate analysis. This was complemented with figures from the key national monitoring mechanisms, and the differences in methodology between the diverse sources referred to are explained in the report.

The few sections of the report which do not include any references are based on the above-mentioned in-depth interviews carried out with a range of experts representing different stakeholder groups.

In order to illustrate the inputs made by interview partners, the report contains direct quotes, which are presented anonymously to protect the privacy and safety of sources.

In line with the JSI methodology, the report looks at the safety of journalists through a gender-sensitive lens, exploring the specific threats faced by female journalists when applicable.



# **CATEGORY A**

**Overview of the situation  
of journalists' safety  
in Ukraine**

## CATEGORY A

# Overview of the situation of journalists' safety in Ukraine

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### Key Indicators

#### 1. Safety and impunity statistics

#### 2. Shared understandings and activities of various stakeholders

In previous years, challenges related to the safety of journalists, in most cases, were associated with media professionals carrying out journalistic investigations.<sup>2</sup> With the beginning of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the main challenges to the safety of journalists became primarily related to the war. They face increased risks both while performing and not performing their professional tasks, due to being in a country that is subject to constant physical and digital attacks. This threat affects all journalists without exception: not only Ukrainian journalists, but also international correspondents traveling to Ukraine to carry out their work and reporting.

Another aspect of wartime reporting is that Ukrainian journalists can be drafted to the army, which also affects the media landscape in the country. In the short term this causes a depletion of qualified personnel from the industry, and in the long term this situation has the potential to create a lasting capacity gap in the industry, bearing in mind that it takes years to train qualified media professionals. According to IMI, 23 journalists who joined the Ukrainian armed forces were killed in action during 2022.<sup>3</sup>

Another group of security threats concerns journalists in the territories temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation both before and after the 24 February 2022 invasion.<sup>4</sup> During in-depth interviews carried out for this assessment, testimonies were collected which reported that journalists in the occupied territories have become targets for attacks, threats, and abductions (*this refers to testimonies from journalists from the previously occupied territories, in particular in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, and those who relocated from the occupied territories*).

Ukrainian journalist Oleh Baturyn was reportedly kidnapped on March 12, in the then occupied region of Kherson (*at the time of producing the report, this region is again under the control of the Ukrainian government*). He reports having been held captive for eight days, interrogated and tortured by Russian soldiers.<sup>5</sup> This is just one of the examples of persecution that journalists are reported to be subject to in the territories temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation.

The scale of these physical and emotional risks (including torture, detention and murder) is yet to be fully assessed, since there is a significant share of the territories

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2 Committee to Protect Journalists, available at: <https://cpj.org/europe/ukraine/2021/>

3 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/infographics/list-of-journalists-killed-i45959>

4 NPR, available at: <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/25/1088808627/ukrainian-journalists-missing-detained>

5 The Guardian, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/they-said-theyd-mutilate-and-kill-me-says-kidnapped-ukrainian-journalist>

temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation in regard to which there is very limited and sporadic access to information. Even those sources of information who risk working with Ukrainian media organizations and journalists, and which shed light on the situation there, are careful to use a variety of digital security tools, including those to preserve their anonymity. Journalists also go to great lengths to protect the identities of their sources of information in temporarily occupied territories and to protect them from imminent danger in the event of disclosure.

The level of safety of journalists working in Ukraine is directly related to the amount of resources that media organizations have. More resources enable newsrooms to provide security equipment, advanced logistics and vehicles, the assistance of security officers and fixers, and to arrange insurance for employees. In media organizations with greater resources, there are also separate security departments that advise journalists when threats are received or other potentially dangerous situations arise, and which have comprehensive security protocols for employees. Freelancers, which do not have access to security arrangements provided by media organizations therefore experience heightened vulnerability.

The situation regarding the safety of journalists is thus closely intertwined with both war-related events in the country and the economic capacity of media outlets. The latter will be explained in more depth in Category D of the assessment, which covers media outlets.

Numerous national and international organizations monitored the situation in Ukraine and collected key data on the work of journalists and the functioning of the media industry. To produce this section, reports from the key national and international monitoring organizations have been considered (a complete list of interviewees and data sources is provided in the annexes to the assessment).

## 1. Safety and impunity statistics

### 1.1 Number and types of threats against the lives of journalists

### 1.2 Number and types of other threats against journalists

During the period under review, journalists in Ukraine reported threats in various forms. This is noted both by data collected by the numerous organizations conducting relevant monitoring, and by the media professionals and other relevant stakeholders who participated in the in-depth interviews within the framework of the assessment.

During the present research period (2022), IMI documented 67 cases of journalists and media houses, receiving reported threats, sometimes repeatedly and including death threats.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

Threats come in different ways, both through digital communication channels and platforms, and in the form of phone calls, emails, and public statements containing them. For example, nine media organizations in Odesa (in the south of Ukraine) reported receiving emails with threats and accusations of “complicity in Nazism”.

In Kherson during its temporary occupation, Kyrilo Stremousov (appointed to public functions by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation) made a public statement in which he threatened journalists and activists, mentioning torture in this context.<sup>7</sup> The correspondent of the Ukrainian information agency Ukrinform in the Kherson office, Iryna Staroselets, reported receiving phone threats because of her work covering the war in the region.<sup>8</sup>

Another reporter, Yevhen Malotetka, who covered the Russian attack on the city of Mariupol, reported receiving a number of threats through social networks. Malotetka documented the 9 March bombing of a maternity hospital in Mariupol. He was later named The Guardian's Photographer of the Year<sup>9</sup> and received a prestigious World Press Photo award as one of four global winners.<sup>10</sup> Despite this international visibility, he was accused by Russian officials on social media of staging his photos and of acting as an “anti-Russian propagandist.”<sup>11</sup>

There were also cases of reported threats and coercion aimed at making journalists in temporarily occupied territories cooperate with the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation and spread messages on their behalf. These cases were confirmed by the IMI organization in the city of Berdyansk.<sup>12</sup>

Aside from threats of lethal violence, the Council of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists reported three cases of the harassment and intimidation of journalists.<sup>13</sup>

According to an IMI report,<sup>14</sup> journalists detentions were observed in 2022. Dmytro Khylyuk, a UNIAN journalist who went missing in the Kyiv region during the Russian occupation in spring, has been detained in a pre-trial detention center in the Russian Federation, according to the report. Another example of detention may be found in the account reported by two local journalists from the Luhansk region. The journalists, who wish to remain anonymous, stated that they were detained by Russian troops and held

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7 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/news/in-kherson-collaborationists-threat-journalists-with-torture-chambers-i44194>

8 PEN Ukraine, available at: <https://pen.org.ua/en/zhurnalisty-na-vijni-monitoryng-zlochyniv-rosijskykh-okupativ-proty-vilnyh-media-onovlyuyetsya>

9 The Guardian, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2022/dec/23/evgeny-malotetka-agency-photographer-of-2022-ukraine>

10 World Press Photo, available at: <https://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo-contest/2023/Evgeniy-Malotetka/1>

11 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/news/russians-threaten-photojournalist-who-took-picture-of-bombing-of-maternity-hospital-in-mariupol-i44300>

12 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

13 Council Of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists, available at: <https://fom.coe.int/en/graphiques>

14 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

in a facility of the so-called Ministry of State Security of the Luhansk People's Republic ("LPR MSS"). Two additional examples of detentions are: Angela Slobodyan, a journalist formerly with the now-closed TRC Ukraina station, who reported that she was detained in solitary confinement in Russian-occupied Kherson; and Gulsum Halilova, a Crimean Tatar journalist employed by ATR, who was reportedly arrested by the Turkish authorities in an Istanbul airport in response to a request from Russia through Interpol's channels.

### 1.3 Number and types of non-fatal actual attacks on journalists

One of the common threats to journalists throughout 2022 was the risk of being kidnapped or (temporarily) going missing. According to Ukrainian legislation,<sup>15</sup> missing persons are not considered deceased until the circumstances of the disappearance are fully clarified or evidence of the death of the missing persons has been presented.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reports that six journalists (temporarily) disappeared during 2022.<sup>16</sup> Out of the six, one remains uncontactable, the Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Khyliuk who reportedly remains in Russian detention at an unidentified location. Ukrainian NGO the Institute of Mass Information (IMI) reported 14 journalists from Mariupol as (temporarily) missing during 2022. 12 of these journalists were later found to have escaped to safety while two journalists' locations remained unknown.<sup>17</sup>

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) lists the case of the journalist Vasyl Klymentyev, from Kharkiv, who reportedly went missing in 2010 and still remained missing in 2022.<sup>18</sup>

Between 1 February and 31 July 2022, the Human Rights Monitoring Mission for Ukraine (HRMMU) reported seven cases of arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of journalists. Six of these acts were reportedly committed by the Russian forces or affiliated groups in territories under Russian control, and one journalist was reportedly subjected to enforced disappearance by the Ukrainian authorities, according to reporting by the HRMMU.<sup>19</sup>

A prominent case was that of journalist Oleh Baturyn, from the city of Kakhovka (Kherson region), who allegedly went missing on 12 March. He was released on 20 March and later testified that he was abducted by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation because of his journalistic activities. He also reported that members of his family who were at that moment still in the temporarily occupied territories had received threats.<sup>20</sup>

15 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2505-19>

16 Reporters Without Borders (RSF), available at: [https://rsf.org/en/barometer?exaction\\_pays\\_pays=210&exaction\\_pays\\_annee=2000&exaction\\_pays\\_statut=prison&annee\\_start=2022&annee\\_end=2022&exaction\\_victimes\\_pays%5B210%5D=210&type%5Bdisparition%5D=disparition#exaction-victimes](https://rsf.org/en/barometer?exaction_pays_pays=210&exaction_pays_annee=2000&exaction_pays_statut=prison&annee_start=2022&annee_end=2022&exaction_victimes_pays%5B210%5D=210&type%5Bdisparition%5D=disparition#exaction-victimes)

17 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

18 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), available at: <https://cpj.org/data/people/vasyl-klymentyev/>

19 Human Rights Monitoring Mission, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ua/2022-09-23/ReportUkraine-1Feb-31Jul2022-en.pdf>

20 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

The Council of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists reports 26 attacks on the physical safety and integrity of journalists in 2022, including killings, physical injuries from shelling as well as beatings.<sup>21</sup> Between 1 August and 31 October, 2022, the Human Rights Monitoring Mission for Ukraine recorded 19 cases in which journalists and media professionals were injured.<sup>22</sup>

A further nine journalists were reported by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) to have been kept temporarily as hostages.<sup>23</sup> Most journalists were held for one day, while journalist Iryna Dubchenko was held for the longest period of time, namely 16 days. RSF also alleges 16 cases when journalists or media crews were assaulted and 19 when journalists were injured. Their statistics also include two cases of property damage (a vehicle or computer).

Other important data collected by IMI report 20 cases of journalists being kidnapped, 15 journalists wounded, and 29 incidents of journalists being shot.

#### 1.4 Number and types of killings of journalists

More journalists were killed in 2022 in Ukraine than any other time since the country's independence in 1991. Within the scope of the review of various reports and data for evaluation, it emerges that the cases of deaths of journalists within the research period are fully attributable to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022.

However, it is worth noting again here that different organizations use their own methodologies to collect and systematize data. Some methodologies take into account only those media professionals who died while directly performing assignments, while others consider also those who died while not being on an assignment, but close to the hostilities or during shelling. Some media organizations (such as IMI) also include killings of journalists or media workers who joined the ranks of the armed forces of Ukraine after 24 February 2022. This explains the difference in data from different organizations.

UNESCO, as the UN agency with the mandate to monitor and report on the killings of journalists, documented killings in Ukraine in 2022 on its online observatory. The UNESCO Observatory of Killed Journalists documented eleven cases of journalists killed in the country while carrying out their professional functions.<sup>24</sup> UNESCO reports the killings of nine male and two female journalists. Six of the killed journalists were Ukrainian and five were foreigners (French, Lithuanian, Russian and American).

21 Council of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists, available at: <https://fom.coe.int/en/graphiques>

22 Human Rights Monitoring Mission for Ukraine, available at: [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ua/2022-12-02/HRMMU\\_Update\\_2022-12-02\\_EN.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ua/2022-12-02/HRMMU_Update_2022-12-02_EN.pdf)

23 Reporters Without Borders (RSF), available at: [https://rsf.org/en/barometer?exaction\\_pays\\_pays=210&exaction\\_pays\\_annee=2000&exaction\\_pays\\_statut=prison&annee\\_start=2022&annee\\_end=2022&exaction\\_victimes\\_pays%5B210%5D=210&typ\\_e%5Botage%5D=otage&&&#exaction-victimes](https://rsf.org/en/barometer?exaction_pays_pays=210&exaction_pays_annee=2000&exaction_pays_statut=prison&annee_start=2022&annee_end=2022&exaction_victimes_pays%5B210%5D=210&typ_e%5Botage%5D=otage&&&#exaction-victimes)

24 [https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/observatory/grid?f%5B0%5D=countries%3A501c7f7d-f0c7-5ac3-a3e8-86ec665c6528&f%5B1%5D=dataset\\_filters%3Ad4a028c7-b988-44c4-9fcd-ef76810a0974&f%5B2%5D=dataset\\_filters%3Ad4a028c7-b988-44c4-9fcd-ef76810a0974&hub=72609&sort\\_by=unesco\\_date&sort\\_order=DESC&date\\_from=2022-01-01&date\\_to=2022-12-31](https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/observatory/grid?f%5B0%5D=countries%3A501c7f7d-f0c7-5ac3-a3e8-86ec665c6528&f%5B1%5D=dataset_filters%3Ad4a028c7-b988-44c4-9fcd-ef76810a0974&f%5B2%5D=dataset_filters%3Ad4a028c7-b988-44c4-9fcd-ef76810a0974&hub=72609&sort_by=unesco_date&sort_order=DESC&date_from=2022-01-01&date_to=2022-12-31)

**Table 1:** Number of killed journalists by type of media in Ukraine in 2022 according to UNESCO

Type of Media	Total
Cross-platform	4 (1 Ukrainian, 3 foreign)
Online	3 (2 Ukrainian, 1 foreign)
Print	1 (1 Ukrainian)
Radio	0
TV	3 (2 Ukrainian, 1 foreign)
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>

Source: UNESCO Observatory of killed journalists

The Ukrainian organization IMI provides data on 43 journalists and media workers who were killed during 2022.<sup>25</sup> The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) also provides data on 43 killed journalists.<sup>26</sup> Data from both organizations includes a breakdown of those journalists who died while on journalistic duty, those who died off-duty and those who died while on military service.

**Table 2:** Number and types of killings of journalists in Ukraine in 2022 according to the NUJU

Type of Assault	Total
On journalistic duty	8 (3 Ukrainian, 5 foreign)
Not on journalistic duty (including military service)	35 (all Ukrainian)
<b>Total</b>	<b>43 (38 Ukrainian, 5 foreign)</b>

Source: National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU)

Other organizations also report on killings of journalists, with numbers depending on the definitions and methodology employed by each. This includes for example the Committee to Protect Journalists (15 killed journalists),<sup>27</sup> the Council of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists (12 killed journalists),<sup>28</sup> and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission for Ukraine (18 killed journalists).

25 IMI, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/freedom-of-speech-barometer-for-december-2022-i49943>

26 The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU), available at: <https://nsju.org/news-english/russias-full-scale-aggression-in-ukraine-takes-lives-of-43-media-representatives-nuju/>

27 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), available at: [https://cpj.org/data/?status=Killed&start\\_year=2022&end\\_year=2024&group\\_by=location&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&motiveUnconfirmed%5B%5D=Unconfirmed&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker](https://cpj.org/data/?status=Killed&start_year=2022&end_year=2024&group_by=location&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&motiveUnconfirmed%5B%5D=Unconfirmed&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker)

28 Council Of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists, available at: <https://fom.coe.int/en/pays/detail/11709594>

One prominent case is the death of the Ukrainian photojournalist Maksym Levin. He went missing on March 2, 2022 while on a journalistic assignment near Kyiv. His body was found on April 1 by the police. RSF later published its own investigation into the circumstances of the journalist's death and regarded it as an execution "in cold blood".<sup>29</sup>

### 1.5 Number of journalists who died not while performing their professional duties

The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) provides data on 13 journalists who died while not directly performing their professional duties.<sup>30</sup> It also recorded 22 deaths of journalists after they joined the armed forces of Ukraine. According to the Geneva Conventions Protocol 1<sup>31</sup>, these journalists are considered combatants, not civilians. Regardless of this classification, their death is still a loss to the journalistic community and the media.

According to the IMI, ten cases of journalists' deaths can be attributed to missile strikes, shelling attacks and artillery fire.<sup>32</sup> In some of these cases, journalists were killed while at home: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty producer Vira Hyrych was reportedly killed while in her own apartment during a Russian shelling attack on Kyiv on April 28, 2022.<sup>33</sup>

### 1.6 Types of threats and attacks on journalists in territories temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation

Obtaining systematic and comprehensive information from temporarily occupied territories is very challenging. As already noted above in this section of the report, limited access to these territories also causes a lack of reliable data.

The media resource of the Center for Human Rights Zmina reports on 98 attacks and threats against journalists and bloggers in the territory of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea during 2022<sup>34</sup>. According to Zmina, 15 independent journalists are behind bars in Crimea and on the territory of Russia<sup>35</sup>.

According to Zmina, the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation was accompanied by the deterioration of the situation in Crimea. In particular, this refers to the introduction of administrative and criminal liability by the Russian government for so-called "false news" about the Russian army, calls for peace and approving of sanctions against the Russian economy.<sup>36</sup>

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29 Reporters Without Borders (RSF), available at: <https://rsf.org/en/exclusive-rsf-investigation-death-maks-levin-information-and-evidence-collected-indicates>

30 National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, available at: <https://nsju.org/news-english/russias-full-scale-aggression-in-ukraine-takes-lives-of-43-media-representatives-nuju/>

31 ICRC, available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/interview/protection-journalists-interview-270710.htm>

32 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

33 RFL, available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/rferl-hyrych-killed-kyiv/31826912.html>

34 Zmina, available at: <https://zmina.info/news/pechonchuk-krym/>

35 Ibid

36 RFL, available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-fake-news-military-invasion-independent-media/31735798.html>

The UN HRMMU also reports on human rights violations in territories temporarily under occupation. In its reports, the organization records violations of human rights and victims among the civilian population, including media professionals. Information collected by the HRMMU on the situation in temporarily occupied Crimea (henceforth Crimea) is presented in a Report of the UN Secretary-General to the UN Human Rights Council.<sup>37</sup> The report covering the period of 1 July to 31 December 2022 noted a progressive increase of convictions in connection with laws curtailing freedom of expression in Crimea.<sup>38</sup> It also lists journalists among the groups most frequently experiencing arbitrary arrest. At the same time, the report notes that all data relies on remote monitoring efforts, since no modality was found with the authorities of the Russian Federation to realize a monitoring mission by the UN to Crimea. Since 2014, based on a request by its Member States, UNESCO monitors and reports on the situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) in UNESCO's fields of competence, including on freedom of expression. Reports covering the situation in 2022 were presented at UNESCO Executive Board sessions in 2022 and 2023.<sup>39</sup>

There are certain differences in the access to freedom of expression in those territories that have not been under the control of the Government of Ukraine for a longer period (such as the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014) and those that were occupied recently, during 2022. In the first case (concerning the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions), the suppression of freedom of speech and oppression of journalists and activists is reported to have occurred more gradually, while in the second case, there was reportedly a rapid deterioration in the situation of journalists' safety within the first weeks after 24 February 2022. For example, journalist Zoreslav Zamoysky, was reportedly found dead on the street in the city of Bucha in early March 2022, with signs of a violent death.<sup>40</sup> Journalist and writer Yevhen Bal reportedly died in Mariupol on 2 April 2022 from injuries incurred during several days of torture.<sup>41</sup>

### 1.7 Number and types of threats against media institutions

Throughout 2022, Ukrainian newsrooms reported threats primarily in connection with the ongoing invasion by the Russian Federation. As mentioned earlier, in total, the IMI reported 67 cases of threats (this includes data on both individual threats, and threats to family members of journalists and media organizations as a whole).<sup>42</sup> For example,

37 Report of the Secretary-General, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5364-situation-human-rights-temporarily-occupied-autonomous-republic>

38 Ibid

39 UNESCO, available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000382685/PDF/382685eng.pdf.multi>;

<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000386692/PDF/386692eng.pdf.multi>

40 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/infographics/list-of-journalists-killed-i45959>

41 Ibid

42 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

"Ukrainska Pravda", one of the oldest online media outlets in Ukraine, which has a well-established reputation and position in the national media market, reported having received emails with threats of "tough interrogations and prison terms" in case of Russian occupation.<sup>43</sup>

Another Ukrainian online media outlet, Glavkom, also reported similar threats.<sup>44</sup> The threats were sent anonymously via email, and they specifically stated that "all the data of the staff of your media has been leaked to the officers of FSB of Russia."

The online media outlet 061.ua from Zaporizhzhia reported receiving emails with threats three times.<sup>45</sup> Another Zaporizhzhia website, inform.zp.ua, also reported receiving threatening messages.<sup>46</sup> The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation was also mentioned in these messages, and the media outlet's staff was reportedly threatened with interrogations and torture if they did not resign. The online portal "Krym Realii" (Crimea Realities), set up within the framework of Radio Free Europe, also reported similar threats.<sup>47</sup>

Testimonies received from CSO representatives during the in-depth interviews carried out for this assessment suggest that in many cases journalists do not take the threats they receive online seriously enough and tend to ignore them.

Many media professionals who took part in these interviews also admitted they do not take online threats seriously, with the exception of media professionals from regional outlets who either had experienced occupation or are in the territories of nearby temporarily occupied parts of the country. Media professionals see this as a potential danger because, firstly, it creates a culture where online threats are normalized and not properly investigated. Secondly, the lack of awareness about the connection between the threats and the actual cases of attacks on journalists<sup>48</sup> increases the toxicity of the environment in which journalists have to perform their professional duties.

## 1.8 Number and type of attacks on media institutions

For some types of media, the availability of equipment, certain resources and workspace is especially critical for carrying out journalistic activities. Digital media proved to be more flexible and adaptable in terms of streamlining the workflow in the face of a full-scale war. At the same time, the print and TV media are much more hindered in conditions where they do not have physical access or lose their production capacity.

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43 Serhiy Sydorenko, editor-in-chief at "Ukrainska Pravda" via social media: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=4874830562571320&set=a.153076604746763>

44 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/news/anonymous-threatens-glavkom-journalists-with-prison-for-terrorism-i44653>

45 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

46 Ibid

47 Institute for Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/news/krym-realiiy-otrymalo-pogrozy-pro-tyuremni-terminy-u-sybiru-i44671>

48 ICFJ, available at: <https://www.icfj.org/news/online-attacks-women-journalists-leading-real-world-violence-new-research-shows>

According to the IMI, in 2022, 16 TV-towers were shelled on the territory of Ukraine. Furthermore, eight newsrooms were seized or devastated by Russian forces.<sup>49</sup> Overall, 24 separate incidents were documented where Ukrainian broadcasting or newspaper dissemination was forcefully interrupted and, in some cases, replaced with the dissemination of Russian news. In some cases, this followed the seizing of television studios, in others, broadcasting signals were jammed. For example, in the city of Melitopol (Zaporizhzhia region), the TV tower was reportedly seized by Russian forces and, as a result, the broadcasting of Ukrainian channels was stopped. Another visible case was the airstrike on the Kyiv TV tower, resulting in the deaths of five people with a further five injured. The TV tower in Kharkiv, another large city in Ukraine, has been attacked several times.<sup>50</sup>

In general, the IMI reports on 216 media outlets having closed down following the 2022 invasion by the Russian Federation.<sup>51</sup>

The NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) provides data on 12 cases of property damage (TV towers or offices).<sup>52</sup> The International Press Institute (IPI) reports on 27 attacks on media infrastructure and offices.<sup>53</sup>

### 1.9 Disaggregated data on the above indicators

UNESCO records data on the killings of journalists disaggregated by sex, type of media, nationality, and type of employment (freelance/staff), as listed under 1.4.

The IMI has disaggregated the types of fatal and non-fatal attacks targeting journalists and media organizations as outlined in the table below.

**Table 3:** Number of attacks on media and journalists in Ukraine in 2022 according to the IMI

Type of Assault	Total
Journalists killed in the line of duty	8
Journalists killed while not in the line of duty (excluding military service)	5
Journalists injured	15
Journalists kidnapped	20
Journalists went missing	14
Journalists received threats	67
Cyber threats	40
Newsrooms seized	8
TV-towers shelled	16
Media outlets closed down	216

Source: Institute of Mass Information (IMI)<sup>54</sup>

49 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

50 Ibid

51 Ibid

52 Reporters Without Borders (RSF), available at: <https://rsf.org/en/ukraine-year-information-warfare-numbers>

53 International Press Institute (IPI), available at: [https://ipi.media/alerts/?topic=russia-ukraine-war&alert\\_type=verbal-online-or-physical-attack&country=ukraine&years=0&search=](https://ipi.media/alerts/?topic=russia-ukraine-war&alert_type=verbal-online-or-physical-attack&country=ukraine&years=0&search=)

54 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/freedom-of-speech-barometer-for-december-2022-i49943>

## 2. Shared understanding and activities of various stakeholders

### 2.1 Among national stakeholder groups, there is an accurate understanding of the extent and nature of the problems

The key national stakeholder groups that are analyzed under this indicator are: the journalistic community, and the Ukrainian government, including different ministries and national, regional and local authorities.

Journalists are aware of the risks they face when covering the war. Also, according to the legislation of Ukraine, they have the right to refuse to perform dangerous tasks and assignments.<sup>55</sup>

As part of the accreditation process (carried out by the Ministry of Defense) for working close to the front line, journalists must undergo specialized training on working in hostile environments and providing first aid.<sup>56</sup> They must also have a set of safety equipment, which includes a high-grade bulletproof vest and a helmet. The introduction of these conditions shows that government stakeholders also understand the risks and address them. Altogether, this gives stakeholders an understanding that the work of reporters in 2022 involved a number of high risks to life, and health and that measures are being taken to reduce the relevant risks.

There is an additional risk of becoming a target for the occupying authorities in territories temporarily not under the control of the government of Ukraine. As described in previous sub-sections, journalists who refuse to cooperate can reportedly become targets for threats, abductions and torture.

Overall, there was a high level of consensus among the media actors interviewed for this assessment that the nature of threats changed greatly in 2022, and that these are now primarily related to the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.

*"The main topic of our investigations and materials concerns war crimes... I almost miss the times when we were engaged in anti-corruption investigations."*

— a quote from an in-depth interview. For security reasons, all quotes here and further are anonymized.

### 2.2 A national strategy exists that identifies targets and role-players responsible for these issues

The assessment confirmed the existence of a number of lower-level rules (which are not part of legislation), guidelines and strategies to enable the work and ensure the safety of journalists. As an example, there are guidelines on the procedure of the Ministry of Defense for issuing press cards for media representatives. These guidelines also include requirements regarding safety equipment, first aid training, etc.

55 Zakon.rada.gov, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/377-99-%D0%BF#Text>

56 mil.gov.ua, available at: [https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou\\_orders/nakaz\\_73\\_zi\\_zminamu.pdf](https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou_orders/nakaz_73_zi_zminamu.pdf)

As concerns the existing legislative background, it was – at the time of this assessment – at the stage of change and renewal, scheduled to be completed in 2023. The legislative framework is described in more detail in the B group of indicators, which is next in this report.

However, the available documents are not sufficient to assert a comprehensive national plan to ensure the safety of journalists. The relevant document of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated 15 October 2021 “On Information Security Strategy”<sup>57</sup>, was put into effect before the research period of this assessment. Often, the initiative to protect media professionals comes from self-organized groups of journalists and the civil society sector.

Nevertheless, there is cooperation between state actors, civil society actors and international organizations to spread awareness about crimes against journalists and the impunity surrounding these. They issue joint statements and condemn crimes against journalists. A number of national-level NGOs, in some cases through the funding provided by international organizations, work on cases of crimes against journalists on a more practical level, providing them with legal advice and support. Through this assistance, they provide a tangible contribution to building a safer environment for journalists.

However, one telling nuance here is that, based on the findings of the in-depth interviews carried out for this assessment, in most cases, journalists who have received threats or experienced a dangerous situation, turn first to their editors or security officers within their media organizations, rather than to the law enforcement agencies.

### 2.3 Information materials are available in the key national languages

As Ukraine has faced hostilities since 2014, by the time of the full-scale invasion in 2022, there was already a body of materials available in the national language, providing safety guidance to journalists working in hostile environments. These materials were created both by civil society organizations, and by state actors.

Further, in 2022, Order No. 73 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine<sup>58</sup>, which regulates the activities of journalists in the combat zone, was updated, and includes further provisions on the equipment that journalists must have, the procedure for the accreditation of media professionals, and cooperation between accredited media professionals and press officers of the armed forces of Ukraine.

### 2.4 Stakeholders collaborate in practice in regard to key public events

Almost the entirety of 2022 was marked by the course of military operations that covered the east, south and north of the country. In this context, holding public events was a highly risky undertaking.

57 president.gov.ua, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/6852021-41069>

58 mil.gov.ua, available at: <https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/zmi/ORDER%2073-English.pdf>

Even with civil society finding ways to rally in regions of the country that are further from the front line, holding public events was subject to a number of restrictions. Mass shelling is a significant threat in any part of the country. Thus, when holding public events, it is necessary to provide for the presence of a bomb shelter or other equivalent reliable shelter. Also, with the beginning of attacks on infrastructure objects in the fall of 2022, blackouts became another challenge. In the absence of electricity, there are also interruptions in the access to mobile communications and the Internet.<sup>59</sup>

Opportunities for holding public events in Ukraine were thus largely limited. Nevertheless, the interested actors came together to make joint statements and coordinate efforts to help journalists without necessarily tying these initiatives to public events. In 2021, the Prosecutor General's Office and media and human rights CSOs signed a memorandum of cooperation on the protection of journalists' rights.<sup>60</sup> During the period covered by this research in 2022, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the National Police, and the Security Service of Ukraine registered war crimes committed in Ukraine, including against journalists.<sup>61</sup> They issued joint statements regarding the data collected and initiated criminal proceedings on alleged criminal offenses against media representatives by the Russian military during the invasion of the territory of Ukraine.<sup>62</sup> More examples of this type of cooperation are available in section D of this assessment.

## 2.5 Safety issues have visibility in relevant days and events

Globally, 2022 saw a sharp rise in killings of journalists, after numbers had steadily declined since 2018. The war played a significant part in this development, with Ukraine being the second deadliest country worldwide that year, after Mexico (where 19 killings of journalists were registered in 2022).<sup>63</sup> In general, the killings of journalists in Ukraine were covered in both the local and international media. Additionally, statements by local organizations (such as the NUJU and the IMI, among others), as well as UNESCO statements, were published for each case, in line with the relevant methodologies of the corresponding monitoring bodies.

Neither World Press Freedom Day 2022 on 3 May nor the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists (IDEI) on 2 November saw an event in Ukraine, due to the ongoing war. However, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published statements on both occasions, calling attention to crimes against journalists and expressing that

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59 Amnesty International, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/12/ukraine-devastating-power-cuts-undermining-civilian-life-as-christmas-approaches/>

60 Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, available at: <https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/11zahist-prav-zhurnalistiv>

61 Ukrinform, available at: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3522417-v-ukraini-porushili-46-sprav-za-zlocini-vijskovih-rf-proti-zurnalistiv.html>

62 Detector Media, available at: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/200758/2022-07-06-politsiya-rozslidui-15-kryminalnykh-provazhzen-za-faktamy-zlochyniv-rosiyan-proty-ukrainskykh-zhurnalistiv/>

63 UNESCO, available at: <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unesco-killings-journalists-50-2022-half-targeted-duty>

perpetrators of crimes should not act with impunity.<sup>64</sup> Global events taking place elsewhere in 2022 brought visibility to the situation of Ukrainian media. For example, the 2022 global World Press Freedom Conference featured an expert panel on the safety of journalists in Ukraine. The global IDEI event, organized by UNESCO and OHCHR in Vienna, also called attention to journalists' safety in the country. Further conferences with the participation and contribution of Ukrainian journalists on the topic of safety took place in neighboring countries and online during 2022.

On 9 September 2022, President Zelensky awarded foreign and Ukrainian journalists, including some that had joined the armed forces, as a way to recognize their contribution to the country.<sup>65</sup> The award ceremony, held at the Presidential Palace in Kyiv, also included a minute of silence to commemorate journalists killed in the war. Through this event, the highest level of government acknowledged the contribution of journalists while also drawing attention to the risks they face.

Further examples of multi-stakeholder cooperation to provide visibility to the safety of journalists in Ukraine are provided in section D of this assessment.

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64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, available at: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/statement-ministry-foreign-affairs-ukraine-occasion-world-press-freedom-day> and <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/statement-ministry-foreign-affairs-ukraine-international-day-ending-impunity-crimes-against-journalists>

65 Office of the President of Ukraine, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-nagorodiv-zhurnalistiv-yaki-boryutsya-za-ukrayinu-77605>



## **CATEGORY B**

**The roles and responsibilities  
of State institutions  
and political actors**

## CATEGORY B

### The roles and responsibilities of State institutions and political actors

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#### Key Indicators

1. State has laws which can protect journalists
2. There are appropriate normative statements, policies, and institutional frameworks that safeguard the importance of journalists' safety
3. The criminal and civil justice system deals effectively with threats and acts of violence against journalists

In Ukraine, there are several laws and other regulatory documents that govern the work of the media and journalists. Civil legislation mainly regulates the procedure for creating media outlets, the rights and obligations of media outlets and journalists, and guarantees for their activities. These legal guarantees include protections for freedom of the press, safeguards against harassment or legal actions that could inhibit journalistic activities, and other legal provisions designed to support the functioning of media outlets. Regarding the safety of journalists and the possibilities of protecting them from criminal encroachments, such dimensions are regulated by criminal legislation, as well as by labor legislation. Defamation is covered by civil law, in line with international standards on freedom of expression.

It is also necessary to take into account that for almost the entirety of 2022, martial law operated in Ukraine, which also left its mark on the regulation of the work of journalists and the media.<sup>66</sup>

All spheres of life in the country underwent a significant transformation due to the invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, and the analysis below will take this into account. The introduction of martial law in Ukraine made it possible for the national authorities to apply the provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law";<sup>67</sup> which, during its operation, permits the limitation of some rights and freedoms, including the right to the freedom of thought and speech, to freely express one's views and beliefs, the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information orally, in writing or in another way, guaranteed by Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine.<sup>68</sup>

In practice, this restriction reportedly led to some local authorities and military-civilian administrations obligating media outlets to show them the content of newspapers before they were published. This phenomenon suggested the existence of signs of censorship on the ground, which authorities justified by wartime requirements, while Article 15 of the Constitution of Ukraine prohibits censorship.<sup>69</sup>

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66 Human Rights Platform, available at: <https://ppl.org.ua/zmi-i-vijna-osoblivosti-poshirennya-informaci%D1%97-ta-foto-pid-chas-voyennogo-stanu.html>

67 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text>

68 president.gov.ua, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-ii>

69 president.gov.ua, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-i>

## 1. State has laws which can protect journalists

The main laws regulating the work of the media in Ukraine are: the Law of Ukraine “On Information”,<sup>70</sup> “On Printed Mass Media (Press) in Ukraine”,<sup>71</sup> “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”,<sup>72</sup> “On Information Agencies”,<sup>73</sup> “On Access to Public Information”,<sup>74</sup> and “On State Media Support, Guarantees of Professional Activity and Social Protection of Journalists”.<sup>75</sup> Also, in December 2022, a new law “On Media” was adopted.<sup>76</sup> However, it entered into force on 31 March 2023,<sup>77</sup> which is outside the period covered by this assessment. The Criminal Code of Ukraine contains a number of articles that provide for liability for violence against journalists (or their family members).<sup>78,79</sup>

Ukrainian legislation regulating the activities of the media and journalists, in terms of ensuring their safety, did not undergo significant changes with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

The only law that was amended in 2022 and that has relation to the safety of journalists was the Law of Ukraine “On State Media Support, Guarantees of Professional Activity and Social Protection of Journalists”. The specified law determines that journalists are guaranteed the rights to labor protection, benefits and compensation for work involving difficult and harmful working conditions, to medical examinations, social insurance, to a comprehensive investigation of accidents, death and damage to health during the performance of their professional duties, and the right to appropriate compensation. The amendment introduced obligations for media outlets to provide safety equipment to journalists traveling to combat areas and also specifies mandatory health and life insurance for journalists working in such areas.

Accordingly, media outlet owners should provide compensation, incentives and benefits to journalists who perform their professional duties in conditions dangerous to life and health. The law also stipulates that if it is impossible to provide the specified guarantees, media outlets do not have the right to send employees to places of emergency or hostilities without their consent.

Media professionals who work as freelancers or do not have a clear affiliation with a particular media organization are thus in a more vulnerable position compared to those who are employed by a media outlet.

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70 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2657-12#Text>

71 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2782-12#Text>

72 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3759-12>

73 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/74/95-bp#Text>

74 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2939-17#Text>

75 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/540/97-bp#Text>

76 Detector media, available at: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/205921/2022-12-13-rada-ukhvalyla-zakon-pro-media/>

77 Detector media, available at: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/209610/2023-03-31-v-ukraini-nabuv-chynnosti-zakon-pro-media/>

78 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/advice/pravovi-porady-zahysti-zhurnalistiv-u-vypadku-napadiv-i-pobyttiv-i29664>

79 Radio Free Liberty, available at: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zakon-zlochyny-proty-zhurnalistiv/31082081.html>

Another important aspect is that Ukraine has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,<sup>80</sup> and the Geneva Conventions<sup>81</sup> (of August 12, 1949). Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, which relates to the protection of victims of armed conflict under article 79 “Measures of protection for journalists”, specifies the following: “Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians.”<sup>82</sup> As civilians, journalists should be protected from all forms of violence during an armed conflict and should not be the targets of attack. However, during the in-depth interview phase of this assessment, testimonies from journalists were received stating that they were targeted by Russian forces, even though their vehicles and crews were appropriately marked as “Press”.

The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees the freedom of speech and expression of views (article 34). However, attempts to misuse the law to restrict media outlets can be observed. The investigative news website Bihus.info faced a number of civil lawsuits claiming to refute false information and protect a business’s reputation. A lawsuit related to an investigation into corruption in the defense sector, which was published back in 2019, was decided by the civil court of cassation in February 2022 in favor of the journalists.<sup>83</sup> Such strategies can be interpreted as a tactic designed to divert part of the resources and efforts of news organizations from their journalistic work to court proceedings.

In general, actors from the group of civil society organizations which provide legal support for journalists and media organizations note that the focus of their work has shifted. Before 24 February 2022, it mostly consisted of responding to consultations by investigative media organizations related to their journalistic investigations. After the invasion, the share of consultations on citizens’ relocation, forced relocation from places of temporary occupation, and especially on double relocation (first from temporarily occupied Crimea or Donbas, and then to safer areas in the west of the country or abroad) increased.

Specialized NGOs and other civil society stakeholders noted that despite the existence of legislation regulating the functioning of the media in Ukraine, there is a lack of synchronization with the bodies responsible for investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes against journalists. This is potentially explained by the fact that no effective law enforcement reform took place in Ukraine.

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80 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>

81 International Committee of the Red Cross, available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions>

82 International Committee of the Red Cross, available at: <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-79>

83 bihus.info, available at: <https://bihus.info/zhurnalisty-bihus-info-ostatochno-vygraly-sud-v-igorya-gladkovskogo/>

## 2. There are appropriate normative statements, policies, and institutional frameworks that safeguard the importance of journalists' safety

The State and state agencies brought their approaches and frameworks regarding the safety of journalists into line with events occurring during 2022. First of all, their official statements and positions were aimed at building interaction with journalists regarding the coverage of military events. State agencies issued clarifications regarding the work of media professionals in wartime through relevant orders, annexes to orders and statements and clarifications by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.<sup>84</sup>

One of the initial legal acts formalizing the relationship between the media and the State was Order No. 73 of March 3, 2022, issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (see also Indicator Category A, 2.3). Titled "On the Organization of Interaction between the armed forces of Ukraine, Other Components of the Defense Forces, and Media Representatives for the Period of Martial Law,"<sup>85</sup> this order defines a list of information that is prohibited from being published. However, it includes several definitions not found in any other regulatory acts, such as "marks identifying an object," "unique operations," "effectiveness of defense forces," "electronic warfare," and more. These definitions lack clarity, which creates a potentially open-ended opportunity for the State to restrict the dissemination of information on military topics. It can lead to unjustified censorship and the criminal prosecution of journalists due to the ambiguous and unclear nature of these terms.

During interviews, participants among political and state actors also mentioned the existence of internal guidelines for cooperating with journalists that different state entities have.

The State and the relevant state institutions use both, data collected by internal tools and mechanisms (for example, through the National Police of Ukraine and the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and data collected by civil society organizations (such as the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine or the Institute of Mass Information). Also, there is occasional cooperation between these entities for the purpose of safety training for journalists (physical and cyber security, landmine security, first aid training).

After 24 February 2022, a significant number of international correspondents arrived in Ukraine, aiming to cover the course of military operations. To do this, journalists had to apply for accreditation from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Therefore, one of the first policies and guidelines that were developed by state structures concerned the procedure for journalists to obtain accreditation, cooperation with press officers, and security rules. These policies were created in Ukrainian and English. They were distributed through the website of the ministry<sup>86</sup> and a number of social networks and digital platforms

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84 Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, available at: [https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou\\_orders/nakaz\\_73\\_zi\\_zminamu.pdf](https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou_orders/nakaz_73_zi_zminamu.pdf)

85 Ibid

86 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, available at: <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/03/04/the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-conduct-accreditation-of-mass-media-to-cover-russias-military-crimes/>

(Facebook, Viber, Telegram). Furthermore, during the interviews, respondents working for state institutions noted that in most cases, journalists themselves approached them with their requests. In addition to publicly disseminated policies and guidelines, military agencies have internal guidelines designed to explain how to interact with journalists.

Some criticisms from the Ukrainian and international media community were raised regarding the military accreditation process. RSF called to respect freedom of expression and to ensure the proportionality of any limitations on journalistic access are proportionate.<sup>87</sup> The Ukrainian Commission on Journalism Ethics has called on armed forces to “maintain a reasonable balance between security and defense measures and the public’s right to receive verified information.”<sup>88</sup> A statement signed by representatives of multiple Ukrainian media and media development organizations in March 2022 called for clarification and transparency in the accreditation process, as well as for sensitization of the military towards the important role of journalists covering hostilities.<sup>89</sup>

It is also important to mention that interview respondents noted that, due to the volatility of the situation in the country, policies and guidelines like the ones referred to in this section require regular review and updating. For example, the foundations for the mechanism for issuing accreditations for journalists were constituted around 2015, with the occupation of Crimea and the beginning of hostilities in eastern Ukraine. Since then, this mechanism has been updated three times, taking into account changes in the situation.

A significant shortcoming is that no specific risks for female journalists are identified or highlighted in policies or public statements. Also, the gender criterion is very weakly taken into account during data collection for monitoring the general situation regarding crimes against journalists.

### 3. The criminal and civil justice system deals effectively with threats and acts of violence against journalists

As of 2022, the National Police of Ukraine had separate digital channels for receiving complaints about crimes against journalists and investigating them.<sup>90</sup>

Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine “On State Media Support, Guarantees of Professional Activity and the Social Protection of Journalists” specifies that responsibility for committing a criminal offense against a journalist in connection with the performance of his/her professional duties or obstruction of his/her professional activities is equated to responsibility for committing the same actions against a law enforcement officer.

87 RSF, available at: <https://rsf.org/en/rsf-urges-ukrainian-authorities-lift-arbitrary-restrictions-reporters-field>

88 CJE, available at: <https://cje.org.ua/statements/zayava-shchodo-neprypustymosti-tysku-i-zastosuvannia-podviynykh-standartiv-do-zhurnalistiv-iaki-vysvitluiu-viynu/>

89 Detector Media, available at: <https://detector.media/community/article/197930/2022-03-28-zhurnalisty-prosyat-prypynyty-tskuvannya-cherez-neobgruntovani-zvynuvachennya-u-koryguvanni-vognyu-zayava/>

90 National Police, available at: [https://dn.npu.gov.ua/news/politsiya-donechchini-reague-na-kozhne-zvernennya-zhurnalistiv-pro-pereshkodzhannya-profesynoi-diyalnosti?\\_cf\\_chl\\_tk=IKLVAOcwghGZGI5BY1BnsKexZnRQEZCPsNI4hyRztw-1714743923-0.0.1.1-1578](https://dn.npu.gov.ua/news/politsiya-donechchini-reague-na-kozhne-zvernennya-zhurnalistiv-pro-pereshkodzhannya-profesynoi-diyalnosti?_cf_chl_tk=IKLVAOcwghGZGI5BY1BnsKexZnRQEZCPsNI4hyRztw-1714743923-0.0.1.1-1578)

Statistics with a gender focus are rarely or not collected in this regard. During interviews carried out with key stakeholders for this assessment, many expressed the perception that gender does not play a distinct role in the current state of media actors' physical safety, as war-related violence impacts everyone and all journalists covering war and hostilities are at risk, without exception. The key risks interviewees identified are associated with various types of shelling, proximity to combat zones, and other related factors.

The gender component has thus not been a key consideration in the security and justice systems of Ukraine as regards to journalists' safety in 2022. However, a group of actors from civil society (for example, the Ukrainian organization Women in the Media) and UN structures have noted that they are working to ensure that a gender lens is integrated into the development of policies and strategies in this field in the future.

In relation to the abovementioned considerations, it is relevant to note that the percentage of female journalists covering the war and related aspects is increasing due to the fact that many male journalists have joined the ranks of the armed forces of Ukraine, as a result of conscription or as volunteers.

There are channels of communication between journalists' organizations and state actors related to security issues in the country. The latter use data from journalist associations and specialized NGOs within the framework of monitoring the situation regarding crimes against journalists. They also make statements concerning the safety of journalists and publicly condemn crimes against them. Thus, the foundations for cooperation between these two stakeholder groups have been laid.

Nevertheless, the in-depth interviews conducted as part of this assessment appear to indicate that the media themselves consider that the attention paid to crimes against journalists is insufficient.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Ukraine should improve the legislation governing the interaction between the media and the armed forces during wartime and in line with international standards, also as referred to in the Global Toolkit for Law Enforcement Agents: Freedom of Expression, Access to Information and Safety of Journalists published by UNESCO.<sup>91</sup> Current legislation<sup>92</sup> has several shortcomings that restrict media's work in war coverage, including, for instance, vague definitions when it comes to prohibited content, the allocation of specific State responsibility for the protection of journalists and for ensuring an environment conducive to media freedom, as well as for approving changes regarding restrictions on journalists' reporting (also pertaining to coverage of pre-trial investigations and trials).<sup>93</sup> This legislation should be amended for clarity, in line with international standards, and in collaboration with media organizations and journalists.

91 UNESCO, available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000383978>

92 Order issued on March 3, 2022, titled "On the organization of interaction between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces, and representatives of the mass media during the period of the legal regime of martial law"

93 See Annex 2, List of information, the disclosure of which may lead to the enemy's awareness of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defense forces and negatively affect the course of assigned tasks during the legal regime of martial law

2. The order legislating journalists' accreditation fails to establish clear criteria for both granting and denying journalists' accreditation, or an appeals procedure in cases of rejected applications.<sup>94</sup> It is recommended that the order be amended to include specific provisions in this regard, through a participatory process including media organizations, to ensure adequate awareness among and engagement with these processes by government authorities and media actors, in line with international standards.

3. It is necessary to ensure broad awareness of legislation and orders that impact press freedom and the work of journalists and media organizations. It is recommended that state authorities strategically engage with media actors and media development CSOs to share current information on legislative changes and open a channel of sustainable dialogue between media and policy stakeholders.

4. It is recommended that Government officials, together with international development partners, allocate resources for the identification of gaps in the implementation of Article 17<sup>95</sup>, that a participatory process, together with media stakeholders, is undertaken to close these shortcomings, as well as priority gaps in other provisions that address journalists' physical safety - including allocation of Personal Protective Equipment and compensation for physical harm and property damage - in line with international standards.

5. It is recommended that state authorities engage with media actors to identify legislative orders that place an additional financial burden on media organizations, such as the mandatory provision of individual protective equipment and insurance for journalists if they intend to carry out their tasks in combat zones, to identify more sustainable mechanisms for journalists' safety while also ensuring that they do not in any way negatively impact on press freedom.

6. Current provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine that protect journalists should be amended to strengthen criminal liability for obstructing the activities of journalists, in line with established precedents of national and courts and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

7. It is recommended to clarify the protections of media workers as non-combatants working in areas of active hostility, in line with international humanitarian law, and UN documents such as UN Security Council Resolution 2222<sup>96</sup> by including a corresponding provision in national legislation, and ensuring the identification and assignation of liability for those responsible for crimes committed against journalists within the context of war.

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94 Issued on March 3, 2022, titled "On the organization of interaction between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defense forces, and representatives of the media for the duration of the martial law regime"

95 Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine "On State Media Support, Guarantees of Professional Activity and the Social Protection of Journalists"

96 United Nations, available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/793613?ln=en>

- 8.** Ukrainian legislation pertaining to the safety of journalists should, in consultation with international and media development partners, and in line with international normative statements such as HRC Resolution 51/9,<sup>97</sup> include gender-responsive indicators and liability for gendered crimes against journalists and media that exacerbate women's and members of other marginalized groups' vulnerability and negatively impact on their participation in media and coverage of the war.
- 9.** It is recommended that state authorities establish engagement with the media and media development partners through creation of an Ombudsman or similar body within the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights. This office could increase the capacity of state officials to monitor the implementation of relevant national and international legislation, coordinate engagement with international organizations and criminal courts, and identify violations of existing standards and rights as relates to media, and specifically to crimes committed against journalists.
- 10.** It is recommended to consider the establishment of a national multi-stakeholder mechanism for the Safety of Journalists in line with the principles to prevent violence against journalists, protect journalists and prosecute crimes against journalists as stipulated in the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.

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<sup>97</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, available at:

<https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FRES%2F51%2F9&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>



## **CATEGORY C**

**The roles and responsibilities  
of State institutions  
and political actors**



## The roles and responsibilities of State institutions and political actors

### Key Indicators

1. CSOs and academia monitor safety and share information
2. National CSOs promote coordinated approaches to journalists' safety issues
3. CSOs and academia build knowledge and capacity

Throughout 2022, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) played a fundamental role in the security response essential for the continued functioning of the independent media in Ukraine. With governmental resources mainly directed toward the war effort and media organizations suffering significant financial losses such as the breakdown of advertising income due to the war, CSOs (both national and international) extensively provided journalists with technical, financial, and psychological support, facilitated the relocation of individuals and media outlets, and provided them with a safe working environment.

The assessment of CSOs' efforts demonstrated three characteristic features: a) CSOs provided complex support aimed at stabilizing and improving journalists' safety; b) CSOs operated in the niches they had expertise in before the 2022 invasion; b) CSOs coordinated using informal horizontal connections without creating an institutional mechanism.

Ukrainian universities prioritized the continuity of their educational programmes, modifying some of their courses to ensure they respond to the specific safety challenges, and supplementing them with extra-curricular activities aimed at improving knowledge about wartime journalism.

### 1. CSOs and academia monitor safety and share information

#### 1.1 CSOs research and monitor safety issues of journalists

CSOs, which traditionally conducted systematic monitoring of journalists' security issues, continued to do so throughout 2022 (e.g. IMI<sup>98</sup> and NUJU<sup>99</sup>). Their reports are public and often referenced by governmental and non-governmental actors. For example, almost all interviewed partners from civil society explicitly mentioned those monitoring reports as reliable sources of information.

*"The statistical data collected by our partners at [anonymised for security reasons] is completely relevant and can be taken into account".*

98 IMI, available here: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

99 NUJU, available here: <https://nsju.org/news-english/russias-full-scale-aggression-in-ukraine-takes-lives-of-43-media-representatives-nuju/>

Furthermore, the close-knit nature of the Ukrainian media community results in media professionals being aware of security incidents affecting colleagues, even if these are not documented through a formalized data-gathering process. As described by one of the stakeholders:

*“We find out about most cases, because they are our acquaintances, or acquaintances of our acquaintances. These are all members of a journalistic community”.*

While the safety of media professionals is a strong focus of CSOs, the specific challenges faced by women journalists have not been a focus topic for most NGOs in Ukraine, due to the fact that media professionals did not identify the primary risks as being gender-related (see sections 1.2 and 1.4 of this report). The NGO “Women in Media” exclusively focuses its research and the support it provides on women journalists and media workers.

Ukrainian academia did not conduct separate monitoring and research on media workers’ safety. However, universities responded by introducing extra-curricular specialized safety-related training and courses, such as “an [international organization] conducted training sessions for lecturers regarding open source intelligence methods” or “a [full-day] training session regarding the behavior of journalists during combat activities... how to hide in a shelter during shelling”. Universities also took part in projects aimed at researching and countering Russian hybrid threats including disinformation and cyberattacks, in collaboration with national counterparts and international organizations (e.g. the Erasmus Warn Project<sup>100</sup>).

### 1.2 CSOs analyse data to produce a high-quality understanding of the circumstances and causes of killings and impunity

CSOs that monitor the threats faced by journalists rigorously investigate emerging cases in order to document the incidents they involve. The IMI and the NUJU have concluded that, for the most part, the risks faced by journalists fall within two broad categories: a) risks that affect the entire civilian population (e.g. missile and artillery attacks, indiscriminate fire, killings connected to alleged assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces); b) risks that are directly connected with journalists’ professional activity. In the latter case, on a number of occasions, civil society organizations have alleged that soldiers of the Russian Federation acted with hostility towards journalists, intentionally targeting national and international media professionals (see reports by IMI, NUJU.)<sup>101 102</sup>

### 1.3 CSOs provide information to the media and the wider public

Information and conclusions from CSOs’ monitoring activities are made widely available to all actors and individuals. They can either be accessed on CSOs’ web pages in the form of public reports or as news pieces adapted from these reports and published on websites and partners’ social network accounts.

100 Warn Erasmus, available at: <https://warn-erasmus.eu/>

101 IMI, available here: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/467-crimes-against-journalists-and-media-in-ukraine-committed-by-russia-in-ten-months-of-the-war-i49772>

102 NUJU, available here: <https://nsju.org/news-english/russias-full-scale-aggression-in-ukraine-takes-lives-of-43-media-representatives-nuju/>

## 1.4 CSOs monitor and report specific attacks upon or harassment of women journalists or other specifically targeted groups

As mentioned before, the main risks to journalists' safety were related to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the resulting war. The dominant risks such as shelling target women and men equally.

While there is limited research on women journalists' safety issues, in November 2022 the CSO Women in Media and the Ukrainian Women's Fund published a comprehensive report titled "The Situation of Women Journalists and Other Women Media Workers in Ukraine".<sup>103</sup> As a consequence of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the report states: "The war further narrows the space for the advocacy of policies of equality, which seem less relevant, although, according to statistics, discrimination and violence tend to grow at such points in history. Risks for women in the media are especially aggravated due to physical and economic threats, increased workload both at work, which is socially important, and outside of work, related to the need to care for relatives, especially if they find themselves in danger due to the hostilities in Ukraine."<sup>104</sup>

The report also notes that Ukraine belongs to the so-called "gender-blind countries" and quotes data from the study "Comparing Gender and Media Equality Across the Globe" by the Nordicom Center. "Gender-blind countries are those whose media claims they have no issues with discrimination against women, and which do not understand the obstacles women face in this sector."<sup>105</sup>

CSO interview partners also highlighted the online harassment of women journalists as one safety risk with a gender-related basis. They reported that a higher degree of online violence usually occurred after gender-related publications and statements by women journalists.

In 2022, Ukrainian Channel 5 presented a calendar containing explicit photos of their women journalists (without faces) with weapons. While the aim of the calendar was to raise funds for the armed forces of Ukraine, it faced strong opposition from a part of media professionals, who claimed the initiative was being used to spread sexist and discriminatory narratives.<sup>106</sup> Several prominent women journalists who opposed the calendar, experienced "significant hate" due to their position. In one of the cases, unknown individuals "discovered sensitive photos of a [female] journalist and "started sharing [them] in closed messages"; "they sent text messages to her husband, who was fighting at the time".<sup>107</sup>

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103 Women in Media and Ukrainian Women's Fund, available on Detector Media (in Ukrainian): <https://detector.media/infospace/article/205802/2022-12-09-stanovyshche-zhurnalistok-ta-inshykh-pratsivnyts-media-v-ukraini-z-urakhuvannyam-dosvidu-pislya-24-lyutogo-2022-roku/>

104 Ibid

105 Ibid, p.6

106 BBC, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-63891864>

107 Ibid

One of the stakeholders involved in monitoring the relevant cases of harassment said that they “did not record any cases” where the perpetrators “had been punished”. This means that there are incidental reports pointing towards an existing problem with online violence targeting women journalists and a climate of impunity, but representative studies are missing.

### 1.5 CSOs provide information to UN agencies and to the Universal Periodic Review process about journalists’ safety

The Universal Periodic Review, which is a United Nations Member States peer review mechanism, last reviewed the human rights track record of Ukraine in 2017. The next review of Ukraine is tentatively scheduled for October 2026.<sup>108</sup> In the 2017 submission, the key CSO contribution on the topics of media freedom and the safety of journalists was a joint contribution by international and national organizations (ARTICLE 19, Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, Anti-corruption Research and Education Centre, Human Rights Information Centre, Human Rights Platform, Regional Press Development Institute).<sup>109</sup> Submissions covering the situation in 2022 will not be provided until 2026.

Beyond the Universal Periodic Review Process, CSOs cooperate with UN agencies to a varying degree—while some have regular joint projects, others only share information with the UN upon request. Among the CSOs interviewed for this report, half reported actively sharing information with UN agencies.

Most CSOs do not implement dedicated monitoring of journalists’ safety and thus do not have data to provide. Furthermore, the lack of a single coordination body among CSOs likely also factors into this. Organizations have certain points of intersection and synchronization of efforts, but these are not comprehensive and, for example, do not apply to data collection and exchange. Those CSOs without active cooperation with UN agencies do not seem to have a clear incentive to share safety-related information with other interested parties.

## 2. National CSOs promote coordinated approaches to journalists’ safety issues

### 2.1 CSOs have the resources to work on safety issues

Due to increased donor support, CSOs had the financial capacity to work on prioritized safety issues, including monitoring, the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE), first aid kits, and relocation. However, budget limitations meant that CSOs were unable to hire additional staff despite the increased workload.

108 OHCHR, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/ua-index>

109 OHCHR, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/art19/2017/en/116176>

The situation was especially challenging in the first half of 2022, when simultaneous relocation of CSOs and a steep growth in journalists' needs resulted in long working hours for the available staff. Even after the first half of 2022, CSOs were often unable to find ad hoc replacements if one of the staff members fell ill or was unavailable due to security reasons, thus increasing mental and physical fatigue across organizations. One stakeholder highlighted that these problems were even more severe regarding management, whose presence was critical for the organization's functioning:

*"During prolonged power outages one of our team members experienced strong anxiety... It was a difficult situation, because she was a middle manager; when the person was anxious, the entire branch suffered."*

The low staff capacity can be attributed to several factors, such as the outflow of the already limited number of professionals due to emigration and relocation, the high workload, and average financial compensation when compared to international organizations.

Thus, when considering the availability of resources to work on safety issues, the resources available to ensure proper mental and financial support for those doing the work should also be factored in. One stakeholder explicitly stated that while significant stress came from work-related issues, regular missile strikes, shellings and air alarms significantly reduced the quality of rest essential for effective operation.

## 2.2 CSOs co-operate among themselves and with other stakeholders

CSOs generally cooperate with each other, primarily relying on informal ad hoc communication, given the existence of a small number of media-related CSOs in Ukraine and in absence of an institutionalized coordination body. This results in a system where cooperation between actors is strongly reliant on their inter-organizational relations.

In 2022, CSOs generally exercised a degree of cooperation in some areas, including sharing information products such as reports or training materials, coordinating the procurement of PPE, and promoting training.

A prominent example happened in May 2022, when the Association of Independent Regional Publishers of Ukraine (AIRPU), the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law, Detector Media, the Institute of Mass Information, the Institute for the Development of Regional Press and Sospilnist Foundation set up an International Insurance Fund for Journalists<sup>110</sup>, which supports journalists during one to three days-long trips to combat areas, occupied or recently liberated territories. The insurance covers medical costs of up to USD 100,000 in case of injury. The same amount can be provided to the journalist's family in case of death. Journalists from media outlets that comply with the Code of Journalistic Ethics can apply, following which a Coordinating Council decides if the insurance can be granted.

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110 Sospilnist Foundation, available at: <https://sospilnist.org/en/2022/05/03/international-insurance-fund-for-journalists-has-been-created-in-ukraine/>

Concerning cooperation with other actors, CSOs, reliant on external support, actively cooperate with donors. CSOs whose activities had a training component and which actively supplied personal protective equipment (PPE) also reported cooperation with international journalistic organizations.

Traditionally, CSOs have actively coordinated with Ukrainian state agencies regarding, for example, media literacy and disinformation. Regarding security issues, CSOs cooperated with the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, which provided training on “anti-mine, radiological, and chemical security”.

### **2.3 National NGOs have significant consultation and coordination with international NGOs**

National CSOs had a degree of consultation with their international partners, who were often eager to share their best practices and financial support with Ukrainian media workers. National CSOs were an essential intermediary in organizing training sessions and distributing monetary support, personal protective equipment and first aid kits provided by international partners.

CSOs reported cooperating with, among others: the Dart Centre, Free Press Unlimited, the Fojo Media Institute, the Global Forum for Media Development, International Media Support, the International Press Institute, Reporters without Borders, and the Rory Peck Trust.

### **2.4 CSOs cooperate effectively with the state, legislative bodies, the UN and others in contributing to law and policy-making**

Ukrainian CSOs differ in their degree of cooperation with state and international actors concerning legislation and new policies.

In 2019, many national CSOs and media organizations formed the Media for a Conscious Choice (Mediarukh)<sup>111</sup> movement, aimed at supplying citizens with comprehensive information about presidential and parliamentary candidates. Since then, Mediarukh has presented a unified position of its members regarding various policies and issues. In 2022, the movement lobbied for transparent access for journalists to the frontlines, criticized strict access restrictions during martial law, urged faster accreditation procedures for foreign journalists, and reacted to the State’s prohibition of the digital broadcasting of Espresso, Priamyi, and Channel 5 (the three channels were disconnected from the digital broadcasting systems in April 2022).<sup>112</sup>

One example of the successful lobbying efforts of Ukrainian CSOs concerned the insurance element of the amendment to the law “On State Media Support, Guarantees of the Professional Activity and Social Protection of Journalists” mentioned under Indicator

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111 Detector Media, available at: <https://detector.media/tag/4798/>

112 Reporters without borders, available at: <https://rsf.org/en/three-ukrainian-tv-news-channels-barred-digital-video-broadcasting-past-year>

B paragraph 1. The amendment regarding obligatory insurance for journalists working in war zones, which was passed on 8 June,<sup>113</sup> allowed insurance to be “paid for not only by the employers”, thereby legally enabling the establishment of the International Insurance Fund for Journalists mentioned under 2.2 above.

### 3. CSOs and academia build knowledge and capacity

#### 3.1 Academic and other journalists’ training courses include adequate professional training on safety issues

In 2022, there many online and offline training courses were provided which aimed at improving journalists’ physical, digital and psychological safety. These covered aspects ranging from how to report in high-intensity hostile environments, risk management, first aid and the use of PPE training, to digital security and mental resilience courses. CSOs usually involve national and foreign professionals to combine the sharing of good international practices with high knowledge of the Ukrainian context.

For the most part, academia was not in a position to swiftly introduce this type of training as a part of their formal programs due to the constraints of the educational system. However, they created extra-curricular activities that addressed security issues and adjusted the contents of existing courses to better prepare students for work in a war context. Journalism departments also urged students to take part in CSO training sessions. Overall, academia focuses on the general education of students rather than specialized training for war journalists.

The decentralized nature of the academic activities meant that their quality and frequency greatly depended on the proactiveness and resources of faculties and their members.

#### 3.2 CSOs provide relevant information, including training opportunities and resources to journalists

CSOs actively advertised their training activities and resource opportunities to journalists via their own and their partners’ webpages, social media channels, informal chat groups, and interpersonal communication. Several CSOs (for example, the Society Foundation) have been active in publishing opportunities for journalists on their social media accounts. CSOs collaborate in sharing opportunities for journalists in an effort to engage with the broadest possible audience.

CSOs reported a high number of inquiries by journalists regarding their services, which indicates that the media community has been well-informed about the current opportunities and how to apply for them.

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113 Rada.gov.ua, available at: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39587>

### 3.3 CSOs provide legal advice and services to journalists on safety issues, including counselling and assistance to journalists under threat and to families of murdered journalists

At least three well-established CSOs (IMI, RPDI, Women in Media) provided legal support to journalists on various topics, including safety issues. The CSOs consulted for this study agreed that there had been a sharp reduction in the number of legal incidents of domestic origin in 2022, which resulted in fewer journalistic requests for this type of support. One of the stakeholders reported that “after the full-scale invasion, we helped journalists that relocated, and we shall continue doing so”.

In 2022, CSOs also collected information on killed and injured journalists to provide legal assistance in future national or international hearings.

CSOs highlighted that they could not provide genuine legal assistance in temporarily occupied territories due to the physical danger involved and lack of the rule of law.

### 3.4 CSOs develop programmes that provide specific support for women journalists

Women in Ukraine in many cases have the principal care-taking responsibility within a family, often alongside paid work.<sup>115</sup> The situation has been further intensified by men volunteering to serve in the armed forces of Ukraine and the mass mobilization of men for the war effort. Women journalists surveyed by the Women in Media organization expressed psychological stress caused by the double burden of working and care taking.<sup>116</sup> Despite this, CSO support programmes for journalists did not generally include a specific gender component. However, as a consequence of martial law introduced on 24 February 2022, which limits most men from leaving Ukraine, women were the main beneficiaries of support programmes that involve traveling outside of the country.

The CSO Women in Media is the only Ukrainian NGO specifically focused on providing assistance to women journalists, through financial and psychological support as well as through peer-support groups.<sup>117</sup>

### 3.5 CSOs evaluate and report on the training and support initiatives undertaken.

CSOs generally perform extensive evaluation and reporting concerning their activities, since they primarily rely on donor financial support. In addition, many CSOs publish reports on their web pages and social media accounts to show their expenditure transparently.

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114 Media Development Foundation, available at: <https://research.mediadevelopmentfoundation.org/en/2022.html>

115 “The Situation of Women Journalists and Other Women Media Workers in Ukraine” available in Ukrainian here: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dhfWfHbKtkdAJV\\_GsQTfk7kueikKxuh7/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dhfWfHbKtkdAJV_GsQTfk7kueikKxuh7/view)

116 *Ibid*

117 Hromadske Radio, available at: <https://hromadske.radio/podcasts/my-ie-buly-y-budem-informatsiynny-maraton/u-media-pratsiue-bil-she-zhinok-popry-tse-ikh-dosi-dyskryminuiut-doslidzhennia>

CSOs are actively trying to enrich the existing knowledge base so as to ensure that any future support initiatives are guided by actual needs. The IMI is most notable for this, as they have the capacity to constantly monitor the media sphere in Ukraine. Other CSOs have conducted research on journalists' needs, to ensure that the activities described in 3.3 and 3.4 were evidence-based.

### **3.6 CSOs provide safety equipment and training for vulnerable media workers**

Journalists working in hazardous environments strongly relied on the PPE procured by CSOs. Depending on the situation, CSOs provided the media with helmets, body armor and first aid kits for a fixed or indefinite period. While the major deficit in safety equipment was addressed during the first half of 2022, these supplies must be regularly replenished, meaning that they remain a necessary expense in CSOs' budgets.

Furthermore, CSOs have facilitated mental health support groups, to ensure that journalists have the capacity to continue working despite the challenging context. Organizations such as the Media Development Foundation (MDF) and the Dart Center have been providing psychological support and organizing support groups both for journalists and editors — ensuring resources to deal with witness trauma, graphic imagery, and daily contact with sensitive content.

### **3.7 CSOs provide, where appropriate, places of refuge or safe houses for media workers under severe threat**

CSOs supported media workers with relocation by finding them temporary places of refuge and work, and helped them look for job opportunities so that they could support themselves in the long term. Most prominently, and with the support of UNESCO and the International Federation of Journalists, the NUJU opened a network of Journalists' Solidarity Centers in Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro. This is discussed further under category D, indicator 2.3. The IMI opened a network of "Mediabaza" hubs in the Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv and Zhytomyr regions. In addition, the Lviv Media Forum set up a hub in Lviv, and many CSOs such as the Media Development Foundation (MDF) and the Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI) opened regional offices which also served as temporary places of refuge.

CSOs made financial support for relocation a crucial point, as a relatively huge number of media professionals were forced to flee their main areas of operations — such as Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kyiv, Sievierodonetsk, and others. Among the organizations that joined this effort are: the MDF and the Lviv Media Forum. A wide range of possible safe spaces and support possibilities were thus organized for journalists to use.

### 3.8 CSOs participate in humanitarian relief efforts for journalists under threat or who have been killed or injured

CSOs independently support injured journalists or the families of media professionals who have been killed or kidnapped. On some occasions, these efforts have been financed by international journalistic organizations. CSOs have used their wide media outreach network to raise awareness of people in need (for example, in the case of Oleh Baturyn mentioned under Indicator A, 1.3, a journalist of Nova Kakhovka who was reportedly kidnapped by Russian forces).

Furthermore, as mentioned previously, in May 2022, six CSOs created an International Insurance Fund for Journalists for media professionals that conduct work trips to the frontlines.

However, a lack of formalized coordination among CSOs meant that occasionally some organizations have not been aware of the specific nature of such efforts carried out by their counterparts.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. CSOs should continue their efforts to support the safety of journalists holistically and comprehensively, taking into consideration the mental health of journalists and media workers - aiming to reduce the level of mental fatigue and strengthen resilience, including through the provision of resources - in addition to physical safety and digital security. They should also actively seek grants to ensure the involvement of professional psychologists in the support they facilitate, both during wartime and in its aftermath.
2. CSOs and academia should strengthen cooperation, possibly through the codification of strategic monitoring and data-gathering, to create incentives for participation in these efforts, including visibility and access to data and other resources. This coordination - possibly through establishment of a CSO network - should enhance the pooling of resources, including human resources, for the mental and physical wellbeing of CSO staff.
3. CSOs and academia should prioritize closer engagement with state authorities, through the provision of research and monitoring data on journalists' safety. In particular, an official and secure channel of communication between these stakeholders and law enforcement should be established to share data on possible crimes committed against journalists (including possible war crimes). In line with recommendation nr. 10 under indicators section B, CSOs are recommended to consider active participation in the establishment of a multi-stakeholder national mechanism on safety of journalists.

4. Ukrainian academia, together with CSOs and representatives of the media should similarly conduct dedicated monitoring and research on the safety of journalists for the generation of data to inform policies and initiatives aimed at improving journalists' safety. Additional coordinated monitoring initiatives could also serve to encourage more transparency on the part of state authorities.
5. CSOs should dedicate adequate resources to monitor and tackle gender-specific challenges, including the holistic safety of women journalists facing physical and economic threats as well as their declining resilience due to increased workloads both at work and in their personal lives. Capacity building initiatives and resources should be specifically tailored by international and local CSOs to address these unique challenges and better ensure women journalists' safety.



# **CATEGORY D**

**The roles and response  
of media actors  
and intermediaries**



## The roles and response of media actors and intermediaries

### Key Indicators

1. Media organizations adopt specific measures to protect the safety of journalists
2. Journalists' unions and professional bodies take specific measures to promote the safety of journalists
3. All media actors, including individual journalists, are aware of safety in digital communications
4. Media actors cover safety issues
5. Intermediary entities respect journalists' safety

Ukrainian media organizations and journalists faced numerous critical challenges throughout 2022 in the context of the ongoing war. The threats to the physical and psychological security of media workers were unprecedented. Fast-changing conditions prompted the media to seek flexible solutions and constantly review and update them. The urgency of the situation, however, hindered the formalization of safety-related policies. According to conducted interviews, written policies to protect journalists' safety exist only in a minority of media organizations. However, informal practices have been established and spread across the vast majority of media outlets.

While many media have had limited capacity to provide all the necessary support to ensure the safety of journalists in such a complicated environment, they have cooperated with other actors, predominantly CSOs (both national and international), to equip their staff with knowledge, training and (PPE). Many journalists themselves made a significant effort to acquire the necessary skills, establish networks with colleagues and develop good practices to ensure their own safety to the greatest extent possible. The lack of adequate insurance and often precarious terms of employment remain one of the most acute endemic issues for journalists. Adverse effects of stress and burnout caused by the continuous exposure to risks also require attention and policy solutions.

### 1. Media organizations adopt specific measures to protect the safety of journalists

#### 1.1 Media organizations monitor safety issues and have a safety policy that is written and available to staff

The full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 and fast-changing conditions on the ground throughout the year made it quite challenging for media organizations to monitor safety issues. However, these unprecedented threats compelled media organizations to look for flexible solutions to monitor and address safety issues and adjust them in response to the new challenges. Few organizations have developed written safety policies, but the oral transmission of recommended practices and the discussion of safety recommendations are widespread and ongoing, both within the editorial teams and in the broader professional community.

Prior to 24 February 2022, many media outlets discussed possible scenarios for their organizations' work in case of an invasion. However, few could foresee the actual scale and all-encompassing reach of the invasion. Several larger media outlets, mostly broadcasters, made some preparations in advance, by moving part of their equipment into the western regions to ensure uninterrupted broadcasting, and renting facilities in these locations, etc. Some smaller organizations, including those from the eastern regions, also took precautionary measures. As one of the editors said in the interview,

*"We had been preparing for this whole story, since the end of 2021 approximately, because we saw, we monitored the situation in the occupied areas. We were working in the Donetsk region and we realized that even if, say, Lviv was not bombed, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions would certainly be affected. That's why we were preparing for the evacuation. We were looking for ways to work, solutions for broadcasting and so on. And on February 24 we transferred our radio station to re-broadcast Ukrainian Radio. We also understood that we had to relocate our staff."*

Most of the media organizations, however, reacted to the developments in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. Their first major concerns and actions included reaching out to all staff members, identifying and coordinating their locations, and making decisions on the evacuation of (some) team members. As tensions escalated and a number of Ukrainian towns and communities became occupied by Russian forces, those media organizations that had their staff members in the temporarily occupied territories had to monitor the developments and seek information from the available sources, often with a greatly deteriorated connection (both internet and cellular), and either organize the evacuation of those willing to leave or develop some guidelines for those remaining under occupation.

Further developments on the battleground, including a forced withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions, also shifted the focus of safety monitoring by the media organizations, to primarily address the safety of journalists reporting from the frontline. It is, however, important to note that the situation has remained fairly dynamic, which has required a significant level of adaptability from the media. The media professionals interviewed pointed out that the scale and magnitude of the invasion prompted media organizations to develop, test and adjust their safety policies through practice.

*"Of course, we developed our internal protocols on how we work in the war zone. How we communicate with the newsroom when we go to a dangerous place, what's needed to be taken care of, how we behave there, how long we stay there, etc. In reality, we worked that out by practicing it... with the help of media organizations that had experience of war reporting. But again, not in their own country. And this has to be taken into account. All those recommendations required adjustment to our situation. And it's different from the already existing protocols [to ensure security] elsewhere."*

Written safety policies can mostly be found within larger media organizations, international news agencies and foreign media outlets working in Ukraine or dispatching their journalists to Ukraine. There are nonetheless also examples of smaller media organizations with these policies. It is not uncommon, however, that journalists are aware of the existence of such policies but do not in reality access and consult them. Instead, the majority of journalists interviewed tend to rely on their own experience and knowledge generated in conversations with colleagues. Such knowledge seems to be perceived as common sense, due to the omnipresence of safety considerations in professional discussions and routines. As one of the interviewed reporters noted,

*“In my information bubble, [the safety rules] are repeated over and over again. They seem obvious. Therefore, I think that colleagues are quite well aware of the rules. Especially those who go to the frontline often.”*

### **1.2 Safety policies extend to freelance journalists, their assistants, local employees and support personnel**

Freelance journalists in Ukraine are usually quite autonomous in their work, including when reporting from the frontline, which means they often assess risks and take decisions based on their own judgment.

*“I’m autonomous. In other words, I take all the decisions. Editors usually trust me. Let’s say, those editors I’ve worked with think that if someone goes to the frontline quite regularly, it means they have more experience, more skills, a better understanding of the situation. Hence, you have a right to make decisions... A person who has never been on the frontline cannot tell you what to do (because of their lack of experience).”*

In most cases, media outlets’ safety policies do not extend to freelance journalists; however, much depends on particular cases of these journalists’ cooperation with media organizations. Some of the freelance journalists interviewed noted that they benefited from cooperation with certain media outlets, e.g. they received some protective equipment, participated in training, etc. It is also quite common for freelance reporters to keep in touch with editors while they are working in the combat zone. Nevertheless, conditions for freelance journalists are precarious. As one of the interviewed freelance journalists mentioned,

*“I would say that the situation (with regard to safety) is the worst for freelancers. I was quite lucky because of my cooperation with [the name of the news agency]. They provided me with all the necessary equipment... But that’s it. No one really bothers about your safety, because you are a freelancer, it’s all up to you.”*

### 1.3 Journalists, including freelancers, have contracts with proper terms of employment, including with respect to safety and personal risk

The Law of Ukraine “On State Media Support, Guarantees of Professional Activity and the Social Protection of Journalists”,<sup>118</sup> amended in 2022, includes provisions that guarantee journalists proper terms of employment, social protection, health insurance, and also compensations and benefits to those journalists who perform their professional duties under dangerous conditions. It is, however, difficult to estimate how many media companies and organizations provide appropriate employment as stipulated by the labor law. In reality, many Ukrainian journalists work as self-employed professionals within a legislative framework for private entrepreneurs, which means that labor legislation does not apply to them the way it applies to official employees. It is also relatively common for journalists to have short-term contracts as service providers for a media outlet. In these cases, they are also in a more vulnerable position compared to those officially employed as staff members. There is a lack of reliable data on the number of journalists employed as staff members and those working under alternative legal arrangements, such as self-employed professionals.

### 1.4 Media organizations ensure that workplace and working conditions are safe and secure

Media organizations in Ukraine have limited capacity to ensure the total safety of their workplaces and working conditions, given the nature of major threats across Ukraine related to the war. These include, as has been mentioned, large-scale missile and drone attacks, and indiscriminate artillery shelling which have caused numerous deaths and destruction all over Ukraine. In response to such threats, Ukrainian media outlets adopted policies allowing and sometimes encouraging their staff to work from home, because not all the buildings used as office spaces have accessible bomb shelters.

During the first weeks of the invasion, many media outlets were preoccupied with the evacuation and/or relocation of their staff and equipment. Journalists working for media located in the areas close to the frontline and those afraid of possible occupation by the Russian forces often took extra safety measures, e.g., anonymizing their content, avoiding public spaces, hiding their electronic devices, etc. A journalist from one of these local media outlets shared their considerations in an interview,

*“When we were still in [name of the town], we decided that we wouldn’t work in the office, because the whole town knew where we worked and if there were some people who wanted to provoke us or harm our property, or threaten us, they would know where to come. So we decided that we would all work from home, that we wouldn’t be together in one place. We also decided not to sign our articles with our names, because that could pose a threat. We actually still don’t sign our stories, because of the safety considerations.”*

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118 zakon.rada.gov.ua, available at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/540/97-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text>

These measures turned out to have been well founded, as some offices and facilities of media organizations in the places close to the frontline or in the areas temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation were indeed either seized, damaged or destroyed. For instance, Russian forces seized the building of the regional public broadcaster Suspilne Kherson and used its facilities for broadcasts by the occupation administration.

Media organizations that had their team members in the temporarily occupied areas faced an additional set of challenges. They either tried to evacuate their personnel, if that was possible, or develop recommendations to minimize the risks for them in an overall dangerous setting, for example by avoiding public exposure, or removing personal and/or compromising data from personal devices. One of the editors described their challenges in the interview,

*“In addition to those journalists from our organization who found themselves in the war zone, some also found themselves under occupation. We tried to find some solutions for them. They continued working, and we received some information from them when it was critically important. Unless it was critically important, those people didn’t work, they didn’t even go outside unless very much needed. For instance, in Kherson, we talked with them via more or less protected channels. No names, no photos, nothing that could identify them or the locations. We were in contact with them all the time, but not too often, because that also posed a risk.”*

The unpredictability of missile strikes that have been threatening the entire country remains one of the biggest problems for media organizations in terms of ensuring safety at the workplace.

### 1.5 Journalists have the right to refuse dangerous assignments

In general, journalists in Ukraine have individual agency when it comes to accepting or declining risky assignments. Indeed, all stakeholders interviewed for this report confirmed that they are able to choose their assignments based on the level of risk involved.

And as already mentioned in one of the previous parts of the assessment (specifically, group B of indicators), according to the legislation of Ukraine, journalists have the right to refuse to perform dangerous tasks and assignments.<sup>119</sup>

### 1.6 Safety policies include risk assessment provisions to establish levels of danger facing employees on particular assignments

As specified earlier, the majority of media organizations do not have formalized, written safety policies. Those that do, usually have risk assessment provisions, protocols that are used when planning assignments in the war zone or other areas that entail risks.

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119 zakon.raga.gov.ua, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2694-12#Text>

However, the majority of media organizations rely on mostly informal check-lists when planning their assignments. These check-lists are usually a product of personal and collective experience. One of the interviewed journalists explained this in the following way,

*"I wouldn't really call this a protocol, rather a "sequence of actions" that I follow. I always travel with a bullet-proof vest and helmet, with a first aid kit. I always have water with me, food, charged equipment... If I work on my own, which happens very seldom, I work only in those locations that I know well. For instance, I know Bakhmut because I've been working there for many months, and I can allow myself to move around certain areas. I know where the locals are, where the evacuation points are, where the military are."*

Interviews with journalists showed that the assessment of possible risks constitutes a part of how they plan their assignments, even in cases when there are no formalized policies and protocols. Most commonly, journalists discuss possible risks with their editors and colleagues who have relevant experience. Journalists also seek advice from their contacts on the ground, including military personnel.

### **1.7 Media organizations provide hostile environment and risk awareness training before journalists are sent on dangerous assignments**

The majority of journalists that are sent on dangerous assignments have first undergone hostile environment training, as well as first aid training. First aid training is most common among media professionals and is one of the requirements for obtaining press accreditation from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (this requirement was valid before the invasion of 2022). Some media organizations require that their journalists have completed the necessary training before going on assignments to the combat zone. One of the interviewed reporters noted,

*"Me and a few other people from our newsroom who go to the war zone are required to have a certificate on taking hostile environment training. I took the training before the full-scale invasion, and I'm glad I did that, because I am now able to go on assignments quickly. We had a four-day course, including first aid, passing checkpoints, how to behave in captivity, and many other things. The certificate is valid for three years. In our media organization, you can only go to the frontline if you've had this training taken."*

In many cases, however, the training is less advanced than that mentioned in the example above, and does not involve training exercises simulating real-life dangerous scenarios. This is likely due to the logistical and financial costs involved. Most media organizations cannot afford such advanced training for their journalists. More basic training is quite widespread and accessible, largely due to the efforts of CSOs and international organizations. The journalists interviewed were quite well-informed about the availability of training and mentioned the Institute of Mass Information, Reporters without Borders, the 2402 Foundation and others, among those actors which provide relevant training. While media organizations often lack resources to organize training for their journalists themselves, interviews revealed that they are largely quite supportive of their staff members seeking training outside their organizations.

### 1.8 Media organizations provide adequate insurance and necessary safety equipment to journalists on dangerous assignments, including equipment that is appropriate to women

The capacity of media organizations to provide the necessary safety equipment and insurance is fairly limited. A few organizations relied on their own resources, while the majority cooperated with national CSOs, international organizations (such as UNESCO) and a journalists' union to equip their staff with safety equipment. Journalists reported a shortage of this equipment at the beginning of the invasion. One of them recalled,

*"I remember (the attack on) Retroville. When we came on the spot, most of the journalists didn't have helmets or body armor."*

Some also noted that they had old equipment from 2014-2015 when the armed conflict broke out in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, but the equipment was outdated. Also, some female journalists noted that the available body armor is often designed for men, which creates discomfort for women when using it. One of the local female TV reporters described their situation in an interview,

*"We had old body armor and helmets, and first aid kits, but they were really old. You cannot compare events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions back then and what we've been experiencing in Ukraine since the invasion. These are different kinds of shelling, different weapons involved. And my body armor was huge, when I'm just 163 cm tall. It was huge and heavy, it was too difficult to run with it. My back would hurt a lot when I used it during those first days of the invasion. It was difficult to find body armor and a helmet in my size. I then got my new ones from the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine... Then we also received first aid kits from the Lviv Media Forum, which was very helpful."*

The situation with safety equipment significantly improved after the first few weeks of the invasion, according to the media professionals interviewed. Adequate insurance, however, remains one of the most acute issues for journalists in terms of safety. The majority of interviewed journalists, with a few exceptions, said that they do not have adequate insurance for work in the war zone.

The Law of Ukraine "On State Media Support, Guarantees of Professional Activity and the Social Protection of Journalists", which was amended in 2022 (discussed in more detail in the Category B section), determines that journalists are guaranteed life and health insurance when they are on dangerous assignments. In reality, however, this is not very common. Some Ukrainian media organizations provide their journalists with basic health insurance, but it usually does not cover accidents related to work in a war zone. Adequate insurance for journalists working on the frontline is not affordable to most of the media organizations.

Some insurance options are available for journalists thanks to the previously mentioned International Insurance Fund for Journalists, an initiative of several CSOs providing insurance to journalists going on assignments in the war zone. Several interviewed journalists mentioned this option, but pointed to some logistical challenges in applying for this insurance, including the insufficient flexibility of the organizations processing applications and the fast-changing conditions for journalists on the ground.

### 1.9 Media organizations provide adequate back-up to journalists on dangerous assignments

According to the interview data, media organizations largely provide adequate back-up to journalists on dangerous assignments. While some journalists, particularly freelancers, prefer to be autonomous and rely on their own experience and contacts on the ground, the majority of journalists interviewed for this report are in close contact with their newsrooms or editors while reporting from the frontline or areas with higher risks.

The intensive experience of war reporting has resulted in established practices of assignment planning, including practices of keeping contact with newsrooms and coordinating activities, even though these practices are usually transmitted orally. In particular, interviewed journalists and editors noted the rules of working “in pairs”, and constantly updating on plans/meetings/movements/whereabouts. In cases of emergency, interviewed journalists also stated that they keep in regular contact with their editors and newsrooms. One of the journalists working for an online media outlet shared their experience,

*“We always plan all our assignments carefully, we know where we are going, to which brigades, on which positions, in which district, where hostilities are taking place. Our editor-in-chief, director, our producers – they all know this... We always update them in our chat group on where we are going and when we are coming back, how everything went and whether we are OK.”*

At the same time, the interviewed journalists and editors noted that back-up support of media organizations is limited by the nature of threats which journalists face on assignment, and which Ukrainians in general are facing. For example, the threat of shelling is unpredictable and beyond anyone’s control. It is perceived as the biggest threat by the interviewed journalists working in the war zone.

### 1.10 Media organizations liaise with security forces where appropriate to establish guidelines on treatment of journalists before entering a dangerous area

The introduction of martial law in response to external aggression, as well as subsequent additional regulations that were passed in Ukraine, provide a framework for interaction between media organizations and the armed forces of Ukraine (addressed in more detail

in Category B). Within this framework, journalists are required to apply for permission to access dangerous areas close to the combat zone or inside it, in addition to obtaining accreditation from the Ministry of Defense. In order to comply with these requirements, journalists establish contact with the press officers of military units and coordinate their plans with them prior to a journalistic trip. As a rule, journalists are accompanied either by military units' press officers or by the military while on assignment in the dangerous areas.

The media professionals interviewed noted that they tend to rely on information received from military units' press officers about the level of danger on certain roads. Most of the interviewed journalists also said that they feel more secure when they are accompanied by the military.

*“On the one hand, journalists are always escorted by the military, and the military can stop the filming if there is some threat, an assault; they can prevent us from going somewhere, they can postpone our visit, etc. On the other hand, you can never predict what’s going to happen if you are going to the frontline. You may go to some quiet position, where no one died during the last two months, where the military say they take rest after heavy battles, but on the very day of your visit a drone might attack that position.”*

Despite the general trust towards the military among the interviewed journalists, concerns have been raised about the military increasing limitations for journalists' work in the combat zone. For example, in November 2022, a number of journalists and CSOs made a statement about journalists covering the de-occupation of Kherson being stripped of their accreditation, and accused the military press center of inefficiency.<sup>120</sup> In addition, interviewed journalists acknowledged that their ability to cover the war depends on particular press officers, some of whom are more open and flexible and others more restrictive.

### **1.11 Media organizations recognise that women employees face specific risks and undertake specific mitigation strategies**

Research by the CSO Women in Media that surveyed women journalists in Ukraine found that 58% of the survey's respondents had experienced discrimination or violence.<sup>121</sup> Nevertheless, media organizations, with some exceptions, do not identify specific risks for women employees related to their work. Some issues, like the inadequacy of available body armor and other safety equipment for women journalists are addressed situationally.

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120 Detector Media, available at: <https://detector.media/community/article/204906/2022-11-14-zhurnalisty-vymagayut-negay-no-povernuty-akredytatsiyu-media-yaki-vysvitlyuvaly-podii-v-khersoni/>

121 Women in Media, available here (in Ukrainian): [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dhfWfHbKtkdAJV\\_GsQTfk7kueikKxuh7/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dhfWfHbKtkdAJV_GsQTfk7kueikKxuh7/view)

Some journalists noted that women may be more vulnerable in some settings, especially in potential captivity. As one of the interviewed female journalists said,

*“A woman is potentially perceived as weak, as an object for sexual violence, harassment or inappropriate jokes not only from the side of the enemy, but also from Ukrainians. The closer a woman is to an extreme situation – the more unusual she [a woman in this context] looks. Even though there is nothing unusual or strange here.”*

Several of the women journalists interviewed also said that they occasionally observe actions of the military that are overly protective towards women when compared to men. Furthermore, men might perceive women as being less knowledgeable about military-related topics.

### 1.12 Community media operate safety protocols as appropriate to their circumstances

The presence of community media in Ukraine has not been registered or studied. While there are citizen journalists and bloggers working in their respective communities, there is a lack of data on more developed forms of community media.

The status of community media was not recognized at the legislative level, although this changed with the entry into force of the new law “On Media” in March 2023. The new legislation makes it possible to identify these media organizations formally and to assess their presence on the Ukrainian media market.

## 2. Journalists’ unions and professional bodies take specific measures to promote the safety of journalists

### 2.1 Journalists’ unions/associations monitor safety issues and advocate to employers and the authorities to have effective policies about these

The NUJU actively monitors safety issues such as attacks against journalists.<sup>122</sup> In 2022 it placed a special focus on the safety of journalists in the context of the war. The NUJU advocated for the safety of journalists by systematically monitoring and reporting on attacks against journalists. The NUJU is a member of the International and European Federations of Journalists (IFJ/EFJ).<sup>123</sup> The second Ukrainian member of IFJ and EFJ is the Independent Media and Trade Union (IMTUU).<sup>124</sup>

### 2.2 Journalists’ unions/associations provide information resources and promote good practices, also in regard to media professionalism

NUJU, along with media CSOs that partially perform functions of journalist’ associations in terms of representing the professional community, have provided information resources, materials and guidelines aimed at developing and strengthening professionalism among media professionals. Principles of professional and responsible reporting have been a

122 National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU), available at: <https://nuju.org.ua/>

123 International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), available at: <https://www.ifj.org/>

124 Independent Media and Trade Union of Ukraine, available at: <https://nmpu.org.ua/>

matter of professional discussion. Sharing of good practices has been conducted via learning events and different kinds of professional activities, like conferences, workshops etc, which were pre-dominantly conducted online. At the same time, in 2022 NUJU and the above-mentioned CSOs were predominantly focused on providing guidance on safety issues and promoting related good practices. Safety and challenges of reporting in the conditions of military invasion were at the foreground of professional discussions in 2022.

### **2.3 Journalists' unions/associations provide practical advice and access to specialist resources to media staff working on dangerous assignments**

Ukrainian CSOs that focus on media development have provided significant assistance to media organizations and journalists by offering resources, expertise and advice on ensuring security when working on dangerous assignments (this is discussed in more detail in the Chapter on CSO actors). The NUJU has also contributed by translating and disseminating the handbook on the safety of journalists reporting in high-risk environments, developed by UNESCO and RSF.<sup>125</sup> The NUJU has also provided advice to journalists in the temporarily occupied territories, including assistance with evacuation matters.

The NUJU, with UNESCO funding, has also opened a network of Journalists' Solidarity Centers in six cities (See Category C, indicator 3.7), where journalists can obtain some assistance and consultancy, including protective equipment, financial aid, legal advice, psychological consultations, office space and access to professional training.<sup>126</sup>

### **2.4 Journalists' unions/associations provide training and stress counseling to journalists**

In addition to the wide range of activities of CSOs aimed at providing training and stress counseling (see Category C, 3.6), the NUJU has launched a 24/7 hotline for psychological assistance to journalists and members of their families. The NUJU has also conducted monthly webinars with psychologists aimed at increasing psychological education among journalists and the broader public. Apart from psychological assistance, the NUJU has also organized in-person training on physical safety, anti-mine security and related aspects.

### **2.5 Journalists' unions/associations make support available to community media and citizen journalists**

The NUJU's resources are available online on their website, and seminars are often available on YouTube. These are therefore in principle accessible to community media organizations and citizen journalists. However, it is difficult to estimate their reach among these particular segments of the media sector.

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125 UNESCO, available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381168>

126 National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, available at: <https://nsju.org/czentry-zhurnalistskoyi-solidarnosti/>

## 2.6 Journalists' unions/associations establish programmes for women journalists that take account of specific risks they will face on dangerous assignments

The NUJU has paid special attention to the safety of women journalists. They have organized and conducted separate training for women journalists and developed recommendations specifically for women journalists (as individual professionals), according to the data collected through interviews.

## 3. All media actors, including individual journalists, are aware of safety in digital communications

### 3.1 Journalists are aware of digital dangers and protection measures

After 24 February 2022, the volume of digital threats increased and their vector changed. Interviewed stakeholders from the group of digital security experts noted that, before the invasion of 2022, threats had a mixed structure (external and internal) and came more from within the country. After the invasion, these threats were attributed to actors from outside the country.

The report from Google's Threat Analysis Group, which contains data for the year 2022, indicates the increased aggressiveness of cyber attacks targeting Ukraine and Ukrainian infrastructure.<sup>127</sup>

The most knowledgeable and prepared - in terms of digital challenges - among Ukrainian journalists are those who carry out investigative reporting. This group of media professionals in particular has adapted its work through the use of basic tools such as secure messengers and browsers, VPNs, and customized authentication. Based on data obtained from in-depth interviews, these are the tools most often used by journalists.

A number of media outlets also requested digital audits from specialized organizations in order to identify potential vulnerabilities, such as unreliable passwords, lack of two-factor authentication, backups, etc. The most common problems in this context require long-term support, and the development of sustainable policies regarding digital security that are followed and updated.

*"In terms of digital security, we don't have a newsroom. So it's about carrying a laptop with you, to password-protect all devices, to use licensed software as much as possible, to change passwords, not to respond to suspicious emails sent from unknown addresses. Do not open suspicious links, ask what it is and do not click until you receive an adequate answer. Well, it's generally common sense [regarding digital security]."*

<sup>127</sup> Google's Threat Analysis Group, available at: <https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/fog-of-war-how-the-ukraine-conflict-transformed-the-cyber-threat-landscape/>

The information war has been waged using cyber-attacks, hacks, social media threats, and attacks against media pages on social media. At least 42 alleged cybercrimes were registered in 2022.<sup>128</sup> As recorded by IMU, Ukrainian publications “Nykvesta” and “Detector Media” in November 2022 reported having detected DDoS attacks, impacting the functionality of their websites.

### 3.2 Journalists effectively use protection in digital communication including appropriate software and other precautionary measures

As digital security experts explained during the phase of in-depth interviews, journalists use the same online protection tools as other users. There are very few specific software programs developed specifically for media professionals, but this is not because the environment ignores their issues. Several of the digital experts interviewed thought that adapting security protocols and applying a basic set of tools for digital protection are sufficient measures.

However, difficulties may arise in those newsrooms that have limited resources for equipment and technical support or that have lost part of their equipment due to hostilities. As such, they have to use whatever equipment they have access to, which increases digital risks. One example of this would be the need to resort to working from public computers that are available to a wide range of users. Furthermore, some media organizations with limited resources do not have a backup system. This is a serious challenge, which can be exacerbated by the conditions of war, because it creates the possibility of organizations losing all their archives and data.

### 3.3 Employers and others provide software, equipment and training that enable journalists to protect communications

The fact that newsrooms have become more active in requesting digital audits and digital security consulting illustrates that media organizations have become more mindful of these challenges (according to data obtained from in-depth interviews). A group of stakeholders working on the topic of digital security noted, however, that smaller newsrooms often do not have a dedicated specialist responsible for digital security.

*“Very often, issues are resolved according to the principle ‘if there is a problem, then we look for a solution.’ Newsrooms do not have clear rules for responding to cyber security.”*

As noted earlier, addressing digital threats often involves systematic and long-term work to create online security policies and culture. This applies mostly to soft skills. However, interviewees noted that it should be accompanied by the designation of technical specialists within newsrooms, licensed software utilization, and regular equipment maintenance, all which could sustainably contribute to the effective management of digital threats.

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128 Institute of Mass Information, available at: <https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/za-11-misyatsiv-vijny-rosiya-vchynyla-477-zlochyniv-proty-zhurnalistiv-ta-media-v-ukrayini-i50332>

Both the digital security experts and journalists who were interviewed note that the role of social media platforms as a source of information and a channel for content distribution has increased, and therefore there have been more attempts to hack social media accounts.

*“We also held cyber security training. Of course, we monitor the security of our social networks and accounts, and we also take all this into account, because there were some suspicious attempts to log into the account there, and two-factor authentication saved us. So, we realize such threats and hacking attempts exist.”*

*“The purpose of cyber attacks in 2022 was to use the influence that journalists have against Ukraine.”*

## 4. Media actors cover safety issues

### 4.1 The media community demonstrates its own concern on the issues of safety and impunity, is not afraid to report on those issues as matters of public interest, and recognize the common interests with community media and citizen journalists in those matters

The media community in Ukraine has expressed concerns about the safety of journalists and the attacks by the Russian Federation, as well as about the violent coercion of media professionals in the temporarily occupied areas (see category A).

*“Russian troops do not recognize this status (journalists having the same rights as unarmed civilians). On the contrary, journalists are their first target.”* — a quote from a public statement by the NUJU for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.<sup>129</sup>

Representatives of the Ukrainian media have participated in a number of international conferences where they provided information about safety-related and other challenges. The Ukrainian media has also provided coverage of cases of violence against journalists. More systematic advocacy activities are mostly done by the CSOs focusing on journalism, media development and freedom of speech.

### 4.2 Media acts as a community advocate for these issues

The threats to journalists’ safety stemming from the war have overshadowed any other types of potential threats affecting this occupational group in Ukraine in 2022. This explains why media organizations have mostly been preoccupied with the urgent need to provide safety to their journalists to the greatest extent possible; while advocacy activities received less attention.

129 IWPR, available at: <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/ukraine-journalists-are-russias-first-target>

### 4.3 Media actors work with non-media stakeholders to ensure adequate policies and attention to the issue

Media actors, including media organizations, CSOs, and journalists' unions, have been engaged in communication with non-media actors in order to influence some aspects of safety for journalists working on dangerous assignments. For instance, in April 2022, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, the Ministry of Defense and representatives of media organizations issued a joint statement<sup>130</sup> on the work of journalists in the combat zone or in the areas targeted by missile attacks and shelling.

## 5. Intermediary entities respect journalists' safety

2022 was an extraordinary year for intermediary entities (including internet service providers, search engines and social media platforms) and users of their services not because of attempts to gain access to data or challenges to the operation of their policies and rules, but due to hostilities. Ukraine's energy infrastructure suffered as a result of missile strikes launched by the Russian Federation. This in turn led to regular blackouts and shutdowns of mobile networks and Internet access. The question of providing backup power, both for the media outlets themselves and for intermediary entities, was thus crucial.

Interview participants stressed that the key challenge during 2022 was the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022. One digital security expert interviewed for this study expressed the opinion that protecting data in the context of intermediary entities' operations was not and is not an institutional challenge for Ukrainian media organizations.

According to this expert, "Ukraine was seen and continues to be seen in the context of so-called "Russian studies". Traditionally, this is the problem of the Russian media, it is the Russian government's attempts to control the Internet and service providers. But Ukrainian media organizations face different challenges."

The international NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) emphasizes that, in 2022, large technology companies such as Meta, Google, TikTok, and Twitter announced numerous measures, most of which aimed at countering harmful disinformation, specifically in the context of the war in Ukraine.<sup>131</sup> HRW however criticized a lack of transparency about these actions and, "One clear finding is that companies should exhibit more clarity, consistency, and transparency so that their actions can be assessed against their human rights responsibilities, which apply wherever their services are used."<sup>132</sup>

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130 [kmu.gov.ua](https://www.kmu.gov.ua), available at: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/spilna-zayava-ministerstva-kulturi-ta-informacijnoyi-politiki-ukrayini-ministerstva-oboroni-ukrayini-ta-predstavniv-zmi>

131 Human Rights Watch, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/16/tech-companies-should-prioritize-rights-ukraine>

132 *Ibid.*

Ukraine has seen attempts to override journalists' freedom of expression and access their personal data through requests made by state authorities to intermediary entities in the past. One such example is the case of Nataliya Sedletska, editor-in-chief of the investigative journalism project, Schemy.<sup>133</sup> Sedletska had met with the head of the Ukrainian Anti-Corruption Bureau in Ukraine and in 2018, following an investigation into the official, two Ukrainian courts (District Court and Court of Appeal) authorized law enforcement authorities (i.e. the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine) to access Sedletska's phone to determine if she had received confidential information. Sedletska turned to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and, in 2021, the Court issued a decision on the merits of the Ukrainian courts' judgements, fully satisfying the complaint of Ms Sedletska. The ECHR ruled that the Court of Appeal's authorization "was not justified by an 'overriding requirement in the public interest' and, therefore, necessary in a democratic society" and constituted a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which enshrines freedom of expression without interference by public authorities.<sup>134</sup>

This case became a precedent in regard to journalists' protection of their sources of information. It also illustrates the reasons why journalists prefer secure encrypted messaging apps to relying on methods of communication such as phone calls or SMS text messages.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Media organizations should formalize and document their safety policies, even if informal practices are already in place. Having written policies ensures clarity and accountability in addressing journalists' safety. Such policies should be aligned with corresponding international standards.
2. Media organizations should prioritize securing adequate insurance coverage for their journalists working in conflict zones, in compliance with Ukrainian law, and ensure that employee contracts include all the necessary provisions related to safety, personal risks, and social security, in compliance with domestic labor laws as well as are aligned with the ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention.<sup>135</sup> Media organizations should also - including through international partnerships and cross-border collaborations with other media - address precarious terms of employment through the standardization of contracts guaranteeing decent working conditions for journalists, which can help reduce individuals' stress and burnout, especially for those working in dangerous environments.

<sup>133</sup> Global Freedom of Expression, available at: <https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/sedletska-v-ukraine/>

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> ILO, available at: [https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100\\_ILO\\_CODE:C155](https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C155).

3. The provisions and security guarantees laid out above should also be extended to freelance journalists and all media professionals (including stringers, drivers, producers, etc.). Media organizations and newsrooms that hire freelance workers should establish contracts that codify their access to safety policies and support mechanisms, and advocate for legal reforms to provide protections for self-employed journalists and those with short-term contracts. These contracts could also be developed as part of cross-border collaborations (see recommendation 5 below) or through the establishment of a network of freelance media workers, for example within the framework of the national unions of journalists.
4. Media actors and newsrooms should recognize and systematically address the specific risks faced by women journalists and ensure that safety policies and procedures recognize the diverse needs of women working in the media, including the provision of appropriate safety equipment (comprising for example body armor designed for women), and women's unfettered access to existing labor law guarantees.
5. Media actors and newsrooms should establish strategic cross-border partnerships, (rather than relying solely on ad hoc arrangements), with CSOs and international media organizations from different geographic regions, for the exchange of information, and more sustainable provision of resources and support. Amongst other functions, these cross-border partnerships could streamline- the collection of reliable data on the employment status of journalists to better understand their needs and vulnerabilities; expand access to affordable or subsidized journalists' training programs, secure data storage, safe work spaces, technical specialists, and equipment sharing to enhance security and resilience; increase the visibility of stories and security for journalists working on investigative or sensitive topics; and generally build a supportive network for addressing shared challenges, including digital threats.
6. In the light of the increased levels of burnout and stress reported by journalists across the country, media organizations should seek managerial solutions to mitigate such risks, including the provision of holistic safety and well-being resources and trainings, and ensuring an effective distribution of work among staff, and encouraging journalists' active engagement when it comes to workplace policies and a healthy working environment.



## **CATEGORY E**

**The roles and response of  
the UN and other international  
organizations with presence  
within the country**

## CATEGORY E

### The roles and response of the UN and other international organizations with presence within the country

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#### Key Indicators

1. UN within the country monitors journalists' safety issues and shares information
2. UN system within the country implements effective co-ordination and responses to safety incidents and problems
3. UN within the country builds knowledge and capacity
4. Within the country, other international intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies promote safety of journalists

After declaring independence, Ukraine identified participation in UN activities as one of its foreign policy priorities. There are currently 24 UN entities in Ukraine. The two most relevant ones that are directly involved in the issues of freedom of speech and expression, as well as the safety of journalists are: UNESCO and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission. The United Nations Development Programme is also indirectly involved in these issues by including the support of relevant educational programs for journalism students in its portfolio.

In the first months after the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, UN agencies focused on humanitarian issues and on monitoring human rights in Ukraine.<sup>136</sup> UNESCO's Director-General Audrey Azoulay systematically condemned the killings of journalists in line with UNESCO's mandate to monitor violence against journalists. Furthermore, UNESCO mobilized support to journalists in Ukraine starting in March and April 2022, when it sent bullet proof vests via the National Union of Journalists, supported safety briefings and the translation and distribution of over 1,100 copies of the RSF-UNESCO Guide for Journalists in high-risk contexts. The initial emergency response also included providing support to IMI and Reporters without Borders (RSF) for the establishment of a press freedom center to assist journalists in Lviv.

#### 1. UN within the country monitors journalists' safety issues and shares information

##### 1.1 UN system at national level maps relevant instruments, actions and actors, and establishes partnership and communication channels with specialised monitoring organizations

Since 1993, UNESCO has been conducting a global monitoring of the killings of journalists and, since 2006, it has been providing information on the judicial status of condemned

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<sup>136</sup> United Nations Ukraine, available at: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/175103-update-un-work-ukraine-16032022>

killings. This information is provided through the UNESCO observatory of killed journalists<sup>137</sup> and an analytical report published biennially.<sup>138</sup> Information for the UNESCO monitoring efforts are collected locally, via the UNESCO Kyiv Desk since its establishment, and in coordination with regional and international monitoring organizations.

The UN HRMMU, established in 2014, collects, processes and systematizes data on human rights violations, including violations against journalists.

When collecting data, HRMMU relied on territorial units. Simultaneously with the beginning of hostilities, the location of these offices underwent changes. Offices in cities temporarily occupied or in dangerous proximity to the hostilities (Mariupol, Kramatorsk, etc.) stopped operating. This gap in data has been filled by information from open data sources and from a network of local and national partner organizations (more details about the partnership between different organizations are provided in category C).

As of July 2023, HRMMU had published 35 periodic reports, ten briefing papers, nine thematic reports and six updates on the human rights situation in Ukraine, all of them providing partners in the country and beyond with evidence-based findings that are presented at each session of the Human Right Council (HRC). In 2022, reports on the situation in Ukraine were presented at each of the three HRC sessions. Reporting for the first session, held from February 28 until April 1, predates the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 but notes concern about cases of attacks against journalists. An example mentioned in the report is: "On 18 January 2022, in Kyiv, a male employee of a TV channel was attacked by participants of an assembly that he was broadcasting live."<sup>139</sup> Reports at the following 50<sup>th</sup> and 51<sup>st</sup> sessions in 2022 then focused on the human rights session in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation and note "a grave deterioration in the human rights situation across the country."<sup>140</sup>

This transformation was described by one of the interviewees:

*"We noticed changes in the cases during monitoring in 2022... previously, there were attacks on journalists for various reasons; for example, they could be investigative journalists... Now the situation is radically different, the bulk of the cases that we are working on refers to cases of the death or injury of journalists during or in connection with hostilities"*

Both UNESCO and HRMMU include all monitoring data on publicly accessible monitoring tools. They also frequently receive requests and cooperate with international partners regarding the provision of data.

While the mandates and activities of UNESCO and HRMMU predate the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the UN also set up an ad-hoc commission of independent experts.

137 UNESCO, available at: <https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/observatory>

138 UNESCO, available at: <https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/dg-report-safety-journalists>.

139 OHCHR, available at: [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A\\_HRC\\_49\\_CRP5.docx](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_CRP5.docx).

140 OHCHR available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/hrbodies/hrc/regularsessions/session50/2022-07-01/A-HRC-50-CRP4-EnglishVersion.docx>.

On 4 March 2022, the UN HRC established the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, in accordance with resolution 49/1 to “investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.”<sup>141</sup> This commission provided reports to the HRC in October 2022,<sup>142</sup> to the General Assembly in March 2023<sup>143</sup> and has been requested to do the same for the following meetings of UN bodies (in October 2023 and March 2024). The report to the General Assembly is available in the five official UN languages and in Ukrainian while the HRC report is available in English, Ukrainian and Russian. Information regarding the safety of journalists is included in the report but not explored extensively.

### **1.2 UN system supports specific projects and activities on building and reinforcing the capacity to monitor and assess safety**

UN cooperation frameworks were established with a number of Ukrainian organizations (such as the NUJU and IMI), which adapted to the new war context to provide relevant data promptly and in the format necessary for reporting purposes. One challenge to the monitoring process is to obtain data from temporarily occupied territories, including those which were occupied recently. It was necessary to identify sources of information from these areas, and to comply with a number of security measures so as not to expose these sources to threats.

At the same time, some respondents from the UN group of actors noted that monitoring efforts could be strengthened if detailed data was made available not only on the number of injured or killed journalists, but also on the number of Ukrainian and international correspondents currently reporting in Ukraine.

### **1.3 UN system at national level has a relevant awareness-raising strategy and makes statements about killings of journalists**

The UN system has a coherent strategy on raising awareness regarding the challenges to the freedom of speech and expression. As mentioned earlier (Category E, Introduction), UNESCO systematically issues statements condemning the killings of journalists. These are published online and via press releases.

There are synergies between the various concerned UN system agencies in their efforts. For example, the UN HRMMU works on collecting, processing and systematizing data on certain challenges in the country. UNESCO works to raise awareness of the challenges facing journalists and the media in general. This is done both through the issuance of reports, statements, and press releases (in English and Ukrainian), as well as through cooperation with state actors in order to build the capacity to address these challenges.

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141 OHCHR, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iicjhr-ukraine/index>

142 United Nations General Assembly, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/a77533-independent-international-commission-inquiry-ukraine-note-secretary>

143 OHCHR, available at: [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/A\\_HRC\\_52\\_62\\_AUV\\_EN.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/A_HRC_52_62_AUV_EN.pdf)

#### 1.4 UN system at national level publishes information about journalists' safety issues and makes this available in the key national languages

After 24 February 2022, UNESCO has made concerted efforts to provide information in Ukrainian. One such initiative was its translation of the UNESCO-RSF "Safety guide for journalists: a handbook for reporters in high-risk environments" into Ukrainian.<sup>144</sup> Since then, UNESCO has significantly increased its cooperation with national partners and, consequently, the provision of materials in Ukrainian. This was primarily done in the form of online and offline training sessions which were, when targeted at a Ukrainian audience, held in Ukrainian or Ukrainian and English. The UNESCO website and social media channels (UNESCO has a separate Twitter account for Ukraine) are still exclusively available in English.

#### 1.5 UN system organizations at in-country level promote the existence and scope of relevant normative standards

Taking into account the fact that Ukraine's independence and, consequently, the development of an independent media, occurred fairly recently, Ukrainian media organizations had a relatively short period for the institutionalization of professional standards, including regarding safety.

With the beginning of full-scale war, these standards must now cover not only routine work processes, but also the challenges associated with the development of security policies and guidelines for war coverage. This is a process that started in 2014 and intensified in 2022.

In addition to safety standards, UNESCO promotes the self- and co-regulation of the media in Ukraine. The Commission for Journalism Ethics (CJE) is an important body promoting ethical journalism, including in the context of the conflict. Although it is outside the scope of this report, UNESCO in 2023 supported the publication of a manual on ethical journalism during conflict which was prepared by CJE.<sup>145</sup>

#### 1.6 Promotion takes cognisance of the fact that women journalists may be subject to specific sexual harassment and violence

UNESCO promotes gender-sensitive, gender-responsive and gender-transformative safety policies as well as an understanding of the specific risks faced by women journalists as a global principle. As mentioned in this document (Category E, Introduction) as one of the first activities responding to the full-scale war, UNESCO translated and disseminated the RSF/UNESCO handbook on safety, which includes a specific section on sexual violence and advice for women reporters.<sup>146</sup>

144 UNESCO Digital Library, available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000243986>

145 CJE, available at: [https://cje.org.ua/news/komisija-z-zhurnalistskoi-etyky-pidhotuvala-posibnyk-z-zhurnalistskoi-etyky/?fbclid=IwAR3sRZyq6Y9eHNWPQGiOfld21yLJTwxhh6YyvUsoLLct63\\_YNcvTq2R0sik\\_aem\\_AdCwtNWEK7288FfypBvpgTiOX3e-4T0okwxNN0KU9SghuHe3XJA0uj8AforR3Hm26YZdU](https://cje.org.ua/news/komisija-z-zhurnalistskoi-etyky-pidhotuvala-posibnyk-z-zhurnalistskoi-etyky/?fbclid=IwAR3sRZyq6Y9eHNWPQGiOfld21yLJTwxhh6YyvUsoLLct63_YNcvTq2R0sik_aem_AdCwtNWEK7288FfypBvpgTiOX3e-4T0okwxNN0KU9SghuHe3XJA0uj8AforR3Hm26YZdU)

146 UNESCO, available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000243986>

### 1.7 UN system at national level requests information from the State about the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity

The UN systems are in close contact with state actors at various levels of support and capacity building. UNESCO, as part of its mandate laid out by the Director-General's report on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity, periodically requests information on the status of judicial processes from all Member States in which killings of journalists have occurred.<sup>147</sup> Information on killings that occurred in Ukraine in 2022 will be requested by UNESCO in 2024. The information provided will be evaluated and made available in the 2024 Director-General's Report.

### 1.8 UN system at national level makes available information on journalists' safety and impunity to the UN at global level

As mentioned above, UNESCO's monitoring of the killing of journalists and impunity is part of its global mandate and is included on global platforms such as the UNESCO observatory and biennial report on the subject. This also occurs within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). SDG 16 is to "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels". This goal includes an indicator (Indicator 16.10.1) precisely measuring the "number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months." UNESCO provides country data, including pertaining to Ukraine, to the global monitoring procedures that assess advancements towards the achievement of the SDGs.

## 2. UN system within the country implements effective coordination and responses to safety incidents and problems

### 2.1 UN system organizations have joint, complementary and coordinated activity in support of the safety of journalists as per the UN Action Plan

With the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, the UN structures largely focused their efforts on providing the necessary humanitarian aid and support. The safety of journalists was one of the three main components of the UNESCO program in Ukraine that systematically worked on the implementation of the UN Plan of Action to address the safety of journalists.<sup>148</sup>

Members of the UN group of actors note that each of the UN structures has a clear mandate, which helps to avoid any duplication of efforts between the structures.

147 UNESCO, available at: <https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/dg-report-safety-journalists>

148 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Journalists/submissions-safety-journalists-and-impunity/states/GA-74-report-contributions-states-ukraine-en.pdf>

## 2.2 UN system encourages multi-stakeholder co-operation with non-UN actors on safety and impunity, and contributes to formulation of national strategies

The UN system in Ukraine implements projects in partnership with national partners. This approach has a number of advantages, because these organizations not only have first-hand knowledge of the needs and challenges to address, but also already have an established reputation and connections, as well as a team that speaks the national language and can quickly establish contact with the potential project beneficiaries.

*"It's very important to empower and reinforce existing structures in the country... we may provide support, structures and methodology. But we listen, and we work... to identify the needs"*

## 2.3 Issues related to the safety of journalists are reflected in the UN Development Assistance Frameworks and other country programming documents, and are discussed within UN Country Teams including both resident and non-resident agencies

The United Nations Partnership Framework was developed in cooperation with the Ukrainian government for the period of 2018-2022, and signed into effect in 2017.<sup>149</sup> The document called for engaging the media and civil society as partners in promoting social change. It also outlined the challenges related to "conflict-related violations of human rights and international humanitarian law". In response to the invasion of Ukraine, a transitional framework for 2022 and 2023 was introduced in September 2022.<sup>150</sup> The framework does not make reference to the issue of the safety of journalists or the need to support the independent press.

UNESCO and OHCHR as members of the UN Country Team through their work on the issue of safety of journalists, raise this topic within the UN Country Team.

## 3. UN within the country builds knowledge and capacity

### 3.1 UN system promotes safety issues in contacts with local stakeholders, disseminates knowledge of relevant good practices and encourages local adaptation

When it comes to the UN's local engagement, best practices were distributed with stakeholders throughout the country, particularly those related to a safe work environment in high-risk conditions. The Journalists' Solidarity Centers supported by UNESCO and the IFJ were particularly impactful hubs for the distribution of this type of information in the six cities where they were opened.<sup>151</sup>

149 United Nations Ukraine, available at: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/49416-government-ukraine-%E2%80%93-united-nations-partnership-framework-2018-2022>

150 United Nations Ukraine, available at <https://ukraine.un.org/en/download/133881/232866>

151 UNESCO, available at: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000384454>

Efforts were aimed not only at adapting best professional practices, but also at ensuring the continuity of media work in the country, for example by providing emergency grants for journalists to continue their professional activities.

### **3.2 UN system organizations provide advice and capacity building to stakeholders on issues such as the treatment of journalists; investigation of crimes against journalists; and prosecution and protection measures**

The implementation of the UN Plan of Action envisages establishing cooperation on these dimensions of key relevance to journalists' safety. With the full-scale war, the focus shifted. Most of the guidelines for navigating the treatment of journalists, both internal and public, during the reporting period related to coverage of military operations, interaction with the armed forces of Ukraine, and procedures for obtaining accreditation for work in high-risk areas.

### **3.3 UN system organizations at national level have, or fundraise, specific budgets for their safety activities**

The UN actors interviewed for this assessment indicated that they have enough resources and capacities to work within the limits of their mandates. However, in order to reinforce advocacy, and highlight the challenges faced by journalists, which have been greatly exacerbated since 2022, additional activities and resources are required.

### **3.4 UN organizations provide safety training to journalists such as on reporting in conflict zones, legal rights, self-protection techniques, first aid, etc. and assist with provision of safety equipment**

In the first month after on 24 February 2022, UNESCO provided an initial 125 sets of PPE.<sup>152</sup> Throughout the course of 2022, UNESCO reports having provided safety and tactical medicine training to over 1,000 journalists in Ukraine. Further initial support included a hotline for journalists via the NUJU and support to the Journalists' Solidarity Centers.

Aside from these measures, UNESCO also provided generators to the six Journalists' Solidarity Centers to ensure energy access during shortages, and additional generators to several independent media outlets.

## **4. Within the country, other international intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies promote safety of journalists**

Other international and regional intergovernmental agencies promoting the safety of journalists in the country are the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The OSCE, for example, organized a number of online expert discussions for Ukrainian journalists on safety issues, such as chemical threats, mine safety and psychological safety.<sup>153</sup> Additionally, the OSCE Media Representative condemned the killings of journalists in Ukraine.<sup>154</sup> The Council of Europe, which in March 2022 expelled the Russian Federation as a result of the

153 OSCE, available at: <https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine/518061>

154 OSCE, available at: <https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/514633#:~:text=VIENNA%2C%2024%20March%202022%20%E2%80%93%20The,of%20the%20Russian%20military%20attack>

full-scale invasion in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, also implemented projects to enhance the safety of journalists via its office in Kyiv.<sup>155</sup>

In addition, a range of international non-governmental organizations supported the safety of the Ukrainian media sector. These either worked closely with local organizations, especially when they did not have a presence in the country, or they organized activities through dedicated missions or through existing offices in Ukraine. In general, the international community working on journalists' safety globally was very active and supportive towards the Ukrainian media community.

#### **4.1 These international actors within the country monitor journalists' safety issues and share information**

Among intergovernmental organizations, the Council of Europe, via its Safety of Journalists Platform, facilitated systematic monitoring of attacks against journalists.<sup>156</sup> The OSCE did not undertake systematic monitoring but occasionally issued public condemnations of the killings of journalists (see above, under 4).

Among international non-governmental organizations, RSF, CPJ, IFJ, and IPI carried-out systematic monitoring of the killings of journalists and other safety issues, and published the related information on their website. Since these organizations do not have offices in Ukraine, they relied on cooperation with local organizations such as IMI and the NUJU.

#### **4.2 These international actors promote coordinated approaches to safety issues**

International actors have promoted coordinated approaches to safety issues and actively organized periodic information meetings as well as communication channels. Examples of this include the Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD), which set up an open information sharing group in February 2022.<sup>157</sup> This group, which meets regularly online, is above all directed towards facilitating the exchange of information, but it has also conducted joint advocacy efforts such as the Perugia Declaration for Ukraine which was co-signed by 219 organizations and published on 3 May 2022.<sup>158</sup> Internews, which operates in Ukraine with an office in Kyiv, has also set up a media donors coordination meeting for periodic information meetings to distribute to international donors.

#### **4.3 The international actors within the country build knowledge and capacity**

International actors in Ukraine have supported a range of capacity-building activities over the course of 2022. Organizations with the relevant capacity in the country conducted these directly, for example Internews, which reports it offered training on physical safety, tactical first aid, digital hygiene, and cybersecurity to 315 journalists across Ukraine between February and November 2022.<sup>159</sup>

Other international organizations such as RSF organized capacity-building activities via its local partners.

155 Council of Europe, available at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/en/sjm-scom-ukraine>

156 Council of Europe, available at: <https://fom.coe.int/en/pagesspeciales/detail/1>

157 GFMD, available at: <https://gfmd.info/engagements/coordination-ukraine-media-support/>

158 GFMD, available at: <https://gfmd.info/perugia-declaration-for-ukraine/>

159 Internews, available at: <https://internews.org/blog/keeping-independent-media-in-ukraine-operational/>

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The UN and other IOs should coordinate to ensure on-going training and resources are allocated to appropriately address the constantly changing conflict and fluctuating media needs in the country. This includes training on and resources for digital security, conflict reporting, and emergency response. Resources, including all information published on digital channels and through partnership channels, should be made available in Ukrainian, to reach a wider audience and enhance accessibility for all stakeholders.
2. The UN should continue supporting and expanding hubs for the distribution of information and resources related to journalists' safety. These centers could also play a pivotal role in coordinating cross-border collaboration initiatives among media organizations and newsrooms (see recommendation 5 in 'roles and response of media actors and intermediaries').
3. The UN and other IOs should collaborate with media development CSOs and local academia on training initiatives and curriculum development, to ensure that journalism students are sufficiently and comprehensively trained on all aspects of safety.
4. The UN and other IOs should mobilize additional resources for general advocacy on the challenges faced by journalists in Ukraine, especially in the context of full-scale war. Enhanced coordination is particularly needed when it comes to promoting transparency on the part of state actors involved in the conflict, sharing of data related to the prosecution of cases of violence against journalists, monitoring state adherence to international standards on journalists' safety, and increasing general awareness and visibility of violations of press freedom and journalists' safety.
5. When it comes to monitoring, the UN and other IOs can improve monitoring in line with SDG 16.10.1 by establishing a centralized hub for publishing all monitoring data available to international partners, and by promoting a coordinated international response to monitoring data, including information about captured journalists and civilians held by the Russian authorities.
6. The framework documents guiding UN work in Ukraine, such as the Coordination Framework and Transitional Framework, should emphasize the safety of journalists as a fundamental component for ensuring freedom of expression.
7. The UN should be provided with access to the entire territory of Ukraine, including that under temporary occupation, for conducting monitoring on violations and analyzing compliance with international conventions by the Russian Federation, including in view of providing data to the ICC.
8. The UN should encourage and facilitate Ukrainian CSOs' interaction and engagement with UN human rights mechanisms (including Special procedures as well as the Human Rights Council, the Universal Periodic Review Process, the Human Rights Committee), by providing dedicated capacity-building measures and information tools to Ukrainian CSOs.

## Appendix 1: List of institutions interviewed and surveyed

### Ukrainian civil society organizations

- Commission on Journalism Ethics (CJE)
- Detector Media
- Digital Security Lab
- Digital Security School 380
- Institute of Mass Information (IMI)
- Lviv Media Forum (LMF)
- Media Development Foundation (MDF)
- National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU)
- Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI)
- Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
- Women in Media

### Ukrainian academic institutions

- Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University
- Ukrainian Catholic University
- UNESCO Chair “Human Rights, Peace, Democracy, Tolerance and International Understanding” at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
- Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University

### Media actors

- 1+1
- 6262.com.ua
- Associated Press
- Babel
- Bihus.Info
- Dziennik Gazeta Prawna
- Gazeta Wyborcza
- Hromadske
- Liga.net
- Media freelancers
- MOST
- NIKCENTER.ORG
- Radio Svoboda Ukraine
- Realna hazeta
- Slidstvo.info
- STB
- Suspilne
- The Kyiv Independent
- The Washington Post
- Ukrainska Pravda
- Vgory
- Vilne radio
- Zmina

## State and political actors

- Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine
- Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy
- Directorate for Information Policy and Information Security of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine
- Directorate of Information Policy in the Field of Defense and Strategic Communications of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
- National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine

## UN agencies in Ukraine

- UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
- UN Resident Coordinator
- UNESCO Kyiv Desk Liaison Officer
- United Nations Development Programme

## Other international intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations

- Chemonics
- Freedom House
- Human Rights Watch
- Institute for War & Peace Reporting
- International Media Support
- Internews Network
- IREX
- OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media

## Appendix 2: Selected references

### A. Websites

For the purpose of data collection and documentation, the following electronic websites were used:

#### United Nations and international non-governmental organizations:

- Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) <https://cpj.org/>
- Council of Europe Platform on the Safety of Journalists <https://fom.coe.int/en/accueil>
- Human Rights Monitoring Mission for Ukraine <https://www.ohchr.org/>
- International News Safety Institute (INSI) <https://newssafety.org/>
- International Press Institute (IPI) <https://ipi.media/>
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) <https://www.ohchr.org/>
- Reporters Without Borders (RSF) <https://rsf.org/>
- UNESCO Observatory of Killed Journalists <https://www.unesco.org/>

#### Ukrainian organizations:

- Detector Media <https://detector.media/>
- Human Rights Platform <https://www.ppl.org.ua/>
- Institute of Mass Information <https://imi.org.ua/>
- National Union of Journalists of Ukraine <https://nsju.org/>
- Women in the Media <https://www.zhinkyvmedia.com/>
- Zmina <https://zmina.info/>

### B. Books, articles and publications

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- Detector Media. 'Поліція розслідує 15 кримінальних проваджень за фактами злочинів росіян проти українських журналістів' (Ukraine, 2022) <https://detector.media/>
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