

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF “KYIV-MOHYLA ACADEMY”
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND SOCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BACHELOR’S THESIS

Degree Level — Bachelor

**RECONTEXTUALISING THE “ROGUE STATE” LABEL USING
THE US ACADEMIC DISCOURSES AND NARRATIVES
DURING 1994-2000 YEARS**

Thesis on International Relations

Student of Fourth Year of Study

Thuy Tien Nguyen

Supervisor:

Candidate of Sciences, Senior Lecturer

Kateryna Zarembo

KYIV-2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	3
CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	8
1.1 Outlining the canvas: the international actors and constructivism.....	8
1.2 Symbolic interactionism – symbol in labels.....	9
1.3 Rogue concept: origin and development.....	13
CHAPTER 2. “ROGUE STATE” LABEL INTERPRETATIONS.....	17
2.1 Rogue label and “prevention”	17
2.2 Rogue label and “structurization”	19
2.3 Rogue label and “alienation”	21
CHAPTER 3. APPLICATION OF THE “PREVENTION”, “STRUCTURALIZATION” AND “ALIENATION” CATEGORIES IN U.S. ACADEMIC FIELD.....	25
3.1. Data Analysis.....	28
3.2. Discussion.....	35
CONCLUSION.....	40
REFERENCES.....	44
APPENDIX.....	49
ANNOTATION.....	78

INTRODUCTION

The classification of entities in the global arena using negative concepts and terms has been the subject of examination by numerous scholars and researchers. The complexities arising from advancements in modernization have ignited discussions and critique surrounding the unbalanced stigmatization of labeling by powerful actors towards less influential ones (Wagner, Werner, & Onerco, 2014, p. 7; Mandell, 1999). Some have raised concerns about whether such labeling aims to criminalize specific actors within the international relations community (Wagner, 2014), while others argue that it is an ineffective and detrimental tool that can escalate hostilities and result in self-fulfilling prophecies of negative outcomes (Malici & Walker, 2014; Malici, 2009).

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected in various spheres of study such as economy, politics, and law, the interplay between variables utilized by nation-states can have both direct and indirect effects. Whether analyzed from a legal standpoint or in terms of economics and politics, the construction of "simplified" definitions and labels for entities that deviate from the established world order undeniably shapes how these subjects are perceived and treated by other actors (Wang, 2011). This socio-attitudinal perspective on the power of language and labels is evident through the lens of symbolic interactionism, which allows us to explore how individuals create and interpret the meaning of concepts, ideas, and names through social interactions (Blumer, 1969, p. 153) and the use of symbols.

The main reason the author decided to use the analysis of "rogue label" in their research is because of the interest that has arrived with the learning of the way actors on the international arena define, categorize and influence each other, especially in the way the "labels" can do. It is worth mentioning that the examination of "labels" in the context of individuals and communities has received more comprehensive research attention within sociological or sociologically related domains, as the works address individuals or an organization of people as the object of matter, with either similar norms, values, and expectations or all together prevails in societal disciplines (Hagan,

1973). It has not, however, been researched much about the connotations and the themes from the negative “labels” in the political and IR academic field of researches and it is under the author’s aspiration to fill up the breach with their own research on how the “rogue state” labeling is being instrumentalized in the narratives of the US academic disputes.

Following the dissolution of the USSR, the emergence and widespread usage of the term "rogue state" reached unprecedented levels, particularly during the 1990s and the first half of the 20th century (O'Reilly, 2007). This phenomenon can be attributed to multiple factors, including the necessity to establish a new direction and framework for foreign policy and the desire to impose sanctions on nations that demonstrated hostility towards the United States and Western countries, while also possessing the capability to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and/or maintaining affiliations with terrorist organizations (O’Sullivan, 2000, p. 56).

However, in this work the underlying reasoning of “labeling” the deviants in the international arena would not be researched and explored, nor will the answers for the alternatives be provided. The focus in this work would be to find out the peculiarities and the undertone meanings behind the usage of the label “rogue state” among the academic circle in order to highlight the US perspective and attitude toward the world, using the delimitation of “Us” and “They” as a main tool of operation. Moreover, it is crucial to recognize that this work does not emphasize or delve into the perspectives of the authors of the academic papers themselves regarding the matter, nor does it address the validity and fairness of the label in question.

Thus, the **research question will be**: what are the peculiarities and connotations of the label “rogue state” in the context of the American discourses and narratives from 1994-2000? The **object**: label “rogue state” and the **subject** is

the instrumentalization of “rogue state” label depending on implications (prevention, alienation, structuralization) in academic narratives and discourses.

In this work, **the tasks** that the author will try to do are: 1) describe what “labels” in IR mean; 2) develop the categories for interpretation of “rogue state”; 3) analyze scholarly works from the United States that discuss the use of the term "rogue state" within the context of the developed categories.

The work's **relevance** stems from its underlying principles and methodology in examining how the historical usage of the "rogue" label informs its current application as a tool for categorization. While there has been extensive research on the concept and terminology of "rogue state," limited attention has been given to exploring the academic perspectives that explore the connection between the symbolic nature of the label, its underlying connotations in different contexts, and the evolving implications associated with it.

The timeline from 1994-2000 will be used, due to the fact that the label “rogue state” has been repopularised with start of the Clinton administration and with the consequence emergence of the article from the National Security Adviser Anthony Lake in 1994 (Wilson Center, 2001), which coined and officially marked the usage of the label “rogue state” in the american foreign policy while addressing Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba (ibid). The year of 2000 has been chosen as the ending mark for the examination and analysis due to the statement from the domestic radio interview of Secretary Albright about the banning of the usage “rogue states”, in favor of utilization of the term “states of concern” (O’Reilly, 2000, p. 303; American University Radio, 2000)

This work has been divided in three parts, each one of them with distinct aims and questions to answer with. Chapter 1 of this dissertation will establish the theoretical framework by integrating the constructivism theory in International Relations and symbolic interactionism from sociology. These two theories will provide a lens through which we can examine the meaning of "labels" in the context of interactions among

international actors. Understanding the significance and implications of labels is essential, given the central focus of this study on the label "rogue state."

The choice of the constructivism paradigm stems from its critical perspective on societal dynamics, encompassing individuals and nation-states. This framework allows for an examination of how American academics during that period assessed, researched, and conveyed their perspectives on US foreign policy, approaches, and trajectories. By focusing on the nature of reality and knowledge (Onuf, Bertucci, Hayes, et al, 2018, Preface), this paradigm challenges our understanding and perception of reality and sheds light on the viewpoints of academics regarding the role of the US in the international arena. Additionally, it underscores the importance of understanding the historical, sociological, and political contexts surrounding labels, including their origins, transmission, and symbolic manifestations.

Moreover, by incorporating the sociological paradigm of symbolic interactionism, the author aims to elucidate the implicit and practical aspects associated with the term "rogue state." This approach allows for a deeper understanding of how the label is utilized and shaped within US academic discourses, which have extensively engaged with this concept. Additionally, a comprehensive historical analysis of the origins and evolution of the "rogue" label will be provided, offering a contextual understanding of its relevance and significance within the specified timeframe.

In Chapter 2 the theoretical framework for the forthcoming analysis will be illustrated, as the paper will look at the distinct approaches of interpretations for the "rogue state" term in International Relations, the studies from the book "Deviance in International Relations 'Rogue States' and International Security" has been used, conducted by Wolfgang Wagner, Wouter Werner, Michal Onderco, Jorg Kustermans, Luigi Corrias and Bernd Bucher, as well as from the work by K. P. O'Reilly "Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the 'Rogue State' Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elites". The theories and perspectives developed by these International Relations scholars have influenced and provided a foundation for understanding the connotations attributed by US academics to "rogue states." The current rise of lawless entities has prompted the

utilization of different categorization approaches in today's society, creating a distinction between "us" and "others." These methods, namely "prevention," "structuralization," and "alienation," play a significant role in shaping this differentiation.

Chapter 3 will focus on constructing and analyzing data through a qualitative deductive analysis. The aim is to identify and understand the different ways in which the term "rogue state" is used in American policy, specifically by examining 30 randomly selected academic articles published between 1994 and 2000. The basis and the model for the scheme has been outlined with the help of the works of Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman and Johnny Saldaña in their book "Qualitative Data Analysis. A method sourcebook", 4th edition, as well as the lectures from Dr. Jaroslaw Kriukow in his course "How to analyze Qualitative Data".

In this work the label with negative connotation is chosen because it came to our consideration that the negative ones are of the most concern of the international community. As the blurry interpretation of some of these concepts are the results of many contextual, environmental and motivational practices, it is therefore under our interest to understand the way the bipolar connotation of the way "wrong characteristics" of the nation-states categorization is distinguished from the ones with "right characteristics", that presumably derived the "good" and the "bad" labels. The perspectives and the power play of those who put the labels and those who received those labels are one of the main reasons the author has chosen to look at the label with bad connotations.

CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Outlining the canvas: the international actors and constructivism

The constructivism paradigm has been selected due to its critical perspective on societal dynamics, encompassing both individuals and nation-states. Through this framework, we can examine how American academics of that era evaluated, researched, and expressed their insights on US foreign policy, approaches, and trajectories. This paradigm places emphasis on the nature of reality (ontology) and the nature of knowledge (epistemology) (Adler, 2013, p. 112-145), challenging our perceptions and understanding of reality and unraveling the perspectives of academics regarding the role of the US in the international arena. Moreover, it highlights the significance of attributing meaning to the "rogue state" label, recognizing it as a social construct.

For the understanding of the role of labels in the structuralist paradigm we need to look at the way meaning is imposed not as a connection between “the name and the object”, but the way the pattern has been formed, implemented and later justified. In describing the constructivism one of the authors, Nicholas Onuf, counted out the formed points in constructivism, which we find quite fitting for our understanding of the method, when “people are turned into moderate-sized objects by assigning them identities” (Onuf, Bertucci, Hayes, et al, 2018, Preface). The same could be applied in relation to this work: constructivism enables us to look at the players in the international field as “moderate-sized objects”, as the academics and researchers can use for their evaluation and description.

Moreover, constructivism has an interpretive and ideational approach “that stresses the role of intersubjective meaning in world politics, manifested through norms, identity, and culture” (Steele, 2017, p. 71). While working with labels, the understanding and the acknowledgment of the historical (when it was coined and in

which historical context), sociological (who, for whom and transmitted by whom) or political (by which nation-state, against or for which political message) context of the label, the motive behind using it and the way it has been symbolically manifested is crucial (Moncrieffe, Eyben, 2007, p.17-33). As the “labels” themselves are subjective due to the information of “who, when and for what” having contextual analysis is a good way to understand the agency of labeling (ibid, p. 2-4). The labels are assigned in accordance to the motives, to the context and to the targets.

Now, understanding the rules and the field of the game, there is a need to outline the players themselves. Such actors as individuals, the NGOs, the corporations, and other entities or organizations that are not nation-states are omitted, a practice that is common and principal when looking and working with the constructivism theory (Theys, 2017, p. 36). Of course, there are instances when the labels are assigned to the organizations, especially in the cases of terrorist organizations and movements (Loren, Mettekman, 2014), however they will not be the focus of this work, due to the uniqueness that those players portray have peculiar characteristics and demand a larger and different amount of variables that needed to be taken into account. Nation-states are perceived and categorized drastically differently, but the conundrum of the differences of actors of which we will not be detailed. In order to ground our work in more or less “evaluable” units, nation-states are the objects that share relatively similar characteristics and have been under the main political limelight during the time period that we have chosen to analyze, namely 1994-2000.

1.2 Symbolic interactionism – symbol in labels

The way people create meaning through interactions with others can be manifested in many different instances. Either by the languages, by the gestures, by the sounds, by the rituals and objects - the options are endless and unlimited by the human’s imagination (Blumer, 1969, p. 2-21). One of the most incredible instances of that is by the power of language, especially, by the names, epithets or tags. Meanings of the names are not fixed or inherent in objects or actions but are created through social

interactions and negotiations (Knoblauch, 2001, p. 80). Thus, they can change over time and can vary across different social contexts.

The research and understanding of this phenomenon has been analyzed by the academics of the social sciences from the first half of the 18th century, with the work of George Mead and Herbert Blumer (ibid, p. 83), and the study that is especially interested in this phenomenon is called the **symbolic interactionism**. Mead's ideas about the importance of symbols and interactions in shaping human behavior were influential, as he took a close look at the way individuals interact with each other and with their environment through the use of symbols, such as language, and that these interactions shape the way individuals see themselves and the world around them. (Mead, 2018, p. 238).

Symbolic interactionism (SI) is a sociological approach that deals with the small-scale, usually close-knit interactions between the social actors and they emphasize on the importance of meaning the actors attach to their behavior and actions (Blumer, 1969, p. 51). For the proponents of this perspective, society is a dynamic structure which changes and constructs itself from the everyday interactions between the social entities (Knoblauch, 2001). Even though there are tools to conduct an order and structure such as norms, rules and routines, the arrangements are quite precarious and can be deviated due to the context, case-to-case circumstances and are pretty moldable (ibid). According to Susie Scott, SI focuses on the fact that “Individual identities emerge out of social interaction and are negotiable through our relations with other actors, which can involve power struggles as well as harmonious cooperation... It focuses on subjective realities: how people experience and make sense of their situations to create social worlds.” (Scott, 2017, p. 218-219) Drawn from the interpretivist epistemology, this approach takes effort in interpretative understanding of social action (ibid) and its influences.

The framework of this study allows us to analyze the way the individuals or entities behave or act based on their own interpretations and worldview. And the application of this framework has been vastly used in the studies of criminal sociology, the way our society sees and identifies certain behavior and acts as acceptable or

deviant, to categorize and classify the “wrongdoers” among the human society. Unlike the surgeon, who can take into account the understanding of the differences of the cancer tissues and the healthy tissues in the human’s body by delving into the characteristics of both of these attributes, society doesn’t have a definite and clear classification of the “unhealthy” and the “healthy” individuals in society. Human interaction is much more complex and the bipolar understanding of “right” and “wrong” is not inherently correct and helpful.

This perspective can also be observed in the distinct perspective adopted by US academics when analyzing the "rogue" actors in the international sphere. As complex as human’s interaction is, the force and the driving reasons for the agents of the international arena are almost the same, because politics, after all, is mechanized by humans, or as worded by Wendt, “states are people too” (Wendt, 1999, 215). On the broader scale, the reasoning and the driving force of the state deviance might be much more complex and there are a lot more factors with a wider spectrum of variables that must be taken into account, yet the simple basis of the state is human-driven. Certain behavior and acts of a state can be frowned upon and for that the tools for changing and punishing them to be “acceptable” could be found.

Through the application of symbolic interactionism as a theoretical framework, we can uncover the deeper symbols embedded within labels and names. This perspective emphasizes the role of individual agency and social context in shaping social behavior and the attribution of meaning. Symbolic interactionism has been widely employed in sociology and related fields to provide insights into diverse social phenomena (Scott, 2017). By adopting this framework, we can delve into the nuanced meanings associated with the usage of the "rogue state" label, particularly within the realm of American academia.

Various nations and states undergo diverse experiences with the process of labeling, subsequently deconstructing it and attributing fresh meanings and underlying connotations. Recognizing our inherent tendency to categorize phenomena, terms, and ideas, it is imperative to explore how the symbolic texture (Davis, 1984, p. 17) and motifs are interwoven within the "rogue" label, contingent upon the specific nation-state

and historical epoch in question. This predisposition prompts us to consider how labels are perceived by the global superpower during a particular era, as well as how our perceptions, actions, and understanding have been shaped to align with those established frameworks.

The Symbol in Labels

Labeling is a unique method of classification that involves assigning metaphorical names to categorize and engage with specific groups of people, ideas, nations, and phenomena. It is perceived as an objective and impersonal tool to handle concepts and notions in a condensed manner, although its ethical implications within the academic field are debatable. Nonetheless, the act of labeling holds a dual connotation as it reveals insights about the subject who assigns the label and the object that is influenced by it (Moncrieffe and Eyben, 2007, “Introduction”).

When labels enter the field of practical and actual usages they can and are easily manipulated and convoluted. They get to become symbols, with meanings, underlying connotations and sentiments behind it. A symbol is always of imaginative nature, it signifies a branched class of phenomena (Amelchenko, 2023). If we delve into the culturological scenery, the lotus flower is perceived as a symbol of Buddha, and for others it means no more than the other flowers with colorful petals. “Rogue” might mean “an entity with savage and disruptive tendencies”(Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). Or it might mean “an oddity, which we want to change”, or “an opportunity to perform our power”.

In the International Relation field, the label can show the underlying power-relation between the entities who have coined and actively spread, adopted and benefited from the label and those who are the objects of attention and concern. Symbols provide the means by which reality is constructed (Amelchenko, 2023) and the connotations that the label “rogue state” plays in the academic discourses might show the affect and influence of the way US foreign policy has developed during the given

timeline. The focus here is the variety meaning, defined in terms of the labeling action and reflected on the discourses and narratives.

1.3 Rogue concept: origin and development

The history of conceptualizing and outlining lawless and rogue entities rummaging in the international system is not the new concept and phenomena. The state deviants have been active since the establishment of the nation-states with borders and rules of international cooperation, as well as the norms and traditions. “Rogueness” has been ascribed to the entities which questioned the established orders and arrangements, that have been put by the majorities and, oftenly, the most powerful ones in the given territories and regions (Wagner, Werner and Onderco, 2014, p. 4). They were the disruptors, the volatile entities on the international arena at the given time and region. The way they conduct their affairs and matters in relation with the other actors of the international community has been pretty much similar to the way it is being conducted even these days: both as free roaming actors, and as the puppets or associates of more powerful sponsors and supporters (Henriksen, 2001 p. 350-351).

One of the most notorious examples of the first case is the Viking nation, an entity that operated from the 8th to the 11th centuries and rattled the European nations by raids and conquests, having left a great imprint in European history (Logan, 1991, p. 13-18). From as far south as North Africa and as far east as the Kyivan Rus they existed as looters, traders, colonists and mercenaries (ibid, p. 58). They have left an important imprint during and after their venture, yet they were the entity that operated as a free roaming, non-conformist and “rogue” way.

Thomas H. Henriksen has also conducted an excellent example in his article “The Rise and Decline of Rogue States” of the lawless entities that operated as affiliates of more powerful patrons. During the rising period of European expansion from the 16th century England, France, Holland, Portugal and Spain in their effort for nation expansion have boosted their maritime power and used the private ships (privateers) to attack the vessels of the others nationalities. (Henriksen, 2001, p. 350). This blurred the distinction between legitimate commerce and hostile action, just as today the same

problem has been crossed by rogue entities. Non-official forces spared European states direct confrontation with an adversary, while doing it harm. (ibid, p. 351).

Even though the term itself has gained its popularity and a more conceptualized version and usage from the end of the Cold War, the concept of “roguery” can and has been described both in western and non-western history, as it was an easy way to outline those who are of similar-values and mind and those who are not (O’Sullivan, 2000, p. 56).

However, with the much more close-knitted and connected world, as expected, especially due to the rise of modernization, the international system is intertwined with each other, making the changes in one geopolitical territory create a huge butterfly effect and a wave across the international board. This issue has been taken up with a great deal in the US history of foreign policies. The deviant entities nowadays, especially in US policies (Hoyt, 2000, p. 310), are subjected to much more scrutiny and are categorized and ranked by volatility, extremeness, severity and advancement. The separation of the camps is at utmost important not only for the locally near geopolitics, and the neighboring nation-states, but also for the whole world.

The concept of the “rogues” isn’t a new one, it has been instrumentalized and weaponized after the Cold War in the lexicon of the US policies and policy-makers, as well as the american academics. One of the reasons for that is the idea and guideline by General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in the 1990s, who has manufactured and enrolled in the American foreign policy lexicon “Rogue Doctrine”, as a device of the post-Cold War strategy. (Klare, 1998, p. 46) The concept has been popularized under the Bush and Clinton administration, as a defining paradigm for American security policy to categorize and punish certain states who pose Threat to the USA and though the “threat” itself has been modified and adjusted through the course of the later half of the 20th century, the “rogue state” label itself has been generally used to punish the states for 4 “wrongdoings”: the vocal animosity to US, support for terrorism and the threat they might impose with the chase after the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely for Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. (O’Sullivan, 2000, p. 56).

And here lies the problem: while it has been used in address of a definite list of “rogue state” actors, the criteria and the standards by which a country could be considered rogue is a lot more complicated. In examining the rogue states, Paul Hyot in their research has analyzed the relationship between the state behavior and the application of the “rogue state” is not automatic and concrete. According to them, “..there is a relationship between state behavior and the application of the rogue label, that relationship is neither automatic nor absolute..” and “defing a rogue based on a set of objective criteria is not possible because it operates from the assumption that it is exclusively the overt policy behavior of states that determines their entry into the category of rogue” (Hyot, 2000, p. 310)

The alleged policies that the states might have performed in order to fall into the “rogue state” category by them has been the acquisition of proliferation, political or military threat to the global stability, or supporting\sponsoring terrorism or challenge to international norms (ibid, p. 303).

Interestingly enough, the American characteristics of the “rogue states” as a country possesses powerful weapons of mass-destruction, as someones who pose a great threat to the international order, as nations who have and are violating their people, or the people from another nation, as states who challenge the status-quo of the powerful ones in the region, have accumulated with time with different labels assigned according to the specific nature and motives of the international deviants: the “outlaw state”, the “pariah state”, the “Axis of Evils”, the “states of concern” - each and one of them have been used in the vocabulary of the US lexicon (Homolar, 2011, p. 710).

The topic of the “Rogue state” term has been analyzed and researched for a long time, even after the ban and the recession of the usage and implementation of US foreign policy. Whether about the natures and the motives of the “rogue states” themselves (O’Reilly, 2007) by american policymakers, or the implication of the state behavior from the labeling with the usage of Role Theory (Malici and Walker, 2014), or just to see the international order (Kapur, 1996), or emphasis on the rogue behavior, not rogue state (Richard Cupitt, 1996). Another great vision is the self-prophecy of labeling, in the work of (Akan Malici, 2009).

The interest of this work thus lies in the peculiarities of the ways the “rogue state” label itself is manifested on the academic discourses. The connotations and the different peculiarities that arise with time and usage, the way of usage as a whole in the American academic setting. In this work the author will try to analyze the way the academic discourse is shaped according to the differentiation and division of the “US” and the “Rogue state”, and the implications of the subject of the label to the object. (Klare, 1998, p. 13).

To summarize, constructivism offers a valuable framework for evaluating and describing international actors as "moderate-sized objects." Its interpretive and ideational approach, emphasizing intersubjective meaning, provides insights into the role of norms, identity, and culture in shaping world politics. When analyzing labels, it is crucial to understand their historical, sociological, and political contexts, including their origin, transmission, and symbolic manifestation. By adopting symbolic interactionism as another theoretical lens, we can uncover the deeper symbols embedded within labels and names. This framework recognizes the influence of individual agency and social context in shaping social behavior and the attribution of meaning. The concept of "rogueness" emerged as a way to label entities that questioned established orders and perceived as disrupters in the international arena. This term gained prominence in US policies and academia after the Cold War, with the introduction of the "Rogue Doctrine" by General Colin Powell. However, the criteria and standards for categorizing a country as a "rogue state" are complex, as many countries which do have “rogue behavior” and “rogue ideology”. Alleged policies such as proliferation, political or military threats to global stability, and support for terrorism or defiance of international norms have been cited as reasons for assigning this label. To better understand the dynamics at play, further research is needed to explore the multifaceted nature of "rogue states" and the implications of using such labels in international relations.

CHAPTER 2. “ROGUE STATE” LABEL INTERPRETATION

The hardship of defining, marking and implementing of this label has been analyzed in the work of Palgrave Studies, a book on learning the Deviance in International Relation. (Wagner, Werner and Onderco, 2014)

The few distinctions that have appeared in the modern day lawless entities are the way the modern world is used to categorize themselves in order to differentiate the “us” and “others”. As much as regulation and surveillance slowly seeped and gained importance in the modern world, the designated statuses for the deviants that been used in order to separate them and the other members of the international community, evident in the labels “rogues”, “pariah”, “states of concerns” and “renegades”. The meaning and assumptions that symbolize the manner and source of their deviance and indicate the need of a befitting policy and responses according to the labels.

There are abundance of research according to the nature of the rogue states themselves (O’Sullivan, 2000; Klare, 1998), as well as the concern that the rogue states pose for the US (Homolar, 2011; O’Reilly, 2007; Hyot, 2000), or the result and the ramification of the “labeling” policies (Wagner and Malici, 2014). This study centers its attention on the intrinsic implications of the "rogue state" label from an American standpoint, exploring how this classification aids in conveying their message and the specific aspects that capture the foremost attention of American academics when employing this label in their research.

While exploring the nature and motives of the labels as a key variable of this work, the division between three camps of understanding what “rogue labels” could be interpreted, namely: “prevention”, “structuralization” and “alienation”.

2.1 Rogue label and “prevention”

One of the most used and perceived connotations of the rogue states, coded as so called “criminals” in the international community. This connotation has much more

“direct” underlying meaning of the “threat” to the U.S., whether on the substantial level (nuclear missile) or ideological (spread of anti-american sentiments). Mostly, the rogues with this interpretation can be categorically divided in these three objectives: 1) those who actively pursue proliferation, 2) those who actively but discreetly support terrorist organizations and 3) those who present a vocal and an active spread of hostile messages against the USA (or, in some cases, the USA and the West). The threat perception is derived from the viewpoint and the evaluation of their own understanding of international peace and security, whether from the state-centric concern of the acquirement and employment of WMDs and the usage of them as a leverage in regarding to their “enemies” or neighbors, or with more emphasize ideology-centric and human-centric perspective, sometimes they add to each other (Wagner, 2014, p. 5).

Following the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a notable void left by the former leadership of the USSR. This void was swiftly filled by various countries and states eager to secure a favorable position within the international community. For the United States, as the remaining superpower, the rapid competition among these international actors to claim a stake in the vacuum became a matter of significant concern (Tanter, 1998, Chapter 1). The main cause of concern, however, is when other nations begin to develop and compete for dominance, but not in accordance with "western ways" (by boosting economic, diplomatic, or soft powers), but rather by bolstering their military strength, or, more specifically, their arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The similar concern has been aimed at the heightened but veiled actions and support of the terrorist groups and organizations. The second objective presents the need to prevent the escalation of the violence among other nations, and the concern over the destruction and extermination that the rogue state may or are fueling, (ibid). The usage of the label “rogue state” in this case is placed to express the condemnation of the links that they have.

Having addressed the first and second objectives, the third objective revolves around the apprehension regarding the anti-Western deployment of soft power. This involves the dissemination of propaganda and efforts to disrupt American integrity and

international perception, perpetrated by the so-called "rogue state." (Klare, 1998, p. 38) Such actions pose a direct and overt threat to the United States, casting doubt on its ability to maintain its position of prominence at that particular point in time.

2.2 Rogue label and “structurization”

Deriving from our point from the definition and perception of “labels” as “symbols”, one of the main reasons for emergence of the labeling has been the decision and the necessity to assign the US a new enemy and a new power to compete with. This interpretation is based on the assumption about the importance of the necessity of a mythical character, an oppositioner against the “good” and the “rightful” ones.

Having struggled with the domestic problems, including the steep economic challenges such as recessions in the early 1990s, the failure at the healthcare sector (failure of the Health Security Act in 1994) (Jennings, n.d) and drastic political polarization and instability (with the political split at the executive and legislative branches after the Republican revolution in 1994) (Levinson, 2022), rise of inequality, racial segregation and other aspects, the uncertainty and the disarray of the domestic field might have fueled the necessity for US government to find a way to unify, in a face of creating and justifying the emergence of new “opponents”, namely North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Iraq and so on. The labels are the personification of the American desire to get better, to find a different goal and target and for the masses to unify. In brief, in substitute for the opposition against Communism, the nation-states with “rogue” behavior and actions have emerged (Henriksen, 2001 p. 352).

One of the basis for the emergence of the label “rogue” is, it has been mentioned, fear. However, as the previous unit has showcased the fear as a motive for enmity and hostility as a reasoning behind the harsh foreign policies, we wanted to showcase the other way this fear has been projected in the interaction with other nation-states.

It has been historically predisposed in the times of substantial social crisis, the tool for unifying was to find a different target and aims, whether it is using the focus on the economic leap (as been with Mao's Great Leap Forward), or from other means. However, with the chaotic character of a world-building state of the international arena,

the balance and the sense they find is with the ability to objectify the “chaos”, “opposing force” and “evilness” is important to reset and recenter a nation's values.

It's the way countries are trying to make sense of the world, when in the economic, cultural or societal crisis, values crumble (Amelchenko, 2023). The revision to the nation's proudness and success that they have achieved with the collapse of the USSR lays in the riddance of those crisis phenomena from negativity.

The bipolar order is a disarray and in order for the western countries to find balance they have created the world where the narrative of “rogueness” helps to produce the myth and collectivize the community against something. Putting ourselves as the “savior” and the “correct” ones. With this the nation acquires more sources for creativity and activity.

The act of labeling serves to establish a distinct categorization, providing a convenient and objectified entity to assign blame to. It facilitates the perpetuation of myths and narratives (ibid). Drawing inspiration from the past and the logic of creating a similar system to that of the communist bloc, there arises a heightened need to direct negativity towards countries that openly oppose Western values and beliefs (Wunderlich, 2014, p. 83).

This brings us to the point that the “labeling” and targeting in the policies toward the “rogue” state also takes its roots in the notion of “barbarism” and “culturality” (Kustermans, 2014, “Identity and Otherness”). In this context it is also worth mentioning the way the rogue states are seen using the frames of international law. Some of the biggest critics of using international law in the discussion about rogues are the way it supports the narrative and the agency of the hegemonic western states. International law plays an “ambivalent role” (Wagner, Werner and Onderco, 2014, p. 7), as it is an instrument for the powerful ones to facilitate their actions and motives, as well as by constraining the deviants with the contention based on human rights, condemnation of aggression and democracy (Kustermans, 2014, p. 26). En masse, by emphasizing on the intrinsic western values, especially in the perspectives of the “modern, civilized, human-centered and favorable” versus the “obsolete, barbarian and

unfavorable” ones, oftentimes with regards to their authoritarian or totalitarian inclination (O’Reilly, 2007, p. 305-306).

While the reasoning behind this perspective may be understandable and valid, it primarily revolves around a bipolar framework of "Us" versus "Them". The fear of the emergence of nation-states possessing WMD is rooted in the perception of "rogue states" as being "unstable", "non-conforming", and overall characterized as "wild", "unpredictable", and "erratic". Consequently, the skepticism and apprehension harbored by American policymakers and implementers have undoubtedly heightened the antagonistic view and sentiment held by adversaries of the United States.

It questions the nature of the “rogue states” themselves, it makes an emphasis of the “inherent evilness” that these states represent, by being “unreasonable”, “bad” and “no good”. It gives the boost of justification for the US to act like they do and creates and enhances the myth of the “global supervisor” and “order-maker”. It provides ramification for the US policies to act, as well as provides the purpose for the external strategy.

2.3 Rogue label and “alienation”

Two of the previous interpretations of “rogueness” are predominantly with a peculiar negative connotation of “condemning” and “needed to be intervened/helped/prevented”. Those connotations are the most popular usage of the label “rogue states”, as by that term they draw the harsh line of “Us” and “They”, those who are “in the good” and those who are “doing harm, bringing havoc and abusing others”. These two interpretations have gained prominence in the aftermath of the Cold War, particularly within the context of American foreign policy, because they serve as convenient means to portray outcasted nations in a negative and villainous manner, effectively casting them into the shadows of international attention.

Nevertheless, there is also an interpretation of the necessity for the label “rogue” with the neutral or even empathetic perception. It is used, when used to delineate those, who are not willing to go under the rules and structure that has been outlined by the western actors of the international community. In my interpretation and understanding,

the line has been made for easy recognition and categorization, acknowledging the question and the concern that the outcasted nation-states have undisclosedly challenged. And it has been done with the usage of international legal order, the way of outcasting those who “do not follow the instruction of the game and/or question the game itself”.

This contention has drawn inspiration from the scholarship of Luigi Corrias, who incorporates the concepts of "rogue nature" espoused by Bernhard Waldenfels in their examination of the nature of the international community of nations. With the referral to Bernhard Waldenfels's work “Der Sinn Zwischen Den Zeilen” (Waldenfels, 1980, p. 72-77), and “Grundmotive Einer Phänomenologie Des Fremden.”(Waldenfels, 2006, p. 27) Luigi broke down the terms “foreign” and “alien”, and questioned the structure and the nature of the fabric of the international community, posing the “blind spot” in international legal order. In this case of work, the “international legal order” refers to the set of regulations, principles, and organizations that oversee how states and other international actors engage and interact with one another on a global scale. However, the delineation of this system is not established from an impartial standpoint. Instead, the boundaries of international order are typically established by one of the poles involved, with the intention of distinguishing itself from an external entity (Waldenfels, 2006, p. 27, as cited in Corrias, 2014, p. 52).

This also brings the distinction between the “rogue state” themselves and the other actors of the international community according to the international rules. They are coded as “outside the international order”, because they reject the power balance set in the existing world order and the justification that US gives in reference to “radically uncertain terms such as ‘humanity’, ‘humaneness’ and ‘mankind’” (Wagner, Werner, Onderco, 2014, p. 6), the rogue states themselves disregard “fundamental aspects of human values” (ibid, p. 6).

“Foreign”, as “belong to others, not us” and “alien” with the connotation of “feeling of puzzlement and mystification, those who strike not alike us”. The need for distinction derives from the perplexities that arise from the contrast, and putting “us” in relevance to “them”. The border is drawn by “us”, to distinguish ourselves from the outside, not by a neutral and supervising third party (Corrias, 2014, p. 52), because

“we” do not see “them” as genuinely someone equal. Thus, the socio-political structure that has arisen and marked was made in order to make the distinction, and the problem is in the one-sidedness of the ordeal. As stated in this work, “The United States have mandated themselves as the representatives of the community of decent (that is, non-rogue) states.” (ibid, p. 54), thus the nature and the “motivation” and “implication” of putting rogue labels on the outcast nation-states lay in the pure way of marking those who “do not follow the rules”, or “challenges western values and perspective”.

This happens without the analysis and overthinking of the possible implication that the “rogue” label can delimitate. This is not questioned by those who have put others into this box (the one who initiated and those who agreed with, on one hand side, and those who are being targeted, on the other hand), it does also rely on the complicity and uncovered agreement of the other participants in the international community. One of the most important points that the author Luigi Corrias has pointed out is that “*they*” are outside “*our community*” and “question the legitimacy of the order themselves” (ibid). The “they” in this case are not casted away because of the condemnation and punishment, or to bring the “us” up in our effort to make sense of the world. But to mark the objects of label as “odd ones”.

It could be seen in these lines: “...this questioning belongs to the nature of the strange: the strange strikes me by surprise, upsets me, discomforts me, unsettles me” (ibid). ‘Rogue states’ do exactly this: they call into question the present world order as it was born after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They do so by appealing to us to consider whether our economic system is really the only decent one available (North Korea), whether the present distribution of WMD actually enhances peaceful relations between countries (Iran), whether the West has a divine right to scarce natural resources (Iraq)” (ibid).

Jorg Kustermans in his chapter “‘Roguary’ and Citizenship” has presented several options and views of “roughness”, according to the perspective, values and power-relations. In the first half he looked at the “rogue” as the entity with improper personhood and the “rogueness” as the way to delimitate “us” and “they” in order to

strengthen the identity of the hegemonic community. “They exist because there is a need for comparison”, a wendtian concept of “Rogue-as-Other” (Kustermans, 2014 p.16-19).

As noted by Wolfgang Wagner, Wouter Werner and Michal Onderco, the objects of labeling target are mostly the less powerful states, those who do not have a particularly high place in international community and are sometimes seen as “outsiders”, who don’t cooperate and don’t operate in the way western nation-states do (Wagner, Werner and Onderco, 2014, p. 7). And here also arrives the weight and attention on the value and the superiority of the western structure and rules due to its human-centric priority and value. The question of human rights inside the rogue nations have been brought up, as they were criticized and condemned. Not to say that doing so is wrong, of course, but the way it can be easily instrumentalized and justified in order to launch the defensive measurements, not to mention the debate of the individualistic-centered western understanding of “human rights” and the other option, as exemplified by the North Korean understanding of “human rights” as an emphasis on the collective prosperity and happiness (Boquine, 2018, p. 19). And the same could be examined in the case of the Islamic definition of the “human right”, with under the liberal islamic interpretation, than “the principles of human rights and democracy can be connected meaningfully with the spirit of the shariah, provided that the shariah is primarily understood as an ethical and a religious concept rather than as a legalistic one” (Bielefeldt, 2000, p. 93)

International law does not have such categories as ‘outlaw’, ‘renegade’ or ‘rogue states’ (ibid, p. 19-20), and there are no guidelines and cases which level or deviance is “acceptable” and which are punishable. There is no uninvoiced protocol or management strategy and the line where the nation-state has gone “deviated” in other countries regarding the rogue states. Not much defined characteristics and course of action in the case of this or that label, outside of the usage and the application from the U.S. policies in the end of the 20th century. These labels are used and spread because they alienate the opposite side in a neutrally-negative way, they mark the position of the U.S. in relation between “those who put the label” and “those who received the label”.

But the importance of this categorization, this “alienation” approach, is that it takes into notice the emphasis that the rogue state themselves have decided to not play by the rules of the international community, by questioning the status-quo and, thus becoming “rogue”. The usage of this label isn’t to outright villainize them and does not portray them as a “threat” in the traditional understanding, but it does shift the responsibility to the rogue states themselves, not the one who has attached this label.

To summarize, the categorization of the connotation of "rogue state" in academic research reveals three distinct interpretations. The first connotation is "Prevention," where rogue states are perceived as criminals posing a direct threat to the United States. This perception is driven by concerns over the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, and the spread of anti-American sentiments. The second connotation is "Structuralization," which questions the inherent nature of rogue states, portraying them as inherently evil, unreasonable, and a force of disorder. This justification provides a basis for US actions and reinforces the notion of the United States as a global supervisor and order-maker. The third connotation is "Alienation," which acknowledges that rogue states have chosen not to abide by the rules of the international community, thus labeling them as rogue. This label does not necessarily villainize them or portray them as a traditional threat, but rather shifts the responsibility onto the rogue states themselves. The varying interpretations of the "rogue state" label highlight the complexity of understanding and engaging with these states in international relations.

CHAPTER 3. APPLICATION OF THE “PREVENTION”, “STRUCTURALIZATION” AND “ALIENATION CATEGORIES IN THE U.S. ACADEMIC FIELD”

As the theoretical concept has been outlined with the categories of “Prevention”, “Structuralization” and “Alienation”, it is time to make an implementation of the

practical part to support or reject the premises. For this task, the deductive approach for qualitative analysis has been done, as it involves using pre-existing theories or frameworks to guide the research process. It starts with a specific theory or hypothesis and seeks to gather data that either supports or refutes the initial theoretical proposition (Given, 2008, Vol.1-2). Even though the deductive method does not produce new knowledge, it does enable us to apply prior knowledge to explain something that has happened (Morin, Olsson and Atikcan, 2021, p. 78). The instruction for the Data analysis has been taken from Dr. Jaroslaw Kriukow's course "How to analyze Qualitative Data" in the Udemy.com platform.

Keeping in mind that the perception and the analysis of "rogue state" in this case is performed in the US academic field, the focus, therefore, of this work will be on the way the label "rogue state" has been used in their articles and the function they play and the connotation they execute.

In analyzing the articles, three questions are designed in order to guide the research:

- *What were the predominant thematic categories employed by American academics when using the label "rogue state"?*
- *Which perspective was predominantly used in the argumentation: that of the "rogue states" based on their existing or potential capabilities, or that of the "US" based on its own capabilities or anticipated actions?*
- *Do they focus on anticipating future threats or are they based on an evaluation of past behavior and actions?*

To assess these issues empirically, the database of 32 articles from JSTOR has been compiled from the randomly picked selections of the search results that have been accessed to me with the grant of Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in München. The parameters for the research have been set with the keyword of "rogue state", specifically from the period of 1994-2000. From all the academic content (book chapters, surveys, etc) for analysis only journals' articles have been picked. The search has also been narrowed down to three subjects for examination: International Relation, Political

Science, Peace and Conflict Studies. In order for us to assess the publications from each year from the search gap, at least 3 articles from 1994-2000 have been picked.

With the sufficient search parameters set, the searches generated 1243 results with the key word containing “rogue state”. It must be noted, though, that many of those publications can be duplicated, thus the number of the count could be significantly lower. The data does not include the publications, where the term can not be applicable due to the distinct characteristics (for example, “rogue state-of-art aircraft”, “state of art education”, “resocialize an "outlaw" state and to reform a "rogue " leader in psychology”, “rogue military units”). We have also eliminated the articles which had specific usage of “rogue state” in specialized directions that do not pertain the “rogue states” or “rogue” characteristics at a whole (i.e. “The Cultural Consequences of the Information Superhighway”, “Colombia's Fault Lines”) and the articles where the subject weren't the US and the rogue state themselves (“Sino-Indian Military Modernization: The Potential for Destabilization”, “Punishing Serbia”).

After excluding the publications that are not relevant for the analysis, specific criteria were applied when selecting the articles for the research:

- The journals are taken from all the varying thematic categories regarding US foreign policy toward the rogue states (North Korea, Iran, Cuba) and states with “rogue” characteristics (India, China, Pakistan) in the relevance with the “Us” and “They” division (i.e. “Inside Missile Defense”, “Foreign Policy”, “World Affairs”, “International Relations”)
- The attention would be narrowed down to the works which portrait policies attributed to the rogue states (i.e. pursue of WMD, support for terrorism, acquirement of high technology), behavior and nature of the rogue states (anti-western, volatile, sporadic; evil, bad, anti-humanistic) and the sides of the justification (from American-centric point of view and from “rogue states”-centric point of view)
- The papers are taken randomly from all the years taken from 1993-2000, with at least 3 papers from each year. The date the paper has been published will not matter in this particular research, as we will not analyze the development and the

shift of the concentration on regarded to categorization, due to the immense variables needed to be taken into the account, as well as a much larger and more complex pool of data in order to avoid sampling bias.

The framework is set in order to determine the peculiarities of the “rogue state” perception that the U.S. foreign policy and international relation academics have on the rogue states themselves.

3.1. Data Analysis

Here comes the part where we will try to divide (again, this is in a way still categorizing and still dividing to Us and Other, but in the sense of the modern fabric)

In analysis of the codes collected from the 30 random articles, 10 sub-thematic categories have been derived:

1. [Rogue states] because of WMD, military capabilities and new technology acquirement
2. [Rogue states] because of the links to terrorists' organizations\groups
3. [Rogue states] as outlaws of the international order\community
4. [Rogue states] to fill in the void in the chaotic non-binary world structure
5. [Rogue states] because they have vocal animosity toward the US -\and the west
6. [Rogue states] because of US's needs to promote the “world's cheriff” image
7. [Rogue states] because of US's needs political support from its citizens.
8. [Rogue states] because they don't play by the rules.
9. Barbarians vs civilization
- 10.[Rogueness] as a defensive mechanism to get acknowledgment among the international community.

Using these thematic categorizations to fill the table according to the emphasized connotation underlying in each of the messages we have put them in accordance with “Prevention”, “Structuralization” and “Alienation” theoretical framework.

Table 1. Sub-thematic categories under “Prevention”, “Structuralization” and “Alienation” framework

Prevention	Structurization	Alienation
[Rogue states] because of WMD, military capabilities and new technology acquirement	[Rogue states] to fill in the void in the chaos after the collapse of the previous non-binary system	[Rogue states] because they don't play by the rules.
[Rogues states] because of the links to terrorists' organizations\groups	Barbarians vs civilization	[Rogue states] as outlaws of the international order\community
[Rogues states] because they have vocal animosity toward the US -\and the west	[Rogue states] because US needs to promote the “cheriff of international order” image	[Rogueness] as a defensive mechanism to get acknowledgment among the international community.
	[Rogue states] because US needs political support from its citizens	

Source: Author's compilation

The category of “Prevention” contains the characteristics and behaviors of the “rogue states” that pertain to the tangible threat (in the face of nuclear threat and the support of terrorist entities) as well as the threat to the nation's image and integrity.

In “Structuralization”, the emphasis goes more on the need and enforcement of the black-and-white viewpoint, marking the underlying value superiority (“promoting democracy and prosperity”). It also allows the American academics to explain and justify the created direction for domestic integrity (“US needs political support from its citizens”) and exterior image fortification (“US needs to promote the “cheriff of international order” image”). Notable, though, is the fact that in this table is the only one that addresses not only the “behavior” characteristics of the rogue states, but also the “nature” of the states themselves (Barbarians vs civilization).

The last category, “Alienation” shows the viewpoint and the perception of “Rogue states” as the outsiders of the international system, as well as the radicals who

perform concern for the U.S. not because of the direct blackmail and intimidation, but more as the way of rejection for the current state of affairs.

In order to elaborate further our viewpoint, *Table 2* demonstrates the publications and thematic categorization as well as the exemplary Key Codes which the author has identified.

Table 2. “Prevention”, “Structuralization” and “Alienation” in academic articles

Name of the publication	Which thematic categorization used	Key Words
1. ““Lure” North Korea” Moon Young (Michael) Park	Prevention	WMD, nuclear weapons technology, nuclear capability, “Rogue” ideology
2. “The Only Credible Deterrent” Seth Cropsey	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	Use of WMD ambitious tyrants with malignant designs, cold blooded despot Nuclear weapons, despite treaty signatory
3. "Cheaper Than War: The Case for Continued Dual-Use Controls" - Jim Lewis	Prevention Alienation	WMD, proliferation, strategic threats lie in unstable region
4. [Untitled] Dorinda G. Dallmeyer	Prevention	nuclear haves and have-nots, actively but covertly seeking nuclear status
5. “An agenda for a more secure planet” - Josiah Beeman	Prevention Structuralization	nuclear weapon, WMD growth of rivalries
6. “The Future That Never Came” - Mitchell Reiss	Prevention Structuralization	promote a political “rogue” ideology, WMD possession WMD possession in rogue as to unify a horrified international community
7. "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare" - Edward N. Luttwak	Structuralization	no threatening great powers on the current world scene, US moral economy is currently damaged
8. “Needed: A Smaller and Very Different U.S.	Prevention	Proliferation of WMD and advancing military

Military” - Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.	Structuralization	technologies collapse from the US long-term rival (USSR)
9. “FOCUS: A Step Toward Sanity” - Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.	Prevention Structuralization	Danger from missile attack to US “Rogue” as challenges in the long term, not near term,
10. “US: Iran Relations: Heading for Confrontation?” - Adam Tarock	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	Proliferation of WMD Absence of the bipolar system [Rogues] as only defense is to acquire a nuclear weapon
11. “International Judicial Intervention” - David J. Scheffer	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	Threats to the peace and security of the international community, impunity Issues of morality Liberation from the rule of international law
12. "Foreign Policy as Social Work" - Michael Mandelbaum	Structuralization	'interest' beyond strict national security concerns, "values" shape its definition of "order.", “moral duty” to act, social breakdowns too dangerous to world to be ignored
13. “US Foreign Policy towards Rogue States and Weapon Proliferation” review by - Khalil Dokhanchi	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	Concern for WMD, means of delivering them to distant lands, anti-western orientation aggressively-minded Sabotaging the prevailing world order
14. "Sanctions: Sticks to Beat Rogue States" - John Bray	Structuralization	nation rhetoric against the external aggressor to boost internal support, need to raise a “posse” to arrest melfactors
15. “Between War and Peace: Deterrence and Leverage” - Robert Kupperman and Frank Cilluffo	Prevention Structuralization	Threat for WMD, enmity toward the U.S. [Rogues as] irrational actors reasons of ethnic, nationalist, tribal, economic, or religious hatred bear enmity toward the U.S

16. "POLARITY AND STABILITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERSIAN GULF" - M. E. AHRARI and BRIGID STARKEY	Alienation	Rogues as who don't recognize the same rules of the game
17. "The Rogues' Gallery" - Janne Nolan and Mark Strauss	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	access to destructive technologies, covert nuclear programs, considered hostile to the West not simply "outlaw" states they're "bad to the bone", "ugly ambitions" dysfunctional, unpredictable, and incapable of moderation. represents an eclectic subdivision of the international system
18. "Differentiated Containment" - Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy	Prevention Structuralization	nuclear weapon threat lack of support of U.S.'s allies, concern for the people of the rogues' states
19. "Bazaar Foreign Policy" The Wilson Quarterly	Prevention Structuralization	links to terrorist activities in the hope of promoting peace, democracy, and human rights
20. "A New Realism" - Ronald Steel	Prevention Structuralization	Rogues [not] as an enemy to US's "national security" [rogues] return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past
21. "The Debate Over NATO Expansion: A Critique of the Clinton Administration's Responses To Key Questions" - Arms Control Today	Prevention Structuralization	security, WMD the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds
22. "Facing the Ultimate Nightmare: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States" - Louis Rene Beres	Prevention	the challenges of WMD, nuclear weapon state

23. "The Rise and Fall of the "Rogue Doctrine": The Pentagon's Quest for a Post-Cold War Military Strategy" - Michael Klare	Prevention Structuralization	large and relatively modern militaries, pursuit of (WMD), hostile stances, antagonistic powers, proliferation of WMD a new threat scenario to justify the preservation of America's superpower capabilities, imbuing the [US] military with a new sense of purpose, [US] is no longer the world's policemen, but rather the world's scherriff
24. "International Security: Changing Targets" -Lawrence Freedman	Structuralization	Credibility gap with the [US's] public, sudden lack of the great conflict power to worry about, attempts to recast international conflict in terms of a clash of great civilizations, [Rogues as] a group of authoritarian, ideologically hostile nations, [Rogues as] a monolithic, like-minded threat deserving of a standard response
25. . "The New Threat of Mass Destruction" - Richard K. Betts	Prevention Structuralization Alientation	WMD, mass destruction, contest of American power [Rogues because] United States has developed overwhelming superiority in conventions
26. "Dealing With 'Rogue' States: Cooperation versus Coercion?" Reviewed Work: Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea by Leon Sigal. Review by: Andrew Mack	Prevention Structuralization	indulged in their bouts of nuclear machismo America as hands for world peace
27. "Deadly Transfers, National Hypocrisy, and Global Chaos" - Robert Mandell	Alienation	disadvantaged states and groups unable to be upwardly mobile in the global hierarchy, do not want to play by the rules, disenfranchised nations

28. "Sanctions of Mass Destruction" - John Mueller and Karl Mueller	Structuralization Alienation	stem less from its actual consequences than from the alarm it inspires, governments, scholars [Rogue as] a new problem in international affairs
29. "Sanctioning "Rogue States": A Strategy in Decline?" - Meghan L. O'Sullivan	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	support for punitive policies pursuit of WMD, vocal animosity toward the US, support for terrorism Response to changing nature if threats for US Fill the void from the Soviet Union and international communism created castigate countries as outlaws
30. "The Present Danger" - Robert Kagan and William Kristol	Prevention Structuralization Alienation	Acquirement and blackmail with WMD Use of weapons to shape the international environment to suit its interests and its principles. [Rogues, who] form tactical alliances for common purpose of unsettling an order

Source: Author's compilation.

For a comprehensive and detailed dataset corresponding to the table under discussion, please refer to Appendix (located at the end of the work).

Having sorted the codes and the thematic categories for each of the articles we need to assess the amount of each theme used in the academic papers and the overall percentage of the analyzes of given 30 picked publications. There is a need to emphasize again, that in each paper there could and have been repeated in more than one thematic categories.

Table 3. Overall statistics

Thematic categories	№ of publications mentioned	% from all of the analyzed publications
Prevention	23	76.7%
Structuralization	24	80%

Alienation	12	40%
------------	----	-----

Source: Author's compilation

3.2. Discussion

With the framework of the result from data has been constructed, there comes to the part where we will try to answer the questions that have been previously formed to guide the work.

- ***What were the predominant thematic categories employed by American academics when using the label "rogue state"?***

Based on the findings presented in *Table 3*, a significant portion of the analyzed publications placed considerable emphasis on the themes of "Prevention" and "Structuralization". These two categories were prevalent in over 75% of the publications, with "Structuralization" having a slightly higher representation by 3.3% compared to "Prevention." On the other hand, the utilization of the "rogue state" label in the context of "alienation" was not as prominent, appearing in nearly half of the reviewed publications, accounting for approximately 40% of the total.

This observation suggests that there is a significant emphasis placed on the narrative of "moral duty" and the need to take preventive actions against rogue states. The category of "Structuralization" particularly highlights the process of villainizing these states, either by emphasizing their inherent nature or by portraying themselves as champions of promoting democracy and prosperity. This reflects the importance placed on framing the actions of rogue states in a negative light and justifying measures taken against them.

Yet it is quite eminent to note, that by looking at the *Table 2* it could be noticed that codes in the "Prevention" and "Structuralization" share a similar synergetic characteristics for "pursuing the proliferation and nuclear weaponry", correspondent with the first category, with "a new threat scenario to justify the preservation of America's superpower capabilities" for the second category. They are not mutually exclusive and have the compatibility to supplement themselves, as well as "Structuralization" and "Alienation" ("[US] the world's scherriff" and "[Rogues]

sabotaging prevailing order”), as well as “Alienation” and “Prevention (“Nuclear weapons, despite treaty signatory” and “Danger from missile attack to US”).

- *Which perspective was predominantly used in the argumentation: that of the "rogue states" based on their existing or potential capabilities, or that of the "US" based on its own capabilities or anticipated actions?*

The response to this inquiry may unveil perspectives on the narration and connotations that illuminate the approach employed by American academics in justifying the labeling of "rogue states". By outlining the ten sub-thematic categorizations previously mentioned, we will examine how the argumentation initiates from these two distinct perspectives.

Table 4. Perspectives: of the "rogue states" determined by their capabilities, and of the "US" influenced by its own capabilities and anticipated actions

"It's the rogue states!"	"We need it..."
they have vocal animosity toward the US -\and the west	to promote peace, order and prosperity
WMD, military capabilities and new technology acquirement	to gain political support from its citizens
because of the links to terrorists' organizations\groups	to fill in the void in the chaotic non-binary world structure
because they don't play by the rules.	
because they are Barbarians	

they are the outsiders of the international community	
because they go "rogue" as a defensive mechanism to get acknowledgment among the international community	

Source: Author's compilation

In line with *Table 4*, the “rogue state” label operates as a function of “condamnation”, when the objectives are about the rogue states themselves. Another use of the label is positioned as the tool to perform in the foreign policy and domestic public diplomacy.

- ***Do they focus on anticipating future threats or are they based on an evaluation of past behavior and actions?***

When analyzing these categorizations, we have noticed the way the argumentations are centered, depending on the time. The “rogue state” label has been put due to the past actions and behavior (past-centric) and due to the threat that it might present, or the possibility it might present for the future setup. Thus we came to the point where the relevance of the categorization is being presented.

Table 5. Angles of assessment

Future-centric		Past-centric	
Prevention	pursue of WMD, military capabilities and new technology acquirement	Prevention	the links to terrorists' organizations\groups
			because they have vocal animosity toward the US -\and the west

Structuralization	to fill in the void in the chaotic non-binary world structure	Structuralization	Barbarians vs civilization
	because US needs to promote the “world’s cheriff” image		
	because of US’s needs political support from its citizens.	Alienation	outlaws of the international order\community
			because they don’t play by the rules.
			as a defensive mechanism to get acknowledgment among the international community

Source: Author’s compilation

As noted from the Table 5, the “Prevention” and “Structuralization” categories have the future-centric agenda, in which labeling the states “rogue” is poised for the benefit of the eventual and feasible beneficial outcome. It monopolizes the attention of the world to the future action of the rogue states (with the pursuit of high-technology and nuclear weapons), as well as on the benefits of the categorization in the American nation’s world structure.

The category referred to as "Past-centric" illustrates how the labeling of rogue states functions as a means of punishing their behavior and actions. This serves to condemn the negative impact caused by these states, warning other nations against following a similar path. In the context of "Structuralization" and "Prevention," the labeling also highlights the consequences faced by those who challenge the established world order and emphasizes the repercussions they may encounter.

To summarize, the analysis of the articles and the application of the theoretical framework have shed light on the usage and implications of the label "rogue state" within American academia. The research questions guided the investigation, revealing important findings. The predominant thematic categories employed by American academics were identified as "Prevention" and "Structuralization," indicating a focus on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, threats to international order, and the justification of America's superpower capabilities. The argumentation predominantly emphasized the perspective of the "rogue states" based on their capabilities and behavior, while also serving as a tool in foreign policy and domestic public diplomacy. The use of the label had a future-centric agenda, anticipating threats and promoting the benefits of categorization within the American world structure. Additionally, the labeling served as a means of punishing past behavior and actions, condemning the negative impact of rogue states and warning others against following a similar path. This analysis highlights the complex dynamics at play when applying the "rogue state" label and the multifaceted motivations behind its usage.

CONCLUSION

This work has outlined specific tasks to address, and the next step is to answer these tasks while summarizing and systematizing the information covered in the previous three chapters. Firstly, in the field of International Relations, the use of labels reveals power dynamics and connotations associated with them. The term "rogue" carries different meanings, representing disruption, potential transformation, or a tool for asserting power. Understanding the historical, sociological, and political context, as well as the motives and symbolic representations tied to labels, is crucial. The implications of the "rogue state" label in academic discourse reflect the influence of US foreign policy and the various interpretations attributed to it.

Secondly, during the review of conceptual and theoretical literature, three distinct categories have emerged for interpreting the "rogue state" label. The "Prevention" interpretation views rogue states as direct threats to the United States due to concerns about weapons of mass destruction, terrorism support, and anti-American sentiments. The "Structuralization" perspective questions the inherent nature of rogue states, portraying them as evil, irrational, and disruptive, justifying US actions and reinforcing American authority. The "Alienation" interpretation acknowledges rogue states' rejection of international norms, without necessarily villainizing them, and places responsibility on the rogue states themselves. These interpretations highlight the complexities of engaging with rogue states in international relations and call for further exploration of their implications.

Lastly, the analysis of articles and the application of a theoretical framework have provided valuable insights into the usage and implications of the "rogue state" label within American academia. The predominant thematic categories used by American academics, namely "Prevention" and "Structuralization," that is, focus on nuclear proliferation, threats to international order, and the justification of US capabilities. The argumentation centers around the perspective of rogue states based on their behavior,

serving as a tool in foreign policy and public diplomacy. The label is future-oriented, anticipating threats and highlighting the benefits of categorization within the American world structure. It also serves as a means of punishing past behavior and actions, condemning the negative impact of rogue states and issuing warnings to others. This analysis reveals the complexities and multifaceted motivations behind the usage of the "rogue state" label, emphasizing its intricate nature.

The academic field is a lens and a tool to look into the structure and the inside-opportunity to look at the US nature, motivation and acts from the external viewpoint, from an subjectively more detached way. It creates a window for us to see the thoughts, ideas and motivation behind the political curtain at the end of the 20th century. It also enables us to see the way they operate and get on with the worldview from the American standpoint, conducting with concepts and the belief system.

Moreover, by analyzing the work of the academics of that time period we are able to analyze the symbols and interactions that are interwoven in the labeling of the states, whether "justifiable" or not. We are able to explore how they interpret political symbols, perceive political situations and justify the decisions based on these interpretations and what is more important, it sheds light into the shared meaning and connotation on the "rogue state" label that they share when applying this term in their work. As with other social concepts, the "label", particularly about the "rogue" one, brings up different connotations and conveys various messages depending on the usages and it has been shown to be the most applicable in the case of the "rogue states". Thus, the analysis of this work about the particularities and connotations of the "rogue state" label enables us to see the way American academics and policy-makers might and are addressing the nation-states that they consider as "rogue", revealing the implications or a building animosity and casting to the aforementioned states.

Despite being officially banned from usage since 2000, the term remains significant as it has become ingrained and widely recognized, still being utilized in the academic field today, either as the "rogue state" label or under alternative names that emerged alongside it. The concept has expanded into various other designations, such as

"state renegades," "pariah state," and "outlaw state," as well as the more recent "Axis of evils" (coined by U.S. President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address) (Corrias, 2014, p. 42) and "States of concern" during the Obama administration (Kustermans, 2014, p. 27).

The selection of a label carries significant implications, as each label is associated with distinct assumptions regarding the origins of deviance and the suitable actions or policies to address it (Wagner, Werner and Onderco, p.4). As a superpower state at that time and one of the powerful states of our time, the way american discourse and narratives around the countries that they have deemed "a threat", "evil" or "outlaw" have impacted not only the targeted states themselves, but also the other nations and states in the way they perceive deviance and outliers. And as a one of the superpower of current time, it is interesting to see the way the discourse will form again, given the rise of nation-states that have emerged under the scope of "neutrally rogue" (i.e. China) and "ruthlessly rogue" (i.e. Russia) characteristics and the ways to handle them. Among the modern superpower states, both these countries have intentions to change the existing state of affairs; however, only Russia has engaged in acts such as attacking neighboring nations, annexing conquered territories, and supporting insurgent groups aiming to seize additional territories, when China and USA's tool to increase the influence is primarily driven by positive means such as trade, investment, and development assistance (Dobbins, Shatz and Wyne, 2019).

The "rogue state" label sparks discussions and debates regarding countries that are perceived to jeopardize regional or global stability through their actions, policies, or perceived lack of adherence to international norms. These discussions revolve around the actors within the international community and the broader question of the applicability of "universalistic values" across various fields of interest, as well as the behavior and manner it conducts in the international community.

It is of utmost importance in our ongoing endeavors to foster state relationships that we avoid emphasizing power dynamics between the "Global North and Global South" or perpetuating the dichotomy of "East and West". Additionally, there is a need

to establish a clear understanding of what constitutes the international community and determine instances in which states should be held accountable to uphold global order while simultaneously advocating for the well-being and prosperity of all people.

We have sought to do that by indicating the connotations that have emerged during the investigation of the label “rogue state”, primarily as an American attempt to comprehend the world and identify the prevailing foreign policy objective of that era as the first step. The aim has been to comprehend, rationalize, and assume the responsibility of creating a structure and equilibrium based on the U.S’s understanding.

REFERENCES

- Adler*, E. (2013). Constructivism in international relations: Sources, contributions, and debates. SAGE Publications Ltd, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587>
- Amelchenko*, N. A. (2023). Myth in a modern political discourse. Kyiv.
- American University Radio*, Washington D.C., Broadcast on 19 June, 10–11 a.m. / Daily Press Briefing, Monday, 19 June 2000, Briefer: Richard Boucher, Spokesman Department 5-10, "States of Concern" versus "Rogue states"
- Blumer*, H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Boquien*, H. (2018). Human Rights in North Korea: Between Fantasy and Reality (thesis). Leiden University Libraries, Leiden. Retrieved from <https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/64502>.
- Bielefeldt*, H. (2000). “Western” versus “Islamic” Human Rights Conceptions?: A Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights. *Political Theory*, 28(1), 90–121. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/192285>
- Cambridge Dictionary*. (n.d.). Rogue. In Cambridge English Dictionary. Retrieved 2 April, 2023, from [<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/rogue>]
- Corrias*, L. (2014) Guises of Sovereignty: ‘Rogue States’ and Democratic States in the International Legal Order. In: Wagner, W., Werner, W., Onderco, M. (eds) *Deviance in International Relations*. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Cupitt*, R. T. (1996). Target rogue behavior, not rogue states. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 3(2), 46–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736709608436622>
- Davis*, F. (1984). Decade Labeling: The Play of Collective Memory and Narrative Plot. *Symbolic Interaction*, 7(1), 15–24. doi:10.1525/si.1984.7.1.15
- Dobbins*, J., Shatz, H. J., & Wyne, A. (2019). Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue: Different Challenges, Different Responses. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE310.html>
- Given*, L. M. (Ed.). (2008). *The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods* (Vols. 1-2). Sage.
- Henriksen*, T. H. (2001). The Rise and Decline of Rogue States. *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(2), 349–373. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357735>
- Hagan*, J. (1973). Labeling and deviance: a case study in the “sociology of the interesting”. *Social Problems*, 20(4), 447-458.

Homolar, A. (2011). Rebels without a conscience: the evolution of the rogue states narrative in US security policy. *European Journal of International Relations*, Volume 17 (Number 4), 705-727. ISSN 1354-0661

Hoyt, P. D. (2000). The 'Rogue State' Image in American Foreign Policy. *Global Society*, 14(2), 297–310. doi:10.1080/13600820050008494

Huberman, M. M. B., & Saldaña, J. (2020). *Qualitative data analysis: a methods sourcebook* (Fourth). SAGE.

Jennings, C. (n.d.). Health Care Reform initiative. Clinton Digital Library. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/health-reform-initiative>

Jian Wang (2008) The power and limits of branding in national image communication in global society, *The Journal of International Communication*, 14:2, 9-24, doi: 10.1080/13216597.2008.9674730

Knoblauch, H. (2001). "Symbolic Interactionism". A Companion to QUALITATIVE RESEARCH Edited by Uwe Flick, Ernst von Kardorff and Ines Steinke.

Kapur, A. (1996). Rogue States and the International Nuclear Order. *International Journal*, 51(3), 420–439. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209605100302>

Klare, M. (1998). The Rise and Fall of the "Rogue Doctrine": The Pentagon's Quest for a Post-Cold War Military Strategy. *Middle East Report*, 208, 12–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013402>

Kriukow, Dr. J. (n.d.). How to analyze Qualitative data. udey. Retrieved May 3, 2023, from <https://www.udemy.com/course/how-to-analyse-qualitative-data/?referralCode=6CCC931222189B2CBE4C>.

Kustermans, J. (2014) 'Roguary' and Citizenship. In: Wagner, W., Werner, W., Onderco, M. (eds) *Deviance in International Relations*. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Land, C., Loren, S., & Metelmann, J. (2014). Rogue Logics: Organization in the Grey Zone. *Organization Studies*, 35(2), 233–253. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840613511927>

Levinson, M. (2022). Looking backward: The Republican Revolution. *Dissent Magazine*. <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/looking-backward-the-republican-revolution>

Logan, F. D. (1991). *The Vikings in History* (2nd ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203419144>

Malici, A., Walker, S. G. (2014). Role Theory and 'Rogue States'. In: Wagner, W., Werner, W., Onderco, M. (eds) *Deviance in International Relations*. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137357274_7

Malici, Akan. (2009). Rogue States: Enemies of Our Own Making?. *Psicología Política*, ISSN 1138-0853, N°. 39, 2009, pags. 39-54. 39.

- Mead**, G. H. (2018). *George Herbert Mead on social psychology*. University of Chicago Press.
- Miles**, M. M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2020). *Qualitative data analysis: a methods sourcebook* (Fourth). SAGE
- Moncrieffe**, J., & Eyben, R. (2007). *The power of labelling: How people are categorized and why it matters*. Earthscan.
- Morin**, J.-F., Olsson, C., & Atikcan, O. (2021). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences: An A-Z of key concepts*.
- Onuf N.**, Bertucci, M. E., Hayes, J., & James, P. (2018). *Constructivism reconsidered: Past, present, and future*. University of Michigan Press.
- O'Reilly**, K. P. (2007). Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the “Rogue State” Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elites. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 3(4), 295–315. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24907295>
- O'Sullivan**, M. L. (2000). Sanctioning “Rogue States”: A Strategy in Decline? *Harvard International Review*, 22(2), 56–60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42762611>
- Scott**, S. *et al.* (2017) ‘Symbolic interactionism’, in *The routledge companion to criminological theory and concepts*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 218–222.
- Tanter**, R. (1998). *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation*. London: Macmillan.
- Theys**, S. (2017). Constructivism. In McGlinchey, S., R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (eds.) *International Relations Theory*. Bristol: E-International Relations, pp. 36-41.
- Wagner**, W., Werner, W., & Onderco, M. (eds) (2014) *Deviance in international relations: ‘rogue states’ and international security*. In: Wagner, W., Werner, W., Onderco, M. (eds) *Palgrave Studies in International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 1-15
- Waldenfels**, B. (2007). *The Question of the Other*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Waldenfels**, B. (2006). *Grundmotive Einer Phänomenologie Des Fremden*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Wendt**, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson Center**. (2001). “Rogue states” approach is counterproductive, Claims Author of New Book. Retrieved from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/rogue-states-approach-counterproductive-claims-author-new-book>
- Wunderlich**, C. (2014). A ‘Rogue’ Gone Norm Entrepreneurial? Iran within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. In: Wagner, W., Werner, W., Onderco, M. (eds) *Deviance in International*

Relations. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137357274_5

Zembylas, M. (2018). The "Rogue" Label and its Effects in US Foreign Policy Discourse. *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 30(2), 147–154. doi:10.1080/10402659.2018.1463047

References of the Publications in Data Analysis:

1. Moon Young (Michael) Park. (1994). "Lure" North Korea. *Foreign Policy*, 97, 97–105.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1149442>
2. Cropsey, S. (1994). The Only Credible Deterrent. *Foreign Affairs*, 73(2), 14–20.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/20045915>
3. Lewis, J. (1994). Cheaper Than War: The Case for Continued Dual-Use Controls. *Harvard International Review*, 17(1), 30–32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43661396>
4. Dallmeyer, D. (1995). Reducing Nuclear Danger. *The Road Away from the Brink*. By McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe Jr., and Sidney D. Drell. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. Pp. ix, 102. Index. \$14.95. - *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990's. Power, Politics, and New Policies*. By Peter van Ham. London, New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs/Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. Pp. 112. \$14.95. *American Journal of International Law*, 89(1), 232–235. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2203914>
5. Beeman, J. (1995). An agenda for a more secure planet. *New Zealand International Review*, 20(2), 12–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45234419>
6. Reiss, M. (1995). The Future That Never Came. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), 19(2), 46–66.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40258977>
7. Luttwak, E. N. (1995). Toward Post-Heroic Warfare. *Foreign Affairs*, 74(3), 109–122.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/20047127>
8. Krepinevich, A. F. (1996). Needed: A Smaller and Very Different U.S. Military. *Policy Sciences*, 29(2), 81–112. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532375>
9. Keeny, S. M. (1996). FOCUS: A Step Toward Sanity. *Arms Control Today*, 26(1), 2–2.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23626464>
10. Tarock, Adam. "US: Iran Relations: Heading for Confrontation?" *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1996): 149–67. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992997>.
11. Scheffer, D. J. (1996). International Judicial Intervention. *Foreign Policy*, 102, 34–51.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1149258>
12. Mandelbaum, M. (1996). Foreign Policy as Social Work. *Foreign Affairs*, 75(1), 16–32.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/20047465>
13. Dokhanchi, K. (1996). US Foreign Policy towards Rogue States and Weapon Proliferation [Review of *And Weapons for All: How America's Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade Warps Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home; With Friends like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam. 1982-1990; Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy*, by W. D. Hartung, B. E. Jentleson, & M. Klare]. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(2), 241–244. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/425440>
14. Bray, J. (1996). Sanctions: Sticks to Beat Rogue States. *The World Today*, 52(8/9), 206–208.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40475844>
15. Kupperman, R., & Cilluffo, F. (1997). Between War and Peace: Deterrence and Leverage. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 4(1), 39–51. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590049>

16. AHRARI, M. E., & STARKEY, B. (1997). POLARITY AND STABILITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERSIAN GULF. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 21(1), 133–151. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45288983>
17. Nolan, J., & Strauss, M. (1997). The Rogues' Gallery. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 4(1), 21–38. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590047>
18. Brzezinski, Z., Scowcroft, B., & Murphy, R. (1997). Differentiated Containment. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(3), 20–30. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20048029>
19. Bazaar Foreign Policy. (1997). *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), 21(3), 120–121. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45268248>
20. Steel, R. (1997). A New Realism. *World Policy Journal*, 14(2), 1–9. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209525>
21. The Debate Over NATO Expansion: A Critique of the Clinton Administration's Responses To Key Questions. (1997). *Arms Control Today*, 27(6), 3–10. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23625772>
22. Beres, L. R. (1998). Facing the Ultimate Nightmare: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 5(1), 313–335. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24589966>
23. Klare, M. (1998). The Rise and Fall of the "Rogue Doctrine": The Pentagon's Quest for a Post-Cold War Military Strategy. *Middle East Report*, 208, 12–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013402>
24. Freedman, L. (1998). International Security: Changing Targets. *Foreign Policy*, 110, 48–63. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149276>
25. Betts, R. K. (1998). The New Threat of Mass Destruction. *Foreign Affairs*, 77(1), 26–41. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20048360>
26. Mack, A. (1999). Dealing With "Rogue" States: Cooperation versus Coercion? [Review of *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea*, by L. Sigal]. *Asian Perspective*, 23(1), 205–214. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704201>
27. MANDEL, R., & Mandell, R. (1999). Deadly Transfers, National Hypocrisy, and Global Chaos. *Armed Forces & Society*, 25(2), 307–327. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45346299>
28. Mueller, J., & Mueller, K. (1999). Sanctions of Mass Destruction. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(3), 43–53. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049279>
29. O'SULLIVAN, M. L. (2000). Sanctioning "Rogue States": A Strategy in Decline? *Harvard International Review*, 22(2), 56–60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42762611>
30. Kagan, R., & Kristol, W. (2000). The Present Danger. *The National Interest*, 59, 57–69. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42897261>

APPENDIX

Input	Codes	Prevention	Structurization	Alienation
1. Yet what is missing from their presentation is recognition of the existing danger that <u>rogue states</u> will buy nuclear weapons technology from Russia, Ukraine, or other former Soviet republics. That present danger will continue to be greater than any potential one from North Korea. Buying North Korea's nuclear capability also eases the prospect that North Korea will sell bombs to rogue groups. If North Korea wants to sell nuclear technology, it is because it needs money, not because it wants to support rogue ideologie [Park]	· Danger from nuclear weapon and capabilities · “Rogue” ideology	Danger from nuclear weapon and capabilities, “Rogue ideology”		

2. Only the third option offers a credible strategy that adheres to American interests. Since the end of the Cold War, the idea that the United States will use nuclear weapons to defend allies in peripheral regions has lost credibility and cannot protect either the United States or its allies from attacks by rogue states. Yet this is a danger, and a responsibility, that the United states cannot shun. As long as it remains the world's greatest economic and military power, America will be a prime target of ambitious tyrants with malignant designs. But the U.S. strategic arsenal is as unqualified to defend this nation against lesser, rogue states as it is to protect America's allies against nuclear attack. A cold-blooded despot could challenge both America's reluctance to legitimize nuclear force by responding in kind and its unwillingness to retaliate against innocent civilian population. [Cropsey]	· Defend US and allies from attacks against nuclear attack · Ambitious tyrants with malignant designs · Cold blooded despot · Retaliate against innocent civilian population	Defend US and allies from attacks against nuclear attack	Ambitious tyrants with malignant designs Cold blooded despot Retaliate against innocent civilian population	
3. Primary concerns now are with unstable regions of the world where ill-considered exports can damage peace and US interests. The difficulty with this approach lies in the treatment of such countries as China or India, which do not pose strategic threats and with which the chance of military conflict is negligible. China, for example, is not a rogue state like Iran, nor does it lie in a region as unstable as the Middle East. While multilateral controls for such countries apply only to proliferation-related items, US export controls do not perfectly reflect these consideration [Lewis]	· Unstable regions · Ill-considered exports that can damage peace and US interests · Pose strategic threats · lie in a region as unstable as in the [xyz]	Ill-considered exports that can damage peace and US interests Only proliferation-related countries		lie in a region as unstable as in the [Middle East]

	· Only proliferation-related countries			
4. The authors abandon the premise of a world divided neatly into the nuclear haves and have-nots; they single out, in addition to the five major nuclear powers, three "unannounced" states (Israel, India and Pakistan) and four states considered to be actively but covertly seeking nuclear status (Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya). While the authors spend several pages discussing the "unannounced" states, they devote surprisingly small space to the four "rogue" states. Instead, they place more emphasis on their final category of states-those that neither possess nor want nuclear weapons. [Dallmeyer]	· nuclear haves and have-nots · three "unannounced" haves states · four have nots states considered to be actively but covertly seeking nuclear status	nuclear haves and have-nots three "unannounced" haves states four have nots states considered to be actively but covertly seeking nuclear status		

5. He must also guard against the possibility that 'rogue' states might move to build a nuclear arsenal, even as the nuclear weapons states are seeking ways to reduce the threat posed by their nuclear weapons. However, the end of the Cold War and the growth of other rivalries have also given rise to new security challenges - from rogue states, from arms proliferation, from regional and ethn conflicts, and from fanaticism. [Beeman]	· build of a WMD · reduce the threat from WMD · growth of rivalries · new security challenges	build of a WMD reduce the threat from WMD new security challenges	growth of other rivalries	
6. That is one reason why the popular fear of nuclear terrorism, while not wholly unrealistic, is greatly exaggerated. Nuclear blackmail is a staple of international spy thrillers such as Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins's Fifth Horseman (1980), in which Libya's Muammar Qaddafi tries to force the United States to support the establishment of a Palestinian state by threatening to blow up New York City. But terrorists and leaders of "rogue" nations face many of the same constraints limiting others who seek to promote a political agenda. Would a nuclear blast advance their cause, or would it unify a horrified international community against them? If one is bent on violence, isn't it far easier to strike at a symbolic target with conventional means? [Reiss]	· promote a political "rogue" agenda · WMD posission in rogue as to unify a horrified international community	promote a political "rogue" agenda	WMD posission in rogue as to unify a horrified international community	

7. Both were fully appropriate to the circumstances of the two world wars and also of the Cold War as far as the planning of non nuclear operations was concerned. Neither fits present circumstances, domestic or international. There are no threatening great powers on the current world scene, only a handful of quiescent <i>rogue states</i>, and many lesser wars and internal disorders that cannot arouse the nation, for none of them directly threatens the United States or its compelling interests. The preconditions of Napoleonic war-making, or for that matter of military interventions as specified in the Weinberger-Powell-Cheney doctrines, are therefore absent. Yet its moral economy is damaged as the United States remains the attentive yet passive witness of aggressions replete with atrocities on the largest scale. Present circumstances call for even more than a new concept of war, but for a new mentality that would inject unheroic realism into military endeavor precisely to overcome excessive timidity in employing military means. [Luttwack]	· no threatening great powers on the current world scene · US moral economy is currently damaged · Circumstances call for a new concept of war		no threatening great powers on the current world scene US moral economy is currently damaged Circumstances call for a new concept of war	
--	--	--	---	--

8. The U.S. military's operating environment has changed radically with the collapse of its long-term superpower adversary, the Soviet Union, leaving the United States as by far the world's dominant military power in non-nuclear capability. Unlike during the Cold War, however, the most dangerous challenges for the United States are not to be found in the near term, but over the long term. These challenges are likely to manifest themselves in the form of a revived competition among the great powers, and a more virulent strain of Third World 'rogue state,' the consequence of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the diffusion of advanced military technologies. Pentagon restructure to support this national security vision, when it is not clear who the next great power challenger might be? Or when it might make its challenge? Or how it might choose to compete? How does the Pentagon restructure to help block a quantum leap in the danger from rogue states possessing weapons of mass destruction and the bitter fruits of the diffusion of advanced military technologies? [Krepinveich]	· collapse from the US long-term rival (USSR) · “Rogue” as challenges in the long term, not near term · Proliferation of WMD and advancing military technologies · “rogue” as to support this national security vision · Danger from WMDs	Proliferation of WMD and advancing military technologies Danger from WMDs	collapse from the US long-term rival (USSR) “Rogue” as challenges in the long term, not near term “rogue” as to support this national security vision	
---	---	---	--	--

9. The lure of funds for a new TMD (theater missile defense) mission led the three services to proliferate dozen programs that collectively would have eventually cost at least \$50 billion billion. The wildly excessive and misleading projections of the ballistic missile stimulated congressional calls for the deployment of a multi-site national missile as well. A more sober intelligence assessment has concluded that this threat will short-range for some time, and that ballistic missiles capable of striking the continental United States from any <i>potential rogue state</i> are at least 15 years in the future. [Spurgeon]	· “Rogue” as challenges in the long term, not near term · Danger from missile attack to US	Danger from missile attack to US	“Rogue” as challenges in the long term, not near term	
10. We now turn to Washington's concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 'rogue' states (or to use again James Woolsey's description 'poisonous snakes') in the Third World, Iran being one of them. In the absence of a bipolar system, when Third World countries could take shelter under the nuclear umbrella of one of the two superpowers, the Third World states feel, particularly after the Persian Gulf War, that their only defence against the military coercion of nuclear states is to acquire a nuclear capability. However, nuclear capability should be seen as a political rather than a military deterrent against the major powers intervening in a conflict. [Tarock]	· Proliferation of WMD · Absence of the bipolar system, where each nation could be under the umbrella of one or another superpower · Third World countries feel that their only defense is to acquire a nuclear weapon	Proliferation of WMD	Absence of the bipolar system, where each nation could be under the umbrella of one or another superpower	Third World countries feel that their only defense is to acquire a nuclear weapon

11. These crimes involve issues of morality, national reconciliation, the rule of both domestic and international law, and the deterrence of future atrocities. Linger on the horizon are rogue horsemen seemingly liberated from the rule of international law: Individuals acting with impunity, sometimes shielded by governments that embrace violations of international humanitarian law, are threats to the peace and security of their own peoples and, inevitably, to the international community. [Scheffer]	· Issues of morality · Deterrence of future atrocities · Liberation from the rule of international law · Threats to the peace and security to the international community	Deterrence of future atrocities Threats to the peace and security to the international community	Issues of morality	Liberation from the rule of international law
12. Hoffmann, a Harvard historian, is also critical of the Clinton administration but disputes Mandelbaum's central argument. The distinction between interests and values "is largely fallacious," Hoffmann maintains. A great power has "an 'interest' in world order that goes beyond strict national security concerns," and its "values" largely shape its definition of "order." Unfortunately, he says, the Clinton administration "has been much too timid in defining and defending a foreign policy based on values and other requirements of world order," in Haiti and elsewhere. Some "carefully selected interventions in foreign domestic crises" are justified, Hoffmann contends. When there is a chance of stopping "genocide or war crimes on a colossal scale," There is a "moral duty" to act, and certain "political, economic, and social breakdowns [are] too dangerous to world to be ignored" [Mandelbaum for the work of Hoffman]	· Great power's 'interest' beyond strict national security concerns · Great Power's "values" shape its definition of "order." · "moral duty" to act · social breakdowns too dangerous to world to be ignored		Great power's 'interest' beyond strict national security concerns Great Power's "values" shape its definition of "order." "moral duty" to act social breakdowns too dangerous to	

			world to be ignored	
--	--	--	------------------------	--

13. The military planners used the existing concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and posited a new enemy type: 'aggressively-minded Third World powers armed with nuclear and/or chemical weapons and the means of delivering them to distant lands' (p. 23). Hence, US policy shifted from Europe to Third World 'rogue' or 'outlaw' states whose anti-Western orientation, illicit proliferation activities, and desires of 'sabotaging the prevailing world order' posed a threat to US national security (pp. 24-26). Countries considered rogue states by the military planners were: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. By the beginning of the Gulf War, the outlines of the rogue-state doctrine had been formulated. The Gulf War itself enabled Pentagon officials to adopt this policy as the official US defense doctrine. The Gulf War was a blessing in disguise for the military officials because it was the 'perfect example of the type of enemy' that the doctrine required. Interestingly, the debate on the US military did not center on the doctrine itself, but on the size that would be necessary to carry it out (pp. 97-129). By the time the Clinton Administration took over, the 'rogue' states had become identified by Anthony Lake, Clinton's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, as 'backlash' states (p. 131). The question of non-proliferation became paramount (p. 172). [Dokhanchi]	· Concern for WMD · New enemy type · 'aggressively-minded Third World powers' · Armed with WMD · The means of delivering them to distant lands · Anti-Western orientation · Illicit proliferation activities · Desires of 'sabotaging the prevailing world order' · Posed a threat to US national security · Need for a policy to diminish [rogue's] access to high tech commodities	Concern for WMD Armed with WMD The means of delivering them to distant lands Anti-Western orientation Posed a threat to US national security Need for a policy to diminish [rogue's] access to high tech commodities	'aggressively-minded Third World powers'	Desires of 'sabotaging the prevailing world order'
--	---	--	---	---

With respect to 'rogue' states, Michael Klare proposes a policy of marginalization' that would diminish their perceived international importance, limit their access to high- tech commodities, and minimize the interest and coverage of them (pp. 219-221). Finally, with reference to proliferation, Klare suggests three solutions: strengthening the existing non-pro- liferation regimes, taking the profit out of proliferation, and promoting regional security (pp. 223-228). This strategy will both serve the interests of the USA and reduce the prospects of war in the future. [Dokhanchi]				
14. The unilateral US sanctions against Cuba, Libya and Iran had impeded the target countries economically, but they have not pled them and they have not led to major political concessions some respects they may well have been counter-productive. All t regimes can blame their economic shortcomings on external factor rather than their own failings, and they can play on nation rhetoric against the external aggressor to boost their internal support. This points to a change in the balance of US power. The States is no longer the world's policemen, but rather the world's scherriff. The distinction is that a scherriff, rather than acting independently, has to raise a posse to arrest melfactors. The US has failed to muster a posse against Cuba, Iran or Lybia, and the new legislation calling for secondary sanctions is more likely to	· Play on nation rhetoric against the external aggressor to boost their internal support. · The States is no longer the world's policemen, but rather the world's scherriff · A need to raise a "posse" to arrest melfactors		Play on nation rhetoric against the external aggressor to boost their internal support. The States is no longer the world's policemen, but rather the world's scherriff A need to raise a "posse" to arrest melfactors	

antagonize would-be supporters than to persuade them. [Bray[MN25] [MN26]]				
15. Today's threat dynamics center around decidedly irrational actors—particularly rogue states and hostile non-state groups, who for reasons of ethnic, nationalist, tribal, economic, or religious hatred bear enmity toward the U.S. These patterns of hatred result in novel forms of conflict. Blended with the increasing availability of technology and knowledge relating to weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, a grave new challenge to U.S. security has emerged. Such a policy would maintain a strategic deter rent to leverage other nuclear weapons states, but would also incorporate a broader spectrum of conventional military options and clandestine means, whether in support of law enforcement or covert action, as appropriate for deterring both rogue states and hostile non-state actor. U.S. strategists must now counter the threats of mass destruction and disruption with a far cloudier picture of the capabilities and intentions of its adversaries. In light of these new imperatives, we argue that the U.S. Intelligence Community must undertake a fundamental review of the its roles, missions, and priorities. Consequently, intelligence will play a critical role in creating a policy of direct action against both rogue regimes and hostile	· Rogues as irrational actors reasons of ethnic, nationalist, tribal, economic, or religious hatred bear enmity toward the U.S · Threat for WMD · New challenge to U.S. security · Employment of WMD on US AND its allies	Threat for WMD New challenge to U.S. security Employment of WMD on US AND its allies	Rogues as irrational actors reasons of ethnic, nationalist, tribal, economic, or religious hatred bear enmity toward the U.S	

non-state groups who would employ the weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its vital interests. [Kupperman and Cilluffo]				
16. The United States invokes a "rogue state clause" in taking itself out of the Gulf balancing game, prescribing to Morgenthau's dictum that "only if states recognize the same rules of the game . . . can the balance of power fulfill its functions . . . "[AHRARI and STARKEY]	· Rogues as who don't recognize the same rules of the game			Rogues as who don't recognize the same rules of the game

17. What a difference the end of a Cold War has made. With the dust barely settled from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Third World states have suddenly been elevated to the status of determined adversaries, on a par with the former U.S.S.R. in terms of their potential to wreak havoc and destruction upon the West. Throughout Washington, a consensus has been growing that the relative stability of the Cold War has given way to a world that is far more dangerous and unpredictable, imperiled by the ambitions of a handful of aggressive "rogue states." Former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey summarized the post Cold War challenge as a world in which "...we have slain the [Soviet] dragon. But we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes." No one quarrels with the depiction of Iraq, North Korea and some of the other "rogues" as mean little countries with ugly ambitions, and the increasing access of Third World countries to destructive technologies is obviously not in dispute. In the animal kingdom, a rogue is defined as a creature that is "born different." Countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq are not simply "outlaw" states that circumvent international law, according to this logic. Rather, these states are rogues—they're "bad to the bone", dysfunctional, unpredictable, and incapable of moderation. "	· [Rogues] potention to wreak havoc and destruction upon the West · the ambitions of a handful of aggressive · the world as a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes [rogues states as well] · mean little countries with ugly ambitions · the access of Third World countries to destructive technologies · In the animal kingdom, a rogue is defined as a creature that is "born different" · are not simply "outlaw" states they're "bad to the bone", · Rogues as dysfunctional,	[Rogues] potention to wreak havoc and destruction upon the West the access of Third World countries to destructive technologies Rogues as states with covert nuclear programs who are considered hostile to the West	the ambitions of a handful of aggressive the world as a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes [rogues states as well] mean little countries with ugly ambitions In the animal kingdom, a rogue is defined as a creature that is "born different" are not simply "outlaw" states they're "bad to the bone", Rogues as dysfunctional, unpredictable,	represents an eclectic subdivision of the international system
--	--	--	---	---

Taken together, the list of identified rogue states represents an eclectic subdivision of the international system—countries with widely varying histories, governments, technical capabilities, and military ambitions. The list is flexible— sometimes including states with covert nuclear programs who are not considered hostile to the West, such as India and Pakistan, although never Israel. This has proven politically sensitive on occasions, such as when India discovered that it was the centerpiece of a U.S. warplanning exercise involving U.S. nuclear strikes. [Nolan and Strauss]	unpredictable, and incapable of moderation. · represents an eclectic subdivision of the international system · Rogues as states with covert nuclear programs who are considered hostile to the West		and incapable of moderation.	
18. First, the international community must credibly demonstrate its concern for the Iraqi people even if their own ruler does sanctions against Iraq continue to be necessary, but the United States and others should try to mitigate the sanctions' effects on ordinary Iraqis. The new policy would start with the recognition that the United States' current attempt at unilateral isolation of Iran is costly and ineffective and that its implementation, in the words of one recent study, "lacks the support of U.S. allies and is a leaky sieve." The United States should instead consider the possibilities of creative tradeoffs, such as the relaxation of opposition to the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for rigid and comprehensive inspection and control procedure [Brzezinski, Scowcroft, Murphy]	· concern for the people of the rogue's states · lacks the support of U.S. allies · nuclear weapon threat	Nuclear weapon threat	concern for the people of the rogue's states lacks the support of U.S. allies	

19. The Clinton administration has put commerce at the center of U.S. foreign policy, in the hope of promoting peace, democracy, and human rights throughout the world. The result has been to cut American foreign policy loose from its strategic and ideological moorings, asserts Kaplan, a Fellow at Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. In the name of "commercial diplomacy," the United States now "engages" nations of all sorts, he says, even those whose links to terrorist activities and human rights abuses have won them places on the State Department's roster <i>of rogue states</i>. " [Quarterly]	· in the hope of promoting peace, democracy, and human rights · whose links to terrorist activities · human rights abuses	whose links to terrorist activities	in the hope of promoting peace, democracy, and human rights human rights abuses	
---	---	--	---	--

20. If the first problem with the concept of "national security" is its vagueness, the second is its expansiveness. In its effort to simplify the issue and to win public support for a global level of engagement, the Truman Doctrine often failed to distinguish between the vital and the desirable, the critical and the peripheral. It suggested that everything was vital and security a seamless web. But then some things turned out not to be so vital after all, like South Vietnam. Where does one draw the line? If South Vietnam was not really vital, then how about South Korea, or NATO? If security is to some degree arbitrary, then are interests arbitrary as well? An example of expansiveness carried to its ultimate extreme as a security doctrine can be found in a declaration by the Clinton administration's former national security adviser, Anthony Lake, that the enemies of the United States, now that the Cold War is over, include no less than "extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, <i>rogue states</i>, and all those who would return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past." Aside from the welcome news that intolerant ways are now largely confined to the past, one wonders whether there is anyone left, by this definition, who is not an enemy of the United States. [Steel]	· Rogues [not] as an enemy to US's "national security" · return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past	Rogues as an enemy to US's "national security"	return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past	
--	--	---	---	--

21. Enlargement will help NATO address the security challenges that do arise. It will make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member-states. In addition, rogue states, the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds continue to threaten trans Atlantic security—as we know from Bosnia. A larger, increasingly cohesive community of trans-Atlantic states able to combine their security resources will be better able to address whatever contingencies arise. [Arms Control Association]	· the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds · to threaten trans Atlantic security	threaten trans Atlantic security	the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds	
22. Aware of this unprecedented nightmare, Robert Kupperman and Frank Cilluffo argue persuasively in an important article in the Winter/Spring 1997 issue of the Brown Journal of World Affairs that "traditional U.S. preventative and response options are inadequate to meet the challenges of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] terrorism."² Referring to the "broadening nature of threats," in terms of both the pertinent new actors and their capabilities, the authors underscore the limitations of traditional modes of deterrence. More precisely, say Kupperman and Cilluffo: "Such a policy would maintain a strategic deterrent to leverage other nuclear weapon states, but would also incorporate a broader spectrum of conventional military options and clandestine means, whether in support of law enforcement or covert action, as appropriate for deterring both rogue states and hostile non-state actors. Successful implementation and utilization of a multitiered and	· Rogues as someone with whom reventative and response options is needed. · the challenges of WMD			

multifaceted strat gy will require determining the appropriate deterrent for each threat” [Beres]				
---	--	--	--	--

23. Since 1990, US military policy has been governed by one overarching premise: that US and international security is primarily threatened by the "rogue states" of the Third World. These states assumed to include Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria are said to threaten US interests because of their large and relatively modern militaries, their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and their hostile stance toward the United States and its allies. To counter this threat, current American strategy requires the maintenance of sufficient military strength to conduct (and prevail in) two Desert Storm-like operations simultaneous. Powell sought to construct a new threat scenario to justify the preservation of America's superpower capabilities in a world devoid of a prime adversary. Fearful that precipitous congressional action would destroy any sense of coherence in US military planning, Powell sought to establish a new strategic paradigm enabling the Pentagon to confine the inevitable cutbacks to bearable limits while imbuing the military with a new sense of purpose. In the weeks that followed, senior Pentagon officials began speaking of the threat posed by well-armed, antagonistic Third	· US and international security is threatened · large and relatively modern militaries · pursuit of (WMD) · their hostile stance against US and its allies · a new threat scenario to justify the preservation of America's superpower capabilities · imbuing the [US] military with a new sense of purpose. · Rogues as the threat posed by well-armed, antagonistic powers · proliferation of WMD	US and international security is threatened large and relatively modern militaries pursuit of (WMD) their hostile stance against US and its allies Rogues as the threat posed by well-armed, antagonistic powers proliferation of WMD confronting a well-equipped	a new threat scenario to justify the preservation of America's superpower capabilities imbuing the [US] military with a new sense of purpose.	
--	--	--	---	--

World powers (this was before the term "rogue state" had come into widespread usage). In April 1990, for instance, Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono discussed this threat in an article in Sea Power magazine: "The proliferation of military power in...the Third World presents a troubling picture. Many Third World nations now possess mounting arsenals of tanks, heavy artillery, ballistic missiles, and chemical weapons.... The United States cannot ignore the expanding military power of these countries, and the Army must retain the capability to defeat potential threats wherever they occur. This could mean confronting a well-equipped army in the Third World." The potency of the rogue doctrine became clearer in 1993, when a new Administration took office in Washington. During the 1992 campaign, then-Governor Bill Clinton had promised to conduct a full-scale review of US military policy in light of the Cold War's end. Once in office, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, ordered a "bottom-up review" (BUR) of US strategy. Although the review generated considerable debate and speculation, the final product closely resembled the Base Force concept devised by General Powell three year [Klare]	· confronting a well-equipped army in the Third World	army in the Third World		
--	--	--------------------------------	--	--

24. Aside from a credibility gap with the public, strategic practitioners faced an even more serious problem: the sudden lack of a problem. The absence of a great power conflict to worry about produced evidence of disorientation. Attempts to conjure up replacements for the lost Soviet threat-out of a reconstituted Russia, revanchist Germany, revivalist Japan, rampant China, or so-called "rogue states" in the Third World-were often greeted with derision, as were attempts to recast international conflict in terms of a clash of great civilizations rather than great powers. The inheritors of the idealist tradition in international relations now apparently rode the tide of history, far more comfortable with the modern themes of the primacy of economics and the shrinking role of the state. American policymakers routinely refer to rogue states, a group of authoritarian, ideologically hostile nations devoted to disrupting the international system. The diverse membership of this aberrant category--Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria--argues against a strategy that treats these nations as a monolithic, like-minded threat deserving of a standard response. [Freedman]	· Credibility gap with the [US's] public · Sudden lack of the great conflict power to worry about · attempts to recast international conflict in terms of a clash of great civilizations · [Rogues as] a group of authoritarian, ideologically hostile nations · [Rogues as] a monolithic, like-minded threat deserving of a standard response		Credibility gap with the [US's] public Sudden lack of the great conflict power to worry about attempts to recast international conflict in terms of a clash of great civilizations [Rogues as] a group of authoritarian, ideologically hostile nations [Rogues as] a monolithic, like-minded threat deserving of a standard response	
--	--	--	---	--

25. When nuclear weapons were born, they represented the most advanced military applications of science, technology, and engineering. None but the great powers could hope to obtain them. By now, how ever, nuclear arms have been around for more than half a century, and chemical and biological weapons even longer. They are not just getting old. In the strategic terms most relevant to American security, they have become primitive. Once the military cutting edge of the strong, they have become the only hope for so-called rogue states or terrorists who want to contest American power. Why? Because the United States has developed overwhelming superiority in convention [Betts]	· Nuclear weapons threat · [Rogues as someone] who contest American power · [Rogues because] United States has developed overwhelming superiority in convention	Nuclear weapons threat	[Rogues as someone] who contest American power	[Rogues because] United States has developed overwhelming superiority in convention
26. When India and Pakistan's indulged in their bouts of nuclear machismo last year the US response was wholly predictable. Mandatory sanctions were immediately imposed on both states. While this may have made some American members of Congress feel better and conceivably may have deterred other states contemplating going nuclear, the sanctions were an exercise in futility as far as India and Pakistan were concerned. Both states had successfully tested their nuclear weapons and neither planned more explosions. Sanctions - and the hostile American rhetoric that accompanied their imposition - only served to increase popular support for the nuclear programs in both Pakistan and India. To many outsiders America's indignation seemed both inconsistent and self-serving. Washington was simultaneously claiming that the handful bombs in South Asian hands were a deadly threat to regional and global stability, while the many thousands of nuclear weapons in American hands were a force for	· [Rogues as someone] indulged in their bouts of nuclear machismo · America as hands for world peace	[Rogues as someone] indulged in their bouts of nuclear machismo	America as hands for world peace	

world peace. Critics argued that at best this was gross hypocrisy; at worst racism [Mack]				
27. The disenfranchised nations, the very notion of rules in today's world is reminiscent of an era when they sacrificed autonomy in their foreign policy for what they perceived to be a quite arbitrary world order. Moreover, for many disadvantaged states and groups that seem permanently unable to be upwardly mobile in the global hierarchy, violating the rules may be a primary means for escaping from a stifling and humiliating status quo, a system whose premises they feel powerless to influence. Actors who do not want to play by the rules, including <i>rogue states</i>, terrorist groups, and transnational criminal organizations, know that in today's international system it is extremely difficult for major powers to exert effective pressure on them over the long haul to change their behavior, and indeed a significant component of these noncompliant actors' status appears to derive from their ability to thwart in flagrant ways the major powers' standards and to get away with it without suffering devastating consequences. [Mandell]	· [Rogues as] the disenfranchised nations · [Rogues as] disadvantaged states and groups that seem permanently unable to be upwardly mobile in the global hierarchy, · violating the rules may be a primary means for escaping from a stifling and humiliating status quo · [Rogues as those who] do not want to play by the rules · [Rogue label as] to exert effective pressure on them over the long haul to change their behavior			[Rogues as] the disenfranchised nations [Rogues as] disadvantaged states and groups that seem permanently unable to be upwardly mobile in the global hierarchy, violating the rules may be a primary means for escaping from a stifling and humiliating status quo [Rogues as those who] do not want to play by the rules

				[Rogue label as] to exert effective pressure on them over the long haul to change their behavior
28. Since the effects of terrorism stem less from its actual consequences than from the alarm it inspires, governments, scholars, and the media should depict terrorism for what it is - the pathetic action of the weak and desperate instead of stoking popular fears and magnifying the destructive capabilities of terrorists to cosmic proportions. Something similar can be said for rogue states. When big problems go away, small problems tend to rise in perceived importance. The "rogue state" concept has accordingly been invented and treated as if it described a new problem in international affairs. Yet there were plenty of such states during the Cold War. Sukarno's Indonesia, for example, frequently threatened other states, as did Nasser's Egypt and Castro's Cuba. Compared to these, not to mention the giant rogues such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Mao's China, the dangers posed today by such enfeebled, impoverished [Mueller and Mueller]	· stem less from its actual consequences than from the alarm it inspires, governments, scholars · [Rogue as] a new problem in international affairs		stem less from its actual consequences than from the alarm it inspires, governments, scholars	[Rogue as] a new problem in international affairs

29. Castigating countries that oppose US interests as outlaws or pariahs is certainly nothing new. However, the concept of a "rogue" state has been popularized in the post-Cold War era in response to the changing nature of threats facing the United States and, many have argued, in an attempt to fill the void that the demise of the Soviet Union and international communism created. Regardless of whether the threats posed by these "rogue" nations require the resources and coordination that containment of the Soviet Union demanded, the concept of "rogue" states continues to influence the debates amongst American foreign-policy thinkers and the decisions of America's highest officials. Despite the prominence of "rogue" rhetoric in the American political system, there is no real consensus on what makes a "rogue." This absence of a checklist of characteristics is not surprising, as the concept of "rogue" states has been used more to garner domestic political support for punitive policies than to provide analytical guidance for sound policies. Nevertheless, the frequent use of the term has produced a group most commonly associated with the label: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. By all considerations, "rogue" states are ones which America accuses of four "wrongdoings": pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, reprehensible treatment of their own citizens, and vocal animosity toward the United States. With the exception of Cuba- whose inclusion on any register of "Togues" is much more a reflection of domestic politics in the United States than any external criterion-a country must be guilty	· Castigate countries as outlaws · Response to changing nature if threats for US · Fill the void from the Soviet Union and international communism created · garner domestic political support for punitive policies · pursuit of WMD · support for terrorism · reprehensible treatment of their own citizens · vocal animosity toward the US	pursuit of WMD support for terrorism vocal animosity toward the US	Response to changing nature if threats for US Fill the void from the Soviet Union and international communism created garner domestic political support for punitive policies reprehensible treatment of their own citizens	Castigate countries as outlaws
---	--	---	---	---------------------------------------

in all four departments in order to be classified as a "rogue" in American politics. Other countries that may be associated with one or more of the offensive behaviors, but not all of them, seem largely to escape the label of "rogue." In this way, Syria, Serbia, China, and Sudan, while certainly problem regimes, have fallen short of full- fledged "rogue" status. Similarly, Afghanistan (or the Taliban) remains outside this classification for the time being, although it may very well be a "rogue" in the making. [O'Sullivan]				
---	--	--	--	--

30. This ability to project force overseas, however, will increasingly be jeopardized over the coming years as smaller powers acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to launch them at American forces, at our allies and at the American homeland. The sine qua non for a strategy of American global pre-eminence, therefore, is a missile defense system that can protect all three of these. Only a well-protected America will be capable of deterring - and when necessary moving against - "rogue" regimes when they rise to challenge regional stability. Only a United States reasonably well shielded from the blackmail of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will be able to shape the international environment to suit its interests and its principles. True, the United States cannot simply wish hostile regimes out of existence. An American strategy that included regime change as a central component would neither promise nor expect rapid transformations in every rogue state or threatening power. The United States would not dispatch troops to topple every regime we found odious. But such a strategy would depart from recent American policy in fundamental ways. It is fair to ask how the rest of the world will respond to the prolonged period of American hegemony. Those regimes that find an American-led world order inhospitable to their existence will seek to cut away at American power, will from tactical alliances with other dictatorships and "rogue" states for the common purpose of unsettling such an order, and will look for ways to divide the United States from its allies. [Kagan and Kristol]	· acquisition of WMD · threat of launching of WMD · American global pre-eminence · American capability of deterring · [Rogues] rise to challenge regional stability. · Shape the international environment to suit its interests and principles. · Hostile regimes · [Rogue] regimes find American-led world order inhospitable to their existence seek to cut away at American power	acquisition of WMD threat of launching of WMD	American capability of deterring Hostile regimes Look at ways to divide the US from its allies	[Rogues] rise to challenge regional stability. Shape the international environment to suit its interests and principles. [Rogue] regimes find American-led world order inhospitable to their existence seek to cut away at American power [Rogues] as common purpose of unsettling such an order
---	--	---	---	--

	· [Rogues] as common purpose of unsettling such an order · Look at ways to divide the US from its allies			
--	---	--	--	--

ANNOTATION/АНОТАЦІЯ

Кваліфікаційної роботи

Тема: Recontextualising the “rogue state” label using the US academic discourses and narratives during 1994-2000 years

Студент: Нгуєн Тхіу Тієн (*прізвище, ім'я та по-батькові*)

Рік навчання, факультет: 4 р.н., ФСНСТ

Науковий керівник: кандидатка політичних наук та старша викладачка Зарембо Катерина Валеріївна (*вчений ступінь, вчене звання, прізвище та ініціали*)

Рецензент _____

(*вчений ступінь, вчене звання, прізвище та ініціали*)

Захищена “ ____ ” _____ 20_ р.

Short summary:

This study explores the significance of labels in International Relations and the various connotations associated with the term "rogue state" in US academic discourses from 1994 to 2000. It examines power dynamics, implications, and historical context related to the term, emphasizing its importance in US foreign policy and academic discussions. Through an analysis of scholarly articles, the study uncovers three distinct interpretations of the term— "Prevention," "Structuralization," and "Alienation"—which shed light on the complexities of engaging with rogue states. The examination of a selection of 30 randomly chosen academic articles gains valuable insights into the motivations and shared meanings behind the usage of this label, as well as exposes potential implications and animosity towards the labeled states. Recognizing and addressing the continued influence and interchangeable usage of terms like "rogue state" is essential for understanding their impact on perceptions, policies, and international relationships in the past, and provides caution for the future usage.

Короткий зміст роботи

У цьому дослідженні акцентується увага на значення таврів у міжнародних відносинах та різні конотації, пов'язані з тавром "держава-ізгой" у академічних дискурсах США з 1994 по 2000 рр. Було розглянуто динаміку сили, конотації та історичний контекст, пов'язаний з цим тавром, а також підкреслено важливість цього тавра у зовнішній політиці США та наукових дебатах. Через аналіз наукових статей дослідження розкриває три різні тлумачення терміну - "попередження", "структуралізація" та "відчуження", - які розкривають взаємодію США з державами-вигнанцями через призму американського академічного кола. Дослідження вибірки з 30 довільно вибраних наукових статей дозволяє отримати цінну інформацію про мотивацію та спільне значення використання цього тавра, а також розкриває потенційні наслідки та ворожість до держав, які мають це тавро. Визнання впливу та взаємозамінного використання тавра "держава-ізгой" допомагає зрозуміти його вплив на сприйняття, на політику та міжнародні відносини минулого, а також забезпечує засторогу у використанні в майбутньому.