MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF "KYIV MOHYLA ACADEMY"
Faculty of Social Sciences and Social Technologies
Department of International Relations, Public Communications and Regional Studies

Language as a Weapon: A Comparative Analysis of Russian and Chinese Linguistic Imperialism

Thesis on International Relations
Student of the Fourth Year of Study
Anna Maslovych

Supervisor:
PhD (Waseda University),
Candidate of Historical Sciences,
senior lecturer Olena Mykal

KYIV – 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are probably the two most controversial states in the world. With imperial past, communist present, and potentially totalitarian future, which may or may not have already dawned on these vast territories, Russia and China have a history of conflicts with the democratic West, but a seemingly unshakable grip on power. This power is realized both in the way the governments of the two states control their own territories, as well as in their influence on the international arena. An important component for both is language, and in this paper, I will argue that China's and Russia's use of language and language policies constitutes linguistic imperialism.

It has now been over a year since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine. Today Putin is still trying to use Russian-speaking minorities and the concept of the Russian World to justify murdering civilians and occupying Ukrainian territories, and the world still clings to the concept of "great Russian culture", while the propaganda in it goes unseen. At the same time, the Communist Party of China is sending Uyghurs to concentration camps to educate them on being more Chinese, while Mandarin is becoming the new international language with millions of learners overseas and rising interest in Chinese culture. It seems like there will be no other time when discussing Russian and Chinese linguistic imperialism would be as ***relevant*** as today.

Linguistic imperialism is not a new phenomenon but researching it at a time when empires are seemingly a thing of the past is all the more interesting. There are three main reasons why Russia and the PRC are a perfect pair for a comparative analysis on linguistic imperialism. Firstly, both are states where ethnolinguistic nationalism is prevalent, leading to a greater focus on language policies and language as an instrument of outreach (Kamusella, 2022). Secondly, there are clear historical and political parallels between the two countries: both at one time were empires, both had a revolution that led to communism, and both ended up as powerful authoritarian states. Finally, both Russia and China display

high levels of chauvinism, which impacts the branding of their languages as progressive, civilized, exceptional or simply “great”.

My research question is the following: How do authoritarian states like the RF and the PRC use linguistic imperialism both within their jurisdiction and on the international arena? The ***purpose*** of my paper is to determine how Russia and the PRC weaponize language through the use of linguistic imperialism to uphold power on their own territories and influence on the international arena. To help me prove this hypothesis I set the following ***tasks***:

1. To outline the theoretical background and the most important definitions.
2. To summarize the history of language planning in Russia and the PRC.
3. To compare the use of language policies as a method of upholding power in Russia and China.
4. To determine the role of linguistic imperialism in Russia’s and China’s foreign policy.
5. To demonstrate the outcome of Chinese and Russian linguistic imperialism and the responses of democratic states towards it.

The ***object*** of the paper is Russian and Chinese official documents, while the ***subject*** is the official documents specifically concerning language regulation and planning. I define ‘linguistic imperialism’ in my work as a spread of one language within and outside the state as a mechanism of domination and promotion of a single ideology. The term can also be used interchangeably with ‘language imperialism’.

To corroborate my research, I use the two different ***methods,*** namely case study and content analysis, which fall under the scope of a comparative approach. I use case study to compare the use of linguistic imperialism by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China under the following two categories: language policy implementation in different regions of the states and linguistic imperialism in the foreign policy of the states. As for the content analysis, I use it to compare the responses and attitudes of democratic states to Chinese and Russian linguistic imperialism.

The ***time frame*** for my research is 2005-2022. 2005 is the year of the law "On the state language of the Russian Federation" which pronounces the importance of protecting the Russian language in Russia and abroad, and it's also the year when Putin first publicly brought up the idea of the "Russian World" before establishing the foundation in 2007. As for China, 2005 was the year when the autonomy law was amended to contain the necessary use and popularization of Putonghua even in autonomous regions (Zhou, 2019, p. 101), and when bilingual and trilingual education started to appear throughout different regions (Zhou, 2019, p. 116; p. 121).

Since I do not speak any variety of Chinese, all my sources are in English and Russian. This might seem like a problem considering how closely my topic is related to language, but the specificity of my work is such that China-based researchers often support communist ideology, while expat researchers and linguists concerned with the situation in the PRC are able to take a sober look at the problems of Chinese language policy, and they write mostly in English. I found an exhaustive amount of English-language literature on Chinese linguistic imperialism and was able to access the official translations of all the documents I referenced.

For my work I use both primary and secondary sources. The ***primary sources*** include official documents from Russia and China, the texts of international conventions, declarations and treaties, as well as official reports, press-releases and statements. Some of the most important official sources for my paper are: the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (President of the RF, 2008), the Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation (RF State Duma, 2005), the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation (RSFSR Government, 1991), the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (5th National People's Congress), the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language of the People's Republic of China (PRC State Council, 2000), and the Long-Term Language Reform and Development Plan (PRC Ministry of Education, 2012).

The ***secondary sources*** can be divided into three parts according to the topic. The first part consists of theoretical literature and includes mostly monographs and articles on social constructivism, sociolinguistics, language rights and linguistic imperialism, most prominently "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", "Constructing International Politics" and "Social Theory of International Politics" by Alexander Wendt (Wendt, 1999), "Language Rights as an Integral Part of Human Rights" by Fernand de Varennes (De Varennes, 2001), and "Linguistic imperialism" by Robert Phillipson (Phillipson, 2013).

The second part consists of literature on Russian language policies and linguistic imperialism, most prominently "Russian and Rashism: Are Russian Language and Literature Really so Great?" by Tomasz Kamusella (Kamusella, 2022), "Language planning and policies in Russia through a historical perspective" by Alex Krouglov (Krouglov, 2021), "Language Policy and Russian-Titular Bilingualism in Post-Soviet Tatarstan" by Teresa Wiggleworth-Baker (Wiggleworth-Baker, 2015), "Questions of the Chechen-Russian Bilingualism in the Chechen Republic" by Aza Yakhyayeva et al. (Yakhyayeva, 2019) and "The Russian World - Changing Meanings and Strategies" by Valery Tishkov (Tishkov, 2008).

The third part consists of literature on Chinese language policies and linguistic imperialism, most prominently "Language Ideology and Order in Rising China" by Minglang Zhou (Zhou, 2019), "The Language Revolution in Communist China" by Tao-Tai Hsia (Hsia, 1956), "The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse" by Arienne M. Dwyer (Dwyer, 2006), "A Sociological Analysis of Tibetan Language Policy Issues in China" by Luo Jia and Pai Qie (Jia and Qie, 2021) and "Overseas Chinese and the Concept of 'Greater China'" by Wei-Wei Zhang (Zhang, 2005).

In terms of ***structure***, I have divided the paper into five parts according to the tasks I have listed above. The first part will deal with the theoretical background for my research, outlining the constructivist perspective on language, language policies and linguistic

imperialism, and providing definitions for these concepts. I will also explain the main characteristics of linguistic imperialism through the lens of sociolinguistics.

The second part of the paper will focus on the history of the language planning in Russia (as well as the former USSR) and China. I will compare the two states' efforts in language regulation and show how they influenced each other in this process. This will help me examine the roots of modern-day linguistic imperialism and its evolution since the middle of the 20th century.

The third part will provide a comparative analysis of language policy implementation in different regions of Russia and the PRC. I will look into language regulation in Xinjiang, Tibet, Tatarstan and Chechnya and show how language in these regions is used as an instrument of assimilation and propaganda.

The fourth part of the paper will examine the signs of linguistic imperialism in Russian and Chinese foreign policy. I will discuss the two states' relations with overseas communities of Russian and Mandarin speakers and look into the role of language in the foreign policy concepts of *Russkiy mir* and Greater China.

The fifth and final part will study the outcomes of Chinese and Russian linguistic imperialism in terms of the two states' relations with their democratic partners. I will demonstrate that, despite the condemnation of minority language rights violations, the West's attention to language as an instrument of power is still not sufficient. I will also examine how Russia and the PRC use branding for their national languages and how this influences the way others see their states.

1. Theoretical and conceptual framework

1.1. Language, ideology and imperialism through the lens of social constructivism

In this paper I use social constructivism to analyse the link between language and ideology as elements linguistic imperialism. Social constructivism is a theory of

international relations that emerged in the 1990s to fill in the gaps of realism and liberalism, since these two traditional theories of IR were unable to explain the dynamic events of the late 20th century. It was popularized by Alexander Wendt ("Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", 1992; "Social Theory of International Politics", 1999), Peter Katzenstein ("The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics", 1996), Kathryn Sikkink ("International norm dynamics and political change", 1998), Martha Finnemore ("National Interest in International Society", 1996), Friedrich Kratochwil ("Understanding Change in International Politics", 1994) and others. Notably, constructivism is a very American theory, but according to Jack Snyder, European scholars also contributed to it in the European Journal of International Relations (Snyder, 2004, p. 60).

The main idea of social constructivism is that a socially *constructed* meaning of a material object is more important than the object itself (hence the name of the theory), and thus it is these meanings that direct actions on the international arena (Wendt, 1992, p. 396-397). This concept is contrasted with *materialism* in the realist and liberal paradigms, where the main instruments of IR are, respectively, military might and diplomacy, and global commerce (Snyder, 2004, p. 59). Constructivism, instead, holds that the *social* aspect of power is usually more important than military might. To take Wendt's famous example of nuclear missiles, we cannot explain America's fear of North Korea simply in terms of possession of weapons, since 500 missiles in the hands of Britain do not spark the same reaction as only 5 North Korean ones (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Therefore, it follows that the negative relationship is based on the *belief* that Britain is an ally and will not attack, while North Korea is an enemy.

This belief is part of a larger system of intersubjective meanings that have been building upon each other throughout the years of participation in international affairs. States are never in a social vacuum on the international arena: their actions are interpreted, and expectations are formed, which in turn create the ground for other states to act on – and this continues in an unending cycle (Wendt, 1992, p. 405). This "model of identity-

and interest-formation" proposed by Wendt suggests that intersubjective meanings also play out on a national level, where they lead to the construction of self-identity and national interest. The reason is simple: the understanding of one's identity and interests "depends on the ideas they hold" (Snyder, 2004, p. 60), but also on the interpretations of the actions of others and the subsequent expectations (Weldes, 1996, p. 276). So, without interpreting North Korea's past actions as hostile and forming an expectation based on that the US wouldn't have gained the identity of North Korea's enemy and crafted their interests accordingly.

Now that I have identified and explained the most important concepts of social constructivism that pertain to my work, it is vital to outline the epistemological framework of the paper. Social constructivism is described by Hurd as being on the verge between positivism and post-positivism, with scholars on each side of the epistemological gap providing different outlooks on the theory, having different aims and using different methodology (Hurd, 2008, p. 307). The examples of positivist constructivist scholars are Wendt, Finnemore, Barnett, etc., who approach the theory "with the same tools of social science", trying to find patterns, systems and cause-and- effect sequences in the "socially constructed international system" (Hurd, 2008, p. 307). The post-positivist approach, backed by theorists such as Campbell and Devetak, is somewhat closer to critical theory, as it recognizes that "all knowledge involves a relationship with power in its mapping of the world" (Campbell, 2007, p. 209-210). Thus, it must be clarified that my research is based on positivist constructivism, as I will be determining cause-and-effect links between different phenomena, and I draw much of the theoretical framework from Alexander Wendt.

In his works Wendt didn't theorize on language in depth, but he did mention it a few times in "Social Theory of International Politics", making it obvious that language is an important variable in constructivist thought. According to Wendt, language not only forms the basis for group identity formation, but it helps determine intersubjective meanings (Wendt, 1999, p. 57; p. 210). He clearly states that "the structure of shared

beliefs is ultimately a linguistic phenomenon" (Wendt, 1999, p. 175), which makes language the underlying driver behind the main principles of social constructivism as such. Based on Wendt's logic, I will define 'language' in my paper as a method of communication between people and states that makes possible the existence of shared values and beliefs and is the cornerstone of collective identity formation.

The term 'ideology' also pertains to the shared belief system, and following the definition of Tannenwald, it signifies "a systematic set of doctrines or beliefs that reflect the social needs and aspirations of a group, class, culture, or state" (Tannenwald, 2005, p. 15). In my case, the groups in question are the Russian and Chinese ruling parties. According to Wendt, common language and ideology are supposed to lead to unity, and even if they don't always do so, "it would be a mistake to dismiss homogeneity altogether as a cause of collective identity formation" (Wendt, 1999, p. 357). As it will be shown in this paper, the reverse is also true, and collective identities are sometimes constructed *specifically* to support the ideology. Or, as Wendt puts it, state elites "through education, immigration, and language policies have tried to create "imagined communities" of people who share objective attributes and as a result come to see themselves as being alike, and different than the members of other states" (Wendt, 1999, p. 355).

As seen from the above quote, identity can mean both being identical to other parts of the whole and different from outsiders. Each state can also have multiple identities and base their various interests on them (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Following the definitions of Wendt and Berenskoetter, I will specify the term 'identity' as a perception of self that is "constructed through ideas, norms, values, symbols, discourses, and practices" (Wendt, 1992, p. 397; Berenskoetter, 2010, p. 6).

Finally, the most important definition is left to consider, and that is linguistic imperialism. Robert Phillipson, Head of the former Institute for Languages and Cultures at Roskilde University with an M.A. in Linguistics, writes that "the study of linguistic imperialism focuses on how and why certain languages dominate internationally, and attempts to account for such dominance in a theoretically informed way" (Phillipson,

2013). Based on his definition of imperialism as domination "over subordinated people and territories" and Wendt's and Tannenwald's definitions of language and ideology, I will define 'linguistic imperialism' in my work as a spread of one language within and outside the state as a mechanism of domination and promotion of a single ideology. The term 'linguistic imperialism' can also be used interchangeably with 'language imperialism', since in Phillipson's works these two are synonymous.

Now that in the first section I have explained the main principles of social constructivism and why I chose this theory, as well as given definitions to the most important terms that my work is based on, I want to proceed with a more in-depth analysis of linguistic imperialism: how it makes language an instrument of state policies, how it ties together language and ideology, how it is exercised both inside a particular state and abroad, and what methods it uses to make one language dominant over others.

1.2. Linguistic imperialism within and outside the state: Overview of terms and definitions via sociolinguistics

The concept of language, although inherent to social constructivism, is mostly taken for granted and not given proper attention by constructivist theorists. To help me explain how linguistic imperialism and language policies work and why language rights are important, I will introduce into my study the discipline of sociolinguistics, which I have chosen because of the strong social element. In this subsection I will proceed to define sociolinguistics and explain its connection to social constructivism, provide a broader explanation of linguistic imperialism and how it works both within and outside of a state, define the concepts of status and corpus language planning, and finally outline an international legal framework behind language rights.

Sociolinguistics is broadly defined as the study of language in relation to society (Sarwat, 2019, p. 2). Sociolinguists "explore the *social* function of the language and the way it is used to convey the *meaning*" (Sarwat, 2019, p. 3), which is the most obvious point of convergence between this discipline and social constructivism. I realize that

sociolinguistics and constructivism study the social elements and the construction of meaning on two absolutely different planes – interpersonal and international – but this is exactly why sociolinguistics can fill in the gaps of constructivist theory in this paper and help shed light on national processes that can play out on an international scale.

Sociolinguists outline a number of language functions apart from communication. In his work on endangered languages in Africa Herman M. Batibo, a sociolinguist from the University of Botswana, compiled the roles of language into different categories: cultural transmission, identity, socialization, solidarity and cohesion, national allegiance, social relations, social stratification, and intelligence (Batibo, 2005, p. 32-36). In the context of linguistic imperialism, the most important language roles to examine are identity and national allegiance.

In the previous section I have already mentioned that states can have multiple identities on the international arena, but the situation is even further complicated by the existence of multiple identities on the national level. In Russia there are 193 officially recognized ethnic groups and in China – 55, and each of them bears their own cultural and linguistic identity (Krouglov, 2021, p. 423; Kurpaska, 2017, p. 15). The Russian government and the CPC have been battling with the issue of uniting these identities into one distinct “Russian” and “Chinese” identity for years, and they are now successfully using language for this very purpose. Thus, there is an interplay between native languages and cultural identities, and state language and state identity, with the latter usually dominating and discriminating over the former. In Wendt’s words “group identities are still “constructions” (what else could they be?), but relative to states and states systems, these constructions are often external or exogenous” (Wendt, 1999, p. 210).

Even more interesting is the use of language for national allegiance. In largely monolingual and monoethnic states like Ukraine, where the national language has been struggling to survive under the rule of several different empires, language naturally becomes a value to unite around and something that holds the society together, even when parts of the population are under the jurisdiction of different states. Multilingual and

multiethnic states, like the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, are a completely different story. Mandarin and Russian, as the designated national languages in these two countries, are used assimilate people speaking hundreds of different regional, titular and minority languages and ensure their loyalty to the state or party ideology.

In fact, ideological support is one of the main principles of linguistic imperialism outlined by Phillipson, but in his works Phillipson makes it clear that the connection goes both ways and ideology in turn helps "rationalize linguistic hierarchy" and normalize the dominance of one language over others (Phillipson, 2013). Of course, with it comes inequality and multiple violations of language rights. Here I have to mention another two terms that will be important for my study: language rights and linguicism. According to Fernand de Varennes, UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, linguistic rights "derive from general human rights standards, especially non-discrimination, freedom of expression, right to private life, and the right of members of a linguistic minority to use their language with other members of their community" (De Varennes, 2001, p. 16). The right to use your native language is inalienable and does not require a state ""giving" some kind of recognition to a minority or indigenous language" or issuing any official legislation on this count (De Varennes, 2012, p. 16).

In his work on language rights in Tibet, De Varennes outlines the most important cases that have set the standard for language rights in international law, and they illustrate how the concept evolved in recent years. Most notably, in 1993 the UN Human Rights Committee concluded that "the right to use a language in private activities was guaranteed by freedom of expression"; in 2000 the UN Human Rights Committee allowed for non-official languages to be used by state authorities "in order to comply with non-discrimination on the grounds of language"; and in 2001 the European Court of Human Rights agreed that children should have the right to education in their native language rather than the official language of the state (De Varennes, 2012, p. 17). Apart from that, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the Lisbon Treaty, the Universal Declaration of Linguistic

Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights all explicitly protect the rights of minorities to use, be educated in and develop their mother tongue.

Linguicism, on the other hand, is one of the main ways in which language rights (and in turn basic human rights) are usually violated. Along with racism, sexism and classism, it is a form of discrimination that favors one group of people over others. According to Phillipson, linguicism "serves to privilege users of the standard forms of the dominant language, which represent convertible linguistic capital" (Phillipson, 2013). This privilege to truly play a role in assimilation and identity-formation, it needs to be institutionalized on the legislative level. This is where language planning comes in.

According to linguists Kaplan and Baldauf, language planning is "an activity, most visibly undertaken by government (simply because it involves such massive changes in a society), intended to promote systematic linguistic change in some community of speakers" (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p. xi). It is usually aimed at "establishing a new hierarchy of languages and language varieties" and leads to the creation of language policy – "a body of ideas, laws, regulations, rules and practices intended to achieve the planned language change in the society, group or system (Krouglov, 2021, p. 412; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p. xi). Language planning is usually divided into corpus planning, which includes "standardization, codification of morphology or spelling, or the development of specialised vocabulary", and status planning, which is concerned with the hierarchy of languages in the state, and language policies exist accordingly (Krouglov, 2021, p. 413). In my paper I will touch on both types of language planning, but status planning is what actually causes linguicism, which is why I will pay it considerably more attention.

Just like that, we now have a complete picture of the progression of linguistic imperialism within a state. To form a collective national identity and create a sense of national allegiance, states like Russia and the PRC use status and corpus planning and promulgate language policies to support their own ideology, but in the process they clash with the linguistic identities of minorities and indigenous peoples and violate their language rights through linguicism. However, linguistic imperialism also plays out on the

international scale, which is the most important for my study. In this context it is vital to understand the role languages play in territorial expansion and vice versa – how expansion helps certain languages go global and become instruments for international communication.

Robert Phillipson positions expansion as one of the main goals of linguistic imperialism. Since the times of the Roman Empire, the languages of colonizers have been systematically imposed on the colonized peoples soon after the acquisition of new territories (Phillipson, 2013). Phillipson sees Stalin's language policies in the USSR as an example of expansive linguistic imperialism and we see the continuation of this tradition in today's war, where Russian troops often burn Ukrainian books, change signposts, and set up Russian-language schools almost immediately after occupying a town (Pyrih, Zaxid.net, 2023; Yankovskyi, Radio Svoboda, 2022). But Phillipson also mentions that the reason why the languages of former empires are so strong and widely used today is "a direct consequence of of successive waves of colonization and of the outcome of military conflict between rival European powers" (Phillipson, 2013). This position is supported by Kamusella, who claims that today "no one questions the fact that Russian is an important language of global communication" because the power-struggle during the Cold War "made the West oblivious to that fact that quite strangely – in comparison to Arabic, English, French, Spanish and even Chinese – Russian was official only in a single country, namely, the Soviet Union" (Kamusella, 2022). Nowadays the global use and popularity of Russian and Mandarin gives the RF and the PRC the power to control the narratives these languages carry, lay claims to people who speak them and territories where these people reside.

* * *

In this chapter I laid down the theoretical and conceptual groundwork for my study. Even though social constructivism does not theorize on language in depth, it can be linked to sociolinguistics through their understanding of society and identity, helping me define terms such as language planning, language policies, linguicism and language rights. These

concepts provided clarity to the understanding of linguistic imperialism and how it works on the national level by making one language and identity dominate over others. As for the international level, linguistic imperialism is a remnant of centuries of colonization that combines expansionist policies with national branding. Now that I have outlined the main terms and definitions, I can safely move forward to a brief history of Russian and Chinese linguistic imperialism.

2. Historical background: Language planning in Russia and China in the 20th – beginning of the 21st century

2.1. Russification, regional autonomy, and the legal framework for Russian language policies

Language planning on the territory of modern-day Russian Federation dates back to the time when it was still the Russian empire and the creation of a classical Russian language as we know it today, but the basis for current language policies was laid down during the times of the Soviet Union. After the revolutions of 1917 and the establishment of the Communist Party, language was given special attention "as a tool for the acquisition and maintenance of power", and policies surrounding the cultures and languages of different Soviet Republics started to bloom with the aim of supporting socialist ideology (Cooper, 1989, p. 155, as cited in Krouglov, 2021, p. 418). First, however, came the corpus planning: Russian morphology and orthography was revised, certain letters were eliminated from the Russian alphabet and new vocabulary began to appear. Even at this stage ideological goals already came into play, as these new words and phrases "were aimed at glorifying the achievements of workers and peasants and Red Army soldiers" and generating popular support for the revolution (Krouglov, 2021, p. 418).

Another important issue to tackle at the time was illiteracy. It is estimated that in 1919 around 60% of the Russian population was illiterate, which needed to change if socialism was to spread, since the Bolsheviks believed that the success of the revolution

depended on the literacy levels in the country (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419). The 1919 Eighth Communist Party Congress "approved a programme establishing the foundation of the Soviet system of education", and the wave of educational reforms culminated in a literacy campaign that swept the country (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419). Schools became mandatory for children between 6 and 16, adults were asked "to study in their free time and attend evening classes", and schools with local languages of instruction started to appear across the RSFSR (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419). Along with the gradual cultural and linguistic revival of non-Russian minorities, local languages were finally standardized with the emergence of *nativization* – "the new approach to language planning", which aimed at restoring minority languages, giving all citizens the right of education in their native language and "giving official status to national languages in the Soviet Union" (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419).

This policy proved to be quite controversial. Even though the constitution of 1918 declared linguistic equality of all national minorities, no means of realizing such equality were put forward (Blank, 1988, p. 74). Many Bolsheviks believed that teaching in the native language was "counterrevolutionary" and fought against attempts of language and religious education as "bourgeois" (Blank, 1988, p. 75). There was an attempt at politicizing the schools instead, and many stressed the "progressivity" of assimilation to Russian language and culture (Blank, 1988, p.75). Interestingly enough, it was Lenin who emphasized the need for the development of all languages and condemned Russian chauvinism at the 1919 Congress (Blank, 1988, p. 77). While Lenin saw culture as a "politicized superstructure" and fought for the elimination of its inherent "bourgeois" component, he took the opposing view when it came to language and leaned away from Russification (Blank, 1988, p. 72). He thought that linguistic coercion was not needed because the "socialist economic and political development would inevitably spread Russian as a lingua franca" anyway, and it was because of him that the ethnic minorities of the RSFSR were allowed to develop alphabets, print literature and textbooks, as well

as translate documents and court proceedings to their languages (Blank, 1988, p. 73; Krouglov, 2021, p. 419).

However, drastic changes in language planning occurred in 1938, when the resolution On the Obligatory Study of the Russian Language in National Republic and Regional Schools made Russian "a compulsory subject in all schools across the Soviet Union" (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419). The reasons for Russification included "the need for better communication between all peoples of the Soviet Union, better opportunities for professional development of national scientists and specialists, and effective service in the Red Army", but in actuality it was part of the attempt to centralize power in the USSR (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419). By the 1950s the school curriculum was strictly regulated by Moscow, all subjects were taught in Russian, other languages were restricted or even banned, and many linguists and writers were arrested or put to death (Krouglov, 2021, p. 419-420). Corpus planning didn't lag behind as multiple languages were transferred to the Cyrillic alphabet and had their grammar and vocabulary modified to bring them closer to Russian (Krouglov, 2021, p. 420). At the same time, "Soviet mass media produced numerous politically correct phrases describing political, economic, and cultural events in the country and overseas" with the aim of "defending the revolution" and fighting capitalism (Krouglov, 2021, p. 420-421).

During the post-Stalin period the main approach to language planning rested in bilingualism, which is still prominent in the Russian Federation of today (Krouglov, 2021, p. 421). Bilingualism, however, should not be understood as the ability for non-Russian minorities to use their own language on par with Russian, "but rather an opportunity to create further inequalities between Russian and other titular languages of the Soviet Union through promoting Russian, not only as the language of communication between all peoples of the country, but also as the language of science, technology, economic development, and the army" (Krouglov, 2021, p. 421). While parents were given "the opportunity to choose the language of instruction for their children" owing to the 1958 law on law On Strengthening the Link between School and Life, Russian was still present

in education and all other spheres of life, and described by Khrushchev as the "second mother tongue (Krouglov, 2021, p. 421). And the increase in literacy, which had risen tremendously since the 1920s, just ensured that the use of Russian would spread to every corner of the USSR by any means possible (Krouglov, 2021, p. 421).

Overall the Khrushchev era was called the period of thaw, when national and minority languages were allowed to be used and developed (Krouglov, 2021, p. 421). Such periods were, however, rather brief in the history of the Soviet Union: with the change of leadership the ideology veered towards creating an identity of the "Soviet man", and Russian was its vital component (Krouglov, 2021, p. 421). From then on Russian-language education was required for all elite positions, the usage domains for all other languages were restricted, and large numbers of minority-language speakers were displaced to Russian-speaking regions (Krouglov, 2021, p. 422). The status of local languages was steadily diminishing, as Bolsheviks only saw fit for them to be used "at home or for some ceremonial occasions", while Russian was considered the language of science, higher education and in general the "higher, more educated strata of society" (Dzyuba, 1968, p. 135, as cited in Krouglov, 2021, p. 422). As a result of this inequality, many languages were stagnating "transforming into languages with limited functional capacity", and had to be mixed with Russian to close "lexical gaps" and communicate on any relevant topics (Krouglov, 2021, p. 422). In addition, "the number of languages used as languages of instruction in the Russian Federation fell sharply from 47 in the 1960s to only 17 by 1982", leading to less and less children being able to learn their native languages at school (Krouglov, 2021, p. 422).

All of the above happened while Russian still wasn't even the official language of the Soviet Union, which it became only in April 1990, after the period of *perestroika* and before the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This was the time when national languages finally made a difference and language status became the focal point for nationalist independence movements" (Chevalier, 2006, p. 27). The new status planning efforts, which culminated in "designating the titular languages as official state tongues",

accelerated the shift of power from center to periphery and led to republics leaving the Union one by one on the cusp of heightened national consciousness. The Russian Federation became a separate political entity with 83 different regions and almost 200 ethnic minorities, and in spite of the gradual democratization there was still a need for language planning – and, evidently, "protecting" Russian, even though many other local languages were in need of revival after decades of bans and restrictions.

In these early years of the Federation the Russian government drafted and ratified a number of laws and conventions on language use and minority languages. The Law On Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR, passed in 1991, "provided the legal base for the coexistence of so many languages in the country" and allowed for some linguistic revival (RSFSR Government, 1991). The State National Policy Concept of 1996 also included the issue of "preservation and development" of minority languages and cultures. Apart from that, Russia ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1998, and signed the signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in 2001, which was, however, not ratified after all. Apparently "even the recognition for the purposes of the Charter of languages other than Russian could pose an existential threat to the integrity of the RF" (Bowring, 2019, p. 84, as cited in Krouglov, 2021, p. 424). Even though laws supporting the use of minority languages existed, there was still a system of both federal and regional legal frameworks that "ensured that Russian remained a common language for the entire federation" (Krouglov, 2021, p. 424), and the most prominent among them was the Law on the State Language of the Russian Federation (RF State Duma, 2005).

The law was passed in 2005, five years after Putin came to power and froze the process of decentralization that had started after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the start of his term as president, Putin was promoting the idea of a "Great Russia", inserting the Russian language into the concept of patriotism and later the "Russian world". Seeing the post-Soviet changes to the status of Russian as a global language, namely the

fact that the number of its learners worldwide “dropped from 23 million in 1982-1983 to 10-12 million in the 1990s”, Putin mobilized the Federal Council on Russian language and drafted a law on the national language of the RF in 2001. The aim behind it was to “strengthen” and support the Russian language at three different levels: as a state and national language of the Russian people, as a “world language” and as “the language of education and mass media” (Chevalier, 2006, p. 29-30).

Once again Russian became the lingua franca in a federation, as well as the language of science, education and media. In 2017, in response to a complaint of a Russian mother, Putin “announced that children in ethnic regions must not be forced to learn languages that are not their mother tongues” during the Council on Interethnic Relations in Yoshkar-Ola, which basically meant that Russian children should not be made to learn minority languages, while children of ethnic minorities would still have to learn Russian (Krouglov, 2021, p. 424). A follow-up amendment to the Law on Education in the Russian Federation passed in 2018 officially “limited the amount of time per week that classroom time could be dedicated to minority languages” and made learning all languages other than Russian optional (Ramos, 2019; RF State Duma, 2018). Other educational reforms “led to the decrease in teaching state, official, and minority languages of the republics and other minority languages” as Putin kept pushing the narrative about the indispensability of Russian for inter-ethnic communication (Krouglov, 2021, p. 424).

In this section I looked into the history of language planning in Russia since the early years of the USSR and up until the most recent language policies of 2018. I studied how corpus and status planning led to the domination of the Russian language over other titular languages of the Soviet Union, as well as minority languages inside Russia itself. Even though the languages of ethnic minorities experienced brief periods of thaw when control was eased and language development allowed, Russification efforts grew in force since the Stalin era, making many languages stagnate. Even still policies such as the Law on the State Language of the RF are trying to “protect” Russian to hold Putin’s ideology in place.

2.2. Mandarin as the national language of the PRC: Standardization, spread and protection through laws

In 1913, just two years after the Xinhai Revolution, which marked the end of imperial rule in China, the Ministry of Education of the newly established Republic of China made the first attempt at unifying pronunciation across the country and creating the first national language – *guoyu*. Unlike many nation-states that faced the same problem of linguistic unification for national unity, the Ministry did not simply use the capital's dialect as the new standard, instead combining "a basic northern pronunciation with key characteristics of phonology from southern regions" (Tam, 2016, p. 284). Like with any manufactured language, however, *guoyu* lacked speakers, since people in China were used to their own language varieties and were often illiterate. One of the only people who found themselves supporting the reform and speaking the new national language was Yuen Ren Chao, at the time a student at Harvard and the future founder of the modern Chinese study of dialectology or *fangyanxue* (Tam, 2016, p. 285).

The term *fangyanxue* comes from the word *fangyan*, which is the denomination of local varieties of Chinese – local languages that compose the Sinitic language family, of which there are from 7 to 10 by different estimates (Zhou, 2019, p. 69; Kurpaska, 2017, p. 15-16). *Fangyan* have come to be translated into English as dialects not only because it's easier to say one word instead of four, but because of the way they are viewed by the Chinese themselves. According to Zhou, linguists outside China rely on phonology, lexicon and syntax when they pronounce Chinese to be a *family of separate languages*, while Chinese linguists rely on "non-linguistic factors, such as culture, society, nation, and state/dynasty", dismissing the fact that the so-called dialects of their language are often not mutually intelligible (Zhou, 2019, p. 69). Zhou calls Chinese as a single language "both an ideology and a desired language order" (Zhou, 2019, p. 70), which brings us back to Wendt and the "imagined communities" of people who must share the same language to have a common, homogenous identity (Wendt, 1999, p. 355).

The study of local varieties of Chinese, or *fangyanxue*, was officially established in the 1920s. Technically, the study of Chinese language and characters had existed even before the current era, but republican academics of the May Fourth movement rejected the remnants of imperialism and antiquity and focused on modernity instead. In short, they were trying to gain a deeper understanding of "their nation and its citizens" (Tam, 2016, p. 282), and Yuen Ren Chao was not an exception. In 1925 he returned home to become an official member of the National Language Unification Committee and was "tasked with determining and perfecting a new *guoyu* pronunciation" (Tam, 2016, p. 285). He specialized in *fangyan* surveys, and his most impactful work to date is "Studies on the Modern Wu Dialect" – a survey of phonological characteristics for 32 local dialects around present-day Shanghai (Tam, 2016, p. 286).

The work of Chao and his peers, however, was only the first step towards language standardization. Apart from phonology, which was the base of Chao's work, there was still written language to be considered, and it became the main concern of Mao Zedong, who established the Communist Party at the height of the May Fourth movement and came to power in 1949. According to Tao-Tai Hsia, researcher and contemporary of the first Chinese language reforms, Mao Zedong was convinced that "the ideographic nature of the Chinese written language was chiefly responsible for China's high percentage of illiteracy, estimated by the People's Government to be *over ninety percent* in the pre-Communist era" (Hsia, 1956, p. 146). To battle this illiteracy, as well as to bring the language closer to the masses, Mao organized a nation-wide language reform structure almost as soon as People's Republic of China was established in 1949 – the Chinese Written Language Reform Association (and later Committee). Their goal was to simplify the writing system and educate people about it "to speed up cultural progress and help implement economic construction" (Hsia, 1956, p. 147).

By 1955, Mandarin or Putonghua, "the modified northern Chinese dialect", was selected as the basis for standard Chinese grammar, vocabulary and pronunciation, and a special program was established to implement the changes (Hsia, 1956, p. 147). As part

of the program, the strokes of over 1700 traditional characters were simplified, variant character forms were abolished, a list of 1500 most used characters was created, writing instruments and ways of writing (from top to bottom, from left to right, etc.) were modernized, Hanyu pinyin was adopted as the new phonetic script and, most importantly, Mandarin was promoted all across the PRC (Hsia, 1956, p. 148-149). Not only were people urged to speak the new language in social gatherings, at schools and in their social life (Hsia, 1956, p. 149), but the so-called "Communist agitators" were relied upon to make speeches and visit homes and factories to promote the new method of communication among their acquaintances. Pamphlets and newspaper articles explaining grammatical rules were also "published and circulated among the masses" in vast numbers (Hsia, 1956, p. 152-153).

Beyond that there was the new *fangyan* survey of 1956-1957. It was compiled by students and scholars from local universities, who were under strict instructions from the Language Reform Committee and the Ministries of Education and Higher Education. The survey included "an outline of the *fangyan*'s phonetic system, a list of homonyms between Beijing pronunciation and the relative *fangyan*, and a comparative formula to explain major pronunciation differences between each *fangyan* and Putonghua" (Tam, 2016, p. 300). The scholars working on the survey relied on Yuen Ren Chao's methods, as well as the Chinese Dialect Survey Handbook, created specifically for the occasion by two researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Tam, 2016, p. 299). Complete with a table and "organizational cards", the handbook produced a consistent methodology and made it easier to look at the surveyed *fangyan* as variables, "rather than living, breathing, modes of expression informed by culture and space" as they are seen by both sociolinguists and constructivists (Tam, 2016, p. 300).

The completed survey depicted all the differences between *fangyan* and the Mandarin standard, which made it easier to teach Mandarin to speakers of the local varieties of Chinese and eradicate the "mistake" that was *fangyan* (Tam, 2016, p. 301). According to Tam, "the language study handbooks fortified a model in which Putonghua

served as the national language from which other *fangyan* emerged and into which they would inevitably dissolve, but they also defined *fangyan* as linguistic abnormalities, robbing them of their independence and belittling their value" (Tam, 2016, p. 301-302).

The use of Mandarin was promoted not only among the Han Chinese, but among the multiple Chinese minorities. Even though their rights to use their native languages were "enshrined in the Interim Constitution" (The Common Program, 1949, p. 9, Article 53), they still had to learn Mandarin, since it was prominent "in the domains of government administration, the courts, education, and the media" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 7). According to Hsia, over 100 thousand cadres from minority nationalities have been trained in Beijing in the 1950s to bring Mandarin – "the language of communication among all brother nationalities in the People's Republic of China" – to their local communities (Hsia, 1956, p. 153). Although, at the time, minoritarian communities also reaped some benefits from the reforms: in 1952 there was a call to reform the minority written languages and create alphabets for those who didn't have them to "establish ethnic and linguistic equality" (Kurpaska, 2017, p. 17). However, these "egalitarian aims" of the early CPC contrasted with the perception of peripheral peoples as "backward" and "without culture" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 7), which only explains the later attempts to completely assimilate them. Again, we see how actions are based on perceptions and meanings that are merely constructed by one group about the other (Wendt, 1992, p. 396-397; 1999, p. 123).

In general, there was a dire need for most language reforms of the 1950s, as they were "closely linked with the expansion of literacy" and aided progress and economic development. As Hsia put it, even though the language reforms were quite obviously a ploy to support the Communist Party, they brought "knowledge to many of the Chinese people and in some respects make their life richer" (Hsia, 1956, p. 154). However, "during the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution of the late 1950s through the early 1970s" minority languages started to be shunned and their rights diminished for the sake of Mandarin promotion (Dwyer, 2005, p. 8).

To increase exposure to the new standard language, “massive media and education campaigns” were launched, and the situation was further complicated by the fact that Chinese policymakers sincerely believed they were doing their “younger brethren” a favor, since minority languages were considered “inadequate for the rigorous communicative demands of modern life” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 9-10). In the 1950s, Putonghua had virtually no native speakers, but by 2016 an estimated 70% of Chinese population spoke Mandarin, and more people were spreading it abroad, with the initial goal to “spread Putonghua to rural China and the world by 2020” (Zhou, 2019, p. 72; PRC Ministry of Education, 2012). Until 1986, there was a view in China that the goal of Putonghua promotion was to wipe out *fangyan* whatsoever and unify the PRC under a common language (Zhou, 2019, p. 72). Even after the 1986 nation conference on language and script work, which “officially made clear for the first time that the promotion of Putonghua is not intended to wipe out Chinese dialects, but only to eliminate the barriers in communication created by Chinese dialects” (Zhou, 2019, p. 73), the restriction of *fangyan* and elevation of Mandarin continued. Owing to the 2000 common language law (Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language of the PRC, 2000), Mandarin received the role of “linguistic citizenship”, which was “stipulated for citizens to establish a stronger identification with the state” (Zhou, 2019, p. 73).

Today, Putonghua is an unchallenged standard of communication in China, supported by Article 19 of the Constitution of the PRC (Consitution of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), Article 10 of the Language Law from 2000 (Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language of the PRC, 2000), which proclaims it the main medium of instruction in schools, and by events such as Putonghua Promotion Week (yearly since 1998) and the Putonghua Proficiency Tests (Kurpaska, 2017, p. 17-18). The standard language in China has the highest status, while dialects and regional languages can be used “in unofficial situations, also to some extent in local media and in traditional folk arts or publications, but with restrictions” (Kurpaska, 2017, p. 17). On the other hand, Kurpaska names the Chinese language policy as the reason for rising interest

in different minority languages, which are better studied thanks to general attention to language in the country (Kurpaska, 2017, p. 21). Even this positive fact, however, doesn't change the real picture: the primary cause of Mao Zedong's linguistic policy was his belief in language as the power source behind propaganda (Hsia, 1956, p. 151).

In this section I outlined the history of language planning in the People's Republic of China since its establishment by Mao Zedong and until the 2020s. Just like in Russia, everything started with corpus planning and the need for literacy, and grew into an unequal language hierarchy in a multicultural state. Unlike Russia, however, the problem for China was choosing a national language among a whole variety of Chinese languages in the first place. After Mandarin, also known as Putonghua, was selected for this role, it was promoted all over the country and supported by legislation such as the Law on Standard Spoken and Written Chinese language. Apart from that, special work was put into studying other varieties of Chinese and making guides which would help regular citizens learn the new common tongue much quicker. All the while local dialects and varieties of Chinese, as well as the languages of other ethnic groups, were becoming more and more restricted, because they were deemed "uncivilized" and "inadequate" for expressing particular notions – a concept the CPC borrowed from Stalin. In the next chapters I will discuss how this historical background impacts the minority languages in China and Russia, as well as how it is reflected in their foreign policy.

3. Linguistic or linguicist? Policies discriminating against Russian and Chinese minority-language speakers

3.1. The Republic of Tatarstan

Tatarstan is an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, situated in Eastern Europe and to the west of the Ural Mountains. As a multiethnic republic, it is populated by Tatars, Russians, Chuvash, Udmurts, Bashkirs, Bulgars, as well as representatives of other nationalities. The two most spoken languages in the region are

Tatar, “a western Turkic-Altaic language”, and Russian, both of which are declared state languages in the constitution of the republic (Constitutional Conference, 1993). Consequently, most of the population of Tatarstan is bilingual, but just like in the Soviet Union bilingualism doesn’t necessarily mean equality. According to Wigglesworth-Baker, Doctor of Philosophy in Russian and Slavonic studies, “bilingualism in Tatarstan is considered to be asymmetrical due to the developments and dominance of the Russian language”. Let us now look at the policies that led to this asymmetry and the ways in which it manifests itself.

Starting from the corpus planning, I should mention that in the 1930s Bolsheviks made the Tatar people transfer from Arabic first to the Latin and then to the Cyrillic script. In the words of the former President of Tatarstan Shaimiev, “without any discussion, and without consulting the Tatar intelligentsia, the Tatars were forced to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet”, even though it didn’t reflect nine of the sounds present in the Tatar language and distanced Tatars from their culture and religion in general (Khasanova, 1997; Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 125). After the collapse of the USSR and during the cultural revival in Tatarstan there was an attempt to abolish the Cyrillic alphabet for Latin, which would at the very least “facilitate integration with information and communication technologies”, but Russians quickly called it “linguistic separatism” and a threat to national security (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 126). In 2002, just a year after an official Tatar Latin alphabet was supposed to come into force, the Russian government overrode this decision with an amendment to the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation, fixing the Cyrillic script as the only one Tatars – and other peoples of the RF – are officially allowed to use (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 4; RF State Duma, 2002).

Why is the alphabet so important? The Soviet and Russian government has been using Cyrillic to alienate ethnic groups from their culture and bring them closer to Russia for years (Krouglov, 2021, p. 420). According to Mirovalev, “this deprives some of these groups access to their pre-Soviet literatures, religious and secular texts” (Mirovalev, 2020). And Kamusella claims that the Cyrillic script, not just the Russian language, is associated

with the Russian world (Kamusella, 2022). Thus there was no better way to silence the movement to reclaim Tatar identity at the time than barring Tatars from using other alphabets and assimilating them with Russians in the region. Russians themselves, however, never had a habit of assimilating "into indigenous societies of the independent states or republics", whether in the RF or abroad, which I will elaborate on in the next chapters (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 2). Therefore, although in 1997 Tatar was made a compulsory language to study at school, Russian parents never stopped complaining – and eventually got what they wanted (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 134).

As of 2011, all textbooks in the Republic of Tatarstan were still written in Russian (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 133). Russian was and still remains the language of most subjects at school, such as history and literature, while Tatar is the medium of instruction for classes connected to Tatar culture (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 5). Apart from that, in universities "science and technology are "Russian subjects"", whereas "humanities and agricultural subjects are taught in Tatar", which is a continuation of the old Soviet narrative about Russian being the only "progressive" language fit for science and scholarly work (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 5; Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 134). As a result of teaching Tatar only for the promotion of Tatar culture rather than for using it in everyday life, "only a limited knowledge of Tatar was obtained in schools, despite the fact that it was compulsory" (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 134). And yet, the language was restricted even further after a single comment of President Putin in 2017 (Chapman, 2017).

During the meeting of the Council on Interethnic Relations in Yoshkar-Ola Putin, replying to the comment of a complaining Russian mother, said that "forcing a person to learn a language that is not their native one is just as unacceptable as reducing the level and time of teaching Russian" (Chapman, 2017). Following this statement, he ordered "Russia's prosecutor general to investigate whether students in the republics were being forced to study local languages to the detriment of Russian language tuition", and as the evidence was apparently found, the hours of learning local languages at schools were

immediately shortened (Chapman, 2017). Children in the Republic of Tatarstan used to study 8 hours of Tatar a week, but according to the new system the language is now "studied on a voluntary basis for up to two hours a week and only with written approval from parents" (Chapman, 2017). Meanwhile Tatar parents are complaining that there are "not enough hours of Tatar language study", but to no avail (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 135).

Education is not the only area of life where Russian dominates over Tatar. Tatar is mainly used for family communication and in the cultural sphere, while Russian is still "the prevalent functional language in all spheres of language use in Tatarstan" – a hierarchy that has not changed since the Soviet period (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 4). Owing to Putin's tight grip on media, "there was no longer any twenty-four-hour Tatar radio or television broadcasting" in Tatarstan since the 2000s, and many Tatar journalists were threatened by the Federal Security Bureau to stop publishing or even "mysteriously killed" (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 119). Even Tatar literature, though protected by events such as the mass dictation of works by Tatar writers, is taught in Russian in schools, which hardly seems possible (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 218; Chapman, 2017).

Wigglesworth-Baker, who carried out a survey among 187 students from different Kazan universities, concluded that, while Russian and English are "used as functional languages" in the school environment, Tatar remains a medium for sharing culture and traditions and is mainly used in this sphere (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 6). Only 24% of Russian and 68% of Tatar respondents answered more than half of the questions in the Tatar reading and writing proficiency test correctly, which shows that not all Tatars are fluent in their native language because of the multiple restrictions (Wigglesworth-Baker, 2015, p. 8). Following the changes to the curriculum in 2017 some Tatar activists tried to protest the limited hours of learning Tatar, but the demonstration in Kazan was unsuccessful and "was blocked by local authorities". Since then it became clear: Tatar, one of the most widely-spoken minority languages in Russia and the native language of

the majority of the population in the Republic of Tatarstan, is dominated by Russian despite all efforts to change this stance in the 1990s.

In this section I examined the impact of Russification and Russian linguistic imperialism on the Tatar language and its speakers in the Republic of Tatarstan. I briefly described the language planning background in the region and proceeded to illustrate how language policies are used to smother the Tatar identity and restrict Tatar language, which is now mostly used for family communication and cultural transmission. Even though Tatar is one of the biggest minority languages in the Russian Federation and has the role of the state language of Tatarstan outlined in the constitution, it has been dominated by Russian in the last twenty years, and the situation is aggravated by new amendments and policies, that come from Putin's efforts of "protecting" the Russian language.

3.2. The Chechen Republic

The Chechen Republic is another autonomous region of the Russian Federation situated in Eastern Europe, namely North Caucasus, and the Chechen language "is the largest member of the Northeast Caucasian family of languages" (Chanturiya, 2017). According to Yakhyayeva, today Chechnya is "practically a mono-ethnic region", populated by 95% Chechens and only 1.92% Russians, and yet bilingualism is prevalent here as well (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3363). Just like in most other republics of the RF, both Russian and the titular language, Chechen, are positioned as state languages in the constitution of Chechnya, but Russian remains the most used language in the region, even though most Chechens consider Chechen to be their mother tongue (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3364; Chechen Government, 1992). Naturally, most of the population is bilingual, but according to Buralova and Khalidov, "bilingualism of 70% of the native speakers of a small nation is a signal that it is necessary to take protective measures, since this is the point after which one should expect the loss of a language, one's own culture, one's national characteristics" (Buralova & Khalidov, 2015). Let us look more closely at what is causing language endangerment in the region.

In 2007 the President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov signed the Law on Languages in the Chechen Republic, which was supposed to "preserve and develop the Chechen language" (Chechen Government, 2007). This law allows the citizens of the republic to choose the language of instruction in schools, but it was quickly noted that it changed nothing, as "the curriculum drawn up by the republic's education and science ministry was entirely in Russian" apart from the subjects of Chechen language and literature. Children in Chechnya continued to study in a language foreign to them, despite the fact that they knew it badly and were uncomfortable using it at school (Matsiev, 2007). In fact, the hours allocated to studying the Chechen language and literature have been steadily decreasing since 2002, while the hours dedicated to Russian have increased until in 2019 almost twice as much time was dedicated to the "national" language of the federation (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3366).

Russian is also the dominant language at universities, where the only discipline taught in Chechen – "Chechen language" – is elective and "given 18-36 hours per one semester" (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3367). Due to the fact that without proper knowledge of Russian children cannot start higher education and, consequently, build their careers, "many parents want their children to study in Russian", claimed the director of Chechnya's national library Edilbek Khasmagomadov (Matsiev, 2007). This is detrimental to the development of Chechen, since, in the words of Buralova and Khalidov, the limitation of languages in the educational sphere during the Soviet period "led to their limitation in other areas, i.e. languages lost their positions as the most important determiners for decades ethno-national self-identification, and the threat of real disappearance hung over many" (Buralova & Khalidov, 2015).

With Chechen this is already reflected in the limited functionality of the language in areas other than cultural and family communication. The Chechen language experiences no natural development and exists "only at the colloquial level, in the family and on the streets, but has no place in the educational, scientific, political, economic and other spheres", such as the justice system (Yusupova, 2014, p. 235; Yakhyayeva, 2019, p.

3367). This leads to the loss of fluency in literary Chechen, “obvious semantic and structural transformations, and tendencies to mix speech” (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3367; Yusupova, 2014, p. 235). At this rate in urban areas even families have the tendency to communicate in Russian, since this language “is more accessible and understandable” to the younger generation, and elders who are considered “the bearers of folk traditions, pass on their heritage in written Russian” (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3366; Chanturiya, 2017). What’s even more alarming, many Chechen children start learning Russian even before attending school, from watching television and perusing the Internet, and even kindergartens have become “accustomed to the fact that many parents require teachers to speak Russian with their children” (Yakhyayeva, 2019, p. 3365; Chanturiya, 2017).

Russian is the language of media, television, theater and literature, while only one newspaper exists in the Chechen language (Chanturiya, 2017). The significance of Chechen is celebrated on April 25, the Mother Language Day, when “various public events”, including “a large number of concerts” are held in the republic and it is custom to dress in traditional clothes (Chanturiya, 2017). One day a year dedicated to Chechen is, however, far from enough, especially considering the fact that the language was recognized as “vulnerable” in the third edition of the UNESCO Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger and is in need of “strong state support” (Chanturiya, 2017; UNESCO, 2012).

According to the survey conducted by Yusupova among 300 students of the Chechen State University and Grozny State Technological Petroleum University, only 51.6% of students speak Chechen fluently, and 42.5% don’t consider it necessary to know it on a higher level (Yusupova, 2014, p. 236). Moreover, it seems that in Chechnya, unlike Tatarstan, young people are also experiencing some problems with Russian, as only 49.2% of students turned out to be fluent in their second language (Yusupova, 2014, p. 236). Children who grew up in the aftermath of two major wars and were forced to continue their education in Russian, instead of being bilingual, now know only parts of each language, and resort to mixing the two or using Russian words to refer to certain objects

and concepts (Matsiev, 2007; Yusupova, 2014, p. 236). Philologists advise on increasing the hours spent on Chechen at schools and "teaching in the Chechen language at least in the primary grades", but with Russians fearing "separatism" and "non-Russian nationalism", we have yet to see if any efforts will be made to protect Chechen from dying out (Chanturiya, 2017; Buralova & Khalidov, 2015).

In this section I looked into linguistic imperialism in the Chechen Republic and the impact of Russian-centered language policies on the Chechen language. I examined several different spheres of language use, including education and media, and compared the popularity of Russian and Chechen in these spheres. I also brought attention to unequal bilingualism and the "vulnerable" status of Chechen, which is stagnating because of lack of use and development.

3.3. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or Xinjiang for short, is an autonomous region in the northwest of China, which "constitutes about one-sixth of China's landmass" and is populated by "a number of non-Hans, primarily Turkic peoples" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 2-3). Among them Uyghurs are the largest ethnic group, amounting up to 8.2 million people in 2002, but the region is also home to Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Oyrat Mongols and Han Chinese, though many of the latter were resettled there from Central China (Dwyer, 2005, p. 3). Just like Tatar, the Uyghur language is "part of the Turkic group of Altaic languages, and the Uyghurs are among the oldest Turkic-speaking peoples in Central Asia" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2023). But in the last couple of decades speaking and protecting this language has been seen by the Communist Party of China as something akin to terrorism, and for the sake of assimilating Uyghurs under the collective identity of "the Chinese person" strict language policies have been implemented in the region. Today linguicide is only a part of the genocide of the Uyghur people, many of whom are sent to concentration camps and "re-educated" to become more Chinese. In this section I will

examine language planning in Xinjiang and try to find out why the official language of XUAR is nevertheless being replaced by Mandarin in almost every area of life.

At the heart of language policy implementation in Xinjiang is the CPC's movement towards bilingual education (WUC, 2014, p. 7). At first glance, the bilingual school policy is on the positive end of Chinese language planning, as it allows children in minority regions such as Xinjiang to be educated in their native languages. In reality, however, it is much more complicated. As explained by Minglang Zhou, the project for integrated minority and Chinese education that came into existence in the 2010s involved three major programs: "inland boarding schools, integration of the two school systems, and the transfer from the native language medium of instruction to the combination of Chinese and native-language media or simply Chinese medium" (Zhou, 2019, p. 105-106). Due to factors such as lack of bilingual teachers, inexperienced school management and ethnic tensions, all the programs eventually led to a single conclusion: the focus on "Chinese proficiency among Uyghur youth" and the adaption of the Chinese identity by minority students (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 1; Dwyer, 2005, p. 38).

According to Dwyer, bilingual policies "were designed to help pupils make a rapid and smooth transition from their native language to the dominant language" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 34-35). Even though the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy states that minority nationality schools "shall, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages, and use their languages as the media of instruction", almost no Uyghur textbooks have been developed and the teacher-training program has been primarily focused on Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005, p. 35; PRC Government, 1984). Even classes on Uyghur literature and poetry are now entirely taught in Chinese and have to be monitored by "language police" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 51). In addition, since September 2002 the Xinjiang University no longer offers courses in Uyghur, even though it used to be a bilingual institution for over 50 years (Dwyer, 2005, p. 39-40). This resulted in Uyghur students "falling behind their Han Chinese classmates", and later to the establishment of Mandarin proficiency assessment for all minority educators, who are now "required to

have a high degree of competence in Mandarin Chinese" (Große, 2002, as cited in Dwyer, 2005, p. 40).

The use of Mandarin by university students was studied in detail by Han and Johnson, who conducted a series of interviews with Uyghur students from Jingling University of Technology (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 1). Even though all four interviewees had different backgrounds – some started with minority schools and later went to integrated minority/Chinese and boarding schools outside Xinjiang, while others had mixed or exclusively Chinese education starting with primary school or even kindergarten – all of them had high Mandarin proficiency, especially compared to other Uyghur children (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 7). On the contrary, students who had Mandarin schooling since kindergarten had poor Uyghur literacy skills, and one student reported being "embarrassed that I could not write my name in Uyghur" (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 7). All four students reported that Mandarin was the main means of communication at their university even among Uyghurs themselves (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 8).

Another interesting insight from the interviews pertains to family attitudes towards Mandarin and education in this language. The existence of three different school systems (Chinese, national, and mixed) created "the myth of school choice" between "sustaining their children's ethnic identity" and "integration into Han society", which could give Uyghur youth a chance at better employment and more prestigious careers (Dwyer, 2005, p. 38). As for the parents of the four interviewees, they all eventually decided for predominantly Chinese education for their children, seeing as that would "raise the scientific and cultural level" and give them prestige and status (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 8). For some students, parents were proud that their children would go to boarding schools outside Xinjiang, but other parents were more hesitant (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 8-9). Considering that bilingual education caused Mandarin to enter the sphere of family communication, the parents were worried about their children abandoning the Uyghur identity and forgetting their native language, but since they were attending mixed or predominantly Han schools, it could not be helped (Han & Johnson, 2020, p. 9). Moreover,

anyone who refused to conform to the Chinese Government's alleged bilingual education system would be labeled a "separatist" or a "terrorist" and could be detained (WUC, 2014, p. 9).

Enough has been said about education, but Uyghur is also losing ground to Mandarin in the media. According to Dwyer, "language policy for the media has caused a decline in the number of Uyghur-language domains" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 48). Most Uyghur newspapers are directly translated from their Mandarin versions rather than originally written in Uyghur, and promote the substitution of some Uyghur terms by their Chinese counterparts. TV and radio broadcasting in Uyghur has also been steadily decreasing since the 1990s, and there are more programs available in English, French, Japanese, Russian and German than in local minority languages (Dwyer, 2005, p. 48). Most Xinjiang-based TV-stations broadcast in Mandarin, and Uyghur-language broadcasts were reduced to multilingual ones "with a maximum of 8 hours of Uyghur per day" (Dwyer, 2005, p. 49). At the same time, "cinema and television films are required to be made in the Chinese language", and all publications have to go through censorship before they are released (Dwyer, 2005, p. 49-51). As a result, the Uyghur language is becoming increasingly Sinicized through the media, and loanwords from other languages are often replaced by Chinese ones (Dwyer, 2005, p. 48).

Apart from language stagnation, restrictions on Uyghur in XUAR are causing deaths and protests. While some people are dying because emergency services aren't available in the Uyghur language, others are trying to protect their native language with similar consequences (Hoshur, 2022). The leaders of the Movement for Mother Language Based Education, which was established in 2012 with the aim of creating an Uyghur kindergarten and fighting for linguistic rights, were arrested on August 20, 2013, after almost a whole year of appealing to authorities and holding forums that were more often than not raided by the police. They were accused of "illegally accepting donations", and there were concerns as to the legitimacy of their trial (WUC, 2014, p. 18; p. 34). According to Phillipson, resistance is one of the most important signs of linguistic imperialism, and

if these arrests tell us anything, it is that Uyghurs do not wish to be assimilated and are trying to hold on to their language and culture, even if they risk being sent to internment camps (Phillipson, 2013).

In this section I examined the implementation of CPC's language policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. I explained how the enforcement of Mandarin in the region is impacting Uyghurs and endangering their native language and culture. The Uyghur language is dominated by Mandarin in almost every sphere of language use, causing Uyghurs to fall behind Han Chinese in education and on the career ladder. But activists trying to advocate for their native language end up in prison or in reeducation camps, which makes it difficult to improve the situation. As a result, Uyghur parents resort to sending their children to mixed and Mandarin schools, while fearing for the loss of Uyghur identity and widening generational gaps.

3.4. Tibetan Autonomous Region

The Tibetan Autonomous Region is historic region of China situated in the West of the country and occupying "a vast area of plateaus and mountains in Central Asia", which is populated with 92% Tibetans and only 8% Han Chinese (Shakabpa et al., 2023; De Varennes, 2012, p. 20). Before the 1950s Tibet was "largely isolated from the rest of the world", but with the establishment of the PRC it became part of China, which remains a controversial issue to this day as many Tibetans see this as "an occupation of a foreign power" (Shakabpa et al., 2023). The Tibetan language is part of the Sino-Tibetan language family, and it is protected by the 2002 Decree on the Study, Use, and Development of the Tibetan Language (Britannica, 2023; De Varennes, 2012, p. 19-20; TAR Government, 2002). However, as we can see from the Human Rights Watch report from March 2020, the Decree has not been successful in fighting linguicism, and Tibetan is being "gradually replaced" by Mandarin in education and other spheres (Human Rights Watch, 2020). I will proceed to examine this issue in detail and study the consequences of CPC's language policies in Tibet.

The Tibetan language went through several periods of revival and stagnation after the establishment of the PRC, and the final stage of language policy shift, which took place from 2000 until 2020, saw Mandarin infiltrating Tibetan schools and taking the place of Tibetan as the region's common language (Jia & Qie, 2021, p. 14-15). Though the 2002 Decree was supposed to protect Tibetan speakers from discrimination, it soon became obvious that they were at a huge disadvantage compared to the Han Chinese, as the linguistic inequality greatly impacted the employment sphere (De Varennes, 2012, p. 22). According to De Varennes, government practices "almost exclusively privilege fluency in Mandarin and almost completely disregard the value of Tibetan as a language for work and employment in the region's civil service" (De Varennes, 2012, p. 22). Since 2005 the exam required for working in the public sector has been held in Mandarin, Tibetans aren't fluent in it are barred from a number of job opportunities and often paid less than Han Chinese cadres (De Varennes, 2012, p. 22).

Tibetans are also steadily losing ground to Han Chinese in "the total government staff and workers category", employment in state-owned projects and initiatives and commerce (De Varennes, 2012, p. 20-21). As career and economic opportunities are now directly dependent on Mandarin fluency, many parents now send their children to exclusively Mandarin schools, prompted also by the fact that "state authorities have systematically been acting to reduce the overall number of schools that teach Tibetan throughout the country" (De Varennes, 2012, p. 24). Overall, since "the entrance exam for universities is only in Mandarin" and universities in TAR are now almost exclusively using the national standard as the medium of instruction, it is hard to deny De Varennes' claim that Tibetan is becoming "merely a symbolic language in public education", sometimes even used to emphasize the difference between Tibetans and Han Chinese and "convey a sense of inferiority" (De Varennes, 2012, p. 20- 24).

This pertains to all levels of schooling. According to Zhou, since the establishment of the PRC Tibet never had an exclusively Tibetan school system, so there was no talk of merging minority and Han schools. While elementary and middle schools in the region

had Tibetan education, high schools taught in Mandarin only, and in urban schools in general, Tibetan posed as a single subject, while Mandarin was the overall language of instruction (Zhou, 2019, p. 113). Therefore, "the integration efforts have been mostly directed at the inland boarding school program and the transition for the native language to Chinese as the medium of instruction" (Zhou, 2019, p. 113), even though mixed classes were still created to assimilate children from Tibetan communities into the Chinese system. For example, the first inland boarding school for Tibetans was created in 1984 with the goal of "improving its students' Chinese proficiency and academic readiness"; the language of instruction was Mandarin and from 1995 it enrolled Han students as well (Zhou, 2019, p. 113). Between 1985 and 2015, the school enrolled close to 110 thousand Tibetan students, and by 2012, there were 31 inland Tibetan middle and high schools, as well as 59 Chinese high schools that started accepting and integrating minority graduates from Tibet (Zhou, 2019, p. 113-114).

As for schools inside the Tibetan Autonomous Region, following the 2001 Law on Standard Written and Spoken Chinese Language, Tibetan provinces started to "use administrative measures to speed up the integration" (Zhou, 2019, p. 114). Guides which "required that Chinese be offered from the first grade on in minority schools" were published, plans to transition to Mandarin as the main language were drafted, and workshops for teachers were held. And starting with 2009, schools and education departments in TAR began to shift to a model of education which pushed Tibetan to the margins as the second language (Jia & Qie, 2021, p. 14-15). According to the Human Rights Watch report, the methods CPC used to establish Mandarin as the main language of instruction at schools were: transferring Chinese teachers to Tibet and sending Tibetan teachers on special trainings, as they are required to be fluent in Mandarin; creating mixed classes with minority and Han students, just like what we saw happen in Xinjiang; "closing rural schools and consolidating them in nearby towns where students have to board, cutting them off from their families and from Tibetan-speaking environments" (ICT, 2020).

Apart from middle and high schools, even preschools became a Mandarin-speaking environment: according to Jia, "since the implementation of the State Preschool Policy in 2013, every village child aged 4 to 6 has had to attend preschool in a township school that does not employ Tibetan language teachers" (Jia & Qie, 2021, p. 17). And Tibetan-language classes in Buddhist monasteries are being banned as well, leaving young Tibetans no alternative way of studying their native language (Gelek, 2019; Office of International Religious Freedom, 2022). As a result, the Han Chinese children in the region, who study in their native language, graduate drop out of school much less and graduate universities three times as often as Tibetans (De Varennes, 2012, p. 23). It has been proven that "an inadequate mastery of the medium of instruction" worsens cognitive development in children and makes it harder for them to adjust to the school environment (Batibo, 2005, p.56). This also leads to a lower literacy rate among Tibetans (De Varennes, 2012, p. 23). On the other hand, Tibetan primary to high school students observed over 2017-2019 were found to barely be able to speak their own language outside the most basic conversations (Jia & Qie, 2021, p. 15). To sum up, there is a dichotomy between Tibetans having poor Mandarin skills, who have it harder at school and at work but are also unable to use Tibetan for employment, and Tibetans who become fluent in Mandarin but lose touch with their native language and identity.

There is little to like in the current state of affairs, and Tibetans are also showing resistance to Sinicization. The shift to Mandarin in education was so rapid that, in October of 2010, thousands of students from different towns and universities "took to the streets and protested the local action to implement the provincial plan for the rapid and extensive transition" (Zhou, 2019, p. 115; De Varennes, 2012, p. 24-33). But Tibetans in the government sector "are afraid of emphasising Tibetan language and cultural concerns as they worry that in doing so they may their position or chances for promotion" (Jia & Qie, 2021, p. 17-18). Supporting the revitalization of Tibetan is dangerous, and the most famous case of a Tibetan language activist only proves the point. Tibetan businessman Tashi Wangchuk who "appeared in a New York Times video requesting Chinese officials

to support Tibetan language education" was later "arrested, likely tortured and given a five-year prison sentence" – all on charges of separatism (ICT, 2020).

In this section I examined the impact of Chinese linguistic imperialism on the population of the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the PRC. I outlined the most significant periods of language regulation and the changes they brought to the speakers of Tibetan. I raised the issue of the complete ban of Tibetan education institutions and the domination of Mandarin in the employment sphere, which makes it almost impossible for Tibetans to build a career in the government sector. I also shone some light on protests against the complete transition to Mandarin and their unfortunate lack of results.

* * *

In terms of internal linguistic imperialism, Russia and China have similar methods of language planning and language policy implementation. Both states largely focus on the education sphere and most official policies regulate the hours of learning the state and minority languages. In China there is a wide system of mixed schools which are bilingual at first glance, but actually use Mandarin as the language of instruction for most subjects and often don't require Han Chinese students to learn minority languages. In Russia the 2017 amendment to the Law on Education made titular languages in republican schools a formality and reduced hours dedicated to their subjects. Speakers of state languages are also privileged in the employment sphere, which is why parents often don't have a choice but to make their children learn Russian or Mandarin from a very young age, even if they themselves fear loss of culture and identity. Apart from that, both the RF and the PRC heavily restrict minority languages in the media, and as a result, minority languages are stagnating, mixing with the state language and slowly becoming endangered.

4. Linguistic imperialism as a part of Russia's and China's foreign policy

4.1. *Russkiy mir* and Putin's claim to Russian-speaking regions

I have already discovered the ways in which the Russian government uses language as a chain that ties hundreds of different ethnicities together and assimilates them into the Russian identity. But language can also become a weapon aimed across the border, either to lay ground for territorial expansion or to spread Russian narratives to different states where Russian diasporas are present. To examine the uses of linguistic imperialism on the international arena it is best to start with Russian foreign policy and see the official guidelines outlined by the president of the RF for "expanding and strengthening" the Russian language.

The official foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation was approved in 2008 by then-president Dmitriy Medvedev, and in its text language is mentioned four times starting with the general provisions (President of the RF, 2008). The fact that language appears so early on in this document (namely on page 2) and that it is embedded in the central principles of Russian foreign policy tells us that this issue is of great importance to the Russian government. According to the context in which language is mentioned, I can outline four linguistic foreign policy goals. Firstly, spreading the Russian language abroad to contribute to "cultural and civilizational diversity of the contemporary world", which cements the role of Russian as a national and even international treasure. Secondly, protecting the rights of the Russian diaspora by "expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture", which means that Russian citizens living abroad are entitled to a certain Russian-speaking space. Thirdly, promoting the learning of Russian as "an instrument of inter-ethnic communication", which shows that they see it as a global language. And finally, the fourth and final goal is specific to the Baltic region and Russia's relations with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as states with a large Russian-speaking population whose rights should be protected "in accordance with the principles and norms of European and international law".

The fact that the Russian-speaking community of the Baltic region was awarded a separate mention in the document is very telling. Since the collapse of the USSR these three states have been rapidly moving away from Russia in the effort to break all links with their Soviet past and form their own national identities, and Russia didn't like it one bit. While states like Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan still had an astonishing percentage of the population speaking Russian, broadcast Russian media and were generally emerged in Russian context, the Baltic states drafted laws to give their Russian citizens a special status that was lesser than citizenship and expand the network of national-language schools. This caused major protests not only of the Russian diaspora, but of Russian officials, and in 2018 Russia's OSCE envoy Alexander Lukashevich called Latvia's plans to have 80% of subjects in minority schools taught in Latvian "discriminatory policy with the goal of forced assimilation of the Russian-speaking population" (Euractiv, 2018).

The truth is, however, that the Russian-speaking population is not so easy to assimilate. Whether they know what is written in the foreign policy concept and try to exist in their own little Russian-speaking space, or they are just used to speaking the dominant language at home, we often see examples in the media of Russians being unable to assimilate into other communities and demanding people around them to speak Russian. Valery Tishkov, Russian ethnologist and Minister for Nationalities at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes that even Russians who have emigrated in the middle of the 20th century still "preserve ties of culture and identity with Russia, many of whom in fact have Russian citizenship and consider themselves first and foremost Russian citizens, even if they live outside of Russia" (Tishkov, 2008, p. 1; p. 21). Both such immigrants and their children remain part of the Russian diaspora long after and preserve some forms of "cultural behavior" which often constitute the "Russian World".

The notion of *Russkiy mir* dates back to the Middle Ages, when it was used as a collective name for Slavic peoples united under the Orthodox church. However, the concept went through major changes throughout the centuries, and by the end of the 20th century it was rethought and redefined by "a quasi-philosophical circle of Russian

methodologists" (Polegkyi & Bushuyev, 2022). The new Russian World was heavily centered around Russian language and aimed at uniting "the islands of Russian-speaking population abroad" with the help of Russian culture. In the 2000s this idea was picked up by Putin, who at the time was already trying to move away from European partnership and democratic changes, and since then the Russian World became "the starting point" for his new doctrine (Polegkyi & Bushuyev, 2022). Reflecting the foreign policy concept, Putin's *Russkiy mir* recognized any Russian-speaking citizens of other states as "Russian compatriots abroad" and pledged to protect their rights (Polegkyi & Bushuyev, 2022).

On the surface this sounds like a good cause, but for the Russian government this noble goal became an excuse to interfere with the affairs of other independent states. In 2007 Putin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation to popularize Russian culture and spread Russian-learning programs abroad, and according to Tomasz Kamusella, "in the post-Soviet countries and states with considerable numbers of Russian-speakers (such as Israel or Germany), the foundation strives to secure an official status for the Russian language, even to the de facto replacement of such a state's own national language, which is the case of Belarusian in today's Belarus" (Kamusella, 2022). A long history of colonization and Russification now allows Kremlin to use Russian language as an identity-marker, and by claiming that "all speakers of Russian are members of the Russian nation *only*" Putin is also trying to claim the territories where Russian is spoken and the loyalty of its speakers (Kamusella, 2022). Ironic though it is considering the second definition of *Russkiy mir* as "the absence of enmity", there is a strong connection between the Russian World and the invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and the current full-scale invasion is often justified in the Russian media by protecting Russian-speaking communities in Ukraine.

Another method of protecting the rights of Russian-speaking communities is through Kremlin-funded non-governmental organizations. In the Baltic states there are at least 40 of them, and they receive millions of euros yearly from the Fund for the Support and Protection of Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Jolkina & Ostapchuk, 2015). This

fund was created by the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2012, and the fact that it exists already speaks volumes about Kremlin's involvement in the Baltics. The Latvian Human Rights Committee alone received more than 200,000 euros from Moscow between 2012 and 2014 (Jolkina & Ostapchuk, 2015). This NGO was established in 1992 and focuses on "the discrimination of people who speak Russian", which usually means people who have the non-citizen status in Latvia and Estonia and aren't allowed to vote just because they refuse to learn the official language of the country they live in. Not only do Russian-funded NGOs see this as a human rights abuse, but they're also trying to fight "fascism" and "national socialism" in the Baltics by expanding the area of use of the Russian language (Jolkina & Ostapchuk, 2015).

Latvian police already suspects the Latvian Human Rights Committee of distributing "biased and distorted information on domestic procedures in Latvia" (Jolkina & Ostapchuk, 2015). But the members of the NGO deny their connections to Moscow while being regular guests on propagandist Russian channels like Alexander Gaponenko (Jolkina & Ostapchuk, 2015). He is a member of the Latvian Non-Citizens' Congress, and in 2015 he stated in a Facebook post that "US tanks stationed in the country for joint military maneuvers were there to keep the Russian population in Latvia under control and to protect Nazi marches", which caused the police to start proceedings against him for inciting ethnic hatred (Jolkina & Ostapchuk, 2015). While people like Gaponenko work on "protecting" Russian-speakers' rights, the Russkiy Mir foundation does not get tired of accusing the Latvian government of "Russophobia", even though the state of Russian in the Baltics is arguably much better than the state of hundreds of endangered languages in Russia itself. And the same thing is happening in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and other neighboring states with large Russian-speaking communities: any attempt at protecting the native language is seen as a threat to Russian compatriots and to Russia itself.

In this section I examined the role of linguistic imperialism in Russian foreign policy. I outlined the main language goals stated in the official foreign policy concept and

studied the ways in which Kremlin is trying to spread the Russian language and culture abroad, sometimes to the detriment of the official languages in several states, while also trying to make Russian-speaking diasporas untouchable and make Russian available wherever possible. I brought attention to the Russkiy Mir Foundation and the Fund for the Support and Protection of Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, and shed some light on the hypocrisy of the Russian propaganda when it comes to native languages.

4.2. The Greater China and the PRC's wish to unite the former empire

Unlike Russia, China doesn't have specific language goals singled out for their official foreign policy, but the 2012 Language Reform and Development Plan does mention the importance of spreading Mandarin to overseas territories that used to be part of the former empire as well as the world at large (PRC Ministry of Education, 2012). In the first chapter of the plan "promoting and popularizing the national standard spoken and written language" is pinned down as one of the guiding principles of language reform and is said to be vital for "promoting economic and social development, and enhancing the cohesion of the Chinese nation and cultural soft power" (PRC Ministry of Education, 2012). Further on there is a section on "disseminating excellent Chinese culture" abroad, which is as close as the document comes to outlining linguistic foreign policy goals.

There are three important points in Section 6 of the second chapter that I have to note down. Firstly, there is a separate paragraph on "expanding and deepening exchanges with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan regions", the gist of which comes down to promoting the use of Mandarin in these specific regions. Secondly, the Commission outlines the goal to "promote international Chinese language education" and "enhance the international influence of Chinese culture" by controlling the teaching standard and spreading the "Chinese Pinyin Scheme" to overseas education facilities. And thirdly, Mandarin is supposed to become a global language and "the official working language of relevant international organizations", and it should help "deepen language and cultural exchanges

and cooperation with countries and regions around the world". Let us examine these three goals one by one and see how they are connected to the PRC's linguistic imperialism.

To understand why deepening linguistic connections with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan is of specific importance to China, we need to discuss the concept of Greater China. In some ways similar to the Russian World, the Greater China stems from the "traditional distinction between China Proper and Outer China", where China Proper is the center of the empire and the Outer China is the periphery, and is a conceptual base for the reunification of all these territories under one rule (Zhang, 2005, p. 65). According to Chinese political scientist and professor of international relations Wei-Wei Zhang, the Greater China entails three different meanings: economic cooperation between the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, cultural exchange, and the strife for political reunification (Zhang, 2005, p. 66). These three dimensions are tightly intertwined, with economy serving as the base for culture and politics, but culture in its own turn forming narratives and identities that "enriched the idea of Chinese-based economic integration and an eventual political reunification" (Zhang, 2005, p. 72). And in the cultural dimension language plays the most significant part.

An important thing to know about overseas Chinese territories is that their population is multilingual, and most of it speaks other varieties of Chinese and dialects such as Cantonese, Hokkien and Taiwanese, as well as other languages such as English and Portuguese – remnants of the islands' buoyant history, colonial past and multinational present (Zhou, 2019, p. 250). Of course, this is also the case on the mainland, but unlike the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan haven't gone through decades of rigorous corpus and status planning and are still not fully or not at all under the PRC's jurisdiction (Zhou, 2019, p. 210-211). This amounts to the fact that most of the residents of Outer China still do not speak Mandarin and cannot fall under the influence of the central government because they simply wouldn't understand the propaganda it is disseminating. This is a problem the CCP needs to tackle if they want Greater China to come true – and they are definitely putting in the effort.

According to Minglang Zhou, Beijing is using "language planning beyond sovereignty", also known as transjurisdictional language planning, to influence language policy changes in overseas regions in favor of Mandarin (Zhou, 2019, p. 210-211). Even though the CCP doesn't have full control, they can "manage input by providing textbooks, multimedia, and instructors, while using Chinese proficiency test, known as HSK (*Hanyu shuiping kaoshi*), to discourage nonstandard varieties and reward the standard variety", and encourage a more positive identity towards "Chineseness" (Zhou, 2019, p. 212-213). The results of their sway can already be seen in Hong Kong, where Cantonese was declared to be a mere dialect by the Education Bureau and where hundreds of schools have been transferring to Putonghua as the medium of instruction since the 2010s (Liu, BBC, 2017; Chan, HKFP, 2015). As Cantonese played an important role for Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement and is generally associated with a separate Hongkongese identity, it is unsurprising that Beijing is trying to interfere, but when they have to bribe schools to make the switch to Mandarin and are constantly facing resistance, it looks very much like expansionist linguistic imperialism (Bacon, 2020, p. 7; Liu, BBC, 2017).

However, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are not the only places where China is trying to promote Putonghua. With over 45 million ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia, Europe, America and elsewhere in the world, it is as unlikely that the CCP could overlook their foreign "compatriots" as if Kremlin did (Zhou, 2019, p. 265). Moreover, as we remember from the Language Development Plan, the goal was to popularize Mandarin and make it not only a language of international communication, but an official language of international organizations (PRC Ministry of Education, 2012). Beijing's most successful method for reaching this goal so far has been the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in over 130 countries of the world (Zhou, 2019, p. 210).

Confucius Institute is a project of the Ministry of Education of the PRC that aims at making Mandarin classes available around the world. The institutes are state-funded and strategically placed in states that China considers important partners or wants to

influence, where they are “embedded in foreign universities and other institutions” (Zhou, 2019, p. 210; Lulu, 2022, p. 1). Similarly, Confucius Classrooms are “an extension of the Confucius Institute program”, but they are based in schools rather than universities (Confucius Institute for Ireland). In the first 14 years of operation, Beijing managed to establish “525 CIs and 1113 CCs in 138 countries and regions on five continents”, which is more than the British Council achieved in over 80 years of work (Zhou, 2019, p. 210). The incredibly fast pace of development, the inclusion of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in Chinese five-year plans and the massive funds allocated towards their establishment every year (around 34 billion dollars by 2018) shows just how important this project is for the CCP (Zhou, 2019, p. 210; PRC Ministry of Education, 2018). And no wonder, because not only do CIs continuously facilitate the spread of the Putonghua standard, but they also let the Party control how their language is taught and disseminate propaganda in their most strategically important regions (Zhou, 2019, p. 210, p. 214; Lulu, 2022, p. 4).

According to Zhou, when relations between China and the West were tense in the 1970s and 80s, “the teaching of Chinese as a foreign language (CFL) used to face the question of which standard to follow”: Putonghua and Pinyin, the standard of the PRC, or Guoyu and Zhuyin, the standard of Taiwan (Zhou, 2019, p. 209). At the time ethnic Chinese in Europe and America were largely multilingual, and a lot more people spoke varieties of Chinese and dialects than Mandarin, because they emigrated before language reforms came into full swing (Zhou, 2019, p. 267). But after the improvement of trade and political relations between the PRC and the US teaching methods started to shift, and Mandarin became the overarching standard for both CFL and resinicization classes in the 21st century (Zhou, 2019, p. 209; p. 266). By 2009 older Chinese immigrants had trouble communicating with youth in Chinatown, but resinicization meant not only learning Putonghua, but also “ethnic, cultural, and even political identification” with the PRC – and this is where the power of linguistic imperialism lies (Zhou, 2019, p. 266). As China went through industrialization in the 1990s and became a new world power, it was

Mandarin, not Cantonese, Hokkien or Guoyu, that became associated with career opportunities, and it was Mandarin that helped form a positive attitude towards China (Zhou, 2019, p. 215). But this is the topic for the next chapter.

So, to summarize, on the scale of foreign policy, Russian and Chinese linguistic imperialism has both similarities and differences. Both states have similar goals of popularizing their national language abroad, making it a language of international communication and spreading it to specific regions of interest. Also the RF and the PRC put a lot of money into organizations that teach Russian and Mandarin abroad, but China arguably had a lot more success with Confucius Institutes that now exist in 138 countries compared to 40 where Russkiy Mir's Russian centers popped up. In addition, the imperialist concepts of the Russian World and the Greater China are somewhat comparable, although *Russkiy mir* has a much bigger focus on language and is personally promoted by Putin.

* * *

Overall, I can conclude that Russian expansionist language policies are a lot more intense, since Kremlin takes great pain to spread propaganda and pours money into organizations that protect the rights of Russian speakers on the spot. For now the CPC is mostly focused on making Mandarin the standard Chinese language not only locally, but globally, and on growing loyalty to China on the basis of language learning for economic and political gain. It can't be said that Beijing is not taking language seriously, but as Russia's identity politics are rooted in decades of colonial influence in the Soviet Union, they are a lot further ahead at the moment and do a lot more than just teach Russian abroad.

5. The outcome of Chinese and Russian linguistic imperialism and the responses of democratic states towards it

5.1. The "great" Russian language: A part of successful branding and a weapon of expansionism

Today Russian is recognized as "an important language of global communication", not least because it is one of the official languages of the United Nations (Kamusella, 2022). According to historian of science Elena Aronova, after World War II "the status of an official language of the U.N. was a proxy for the country's standing on the world stage among the architects of the postwar world order", and since Russia wanted to take part in creating the new world order and to make the West abide by it, it became one of the states that contested the first choice of languages for the UN and sent a special delegation to advocate for putting the Russian language on par with English and French (Aronova, 2017, p. 643, p. 647; Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, p. 359). After Russian became globally recognized, it enabled Kremlin to use it for agenda-setting, propaganda and influencing the perception of Russia abroad (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, p. 355). Language became the basis for RF's soft power in the 2000s and its impact after twenty years is undeniable.

According to Tomasz Kamusella, "the perception of Russian language and culture [in the West] largely follows wishes of the Kremlin's propaganda and the ideology of the Russian world" (Kamusella, 2022). No one questions the fact that Moscow has "the exclusive ownership of the Russian language", and Russian literature is admired at the same time as imperialist narratives in it are overlooked (Kamusella, 2022). The West completely buys Kremlin's branding of the "great Russian language and culture" and systematically consumes them, not realizing how much lies and propaganda there is inside classical literature and other cultural media. For example, writers like Tolstoy and Pushkin in their most famous works "promoted the then ongoing colonial expansion of the Russian Empire", used racial slurs commonly given in the Russian language to almost every ethnic group in and around Russia and described main characters that massacred other peoples

just for fun (Kamusella, 2022). But since the Soviet Union has been strictly controlling the publishing of the literary works of colonized nations and prevented many of them from being seen by the world, the West didn't have any other perspectives to read from than the colonizer (Kamusella, 2022).

Another impact of linguistic imperialism concerns the study of Slavic languages and cultures in global universities. According to Kamusella, "attention is almost exclusively paid to Russian language and literature", which is directly caused by Russian imperialist language policies and branding (Kamusella, 2022). After decades of prohibitions of titular languages of the USSR and even more active promotions of Russian "the belief is rife that Ukrainian with 40 million speakers, or Uzbek with 35 million speakers are 'small languages'" and their literatures are not worthy of attention (Kamusella, 2022). Students of Slavic departments in the best universities of the UK and the US as well as people attending Russian Centers of the Russkiy Mir Foundation in over 50 different countries of the world continue to learn Russian with the belief that it is the only language that can open the "gate to the Slavic world" (Kamusella, 2022). And the more people speak Russian, the wider the Russian world becomes.

According to French historian and political scientist Anne de Tinguy, Russian-speaking communities abroad are "a source of political capital for Russia" (De Tinguy, 2005, as cited in Hofmann, 2005). Not only do "Russian-speakers help to demonstrate that Russia matters in the world", but they also make Russia's statehood more sustainable (De Tinguy, 2005, as cited in Hofmann, 2005; Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015, p. 355). As discussed in the previous chapter, Kremlin considers every Russian-speaking person in the world a citizen of the Russian Federation even if they live abroad, and as long as these people exist so does Russia, because little islands of the Russian World are out there, "building bridges" between the RF and other states. How strong these bridges are is questionable, but their power is enough to make the West blind to Russian imperialism on a larger scale.

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022, Ukrainian diplomats and civil society called for blocking Russian cultural exports and "cancelling" Russian art. Among all other efforts of outreaching to Western societies and weakening Russia, this one was arguably the most contested. People in Europe and America denied the connections between Russian art and "Putin's war", despite the clear examples of glorifying war and imperialism throughout the whole history of existence of said art, and despite how deeply Russian culture and soft power are intertwined with hard power. If the West failed to notice how the Kremlin has been "weaponizing" language since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, if not since the invasion of Georgia in 2008, then Russian narratives are clearly working and the language branding is already affecting the West's ability to think critically, which in turn is making it harder for Ukraine to ask for help because many just don't understand what we really need help from. The West fears Putin and his nuclear weapons, instead of fearing the Russian world and its cultural ones.

For now language rights violations in Russia remain largely unnoticed or at least unaddressed by the international community. If you try searching the Internet for "Russian language rights violations", most of the results come up with Russian propaganda, with headlines proclaiming that "New Language Recuirement Raises Concerns in *Ukraine*", "New law stokes *Ukraine* language tensions", "Rights of the Russian-speaking people are violated in the *Baltic states* and *Ukraine*" and so on. It is telling that most international media would rather bring up the non-existent issue of Russian speakers being discriminated abroad – the main narrative of Kremlin and the Russian world – than give voices to thousands of speakers of endangered and dying languages in Russia proper.

Even as more and more people in Ukraine are reclaiming their identity and choosing to speak Ukrainian, there are still over 30% of people speaking Russian and other minority languages in the country (Ilko Kucheriv DIF, 2023). Meanwhile in Russia, where a lot more ethnicities and languages historically exist, over 85% speak Russian and 70% of minorities experience "linguistic russification" (Badmatsyrenova & Elivanova, 2006, p. 216). And yet, the West focuses its attention on states that are battling century-long

linguistic imperialism rather than the political heir of the empire that is still using said linguistic imperialism both on its own territory and abroad. What else can it mean other than this: Russian linguistic imperialism is working.

In its strategy Kremlin has effectively grasped one of the Wests main values, human rights, and used it for its own purposes. While proclaiming from every possible platform that language rights of Russians have been violated in various post-communist states, Moscow has been hiding their own crimes behind a public image of a beautiful multicultural Russia that protects its citizens. Even still, as the West is slowly finding out about the real Russian world through "denazification" efforts in Ukraine, where Russian soldiers take great pains to change street signs, burn Ukrainian books and destroy museums and archives, "in the Western mass media and capitals voices can be heard that what journalists report from Ukraine under the relentless Russian onslaught should not be identified with Russian language and culture" (Kamusella, 2022). This shows the real power of Russian language branding, and how the so-called "greatness" makes millions of people blind to linguistic imperialism.

In this section I examined the outcomes of the long-term use of linguistic imperialism by Russia. So far linguistic imperialism helped to pin down Russian as a language of international importance and became important for spreading Russian culture and propaganda abroad. As a result of the long historical process of dominating over other languages, Moscow was able to spread their own imperialist narratives and dominate the sphere of Slavic languages and cultures in foreign universities and institutions. However, Russian influence has been so great that even after the full-scale invasion in Ukraine, Western leaders still fail to accept the monumental scale of Russian linguistic imperialism, which goes hand-in-hand with the hypocricy of "protecting" the undermined Russian speakers. In Kamusella's words, "the Kremlin's fixation on such monumental feats of language engineering as its main instrument for furthering the goals of Russian neo-imperialism has evaded the West's scrutiny" (Kamusella, 2022).

5.2. Mandarin as the new international language and reaction to language right violations

According to Zhou, Odinye and Ramzy, Mandarin has already begun to "challenge the existing global language order" by becoming a global language that might soon compete with English (Zhou, 2019, p. 209; Ramzy, 2006; Odinye, 2015, p. 3). By 2021 there were already over 200 million people around the globe who had learned Chinese and another 25 million that were learning it (George, Language Magazine, 2021). As we saw previously, Beijing allocated huge funds to the promotion of Chinese through Confucius Institutes, "taking it as a way to develop soft image abroad and to garner national strength" (Odinye, 2015, p. 2). However you put it, learning Mandarin has never been only about language. On the one hand, the major motivation for foreigners to learn Putonghua stems from the financial opportunities, since China is a rising global power and one of the top economies in the world. On the other hand, by managing curriculums and issuing special guidelines for teaching Chinese as a foreign language, the CPC "is trying to sway Chinese learners' and their communities' affinity with the Chinese language, culture, people, and state" (Zhou, 2019, p. 213). This way they can shape the image of the PRC abroad and influence affinity with China (Zhou, 2019, p. 213).

Apart from Mandarin classes, the CPC is also working promoting language through soft power sources, such as music, TV and entertainment. In recent years the world has seen a rise in popularity of Chinese dramas, anime, video games, music and other forms of content. Alongside traditional culture – Confucianism, literature, art, traditional medicine – Beijing is globalizing the production of modern forms of art and entertainment which are heavily controlled by censorship and often carry propagandist messages. But for young people abroad it is content like this that encourages them to learn Mandarin, travel to China and contribute to Chinese economy in different ways. This is another goal of the CPC: according to Zhou, China wants to have not only influence, but "technology, science, and talent", and via linguistic outreach they have been recruiting cadres from overseas for decades (Zhou, 2019, p. 271). This has had a huge impact on ethnic Chinese

communities in Europe and America, as talented scholars and scientists of Chinese origin gave up grants and privileges just to offer their allegiance to China (Zhou, 2019, p. 271).

Interestingly enough, this is not the only negative impact on overseas Chinese communities. The attempted resinicization of ethnic Chinese in South-East Asia in the 20th century led to "major ethnic genocides and cleansings" in Indonesia, Khmer and Vietnam, at the same time as Beijing stopped recognizing double citizenship (Zhou, 2019, p. 270). The communist party is not afraid to use their overseas brethren to further national interest and promote Chinese culture, even though Chinese communities have been victimized as a result of this practice in the past. Zhou is positive that "the PRC is ready to use or sacrifice local ethnic communities" for "national security", and unfortunately, this is not the only plain where Beijing's linguistic imperialism caused major human rights violations and brought struggles for both Han and ethnic minorities (Zhou, 2019, p. 270).

Language rights violations caused by the CPC's language policies in different regions have already been noticed by China's most important democratic partners, such as the US and the EU. Content analysis showed that, even though the West considers Xinjiang detention camps, religious freedom and freedom of speech the most important human rights issues in China and mention them the most often, they still see language as an integral part of basic human rights, especially when it comes to ethnic minorities and freedom of expression. This is evidenced by documents such as the US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in China, where various linguistic rights infringements have been recorded every year since 1998, and the European External Action Service reports on human rights and democracy (US Department of State, 2022; EEAS, 2020). Apart from that, EU member states have been trying to push the CPC to respect the obligations that they have signed up to and target people responsible for major violations with sanctions, like they have done in March 2021 (Taylor, 2022, p. 374; Emmott, Reuters, 2021).

Representatives of the US and different European states initiated Human Rights Dialogues, formed coalitions, and advocated for the release of language rights activists

like Tashi Wangchuk and Abduweli Ayup (US Department of State, 2022; Roth, HRW, 2022; EEAS, 2019). Additionally, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Advisor to the US Permanent Mission to the United Nations Linda Lum, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell, President of the European Council Charles Michel and other Western officials have issued statements, mentioning their concern over restrictions on the use minority languages and other minority human rights issues (Blinken, 2022; Lum, 2019; Borrell, 2019; EEAS, 2020). But no matter what, PRC's response remains the same: the US has apparently no right to raise China's "internal issues", especially if, from China's point of view, they are spewing falsehoods that need to be debunked (Embassy of the PRC in the USA, 2022).

For now the back-and-forth between China and the West is completely counterproductive, but human rights issues show misaligned values and are becoming an obstacle in Sino-American and Sino-European relations (EEAS, 2020). Especially after the news of Uyghur genocide and massive protests in Hong Kong caught media attention worldwide, human rights are the first thing Americans associate with China, and according to Pew Research Center, 70% of American citizens are in favor of promoting human rights in China, even if it harms economic relations (Silver, Devlin & Huang, 2021). It is true that the West is more likely to look at civil and minority rights in general, but as linguistic imperialism starts causing major problems in particular regions, like Inner Mongolia in 2020, language rights violations become the limelight of attention (EU Annual Report, 2020, p. 193). As Chinese linguistic imperialism is becoming noticed, its negative effect on PRC's relations with the West is also becoming obvious.

In this section I looked into the outcomes of Chinese linguistic imperialism and responses towards it. Through language planning and creating institutions for spreading Mandarin abroad, the PRC was able to globalize their official language and make it appealing for millions of learners around the world who seek employment in China or are interested in Chinese culture. However, unlike Russia, the West not only saw through Beijing's attempts to spread propaganda via Mandarin, but went on to condemn language

rights violations happening inside the country to minority groups such as Uyghurs, Mongolians and Tibetans. Official reports on human rights issues in both the US and the EU show that this issue has been noted for years, and statements made by state officials, as well as joint statements show the West's determination to help with human rights issues in the PRC. Even though linguistic imperialism remains mostly in shadows, language rights as part of basic human rights are now an undeniable factor in China's relations with its democratic partners.

* * *

According to Kwan, "Western countries for decades "mishandled, misunderstood or simply ignored" the authoritarian challenge to the international order, often because it was pursuing stronger economic ties with the same governments they now see as systemic rivals" (Kwan, 2021, as cited in Oud, 2022). For this same reason, the West chose to remain blissfully unaware of Russian and Chinese linguistic imperialism, especially considering that language is not often taken into account on the international scale. Even though the Russian invasion of Ukraine was supposed to finally make the West realize the danger of authoritarian regimes and the importance of imbedding human rights in international relations, the issue of language is more often omitted or misunderstood than seen as an example of hundred-year-old linguistic imperialism (Oud, 2022). The same goes for China and the complicated system of local languages and dialects, which are easier to dismiss in favor of Mandarin than to understand in terms of cultural treasures and a human right to communicate in one's native language. Moreover, as both states go out of their way to market their languages and cultures as something excellent and exemplary, it is easy for the West to miss the propagandist narratives embedded in them and continue arguing that language and culture are beyond politics and war. But as evidence shows, the RF and the PRC are exactly the right to states to look at if you want proof that language is in the center of all that and can be easily manipulated and used as a weapon.

Conclusion

This paper examined the use of linguistic imperialism by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China for control within their states and influence abroad.

The combination of Alexander Wendt's social constructivism, Robert Phillipson's concept of linguistic imperialism and sociolinguistics enabled me to study how language overlaps with identity both on the local and international levels, and how this connection is manipulated by authoritarian states for economic gain and propaganda. Using case study and content analysis under the scope of a comparative approach, I examined Russian and Chinese linguistic imperialism in 2005-2022 to find out how this process works on two levels: state and international.

To understand the roots of linguistic imperialism, it was important to look into the history of language planning in Russia, as well as former USSR, and China. Although the process started a few decades earlier for the USSR, later inspiring Mao Zedong and his language commission in their work on language standardization and dialect eradication, there were a lot of similarities between the two states. The first step was corpus planning, which helped the government control how the official language looked and sounded, but it was eventually status planning that led to the domination of Russian and Mandarin in their respectful areas. The choice of Mandarin as the national language of the PRC and Stalin's push for Russification in the Soviet Union were followed by major restrictions on titular languages, local dialects and ethnic minority groups.

Some of the languages in Russia and China have faced decades of stagnation and, further limited by continuous language policies of the 21st century, have never been able to become widely spoken or independent again. As regional language policies became a method of upholding power over the diverse population with multiple group identities, both Kremlin and the CCP continued to spread and "protect" their official languages in regions such as Tatarstan, Chechnya, Xinjiang and Tibet. After examining the implementation of language policies in these four regions, I found a major tendency for shifts towards Russian and Mandarin education, media, work and sometimes even family

communication, which leads to languages like Chechen gaining the "vulnerable" status in the UNESCO Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger.

But as previously mentioned, linguistic imperialism is unleashed not only on the national, but on the international scale. A study of linguistic imperialism in the foreign policy of the RF and the PRC brought to light expansionist tendencies in the two states' use of language as a weapon. The concept of *Russkiy mir*, and less so the concept of Greater China, are used by Moscow and Beijing in an attempt to unite the territories where Russian and Chinese are spoken. At the same time, huge funds are poured into Russian Cultural Centers, Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, whose purpose it is to spread Russian and Mandarin around the world. Along with cultural expansion they bring propagandist narratives and spread Russian and Chinese perspectives, influencing identity-formation and positive ties with important partner-states.

So far, Russian and Chinese linguistic imperialism has already had major outcomes on the international arena. Decades-long efforts made both Russian and Mandarin Chinese languages of international importance used at international organizations such as the United Nations. But the more appealing these languages are to millions of learners awed by Russian and Chinese culture, economy or both, the more these same learners are influenced by state narratives and steered exactly in the direction the RF and the PRC need them to go. Kremlin has been especially successful in language branding, so much so that the use of Russian as a hard power in Ukraine and Georgia has gone unnoticed by Western politicians. For China, on the other hand, democratic states and organizations like the US and the EU have responded to language rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, although arguably not soon or strongly enough.

Overall, the efforts of China and the Russian Federation to weaponize language show that linguistic imperialism helps create a controlled language environment and spread an ideology on the national level, while emanating a very distinct national identity and building a basis for expansionist politics on the international scale.

Documents

5th National People's Congress. (1982, December 4). *Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Chapter I: General Principles*. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm.

Chechen Government. (1992, March 12). *Constitution of Chechen Republic*. Retrieved April 10, 2023 from https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5fb8.html.

Chinese People's PCC. (1949, September 29). *The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.* Retrieved January 20, 2023, from http://www.commonprogram.science/documents/THE%20COMMON%20PROGRAM.pdf.

EEAS. (2019, April 2). *The European Union and China held their 37th human rights dialogue*. European External Action Service. Retrieved November 10, 2022, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/60545_en.

EEAS. (2020, June 22). *EU-China Summit: Defending EU Interests and Values in a Complex and Vital Partnership - Press Release*. European External Action Service. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu-china-summit-defending-eu-interests-and-values-complex-and-vital-partnership_en.

EEAS. (2021, June 21). *EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World. 2020 Country Updates*, pp. 193-195. Retrieved November 16, 2022, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2020_eu_human_rights_and_democracy_country_reports.pdf.

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. (2022, June 19). *China's comprehensive, systematic and elaborate response to Secretary Antony Blinken's China policy speech*. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zxxx/202206/t20220619_10706097.htm.

PRC Ministry of Education. (2012, December 10). *Notice of the National Language Commission of the Ministry of Education on Printing and Distributing the Outline of the National Medium and Long-Term Language Reform and Development Plan (2012-2020)*. Retrieved April 9, 2023 from http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A18/s3127/s7072/201212/t20121210_146511.html.

PRC Ministry of Education. (2018, May 8). *2017 National Education Budget Statistics News*. Retrieved April 13, 2023, from http://www.jyb.cn/zcg/xwy/wzxw/201805/t20180508_1066983.html.

PRC State Council. (1984, May 31). *Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy*. Retrieved April 10, 2023 from https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/35194/124676/F2146249224/CHN35194%20ChnEng.pdf.

PRC State Council. (2000, October 31). *Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-08/31/content_27920.htm.

President of the Russian Federation. (2008, July 12). *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*.

RF Constitutional Conference. (1993, December 12). *The Constitution of the Russian Federation*. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm.

RF State Duma (2002, December 11). *Federal Law N 165-ФЗ "On introducing a supplement to Article 3 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation""*. Retrieved April 10, 2023 from https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=13394#l0.

RF State Duma. (2005, June 1). *Federal Law No. 53-FZ "On the State Language of the Russian Federation"*. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from https://admpravd.ru/procuracy-dep/p-elucidation/3060-o-gosudarstvennom-yazyke-rossiyskoy-federacii.html.

RSFSR Government. (1991, October 25). *Federal Law No. 1807-I "On the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation"*. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from https://normativ.kontur.ru/document?moduleId=1&documentId=12411.

TAR Government. (2002). *Decree on the Study, Use, and Development of the Tibetan Language*.

UNESCO. (2012). *Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger: New Edition*. Retrieved April 10, 2023 from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/endangered-languages/atlas-of-languages-in-danger/.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/.

Государственная Дума РФ. (2018). *Законопроект № 438863-7 О внесении изменений в статьи 11 и 14 Федерального закона "Об образовании в Российской Федерации" (в части изучения родного языка из числа языков народов Российской Федерации и государственных языков республик, находящихся в составе Российской Федерации)*. Retrieved April 10, 2023 from http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/438863-7.

Правительство Чечни. (2007, 25 апреля). *Закон Чеченской Республики N 16-РЗ "О языках в Чеченской Республике"*. Retrieved April 10, 2023 from https://docs.cntd.ru/document/819050527.

Literature

Aronova, E. (2017). Russian and the making of World Languages during the Cold War. *Isis*, *108*(3), 643–650. https://doi.org/10.1086/694163.

Bacon, J.S. (2020). *Defending a Language: The Cantonese Umbrella Movement*. Department of Communication at Purdue Fort Wayne. Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Badmatsyrenova, D., & Elivanova, A. (2006). Language Policy in Russia: the Case Study of the Yakut Language. *The Northern Research Forum Secretariat. The Borderless North*, 215-218.

Batibo, H. M. (2005). African Languages as a Resource. In *Language Decline and Death in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Challenges* (pp. 32–50). Chapter, Multilingual Matters.

Batibo, H. M. (2005). The Minority Languages of Africa. In *Language Decline and Death in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Challenges* (pp. 51–60). Chapter, Multilingual Matters.

Berenskoetter, F. (2010). Identity in International Relations. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.218.

Blank, S. (1988). The Origins of Soviet Language Policy 1917-21. *Russian History*, *15*(1), 71–92. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24655846.

Blinken, A. (2022, May 26). *The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

Borrell, J. (2019, December 18). *High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on the Situation of the Uyghur in China*. Delegation of the European Union to Türkiye. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-situation-uyghur-china-10039.

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2011, April 1). Tibetan language. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tibetan-language.

Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2023, March 23). Uyghur. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Uyghur.

Buralova, R. A., & Khalidov, A. I. (2015). Trends in Chechen-Russian bilingualism and the ecolingvistic situation in the Chechen Republic. *Современные Проблемы Науки и Образования*, *2*(2). https://doi.org/10.17513/spno.129-21854.

Campbell, D. (2007). Poststructuralism. In *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith, Ed.) (pp. 203-228). Oxford: University Press.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2023, May 9). *Russia - The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#introduction.

Chanturiya, K. (2017, April 25). *Чеченский язык: и не живой, и не мертвый*. OC Media. Retrieved March 19, 2023, from https://oc-media.org/ru/statyi/chechenskiyo-yazyk-i-ne-zhivoyo-i-ne-mertvyyo/.

Chan, Y. (2020, March 31). *Mother Tongue Squeezed out of the Chinese Classroom in Cantonese-Speaking Hong Kong*. HKFP. Retrieved November 8, 2022, from https://hongkongfp.com/2015/07/22/mother-tongue-squeezed-out-of-the-chinese-classroom-in-cantonese-speaking-hong-kong/.

Chapman, J. (2017, December 5). *Russian minorities fear for languages*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.dw.com/en/russian-minorities-fear-for-languages-amid-new-restrictions/a-41639610.

Chevalier, J. F. (2006). Russian as the National Language: An Overview of Language Planning in the Russian Federation. *Russian Language Journal / Русский Язык*, *56*, 25–36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43669126.

Confucius Institute Ireland. (2020). *Confucius Classroom*. Confucius Institute Ireland. https://www.cii.ie/projectsresources/confuciusclassroom/.

De Varennes, F. (2001). Language Rights as an Integral Part of Human Rights. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, *3*(1), 15–25. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315095028-6.

De Varennes, F. (2012). Language Rights and Tibetans in China: A Look at International Law. *Minority Language in Today's Global Society*, 14-38. Trace Foundation.

Dwyer, A. M. (2006). *The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse*. East-West-Center Washington.

Emmott, R. (2021, November 24). *EU Extends Human Rights Sanctions, Including on Chinese Officials*. Reuters. Retrieved November 14, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-extends-human-rights-sanctions-including- chinese-officials-2021-11-24/.

Euractiv. (2018, June 25). *Latvia's school language reform irks Russian minority*. Euractiv. Retrieved March 30, 2023, from https://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/in-latvia-school-language-reform-irks-russian-minority/.

Gelek, L. (2019, January 30). *Tibetan Monasteries in Nangchen Banned From Teaching Language to Young Tibetans.* Radio Free Asia. Retrieved January 22, 2023, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/language-01302019155917.html.

George, A. (2021, January 6). *Chinese Progresses as a World Language*. Language Magazine. Retrieved May 1, 2023, from https://www.languagemagazine.com/2021/01/06/chinese-progresses-as-a-world-language/.

Han, Y., & Johnson, D. C. (2020). Chinese Language Policy and Uyghur Youth: Examining Language Policies and Language Ideologies. *Journal of Language, Identity & Education*, *20*(3), 183–196. https://doi.org/10.1080/15348458.2020.1753193.

Hofmann, E.T. (2005). *The Emergence of a Russian-Speaking World and its Impact on Russia's International Relations*. Wilson Center Meetin Reports. Kennan Institute. Retrieved April 19, 2023, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-emergence-russian-speaking-world-and-its-impact-russias-international-relations.

Hoshur, S. (2022, October 5). *Lack of Uyghur-Language Emergency Services Leads to More Deaths in Xinjiang*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/emergency-services- 10042022154616.html.

Hsia, T.-T. (1956). The Language Revolution in Communist China. *Far Eastern Survey*, *25*(10), 145–154. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023892.

Human Rights Watch. (2021, September 23). *China's "Bilingual Education" Policy in Tibet*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 7, 2022, from https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/03/04/chinas-bilingual-education-policy-tibet/tibetan-medium-schooling-under-threat.

International Campaign for Tibet. (2020, March 5). *Chinese Replacing Tibetan Language as Medium of Instruction in Tibet, Report Says*. International Campaign for Tibet. Retrieved November 5, 2022, from https://savetibet.org/chinese-replacing- tibetan-language-as-medium-of-instruction-in-tibet-report-says/.

Jia, L., & Qie, P. (2021). A Sociological Analysis of Tibetan Language Policy Issues in China. *SN Social Sciences*, *1*(4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-021-00092-y.

Jolkina, A., & Ostaptschuk, M. (2015, December 9). *Activist or Kremlin agent?* Deutsche Welle. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.dw.com/en/activists-or-kremlin-agents-who-protects-russian-speakers-in-the-baltics/a-18903695.

Kamusella, T. (2022, June 7). *Russian and Rashism: Are Russian language and literature really so great?* Wachtyrz.eu. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://wachtyrz.eu/russian-and-rashism-are-russian-language-and-literature-really-so-great/.

Kaplan, R., & Baldauf, R. B. (1997). *Language planning from practice to theory*. Multilingual Matters.

Khasanova, G. (1997, October 10). *Language and sovereignty: The politics of switching to the Latin alphabet in Tatarstan*. The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://jamestown.org/program/language-and-sovereignty-the-politics-of-switching-to-the-latin-alphabet-in-tatarstan/.

Krouglov, A. (2021). Language planning and policies in Russia through a historical perspective. *Current Issues in Language Planning*, *23*(4), 412–434. https://doi.org/10.1080/14664208.2021.2005384.

Kurpaska, M. (2017). The Effects of Language Policy in China. *Język. Komunikacja. Informacja*, (12), 14–24. https://doi.org/10.14746/jki.2017.12.1.

Kwan, R. (2021, May 22). *Interview: Author Joanna Chiu on how the West tried to curry favour with an expansionist China*. Hong Kong Free Press. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://hongkongfp.com/2021/05/22/interview-how-the-west-tried-to-curry-favour-with-an-expansionist-china/.

Liu, J. (2017, June 29). *Cantonese v Mandarin: When Hong Kong Languages Get Political*. BBC News. Retrieved November 8, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40406429.

Lulu, J. (2022). Propaganda and beyond: A note on the 2020 Confucius Institute reform. *Sinopsis: China in Context and Perspective*. https://sinopsis.cz/en/propaganda-and-beyond-a-note-on-the-2020-confucius-institute-reform/.

Lum, L. (2019, April 26). *U.S. Statement: UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 18th Session Agenda Item 12; Participation of Indigenous Peoples*. United States Mission to the United Nations. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://usun.usmission.gov/u-s-statement-un-permanent-forum-on-indigenous-issues-18th-session-agenda-item-12-participation-of-indigenous-peoples/.

Matsiev, I. (2007, November 22). *Chechnya's language dilemma*. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Retrieved February 25, 2023, from https://iwpr.net/global-voices/chechnyas-language-dilemma.

Mirovalev, M. (2020, June 2). *How the Russian language caused this century's bloodiest war in Europe*. TRT World. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/how-the-russian-language-caused-this-century-s-bloodiest-war-in-europe-36881.

Odinye, S.I. (2015). The spread of Mandarin Chinese as a global language. *Journal of Linguistics, Language and Culture, 2 (32)*. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305639211_The_spread_of_Mandarin_Chinese_as_a_global_language.

Oud, M. (2022, May 4). *Embedding Human Rights in European and US China Policy*. The German Marshall Fund. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.gmfus.org/news/embedding-human-rights-european-and-us-china-policy.

Phillipson, R. (2012). Linguistic Imperialism. In The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics, C.A. Chapelle (Ed.). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal0718.

Polegkyi, O., & Bushuyev, D. (2022, September 6). *Russian foreign policy and the origins of the "Russian World"*. Forum for Ukrainian Studies. Retrieved March 30, 2023, from https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/09/06/russian-foreign-policy-and-the-origins-of-the-russian-world/.

Ramzy, A. (2006, June 26). Get Ahead, Learn Mandarin. *Times Magazine, 4 (50)*. Retrieved May 1, 2023, from https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047305,00.html.

Reus-Smit, C., Snidal, D., & Hurd, I. (2010). Constructivism. In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 298–316). Chapter, Oxford University Press.

Roth, K. (2022, January 31). *China Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.

Sarwat, U.N. (2019). Sociolinguistics. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331285240.

Sergunin, A., & Karabeshkin, L. (2015). Understanding Russia's soft power strategy. *Politics*, *35*(3–4), 347–363. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12109.

Shakabpa, T. W.D. , Wylie, . Turrell V. , Richardson, . Hugh E. and Falkenheim, . Victor C. (2023, February 16). Tibet. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Tibet.

Silver, L., Devlin, K., and Huang, C. (2021, March 4). *Most Americans support tough stance toward China on human rights, economic issues*. Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/03/04/most-americans-support-tough- stance-toward-china-on-human-rights-economic-issues/.

Smith, S., & Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Snyder, J. (2004). One World, Rival Theories. *Foreign Policy*, (145), 52–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944.

Tam, G.A. (2016). "Orbiting the Core": Politics and the Meaning of Dialect in Chinese Linguistics, 1927–1957. *Twentieth-Century China, 41*(3), 280-303. doi:10.1353/tcc.2016.0021.

Tannenwald, N. (2005). Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *7*(2), 13–42. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925808.

Taylor, M.R. (2022). Inside the EU–China Human Rights Dialogue: Assessing the Practical Delivery of the EU's Normative Power in a Hostile Environment. *Journal of European Integration*, 44:3, 365-380, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1854245.

Tishkov, V. (2008). *The Russian World - Changing Meanings and Strategies*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Weldes, J. (1996). Constructing National Interests.*European Journal of International Relations*, *2*(3), 275–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066196002003001.

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, 46, pp. 391-425. doi:10.1017/ S0020818300027764.

Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, 20: 71-81.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. (S. Smith, Ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Wigglesworth-Baker, T. (2015). Language Policy and Russian-Titular Bilingualism in Post-Soviet Tatarstan. Thesis, University of Sheffield.

Wigglesworth-Baker, T. (2015). Language Policy and Post-Soviet Identities in Tatarstan. *Nationalities Papers*, *44*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1046425.

World Uyghur Congress. (2014). *Movement for Uyghur Mother Language Based Education*.

Wright, S. (2001). Language and Power: Background to the Debate on Linguistic Rights. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, *3*(1), 44–54.

Yakhyayeva, A., Abakarova, N., Yusupova, S., Dzeitova, K., & Evloeva, Z. (2019). Questions of the Chechen-Russian bilingualism in the Chechen Republic. *The European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 3361–3368. https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2019.12.04.451.

Yusupova, S.M. (2014). Cognitive and ontological aspects of language conflict. *International conference on language policy and language conflicts in contemporary world*, 234-240.

Zhou, M. (2019). *Language Ideology and Order in Rising China*. Springer Singapore.

Сталин И.В. (1997). *Сочинения.* – Т. 16. – М.: Издательство “Писатель”. С. 104–138. Retrieved January 20, 2023, from http://grachev62.narod.ru/stalin/t16/t16_26.htm.

Пиріг В. (2023, 5 лютого). *Росіяни на Луганщині спалюють українські книги в котельнях*. Zahid.net. Retrieved March 10, 2023, from https://zaxid.net/rosiyani_na_luganshhini_spalyuyut_ukrayinski_knigi_v_kotelnyah_n1557383.

Фонд “Демократичні ініціативи” ім. Ілька Кучеріва. (2023, March 10). *Національна культура та мова в Україні: зміни в громадській думці після року війни*. Фонд “Демократичні ініціативи” ім. Ілька Кучеріва. https://dif.org.ua/article/natsionalna-kultura-ta-mova-v-ukraini-zmini-v-gromadskiy-

dumtsi-pislya-roku-viyni?fbclid=IwAR0ySTl6R3lONVANQ_ogCYNthYxjGCBwq7M9PAT_etg3ZMAOP44V2uZLH38#_Toc129302260.

Янковський О. (2022, 26 серпня). *«Нас попередили, щоб не говорили українською». Освіта на півдні під тиском окупантів*. Радіо Свобода. Retrieved March 10, 2023, from https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/novyny-pryazovya-1-veresnya-okupatsiya-kherson-osvita/32005468.html.

ABSTRACT

of the thesis

Topic: Language as a Weapon: A Comparative Analysis of Russian and Chinese Linguistic Imperialism

Student: Anna Maslovych, fourth year of study, Faculty of Social Sciences and Social Technologies

Supervisor: PhD (Waseda University), Candidate of Historical Sciences, senior lecturer Olena Mykal

Reviewed by:_____

Keywords: Linguistic imperialism; Language policy and planning; Language rights; Language as a weapon; Russian Federation; People's Republic of China.

Short summary:

The paper examined linguistic imperialism of the RF and the PRC as a method of weaponizing language both on the national and the international scale through the lens of Alexander Wendt's social constructivism. It applied a comparative case study with the time frame of 2005-2022 and content analysis of documents and official statements. After linguistic imperialism was defined as a spread of one language within and outside the state as a mechanism of domination and promotion of a single ideology, it was found that both Russia and China have a long history of language planning that favored one language over others. While Russian and Mandarin are used to create a controlled national language environment, Kremlin and the CPC keep weaponizing language for propagandist purposes as part of their foreign policy, which only rarely gets public attention. The paper concludes that linguistic imperialism helps spread an ideology on the national level, while building a basis for expansionist politics on the international scale.

Короткий зміст роботи:

У статті розглядався лінгвістичний імперіалізм РФ і КНР як метод перетворення мови на зброю на національному та міжнародному рівнях через призму соціального конструктивізму Александра Вендта. Мої методи дослідження включали порівняльне кейс-стаді з часовим проміжком 2005-2022 рр. та контент-аналіз документів та офіційних заяв. Після того, як лінгвістичному імперіалізму було дано визначення «поширення однієї мови в державі та за її межами задля домінування та просування єдиної ідеології», було виявлено, що і Росія, і Китай мають довгу історію мовного планування, яке надавало перевагу одній мові над іншими. У той час як російська та мандаринська використовуються для створення контрольованого національного мовного середовища, Кремль і КПК продовжують скеровувати мову в пропагандистських цілях у своїй зовнішній політиці, яка рідко привертає міжнародну увагу. Робота дійшла висновку, що мовний імперіалізм допомагає поширювати ідеологію на національному рівні, водночас створюючи основу для експансіоністської політики в міжнародному масштабі.