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the Prism of Post-Marxism”**

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INTRODUCTION

The full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 revealed the scope of their propagandistic activities, having made it clear that it is not limited primarily to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or other states, traditionally and misleadingly perceived as the russian sphere of influence. The results of the voting in the United Nations (UN), diplomatic visits or telephone diplomacy of russian government officials to the countries of the so-called “third world” (which originally implied the non-aligned countries during the Cold War, which now can be perceived mainly as an anti-Western stance (Mohan, 2022), as well as refusal of the states like India, Mexico or the United Arab Emirates to impose sanctions “to maintain stable international relations” (Westwood, 2022), are manifestations of the lost post-colonial discourse by Ukraine.

Thus, except for Soviet and consequently russian “soft power” activities in the regions, initially having suffered from the imperialistic ambitions of the European states and subsequent lopsided economic development, the issue of the lack of study about russian colonialism contributes to the abstention in the UN or even pro-aggressor position in the international conflict. Therefore, the object of this research paper is russian settler colonialism, while the subject is specific peculiarities of russian settler colonialism, in particular, the imposition of russian culture on the settled societies, specifically, in Ukraine through the prism of post-Marxism. russian settler colonial practices put this country on one list with the British, French and Spanish imperial powers, although such a claim can meet “extremely hostile reactions from russian scholars” (Grachev and Rykin, 2007, as cited by Morrison, 2017).

The paper’s goal is to trace the link between russian settler colonialism and their way of imposition of cultural hegemony on the settled territories, particularly, in Ukraine. The objectives of the thesis paper follow the goal and include:

- finding out the reasons for the emergence of Settler Colonialism as a separate scholarly subfield and conceptualizing the term “settler colonialism” and specific peculiarities that distinguish it from other forms of colonial relationships;
- categorizing transfers as the underlying principle of settler colonial policies;
- identifying the key tenets of the post-Marxist theory of Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism;
- illustrating a case of settler colonialism in the North-West European macroregion to prepare the basis for russian settler colonialism overview;
- highlighting distinctive traits of russian settler colonialism in the case of Siberia;
- exemplifying russian settler colonialism in Ukraine during the Soviet times;
- figuring out settler colonialism features of the russian federation on the Ukrainian territories after the collapse of the Soviet Union;
- determining russian settler colonialism on the temporarily occupied territories after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022;
- finding out the consequences which russian settler colonialism and the subsequent attempts to impose cultural hegemony has manifested in contemporary international relations and the ways of counteracting employed by Ukraine and the world community.

For this research, interpretive epistemology is used, peculiarly the case study of Ireland, Siberia, and Ukraine in order to provide descriptive accounts of settler colonialism, especially with an emphasis on the importance of social practices in the above-mentioned phenomenon. Moreover, the predominant approaches to studying russian settler colonialism are settler colonialism as a subfield of postcolonial studies and post-Marxism, particularly neo-Gramscianism. The key theoretical works are “Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview” by Lorenzo Veracini, “The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism” by Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini; the numerous scholarly articles on key findings of Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, and on the phenomena of settler colonialism, provided by Patrick Wolfe, M. Sviezhentsev, J. Connolly, A. Morrison, A. Kazarkin, et al.

The chronological framework includes the period from the Soviet Union in 1920s with the references to the Tsarist times to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2014-ongoing [as of writing the research paper]). Such a contemporality serves as a factor that adds limits to the research due to the unavailability of fully reliable data from the occupied territories; still, the data sources include statistics provided by the Russian Federation, as well as news sources, both Ukrainian and Russian, in order to provide a whole picture to the extent possible under the military aggression. Except for this, documents published by both international organizations (particularly the resolutions of the Council of Europe and the United Nations) and Ukrainian authorities (peculiarly the legislation adopted by the Verkhovna Rada – the Parliament of Ukraine) serve as data sources. Finally, primary sources also include official speeches given by both Ukrainian and Russian state figures, while secondary sources consist of archival data provided by Ukrainian scholars – primarily party documents of the Communist Party of the USSR.

The thesis paper consists of 3 chapters, 9 subchapters, placed on 56 pages. This paper also has 2 figures and 4 appendices.

Chapter 1. The Theoretical Framework of the russian Settler Colonialism

1.1 The Conceptualization of the Term “Settler Colonialism” and Its Challenges

The issues with defining settler colonialism originate from several main aspects: the complexity of the colonial-related studies, critics and subsequent marginalization of the field, and failure of existing various approaches to explain the occasionally occurring phenomena of sovereignty on the settled territories, which cannot always be linked with the metropolis. Firstly, although the study of colonial phenomena is not new (take Karl Marx and Friederich Engels’ “need of a constantly expanding market for its product”, which “chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe” [Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 16]), the 1950s and 1960s, which are known as “age of decolonisation”, laid the foundations of the fragmentation of this scholarly field. Instantaneous response to the decolonization process took form of the emergence of **neocolonialism** “to denounce relations that ostensibly acknowledged the equality of the former colonizer and former colonized” (Nkrumah, 1965, as cited by Cavanagh, 2017, p. 2); the 1970s engendered **internal colonialism** approach, which focuses on the “resilience of colonial relationships within a specific polity”, but fails to envisage “the sovereign independence of the colonized” (Hechter, 1975, as cited by Cavanagh, 2017, p. 2). **Postcolonial** thought emerged in the 1980s with the credit to Edward Said’s “Orientalism” as the founding book and further development in the UK and the US academies in the 1980s (Elam, 2019; Batiste, 2008) with the main emphasis on the long-lasting “legacy of colonial regimes” and how these legacies form the political strategies “after the end of formal colonial subjection” (Said, 1978, as cited by Cavanagh, 2017, p. 2).

Even after decades of the existence of post-colonialism as a part of “new and politicized fields of humanistic inquiry” (Elam, 2019), the scholars of anticolonial thought from Great Britain’s former colonies (where this type of critical theory originally

comes from, which is the reason why such collocation is used in this research), such as Gayatri Spivak, tend to denounce post-colonialist studies as “just totally bogus” (Spivak, 1991, as cited by Williams, 1993), mainly due to the approach failing to explain the continuing subjection of indigenous peoples. One of its practical manifestations is a Blue Water doctrine, or principle, having appeared during the UN debate on decolonization (Robbins, 2015). According to a “blue water” definition, colonization implies sea-based conquest, and “it is only crossing the ocean to conquer that is scandalous” (Robbins, 2015, p. 48), exempting settler colonialists from the discourse. Notably, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541, aimed at ensuring decolonization and passed after the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (which is also known as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514), is based on the “blue water” definition of colonialism (Veracini, 2017, p. 2).

Except for already existing criticism mainly towards “US post-colonial theory” (Eagleton, 1999), all of the above-mentioned subfields of scholarly colonial studies had been failing to explain the phenomena of settler colonialism. This is why there are examples of the US or Australia that are out of post-colonial discourse even with the context of their series of the conquest of indigenous peoples, being presented as a product of other nations’ colonization as a result of arrival by sea, as well as “russia’s long series of conquest to its east and south does not count as colonialism at all”, as mentioned by Robbins (2015, p. 48). It exempts a number of countries, including the russian federation, from the important debate regarding (post-/neo-) colonialism and colonization, as well as the structural inequalities it has engendered.

Finally, settler colonial studies “has consolidated in the last two decades as a distinct subfield” (Cavanagh, 2017, p. 2), although it would be wrong to assume that it is the first time when this separate form of colonial action was distinguished then – for instance, Engels what is now known as settler colonies called “the colonies proper” (1892, as cited by Finley, 1976, p. 186). Its political manifestation can be found in the 2007 UN “Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples” where, according to Cavanagh and Veracini, settler colonialism is recognized as a “mode of domination” (2017, p. 3).

Nevertheless, it is rather implied in the provisions of the Declaration than explicitly stated since neither “settler colonialism” nor “domination” can be found in the text itself (United Nations, 2007), leaving alone the orientalist cover of the Declaration (Appendix 1). The Declaration seems to be aimed predominantly at the political recovery from the collocation of “non-self-governing territory” (NSGT), which was used in Chapter XI of the UN Charter, describing peoples who “have not yet attained a full measure of self-government” (United Nations, 1945, Article 73), thus excusing occupation (Crocker, 2022) of these territories. This is why more in-depth studies of settler colonialism are still work in progress, which explains the variety of approaches and methodology applied.

As a specific definition, collocation “settler colonialism” appeared in the 1920s to explain a specific form of British colonialism in the context of Australia. The conceptual difference between conventional colonialism, tendencies in South Australia (settled by “free” settlers), and New South Wales had to be made (Connor, 2002, as cited by Veracini, 2017, p. 4). The necessary notions to be applied when elaborating on settler colonialism are 1) the recognition that colonialism can manifest in ways beyond arrival on boats (although sometimes it is the case, too); 2) settlers may (but not always do) act on their own behalf, depriving themselves of the role of an agent of distant metropolis; 3) these actors tend not to sail away after settling (despite the fact that, once again, sometimes they do) (Veracini, 2017, p. 3). In other words, settler colonialism is crucial for the realization that notwithstanding the traditional and justifiable “global continent-shaped vision” settlers “typically claim macroregions” (Veracini, 2017, p. 2), which is essential for further analysis of russian settler colonialism. Macroregions are used in this context as a form of categorizing nation states based on their geographical nearness (Dunning, 2000), and this term has become widespread with the rise of globalization processes, marking that though being used in colonial studies, it is merely about geo-proximity and not national component.

Notwithstanding the present analytical distinction in colonial-related studies (such as the claim that settler colonialism, unlike other forms of it, has similarities with migration and colonialism, is “intimately related to both”, while at the same time is purely

neither of them [Veracini, 2010, pp. 3-4]), it is also suggested that all of them “intertwine, interact, and overlap” (Veracini, 2010, p. 4). Still, according to the historian and professor at Swinburne University of Technology’s Institute for Social Research, settler colonialism should be perceived as structurally distinct from what has been studied in the colonial scholarly field before.

Considering that “not all migrations are settler migrations and not all colonialisms are settler colonial” (Veracini, 2010, p. 3), the significant distinction between settler colonialism and migration are the following:

- Notwithstanding that both migrants and settlers relocate from one place to another, and frequently establish permanent residency in their new location, settlers “are made by conquest, not just by migration” (Mamdani, 1998).
- Migrants are considered appellants that have to face the already existing political order, while settlers are founders of political orders and “carry their sovereignty with them” (Veracini, 2010, p. 3), whether it is a metropolitan or exclusively autonomous one.
 - Moreover, migrants can co-opt the newly established settler colonial political regime, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 2.
 - Additionally, settlers, unlike migrants who tend to choose their place of residence purposefully, desire that their locations were situated in different regions. For instance, present-day Israel is in “Asia”, not in “the West” (Veracini, 2017, p. 5).
- “Emigrant joined someone else’s society, a settler [...] remade his own” (Belich, 2009, p. 53). Migrants move to another country, and settlers move to, according to Veracini, “their” (2010, p. 3).
 - In addition, settlers “manipulate time” (Veracini, 2017, p. 6). That is to say, they frequently relocate with the intention of returning to a pure and undisturbed social order that has been disrupted by modernity, such as gender and other revolutions, reclaiming the land and regaining the ability to truly own it, which has been disrupted by enclosures and other forms of

dispossession. With a tint of romanticizing of imperialistic behavior, T. Lynch and L. Veracini call it “stories of [...] returns by way of forward movement” (2017, p. 6).

- Finally, settlers “remove to establish” (Veracini, 2010, p. 4) a new polity.
 - The “removal” mentioned by professor Veracini is the reason why Patrick Wolfe, an Australian scholar, argues that the issue of settler colonialism is never far from the question of genocide (2006, p. 387). Furthermore, in his work “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”, he rejects the claim that settler colonialism is “simply a form of genocide” (2006, p. 387), implying that these two phenomena are perceived as closely intertwined ones.

What is more, according to Veracini, “settler colonialism is not colonialism” (2010, p. 4) in its classical understanding. Thus, the vital distinctions between these two definitions to be made are next:

- Although colonial and settler-colonial forms coexist, settler colonialism contains “a number of structuring contrasts” (Veracini, 2010, p. 4).
- Georges Balandier, who is the author of the seminar article which is believed to be the initiative of colonial studies in a scholarly environment, defined conventional “colonial situation” as “the domination imposed by a foreign minority, racially [...] and culturally different, acting in the name of racial (or ethnic) and cultural superiority dogmatically affirmed” (Balandier, 2010, p. 54). In other words, it suggests a foreign rule of the dominant minority over the indigenous majority, which is perceived to be inferior. Subsequently, the decisions over the ruling on the colonized lands are made in the metropolis. According to this definition, one may, although inappropriately, assume that “colonisers cease being colonisers if and when they become the majority” (Veracini, 2010, p. 5). Rejecting this is the reason why settler colonialism eventually became a separate scholarly subfield. Nevertheless, the mentioned “cultural superiority” is the aspect to be elaborated

further in this and subsequent Chapters, demonstrating that “racial superiority” has not always been the reason for justifying the elimination of the natives.

- A. G. Hopkins’ (1999) and D. K. Fieldhouse’s (1965) classifications of colonialism are based on the demographic situation. According to them, when white settlers became numerically predominant, the new states appeared, whereas when the natives remained the basis of government, the state was based on existing peoples.
 - However, Fieldhouse’s definition seems to be more sophisticated. He outlines three types of settlements (1965, pp. 11-12):
 - 1) “Mixed”, where the settlers had to confront a substantial and resilient indigenous population. They asserted their dominance while simultaneously relying on the native for the workforce.
 - 2) “Plantation”, where colonists relied on imported and enslaved labor.
 - 3) “Pure”, where the settlers eliminated “and/or marginalized” the indigenous peoples, which is the case of settler colonization. In this type, the settlers might become the majority. Nevertheless, the period of intense anticolonial uprisings in Africa became the impetus to start using the term “settler colonialism” to describe a particularly extreme form of colonialism (“ultra-colonialism” [Anderson, 1962]) where settlers were able to maintain political control despite not being the majority demographically (Veracini, 2017, p. 5). All the distinguished types of marginalization of the local population are depicted in the following subchapter.
- According to Veracini (2017, p. 3), classical colonial relations emphasize the reproduction of the subordination of the colonized ones, while settler colonialism focuses on the determination to erase these subjectivities.
- Finally, when the classical colonial system requires the dyad of relations between the colony and the metropolis, the settler colonialism dimension might comprise the triangle between “metropolitan, settler, and indigenous agencies” (Veracini, 2010, p. 6), which is to be analyzed further.

In conclusion, settler colonialism is still a relatively new subfield of scholarly endeavor, which complicates the search for absolutely clear definitions. After all, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128), which is why case studies become more illustrative than theory, which is nevertheless crucial for the analysis.

To summarize, settler colonialism is a form of colonialism characterized by the establishment of permanent settlements by a foreign group of people (settlers) in a territory belonging to indigenous populations. Settler colonialism involves the conquest or displacement of the natives and the intention of the settlers to create a new society or polity in the colonized land, rather than just exploiting its resources or exerting dominance over the indigenous population. Settler colonialism is structurally distinct from other forms of colonialism, and it often involves the removal or marginalization of indigenous peoples and the assertion of settler sovereignty.

1.2 Transfer as a Basis of Settler Colonialism

Settler colonialism is based on the ability of conducting a collective sovereign displacement. That is, according to the historian of the “Angloworld”, James Belich, “mass transfer”, or the capacity to move significant groups of people across oceans and mountains (Belich, 2011, p. 107). Palestinian scholar Nur Masalha argued that “transfer” is the crucial concept in Zionist thought (Masalha, 2012, p. 173). It is so due to the fact that the very presence of the indigenous people challenges the basic legitimacy of the settler entity. Nevertheless, Veracini, being the key figure in settler colonial studies, argues that the fundamental basis for all settler projects is rooted in the idea of ultimately eliminating the diverse identities (indigenous (e.g. the Mi’kmaq in what is now known as Nova Scotia) and exogenous (Acadians (of the French origin) in Nova Scotia, having been associated closely with indigenous population and subsequently conquered by the British) present in the settler community, as a means of “cleansing” the settler body politic. Moreover, this mass transfer is a much more complex phenomena than simple

removal or elimination of the natives or even exogenous Others, so various strategies have to be deployed while analyzing settler colonial situations because “transfer does not exclusively apply to bodies pushed across borders” (Veracini, 2010, p. 34). In addition, the transfers of both indigenous and exogenous Others are closely related since the ability to manage transfer of one group can also be utilized with regard to the other due to the learned transfer capabilities (Veracini, 2010, p. 33). Although both colonial and settler colonial structures involve the subjugation of indigenous and exogenous identities, the former can be defined as an act of domination for the purpose of exploitation, while the latter is an act of domination aimed at transfer.

The strategies of “mass transfer” designated by Lorenzo Veracini (2010, pp. 33-52) are the following:

1. **Necropolitical transfer.** The indigenous communities are liquidated with military forces.
2. **Ethnic transfer.** The forcible deportation of the indigenous population (either within or without the territory claimed by the settlers). When indigenous communities are forcibly transferred, they lose their indigenous status regardless of where they end up.

Settler colonial projects are interested in making indigenous peoples refugees because refugees, especially those who have been repeatedly forced to leave their homes, become “by definition” indigenous to somewhere else, which is the opposite of being “aboriginal” (Veracini, 2010, p. 35). The embodiment of such transfer is the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948. In addition, so-called “voluntary transfers”, delusionally defined this way, also fit ethnic transfer (Veracini, 2010, p. 35).

3. **Transfer by conceptual displacement.** Indigenous peoples may be perceived as exogenous Others who entered settler spaces at some point, particularly after the arrival of the settler collective, and not recognized as indigenous to the land.

As a complementary practice, the locals can be put in “an unspecified wider “native” category”: for instance, Palestinians as “Arabs”. As a consequence, this broader

category of people discursively resides in the borderlands beyond the territory claimed by the settler entity – they become conceptually displaced “to the exterior of the settler locale” (Veracini, 2010, p. 35).

In addition, it contributes to the representation of indigenous peoples as “pathologically mobile”, “nomadic”, “engaged in unpredictable migrations” (Veracini, 2010, p. 36), however, not necessarily (if ever) occupying the land claimed by the settlers.

4. **Civilizational transfer.** The representation of indigenous peoples in their supposed traditional form as settlers.

An illustrative example is the discursive “Europeanization” of the Algerian Kabyles in contradiction against local Arabs. Alexis de Tocqueville, a French Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1849, compared the inhabitants of Kabylia with the Swiss, saying that they are democratic, well-governing, secular, independent, and less restless and fanatical than the Arab tribes (Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, p. 172, as cited by Veracini, 2010, p. 36). The historian Charles Ageron claimed that the Kabyles of Algeria “were [...] descendants of the Gauls, the Romans, Christian Berbers...” (Ageron, 1992, p. 72), thus making them both indigenous unlike the invading Arabs, and at the same time putative settlers like the incoming French. Notably, civilizational and conceptual displacement transfers interact.

5. **Transfer by assimilation.** “Uplifting” of the indigenous peoples. This approach does not necessarily include displacement, though the language of assimilation is inevitably referred to movement – “assimilation ‘raises’ indigenous peoples” (Appendix 3).

The cases of this transferist approach are Canada’s Gradual Civilisation Act of 1857 and Gradual Enfranchisement Act of 1869. It created a distinction between “status Indian” and “Canadian citizen”, enabling the conditional inclusion of indigenous people into the settler body politic, provided that they abandoned their traditional communities. Assimilation in this context is understood as a process where indigenous people result in conforming to diverse constructed concepts of settler “racial, cultural, or behavioral normativity” (Veracini, 2010, p. 38). Assimilation may also imply subsequent absorption

(the capacity of the settler body politic to absorb the preliminarily assimilated natives). However, the success of assimilation is never dependent on the performance of the indigenous peoples, but on the assimilation policies provided either by settler sovereign entities or metropolises. Finally, this approach implies that indigenous peoples are only temporarily excluded, and the ongoing process of assimilation enables settlers to assert that they ultimately represent all inhabitants of the population economy.

6. **Transfer by accounting.** Indigenous people are excluded from existence or not counted in any way. This type of transfer encompasses cases where administrative fixation on blood quanta (BQ) leads to speculations about the inevitable disappearance of indigenous people. According to transfer by accounting, combining indigenous and exogenous elements “engenders an exclusively exogenous outcome” (Veracini, 2010, p. 39).

It has manifestations in Blood quantum laws in the United States of America that use fractions of Native American ancestry to define Native American status. BQ is based on a formula “half of the combined degree of “Indian blood” an individual’s parents possess” (Hilleary, 2021). So, if both parents have 100 percent Indian blood, a child’s BQ is 100%. However, this concept is severely criticized in the US both for being the formula for “paper genocide” (Sutton, 2020; Hilleary, 2021; Deerinwater, 2019 et al.) and rejecting the rights of indigenous self-determination.

Moreover, transfer by accounting leaves the settler body politic right not to count indigenous people (such as not taking in consideration the number of dead people, discounting the living, failure to register births etc.). What is more, this remains a contemporary problem in Australia, for example, as not registering births results in the discursive disappearance of indigenous people in settler Australia. It turns indigenous peoples into refugees in their own countries, making them deprived of rights to work, vote, drive, travel, access social welfare etc. (Veracini, 2010, p. 40).

7. **Transfer by means of “repressive authenticity”.** When “authentic” aboriginality is “constructed as a frozen precontact essence, a quantity of such radical historical

instability that its primary effect is to provide a formula for disqualification” (Wolfe, 1999, p. 204).

Such claims about “radical authenticity” enable the creation of specific methods for transmitting these entitlements across generations of indigenous people, justifying marginalization and/or elimination.

8. Narrative transfers.

- *Narrative transfer (I)*. The representation of the natives as “hopelessly backward [...] unchanging specimen of a primitive form of humanity”, living in the past but surrounded by modernity (Veracini, 2010, p. 41).

Once again, the language includes movement – really existing in contemporaneity people “are transferred ‘elsewhen’”, and the discourse of indigenous sector of the population economy is emptied.

- *Narrative transfer (II)*. The delegitimization of ongoing struggles of the indigenous people through the “‘tide of history’ rationale” (Veracini, 2010, p. 41).

It suggests that the natives’ grievances are futile in the face of larger historical forces, and colonizers may even express regret over the eventual disappearance of indigenous people. It recognizes the existence of the past “indigenous golden age”, but emphasizes on the “contemporary decadence” (Veracini, 2010, pp. 41-42). In this subtype, the settlers might even recognize genocide, but the discourse is focused on the fact that the natives “are long gone” (Veracini, 2010, p. 42).

- *Narrative transfer (III)*. Settlers claim to be indigenous people as well. This transfer emphasizes the continuity of settlers on the land and suggests that both settlers and indigenous people have successfully indigenized.

Another interpretation of Narrative transfer (III) implies that indigenous people are also settlers, but both of the variations of this transfer attempt to erase the inherent difference between settlers and indigenous people’s relationship to the land. Hence, the denial of this particular connection between indigenous people and their land is a crucial part of this transfer (Veracini, 2010, pp. 42-43).

9. **Transfer by coerced lifestyle change.** The indigenous social organization is taken away. The most notable manifestation is an enforced sedentarization (Veracini, 2010, p. 44), that is, the settling of a nomadic population.
10. **Non-diplomatic transfer.** The settler entity retains overall control, but does not acknowledge its responsibility for a particular area.
11. **Indigenous incarceration, criminalization, and/or institutionalization.** The forced and institutionalized association between indigenes and criminality. Thus, the natives become reclassified (for instance, the people as a criminal class) (Veracini, 2010, p. 45). Nonetheless, this transfer does not necessarily require criminalization: for instance, they can be classified as “the poor”, or infantilized, which is a manifestation of an orientalist approach, making the natives “welfare dependent” on the settler entity.
12. **Transfer by settler indigenization.** The settler groups assert their holding of an indigenous status in the present, and the unique identity of the actual indigenous population becomes less distinct (Veracini, 2010, p. 46). Moreover, this type of transfer can include the cultural appropriation of the natives.
13. **Transfer by name confiscation.** Colonizers confiscate the term that defines indigenous communities because naming “is about and produces entitlement” (Veracini, 2010, p. 47).
14. **Transfer by executive termination.** When the distinctiveness of indigenous identity, including its name, is officially abolished. In other words, it is the recognition (although not always actual) that the people are extinct.

In essence, “transfer” in the settler colonial context refers to various strategies and mechanisms employed by settlers to displace and eliminate indigenous populations. These strategies include forced removal, deportation, conceptual displacement, assimilation, exclusion, narrative manipulation, coerced lifestyle change, institutionalization, indigenization, name confiscation, and executive termination. Transfer aims to dispossess and marginalize indigenous peoples while asserting settler dominance, control over (and even belonging to) the land.

In conclusion to this part, it is important to mention that the terms that have not been elaborated in-depth are mentioned in order to provide a theoretical framework for Chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, not all of the elaborated by Lorenzo Veracini transferist approaches are mentioned above due to the irrelevance in terms of subsequent russian settler colonialism research. Finally, these types of transfer do not exist in spatial or temporal insulation and can be (and often are) complementary to one another or deployed in different stages of colonization and settler colonialism processes.

1.3 The Place of Cultural Hegemony in Post-Marxism: Key Tenets of Gramscianism and the contribution of Neo-Gramscianism as a Framework for Studying russian Settler Colonialism

Settler colonial studies require both presence of the dominant group and the perceived cultural superiority, which even might lead to such ambiguous terms as “cultural genocide”, which was in Lemkin’s favor as the inventor of the word “genocide” itself, as well as the author of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). Nevertheless, the author of the work “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native”, Patrick Wolfe, disagrees with this term, claiming that genocide is by its nature biological, and the usage of this term in the context of culture either makes it not real or has to have an impact on people’s capacity to stay alive (2006, pp. 398-399). Hence, the theoretical framework for the analysis of ways to impose culture on the peoples has to be employed here, which is why the post-marxist paradigm, particularly Gramscianism and Neo-gramscianism, is a useful tool.

The founder of the Communist Party of Italy, Antonio Gramsci, who was imprisoned by the fascist regime in November 1926, is recognized as the author of one of the crucial contributions to the theory of Marxism made in the 20th century. Hence, the theory of Gramscianism itself could not be systematized at the time of its creation because it originated in manuscripts *Quaderni del carcere*, or the Prison Notebooks. That is why researchers of Gramscianism faced the problem of correctly transferring Antonio

Gramsci's ideas into a single theory: it was important not to create the illusion of a theory that actually had not existed, and not to arbitrarily emphasize a casual idea (Bates, 1975, p. 351; Lears, 1985, p. 567; Artz and Murphy, 2000, p. 1). Furthermore, the written translations of A. Gramsci's works do not contain an exact definition of the term "cultural hegemony", although this very concept is the "thread that unites" the notes of the Italian intellectual, and proves that they are worth becoming a theory posthumously.

The main difference from the theory of realism and the neorealistic perception of the concept of hegemony is the interpretivist idea that a man is governed not only by force but also by ideas. According to his notion, ideas are the basis for the "ideological unity of a whole social bloc" (Gramsci, as cited by Bates, 1975, p. 351). The concept of hegemony arises from this, which somewhat contradicts classical Marxism with the thesis that every state is a dictatorship. Based on the surviving translation from Italian, hegemony is "political leadership based on the consent by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class" (Bates, 1975, p. 352). It is "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant [...] group" (Lears, 1985, p. 568). According to T. J. Jackson Lears, the consent referred to is not inherent or natural but rather has its origins in historical factors, specifically, the dominant group's prestige and confidence, which are a result of their position and role in the world of production (1985, p. 568). Connecting it to the Irish case of settler colonialism, elaborated on further (as one of the most illustrative and comprehensive rather than unique examples), its manifestations can be found in the fact that the Irish names could appear in the English administrative records as holders of land, litigants, or members of urban guilds if they had obtained charters conferring on them the status of English (hence the dominant group's) subjects, and there were cases of the Irish showing good knowledge of English or wearing English clothing (Connolly, 2017, p. 50). Although it is difficult to speculate about the "consent" considering the fact that the city council of Limerick restricted franchise to this group of Irish people in 1512 (Ellis, 2003, pp. 21-32; Ferrar, 1787, p. 433).

Gramsci challenges classical Marxism also in that its “superstructure” (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 19) is not merely a reflection of socioeconomic organization. Gramsci’s work divides the “superstructure” into two levels – civil society and political society. Civil society includes schools, churches, clubs, magazines, parties – everything that contributes to the formation of social and political consciousness; at the same time, political society is state institutions, everything that exercises “direct rule” and is synonymous with the word “state” (Bates, 1975, p. 353). In addition, civil society itself is the sphere of potential historically important action or change (Bates, 1975, p. 357). According to Antonio Gramsci, the ruling class exercises its power at both these levels, but by different methods: intellectuals enter civil society as “sellers” of cultures. Intellectuals succeed in creating hegemony to the extent that they are able to extend the worldview of the ruling class to those they rule and thus ensure the “free” consent of the masses to the exercise of power. If the intellectuals fail to create hegemony, the ruling class resorts to coercion, which disciplines those who “disagree” (Bates, 1975, p. 353), which has various manifestations in the settler-colonial context, which was shown in the previous subchapter and is illustrated further in this paper.

Still, the characteristic of the intellectual referred to remains implicit in the statement. According to Gramsci, “an independent class of intellectuals does not exist, but rather every social group has its own intellectuals. However, the intellectuals of the historically progressive class [...] exercise such a power [...] that they end [...] subordinating the intellectuals of other social groups and thus create a system of solidarity [...]” (Gramsci, as cited by Bates, 1975, p. 353). This intellectual dominance, as well as the argument that this process is realized spontaneously and differently in historical periods in which alternative social groups appeared to be truly progressive (Gramsci, as cited by Bates, 1975, p. 353), is seen from the shifts in self-image and metropolis’ identification of the settlers in their homelands.

Antonio Gramsci believed that government and voting are mere forms whose real content consists of effective control over cultural organizations and communication networks in civil society. Thus, “normal” hegemony is a balanced combination of power

and consensus, in which coercion does not undermine consensus, demonstrating everything in such a way that power is based on the consent of the majority (Gramsci, 2000, p. 26). Nonetheless, the settler colonial setting is not to be applied to the case of “normal” hegemony, taking into consideration the presence of genocidal (be it “indigenocide”, “cultural genocide”, “ethnocide”, or “politicide” [Wolfe, 2006, p. 402]) or marginalizing tendencies during settling processes.

It can be concluded that cultural hegemony in the understanding of A. Gramsci refers to the domestic politics of the state and the method of its legitimization. This is absolutely applicable to the study of the colonial relationship, especially in the Medieval times described above. Back then, “state” as such had not existed until the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and some of the settled colonies (take Ireland, the French Algeria in 1830-1962, or the further analyzed Siberian case), were claimed to be part of the empire. However, it does not fit Northern American case. Nonetheless, for understanding contemporary Russian settler colonialism, it is worth paying attention both to Gramsci’s work and to the contribution of Neo-Gramscianism, the founder of which is considered to be Robert Cox. If, according to Gramsci, the state is a block of the ruling class (i.e., their values), power structures (i.e., institutions), and intellectuals (ideas and ideology), then, R. Cox (1981, p. 126) claims that the foreign policy of the state, as well as the domestic one, is determined by the ruling class and serves its interests, and in the conditions of globalization, the ruling class seeks to spread its hegemony beyond the borders of its state.

Using a post-positivist approach and drawing on the works of Walter Lippmann, Noam Chomsky, Stuart Hall, Maxwell McCombs, et al., it can be argued that social structures and practices are primarily based on the fact that they are accepted by the public, and in general, modern societies exist due to the so-called “manufacture of consent” (Artz and Murphy, 2000, p. 3). As an example of cultural hegemony, media studies experts L. Artz and B. Murphy explored the concept of the “American dream”: if hegemony depends on consent achieved through material benefits, political organization, and cultural practices, then the existence of American hegemony means that subordinate

social groups have received significant benefit and supported those social relations that serve the dominant interests (Artz and Murphy, 2000, p. 35]. The American context has created such conditions that arrangements between large corporations, the government, and the working population are widely supported because there is a belief that anyone can become wealthy and successful, and that the “American dream” is not only for those in power, in the first place it is aimed at those who do not possess it. The “American dream” has serious material, political and cultural manifestations that are beneficial to the ruling classes, but echo among subordinate groups (Ellul, 1973, p. 66-68). The Russian desired alternative for such a cultural hegemony concept as a tool of foreign policy is to be analyzed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 2. Historical Perspective of the russian Settler Colonialism

2.1 The Irish Case Study as the Research Strategy for russian Settler Colonialism

A concentration on the worldwide history of settler colonialism is useful for truly transnational perspectives, and it counteracts the tendency to narrow the scope of narratives to the level of individual nations and states. The wide geographical scope of settler colonialism (considering the claim that the concept is applicable for analyzing locales in Africa, Latin America, Taiwan, the US, Israel, and Pakistan [Veracini, 2017, p. 4]), appears to be a more accepted concept in both scholarly and political realms, especially with the consideration of long-lasting existence of the “blue water principle”. Thus, to elaborate on the above-mentioned tendency to encounter the natives in the neighboring territories, the case study of Ireland (with additional remarks on the colonization in other parts of Europe and Northern America) is used to demonstrate both traditional perception of colonial relations and the exclusive peculiarities of settler colonialism, although they have proved to be less strict than might be expected. These distinctive features include the perception of colonizers’ ethnic/racial, but mainly (with regard to the current research) cultural “superiority”, manipulation with time, carried sovereignty on the settled territories, marginalization of the indigenous population, and a triad of relations between actors (settlers, natives and metropolis) instead of a dyad. Furthermore, the Irish case is taken into consideration with the purpose of illustrating the lack of the deterrent effect of time (from the English conquest (the late 12th) to the 17th century) or space when it comes to the phenomena of settler colonialism, and different scales of elimination of the indigenous peoples, which contributes to the further understanding of russian settler colonial tendencies shown in subsequent chapters.

Ireland is a vivid example of settlers’ pattern to move within macroregions in search for lands for establishing new social orders or polities. Professor Stephen Howe

claims that Ireland “was indeed a long-lasting laboratory of settler colonial practices (as well as of colonial ones, of course)” (Howe, as cited by Canny, 1973, pp. 575-98). Moreover, the Irish historian S. J. Connolly argues that a society of modern Ireland is totally formed by colonization, since both military conquest and the foreign settlers changed the demography, language, culture, religion and the social structures of this state forever (2017, p. 49). The Irish case is especially important in a sense that the distance settlers had to overcome was so short that “their movement could be credibly presented [...] as the reclamation and integration of an underdeveloped periphery” (Connolly, 2017, p. 49). What is more, the lack of racial factor (“the indigenous population among whom they settled [...] was both white and Christian” [Connolly, 2017, p. 49]) in conquering Ireland is another aspect making this case vital for studying Russian settler colonialism (especially in Ukraine).

The English colonization of Ireland was a part of a broader European process: adventurers from the territories of the former Carolingian empire embarked on a vast expansion, pushing into Slav regions east of the Elbe from the Germanic lands, from Normandy to Scotland and England; the Christian enclaves in northern Spain also reclaimed lands lost to the Arabs, while Christian statelets were established in the Middle East. This expansion was possible due to then superior military technology such as the crossbow, castle, and armored horseman, but it was also driven by population growth (Bartlett, 1993, as cited by Connolly, 2017). Nonetheless, the conquest of Ireland did not only involve the forceful imposition of a new ruling class on the native population, but it also paved the way for an influx of craftsmen, peasants, and laborers. Thus, despite the English conquest of Ireland being part of wider European tendencies, the political form initially was different – it was “the work of independent entrepreneurs, not states, and the outcome was the creation of autonomous new units” (Connolly, 2017, p. 50) and not the subordination of one country to another. Still, it is worth mentioning that the subsequent military development and success of England, as well as Henry II’s fear of the emergence of a rival state in the west, led to the monarch’s intervention in the conquest (which

initially was “likewise a freelance venture” [Connolly, 2017, p. 50]) with the proclamation of Ireland as a possession of the English crown.

Moreover, the density of settlement varied (Connolly, 2017, p. 49), thus, the lack of massive elimination of the natives does not imply a lack of settler colonial tendencies or simple migration. For instance, in Connacht and Ulster (Appendix 2) English lords had a network of small towns, but they extracted rents from the countryside, which was inhabited predominantly by the indigenous Irish population. On these territories, they were not able to survive the crisis of the late 13th and 14th centuries “when the lordship suffered a series of military reversals” (Connolly, 2017, p. 50), resulting in the fact that Irish lords were able to recover, whereas the few English magnates, “like the de Burgos of Connacht or the Savages of the Ards peninsula in east Ulster” (Connolly, 2017, p. 50) became integrated into the Irish environment. This appears to be the manifestation of a more classical colonial relationship. However, the surviving records about the east and south counties indicate that half or more of the head tenants on landed estates had surnames of English origin, laws, and taxes were under the jurisdiction of royal officials residing in Dublin (Empey, 1986), and “a slightly archaic dialect of English remained in widespread use” (Connolly, 2017, p. 50). In other words, right after the Black Death of 1348-1349, the English magnates were absorbed in the Gaelic environment in east Ulster; the counties adjacent to the city of Dublin (“the English Pale”) were the place with the settlers’ majority, while a frontier region, which was still ruled by the English, was “largely Irish in language and custom” (Connolly, 2017, p. 50), with Carrickfergus and Galway on the west remaining “solid bastions of English culture” (Connolly, 2017, p. 50). As can be seen, the degree of interaction between the settlers and the natives differed according to the region and the status. Those settled further from the Dublin-centered core of Englishness became almost indistinguishable from the locals in terms of dress or lifestyle (in particular due to marriage alliances needed for the decentralization of Irish polity) (Connolly, 2017, p. 51), while others retained most of their English heritage. Thus, within the boundaries of one country, there were manifestations of different types of colonialism, including settler one.

Peter Hogg, a New Zealand-born Canadian scholar and lawyer, notes that British common law distinguished between colonies that were acquired by conquest or settlement. When there was a conquest, “the law of the conquered people continued in force”, while during settlement, “the settlers brought with them the English law, and this became the initial law of the colony” (Hogg, 1997, Chapter 2). After 1172, when Ireland was designated as an English possession, the settler colonial features of the English judiciary manifested in the fact that the “legal code” of the new political unit (Ireland as a lordship) made the formal distinction between the settlers and the natives, where Irish could not own land, sue in the king’s courts, hold office neither in central nor in local government; and the killing of the Irish was not a felony in English law, wearing Irish costumes was penalized (Connolly, 2017, p. 50). That is to say, Irishmen were perceived as aliens rather than subjects, and they were deprived of the protection of the law. It was manifested in the 1454 mass expulsion of Irishmen who lived within the city of Dublin limits (Booker, 2018, p. 45), which is one of the settler colonial population marginalization techniques shown in subchapter 1.2. In this context, the Irish case is not unique since similar institutionalized ethnic distinctions (as Connolly puts it, “differential codes”) existed east of the Elbe (German rule over conquered Slavs), in the Spain of the Reconquista (between Arab and Christian), letting alone cases of racial differentiation in other parts of the world.

Nevertheless, the marriage alliances, English presidency over Irish-speaking households where Irish identity could not be rooted out, as well as a mixture (with a varying degree depending on the region) of Irish and English sovereignty (which is sometimes called the process of “gaelicization” [Connolly, 2007]). The “gaelicization” suggests a shift in English settlers’ self-image, which distinguishes settler colonialism from other forms of colonial relations. Eventually, the distance in terms of political identity between the settlers and their former homeland became so significant that “visitors to England, despite their English blood, could find themselves treated as foreigners” (Connolly, 2017, p. 51), in addition to the fact that in 1440 English settlers in Ireland were added to the poll tax “levied on aliens” (Connolly, 2017, p. 51). Finally,

within Ireland, there were frequent clashes between the established settlers and newly arrived ones, or between the settlers and English-born officials who were sent to Ireland to impose unwelcome regulations. In addition, the state's status as a lordship, complete with its own parliament and legal system, formed the institutional foundation for a distinct corporate identity. Nonetheless, it is necessary to mention that medieval Europe was a society of overlapping jurisdiction, as well as liberties, so frequently unruly behavior of the lordships was not much different from that of their counterparts on Welsh or Scottish borders, or the peripheries of other states situated in Europe (Ellis, 1995). Subsequently, the declaration in 1460 about Ireland being "corporate of itself" (Lydon, 1995, p. 9) was a manifestation of the mentioned triad of the relationship between the natives, the settlers, and the metropolis: it was neither the rejection of the English identity nor recognition of the Irish self-determination. It was settlers' assertion of the sectoral rights as the English in Ireland in return for their subjectivity under the crown with the defense of their Irish possessions (Cosgrove, 1983, pp. 25-41).

The end of the sixteenth century with the extended Tudor rule over Ireland brought new challenges for the self-image of the English settlers, as well as gave the example of one of the most distinguishing peculiarities of settler colonialism, which is manipulation with time. The newcomers from England, which was then "solidly committed to the Reformation" (Connolly, 2017, p. 51), started settling in Ireland which remained faithful to Rome. According to Veracini, in a settler colonial setting, policy plays a crucial role in facilitating the advancement of settlers while simultaneously neutralizing the impact of new migrants (2010, p. 4). Hence, though tensions between recently arrived and longer established colonists were not new, a deepened confessional division led to the emergence of two groups that are easily discernible: the Protestant New English and the Catholic Old English (Connolly, 2017, p. 51). That is the moment when newcomers' perceived cultural supremacy was back at the game with attacks on the Old English for the "cultural degeneracy reflected in their intermarriage with the Gaelic Irish and their adoption of [...] Irish custom" (Clarke, 1966, as cited by Connelly, 2017, p. 52). This led not only to the Irish elites' deepened crisis but also to the Old English settlers' because the New English

in Ulster became numerous enough in order to provide the alternative elite. The peak of these identity crises is depicted in the case of 1641 when, during the British multi-sided civil war, the Old English joined the Gaelic Irish. Starting from the late sixteenth century, the emergence of the term “Old English” indicated a significant and even dangerous shift in the status of the descendants of medieval settlers in Ireland. They were no longer considered the English of Ireland, furthermore, they began to be considered “unreliable” in the metropolis (Connolly, 2017, p. 53). After 1660, the term “Old English” vanished and the Protestant ruling class started using “Irish” to refer to the entire Catholic population, without regard to their ancestry, while reserving the label “the English” for themselves as true guarantors of crown’s political order (Connolly, 2017, pp. 52-53), simultaneously with the active import of Scottish settlers to Ireland (Connolly, 2017, p. 54). Therefore, such a language choice was part of a broader strategy to reinforce the social and political dominance of the Protestant elite in Ireland, and the long-established settlers became the victims of their own strategy, which is mainly based on the dogmatically excused cultural dominance of the colonialists and can also be tracked in the context of russian settler colonial practices.

2.2 Siberia as a Principal russian Settler Colony

Despite the narrative that russia is not a typical (if at all) colonizer due to its both so-called growing “friendship” with the indigenous populations and lack of continent-to-continent approach, mentioned in the previous Chapter, both russian and English-speaking scholarly endeavors demonstrate that Imperial russia adopted practices and ideologies which explicitly resemble those of other European imperial states (Morrison, 2017 p. 313). However, the very history of russian imperialism poses a challenge to its studies: most studies concentrate on colonization taking place before the upheaval of 1917 1) denouncing colonization “as one of the Tsarist regime’s many exploitative policies” (Morrison, 2017, p. 313); 2) legitimizing russian narrative about subsequent resettlements

as a part of “a high modernist nation-building framework” during the Soviet times with the inevitable accusation of “bourgeois nationalism” if continuing applying colonial-related terms to russian context after the establishment of the USSR (Morrison, 2017; Slezkine, 1994). Moreover, the restrictions existed in the face of lack of published sources before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which also contributed to the “long afterlife” of even “least convincing aspects of Soviet historiography” (Morrison, 2017, p. 313), such as the concept of fraternity or friendship between various Soviet ethnoses. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War became the impetus for the scholars to start gathering the body of publications regarding russian imperialism.

Even while studying the history of russian expansion, one may encounter justifying narratives of the colonial practices. For instance, Alexander Etkind, who is now considered to be Soviet-born American and British historian and cultural scientist, has suggested the history of russian expansion as “a process of ‘internal colonization’ of different peoples (including the russians themselves) by a state that was equally alien and remote to all” (Etkind, as cited by Morrison, 2017, p. 314). russian literary critic A. Kazarkin (2008) appears to be a bit more denunciatory in his suggestions regarding russian colonization of Siberia. In his work “Stages of Colonization of Siberia” (“Etapy kolonizatsii Sibiri”) (here and further translated from russian by the author) he cites G. Potanin who was one of the first russian scholars to claim that the history of Siberia is the history of colonization (letting alone various “narrowly nationalist view[s]” of scholarship from Kazakhstan, Tashkent, Turkestan etc. [Morrison, 2017, p. 314]). According to G. Vernadsky, an American historian of Ukrainian origin born in russian Empire, moscow became the heiress of the Golden Horde, but colonization went the opposite direction – from west to east (Vernadsky, as cited by Kazarkin, 2008, p. 40). Moreover, the classics of russian historiography were more than straightforward in their works: for instance, V. Klyuchevskiy (1841-1911) wrote that “the backbone of the national [russian] history is the colonization of new lands” (Klyuchevskiy, as cited by Kazarkin, 2008, p. 31). The discussion within russian ethnographers and historians continued with the question: What reasons compelled the russian people, who possessed

a comparatively spacious territory in relation to their population, to occupy more and more new places (Lyubavskiy, 2000, p. 164, as cited by Kazarkin, 2008)?

According to G. Potanin, there were two variations of russian colonization: the first was “free people’s” (“volnonarodnaya”) and the second was governmental, led by military commanders known as voivodes. There is a clear connection between the Irish and the Siberian cases with the former starting with the influx of peasants and craftsmen, and the latter, according to A. Morrison (2017), as a consequence of the imposition of serfdom and religious persecution resulting in the many peasants fleeing from the areas of russian state authority. In other words, an emphasis is on the idea that settlement had begun from the grassroots. The same tendency is claimed by historians and ethnographers P. Slovtsov and A. Schapov who emphasized that the aspiration of the people to relocate to Siberia was a consequence of the conflict with the state, and the same opinion was voiced by S. Bakhrushin during the Soviet times (cited by Kazarkin, 2008, p. 31).

Nonetheless, although Alexander Morrison claims that “...there [in English-language historiography] is now enough published [...] on russian settler colonialism” (2017, p. 314), the ideas who were the first russian settlers in Siberia vary, but this research is aimed at complementing the existing scholarship. With regards to Morrison, the first settlers were mainly the Old Believers (“starovery”) who had fled from religious oppression and eventually formed a unique community of “old residents” (“starozhiltsy”) before the state-ruled colonization, where they incorporated both indigenous and settler ways of life, which is the manifestation of how settlers manipulate time and carry their sovereignty with them following Veracini’s characterization of settler colonialism. It is also mentioned in russian-speaking scholarship with Kazarkin emphasizing on “Old Ritualists” (“staroobryadcy”), who are the same as Old Believers, and according to him, they not only fled from the state voluntarily, but also were exiled to Siberia over allegations of being schismatic “despite the fact that it did not match with the historical reality” of the russian empire (2008, p. 34).

Speaking about state-ruled colonization, the manifestation is russian recognition and incorporation of the autonomous Cossack groups that arose beyond its borders from

the intermingling of runaway serfs and semi-nomads, offering them land and tax exemptions in exchange for military service (Morrison, 2017, p. 314). russian-speaking sources describe the Cossack movement to Siberia as “triumphal advancement through the taiga zone [...], indeed, firearms and combat organization made a “conquering” impression on the indigenous people” (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 32). Nevertheless, Kazarkin describes first stages of settling Siberia as “genocide”, since “colonization usually refers to the influence of a stage-superior culture on indigenous peoples” (2008, p. 32), and it, according to him, took place later, which formally denies colonization itself on the early stages due to the lack of acknowledgement of settler colonialism as a concept. This thesis is supported by Morrison, who claims that even though russian settlement in Asia was often catastrophic for non-russian peoples, it is not that easy to classify as settler colonialism. Instead, politically and religiously dissident and culturally hybrid communities of Sibiriyaki emerged on the margins of the russian state (Morrison, 2017, p. 314) and sometimes joined forces with indigenous peoples against it with Pugachevshchina as a manifestation – the Pugachev’s rebellion in 1773, when Cossacks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Qalmyqs, and Kazakhs rose up against Catherine II (Bosin, 2009).

One more of the weighty and complex manifestations of russian colonization processes is the existence of penal colony, which is an exile by administrative decrees and by the verdict of the courts, where remoteness of hard labor places, harsh climate and difficulties with escaping made Siberia attractive for state-ruled settlement of the region. “The criminals were a real scourge of the Siberian villages, but it was they who made up the bulk of the “settlers” (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 34). The impetus took place after Pugachev’s rebellion, when Siberia became more actively used as a place for criminal and political banishment for those the state “considered undesirable” (Morrison, 2017, p. 314).

According to A. Morrison, the hierarchies in russian settler societies were not based on race or degree of admixture of “European” blood but rather on access to power and religious beliefs (2017, p. 314). Only after a long period of near-independence were the Sibiriyaki subjected to centralized state control, and it was only in the late 19th century that a creole Siberian identity began to re-emerge, which has never successfully separated

itself from Russian control (Witzenrath, 2007, as cited by Morrison, 2017). With a usage of sarcastic language, Russian scholar claims that “unlike the democratic United States, the Russian Empire included aborigines in the social hierarchy, “foreigners” sometimes made progress in career advancement, but a condition for achieving high ranks was baptism” (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 33). Moreover, he also added that acculturation was one of the key challenges for settlers in Siberia: the number of nomads lowered, and more and more agriculturalists could be found within Tatars, Khakas, and Buryats (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 33), which is known as the process of sedentarization, and is the bright manifestation of Veracini’s transfer by coerced lifestyle change. In fact, Russians highly institutionalized their settler colonialism: in the Steppe Statute of 1891 it was stated that the land, occupied by nomads “remains in indefinite collective use of the nomads, on the basis of custom [...]” with a note that “land which appears to be surplus [...] for the nomads will come under the direction of the Ministry of State Properties” (*Polozhenie ob upravlenii oblastei Akmolinskoi, Semipalatinskoi, Semirechenskoi, Ural’skoi i Turgaiskoi i ob izmenenii nekotorykh statei Polozhenii ob upravlenii Turkestanskago kraya* [Regulations on the administration of the regions of Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Semirechensk, Ural and Turgai and on amendments to some articles of the Regulations on the administration of the Turkestan Territory], 1891, p. 143, as cited by Morrison, 2017, p. 318), which implied that the process of determining available land was a contentious and subjective matter, despite the attempts to make it look scientific in administrative terms. As a demonstration, 1896 became the year when an expedition led by statistician F. Shcherbina was dispatched by the Committee for the Transsiberian Railway for surveying the northern region of the Kazakh steppe to evaluate the agricultural potential of the land and the probable impact of its settlement (*Materialy po kirgizskomu zemlepol’zovaniuu* [Materials on Kyrgyz land use], 1898-1909, as cited by Morrison, 2017, p. 318). After this expedition, the set of norms was elaborated for the distinguished Russian and Kazakh households which was used to determine the amount of available land and the number of settler plots that could be established on that land. As a result, the above-mentioned sedentarization of the indigenous peoples became the result of state-ruled scientific-like expedition, which

justified the so-called diminishing land needs of the locals for the purpose of giving the “surplus” of the land (*izlishki*) to the respective Ministry, thus leaving the natives no option but to come under the settlers’ transfer by a lifestyle change in order to be able to be in direct competition with settlers “for the best arable land” (Morrison, 2017, p. 318). What is more, russian scholarship emphasizes that in Siberia, “the main features of russian culture of the previous centuries had been repeated”: preference for river routes over land, folding at first military-administrative, and then cultural centers. Turko-Mongolian Siberia subjugated Rus’ on horseback, and [...] Cossacks crossed Siberia along the rivers, like the Vikings in [...] Rus’” (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 35), which manifests imposition of cultural hegemony on the settled territories. It is also supported by the fact that in “pre-russian Siberia” rivers had not been used for traveling long distances, and means of transportation corresponded to the economy of the appropriating type, and there had been no need for roads (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 35). Furthermore, russian ideology suggests that areas that “do not set cultural goals, do not live for themselves, [...] and therefore remain a raw material colony. Then national tasks are solved at the expense of abandoning local ones” (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 38). Thus, not supporting the dominant culture would imply being left on the periphery of social and state life.

Finally, once encouraged by the state to resettle Cossacks became the victims of “*ob’yasachivanie*” (the term that does not have an equivalent in English but means the imposition of *yasak* – a fur tribute/tax (“*dan*”) designated using a Turkic word literally meaning “tribute” imposed on indigenous people in imperial russia). The shift in perception of the former allies of the state caused the swift movement of settlers even further to the east (Kazarkin, 2008, p. 32), for instance, to Kamchatka.

To conclude, despite the “free people’s movement” part, the most distinctive part of russian settler colonialism, according to Morrison, is the strong identification with the state and consequent gaining of its support, due to which poor peasants could become landowners if they moved to settle in the distant regions of the russian empire.

2.3 russian Settling Colonialism and Ukraine During the Soviet Times

The history of Ukraine is complex and marked by a series of invasions, wars, and periods of colonization, one of the most significant for understanding modernity is the russian settler colonialism, which began in the late 18th century and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (with the manifestations evolving nowadays). During this time, Ukraine was subject to a range of policies aimed at consolidating russian power, from land reforms and forced russification to violent suppression of national uprisings. This subchapter explores key features of settler colonialism which evolved in Ukraine due to the endeavor of russia during the Soviet era. Importantly, the discussed cases are presented not in chronological order, but with regard to the critical components of settler colonialism as a notion. Finally, the main emphasis is put on Crimea as the clearest illustration of settler colonial practices employed by russia.

Considering the above-mentioned various transfers as a defining basis for settler colonialism, one of the most outstanding and least contentious (in terms of difficulties with denying it) manifestations is **ethnic transfer**, taking place continuously during the times of colonization of Ukraine with the notable example of the Crimea during the Soviet times. According to M. Sviezhentsev, the Soviet Union successfully utilized national and migration policies to replace the local population with migrants in order to strengthen the loyalty of the border territories, moreover, the methods of such replacement were not unique and repeated the usual imperial colonial traditions (Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 73).

Taking into account Patrick Wolfe's statement that settler colonialism is "a structure not an event" (Wolfe, 1999, p. 96) since colonizers come in order to stay, the fundamental aspect is that this structure typically continues to exist and reproduce even after the formal decolonization of the land: for instance, successors of settler colonizers naturally begin to consider the colonized territory as their own, blurring the term "local" as such. Consequently, the post-World War II colonial transformation of Crimea is not an event but a structure that was created by the efforts of state national policy and has remained after the collapse of the USSR (Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 74).

Hence, despite various relatively small-in-scope transfers (or deportations) of Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1920s (see Dovbnaya, 2018), the biggest ethnic transfer taking place in Ukraine is the deportation of Crimean Tatars (or qırımli, a modern self-name of the Eastern European Turkic indigenous peoples of the Crimea) in 1944 organized by Joseph Stalin. The forced displacement of indigenous peoples of the Crimea began on 18 May 1944 “in all Crimean inhabited localities” with more than 230 000 people (of whom qırımli exceeded 200 000, and also included 9 620 Armenians, 12 420 Bulgarians, and 15 040 Greeks [Sandole et al., 2008]) deported, mostly to Uzbekistan (Appendix 4).

Furthermore, on 15 March 1954, the secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Communist Party (CP) of Ukraine Dmytro Polyanskyi addressed the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), Andriy Kyrychenko, with a request to prohibit “all administratively evicted persons in 1944 from returning and living in the territory of the Crimean region” (TSDAHO [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], sheet 6, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 76). As a result of this letter, Kyrychenko turned to Nikita Khrushchev, where it was noted that “...the Crimean region is a border region and the settlement of former special settlers [the deported peoples] there is undesirable” (TSDAHO [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], sheet 7, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 76). According to the document sent in 1967 to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU Shelest by the Crimean Regional Committee of the Party, during the planned resettlement to Crimea after the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944, 101 707 families, or 406 828 people, were relocated to the peninsula, of whom around 4000 families who stayed in the Crimea were related to the former officers, that is, military retirees of high rank (Sviezhentsev, 2017, pp. 78-79). Notably, Sevastopol (being the main city of the Black Sea Fleet and settled by the military pensioners) became closed for visiting in 1966, having resulted in making it the city of the military “with a unique culture, political significance for Crimea, and a consciousness of the population” (Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 80).

The **transfer by conceptual displacement** with a lack of recognition of the natives as indigenous to the land can be seen in the party documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As an illustration, after 1956, when some restrictions on the place of residence for qırımlı were partially lifted, the party records included complaints from the Crimean Regional Committee of the CP and central republican party bodies about the “nationalist activities of certain segments of the intelligentsia among the Crimean Tatars”: according to these documents, qırımlı activists “use their visits to the Crimea to search for various historical and archival materials that would confirm that Crimea is *supposedly* (italics by Sviezhentsev) an ancestral Tatar land and, relying on these materials, seek to return to the Crimea” (TSDAHO [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], sheets 71-72, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 76).

Notably, the complementary practice noted by Veracini with an unspecified broader group also took place with the conceptual displacement outside of the settlement area. Its manifestation is seen in the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU’s address to Nikita Khrushchev with a request to allow the renaming of Crimean toponyms since such Turkish and Tatar names remind “the period of suffering from the raiding hordes of Turkish sultans” (TSDAHO [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], sheet 22, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 77).

Transfer by means of “repressive authenticity”, intertwined with **Narrative transfer (I)** in the case of qırımlı evolved in the overall russocentric context of the russian empire and the Soviet Union. Talking about the latter, the New Economic Policy (NEP) period can be characterized, according to Terry Martin, by the affirmative action policies, which, nevertheless, were rather “short-term concessions” from the Bolsheviks in order to gain support from the non-russian republics (Martin, 2001, p. 20). Nonetheless, since the 1930s, the national policy of the USSR began to favor russian nationality over other communities, which was called russocentrism by Brandenberger (cited by Umland, 2010). In accordance with Brandenberger, these changes reinforced the existing hierarchy and added an informal level to the formal institutional hierarchy, and the Soviet Union’s “friendship of nations” and multiculturalism envisioned the russian people gradually

becoming “first among equals,” with Russian language and culture serving as a unifying force for all Soviet peoples. At the same time, the cultures and histories of non-Russian peoples were to be coordinated and incorporated into the overall historical narrative of the Russian state, serving as a supplement to the main narrative (Brandenberger, 2009, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 74). Since the 1930s, multiethnicity stopped being perceived as a tool for increasing loyalty and got back to an orientalist approach with the “Western” (in the case of the USSR – Russocentric) perception of non-Slavic peoples and accordant characteristics that are allegedly specific for the East. Hence, the authenticity of Crimean Tatars became the excuse for the CP to deport the indigenous peoples of the Crimea because of “distrust in national elites that populated the border territories” (Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 75), which corresponds with the idea implied in this transfer – “radicalism” which legitimizes the marginalization of the natives, depicting them as lacking in development and progress, representing a basic form of human civilization, which helped in justifying Russian domination in the diverse Soviet society with a vivid example of the history of the Crimea. It should be mentioned that the primitivization of the Crimean Tatars has its origins in the Tsarist times: Catherine II explained the reasons for the annexation of the peninsula with the thesis that Crimean Tatars have “inborn intransigence” (Schönle, 2001, p. 2) and that they are incapable of self-government due to the consistent dependency on the Ottoman Empire (Sasse, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 77).

In addition, the Narrative transfer (I) suggests that the indigenous sector of the population economy is emptied, which also could be seen in the post-war Crimea. According to Sviezhentsev, after the “cleansing” of the Crimea, the already complex economic situation worsened even more – the main problem in the development had been drought (before the building of the North Crimean Canal in 1961-1971), and the Crimean Tatars knew how to deal with the peculiarities of the region. However, after the ethnic transfer of 1944, they were replaced by farmers from other regions and republics (later – with the former military personnel. The numbers are presented in Appendix 4) of the

Soviet Union, and the natural conditions of Crimea became the first and the most major challenge for the settlers (Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 76).

Indigenous incarceration, criminalization, and/or institutionalization is the main tool for the marginalization of both Ukrainians and qırımlı. First of all, during the 1930s, the period of the collectivization in the Soviet Union, the kulaks (or kurkuli) – relatively wealthy peasants in the USSR who were considered to be capitalists, hence, enemies of socialism. During a reception at the kremlin in 1937, Joseph Stalin proclaimed, “We will eliminate every such enemy [of the state] ... we will eliminate his entire lineage [“rod”], his family!” (Alexopoulos, 2008). As a result, the policies of “dekulakization” had been enforced by the Soviet authorities that combined several types of settler colonial transfers: 1) “kulaks” had been deported to the distant areas of the USSR (63817 families from Ukraine were exiled just during 1930-1931 [Zemskov, 2005]), with the subsequent settlement of russian families to the now-vacant houses (from Kaganovich’s letter to Stalin, “you asked what operational task we gave to the Resettlement Committee for 1933. At the end of August, we tasked them with resettling 15-20 thousand families in Ukraine (in the steppe)” (Kramar, 2010) which, taking into consideration contemporary recognition of 1932-1933 famine as genocide of Ukrainians (take European Parliament, 2022), it can be assumed as an ethnic transfer with the goal to prepare the ground for the resettlement of russians (Morochko, 2017, p. 34); 2) overall planned shift from the individual to collective household is a manifestation of transfer by coerced lifestyle change; 3) deportation to Siberia as a place for penalty demonstrates criminalization of Ukrainian peasants. Furthermore, even “children [of kulaks] got criminalized and placed in labor colonies” (Kuzovova, 2021, p. 61).

Speaking of the qırımlı, the Soviet authorities declared Crimean Tatars as collaborators with accusations of relations with the Nazi regime (Dagdzhi, 2008) with the demonstrative court process over the “group of traitorous executioners of the Motherland” in 1972 (in addition to overall ethnocide of the qırımlı). What is more, in 1966, the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Gorshkov addressed the Central Committee of the CPU with the request to limit access of third parties (mainly the deported

population) to Sevastopol and adjacent areas of strategic importance: “after allowing free entry to Sevastopol, the number of cases of hooliganism and venereal diseases has increased in the city, and the conditions of living services for servicemen and their families have deteriorated, which leads to a decline in discipline and morale-political issues...” (TSDAHO [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], sheet 113, as cited by Sviezhentsev, 2017, p. 76), which supports the implied association between the natives and criminality, specific to this type of transfer.

Transfer by name confiscation is applicable to both Ukrainians and qırımlı as well. Speaking about the former, this transfer is most noticeable in the surnames: “He went [to the Soviet army] as Havryliv [...] and got back as Havrilov, there was Shvets’ [who] became Shevtsov” (although Shvets is a Ukrainian surname derived from the word “shoemaker” (shvets’), which is “sapozhnik” in russian) (Popovskyi, 2015, p. 189). According to him, such examples are numerous, and they are mainly based on the philological peculiarities of the languages. Nevertheless, Popovskyi emphasizes that some of the national surname characteristics disappeared and their structure was distorted, while instead foreign national features were being rooted in order to russify Ukrainians. The same is applicable to the toponymic names in Ukraine. According to the language researcher of Soviet totalitarianism, Larisa Masenko, numerous renamings of historical names under the pseudonyms and surnames of Soviet leaders and officials resulted in hundreds of identical names of settlements derived from anthroponyms like Lenin, Kirov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Sverdlov, etc. that spread throughout the vast territory of the giant state. Thus, the same names of avenues, streets, and alleys formed a uniform toponymic landscape of cities and villages of the former USSR (Masenko, 2017, p. 205), let alone russian-themed streets that contributed to challenging the formation of civic and national Ukrainian identity and imposing russian cultural space and consequently the hegemony.

When it comes to the Crimea, according to the request of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU to Nikita Khrushchev, the renaming of Crimean Tatar and Turkish toponyms was desirable since “a number of geographic objects such as mountains and rivers that have Turkish and Tatar names [...] remind our people of the period of

severe suffering from the marauding hordes of Turkish sultans and Crimean khans. In order to restore names that correspond to historical events and natural conditions, [...] the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine requests permission to change the names of the indicated geographic objects in the list and give them names that correspond to historical events and the interests of our people” (TSDAHO [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], sheet 22, as cited by Sviezhentsev, p. 77).

Summing it up, it can be seen that settler colonialism of Russia on Ukrainian territories evolved consistently during the Soviet times and had its origins in the Tsarist times. The ethnic transfer, exemplified by the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944, stands out as one of the most significant manifestations of settler colonial practices. The use of repressive authenticity and narrative transfer further marginalizes indigenous populations, whom Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars are, by criminalizing, institutionalizing, and displacing them, with the manifestations during the Holodomor and policies applied towards qırımlı after the deportation. The renaming of toponyms and surnames also serves as a tool for name confiscation, erasing the indigenous cultural identity and imposing Russian hegemony. Overall, the case of Ukraine, particularly the Crimea, illustrates the enduring legacy of settler colonialism and its impact on the region’s history, population and identity. Furthermore, Russia appears to be steady in its colonial and settler colonial politics even after large-scale decolonization processes of the 20th century, which is to be analyzed in the next Chapter.

Chapter 3. Contemporary Attempts at russian Settler Colonialism in Ukraine

3.1 Contemporary Colonization of the Crimea as the Case of russia's Combination of Settler Colonialism with Influence Activities

Access to resources might be perceived as a basis for international affairs, and the struggle for them, of which the most significant are human resources, is believed to have reached a different level nowadays. According to M. Karmazina (2015, p. 22), possessing human resources ensures the possession of other resources (including raw materials), in addition, it ensures the production of material goods, which are redistributed by those who have the governing resource in the state, and in yet others, it enables the acquisition and retention of the “power” resource itself. The acquisition of human resources is ensured by openly violent means and by the so-called “soft power” directed primarily at reformatting human knowledge and, accordingly, beliefs.

In the current research paper, it is suggested that the russian federation has long-lasting ambitions of hegemony – that is, dominance over other states; however, it does not possess the characteristics given by Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox, such as the spontaneous consent given by masses to the general direction imposed by the dominant group, as is described in 1.3. Then, if the imposition of Gramscian cultural hegemony is not possible due to the lack of significant benefits that would attract the subordinate social groups to support the social relations that serve the dominant interests, the acquisition of human resources is ensured by hybrid methods (including influence activities), which, according to Karlsen (2019, p. 2) is a “tradition” of the russian federation which was inherited from the Soviet Union. Influence activities “are aimed at influencing someone to agree with your opinions or do what you want” (Collins, 2017). Moreover, it aligns with the russian understanding of “soft power”: while Joseph Nye (2004, p. 10) argues about the link between political power and the attractiveness of culture and values, for the russian federation, soft power, instead of attraction, “refers to non-military

instruments for manipulating, undermining, and weakening opponents, a supplement to moscow's military power" (Meister, 2016, p. 7). In other words, influence activities are tools of hybrid warfare, which is "a combination of military actions, covert operations, and an aggressive program of disinformation" (Rasmussen, as cited by Wither, 2016, p. 76), which is stated in this research as a tool of russia to impose its hegemony, including cultural one.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of Ukrainian identity became highly scrutinized in both Ukrainian- and English-speaking scholarly fields, especially from the postcolonial perspective. As stated by M. Karmazina (2015, p. 23), one of the most significant challenges to civic identity is the external political pressure from neighboring states, and the influence of russia on the processes of the formation of Ukrainian civic identity (as an attractive period for those willing to acquire Ukrainian human resources) has been dominant since the beginning of the 1990s, and the independence of Ukraine became the traumatizing event for russian imperial consciousness.

Furthermore, an ethnic factor will later become the basis for russian claims on the human resources of Ukraine: at the beginning of the 1990s, actions of the russian government agencies were aimed at forcefully implanting russian civic identity in people who lived on the territory of Ukraine. This is evidenced by the fact that on January 6, 1992, the personnel of military units deployed on the territory of Ukraine were ordered to take an oath of allegiance to the russian federation ("Ukraina moloda" [Young Ukraine], 1992, as cited by Karmazina, 2015, p. 25). In other words, people who felt a kind of "coercion to citizenship", were military personnel, which corresponds with the policies of the USSR in the post-war Crimea (Karmazina, 2015, p. 25). As one of the main mechanisms for the destruction of Ukrainian newly-established political space, public organizations (especially those based on an ethnic basis) played a significant role: "russian Community of Crimea", "Front of National Salvation /Crimea/", "Congress of russian Organizations of Ukraine", etc (Karmazina, 2015, p. 27). Getting back to Appendix 4, it comes as no surprise that russians were especially active in the Crimean

Peninsula. It can be assumed that the Soviet policies conducted in the Crimea since the 1940s created the basis for the consequent consolidation of anti-Ukrainian forces in the Crimea with blurring the line of who the natives of the region are, which is a peculiarity of settler colonialism and the Narrative transfer (III), as well as Transfer by settler indigenization. For example, the idea of “Crimea as russian land” has been present in the information space of the peninsula in one way or another with the manifestation in the rally held in Simferopol, organized jointly by the Crimean Republican Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the “russian Community of Crimea”, and the “russian Society” in October 2003, where the participants speaking under russian flags openly declared their readiness to transfer the island of Tuzla and the entire Crimea to the russian federation (“2000”, as cited by Karmazina, 2015, p. 29). Furthermore, in February 2004, it was noted that “Crimean media mostly take pro-russian positions. Moreover, they behave aggressively towards Ukraine, denigrate everything Ukrainian, reject Ukraine’s statehood, advocate for the annexation of the Crimea to russia, and provide platforms for anti-Ukrainian statements by russian politicians” (“Chornomorski novyny” [The Black Sea News], 2004, as cited by Karmazina, 2015, p. 32). As a result, after the russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014, vladimir putin issued a decree to award around 300 journalists for “objectivity in covering events in the Crimea” (Karmazina, 2015, p. 32).

In addition, the russian Orthodox Church has traditionally been a specific provider of russian interests in Ukraine (and other territories where it operates), actively involved in supporting pro-russian forces in Ukraine and their activities against Ukrainian identity since Ukraine gained independence. Its manifestation is seen in the statements of the representatives of this church in the Crimea: “...The russian people are a divided nation on *their historical territory* (emphasis added), which has the right to reunite in a single state entity... We hope that the mission of russian soldiers to defend the freedom and identity of these people and their lives will not encounter fierce resistance that will lead to large-scale clashes” (Chaplin, 2014, as cited by Karmazina, 2015, p. 35), thus legitimizing occupation in the minds of the believers.

Finally, in his research, Erik Brattberg (2018) illustrates cases of russian interference in the elections in European countries with its intention to have pro-russian agents in the parliaments of countries that are perceived as traditional democracies. Hence, russian interference in elections in Ukraine during its civic identity formation period seems to be typical of their political strategy. For instance, the russian political technologist and advisor to the head of the russian presidential administration G. Pavlovsky confessed to his active participation in Viktor Yanukovich's 2004 election campaign (Karmazina, 2015, p. 33). Let alone covert interference resulted in the fact that Ukrainian state leaders', such as Ukrainian Prime-minister V. Pustovoytenko's, claims about the importance of strategic partnership with russia, or then Ukrainian President L. Kuchma's statements that cooperation with russia is in accordance with Ukrainian national interests in 2003 (Karmazina, 2015, pp. 29-30) on the background of clearly separatist activities in regions suffering from russian settler colonialism.

To conclude, the "cleansed" (in alignment with the then vocabulary of the CPU, but in reality, settled by colonizers) peninsula became the fertile soil for the subsequent russian influence activities, which resulted in the occupation of the Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent aggression against Ukraine, including full-scale invasion.

3.2 russian Settling Colonialism after the russian Invasion of Ukraine (2014-ongoing)

As can be seen, russian leadership has actively employed the usage of ethnic factors in their foreign policy strategy. Moreover, according to Karlsen (2019, p. 1) targeting populations, as well as using minorities, refugees, and extremists, are distinctive features of russian influence activities. In line with Chyrkov (2017, p. 26), russia as an aggressor state uses ethnicities in various ways, and the russian invasion of Ukraine, which started in 2014, has an impact on the ethnic structure of the Ukrainian population due to the russian need to "correct" the Ukrainian state's policy, parties, and other political entities

regarding national security. Furthermore, even russian researchers (such as A. Illarionov [2016] reported that putin's claims about the numerical dominance of ethnic russians on Ukrainian East-South ("The south of Ukraine [...] there are only russians there... [putin, 2008]"; "We will always protect ethnic russians in Ukraine and that part of the Ukrainian people who feel their inseparable not only ethnic but also cultural and linguistic connection with russia" [putin, 2014, as cited by BBC, 2014]) do not correspond to reality. Then it can be concluded that russian policies in the occupied regions are aimed at bringing these statements to actuality, especially considering the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decrease in the proportion of ethnic russians by two or more times, as well as the relative weight of Belarusians, had been taking place as a result of ethno-demographic changes in Ukraine as a result of both the return of Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland and restoration of historical memory by the previously russified groups of Ukrainians (Chyrkov, 2017, p. 27). Hence, russia was losing its main social base for its influence on Ukraine and for controlling the Ukrainian government.

According to Veracini's classification of transfers used in settler colonial practices, russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 is a manifestation of **non-diplomatic transfer** where the settler retains control over the area but does not acknowledge its responsibility. It had been the case until February 2022.

First of all, it is crucial to mention how the special operation to annex the Crimea by russia started: on January 20, 2014, the trucks without license plates and the russian military with weapons but without identification marks, later called "polite men", or "little green men" by russian journalists, appeared on the peninsula. According to Sinyakov (2014), calling the invaders "russian troops", thus recognizing the invasion of a sovereign state, was not accepted and is even dangerous in russian media space). Then, in Sevastopol and Simferopol, anti-Ukrainian rallies were organized by special services under separatist slogans and St. George ribbons, where the leading role was played by "specially imported citizens of russia, including athletes, security company employees, and former military personnel who provoked conflicts and tried to destabilize the

situation” (CCD, 2023), which is also a typical hybrid operation as a part of russian influence activity in the region described in the previous subchapter. A month after the annexation and after the invasion of the Eastern part of Ukraine, during his annual “direct line” – a political question and answer televised event in the russian federation, vladimir putin acknowledged the presence of russian military personnel as “green men” in the Crimea, but recognized neither russian presence in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, nor new Kyiv authorities (RIA, 2014). Speaking of the russian puppet regime in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the russian federation had not recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed so-called “the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic”, nor had it acknowledged its presence there until February 21, 2022, when vladimir putin announced recognition the independence of these two Ukrainian regions that had been occupied since 2014 (BBC News, 2014) and April 28, 2023, when the russian leader signed a law on the status of combat veteran for russian occupants who fought in Donbas since 2014 (with this document, russia officially recognized the presence of its army in Ukraine since 2014, which brought their narratives about self-government of the separatist regions and russian “we-will-deny-they-are-there” [“ikhtamnet”], as well as non-diplomatic transfer, to an end), accordingly.

After the illegal and illegitimate referendum conducted in the Crimea and subsequent annexation of the peninsula, as well as the seizure of a large part of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, colonial practices became a decisive factor in changing the ethnocultural situation back in national interests of the russian federation. According to Chyrkov (2017, pp. 26-28), on the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the main target remained the consciousness of the population, but in the Crimea, there began a decrease in the proportion of indigenous peoples (Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars), and a resurgence in the share of ethnic russians, which was evidenced by the population census conducted by the occupying authorities and collaborators in the Crimea (which, of course, contributes to undermining trust in the reliability of the source; yet, in the context of occupation, this remains one of the exceptional sources to get data from).




Figure 3.1 – The population of the Crimea according to the census conducted by the Russian Federation in 2014 after the annexation.

Source: by the author based on data provided by Russian occupation authorities (Statdata.ru, 2021)



Figure 3.2 – The population of the Crimea according to the census conducted by the Russian Federation in 2014 after the annexation (thousands of inhabitants)

Source: by the author based on data by Russian occupation authorities (Statdata.ru, 2021)

The naming of the population categories is kept from the original source – notably, the inhabitants of the Crimea coming from the Russian Federation are put as of “the Russian Federation *subjects outside Crimea*” (emphasis by the author), highlighting the so-called belonging of the peninsula to Russia. In addition, it is crucial to keep in mind that the share of the native-born inhabitants of the peninsula is strongly affected by the previous settler colonial practices including the elimination of the indigenous peoples conducted in the post-war period.

Moreover, as reported by the occupants (Statdata.ru, 2021), the population of the Crimea as of January 1, 2021, is 2,411,570 permanent residents, which leads to an assumption that, compared to 2014, it has increased by more than 120 000 people. Nevertheless, according to estimates from various Ukrainian experts, between 600,000 to one million Russians have moved to live in the occupied Crimea since 2014 (Dorohan, 2021). One thing is clear in any case – after the occupation Russians got back to their policies of settler colonialism. Following the locals’ comments given to Ukrainian media, “Indigenous Sevastopol residents and Crimean natives are leaving, and there is a process of genetic mixing and settlement of Russians. They are being resettled here, provided with housing, given some incentives, [...], while we are simply pushed to the back of the line” (Dorohan, 2021). In line with this information, contemporary Russian settlers want to live in a warm place, coming from Norilsk, Lake Baikal, Arkhangelsk, and so on.

Except for the mere resettling, Russians keep providing the needed for settler colonialism transfers, especially indigenous criminalization and incarceration. For instance, in 2016, the Ministry of Justice of Russia included the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (which is the single highest executive-representative body of the qırımlı) in the list of extremist organizations. The same year, the Crimean Tatar lawyer Emil Kurbedinov reported on the prosecution of four Crimean Tatars for “extremism” (unian.ua, 06.2016), The First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars, Nariman Dzhelal informed that searches of qırımlı in the Kamianka district of Simferopol were conducted as part of the so-called fight against illegal migrants (unian.ua, 26.05.2016), after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, there have been increasing cases

of detentions of Crimean Tatars on the peninsula, and searches in the homes of Crimean Tatars and mosques have become more frequent, and a dissident and the former Chairman of the Mejlis Mustafa Dzhemilev published the list of 14 Crimean Tatar political prisoners who were held in the detention facilities of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (unian.ua, 10.05.2016).

Speaking of the settler colonialism of Russia after the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, despite the deficit of information, it can be concluded that it continues to evolve. For instance, there was an advertisement posted on the Russian site “bulletin board” Avito with the apartments that are sold in Melitopol (Strilchuk, 2022), the city in the Zaporizhzhya region of Ukraine which was occupied on the 1st of March, 2022. According to the head of the Luhansk regional military administration Serhiy Haidai, the occupants are settling various types of militants in the houses of the locals, including Wagner mercenaries, as well as newly mobilized individuals of different backgrounds (Rudenko, 2023). The same scenario had been evolving in Kherson – the only regional center that Russian troops were able to seize after the full-scale aggression. According to Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Hanna Malyar, Russian military personnel is transporting their relatives to temporarily occupied Kherson and settling them in apartments and houses of local residents who were forced to leave their homes. On June 16, 2022, during the briefing, she announced that the transportation of families of Russian servicemen has intensified (Ukrinform TV, 2022). Following Ukrainian officials’ statements, it has been made to convince locals that they are supposedly staying there “forever”. Finally, Russians promise the Ukrainians who were forced to leave their homes as a result of occupations to give them back their houses in exchange for getting the passports of the Russian Federation (Prokopchuk, 2023), which fits the Russian perception of cultural hegemony – the imposition of their identity, blurring civic consciousness of the colonized peoples, and forced Russification.

3.3 Ukrainian and International Policies Aimed at Counteracting russian Settler Colonialism and Cultural Hegemony under Conditions of Military Aggression

As a response to the challenges posed by both russian full-scale aggression and long-lasting settler colonialism (as well as classical colonialism) with the peculiar imposition of cultural hegemony, Ukraine is in the stage of developing a policy strategy aimed at safeguarding its sovereignty, protecting its indigenous population, and preserving its cultural identity, while simultaneously being invaded by russia and fighting on the battlefield. In addition, Ukraine engages the international community to counteract the consequences of russian imperialistic ambitions.

First of all, taking into consideration the difficult conditions of qırımlı after the russian occupation of the Crimea, on July 21, 2021, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed into law “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine” No. 1616-IX, which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on July 1, 2021. According to the Law, the Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks are recognized as indigenous peoples of Ukraine who have formed on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. This act aims to provide maximum protection of the cultural, informational, and other rights of indigenous peoples and to establish mechanisms and tools for their collaboration with the Ukrainian state, and it specifically recognizes representative bodies of indigenous peoples, which are now considered to be “extremists” in the russian federation. According to the document signed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, indigenous peoples have the right to observe, revive, and develop their spiritual, religious, and cultural traditions and customs, preserve their tangible and intangible cultural heritage, determine the list of their own places and objects of religious and cultural significance, restore their historical toponymy, and cooperate with educational institutions to ensure the study of their language, history, and culture. The law comes into effect from the day of its publication (except for part 3 of Article 7, which establishes the right of indigenous peoples to allocate a portion of the revenue from the use of natural resources for the needs of indigenous peoples of Ukraine, and which

takes effect after the return of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol under the general jurisdiction of Ukraine) (Official website of the President of Ukraine, 2021).

Furthermore, Alim Aliyev, a social activist of Crimean Tatar origin whose family got back to the Crimea from Uzbekistan, admitted that “over the past five to six years [from 2015 – author], the amount of Crimean Tatar literature translated into the Ukrainian language has increased several times compared to the previous quarter-century” (Aliyev, as cited by Trehub, 2021), which illustrates Ukrainian willingness to get acquainted with the culture of the indigenous peoples of its state.

Secondly, the Association of Reintegration of Crimea (ARC) in cooperation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine et al. under the International Scientific-Practical Roundtable on the Occasion of the Day of Resistance to the Occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol published the strategy of de-occupation and reintegration of the Crimea. They reported that russian aggression, among other things described above, “has worsened the situation regarding children’s rights in the occupied Crimea and has created new challenges for children in conflict zones and newly occupied areas of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and other regions of Ukraine” (Sidorenko, 2023, p. 242). ARC has consistently communicated concerns regarding the infringement of Ukrainian children’s fundamental rights by russian aggressors to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the UN Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, including child prostitution, child pornography and other child sexual abuse material (ARC, 2022).

Considering russian active usage of children in its occupation strategies, it can be assumed that youngsters are the main target of the russian federation in terms of the imposition of cultural hegemony. In its submission to the UN Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, ARC noted that “all Ukrainian minors transported from the

conflict zone to the occupied russian peninsula underwent criminal ‘sorting’, and all their cultural needs were ignored by the russian aggressors” (Sidorenko, 2023, pp. 243-244).

On February 6, 2023, the propagandistic sources of the russian federation disseminated a statement made by Maria Lvova-Belova, the authorized representative for children’s rights to the president of the russian federation, in which she announced the implementation of an integration project called “Poslezavtra” (The Day After Tomorrow) in the Crimea. According to the ARC report (2023, p. 243), this project represents yet another criminal violation against Ukrainian children, which is evident from publicly available information that these activities were organized in October at the “Litvinove” base in Krasnogorsk, near moscow. Additionally, a similar illegal event took place in Tuapse in 2022, and the occupiers previously announced another “project” with a military-patriotic focus that would occur in Chechnya. Taking into consideration limitations of access to the occupied territories by the Ukrainian state, at the current stage, counteracting policies include monitoring such events with the example of the activities of The Center for Civic Education “Almenda”, which was created in 2011 in Yalta, Crimea. They publish reports on propagandistic activities conducted over Ukrainian children in the occupied Crimea (for instance, Monitoring Reports on “Universal Soldier” events are published after every single conduct [Almenda]).

The 2022 UN Resolution on Human Rights in the Crimea highlighted the detrimental and lasting environmental impact of russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the occupied Crimea. It also acknowledges the forced displacement of a significant number of Crimean residents due to the occupation regime and emphasizes the criminal deportation of individuals to and from the Crimea by the russian occupiers. Additionally, it brings attention to the criminal “filtering procedures” imposed on displaced persons. In addition, the UN General Assembly demands that russia promptly and unconditionally revoke the “procedures for obtaining russian citizenship” for Ukrainian orphans, as well as urges russia to provide comprehensive information to relevant UN entities regarding forcibly transferred or deported Ukrainian children, including those illegally “adopted”. Furthermore, the resolution calls for an end to these criminal practices (such as

“militarization and assimilation of young people in the Crimea by the Russian Federation, including combat training for Crimean children for military service in the Russian Armed Forces and the introduction of a “military-patriotic” education system [...], blocking of the access of residents of the Crimea to Ukrainian education” [UN General Assembly, 2022]), which demonstrates the engagement of the international community in the process of dealing with consequences of Russian occupational practices.

In addition, on January 26, 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly (PA) of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 2482 (2023) titled “Legal and Human Rights Aspects of the Russian Federation’s Aggression against Ukraine”. This resolution classifies the aggressor’s actions as crimes, including enforced disappearances, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, unlawful detention of civilians, forcible displacement and deportation of Ukrainian citizens, including children, to the Russian Federation or occupied territories of the Russian Federation, and forced illegal “passportization” (Parliamentary Assembly, 2023). In Article 17 (Parliamentary Assembly, 2023) of the Resolution, the PA urges the Ukrainian authorities to prioritize the implementation of necessary procedures to gather information and facilitate the safe repatriation of Ukrainian children who have been forcibly transferred to the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied territories. After all, it is precisely what the International Criminal Court’s Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan issued arrest warrants for Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in accusation of kidnapping and deporting thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia (International Criminal Court, 2023).

Speaking of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, considering that the influence activities there have been more impactful than settler colonialism to the ongoing fighting since 2014, Ukraine, recognizing the significance of education and media in countering cultural hegemony, is currently developing the policy strategy of reintegration of the Donbas region which has been under occupation since 2014. It includes initiatives to strengthen Ukrainian-language education, promote cultural diversity, challenge distorted historical narratives propagated by Russian authorities, provide healthcare, restore the financial and banking sector, increase employment, demining territories, etc. (Ministry of

Internal Affairs of Ukraine), which is also under development by The Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, which was established in 2016.

Another aspect of Ukrainian policies aimed at fighting the imposition of russian culture is the renaming of russian-related toponymy. On March 21, 2022, a law was passed in the Verkhovna Rada that prohibits geographical names that symbolize the occupying state or its prominent, memorial, historical, and cultural places, and figures associated with military aggression (Horlach, 2022). As noted in the explanatory note published by the Verkhovna Rada, “the law aims to decolonize toponymy and regulate the use of geographical names in populated areas of Ukraine [...] Its purpose is to fully restore Ukrainian historical and national toponymy, modernize it with the names of contemporary heroes in the struggle against the enemy”. It should be noted that prior to this law, in 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted legislation aimed at the condemnation of the communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the prohibition of the propaganda of their symbolism (Verkhovna Rada, 2015, as cited by Horlach, 2022), which, by the way, had been called controversial by the leading media, such as The Guardian, which published an article with the name “Ukraine to rewrite Soviet history with controversial ‘decommunisation’ laws” (Hyde, 2015).

Finally, the proactive management of migration and settlement patterns is under consideration in Ukraine, understanding the risks associated with the influx of russian settlers. For instance, Tamila Tasheva, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea commented on policies that will be applied regarding russian settlers after the de-occupation of the Crimea. According to her, after leaving the territory of Ukraine, russians will have the opportunity to apply for residence to Ukrainian migration authorities, and certain categories of individuals will be able to obtain residence permits in Ukraine: for instance, this applies to representatives of indigenous peoples-repatriates. According to Tasheva, this includes thousands of people who began the process of obtaining Ukrainian citizenship in 2014 but did not have time to complete it. It may also apply to lawyers of political prisoners, relatives of illegally

imprisoned individuals, and a limited category of people who have been assisting and supporting Ukraine throughout the entire period (Tasheva, as cited by Lozovenko, 2023). Importantly, she noted that “all russian citizens, in fact, are colonizers because they came to the occupied territory to change its demographic composition. They are accomplices in the crime” (Tasheva, as cited by Lozovenko, 2023). Following her, the collective expulsion of russians who illegally entered the territory of Ukraine after 2014 will not take place in the Crimea, therefore, individual decisions will be applied to those russians, moreover, she emphasized that Ukraine recognizes all Ukrainians in the Crimea who have become victims of russia’s forced passportization as its citizens according to the legislation.

To conclude, Ukraine, despite being in the context of the military aggression of the russian federation, has started the process of developing policies and strategies to protect its sovereignty, indigenous population, and cultural identity as a response to challenges brought by russian long-lasting both colonial and settler colonial practices, which became especially salient after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine not only for Ukraine and its citizens but for the whole world.

CONCLUSIONS

With regard to the research findings, settler colonialism, which emerged in the last two decades as a separate subfield in the realm of colonial-related studies, though the term has existed since the 1920s as an explanation of British colonialism in Australia, is connected with the failure of previous scholarly endeavors (such as neocolonialism, internal colonialism, postcolonialism) to explain the continuing subjection of the indigenous peoples, especially on the territories where the “blue water” principle – that is, colonizers’ arrival by sea, could not be applied. Hence, the peculiarities of settler colonialism include 1) the recognition that colonizers do not necessarily arrive on boats (though sometimes they do); 2) settlers can act independently from the state (despite it can be otherwise); 3) settler colonialism includes structuring contrasts that are not present in mere colonial forms; 4) existing of settler colonialism rejects statement that colonialism ceases being colonialism when colonizers become the majority; 5) it also rejects the idea that new states appear when settlers outnumber the natives, which had been an influential thought in colonial-related studies until the 1990s; 6) settler colonialism focuses on the erosion of the colonized subjective, not the reproduction of the subordination; 7) instead of a classical dyad of relations between the colony and the metropolis, settler colonialism includes a triad between metropolis, settlers, and the natives.

Furthermore, settler colonialism is impossible without a collective sovereign displacement. Thus, transfers – or the capacity to move groups of people (physically or narratively), are the basis for this type of colonial relations. Those of them that are relevant for this research, include necropolitical transfer, ethnic transfer, transfer by conceptual displacement, civilizational transfer, transfer by assimilation, transfer by accounting, transfer by means of “repressive authenticity”, three types of narrative transfers, transfer by coerced lifestyle change, non-diplomatic transfer, indigenous incarceration, criminalization, and/or institutionalization, transfer by settler indigenization, transfer by name confiscation, and transfer by executive termination.

Considering the fact that settler colonialism and colonialism are intertwined, and the latter is closely associated with the ethnic, racial, or cultural supposed superiority of the colonizers, the key tenets of Gramscianism had been identified. They incorporate the idea that people are governed not only by force but also by ideas; popularization of the worldview of the ruling, or dominant class, and the subsequent “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the subordinate population; the exercise of power of the ruling class on both levels of socioeconomic organization – civil and political societies. Notably, if the “sellers” of cultures (according to Antonio Gramsci, these are intellectuals) fail to create hegemony, the dominant class resorts to coercion (which is the case with Russian settler colonialism), but then it ceases to be “normal” cultural hegemony and turns into indigenocide. The contribution of Neo-Gramscianism includes the idea that cultural hegemony (which is proposed by A. Gramsci as relations between the ruling and the ruled class inside one state) is determined by the aspirations of the dominant group to spread it beyond the borders of its state in the context of globalization.

Taking into account the lasting existence of the “blue water” principle, the Irish case of settler colonialism serves as a vivid example of settlers’ pattern to move within macroregions and illustrates the importance of studying settler colonialism from a global perspective. The case study of Ireland is used to demonstrate both traditional colonial relations and the distinct characteristics of settler colonialism (in comparison with migration): factors such as cultural superiority (in contrast to the traditional perception of the supposed racial superiority of the colonizers – the imposition of English culture on Irish population), manipulation with time (escaping the social order disrupted by modernity, in case of Ireland – fleeing of the English Catholics), sovereignty over settled territories, marginalization of indigenous populations (for instance, transfer by name confiscation), and the triadic relationships between settlers, natives, and metropolises (conflicts between the “New English”, the “Old English”, and the Irish).

Having an example of settler colonialism within Eurasia, the case study of Siberia (based on both Russian- and English-speaking scholarly endeavors) demonstrates that imperial Russia adopted practices and ideologies typical of other European imperial

powers. The early stages of russian settler colonization of Siberia included the influx of Old Believers and autonomous Cossack groups (with the former illustrating the manipulation with time concept), as well as the subsequent establishment of penal colonies. Speaking of cultural aspects, the hierarchies, similarly to Ireland, were based on religious beliefs rather than on race. Nevertheless, the distinctive feature of russian settler colonialism, apart from the typical characteristics inherent in settler colonialism and its transfers, is the later strong identification of the settlers with the state.

According to the results of the research paper, russian settler colonialism in Ukraine during the Soviet era had significant impacts, particularly, but not exclusively, in the Crimea. The forced deportation of qırımlı, as well as other ethnic minorities on the peninsula, in 1944 and the subsequent resettlement of russian migrants aimed to consolidate russian power, which was also the case as a result of collectivization in other parts of Ukraine. The Soviet Union's state-ruled national and migration policies replaced the local population with settlers, in addition, it blurred the concept of "local", which has manifested nowadays. The marginalization of indigenous people, denial of their indigenous status, and renaming of toponyms further illustrate the settler colonial practices. Furthermore, these transfers and repressions persisted even after formal decolonization; name confiscation affected both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, reinforcing russification efforts in the region. Hence, it can be concluded that the Soviet era in Ukraine reflects the structures and impacts of settler colonialism.

Having "cleansed" the peninsula during the Soviet times, russia continued its settler colonial practices after Ukrainian independence was obtained in 1991. Nevertheless, due to the inability to impose "normal" hegemony, russia has applied its influence activities on the territory of a sovereign state, contributing to the formation of Ukrainian civic identity. russian interference, including covert actions and support for pro-russian forces, has been observed in elections and political activities in Ukraine, and the russian Orthodox Church has played a role in supporting pro-russian forces and legitimizing occupation. All these factors have contributed to the russian annexation of Crimea in 2014

and subsequent aggression against Ukraine, which has been used by the Russian Federation as another opportunity to get back to their settler colonial practices.

Russian invasion of Ukraine, among other things, is aimed to manipulate the ethnic structure of the population. Settler colonial practices, including resettlement and marginalization of indigenous peoples, have been observed: Russia has settled its own citizens (particularly military personnel and their families) in occupied territories; the Crimean Tatars have faced persecution, and the Russian government has recognized extremist organizations; Russia seeks to enforce cultural hegemony by means of forced Russification (including passportization and “military-patriotic” education system imposition on Ukrainian children on the occupied territories).

In response to the challenges posed by Russian aggression and the accompanying settler colonialism, Ukraine is developing policy strategies to safeguard its sovereignty, protect its indigenous population, and preserve its cultural identity. These strategies aim to promote cultural diversity and counteract Russian cultural hegemony, which is seen from the adopted legislation regarding Russian-themed names, the rights of indigenous populations, as well as the increasing translation of Crimean Tatar literature into Ukrainian, etc. Furthermore, Ukrainian public organizations are involved in monitoring Russian propagandistic activities targeting the Ukrainian population on the occupied territories, and the corresponding submissions are being made to relevant international organizations. As a consequence, the international community is also engaged in addressing the consequences of Russian occupational practices, including highlighting human rights violations, demanding the repatriation of Ukrainian children, and classifying the aggressor’s actions as crimes.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1


The cover of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples



Source: “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2011, pp. 909–921, <https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2011.0040>.

Appendix 2


The bastions of English culture and political allegiance in Ireland



Source: Connolly, J. “Settler Colonialism in Ireland from the English Conquest to the Nineteenth Century.” *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, by Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, London, Routledge, 2017, p. 62.

Appendix 3

The illustration of movement implied in the language of transfer by assimilation



Source: Veracini, Lorenzo. *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 25.


Appendix 4

The demographic situation on the Crimean Peninsula as a result of ethnic transfer

Crimean population

A look at the historical composition of Crimea's population.

Major populations
in percent



Sources: Census data (Simferopol 1989) via "Crimea", by Maria Drohobycky; 1959 Soviet Census; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001 census

C. Inton, 14/03/2014

REUTERS

Source: Lubin, Gus. "How russians Became Crimea's Largest Ethnic Group, in One Haunting Chart." Business Insider, 2014, www.businessinsider.com/crimea-demographics-chart-2014-3?r=US&IR=T.

АНОТАЦІЯ

Кваліфікаційної роботи

Тема: Переселенський колоніалізм російської федерації в Україні через призму постмарксизму

Студент: Шумська Катерина Олександрівна

Рік навчання, факультет: 4 рік навчання, факультет соціальних наук та соціальних технологій

Науковий керівник: ст. викладач, кандидат політичних наук Тараненко Г. Г.

Рецензент _____

Захищена “ ____ ” червня 2023 р.

Короткий зміст роботи:

У кваліфікаційній роботі досліджується концепція переселенського колоніалізму в контексті колонізації України російською федерацією крізь призму постмарксизму, зокрема грамшіанства та неограмшіанства. Дослідження має на меті виявити причини появи переселенського колоніалізму як окремого наукового напрямку та концептуалізувати термін «переселенський колоніалізм» та його специфічні особливості, що відрізняють його від інших форм колоніальних відносин. Крім того, встановлено відмінні риси російського переселенського колоніалізму. У роботі також концептуалізується трансфер як основа для переселенського колоніалізму та демонструються приклади на розглянутих кейсах Ірландії, Сибіру та України. Насамкінець, у статті розглядаються поточні та потенційні наслідки переселенського колоніалізму України російською федерацією та шляхи протидії йому з боку України та міжнародної спільноти.

Short summary:

The thesis paper explores the concept of settler colonialism in the context of the Russian Federation's colonization of Ukraine through the lens of post-Marxism, particularly Gramscianism and Neo-Gramscianism. The research paper aims to identify the reasons for the emergence of settler colonialism as a separate scholarly subfield and to conceptualize the term "settler colonialism" and its specific peculiarities that distinguish it from other forms of colonial relationships. Moreover, distinctive features of the Russian settler colonialism are determined. The paper also conceptualizes transfer as a basis for settler colonization and finds examples from the overviewed cases of Ireland, Siberia, and Ukraine. Finally, the paper considers the current and potential consequences of Russian Federation's settler colonization of Ukraine and the ways in which Ukraine and the international community counteract it.