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## REGIONAL SPLIT IN UKRAINE: THE CASE OF POLITICAL CULTURE

*The article considers the distribution of some aspects of political culture (political competence, trust in politicians and the voting rate) in the regions of Ukraine using a solid empirical basis (20381 interviews collected by Kiev International Institute from May 2001 to April 2002). The popular belief that western region of Ukraine is a seat for the strongest political engagement of population is tested. The data show the absence of one unique pattern of political culture in the western region. The three elements of political culture are strongly dis-correlated here and in other regions of Ukraine. This means that only Galicia region without Ternopil oblast shows coherent political culture, otherwise components are unevenly developed. Some central and southern oblasts have either high political competence or high voting rate.*

West-east cultural split in Ukraine is often referred issue in political and scientific discussions. It is widely known that Ukraine is divided into western Ukrainian-speaking and Russified eastern part. This split is determined by historically rooted cultural divergence and it coincides with geographic locations of these regions. Normally the most western seven *oblasts* are referred as "western Ukraine" that quite precisely corresponds to the history of this area - joining Soviet Union relatively recently, in 1939-1945 years besides Volyn, domination of Ukrainian language, pro-national independence attitudes and pro-Western orientation in understanding of foreign policy. Central oblasts, which are situated on the both banks of Dnepr, came under the control of Russia much earlier, in XVII and XVIII centuries, and consequently are stronger Russified than the western oblasts. Southeastern parts, although being under the power of Cossacks and Crimean Tatars until XVIII century, were even stronger Russified than the center because of mass set-

tlement of Russians there. Five most eastern oblasts are the closest to Russian border and the most Russified that is typical for Crimea, the area that became "Ukrainian" only in 1954, as well. Hence, studies show [1] that usage of Russian language and pro-Russian orientation increases as one moves from the west to east-south [2].

However, little is known how far the west lasts in cultural terms and whether the central part can be described as some "in-between" tendency, neither Russian, nor Ukrainian, "vague identity" [3], where nationalistic values are weaker than in the western Ukraine but stronger than in the eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, in the oblasts commonly defined as "western" live no more than 20% of population, however, 40% live in central part of Ukraine. Central Ukraine has its own history, the longest in terms of national sovereignty if to recall three hundreds years of Cossack state rule that lasted from XV to late XVIII century. This may signify that central parts formed their particular

culture that differs from both western and eastern tendency not only in strength but also in the quality of cultural values.

Another problem is north-south split in cultural space. The point is that southern and northern oblasts of Ukraine have borders with different states and their borderland's experience may be important for formation of cultural values there. Whereas northern parts were largely under the influence of Russian empire, borderland's experience of southern oblasts is associated more with the influence of non-Slavic cultures: Romania, Hungary, Turkey and Crimean Tatars. Maybe multicultural experience, which is far richer in forelands of Black Sea than in hinterlands like north and remote east lands of Ukraine, is facilitating, for example, for more openness and trustfulness in attitudes.

These considerations propel the hypotheses that cultural split may be seen along horizontal (north-south) not only vertical (west-east) lines. Situation of western Ukraine is of particular interest, since although being border zone as a whole, it is culturally heterogeneous in itself, that is understandable because its southern (Bukovina and Zakarpattjia), central (Galicia) and northern (Volyn) parts experienced different history with different empires and states that had colonized them (Austro-Hungarian, later Poland, Hungary, Check lands and Moldova, and, on the other hand, Russian Empire). It may well happen that in some respects Volyn is closer to other northern oblasts than to Galicia, or that Bukovina and Zakarpattjia share the same cultural pattern rather with other southern oblasts than the other western. This is, in other words, to say that none of the regions is inner homogeneous in a sense of values, however, the western region - in a last turn, because of its location on the crossroads of cultures.

#### Political Culture: Theoretical Premises and Study in Ukraine

In order to test these two hypotheses, about the place of the north on the cultural map and the role of horizontal border-lines I suggest to consider *political culture* as a dependent variable. Political culture is a complex set of attitudes, feelings and behavior about political subjects. Similarly to other cultural variables such as language in use and religiosity, it is believed to be a stable constellation typical for a certain historical region during considerable period of

time. It is formed by historical past, geographic location and access to resources and by many other factors that altogether produce different "quality of civility", which is believed to be overwhelmingly persistent despite changes in relative ratings of economic indicators of the region [4].

However, the problem with Ukraine that two tendencies that are relevant to development of civic culture, democratization and modernization [5], came from different ends of the country. Western part of Ukraine definitely has longer democratic experience and less heritage of autocracy due to less anti-nationalistic pressure in Austro-Hungarian Empire and its successors than in Russia Empire and Soviet Union. However, modernization came into Ukraine from the side of Moscow that was conducive to the growth of large industrial cities on the east of Ukraine starting from the second part of XIX century. In contemporary Ukraine nine out of ten cities with the largest populations situated out of western region. The growth of cities is congruent with growing education, flows of information, developing of infrastructures that altogether are conducive to growing of political awareness and political participation [6], no matter was it capitalist or Soviet industrialization.

All these arguments are used to assume that although west-east continuity perfectly well reflects the decline in importance of such variables as Ukrainian language in use, religiosity, family patterns and nationalist attitudes, it may not show the decline in political culture patterns.

Almond and Verba [7] defined three components of political culture: cognitive, emotive and behavioral. Cognitive component encompasses exposure to politics, or following political affairs, and subjective competence, or belief in the effect of policy on one's life. Along with emotional component (national pride and belief in equal treatment by power) and behavioral (political participation) it composes unique combination of political culture. High placement in all three signifies the emergence of participant political culture, or *civic culture*. The opposite pole is *political alienation*. Almond and Verba described the cases of inconsistent patterns of political culture, when high placement on one scale coappears with low placement on another. Thus, political culture of Mexico was described as combination of national pride and desire to express political attitudes with lack of political

information, while political culture of Italians was described as high involvement in political affairs but hostile attitudes toward state policy. Similarly in Ukraine, it might have happened that different experience of democratization, of multicultural contacts and of modernization in different regions facilitated uneven development of three elements of political culture in Ukraine.

There is the unique empirical evidence on the inconsistency of regional patterns of political culture in Ukraine, which was gained on the eve of obtaining independence by Ukraine in 1991 [8]. The first wave of this study showed negative correlation of political competence (measured as the share of those, who read about politics in newspapers and talk about politics with friends) with political activity (measured in participation in rallies and contacts with political activists). In seven out of nine specified regions [9], with exception of Crimea and the east of Ukraine, engagement in to political information was found to be in reverse proportion with the rates of political participation. The strongest miscorrelation was reported in western Ukraine, which was taken without its northern and southern parts, or *as* the region known historically as Galicia, the part with the highest rate of nationalistic attitudes. Here one can find the second lowest after Crimea % of those reading about politics in newspapers (33% of those, who provide answers) and the highest in Ukraine share of those who contacts activists of political movements (12%) [10]. In contrast, in Central part including Kiev-city, higher competence (50 and 51% correspondingly) appeared in parallel with low rates of participation (3 %). Eastern region and Crimea showed coherent patterns of competence and participation, both high in the east (58 and 8 % respectively) and low in Crimea (25 and 5 %),

Basing on this finding it can be hypothesized that some regions of Ukraine in the year 2002 can be described as some patterns where high placement in one dimension does not correspond to high placement in the other. Probably, the western region still can be described by low political awareness but high activity, while the center shows high interest in politics, but low activity. It well may happen that none of region show "consistent" pattern of political culture with all dimensions placed high or low.

I do take into consideration that specific combination of elements of political culture is

probably not stable constellation typical for this or that region of Ukraine. One should remember that "political culture" is but one concept to explain political activity that is not defended from critics [11]. Concept of "rational choice", for example, suggests current economic interests as the factors of left-right voting.

Nevertheless I would like to look for patterns similar to that found by Golovacha in 1991, in Ukraine of 2002, when the separation of this or that region from Ukraine is no longer an issue. Probably because of the aforementioned contradicting influences that came from the west and the east, stable types of political cultures have been formed in the certain region. Since the case of Ukraine can be described as "several countries in one", several types of political culture can be probably found.

In theoretical sense I am not going to explain the specificity of political culture in different regions of Ukraine but to question the very existence of a "single political subculture" within traditionally taken regions of Ukraine. Political culture probably will provides different basis for rationalization that the distribution of language, religiosity or even political preferences that means nothing else that differently put questions provide different answers.

#### Operationalization of the Key Terms and Data Description

In this text political culture is understood as the combination of three elements: political competence, political trust and political participation. This approach has just some repercussions with concepts of civic culture by Almond and Verba. The three dimensions under study are: awareness about political affairs (cognitive component), trust in politicians (emotive-cognitive component) and participation in elections (behavioral).

The data that I use are aggregated, or ecological, data: they show distribution of the variable in percentage or average index calculated for oblasts of Ukraine, not for respondents. Therefore, we analyze percentage or means within 26 cases (25 oblasts of Ukraine plus Kiev-city as a separate case). Data were taken from national representative for adult population surveys that were conducted by Kiev International Institute of Sociology for the "Foundation for Public Opinion" (Russia), from January to May of 2002, altogether 10 studies, total number of the interviewed is 20381 [12]. Aver-

age indices of political competence and trust were calculated for each oblast and included in ecological data, percentage of those, who took part in the voting, was taken from the site of Central Election Committee.

Political competence was calculated as the number of marks provided to the question: "Here some Ukrainian politicians are named. Please, mark if you ever heard, or read, about some of them". From 18 to 23 prominent politicians were incorporated in the list, eleven of them were analyzed as by no means known personalities, who took active part in election campaign to Ukrainian Parliament, Verkhovna Rada, that took held in January-March 2002 [13]. The index has maximal value "11" for those who marked all eleven politicians, and value "1" for those who named only one politician. Value "0" includes those who marked no name, who avoided answering, or named solely one or more of the other seven less known politicians about whom question was asked that is rather improbable situation.

Political trust was operationalized as the difference between attitudes that express general trust and distrust to prominent Ukrainian politicians. General trust was calculated as a number of positive responses to the multiple choice question concerning the same list of eleven politicians "To whom of them do you trust?". The answers were coded as "1" for one choice and "0" for all other versions. Similarly to political awareness the index took values from "1" for those, who named one politician, and "11" for those, who named all eleven. General distrust was constructed in the same way, with only difference that choices were coded as "-1", and maximal value of distrust is, respectively "-11". The resulting index of political trust is taken as a simple difference (general trust - general distrust), and varies from -11 to 11. In ecological data this index is correlated positively with general trust (0,14) and negatively with general distrust (-0,92).

Since the list included both, oppositional (5) and power-party politicians (6), our variable "General Trust" taps the amount of trust that people are ready to grant to politicians. It is intuitively felt that trust expressed to opposition and pro-power politicians has different connotations. Pro-power politicians had already the chance to meet people's expectation and people judge about their reliability basing on their knowledge on efficacy of these politicians. Trust

in opposition is based rather on expectation of better than power-party performance since none of them has operated in full power including Viktor Yuschenko, who once took the post of Prime Minister. Nevertheless, here we are interested in general ability to invest trust in politicians despite any particular political sympathies.

Political participation is taken as voting rate as Central Election Committee reported it, in % to eligible electorate in each oblast.

The first hypothesis is that western Ukraine, defined as seven most western oblasts, is not the region where all elements of political culture are placed high. Political culture of the eastern and southern Ukraine will be more alienated than that of the western and northern Ukraine, however, there is no evidence that enable us to predict the relative ranking of the three components of political culture. Second hypothesis posits that uneven development of the three elements of political culture will be found, and first of all in the western and central region as it was in 1991.

#### **Political Competence, Trust and Voting Activity in Ukraine**

First, we will analyze political competence, trust to politicians and voting activity within regions taken by their geographic definition (See Map1 the Footnote 1 one for the distribution of oblasts).

**Table 1. Regional Means of Political Competence, Trust and Voting Rate**

Region	Mean of Competence	Mean of Trust	Mean of voting rate
West	8,24	-0,32	75,04
Center	9,30	-0,69	72,82
South	7,99	-0,76	64,30
East	8,74	-1,14	65,60
F-statistics	1,68	1,21	8,32*
Ukraine	8,68	-0,68	70,80

\* - two tail significant at the level of 1%

It can be seen from Table 1 that distribution of political competence does not correspond to

"west-east axis". The mean of political competence in the western region (8.24) is significantly lower than in the center (9.30) and even somewhat lower than in the eastern region. The region with the lowest political competence is the southern, not eastern region.

Although difference among all regional means is statistically significant, variance among oblasts is even higher that is shown by non-significant F-statistics. This is to say that political competence varies vastly not only within the western region, but within the other regions too due to some oblasts-exceptions. Although central region showed the highest competence, two oblast out of nine (including Kiev-city as "oblast") there are two exceptions: Zhytomyr and Chernihiv (difference with the next "lower-competent" central oblast, Kievan, is significant at the level of 1 % ) (See Table 2). Looking at the western oblasts we see the widest range of political competence starting from 3,99 of average names of politicians listed in Ternopil oblast to 9,59 in Rivne. Concerning the eastern region one may say that habitants of these region at average are less competent than habitants of the central oblasts, however, with exception of Dnipropetrovsk with 9,43 politicians named (difference with the next "high-competent" oblast, Kharkiv, is significant at the level of 1 %). The southern region has the lowest political competence, less than 8 politicians at average named, but again with exception of one oblast out of four: Kherson (differences with the next "high-competent" oblast, Odesa, is significant at the level of 1 %).

How these exceptions can be explained? Ternopil is the most obvious exception from the western region with extremely low political competence. This only partially can be explained by the fact that Ternopil like almost all western oblasts belong to the most ruralized region of Ukraine (54,5% of rural population here). Habitants of the cities and villages of Ternopil oblasts show almost identical competence. On the other hand, other rural western oblast (Zakarpattjia) showed much higher competence, both within rural and urban dwellers. The level of education, a stable correlate of political competence, in Ternopil is about country average, both measured as average number of years studied and as a share of people with higher education. Probably, "rural culture" effected both urban and rural dwellers.

Italics signify those oblasts with inconsistent pattern of political culture. Bold marks the means that are higher than average for Ukraine, and italics - when lower, but only for those parameters that define the exceptional position of the given oblast relatively to a region.

Relatively higher political competence in Dnipropetrovsk is, probably, explained by highly urbanized structure: Dnipropetrovsk oblast is not only strongly urbanized oblast where almost half of population live in the largest urban units, it also has the highest in the eastern region share of highly educated people. Although, Kharkiv follows shortly after Dnipropetrovsk by urban and education structure, the difference is that Kharkiv shows a considerable gap between competence of urban (9,01) and rural dwellers (7,79). Probably this is explained by the fact that Dnipropetrovsk region was the most powerful basis for military metallurgic industry of the Soviet Union that ensured relatively high living standards there, and higher political competence as a consequence. Probably, these conditions effected rural dwellers as well as urban.

Kherson, the meaningful exception from the "southern case" is different from the other four southern oblasts due to relatively higher share of Ukrainian speaking population (13% against 1,4-10 in other oblasts) and less pro-Russian orientation (27% comparing to 70 in Crimea and 53 and 62 in Mykolaiv and Odesa respectively). Probably, because of slightly more nationalistic orientation Khersonians are more engaged in politics than the habitants of the other Southern oblasts (See the Appendix for data).

If one will look at the regional means on political trust above, the western region will appear to be the most trustful, or taking negative sign into account, to be the least distrustful. However, the analysis of distribution by oblasts (Table 2) permits to see that the least trustful oblast - Volyn, is the western oblast as well. Here extremely high distrust is found among city dwellers (-4,34) that is in sharp contrast with this indicator for rural habitants (0,39) that may be explained by some acute frustration of expectation of urban dwellers for economic flourishing. The analysis of economic attitudes the share of those, who think they have managed to find their place in today's life, according to the survey, is the highest in the region:

*Table 2.* Participation in Elections on March 31, 2002, Data of Central Electoral Body, percentage, Political Competence and Trust to Politicians, indices

Oblast	Voting	Competence	Trust	Region
Ternopil	82,1	3,99	0,74	West
Volyn	81,7	8,79	-2,20	West
Rivne	80,2	9,59	0,24	West
Khmelnytski		9,37	-0,84	Center
Ivano-Frankivsk	75,7	9,18	-0,64	West
Chernihiv	75,7	7,93	-0,48	Center
Vinnitsa	75,4	9,57	-0,36	Center
Poltava	75,0	9,75	-2,05	Center
Sumy	74,9	9,28	0,15	Center
Lviv	74,7	9,34	-0,28	West
Zhytomyr	74,1	8,11	0,15	Center
Kirovograd	73,0	10,21	0,35	Center
Cherkassy	71,4	9,83	-0,91	Center
Kievan oblast	70,8	8,98	-1,06	Center
Mean of Voting Rate	70,3			
Chernivtsi	67,4	7,44	0,04	West
Donetsk		8,31	0,96	East
Zakarpattjia	67,0	9,43	-0,15	West
Mykolaiv	66,5	6,91	-0,54	South
Zaporizhzhia	66,0	8,34	-1,33	East
Kherson	65,8	9,28	-0,13	South
Luhansk	65,4	8,46	-0,44	East
Dnepropetrovsk	65,4	9,43	-1,36	East
Kharkiv	64,5	8,77	-1,87	East
Odesa	61,6	7,84	-0,99	South
Crimea	61,5	7,59	-0,83	South
Kiev-city	61,1	10,01	-1,06	Center

56 % against 38-50 in other western oblasts (See for the text of question and data the Appendix). At the same time income per capita in other western oblasts are 20-30 % less than in Volyn. This means that the habitants of Volyn endures more severe relative deprivation that other population of the western oblasts, probably, because of longer period of the Communist rule that has caused discredit of politicians, or because of rapid decline in the formerly strong region.

The central region, second in rating of mean trust, is split in two halves, in one of which trust is higher than the average for population with maximal high trust in Zhytomyr, while in another - trust is lower than average with the second lowest trust after Volyn in Poltava. It should be noted that in all central oblasts rural population is more trustful than urban, however, only in Volyn and Poltava this gap reached a dramatic level.

According to the regional means the central oblasts are followed by the southern oblasts, however, the difference in means is statistically insignificant. On the south, Kherson shows much higher than average for southern region trust, difference is statistically significant. The eastern oblasts show by no means the lowest trust with exception of Luhansk, difference with the next by trust rate oblast, Donetsk, is significant. Interregional differences are again lower than within-regional, for what insignificant F-statistics is a proof.

Voting rate provides the most clear-cut division among geographic regions in comparison with other two components of political culture under study: F-statistics is significant that points to higher variance between regions than between oblasts. It is obvious that the eastern and southern regions show lower activity than the northern and the western: in the former case less than 70% of voters voted in all oblasts without exception. The western region is unquestionable leader of voting activity, the central region showed only 2,5% of difference. The southern and eastern regions appeared as quite close to each other but with a considerable gap with western-central region: more than 7% in a case of the east and the center, and 10% between the west and the south.

Since regional difference in voting activity is the most pronounced, the oblasts that are exceptions in this particular case call for the special attention. Thus, among more passive

oblasts we see two oblasts from the western region, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattjia, and Kiev-city. Here participation in voting is significantly lower than in other western or central oblasts.

Chernivtsi is a borderland, which borders with different countries than the other most western oblasts: Orthodox Romania and Moldova. According to statistics almost one third (31,6%) of population of this oblast belong to ethnic non-Russian minorities: Moldavians, Jews, Gypsies, while in Galicia oblasts (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk) share of ethnic minorities ranges from 2,1 to 4,5 (See Appendix). This is an outcome of the history long borderlands' conflicts, which has never reached in Bukovina such radical form as in Galicia, where it lead to the expulsion of Poles from Galicia. This is reflected in less popular Ukrainian as the language of use in Chernivtsi, 73,6%, that is less than in five non-western oblasts and definitely less than in other western oblasts (92-99 % with exception of Zakarpattjia), and stronger than in other oblasts pro-Russian orientation in foreign policy (27%). The same can be pursued about Zakarpattjia that is also specific in similar respects although to a weaker extend: in share of ethnic minorities (12,4%, who are presumably Hungarians), and Ukrainian in use of only 86% of population. Thus marginal location and multiethnic composition of these two oblasts could have caused some loss in the interest in Ukrainian politics that is understandable, if to take into account the weakness of ethnic accent in Ukrainian political campaigns.

On the Table 2 there are several oblasts that are marked in italic that show not only difference from their region, but also low correlation among elements of political culture. Hierarchical cluster analysis has been used in order to find out whether these cases of inner inconsistency of political culture call for additional interpretation or whether some groups of oblasts with similar types of political culture can be found

### Types of Political Culture

When political competence, political trust and participation in voting are considered the following seven clusters are obtained (Table 3) [14]. The third cluster can be named the closest approximation to civic culture with consistently high engagement (9.55), higher

*Table 3. Clusters and Cluster Means, Results of Grouping by Political Competence and Participation [15]*

№	Clusters	Competence	Political Trust	Voting Rate
1	Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Chernivtsi	7,44	0,57	64,27
2	Kiev-city, Kiev oblast, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zakarpattjia, Dnipropetrovsk	9,31	0,92	65,75
3	Vinnitsa, Kyrovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytski, Cherkasy, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne	9,55	-0,59	75,23
4	Volyn	8,79	-2,19	81,70
5	Zaporozhzhia, Luhansk, Donetsk	8,37	-0,90	66,20
6	Chernihiv and Zhytomyr	8,02	-0,08	74,90
7	Ternopil	3,99	0,74	82,10
	Eta2	<b>0,944</b>	<b>0,447</b>	<b>0,866</b>
	Ukraine	8,67	- 0,67	70,8

Bold font signifies significance of Eta squared at 1% level.

than country average trust (-0,59) and voting rate (75,2). Here we find Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts from Galicia region, Rivne and most of the central oblasts without three northern oblasts. Therefore, if the western region indeed shapes a pattern of the most "politically conscious" region, then only in the case of three oblasts out of seven: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Rivne. These three oblasts altogether have about 4 millions of voters, while central oblasts - 6,7 millions, therefore, share of population from the central region, where political culture is the closest approximation of civic culture, is higher that provides the support for the first hypothesis. Central oblasts here, however, do not include three northern oblasts: Kievan, Chernihiv and Zhytomyr and Kiev-city.

There are two western oblasts that form two separate clusters with voting rate even higher than in the third, "civic culture" factor: Volyn and Ternopil oblasts.

Ternopil with its extremely low political competence, high trust and voting activity seems to be an illustration of inconsistent political culture as it was observed in 1991 by Golovacha in Galicia. Probably, this pattern was observed in 2002 only due to one Galician oblast, Ternopil, that contributes to inconsistent pattern of political culture in this region.

First cluster that is composed by four southern oblasts represent the opposite of the third cluster, representing the most alienated political culture with the lowest political competence and voting rate. Here besides Crimea, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts we find Chernivtsi, the western oblast that, due to its specific location on the intersection of the west and the south, in terms of political culture resembles southern oblasts to at least at the same extend as the western. There are however two clusters with the level of trust even lower than in the "alienated" cluster - the second and the fifth (besides Volyn). The second cluster is the case of the most obviously incon-

sistent pattern of political culture. In this cluster high competence coincides with low political trust and low voting rate. Kiev-city is the case of extreme inconsistency with its highest political competence and the lowest among all regions participation rate. We find here strongly urbanized Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Kievan oblast together with Kiev-city (about 80 % of urban dwellers), moderately urbanized Kherson (62 %) and weakly urbanized Zakarpattjia (40%). This detachment from politics of the three remote regions should be, probably, explained not so much by regional specifics, but by the culture of megapolis such as Kiev, and highly urbanized Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions. This explanation, however, poorly fits to the cases of Kherson oblasts, Kievan oblasts without Kiev and Zakarpattjia that are not highly urbanized areas.

The fifth cluster with three the most eastern oblasts, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia differ from "alienated" cluster by higher competence but lower trust. However, since the value of Eta squared showed that clusters do not differ much due to trust, it can be said that political competence makes difference between the south and the east. Therefore, it can be suggested that west-east opposition in a sense of political culture exist mainly in voting rated activity, however, in the area of political competence, the south is the most politically alienated.

The last of the analyzed cluster, the sixth, includes two northern neighboring oblasts, Chernihiv and Zhytomyr. They are similar by the relatively low for northern region competence and by the rate of voting on the level of the central region. These two northern oblasts do not differ from the other two northern non-western oblasts, Sumy and Kievan, neither in distribution of rural population, nor in the share of highly educated population. However, when economic attitudes are taken into account, it is seen that Chernihiv is one of the most frustrated oblasts (59 % of those who find themselves out of place in life) and by no means the most pessimistic (71 % of those who do not see the opportunities for improvement of their situation). One can pursue that pessimism in Chernihiv is particularly high, because economic decline is reinforced by extremely unfavorable demographic situation of Chernihiv: 30 of the population above able-bodied age, while it is about 23 % in Ukraine, the highest share of

women and the lowest birth rate. This frustration could provide an explanation, however, for the lower competence in Zhytomyr, where economic attitudes are much better than in Chernihiv (45 of those who failed to adjust and 47 of pessimists). On the other hand in Volyn, where the number of those, who failed to adjust to the present life is almost as high as in Chernihiv, however, political competence is high.

### **Conclusions, Limitations and the Tasks for Future**

The first general hypothesis of this study has been confirmed: in a sense of political culture central Ukraine can not be depicted as some "averaged", or "in-between" tendency. If some confrontation of political subcultures, participated against alienated, can be reported, than it is between the pair "center - south", not "west-east". Even if pattern that can be described as approximation of civic culture is observed on the west, it is only in three western oblasts, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Rivne.

Second hypothesis about vast inner heterogeneity of the regions under the scope of political culture, with the west on the first place, has been also confirmed. Traditionally defined western region, as seven the most western oblasts, shows all possible types of inconsistency within patterns of political culture. Ternopil show the most striking in relative and absolute terms example of very low political competence but high trust in politicians and voting rate. Zakarpattjia is placed on the opposite pole with high competence but low voting rate, while Volyn differs from other western oblasts mainly by low political trust. Above all this, Chernivtsi shows definitely "non-western" type of political culture with all dimensions at low rate that made it similar to southern oblasts.

There is no ready-made explanation for the existence of pattern with high competence but low participation and vice versa. Only longitudinal studies can draw the light on the question of stability of these patterns. It is quite possible that interest in politics and belief in political personalities change quite often that depends very much on how strong the regional interests are lobbied in Verkhovna Rada, for example, or on economic functioning of the region at the moment.

Obvious shortcoming of this analysis is the limited conceptualization of political culture.

Certainly, subjective competence and feeling of national pride correspond better to the concept of political culture than merely political awareness and trust put in a group of politicians. The number of the named politicians as an indicator of political trust certainly overlooks the intensity of trust put in only one politician. In a pure empirical sense only participation in voting provided clear differences between regions, while interregional differences in political awareness and, especially, in political trust vary weakly from region to region. Probably, these two variables are less regional dependent and constitute one norm for every region that is explained by level of education and gender (competence) and age and rural-urban place of living (trust) than by cultural specifics. Still

the present findings should not be underestimated since they provide important knowledge on possible future differentiations in political behavior even if in a kind of hypotheses. Thus, although western oblasts at average are quite close to central and northern oblasts in voting rate, the central oblasts still differ by higher political competence, while western by higher political trust. Similarly, closeness in voting rate of eastern and southern oblasts does not prevent differences in trust that is higher in southern region, and in competence that is higher on the east.-The explanation of this patterns demand not only longitudinal studies but deeper insight in the history of regions and its effect on quality of civility in general, and trust in particular.

## APPENDIX

Oblast	Urban dwellers	Ukrainian language In use	Ethnic minorities	Religiosity	Pro-Russian orientation	Income per capita	"Failers"	Pessimists
Crimea	68; 15	1,39	15,87	63,59	70,43	115,26	59,52	53,24
Zaporizhzhia	77,10	6,50	9,99	60,00	44,29	102,54	58,53	58,04
Ivano-Frankivsk	43,42	96,09	4,51	94,96	7,79	95,95	49,73	44,96
Kirovograd	60,78	52,15	4,53	71,55	23,26	80,08	76,74	69,57
Luhansk	86,39	2,82	7,02	60,09	62,14	116,47	64,58	65,49
Lviv	61,12	93,03	3,92	93,88	2,97	88,20	38,92	39,85
Mykolaiv	66,65	6,57	5,08	43,20	53,30	84,50	52,56	40,48
Odesa	66,96	9,95	12,69	70,74	62,56	101,20	49,56	51,13
Poltava	58,47	80,91	3,01	68,13	26,21	101,23	57,93	63,17
Rivno	47,95	95,82	2,63	96,39	6,67	81,43	46,67	42,80
Sumy	64,18	39,72	4,01	58,65	48,09	87,25	62,25	67,70
Kiev-city	100,0,	18,69	4,96	54,74	37,63	165,13	53,73	49,49
Ternopil	43,43	99,22	2,13	98,84	1,74	73,59	53,81	41,18
Kharkiv	79,00	15,89	6,25	57,52	43,36	104,65	68,56	71,41
Kherson	62,28	13,63	4,29	61,04	38,68	99,29	70,14	62,73
Khmelnyski	51,71	84,66	7,38	84,55	9,91	86,87	58,29	56,24
Cherkasy	53,84	77,62	5,64	67,69	25,04	89,86	44,37	53,95
Chernivtsi	43,66	73,64	31,63	90,91	27,07	69,91	50,83	49,17
Crernihiv	57,52	56,83	3,13	65,00	40,59	96,76	59,96	71,30
Kievan oblast	57,10	69,43	3,99	70,97	23,55	119,63	49,53	53,97
Vinnytsia	47,39	90,33	4,60	76,92	19,73	82,99	55,81	59,59
Volyn	52,27	92,15	3,42	90,67	12,23	103,57	56,35	48,92
Dnipropetrovsk	83,88	15,68	5,52	67,31	43,54	57,95	134,76	57,56
Donetsk	90,25	2,64	6,33	59,06	62,93	132,23	57,85	62,26
Zhytomyr	55,90	84,14	6,70	69,29	4,25	93,71	45,75	47,62
Zakarpattjia	39,51	86,36	12,43	89,53	9,26	71,70	48,69	44,47
Ukraine	62,27	52,53	6,96	72,50	31,05	99,18	55,72	54,86

*Percentage of urban dwellers and of ethnic minorities other than Russian* - are taken from the Ministry of statistics. All other data are calculated from the study that is under analysis in this article.

*Language of convenience* - is the index developed by V.Khmel'ko that in this shows percent of those respondents who at the very beginning of interview answered that it is more convenient for them to answer in Ukrainian and continue to speak this language during interview. See more about this index in [16].

*Religiosity* - percent of those respondents who consider themselves a "religious person".

*Pro-Russian orientation* - the question was as follows: "By your opinion, is it better for Ukraine to have connections with Russia or with the West?" The answers were coded as 5 point scale. The above percentage refers to the two alternatives: "Rather with Russia" and "Only with Russia".

*Income per capita* - total income reported by respondents in Hryvnas divided by number of family members living together.

*"Failures"* - the question was formulated as follows: "Have you managed to find your place in the today's life?" "Failures" is the percentage of those who answered "No" and "Rather no".

*"Pessimists"* - are those who answered "No" and "Rather no" to the question: "Do you think that you (your family) will be able to improve your living standard in one-two years; to live better, richer than today?"

1. *Khmel'ko V., Wilson A.* Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine / Ed. by T.Kuzio. Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transition. - New York: Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. - P. 60-80.

2. Seven western oblasts include Volyn, Zakarpattja, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi; Central oblasts are Kiev-city, Kievan oblast, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kyrovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytski, Cherkasy, Chernihiv; southern oblasts are Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kherson; eastern are Zaporozhzhia, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk. For distribution of language in use, see Appendix.

3. *Odushkin O.* Political Subcultures in Ukraine: Historical Legacy and Contemporary Divides, Extreme Movements and Ideological Preferences of Eastern and Western Ukrainians as Indicators of Hidden Antagonism // Polish Sociological Review. - 2000. - № 4 (132). - P. 411-445.

4. *Putnam R.* Making Democracy Work. Civil Traditions in Modern Italy. - Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

5. *Putnam R.* Making Democracy Work; *Almond G., Verba S.* The Civic Culture. - Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

6. *Inkeles A., Smith D.H.* Becoming Modern. Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1974.

7. *Almond G., Verba S.* Op. cit.

8. *Головаха Е., Панина Н., Пахотом К.*, я др. Політична культура населення України: результати соціологічних досліджень. - Київ: Інститут соціології НАН України, 1993; The study was conducted by the interviewing network of Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The sample was representative for adult population older than 18 for sex, age, education and regions of Ukraine. First wave was conducted in January, 1991, number of the interviewed 1739, second wave - in November of the same year, number of the interviewed 1752.

9. Nine regions specified by Golovakha: Northern: Kievan oblast without Kiev-city, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv; Central: Vinnitsa, Kyrovograd, Poltava, Cherkasy; Northern-Western: Volyn, Rivne, Khmelnytski; Western: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil; Southern-Western: Chernivtsi and

Zakarpattja; Northern-Eastern: Sumy and Kharkiv; Southern: Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kherson; Eastern: Zaporozhzhia, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk; and Kiev-city and Crimea as two separate regions.

10. *Головаха Е., Панина Н., Пахотом Ю.* и др. Політична культура населення України... - С. 26.

11. *Evans G., White field S.* Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe // British Journal of Political Science. - 1993. - № 23. - P. 521-548.

12. Large number of the interviews allowed for reliable comparison of oblasts since unlike in most surveys the number of respondents in every oblasts is large enough for statistical inferences. In the smallest western oblast, Volyn, the number of interviews were 417, while in the largest eastern, Donetsk - 2088, in Kiev-city - 1087 were interviewed.

13. These politicians are: politicians "in power": Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Medvedchuk, Valerii Pustovoitenko, Anatolii Kinakh, Serhii Tyhipko, Yevhen Marchuk; and opposition politicians: Viktor Yuschenko, Olexandr Moroz, Petro Symonenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Viktor Pynzenyk.

14. The analysis was done with the help of Ward method that allows to obtain the most accurate classification. The procedure is based on the premise that the most accurate information is available when each entity constitutes a group. Consequently, as the number of clusters is systematically reduced from  $k, k-1, k-2, \dots, 1$ , the grouping of increasingly dissimilar entities yields less precise information. At each stage in the procedure the goal is to form a group such that sum of squared within-group deviations about the groups mean of each profile variable is minimized for all profile variables at the same time. The value of the objective function is expressed as a sum of the within-group sum of squares. Each reduction in groups is achieved by considering all possible  $N(N-1)/2$  pairings and selecting the pairing for which the objective-function value is smallest. Each cluster previously formed is treated as one unit.

15. Indices of political competence and trust were standardized before the analysis so that they range from 0 to 100 in order to be comparable with the voting rate.

16. *Arel D., Khmelko V.* The Russian Factor and Polarization in Ukraine // The Harriman Review. - Vol. 9. - P. 81-82.

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## ДЕ ЗАКІНЧУЄТЬСЯ "ЗАХІД" УКРАЇНИ: ВИПАДОК ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ

*У статті розглядаються такі аспекти політичної культури, як політична компетентність, довіра політикам, та участь у голосуванні. Перевіряється гіпотеза про більш розвинуту політичну культуру на заході України. Дані показують відсутність єдиного для всіх західних областей України типу політичної культури. Тут, як і в багатьох інших регіонах України, елементи політичної культури слабо корелюють. Це означає, що з огляду на вказані три аспекти, лише Галичина без Тернополя вирізняється високою політичною культурою, а в решті областей принаймні один з компонентів слабо розвинутий. Деяким областям півдня та центру також притаманна висока інформованість або участь у голосуванні.*