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Special thanks to all Ukrainian defenders in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and detachments beyond them for their heroic standoff and the safety of my country;
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INTRODUCTION

Relevance. The overall relevance of research in the network structure of far-right organizations during protest events and other forms of contentious politics owes to "great white spots" in the previous body of knowledge. Precisely, three descriptive directions were most prominently vulnerable in the debate: (1) the upsurge of the far-right political violence in the Global North and the ambivalence of transnational ties of the Ukrainian far-right (security governance dimension); (2) the lack of a direct application of network methods to social movements studies (methodological dimension); and (3) an unproved perception of the Ukrainian far-right as a consolidated milieu, which is usually sustained by the politicization of the question and narrowmindedness of techniques used in preceding literature (political dimension).

First, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2019, the accounts of far-right political violence skyrocketed by 320% in the regions of North America, Western Europe, and Oceania (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 3). As the Ukrainian far-right wields transnational ties (Bourdon, 2020), it is reasonable to dive into the intricacies of inter-organizational relations within Ukraine, given the potential impact on cooperation with like-minded from the rest of the Global North. This would provide a qualitative understanding of a political opportunity for an all-in transnational diffusion of the far-right collective action, bearing strategic repercussions for national and international security orders in the making.

Second, network analytic methods have yet to be in wide use among students of social movement alliances (or coalitions of contention). Social network analysis (SNA) has already been applied to the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) in the assessment of public policy whereby social movements happened to have their stake, too (Gronow & Ylä-Antilla, 2016). Besides, much network analytic assessment has been done in terrorist studies (Bright et al., 2018) and case studies of social networks in separate social movement organizations (SMOs). However, inter-organizational

relations within one social movement industry (SMI) have not yet caught a scholar's eye. The previous findings confined themselves to the description of framing strategies and the ascription of them to incumbents (Levi & Murphy, 2006).

Third, studies of the Ukrainian far-right are now heuristically limited and frequently subject to political manipulations, given the ideological undercurrents of the Russo-Ukrainian War and numerous Russian psychological operations (Gomza, 2022). Suffice it to say, Ukrainian studies are under severe pressure of disinformation and ideologically laden confrontations. Among contributing factors are the spread of Russian methodological nationalism in academia and Ukraine's decolonization efforts (Kuzio, 2019; Hrytsak, 2021; Wynnyckyj, 2019). Notwithstanding terrorism studies' long-lasting aspirations to manifest the contrary (Kydd & Walter, 2006), one may well unreasonably think of the Ukrainian far-right as if they were a monolithic coalition or powerful stakeholders in Ukrainian conventional politics. Macrolevel indices—like those of political violence monitoring missions (Marker, n. d.), systemic protest-event analysis (Ishchenko, 2016), and sociological surveys (Bustikova, 2015)—and investigative journalism of the state's relationship with the radical groups (Bellingcat Anti-Equality Monitoring, 2019) could summon the veil of "conventional wisdom" in this regard. Sometimes scholars tend to describe the microlevel trajectories of the leaders (Shekhovtsov, 2013), which serves as a shred of partial evidence of the significance of subcultures created through shared socialization and stories of recruiting. At the end of the day, all of the pundits do not prove the monolithic nature of the organizational ecology. Nor do they decently validate the influence of the far-right groups on the state sector, let alone their capacity to capture the state.

Concomitantly, competitive dynamics within a coalition of contention are acutely detrimental to its sustainability and very existence, however monolithic the alliance might have been before (Tarrow, 2007, p. 164). In a similar fashion, the case of the French integral nationalists of the 19th and 20th centuries is illustrative of how a chance to seize power is lost in the face of a captive inability to unite factions

(Gomza, 2021). Hence, the survey of the mesolevel—i.e., inter-organizational relations—of the far-right activity in Ukraine would be beneficial. By employing both the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and network analytic toolbox as a counterbalance to its flaws and balances, this bachelor's thesis brings novelty to the aforementioned studies, namely a unique dataset on the Ukrainian far-right protest activities from 2014 to 2021, an updated listing of the far-right organizations, and an attempt at an estimation of competition and alliance-making capacity of the Ukrainian far-right from the two perspectives at the same time.

Research objective is to trace the alliances in the network of far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) through the lens of contentious politics theory.

Research tasks.

(1) Assess the scholarly debate on the definition of the far-right ideology and theoretical aspects of the activity of such organizations.

(2) Delimit the theoretical borders of contentious politics and its network effects.

(3) Define the terms "social movement alliances" and "coalition of contention" and draw implications for social network analysis.

(4) Define the challenges and rules for the catalogization of protest events of the far-right organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021, for further protest-event and social network analyses.

(5) Define the measure of the competitiveness of the far-right organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021;

(6) Define the procedure of network analysis, community (alliance) detection, and statistical model techniques to predict the network structure of the far-right organization in Ukraine, 2014–2021;

(7) Present the results of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index measured for the protest-event dataset collected for the Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021;

(8) Calculate descriptive statistics for the obtained protest network, clustering coefficient (network transitivity), and modularity of communities in the network of the Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021;

(9) Perform network community (alliance) detection in the obtained network of the Ukrainian far-right, 2014–2021, and exponential random graph model analysis with the following factors: ideological subtypes, repertoire diversity, target diversity, and cross-regional diversity over the network structure of the Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021.

Research object. The far-right organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021.

Research subject. Alliances that the far-right organizations in Ukraine had been forming with each other during contentious politics from 2014 to 2021.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of the research are comprised of (1) a minimal definition of the radical right per Cas Mudde; (2) Ehud Sprinzak's typology of right-wing extremism; (3) the contentious politics theory of Charles Tilly, including the typology of transgressive and contained contention; (4) the definition of collective violence per Charles Tilly; (5) the definition of social movement alliances (or coalitions of contention) per Margaret Levi and Murphy; (6) differentiation between a network and a coalition of contention per Sidney Tarrow; (7) resource mobilization theory of social movements; and (8) Charles Tilly's definition and typology of repertoires of contention.

The **source base of the research** is comprised of (1) the repository of such media outlets as the Ukrainian Pravda, Hromadske TV, Obozrevatel, and Zaxid.net; (2) web pages of human rights non-governmental organizations (ZMINA.info); (3) web-pages of selected far-right organizations in Ukraine and (4) their social media resources.

The **chronological frame of the research** is between 2014 and 2021—this is the period between the initiation of two different forms of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a proxy one and an all-in one. Since 2014, the Russian leadership has launched numerous disinformation campaigns labeling the Ukrainian government

and society "neo-Nazi" (Leichtova, 2016; Kuzio, 2019). The present bachelor's thesis is devoted to debunking this grand myth by investigating the network-based mobilizational capacity of the Ukrainian far-right.

Research methods consist of (1) peak-listing of social movement organizations as a method of sampling (Andrews et al., 2016); (2) a nominalist approach in the network boundary specification (Ylä-Antilla et al., 2018; Laumann et al., 1983); (3) protest-event analysis with data triangulation performed via the use of keywords (Ayoub et al., 2014, Hutter, 2014); (4) the "Dynamics of Collective Action" codebook as a set of rules for data collection (Stanford University, 2009); (5) the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the measurement of concentration of protest shares and competition among the Ukrainian far-right and the "*hhi*" package in R (Wagagoner, 2018); (6) Shannon's H for the measurement of diversity of repertoires, regional concentration, and "vegan" package in R (Oksanen et al., 2022); (7) the "*igraph*," "*intergraph*," and "*ergm*" packages for network analysis in R (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006; Bojanowski, 2015; Hunter et al., 2008); (6) exponential random graph modeling for the purposes of estimation of exogenous factors; and (7) logistic and linear regression analysis.

Hypotheses:

(1) H_1: The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by ideological subtype;

(2) H_2: The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by the diversity of the repertoire of contention;

(3) H_3: The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by the diversity of targets;

(4) H_4: The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by the diversity of (cross-)regional cooperation.

The **structure and volume** of this bachelor's dissertation consist of three chapters with nine sections (three sections per chapter), conclusions, the list of sources and literature cited, five appendices, and an abstract of the bachelor's dissertation (written in Ukrainian). The volume of the bachelor's dissertation is 75 pages, which does not include the list of sources and literature cited as well as the appendices.

I. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A STUDY IN THE ALLIANCES OF THE RIGHT-WING ORGANIZATIONS IN 2014–2022 UKRAINE, NETWORK MODULARITY, & CONTENTIOUS POLITICS[1]

1.1. "The Kingdom of Darkness": The Definition of Far-Right Organizations and Theoretical Aspects of Their Activities

First and foremost, this bachelor's thesis suggests scholars resort to use the term "far-right" as more preferential in comparison with the great many alike. No other term seems to grasp the fragmentation of transnational right-wing radicalization as a sociopolitical phenomenon. However, the unity of the far-right is expressed neither explicitly nor implicitly, in spite of its umbrella nature, which is frequently instrumentalized by a myriad of actors under the auspices of the Russian disinformation campaigns against Ukraine (Kuzio, 2019). Seeking the avoidance of this trail of falsification of social and political reality caused by the exceeding politicization of the discussion by the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, it is worth reviewing and revisiting the debate surrounding the terms "radical right," "extreme right" (or "right-wing extremism"), and even "right-wing populism."

The diversity of the far-right social movement is illustrated as best as possible in the taxonomy that students of different strands of Political Science employ in their research efforts in conventional politics and fringe political process instances like terrorism. As Ehud Sprinzak (1995) proposes, right-wing extremism shall be divided into six subtypes as opposed to the understanding of it as a monolithic phenomenon: (1) revolutionary extremism, (2) reactive extremism, (3) vigilante extremism, (4) racist extremism, (5) millenarian extremism, and (6) youth-counterculture extremism (p. 22). At the core of this typology lies the mechanism of split delegitimization of a diverse array of political and social actors. Its targeting takes a

[1] This first chapter of the bachelor's thesis is grounded on the term paper from the previous 2021–2022 year. By the decision of the Department of Political Science of the National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy," third-year students were allowed to write the first chapter for their bachelor's thesis instead of a full term paper due to the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

peculiar form almost exclusive to each subtype and forges an original framing of "internal enemies" through the categories of (1) "inferior" social groups and/or (2) the government. As per Ehud Sprinzak (1995), the targeting, in reality, takes place by a lexicographical order: for right-wing extremists, internal enemies from the first category are more likely to be primarily targeted than the second one. Nevertheless, it is essentially crucial that each of these taxons is not mutually exclusive and exhaustive; thereby, ideological interlacings are not subjected to the researcher's questioning (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 22).

In their turn, radical right organizations that weigh more heavily on conventional politics than right-wing extremists do because of a divergent cognition and perception of the political process as a whole (Bötticher, 2017) are structurally "thin ideologies" and are situated on the brink of social movements due to the ideology's diversified essence (Gunther & Diamond, 2003). However, the overall tendency could not be said to be outstanding and exclusive to the radical and extreme right. Attending to the work of Laclau and Mouffe, some scholars maintain that the rights of sexual minorities, for instance, are a floating signifier—a topic in a public sphere that is overloaded by divergent, sometimes mutually conflictual senses—which provokes an almost natural fragmentation of the European right (Mos, 2022). The same applies to gender politics and policy. By comparing the cases of Romania and Hungary, Ov Christian Norocel (2018) deductively derived the ideological spectrum of the conservative right from the present stances toward various feminist projects of social transformation. Nonetheless, what truly unifies the radical and extreme right is a narrative strategy called "civilizationism," which emphasizes a one-of-a-kind cultural role of Europe in the world; and the core concept of which is the premise of Christian civilization and its status being endangered by covert external or internal collective actors (Mos, 2022). The more logical and justified such a statement, once one considers the works of such political theorists as the representatives of the Conservative Revolution, namely Oswald Spengler and Carl Schmitt, or the founding father of the school of the post-war mysticist (neo)fascism

Julius Evola. The very durability of the advocacy for traditionalism, illiberalism, and anti-rationalism in the political thought of these authors gives them a legitimate ground to be called the ideational inspirators of the contemporary ultraconservative social movements (Sedgwick, 2019)

As a matter of fact, the emphasis on the nativity and the civilizational role of Europe (or other areas) may well be formative for any sort of nationalisms or regionalisms. Furthermore, it is essential to discern nationalism from populism, although there exists no strict dichotomy between the two on the theoretical level, and thus, both ideologies can superimpose onto each other (Freeden, 1998). Scholars tend to cite national-conservative social movements and parties as paragon examples of such an overlap (Gwiazda, 2020). However, Cas Mudde (2007), for example, assures that populism is, in fact, a mobilizational strategy, an ideologeme, but not an ideology. Thereby, the term "populist radical right" finds a new meaning: as Cas Mudde (2007) continues, it illustrates the way radical right ideologies seek to attract and rally potential sympathizers—i.e., via the watershed between the elite and the (true) people. Simultaneously, by paying attention to this very watershed, which could be regarded as a form of cognitive closure (Hertog & Gambetta, 2017, p. 131), Manuella Caiani and Donatella della Porta demonstrated that there were found statistically significant discursive coincidences between the binary anti-elitism of right-wing extremists and right-wing radicals in Germany and Italy (Caiani & della Porta, 2011). Yet, right-wing extremism, first and foremost, urges a specific action against the current state of affairs and legitimizes political violence as a means of resistance, whereas populism does not contain such a trait by default.

For these reasons, in order to avoid the above-described terminological pluralism, one of the previous research papers advised employing the minimal (broad) definition of right-wing radicalism instead of the maximum (narrow) definition, which is usually done through the use of the term "far-right" (Khutornyi & Yakovlyev, 2021, p. 10). As per Cas Mudde (2007), the minimal definition of right-wing radicalism is imminently comprised of two core concepts: (1) nationalism

(one that homogenizes domestic politics and policy and promotes an exclusivist standpoint of external actors) and (2) nativism (which imperatively anticipates an exclusive tenure of the constructed natives or local political actors) (p. 12). In the present bachelor's thesis, the minimal definition is also employed on the basis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's (2009) family resemblance principle (p. 39) and, accordingly, the research design of most similar systems design in comparative political studies (Levy, 2008). This theoretical and methodological decision is potentially endorsed, first and foremost, in the circles of social movement studies and political party studies wherein the terms like "social movement family" (della Porta & Rucht, 2004), "social movement community" (Staggenborg, 1998), and "party family" (Mair & Mudde, 1998) are extensively integrated into the professional vocabulary. Per Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht, a "social movement family" is "a set of coexisting movements, which, regardless of their specific goals, have similar basic values and organizational overlaps, and sometimes may even join for common campaigns" (della Porta & Rucht, 2004, p. 121).

Thus, in order to comprehend all the theoretical aspects of activities of a social movement family, it is important to attend to the notion of ideology and ways resembling organizations may operate. Speaking of the factors of the far-right protest mobilization, scholars generally point to the reactivity or backlash nature of the phenomenon (Gattinara & Pirro, 2018; Gattinara et al., 2021; Kocyba, 2019; della Porta, 2020). As a group of researchers has established, cultural discontent is the most catalytic for the far-right in comparison with other factors of deprivation like economic or political ones (Gattinara et al., 2021). Since external exclusion is inherent in both definitions of the right radicalism in accordance with Cas Mudde (2007), these findings underscore the pertinence of the view suggested in the present bachelor's dissertation. Although academia's "path dependency" in treating the activities of the far-right through the prism of the theory of deprivation (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 7) appears to be partially empirically justified, it is advised not to resort to such a simplification and reduction. The far-right organizations, just as any other

social movement organizations, depend on the mobilization of resources and the local structure of political opportunities, and if and only if these factors are combined, their protest activities found wide recognition and diffusion (Gattinara et al., 2021). Thereby, exoticization and reduction to deprivation are neither sufficient nor necessary. For this reason, Manuella Caiani, Donatella della Porta, and Klaus Waggerman devised their own model of far-right mobilization. In the present bachelor's dissertation, it is proposed to refer to this model on par with the theory of resource mobilization, as has been once done in previous research (Khutornyi & Yakovlyev, 2021, p. 24). The three authors suggested a model that includes four components: (1) the structure of political opportunities (the focus of the activities might be either institutional: e.g., an emphasis on parliamentary elections; or extra-institutional: e.g., protests); (2) the organizational structure (centralized or decentralized intra-organizational order and whether the resources are predominantly material or symbolic); (3) the repertoire of contention (whether the employed tactics of contentious politics are contained or transgressive); and (4) an organization's framing (that includes three major directions—anti-democratic, ultranationalist, and traditionalist) (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 111).

1.2. "Butcher's Hands, Gentle Souls": Contentious Politics Theory and Its Network Effects

In the present bachelor's dissertation, it is advised to analyze the activities of the far-right organizations in Ukraine through the paradigm of contentious politics theory. First, the theoretical premises of this approach are delineated. Then, its advantages over other frameworks are discussed in the context of a subject matter like ours. Lastly, the research field is further delimited.

According to the definition of the pioneer of eponymous studies, Charles Tilly, contentious politics is an "*episodic, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at*

least one of the claimants" (Tilly, 2000, p. 137; accents preserved). Tellingly, contentious politics is overall an extra-institutional phenomenon (Tilly, 2008, p. 6). Contentious politics itself can be divided into two types: (1) contained and (2) transgressive. In essence, a criterion for their distinctiveness from each other lies in the presence of symmetrical institutionalization of perceptions between all parties, namely the government, extra-institutional actors, and/or their constituents. Per Tilly (2000), contained contentious politics is an "episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, where (c) all parties to the conflict were previously established as constituted political actors and (d) all parties employ well-established means of public claim-making" (Tilly, 2000, p. 138; emphasis is ours). At the same time, transgressive contentious politics shall be discerned from the contained one on the condition that "[...] (c) at least some parties to the conflict are *newly self-identified political actors*, and/or (d) at least some parties employ *innovative means of collective action*" (Tilly, 2000, p. 138; emphases are ours). It is worth noting that transgressiveness is generally relative and relational, yet some tactics of contentious politics are "universally" transgressive beyond any separate cases. For instance, the regime's tolerance to peaceful, non-violent marches greatly varies, depending on the level of state coercion and state capacity. However, political violence of all strands poses a threat to the stability of law and order and, by general rule, is targeted by the agents of social control (Bapat, 2007).

The terms "collective action" and "social movements" are immediate candidates for the assessment of conceptual interrelationships. On the one hand, Tilly (2000) himself exploits the term "collective action" in the above-described definition of transgressive contentious politics, while some students, such as Sidney Tarrow (2007), openly juggle with the terms "contentious politics" and "contentious collective action" as interchangeable synonyms (Tarrow, 2007, p. 174). On the other hand, there is a fundamental, principal methodological difference between the two.

As Tilly (2008) notes, collective action stands for "coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs. Baseball teams engage in collective action, but so do choirs, neighborhood associations, and neighbors who track down a child molester" (p. 6). Perhaps, renowned political economist Mancur Olson (1971)—the founding father of the term whose vision is one of the most cited in academia and touches upon social class and vested interests in the government—would not have come to terms with such a radical definition of collective action, the conceptual referent of both is an achievement of a specific and common collective good through the venue of cooperation as a unified group. Both definitions are, nonetheless, equally wider than Tilly's (2000) definition of contentious politics. Yet, not each and every contention necessarily anticipates an actor to engage in a coordinated group effort. For example, in a setting of individual radicalization, the group identity is rather serving as a catalyzer of this process that incentivizes the extremist actions of an individual actor, although the group does not always pre-determine them (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 419). Thereby, lone-wolf terrorism is not a collective action per se, but it intercepts the field of transgressive contentious politics via negative social sanctions imposed onto violence and via collective interaction with other political actors as a push factor. Political violence, instead, is an "episodic social interaction that (1) immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects [...]; (2) involves at least two perpetrators of damage; and (3) results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts" (Tilly, 2003, p. 3). As a result, it is as proper a term as possible that is heuristically capable enough to demarcate a contentious event that grasps a (1) transgressive and (2) collective action at the same time.

Social movements, in turn, are a form of collective contentious politics, since they are defined as "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities" (Diani, 1992, p. 1). Therefore, this theoretical debate drives us to one core logical-conceptual conclusion: it appears that

there exists a partial relation of subordination between these three concepts—i.e., collective action, contentious politics, and social movements. The first concept is the widest, the second one is subordinate to it, and the last one is the narrowest among all.

Spatial and ideational dissemination of contentious politics is largely connected with such social network phenomenon as homophily, the significance of which, suffice it to say, is of the highest salience for transgressive forms of contention. In general, scholars concur on two paramount mechanisms for collective action to be spread: (1) diffusion and (2) brokerage. Per Doug McAdam (2003), the success of both mechanisms—i.e., emulation and further integration of emulating actors into a shared collective effort—is determined by a peculiar medium called "attribution of similarity." Attribution of similarity is an actor's voluntary self-identification with a geographically and institutionally distant group to the extent that the latter is treated as "sufficiently similar as to justify common action" (McAdam, 2003, p. 295). The term heavily resonates with the premises of social capital theory as part of a broader network analytic theoretical discussion. As Nan Lin (2002) points out, this is homophily that incentivizes the formation of the expressive dimension of social capital, whereas heterophily stimulates the instrumental one (p. 41, 46). The expressiveness of ties and the sentiment of kinship, in turn, is a constitutive factor of effective mobilization in a network: it underpins the formation of conscience constituents, who invest personal resources into a movement due to the feeling of moral obligation or solidarity (Klandermans et al., 2015, p. 155). This type of social movement constituents is contrasted with beneficiary constituents, who calculate prospective individual or collective goods that the movement can bring about (Klandermans et al., 2015, p. 155). Concomitantly, the instrumentality of heterophily can also be put to good use but under the condition of relatively quick systemic changes. Owing to the instrumentality of alliances, which are saturated with brokerage instead of diffusion, the 1642–1651 English Civil War arguably took

place at all; it was the instrumental brokerage of the merchants that facilitated elite cohesion (Hillman, 2008, p. 448).

For political violence colludes with high-risk activism, a special emphasis is made on homophily *within* transgressive groups, the status of which becomes an obstacle en route to in-group solidarity (McAdam, 1986). Some students like Jeff Goodwin (1997), in fact, go in line with these considerations, in spite of their rejection of the model of political opportunity structures. Having surveyed the Philippine 1942–1954 Hukbalahap Rebellion, Goodwin (1997) revealed that libidinal economy—i.e., the structure of feelings related to the notions of sympathy, attraction, and kinship—was a critical point for the in-group cohesion. Homophily is also potentially a precursor for one of the psychological mechanisms of political radicalization, for Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley argue that individual radicalization becomes possible if the authority of friends and relatives is reflected or represented in a transgressive group (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). To some extent, our assumption on the significance of homophily may be under serious scrutiny provided attribution of similarity is not the case; alliances are then not formed, and competition may well be high among the transgressive groups (Kydd & Walter, 2006, c. 76).

For these reasons, the discussion of political violence as transgressive contentious politics begs special and cautious attention in the present bachelor's dissertation. Generally speaking, the concept of human violence is covered with an interdisciplinary array of studies. As previous research has shown, political and social philosophers are chief in this debate, although they do not have a uniform stance on the phenomenon; a great many of them refer to it as a metaphor for inequalities in late-capitalist societies (e.g., Slavoj Žižek and Pierre Bourdieu) or the place of the human body in the governmentality strategies (Michel Foucault) (Khutornyi & Yakovlyev, 2021, p. 15). More proximate to social movement studies may well be theories and perceptions of violence of Georges Sorel, Carl Schmitt, Hanna Arendt, and Jean Rancière. All these thinkers point at violence as an integral

part of politics (or certain social changes, as is the case in Sorel (1999) and Arendt (1970)). For Sorel, who became a godfather for extremists from anarcho-syndicalism to fascism (Röhrich, 1982), violence allures agents to the irrational that is foundational for a collective myth: through its mobilizational capacity, myth, in turn, ascends the rupture in over-rationalized utopias of political discussions, which are pertinent to capitalist societies; accordingly, violence has to be ever-present. From a strategic point of view, Carl Schmitt (2007) theorizes in a similar direction, as he views violence as an apotheosis of the political, for the Schmittian "friend–enemy" dichotomy takes on the practical political meaning through physical clash (p. 33). Almost identically, yet without a direct emphasis on violence, Rancière et al. (2001) argue that a group or an individual becomes agential through the confrontation between politics (the denigrated people) and the police (dominant social order and its means for social control), including the venue of violence. Describing the sources of totalitarianism and its movements, Arendt (1970) understands terrorism in the political process of atomized societies as "political expressionism" as a result of deprivation from "hypocrisy" (p. 440).

Furthermore, it is important to consider the anthropological side of violence, which raises questions about temporality. One of the first to point out the "persistence" of violence in human communities was anthropologist Carol Ember, noting that a predisposition towards violent action was more prevalent among hunter-gatherer societies (in contrast to the prevailing belief in Ember's time that humans were peaceful) (Ember, 1978). Another anthropologist, Lawrence Keeley, expanded the scope of the issue by tracing violence in historical human communities as a form of warfare (Keeley, 1996). The research of Bruce Knauft, also an anthropologist, is equally significant: he identified a disproportionate number of violent deaths in the Gebusi tribe during its isolation period (Knauft et al., 1987). Referring to Knauft's data, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2020) explain the prevalence of violent cases by the normative frameworks of the tribe, particularly in relation to their understanding of death as a result of sorcery (p. 22). Therefore,

this particular cultural characteristic of the tribe could be described as the ritualization of violence.

However, these explanations and approaches are not taken into account in the present bachelor's thesis. Firstly, a very clear objective is set, which compels us to reject the aforementioned approaches. *We aim to trace the alliances and underlying factors in the network of far-right organizations in Ukraine through the prism of the theory of contentious politics from 2014 to 2021*. Secondly, the formulation of the objective is justified precisely because it does not encompass pre-modern manifestations (and transformations) of violence in societies or the "ideational" dimension of understanding violence in a particular period via a study of philosophical texts. Instead, the approach of contemporary Social Scientists, mostly in the field of social movements studies and collective violence as contentious politics, is adopted as the basis for the present bachelor's dissertation. All the just-described phenomena reflect processes that have replaced the pre-modern forms of articulating social demands (Tilly, 2008, p. 124) and are uniquely framed by new social movements (Diani, 2000). This approach is justified by the distinct non-institutional nature of far-right parties and organizations both in their genesis and in the political process in Ukraine and the world (Caiani & della Porta, 2018; Gattinara & Pirro, 2018; Gomza & Zajaczkowski, 2019).

One of the most elaborate classifications of violence in the political process was provided by Mark Beissinger. According to him, there are three levels of nationalist political violence: (1) marginalized forms of violence (individual or small-group trajectory), (2) mixed state-society forms (trajectory between meso- and macro-levels), and (3) state-based forms of violence (macro-level) (Beissinger, 2002, p. 306). Within these categories, the types of violence also differ in terms of organization: acts of violence can be purely "spontaneous" or mobilizational, or they can be carefully and rationally planned and organized (Beissinger, 2002, p. 306). However, these categories are not mutually exhaustive, and mixed types of violent actions can occur between both extremes. Furthermore, there are additional

attributes derived from the quality of the relationship between the object and the subject: (1) acts of dominant aggression, (2) acts of national rebellion, and (3) acts of nationalist combat (Beissinger, 2002, p. 305), which are also not pure types and can be combined. Thus, Beissinger describes the following types of political violence: (1.1) diffuse social violence and (1.2) terrorist activity; (2.1) ethnic riots, (2.2) national insurrection, (2.3) communal violence, (2.4) pogrom violence, (2.5) interethnic war, and (2.6) vigilante violence; (3.1) forced expulsion, (3.2) genocide, (3.3) interstate warfare, and (3.4) enaction of discriminatory practices (Beissinger, 2002, pp. 305–307). The only type of violence that falls on the "crossroads" is state-sponsored terror (Beissinger, 2002, p. 305). For a visualization of the classification, see Appendix E.

Basinger's classification of political violence can be criticized for multiplying essences that likely overlap and for assuming that states are generally not inclined to cooperate with extreme political groups and individuals, provided they have sufficient state capacity (Bapat, 2007). However, in studies of radical politics and other fields, there are indeed cases where radicals and extremists have been sponsored (or strategically incentivized) by the state to maintain legitimacy with the existing political class and artificially factionalize opponents. For example, Robert Horvath (2014) points to cooperation between Russian nationalists and the organization "*Russkii Obraz*" and the Russian state, describing this prolonged mutually beneficial process as "managed nationalism." Overall, such a mechanism is not surprising in studies of political regimes: cooptation is one of the reasons why neo-patrimonial authoritarian polities are still the most flexible in dealing with terrorism, despite being the most frequent target of transgressive actors due to the relatively low threshold for dialogue with representatives of conventional politics (Wilson & Piaza, 2013). Sometimes, a diametrically opposite situation occurs wherein the state independently creates agents of radicalization rather than utilizing the existing social movement industry. In military and single-party regimes, for example, administered mass organizations (AMOs) are sometimes artificially

created from the top (Kasza, 1993). One of the most well-studied cases is the Islamic Republic of Iran, where administered mass organizations are de facto state-backed forces tasked with exercising social control in society, particularly in regions where dissent is concentrated (Golkar, 2015).

Therefore, it is necessary to delimit the conceptual field of contention as a term in this work. Following Beissinger's (2002) differentiation, the scope of this study will be limited to an examination at the level of mixed state–society forms of contention. This means that we exclude cooperative interaction between boundary and state actors, as well as those forms of contained and transgressive contention that do not involve collective action directly (e.g., lone-wolf terrorism).

1.3. "In Monotonie Concordia": The Definition of the Alliances of Social Movements (Coalitions of Contention) and Network Implications

The concept of coalitions is widely used across the disciplinary boundaries of Social Sciences. Primarily, it is most commonly used in the field of comparative politics and policy analysis. The first cohort of scholars employs the concept of coalitions to explain the dynamics and mechanisms of power distribution in governance (see Lijphart, 2012; Smith et al., 2005). The second cohort resorts to the analysis of advocacy coalitions (advocacy coalition framework). According to the most cited definition by Paul Sabatier, an advocacy coalition is a conglomerate of "actors from different governmental and private organizations who (a) share a common set of normative and causal beliefs and (b) engage in nontrivial coordinated activity over time" (Sabatier, 1998, p. 103). The presence of shared core beliefs is a necessary and sufficient condition (Sabatier, 1998, p. 105).

While some scholars have included social movements as agents in advocacy coalitions and their social network analysis (Gronow & Ylä-Antilla, 2016), and the premise of values aligns with Hypothesis 1—thus partially aligning with the aims and objectives of this research—coalitions of contention will be further considered. This is because conventional politics and its manifestations, such as legislative

processes, are not the primary focus through which the activities of far-right organizations are understood in this study, as contention politics is predominantly an extra-institutional phenomenon. According to Levi & Murphy's (2006) definition, a coalition of contention represents "collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool resources in order to effect change. They have rules for resolving conflict and defining membership" (p. 654). In other words, a coalition is the *modus operandi* of social movement organizations: there is minimal coordination among their participants, aiming to align tactical and, above all, strategic dimensions of action to achieve a common goal (Alimi, 2009, p. 231).

The Latin expression "*modus operandi*," found in the literature on social movements, implies the contractual nature of interaction among actors of contention (and thus its variation depending on the conditions) and the need to converge interests. According to Tarrow (2007), coalitions of contention can be divided along two axes: (1) the degree of cooperation among actors of contention (high or low) and (2) the duration of this cooperation (long and short) (p. 167; see also Appendix C). Thus, grounding on the different intensities of both axes, Tarrow identifies four types of coalitions: (1) event coalition (high cooperation, yet for a short period of time), (2) instrumental coalition (weak cooperation for a brief period of time), (3) campaign coalition (high cooperation for a long period of time), and (4) federation (weak but enduring cooperation). At the same time, the necessary and sufficient conditions for forming alliances in social movements arise from a kind of Marshallian cross between two different trajectories, namely inter-organizational and institutional. The former is a proxy for the trust among actors of contention, which is grounded in the experience of previous interactions with each other; the latter involves external factors that, for instance, come from the structure of political opportunities (Levi & Murphy, 2006). In the realm of contention politics, the "extreme" case of the intersection of these two trajectories and the most intensive and enduring cooperation (i.e., campaign coalitions) would be represented by the so-

called “spillover effect,” in which social movements coalesce into a single organization despite previous differences so that their own agenda is kept on (Meyer & Whittier, 1994).

Naturally enough, the discussion of various trajectories of inter-organizational interactions (i.e., of organizational ecology) and network effects leads us to the adoption of certain premises of resource mobilization theory and the amendments to it from the perspective of the fields of strategic action theory. There are three main units of analysis: (1) social movement organizations (an informal association or formally acknowledged organization that identifies with a social movement); (2) social movement industry (a *mobilizable* agglomeration of all social movement organizations—as opposed to a set of ideas behind a movement—that aspire to the goals of that movement); and (3) social movement industry (a complex of sympathizers and critics as well as their distinct social movements that somehow relate to the movement in question) (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, pp. 1218-1220). The present paper is devoted to the first two units, and they have built-in assumptions. First, alliances and mobilization as a whole derive from the formal inter- and intra-organizational structure; a coalition is a product of political entrepreneurs and is thus a conscious commitment of an organization to investing its resources for the sake of the cause (Jenkins, 1983, p. 528). Second, the grounds for such interactions are laid by the knowledge of an organization and its previous experience of alliance-making (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 3).

However, the definition of coalitions of contention by Levi & Murphy (2006) has one paramount flaw. Although resource mobilization theory has a record of its application to political violence (Beck, 2008), the conceptual framework developed by the two scholars was designed to operationalize data from mostly *peaceful* protest events, such as the 2011 protests in Seattle against the World Trade Organization (Levi & Murphy, 2006). Therefore, there is a terminological challenge when applying such a definition to cases of transgressive contentious politics: coalitions often tend to be informal due to the “thin” organizational ecology of radical and

especially boundary groups, referred to as “dark networks” in network analysis. This informality can be explained by two factors. The first factor is the ever-present threat of policing, which is often observed in high-risk activism cases (McAdam, 1986; Goodwin, 1997). The transgressiveness of collective action primarily distorts intra-organizational relations, and membership in organizations is rather informal (or at least clandestine), which is not accounted for in the above-described definition. As a result, the phenomenon of a “covert social movement network” emerges, as was the case with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Due to the secrecy imposed by the high-risk nature of their activities, the IRA was not only fragmented, but some factions within it formed a dominant informal tight, and centralized “inner circle” of leadership (Stevenson & Crossley, 2014). Around these individuals, the entire critical network infrastructure of activist resources was built. In other situations, such as right-wing extremism in the USA from the 1960s to the 1990s and later in Islamist militants in the 21st century, the model of “leaderless resistance” or phantom cell networks was proposed, which involved secretive informal membership and decentralized “cells” to rapidly carry out tasks and prevent infiltration (Kaplan, 1997; Bright et al., 2018). There is a need for a “facilitator,” who performs brokerage (Bright et al., 2018). Alliances of particularly transgressive groups tend to be either enduring with a constantly changing composition of participants (Bright et al., 2018) or temporary and volatile (Diani, 2003).

Another potential factor of the informality of membership and alliances is the loss of trust within the referent group, meaning potential sympathizers and activists of a particular organization. Brent Simpson, Robb Willer, and Matthew Feinberg (2018) showed that the use of violence by white supremacists directly correlated with changes in public opinion about them and their counterparts. Firstly, the violence alienated third parties, like the observers; secondly, the impact depended on (1) the perceived legitimacy of the demands and (2) the strength of identification with the participants; thirdly, the violence also alienated some former sympathizers and realigned them in favor of a counter-movement (Simpson et al., 2018, pp. 3, 5-

6, 7, 9). In other words, it can be assumed that transgressive groups may avoid *formal* alliances with similar groups so as not to share their fate. All of these characteristics of "dark networks" impose methodological constraints on the nominalist approach to network sampling and highlight the need for interview methodology, which is, unfortunately, not tooled in this study.

Therefore, in a study of the formation of coalitions during collective violence as a form of contentious politics (Tilly, 2003), it is necessary to expand the delimitation of the concept of alliances in social movements by adopting the minimal definition of contention coalitions provided by Levi & Murphy (2006). *Considering the theoretical considerations mentioned above, thereby, by coalitions of contention (or social movement alliances), we will refer to the arrangements among far-right organizations in Ukraine from 2014 to 2021, which aim to mobilize shared resources for a common goal through protest events, which serve as proxies for these same arrangements from a methodological standpoint*.

The final question is how coalitions of contention relate to network analysis and network modularity. The term "social networks" is much narrower than the concept of a coalition or alliance. According to Sidney Tarrow, the term "networks" encompasses both structural and agential definitions (Tarrow, 2007, p. 163). Structural aspects manifest in collective action when the resources of actors who are unfamiliar with each other but share common orientations are mobilized, while agential aspects involve mobilization for a specific purpose. However, coalitions of contention involve threats and opportunities (Tarrow, 2007, p. 163). In other words, to some extent, a coalition of contention is a consequence of the protest network, most prominently its structural and agential characteristics. On the other hand, network modularity refers to the measure of significant community clustering in a network (Newman, 2006, p. 8578). Typically, communities refer to clusters of network connections that have higher density among themselves than with actors outside the community (Shai et al., 2021, p. 313). In our case, such dense clusters

will be the coalitions of contention formed during far-right protest events in Ukraine from 2014 to 2021.

As revealed from the literature review on alliances of social movements, factors such as ideology and the use of violence are also important. The coalition formation process might hinge on (1) how similar ideological subtypes are—i.e., homophily effect and the organizational trajectory (van Dyke & Amos, 2017)—and (2) whether the selected organizations tend to cooperate during transgressive contentious politics, for the latter could be interpreted as a proxy for high cooperation and trust between actors. Additionally, the exploration of network communities through these factors would partially bridge the gap between the concepts of networks and coalition, as both concepts are components of the dynamics of cognate collective action dynamics (Diani & Bison, 2004).

Concomitantly, the tendency of social movement organizations to coordinate efforts equally depends on the process called "frame bridging" that, depending on an organization's frame locus of attribution, rigidity/flexibility and exclusivity/inclusivity distinctions, resonance, interpretative scope, and other mechanisms, determines the alignment of collective action efforts (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 618-620). Not only does it confirm the just-described discussion of ideological underpinnings of the coalition formation process, but it also implies that "repertoires of contention" are likely to intervene. Per Tilly (2006), repertoires of contention are "the limited, familiar, historically created arrays of claim-making performances that under most circumstances greatly circumscribe the means by which people engage in contentious politics" (p. vii). Situated on the axes of familiarity and the likelihood of repetition by others, repertoires happen to be (1) absent (low repetition, constant familiarity), (2) weak (repetition grows *in direct proportion* to familiarity), (3) strong (repetition grows *exponentially* as familiarity rises), and (4) rigid (constant repetition, high familiarity) (Tilly, 2006, p. 40). Such a consideration is further confirmed by studies of social movement diffusions, which postulate that the feasibility of forms of contention increases the emulation (Biggs,

2013). Moreover, per some scholarship turning to non-state actors in social movement studies, the convergence in targets (i.e., locus of attribution) affected the dynamics of collective violence as well as contained contention (Benford & Snow, 2000; van Dyke et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2009). Lastly, the bureaucratization of a social movement organization and its spatial dissemination seemingly contribute to the sustainability of its protest cycle and the surge of its brokerage capabilities (Tarrow, 1993; Soule & King, 2008; Staggenborg, 2022).

Overall, as a result of this literature review, the following hypotheses could be coined for further assessment:

(1) H_1: *The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by ideological subtype*;

(2) H_2: *The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by the diversity of the repertoires of contention*;

(3) H_3: *The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by the diversity of targets*;

(4) H_4: *The structure of the alliances in the network of the far-right organizations in Ukraine (2014–2021) is predicted by the diversity of (cross-)regional cooperation*.

II. METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A STUDY IN THE ALLIANCES OF THE FAR-RIGHT ORGANIZATIONS IN 2014–2021 UKRAINE, NETWORK MODULARITY, & CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

2.1. Rules for Data Collection on the Far-Right Organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021: Key Definitions, Frameworks, and Challenges for Protest-Event and Social Network Analyses

The quest for viable solutions to research dilemmas sparked by the nature of our subject of inquiry and subjects alike have long troubled paragon minds of contentious politics and social movements studies as well as network analysis fellows of all different academic fields. We would like to dedicate this section to an outline of challenges that will be central to the present study of the operation of the far-right organizations in 2014–2021 Ukraine. Then, possible scenarios for the mitigation of these challenges are suggested. As a whole, the constraints one would have to wrestle with in a study like ours root in a methodological "gray area" rendered by the organizational ecology of the Ukrainian far-right. On the one hand, the façade ontology of the far-right (i.e., the "far-right" label itself) suggests possible adherence to extremist or at least radical contentious politics and thus implies covertness; on the other, the publicity and engagement in non-violent resistance point to the robustness of trends typical of new social movements among the Ukrainian far-right. As a result, challenges pertinent to both contained and transgressive SMOs can theoretically occur en route to data collection.

Suffice it to say, the root cause of all data collection concerns applicable to our case lies in the fact that the far-right organizations in 2014–2021 Ukraine are likely to represent the family of "covert networks" in many regards. There exists a whole different series of research efforts devoted to the delineation of limitations caused by the nature of covert networks—i.e., networks, the activities of which are deliberately clandestine (Olivier et al., 2014, p. 1). There are two criteria for a network to be considered a covert one: "(1) *commit illegal acts whose details must*

be kept secret from the authorities prior to their commission; and who (2) *seek to remain anonymous to all but a select few after their commission*" (Crossley et al., 2012, p. 638; accents saved). In the case of "dark networks" or "illicit networks" (e.g., terrorist networks and organized crime networks), observers argue that covertness is rooted in steady state coercions and negative social sanctions, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Yet, covertness as a network feature goes beyond these explicit examples and includes a broader category of "covert social movements," too (Crossley et al., 2012, p. 638). Operationally, actors do *not* steer clear of public statements and claims *per se*, yet do tend to avoid public appearances. Structurally, such networks have low density and decentralized modus of internal interactions and resemble mirage networks (Diani, 2003). On top of these two peculiarities, sampling appears to be troublesome. Not only does the avoidance of public appearances complicate the exact delimitation of who is a constituent of the network and who is not, which scrutinizes nominalist approaches to the formation of network membership (Laumann et al., 1983). But it also raises the questions of loyalty and commitment rooted in a setting of secrecy: members of a secret society may not be willing to give up the names of their associates because of affectionate ties or fear of blowing that very secret and thus putting the existence of the group at stake (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020). This insincerity is detrimental to interviewing techniques of realist strategies of network sampling (Laumann et al., 1983), which include snowball sampling methods and techniques of name generators (Elsissy et al., 2022).

As a result, both nominalist and realist methods of sampling are equally and chiefly exposed to the boundary specification problem. In other words, data is highly likely to be missing whichever side is chosen, nominalist or realist. Because we do not intend to resort to interviews in order to obtain data, it is reasonable to confine our overview and answers to the boundary specification problem to (1) meso-level analysis and (2) nominalist approaches of network data collection and their limitations in that regard. Since our available capacities and objective circumstances

do not enable us to grasp the whole far-right social movement industry on the conscience-constituent level (see Klandermans et al., 2015)—there are not enough resources for conducting in-depth interviews or focus groups, whereas the majority of conscience constituents of selected organizations are heroically defending Ukraine from the all-out Russian invasion on the frontlines—the covertness of radical political groups and their networks incentivizes us to adopt the meso-level analysis. Not only can such a solution be logically deduced from methodological challenges, but it also fits the trends in the studies of political extremism and social movements. For instance, the Mitchell Center for Social Network Analysis at the University of Manchester, a premier group of scholars of covert networks, compiled 47 covert network datasets, the majority of which are comprised of organization-by-organization ties (Analytic Technologies, n. d.). Moreover, inter-organizational links have long been a prevailing avenue in the estimation of network effects of democratization (Cranmer et al., 2020) as well as national and transnational dynamics of collective action (Smith & Wiest, 2012), and quite recently, it has been brought into the discussion of the Ukrainian far-right (Umland & Tarasiuk, 2021). Thereby, conducting research in a similar vein would oblige us to deal with the *socio-centric* type of networks and code data respectively.

Our response to the problem of boundary specification of the Ukrainian far-right organizations is as follows. *Given the convergence of resource scarcity and boundary specification problems that grow out of heuristical loopholes in nominalist strategies, the exploitation of secondary sources in a study of the networks that far-right organizations in Ukraine congregate can be a viable option if and only if it is accompanied by robust data triangulation, which is the strategy of the present paper*. Continuing the nominalist tradition, this bachelor's thesis' boundary specification principles are grounded on the "peak list" sampling of social movement organizations introduced by Andrews et al. (2016). The peak list sampling hinges on the idea that through data triangulation of available organizational listings and distribution of social movement organizations by attributes, an opportunity to omit

biases of individual listings is available (Andrews et al., 2016, p. 236, 238). For the objectives of this research, the listings of the Marker and Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine projects are starting points, and so is the existing body of scholarly debate (see Section 2.3); the rest of the organizations are found and examined by ourselves in a snowball fashion, which is a novelty of this paper.

The data triangulation component is coordinately key to the next aspect of our research design, namely protest-event analysis as a basis for network data collection. In the present bachelor's thesis, unitizing is performed in accordance with the "Dynamics of Collective Action" codebook developed by scholars at Stanford University (2009) and includes 14 variables: the link to the source, the names of groups 1-7 (variables 2-8), unique event identification number, the region (oblast) the protest event took place in, the type of target, the main form of protest, the use of violence by protesters, and the use of coercion by the police. This codebook was chosen for its protest-centric orientation (Hutter, 2014, p. 343), which facilitates the central need of this paper: the creation of an affiliate protest network. While the first six variables are filled in with characters, the last two are binomial (0/1) and simply state the presence or absence of a phenomenon in the source. The coding options for the target and form variables are borrowed from the "Dynamics of Collective Action," too. The full list of them is available in Appendix B, and the operationalization of this data is mostly necessary for network attributes, which is discussed in Section 2.3.

Once the list of organizations is defined (see Table 1), the data triangulation algorithm is enacted in a two-pronged "maximalist" way in the present bachelor's thesis. Through the triangulation of data retrieved from think tanks, human rights centers, news articles, and posts on the social media of individual organizations (Ayoub et al., 2014), the representativeness of the organizational listing framework and contentious politics dynamics are thought to be maximized so that network boundaries of the far-right coalitions of contention—which are established to be covert—are in proximity to the political reality. In particular, we used news articles

from the Ukrainian Pravda, Hromadske, Obozrevatel, and Zaxid.net, publications on the website of human rights NGO called ZMINA.info, and individual social media pages of 23 far-right organizations. The first two media outlets and Zaxid.net were chosen because of their high standards (Institute of Mass Information, 2021), whereas Obozrevatel was instrumental because of its high national volume (Institute of Mass Information, 2022); ZMINA.info was selected among other Ukrainian human rights NGOs for its prominent role in the monitoring of the far-right political violence in the country (ZMINA.info, 2015; ZMINA.info, 2020); and, if present, individual social media pages—including Telegram channels, Facebook and VKontakte (banned since 2017 by the decree of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, see Ukrainian Pravda, 2020) public pages—were used for the sake of calibration of the findings and minimizing saturation effect stemming from the use of media sources (Scott, 2001).

Table 1. Ideological typology of the Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021.

Names of organizations	Far-right types
Brotherhood (*Bratstvo*)	Millenarian
C14 (or *Sich*)	Reactive
Carpathian Sich (*Karpatska Sich*)	Reactive
Christian Front (*Khrystyianskyi Front*)	Millenarian
Cultural Union “Avanguard”	Revolutionary
Edelweiss	Vigilante
Freedom (*Svoboda*)	Reactive
Freikorps	Reactive
Furious (*Liutych*)	Vigilante
Katechon (*Katekhon*)	Millenarian
Knights of the City (*Lytsari Mista*)	Vigilante
National Corps (*Natsionalnyi Korpus*)	Revolutionary
National Resistance (*Natsional’nyi Sprotyv*)	Reactive
Order (*Orden*)	Millenarian
Right Sector (*Pravyi Sektor*)	Revolutionary
Solaris	Reactive
Street Front (*Vulychnyi Front*)	Vigilante
Sunrise (*Svitanok*)	Revolutionary
Tradition and Order (*Tradytsiia i Poriadok*)	Millenarian
UNA-UNSO	Revolutionary

On the other hand, our adherence to social movement studies methodologies and meso-level analysis as potential "remedies" for boundary specification problems renders a whole different set of backlashes. Namely, among the major ones pertinent to this bachelor's thesis are *selection* and *description biases* that may well take place during the conduct of the protest-event analysis dataset (Ortiz et al., 2005). Media outlets report separate selected events and describe them not in full. Consequently, these biases, if not dealt with correctly, are highly likely to skew the network measures, including the estimations of homophily, and thus spoil the goodness of fit of the exponential random graph modeling techniques in an affiliate network of contention such as one of the Ukrainian far-right organizations. For this reason, if correlations in a hypothetical exponential random graph model turn out to be statistically insignificant and the model's statistical fitness proves not to be robust, it may well partially be an outcome of erroneous coding of protest events and/or false prescription of network attributes to actors. (This aspect of inferential network analysis is discussed in detail in Section 2.3 of this chapter.) To mitigate these risks is the main idea behind why the present bachelor's thesis attends to social media pages of separate organizations: while national media are likely to suffer from these biases or from saturation effect, an organization could have a different vision of its own operations.

In conclusion of the first section, it is mandatory to treat the protest network of the Ukrainian far-right (2014–2021) as a *one-mode socio-centric affiliate valued undirected network* (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006) wherein its vertices correspond with political groups classified as far-right, whereas the edges stand for the number of coincidences of participation in the same protest events, which are presumed to be reciprocal ties *per se*.

2.2. Measuring the Competitiveness: An Introduction to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Its Application to Protest Events of the Ukrainian Far-Right, 2014–2021

As argued in the first chapter, the degree of consolidation of a social movement is theoretically directly proportional to its capacity to exercise extra-institutional power over conventional politics. In that sense, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index can provide us with useful and eloquent descriptive statistics in order to detect "oligopoly" (i.e., dominance)—or alternatively, diversity—in the far-right social movement sector before the assessment of inter-group dynamics through network analytic measures. Thus, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is instrumental in informing about the social cohesion of the Ukrainian far-right during the events of contentious politics from 2014 to 2021, estimating the concentration and exploring these phenomena further.

A blossoming interdisciplinary body of literature encompasses using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for exploratory purposes from Social Sciences like Political Science and Ethnoreligious Studies to Natural Sciences like Biology (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 1). Previously, that index was also used by Sarah Soule (2008) as an independent variable in her case study of competition and resource partitioning among various SMOs in environmental, women, and anti-war social movement industries.

$$\square\square\square = \sum_{\square=1}^{\square} \square_{\square}^{2} \quad \text{(Soule, 2008);} \tag{1}$$

The presented formula calculates the sum of squares of protest share expressed through a whole number instead of decimals. *S* stands for the protest share in percentages, which is a proportion of the number of protest events of a given organization to the sum of all protest events for a given period; *i* stands for the organization's numeric index. By exponentiating protest shares and totalizing them,

the Herfindahl-Hirschman index lays out an absolute-zero measure that indicates competition in the social movement industry from 0 to 10,000, from the absolute competition (0% of shares possessed by all social movement organizations) to the absolute concentration of the protest field (100% of protest shares possessed by one single social movement organization). This paper cites Pavic et al. (2016) for the interpretation table.

Most of the critiques that are directed against the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are built on arguments traversing the credibility of its originators' theoretical claim that the behavior of actors is grown out of structural factors underpinning the field they are operating in. In its pure unmodified classical form, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index constantly (re)produces structural biases, which is built-in collateral damage: being monadic by nature, the index ignores behavioral outcomes of interactivity and positionalities in a field engendered by inter-organizational ties and their quality (Roberts, 2014; Bos et al., 2017; Kvålseth, 2021). Bos et al. (2017) point to two biases of this index: (1) *omitted variables bias* (e.g., mutual awareness and expectations of actors in different situations are not included, which causes skewness) and (2) *aggregation bia*s (incorrect selection of proxy variables that leads to wrongheaded rejection of the null hypothesis) (p. 62, 64). However, the research design of this paper mitigates these risks by extensively employing network analysis, especially inferential methods like exponential random graph modeling. By doing so, one can ensure that potential behavioral factors behind the network structure are on the horizon. Additionally, the social network analysis component allows us to go beyond the flaw of Soule's (2008) and others' (Ishchenko, 2016) frameworks that do not wield enough relativity and overly hinge on quantities.

Table 2. Interpretation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Pavic et al., 2016, p. 7)

Concentration level	Herfindahl-Hirschman index level
Non-concentrated	< 1,500
Moderately concentrated	1,500–2,500
Highly concentrated	> 2,500

2.3. The Algorithm of Network Analysis Applied to the Alliances of the Far-Right Organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021: Descriptive Statistics, Network Attributes, Community Detection, and Exponential Random Graph Model

After performing the between-group assessment of competitiveness in the Ukrainian far-right social movement industry via the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, it is essential to wrestle with actor-level and, most importantly, meso-level dimensions of the mobilizational capacities of the Ukrainian far-right. In that regard, network analytic approaches provide a heuristically powerful toolbox meeting the research tasks of the present bachelor's thesis and a study of coalitions of contention. This section of the second chapter is broken as follows. First, descriptive network statistics are calculated via the basic centrality measures and via structural holes. Second, the clustering coefficient, community detection techniques, and exponential random graph model are considered. Last but not least, network attributes are assigned for the inferential analysis in accordance with the up-and-date body of literature on what interferes with social movement alliances and forces the hand of cooperation, non-cooperation, and competition.

Descriptive Network Statistics: Basic Centrality Measures and Structural Holes

Before mapping alliances that had occurred in the network of the Ukrainian far-right from 2014 up until 2021, it is essential to describe the resultative network itself. As per social movement scholars (Crossley, 2008), *degree centrality*, *betweenness centrality*, *eigenvector centrality*, *closeness centrality*, *network centralization*, and

network density are seemingly prerequisites for the analysis. Moreover, the centrality measures are crucial in the identification of key agents (Nieves & Casas-Méndez, 2023, p. 1366). Less popular and in plain sight of Political Scientists appears to be the measure of *structural holes* (Buskens & van de Rijt, 2008).

First, the network analytic part of the research shall proceed with node-level measures. Degree centrality is an essential network measure that counts the number of edges that a node has in a given network, whereas weighted degree summarizes the strengths of all ties attached to a node. Betweenness centrality is the next measure that computes the number of unique edges, which are not present in the network but can be facilitated by a particular node (Formula 2). Then, closeness centrality distribution among 23 organizations is depicted: this index measures the average number of steps needed to be taken so that an actor would be able to reach out to another one (Formula 3). In other words, it indicates the embeddedness of a vertice. Next, eigenvector centrality is calculated: this index measures the proportion of a number of ties to high-scoring actors to the overall count of ties of an actor (Formula 4). Finally, the structural holes index (also known as Burt's constraint) indicates the competition of actors for the same network alters (or how indispensable an actor is depending on how exclusive the ties of their alters are) (Formula 5).

$$\square_{\square}(\square_{\square}) = \sum_{\square<} \quad \sum_{\square} \quad \frac{\square_{\square\square}(\square_{\square})}{\square_{\square\square}} \text{ (Freeman, 1978, p. 223);} \tag{2}$$

$$\square_{\square}(\square_{\square}) = \frac{\square - 1}{\sum_{\square=1}^{\square} \square(\square_{\square}, \square_{\square})} \text{ (Freeman, 1978, p. 226);} \tag{3}$$

$$\square_{\square} = \frac{1}{\square} \sum_{\square \in \square} \quad \square_{\square,\square} \square_{\square} \text{ (Bonacich, 1987, p. 1172);} \tag{4}$$

$$\square_{\square} = \sum_{\square \in \square(\square)} \quad \square_{\square\square} \text{ (Everett \& Borgatti, 2020, p. 4).} \tag{5}$$

Second, network-wide indices would be of service in counterbalancing the biases of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The network centralization index will be a viable alternative measure for the protest *network* concentration, as it calculates the dispersion (farness) of centrality scores (Formula 6). Also, density is measured in order to confirm the structure by calculating, which outputs the index of the closeness of nodes to each other (Formula 7). Lastly, network transitivity (or clustering coefficient) is used to establish if dense hidden communities had appeared in the protest network of the Ukrainian far-right from 2014 to 2021 (Formula 8).

$$\square(\square) = \sum_{\square}^{\blacksquare\blacksquare} (\square\square\square_{\square}\square_{\square} - \square_{\square}) \text{ (Freeman, 1978, p. 228);} \quad (6)$$

$$\square = \frac{\square(\square-1)}{2} \text{ (Csardi \& Nepusz, 2006);} \quad (7)$$

$$\square_{\square}^{\square} = \frac{1}{\square_{\square}(\square_{\square}-1)} \sum_{\square,h} \frac{\square_{\square\square}+\square_{\square h}}{2} (\square_{\square\square}\square_{\square h}\square_{\square h}) \text{ (Barrat et al., 2004, p. 3750).} \quad (8)$$

Community Detection, Modularity, and Exponential Random Graph Model

Nevertheless, basic network analytic calculations, such as centrality measures, fall prey when one's research task is to predict within-group dynamics—i.e., within-coalition dynamics in our case. These descriptive statistics are representative of a strictly localized node-level social capital or too general. For this reason, the degree of (non-)cooperation on the group level—i.e., on the level coalitions of contention—

shall be estimated and analyzed through the venue of community detection algorithms, their modularity, and exponential random graph model analysis.

First, let us unpack the four algorithms and the reasons for choosing them as best fits for the network analytic motives of the present paper: (1) infomap algorithm, (2) edge-betweenness algorithm, (3) walktrap algorithm, and (4) Louvain algorithm. The logic behind the selection of these four is grounded on the question-alignment approach, which means that an algorithm shall fit the research question of a network study (Smith et al., 2020). Generally speaking, there exist three generic questions: (1) divisive (i.e., whether one is interested in "polarizing" the network); (2) agglomerative (i.e., whether one is interested in "uniting" the network); and (3) optimizing (i.e., whether one is interested in detecting "small worlds" effectively transmitting information) (Smith et al., 2020, p. 5, 14). The infomap and Louvain algorithms represent the third category, whereas the edge-betweenness and walktrap algorithms fit into the divisive and agglomerative categories, respectively (Smith et al., 2020, p. 14). For the alliance-making is a dynamic process, involving polarizing, uniting, and small-world tendencies all at once, it is decided to test all of the three and choose one that would perform the highest modularity score so that the most optimistic scenario for a seven-year-long coalition-building is generalized.

Second, after performing the network transitivity calculation, a network modularity index (from 1 to –1) will be calculated separately for each algorithm (Formula 9). The closer the retrieved value to 0, the more likely a small-world situation is the case for a network. This would imply highly conducive conditions for communications (and thus diffusions and emulations of repertoires and the movement as a whole).

$$\square = \sum_{\square=1}^{\square} (\square_{\square\square} - \square_{\square}^{2}) \text{ (Newman, 2006, p. 8578).} \quad (9)$$

Thirdly and lastly, the exponential random graph model (Formula 10) is conducted via the "*ergm*" package in R (Hunter et al., 2008). Exponential random graph models are part of a wider family of statistical inference methods dealing with exponential distribution (e.g., regression analysis).

$$\square\square(\square = \square|\square) = \frac{1}{\square(\square)}\square\square\square\ (\square^{\square}\square(\square)) \text{ (Al-Balla et al., 2019, p. 3)} \quad (10)$$

In turn, the effect of homophily criteria—i.e., network attributes—shall be estimated via exponential random graph modeling techniques. As identified in the theoretical foundations of this bachelor's thesis, the process of social movement alliance formation is intrinsically related to the phenomenon of homophily. Thus, our exponential random graph model necessarily has to integrate potential homophily factors that could be critical in forming communities—i.e., alliances or coalitions of contention. The next subsection of this section will be devoted to network attributes as homophily predictors and to devising the list of network attributes relevant to social movement studies as a subdiscipline and the Ukrainian far-right activities in particular.

Independent Variables: Exogenous Factors

As mentioned above, network attributes can be instrumental in the comprehension of factors behind the formation of network structures. Network attributes can be exogenous or endogenous independent variables in an exponential random graph model and are generally understood by network analysts as node-level characteristics that collect all nodes into groups (e.g., gender, race, position, etc.) As indicated in Chapter 1, the methodology of the present bachelor's thesis integrates the following attributes into the model: (1) ideological subtype of far-right

organizations; (2) containment–transgressiveness division; (3) diversity of repertoire of an organization; and (4) diversity of regional cooperation.

To begin with, ideological discrepancies may affect the trajectory of coalitions of contention. Here, Sprinzak's (1995) aforementioned six-part typology of right-wing extremism appears to be instrumental. For the sake of the current paper's research tasks, it is decided to code 22 Ukrainian far-right organizations only into four subtypes out of five.

Before presenting the arguments behind the coding of ideological subtypes, it is necessary to retort considerations of the preceding body of research on the Ukrainian far-right. The Kremlin's pundits and some Western academics tend to equate three entities: various Azov-related military units, the Azov Movement, and the National Corps (Gomza, 2022). However, such an equation is improper. First, it violates the military–civilian relations distinction, which is detrimental to the present bachelor's thesis: the civilian side of political processes in Ukraine is taken into account only. Second, there exists an integral ethical component: many of the references to symbols with initially far-right connotations end up being manipulations devoid of substantial evidence for considering the bureaucratized, nationwide movement far-right one in principle (Gomza, 2022). As a matter of fact, these remarks are applicable and are applied to other Ukrainian far-right organizations, which have namesake or partially affiliated military units in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or national law enforcement (e.g., Right Sector Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, Carpathian Sich 49th Infantry Battalion, the Legion of Freedom, Freikorps Volunteer Combat Unit, the UNA-UNSO Battalion, St. Mary's Battalion, the Bratstvo Reconnaissance Battalion, and others—see Right Sector, n. d.; TSN.ua, 2015; Zaborona, 2020; UNA-UNSO, n. d.; Verner, 2015; PRESSING, 2023). For these reasons, classifying veteran activism of these units as affiliated with the far-right social movement industry is **ethically** and **methodologically dubious**, and they will not be considered far-right in this bachelor's thesis. Table 1 summarizes the description of each organization available below.

1. *Vigilante far-right organizations*. As Sprinzak defines, vigilante right-wing extremism grows out of a sentiment that a government, national or local, underperforms so severely that it is necessary to confront it and enforce the rule of law independently (p. 29). In that sense, three organizations fall into this category: the Knights of the City (*Lytsari Mista*), Edelweiss, the Furious (*Liutych*) and the Street Front (*Vulychnyi Front*). The Knights of the City is a primarily Kyiv-based straight-edge group that was initiated in 2017 and aims to "[c]ombat against negative social phenomena: hooligans, alcoholics, drug addicts, drug traffickers, thieves, fireworks, [Roma people], etc." (Knights of the City, 2017). Aside from racist insults toward the Roma people, other aspects of the organization's activities evidence its affiliation with the Ukrainian far-right/nativist social movement industry: the organization's "ideologue" wore a shirt with a wolfsangel symbol[2] (44.ua, 2018) while activists have extensively cooperated with Freedom (*Svoboda*), C14, the Right Sector (*Pravyi Sektor*), and the National Corps (*Natsionalnyi Korpus*) on the issue of local governance in Kyiv (Knights of the City, 2018a; 2018b). In turn, Edelweiss originates from Vinnytsia and was founded in 2018. Its activities were widely regarded as anti-LGBTQI+ conservatives and appraisers of the eponymous Nazi German infantry division by human rights observers, and the organization's leadership proclaims it to be a "youth nationalist organization" (Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine, n. d.-b). However, in the present bachelor's thesis, Edelweiss is coded as a vigilante far-right because of its strong dedication to Vinnytsia-specific developments. The Furious is a related Vinnytsia-based organization that specializes in nationalist teach-ins for the youth of Vinnytsia Oblast and has closely cooperated in an attempt at creating a traditionalist radical right military and political association together with C14 (Furious, 2021). Lastly, the Street Front is an Odesa-based association that was created in 2016. Cooperating with Odesa and youth branches of Freedom and National Corps, its leadership described itself as "a joint public

[2] Not to be confused with the "nation's idea" symbol.

initiative of Ukrainian nationalists in the city of Odesa who have united with the goal of bringing order to their hometown" (Street Front, 2016).

2. *Reactive far-right organizations*. This type of right-wing extremism, as per Sprinzak (1995), is distinctive in its devotion to the *status quo ante* and readiness to employ violent resistance to any disruptions in the current (or imaginative) social order (p. 26). In other words, activities of a reactive far-right organization would mainly figure chiefly as (transgressive) backlash politics (della Porta, 2020). As a result of peak-listing and extended social media research, the following organizations are included: Freedom, C14, the Carpathian Sich (*Karpatska Sich*), Freikorps, the National Resistance (*Natsionalnyi Sprotyv*), and Solaris. The Freedom Party has long been known for its anti-immigrant sentiments and xenophobic attitudes and has often been considered ultimately a reactionary force in the Ukrainian political milieu (Shekhovtsov, 2011; Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2014; Bustikova, 2015). As the most institutionally formalized, not only did Freedom accidentally get into conventional politics through elections, but it also has a de-facto youth wing, the Falcon (*Sokil*) (Marker, n. d.-c), which we coded as Freedom on par with other protest events of the party. Founded in 2011, C14 is widely regarded as a neo-Nazi group with a history of steady participation in group violence against ethnic and sexual minorities as well as gender activism (Marker, n.d.-a; Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine, n. d.-a; Umland, 2020). The Carpathian Sich is a Uzhhorod-based organization that backlashed against multiculturalism, "ethnic crime," and LGBTQI+ representatives (Marker, n. d.-c; Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine, n. d.-d). Similar profiles were prepared for Freikorps and Solaris (Reporting Radicalism in Ukraine, n. d.-c; ZMINA, 2021). Less known is the National Resistance. The Marker (n. d.-d) research group points to the National Resistance's adherence to the Cultural Marxism conspiracy theory and fierce hostility to LGBTQI+ activists, yet this brief dossier loses out of sight of the overt identitarian outlook, both in symbols and rhetoric (National Resistance, 2019).

3. *Millenarian far-right organizations.* The key ideological trait of this type of far-right organizations is an inherent belief in the eschatological political process, which is caused by the diversion of humanity from traditionalist values of religion to modern values (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 33). In its allegiance to status quo ante, the millenarian far-right reminds reactive far-right organizations, yet millenarians have to be treated separately because of their solid loyalty to religion as *opposed* to modernity as a whole, which presumes a radically different political imagination of *status quo ante*. In Ukraine, the Brotherhood (*Bratstvo*), the Christian Front (*Khrystyians'kyi Front*), Tradition and Order (*Tradytsiia i Poriadok*), Order (*Orden*), and Katechon (*Katekhon*) are proposed to be identified as millenarian. The oldest in this relatively latter-day segment of the Ukrainian far-right social movement industry, the Brotherhood was founded as a political party in 2002 by the former UNA-UNSO leader Dmytro Korchynskyi and designed as a "Christian revolutionary community" or as a "national-anarchist party" that seeks to restore traditional Christian values (Marker, n. d.-b; ZMINA, 2019). In a similar vein Tradition and Order, (re-)founded in 2015 and led by the former associate of the Brotherhood Bohdan Khodakovskyi, violently stands up for the preservation of traditional family values and Christianity in Ukraine, although adopted a largely statist stance toward nation-building (which has to be revisited through the lens of traditionalism), unlike Korchynskyi's group (Tradition and Order, 2021; Roschchyna, 2022). The Order and Katechon are two frequent companions of Tradition and Order, and their ideologemes appear to align in the fusion of Christian politics and statism (Marker, n. d.-e; Marker, n. d.-g). The Christian Front is a Kyiv-based anti-LGBTQI+ traditionalist organization that has cooperated with Tradition and Order (Ukrainian Pravda, 2021) and is missed in the ratings potentially due to its fewer media appearances and protest activities.

4. *Revolutionary far-right organizations*. Sprinzak (1995) defines this subtype as follows: "right-wing revolutionary movements belonging to the Fascist and Nazi schools," involving "a lengthy trajectory of rejection of the late nineteenth-

century bourgeois society and parliamentary democracy," and considering "[v]iolence [...] an essential part of their original philosophy of government" (p. 23). The representatives of the revolutionary far-right resort to selective, tactical political violence that would compromise the *status quo* and proximate desired systemic, radical social transformations (Sprinzak, 1995, p. 25). For the sake of ethics and outlined theoretical framework involving the minimal definition of far-right ideologies, it is suggested to widen Sprinzak's (1995) vision of this subtype beyond Nazism and Fascism since it would be inappropriate to equate the Ukrainian revolutionary far-right solely to these schools. Thereby, the National Corps, the Cultural Union "Avanguard," Sunrise, Right Sector, UNA-UNSO, and the Social-National Assembly are coded as the revolutionary far-right. To begin with, the Ukrainian National Assembly — Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO) is the oldest far-right group that can be dropped into the category of the revolutionary far-right on the basis of the existing body of scholarship and its background of an anti-communist force in the last years of Soviet Ukraine (Umland, 2013, p. 4; Umland & Shekhovtsov, 2013, p. 38). Similarly, the Trident was cited as an organization claiming the revolutionary legacy of the OUN and Stepan Bandera (Umland & Shekhovtsov, 2014, p. 59). In a similar vein, the Social-National Assembly (or the Social-National Party), the Freedom Party's formal predecessor that was created in 1991, is oftentimes understood as a neo-fascist and right-wing extremist organization with an orientation to social corporatism and ethnic nationalism (Iovenko, 2015, p. 229). It is coded as the revolutionary far-right due to its double negative self-identification, which contrasted the Assembly's members with both Ukrainian national democrats and communists, as well as due to the revolutionary nationalist ambit of the program (Iovenko, 2015, p. 230-231). Scholars refer to the organization as a defunct one that merged into the Freedom Party (Iovenko, 2015), yet our dataset captures several precedents of its independent extra-institutional activities. Although the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists is close to the Assembly and the Freedom Party, it was not included in the sample

because of its big-tent position and "congressional" *modus operandi* (Umland, 2013, p. 4; Umland & Shekhovtsov, 2013, p. 40). Next, the Right Sector and the National Corps are in the revolutionary far-right sublist, too. While the former had been initiated during the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests as an association of far-right groups and a revolutionary agent from the get-go (Umland & Shekhovtsov, 2014, p. 59), the latter came to prominence after the success of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and the consequent Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and appealed to Ukraine's post-Euromaidan youth (Umland, 2020, p. 265-266). Before the National Corps' official appearance as a party, the Civil Detachment Azov constituted a "pre-political wing," as Gomza & Zajaczkowski (2019) put it (p. 792), and the National Fellowships performed the role of National Corps-backed vigilante militias (Umland, 2019, p. 123). Ergo, activities of the CD Azov and the National Fellowships, if found, are to be coded as those of the National Corps. Lastly, there is a "third wave" of the revolutionary far-right in Ukraine embodied in such organizations as Sunrise and CU "Avanguard." The former situationally instrumentalizes collective political violence against monuments, buildings, and Soviet nostalgists and supplies other far-right organizations with the support of its conscience constituents (Marker, n.d.-c). The CU "Avanguard" aims to mobilize Ukraine's post-Euromaidan youth and position itself as a bulwark of youth counterculture. It could qualify for Sprinzak's (1995) youth-counterculture subtype of the far-right organizations, yet the revolutionary component is increasingly critical: the CU "Avanguard" proclaimed itself "traditionalist revolutionaries" and "reactionary nihilists" (Avanguard, 2020; 2021c), called for an "agrarian revolution" (Avanguard, 2021a) and figuratively declared an "alumina war" (Avanguard, 2021b).

Additionally, as van Dyke & Amos (2017) maintain, the institutional environment (e.g., the coercivity of the regime) has been no less popular heuristic in social movement scholarship. State coercion inflicted upon a group may either ruin the organizational ecology by physical expulsion of transgressive individuals or

facilitate what some students of radicalization call "condensation" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). Thus, state coercion may either inhibit the coalition formation process or render a precedent for greater group cohesion. These theoretical considerations generate two boundary-case network attributes that would have to be controlled in the model: (1) the transgressive/contained divide (whether an organization resorts to violent or non-violent resistance in the preponderance of protest events it had participated in); and (2) the toleration/coercion divide. In our protest-event data collection, two special binomial variables are added ("violence" and "police") where, in an organization-by-event manner, each organization is assigned 0 if it had recourse for contained contentious politics and/or was policed. Alternatively, an organization was prescribed with 1 for an event in either variable. In the aftermath, the proportion of transgressive contention to contained contention is calculated and four network attributes for two groups are obtained: (1.1) contained (if non-violent methods of resistance exceed 50% of an organization's events) and (1.2) transgressive (vice-versa); (2.1) tolerated (if policing was *not* the case for more than 50% of the protest events of an organization) and (2.2) coerced (vice-versa).

Apart from ideological undercurrents and violence, repertoires of contention, types of targets, and regional concentration wield a theoretically significant impact on the coalition formation process, as mentioned in Section 1.3. Therefore, the more comprehensive the repertoire, types of targets, and (cross-)regional cooperation, the more capacity a social movement organization theoretically wields and the more likely it can access like-minded counterparts beyond its original headquarters and form alliances with them due to flexibility. In pursuit of the estimation of repertoire, tactical, and target diversity employed by a social movement organization, it is propounded to attend to the measure called Shannon's H (Formula 11). Such a choice is substantiated by innovations in the research on political regimes and repertoires. For example, in Bagozzi et al. (2021), this measure was tooled to estimate the diversity of repertoires of repression from a similar protest-event dataset

but coded for the state coercion side. Unlike the above-discussed Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Shannon's H is able to discern between high and medium levels of concentrations, which makes it better suited for the definition of network attributes (Bagozzi, 2021).

$$\square\square = -\sum_{\square=1}^{\square} \square_{\square}(\square\square\square_2\square_{\square}) \text{ (Bagozzi et al., 2021).} \quad (11)$$

III. COMPETITIVENESS AND ALLIANCES IN THE NETWORK OF THE FAR-RIGHT ORGANIZATIONS IN UKRAINE, 2014–2021

3.1. Unlocking Horns? The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Applied to Protest-Event Data of the Far-Right Organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021

In the aftermath of protest-event data collection, a large-N dataset was obtained.[3] In this dataset, 956 protest engagements were coded with all selected far-right organizations present in 521 unique events with a timespan from 2014 well into 2021. This means that 23 Ukrainian far-right organizations had *cooperated* in slightly more than 1 in 2 protests (53.56%).

Table 2 demonstrates protest shares per organization. The top protest participant is Kharkiv-based Sunrise, which leads the ranking with an 18.83% protest share (180 protest events), while the Unknown Patriot group closes the ranking with a 0.11% protest share (1 event). However, the protest shares are relatively even in terms of distribution among the tier-four organizations: the Sunrise, the Street Front (14.44%, 138 protest events), the Right Sector (10.57%, 101 protest events), and Edelweiss (10.46%, 100 protest events). The overall Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 2014–2021 scored 1,036.55, which is symptomatic of low protest activity concentration (> 1,500) and relatively high competition in the Ukrainian far-right social movement industry that gravitates to the mark of moderate competition (1,500–2,500 range). This indicates an almost conducive setting for the creation of coalitions of contention, although the competition is yet high.

To access the dynamics of the competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index was conducted for each year separately and plotted for the period from 2014 to 2021. As observable in Figure 1, protest concentration was at the score of 4,013.08 in 2014, 6,456.60 in 2015, 2,506 in 2016, 3,224.07 in 2017, 1,372.12 in 2018, 1,790.66 in 2019, 2,086.72 in 2020, and 1,260.06 in 2021.

[3] The dataset is available via the following link: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/10Y84-3lBoQBobi9Uu545HVECy9H08X1TXVMhRjhqi1Y/edit

There could be made several suggestions as to why dynamics had differed drastically from 2014 to 2018 and then recalibrated to high competition from 2018 onwards. First and foremost, it coincides with the emergence of new actors and the decline of the old. In other words, the dynamics rely on changes in the equilibrium of organizational ecology. Only five organizations publicly engaged in 2014, most of which were created years prior (except for the Right Sector): the Carpathian Sich with a 56.90% share, the Right Sector with a 25.86% share, the Brotherhood and Freedom with a 6.90% share each, and the Social-National Assembly with a 3.45% share. The Ukrainian social movement industry, then, was dominated enough by experienced and reified organizations. In 2015, however, the index reaches its apex for the whole period, with only four organizations participating and the Brotherhood and the Social-National Assembly, the oldest actors in the far-right cohort, falling off the grid. Concomitantly, a new generation of far-right organizations started stepping in, notably Tradition and Order (then known as Revanche). That year, the dominating Right Sector ended up with a 79.31% share, Freedom with a 10.35% share, Tradition and Order with a 6.90% share, and the Carpathian Sich with a 3.45% share. Moreover, 2015 was the year of record-low protest activity of the Ukrainian far-right. In 2016, the Right Sector's oligopoly is undermined completely and has not recovered to its previous state ever after. Such underperformance can not be explained without a broader intra-organizational context that was remarkable in the organization's legal issues and internal conflicts sparked by the 2015 Mukacheve shooting (Ukrainian Pravda, 2016). It achieved only a 13.72% protest share, whereas two young groups, the Street Front and Tradition and Order with 39.22% and 24.52% shares, respectively, led the ranks. Meanwhile, the Freedom Party (9.80%) continued its status as a mid-rank player in the extra-institutional arena, and seasoned actors like Brotherhood (1.96%) and C14 (8.82%) returned to the protest side of the social movement industry. Worth noting is that 2016 also marked the year of the National Corps and its associates' debut. In 2017, no significant changes to the equilibrium could be traced, except for the appearance of the National Resistance

(3.00%) in the list. In 2018, the first major shift is observed, as six more organizations were added to the list: Sunrise (26.43%), Edelweiss (11.92%), the Knights of the City (8.29%), Freikorps (1.55%), with a brief comeback of the Social-National Assembly (0.52%).



Fig. 1. Dynamics of competition between the Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021.

Table 3. Protest shares of 23 Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021.

Names of organizations	Shares (%)
Brotherhood (*Bratstvo*)	1.36%
C14 (or *Sich*)	3.56%
Carpathian Sich (*Karpatska Sich*)	4.29%
Christian Front (*Khrystyianskyi Front*)	0.21%
Cultural Union “Avanguard”	4.29%
Edelweiss	10.46%
Freedom (*Svoboda*)	5.35%
Freikorps	2.72%
Katechon (*Katekhon*)	0.21%
Knights of the City (*Lytsari Mista*)	4.29%
National Corps (*Natsionalnyi Korpus*)	7.95%
National Resistance (*Natsionalnyi Sprotyv*)	0.42%
Furious (*Liutych*)	0.11%
Order (*Orden*)	0.63%
Right Sector (*Pravyi Sektor*)	10.57%
Social-National Assembly (SNA)	0.42%
Solaris	0.21%
Street Front (*Vulychnyi Front*)	14.44%
Sunrise (*Svitanok*)	18.83%
Tradition and Order (*Tradytsiia i Poriadok*)	9.10%
Triden (*Tryzub*)	0.11%
UNA-UNSO	0.11%
Unknown Patriot (*Nevidomyi Patriot*)	4 (0.42%)

Note. $HHI_{2014–2021} = 1{,}036.55$

From that year on, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index had not gone beyond the range of moderate concentration, which is indicative of conducive conditions for the formation of coalitions. In fact, 2019 was earmarked by the efforts of the Ukrainian far-right to form an institutionally integrated coalition in conventional politics: on the eve of the 2019 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Andrii Biletskyi, the leader of the National Corps, announced the establishment of an electoral bloc comprised of the National Corps, the Freedom Party, and the Right Sector (LB.ua, 2019). At the same time, Bohdan Khodakovskyi attempted to gain office through his candidacy in the list of the Strength and Honor party (Chesno, n. d.). In 2019, a spike in far-right protest activity and the participating organizations also took place. The "third-wave" organizations (CU "Avanguard," Katechon, and the Christian Front) came into sight, while the early-bird organizations like the UNA-UNSO re-emerged. Besides an active electoral cycle, which can account for partially institutionalized actors, such as the National Corps and the Right Sector, there were plentiful stimuli for contentious backlash. In particular, with Volodymyr Zelenskyi taking the presidential seat in 2019, a great many of the far-right groups supported the Resistance against Capitulation movement and joined protest events associated with public discontent with the so-called Steinmeier formula (Ukrainian Pravda, 2019). In 2020, the Ukrainian far-right social movement industry was substantially demobilized (only 11 actors were participants in any protest events), with approximately similar protest shares as in 2018, but dominated by four particular organizations: Sunrise (35.29%), Edelweiss (21.85%), the National Corps (12.61%), and Tradition and Order (10.92%). The mounting rigidity of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index throughout the selected period invites us to move to the network analytic component of the present bachelor's thesis.

3.2. Pretty Centralized, Yet Different: Descriptive Statistics, Community Detection, and Modularity of Alliances in the Network of the Far-Right Organizations in Ukraine, 2014–2021

The structure of the resultative one-mode socio-centric affiliate valued undirected network of protests is constituted by 66 edges (ties) between 22 nodes (organizations). Only one organization from our sample, Solaris, did not share any protest event with others and thus was not integrated into the protest network. On its count, there is only one "solo" protest event, which represents transgressive contentious politics and collective violence. On May 27, 2023, they disrupted a screening of the Ukrainian LGBTQI+ documentary film "Let Us Be Healthy! Dialogues on Dignity" ("*Budmo, hei! Dialohy pro hidnist*"), broke the window and threw a flare and a tear-gas canister into the building (ZMINA.info, 2021). Overall, the range of edge weights is dispersed from 1 to 21, with an average of 4.97. It implies that, on average, the Ukrainian far-right organizations aligned in almost common 5 protest events that had taken place between 2014 and 2021, providing confirmation for a similar finding in Section 3.1. Figure 1 visualizes the obtained network graph of the Ukrainian far-right protest events via the graphopt layout method and by grouping vertices into betweenness clusterization community membership. For this purpose, the plotting tools of the "*igraph*" package in the R language were utilized.



Fig. 2. The protest network of the Ukrainian far-right organizations, 2014–2021: the "*igraph*" visualization with the graphopt layout and betweenness clusters.

In the visualization provided in Figure 2, it is already crystal clear that ideological subtypes may well not be a significant factor. The obtained network is pretty interconnected, although "core" actors are also discernable from the thickness and opacity of edges, which stand for the frequency of the coincident presence of the organizations in common protest events. The color of a vertice and the background is defined by the membership in clusters detected by the Louvain algorithm, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Yet, in the case of actor-level measures, the distribution of values largely depends on an individual measure and varies from case to case. In unweighted degree centrality, the average is 6, the minimum score is 1, and the maximum is 16. The top four leaders with a more or less equal distribution of degrees are clearly identifiable: the Right Sector (tied to 16 organizations), Freedom (14), Tradition and

Order (13), and C14 (13). Yet, once the weighted dimension of degree centrality is taken into account, the situation changes. The average turns 29.82 with the minimum score being 1 and the maximum being 115. The Right Sector (115) and Freedom (100) continue to lead the rating while Tradition and Order (86) is still on the tier-four list, but the National Corps (89) comes out third, although it had a lower unweighted degree score. Rating-wise, almost identical is the situation of the eigenvector centrality that calculates the transitive, channeled mobilizational capacity of an organization in the network, which is determined by the count of ties to high-scoring actors. The average is 0.29, the minimum value is 0.002, and the maximum one is 1.00. The Right Sector (1.00), Freedom (0.86), National Corps (0.82), and Tradition and Order (0.82) enjoy the very same placement as the leading four.

In comparison with the weighted degree centrality, betweenness centrality scores are even more divergent. While the average is 14.71 in this index, Edelweiss, a vigilante far-right organization, makes a rapid appearance as a leader with a score of 47.48, then the regular leaders close the top four rank: the Right Sector (47.34), Freedom (46.37), and C14 (33.74). What is no less surprising is that other hypothetically "specialist" far-right social movement organizations also scored higher than the average and some "generalists" like the National Corps, the betweenness value of which is 0 (e.g., Orden scored 28.70, the National Resistance 27.57, and the Knights of the City 19.80). In order to balance the betweenness measure, Burt's constraint values need to be briefly reviewed. The average score of Burt's constraint in the obtained protest network is 0.59, whereas the minimum is 0.34 and the maximum is 1. In order to test the aforementioned observation that regionally concentrated organizations may wield unique capabilities for bridging actors who are not otherwise connected (which, as a result, increases their betweenness score and decreases Burt's constrained), we ran two logistic regressions wherein the dependent variables were the betweenness scores and Burt's constraint and the independent variable was the network attribute for regional diversity (see

Section 3.3). The results advise us to reject such an assumption: neither model was statistically significant ($p < 1$; see Figure 4 for a visualization).



Fig. 3. Bar plots of the distribution of basic centrality measures and Burt's structural holes constraint.



Fig. 4. Patterns of betweenness and Burt's constraint scores in relation to regional diversity

Furthermore, defining cut points is instrumental to understanding brokerage. As could be inferred from Figure 2 and is confirmed by R outputs, such are Edelweiss and Order that bridge three actors with exclusive ties to the two: the UNA-UNSO (Edelweiss), the Social-National Assembly (Edelweiss), and the Christian Front (Order). In addition, we decided to subset the network by thresholding it via the removal of those organizations, the edges of which had a weight less than the average in the network (i.e., 4.94; see Figure 5). The obtained network could be referred to as the "core team" network wherein only the most engaged organizations, which consists of the CU "Avanguard," the Brotherhood, C14, the Carpathian Sich, Edelweiss, Freedom, Freikorps, the National Corps, the Right Sector, the Street Front, and Tradition and Order. Here, the cut points are Freedom, the National Corps, and the Right Sector. Overall, these findings imply the following. If, out the

of blue, the operations of the Ukrainian far-right were to be disrupted, the quality of that disruption differs depending on which cut points disappeared in what type of network—first and foremost, full or subset "core." In the full network, a rapid disappearance of Edelweiss and Order from the social movement industry could hamper the enlargement of the movement by the loss of connections with the Furious, the UNA-UNSO, and the Christian Front organizations. However, the sustainability of the industry would be maintained, for the central "core" is still operating and most of the clusters remain unaffected. Thus, this is in the subset "core" where the existential danger lies. By cutting off the National Corps, Freedom, and the Right Sector, some of the most committed organizations (e.g., Edelweiss, CU "Avanguard," the Brotherhood, the Carpathian Sich, and the Street Front) might disappear, too.



Fig. 5. The subset protest network of the Ukrainian far-right organizations.

In general, there are two crucial potential takeaways that could be drawn from the descriptive statistics of the far-right protest network. First, given the similarity of the weighted degree centrality and eigenvector centrality ratings, which could be seen visualized via bar plots in Figure 3, a presumption could be made that there exists high cohesion between actors that are high-scoring weighted degree centrality. Second, as Burt's structural holes constraint measured for each organization demonstrates, the moderate character of inter-organizational competition indicated by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index and thus conduciveness of organizational ecology for the coalition formation process is yet once more underscored: in a setting when each and every organization is well suited and hypothetically faces no severe obstacles to access popular actors because of almost evenly distributed closeness measure, this quality spills over into similarly distributed constraints in organizational ecology. In other words, no organization can freely declare that it is indispensable (except for the "core" and cases of inter-group brokerage, which are analyzed below).

Structurally, the general network is moderately centralized. The density measure's value is 0.29, which means that less than 30% of all theoretically possible ties between the organizations are really in effect. Moderate centralization is also indicative once the network centralization index is enacted. The index's value is 0.48, which implies that in 48% of cases, peripheral organizations—i.e., those with a smaller individual degree centrality index—would have to attend protest events of more central ones in order to cooperate with similarly peripheral actors. As a result, the coalition formation process is likely to depend on a group of key initiative organizations. Furthermore, it is partially proven through a linear regression model of a relation between protest shares as a dependent variable and closeness centrality measure as an independent variable (see Figure 6 for a visualization). The effect is positive and highly significant ($p < 0.01$): it turns out that the more an organization is integrated into the protest network, the more likely its protest share will grow. Less prominent and robust are the impacts of eigenvector centrality ($p < 0.05$,

statistically significant) and Burt's constraint over the protest share ($p < 0.10$, statistically almost insignificant) (see Figure 7 for a visualization). In the case of the former, the more an organization is tied to popular, central counterparts in the social movement industry (i.e., the higher its eigenvector score), the larger its protest share. A consequence this possibly implies is that an organization is more likely to mobilize its resources if it is tied to a more integrated counterpart.



Fig. 6. Patterns of protest share in relation to closeness and degree.



Fig. 7. Patterns of protest share in relation to eigenvector and constraint.

At the same time, the network transitivity index hints at clusterization—i.e., the formation of particular far-right coalitions of contention—in the making. Its value is 0.46, which indicates that it is a 46% probability that adjacent organizations of an organization are connected to each other. To put it in a different way, there is an approximately 54% chance that ties are exclusive and contained in a dense cohort of the network. Indeed, clusterization appears to be the case for the resultative network of far-right protest events. Since the obtained network of far-right protests is moderately centralized, chances are some of the community detection algorithms might not be of good service for the purposes of the present bachelor's thesis and are not likely to contribute to our understanding of in-group dynamics of the far-right political milieu.

In order to choose what algorithm will be foundational for further in-group analysis, several were tested. Because of moderate network centralization, for instance, the betweenness clustering algorithm looks appealing. The algorithm

suggests that there exist three distinct groups, the network density index within which approximates 1. Yet, its network modularity value is low (0.04) and is indicative of weak clusterization and low divisiveness. Alternatively, the infomap community detection algorithm suggests only one dense cluster including all the selected organizations, which is not informative enough for the purposes of the present paper. A record low modularity index ($Q = 0$) for this algorithm indicates that there are no limitations over the spread of information in the network (Smith et al., 2020, p. 14). The walktrap community detection algorithm comes up with six dense clusters in place—three being one-actor clusters—the modularity index for which is 0.12. The Louvain community detection algorithm proposed three dense clusters with a modularity score being 0.15. In order to confirm the correct selection between the just-described algorithms and thus zoom into the complexity of inter-organizational interactions of the Ukrainian far-right in contentious politics, the optimal community structure algorithm was run and its modularity index was used as a yardstick because of its orientation to hypothetical optimality of community structures in a graph. For this reason, we chose the Louvain algorithm. Table 4 illustrates the distribution of organizations into clusters as per various algorithms. Frequent discrepancies between the compositions of these groups produced by four different algorithms provide a culprit that coalitions of contention may well be fluid in such a network, for it is moderately dense and centralized.

The accessed clusters are neither dense nor highly centralized. Community 1 has the density score of 0.33 and the centralization score of 0.47. The density and centralization of Community 2 are both 0.4. Lastly, the density and centralization outputs of Community 3 are both 0.5. These numbers imply that alliances do have central actors (e.g., Edelweiss in Community 1; the Right Sector, Tradition and Order, and C14 in Community 2; and Freedom in Community 3). Nevertheless, in spite of low density, alliances remain somewhat cooperative, for centralization has not exceeded 0.5 in none of the cases. Given the overall fluidity of the line-up of alliances, their low modularity, and the overall network's similar centralization and

density patterns, it is reasonable to infer that there does not exist a clear boundary in the social movement industry and cooperation is mobile and ad hoc.

Table 4. Communities/alliances in the Ukrainian far-right network, 2014–2021.

Community (= alliance)	Infomap	Betweenness	Walktrap	Louvain
Community 1	All organizations	CU "Avanguard," Freikorps, National Corps, Street Front, Freedom, Knights of the City, National Resistance	CU "Avanguard," Edelweiss, Carpathian Sich, National Corps, Street Front, Freedom, Sunrise, Knights of the City, SNA, National Resistance	CU "Avanguard," Edelweiss, National Corps, UNA-UNSO, SNA, Furious
Community 2	—	Brotherhood, C14, Carpathian Sich, Order, Right Sector, Tradition and Order, Sunrise, Katechon, Unknown Patriot, Christian Front, Triden	Brotherhood, C14, Freikorps, Right Sector, Tradition and Order, Katechon, Unknown Patriot, Triden	Brotherhood, C14, Freikorps, Order, Right Sector, Tradition and Order, Katechon, Unknown Patriot, Knights of the City, Christian Front, Triden
Community 3	—	Edelweiss, UNA-UNSO, SNA, Furious	Order	Carpathian Sich, Street Front, Freedom, Sunrise, National Resistance
Community 4	—	—	UNA-UNSO	—
Community 5	—	—	Furious	—
Community 6	—	—	Christian Front	—
Modularity	0.00	0.04	0.12	0.15

3.3. Beyond Ideology: Exponential Random Graph Model and Structuring Effects of Endogenous and Exogenous Variables

As mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the next task for the present bachelor's thesis is to attempt to predict the protest network's structure and its clusters if any were found at all. Pursuing the estimation of underlying structuring effects, exponential random graph model analysis was performed with four terms: (1) edges, (2) repertoire diversity, (3) cross-regional diversity, and (4) ideological subtypes of the organizations. While the first is an endogenous factor, the other three are exogenous with a homophily/heterophily capacity. The other two variables that were coded—i.e., the use of violence and the presence of coercion—were not included in the analysis because they did not meet the 50% threshold. ERGM scholars suggest beginning with edges as the first term (Wimmer & Lewis, 2010; McFarland et al., 2014). Thus, the exponential random graph model could be expressed as follows:

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Table 5. Results of exponential random model analysis examining terms associated with the protest network of the Ukrainian far-right, 2014–2021.

Variable	Estimates	Standard Error	*p*-value
Edges	–0.895	0.248	< 0.001
Repertoire diversity	1.310	0.326	< 0.001
Cross-regional diversity	–1.547	0.349	< 0.001
Target diversity	–0.533	0.355	0.133
Ideological subtypes	0.211	0.379	0.578

Revolutionary far-right organizations received attribute number 1, millenarians were given number 2, reactive organizations were prescribed with number 3, and vigilantes were numbered 4. Depending on the scale of accessed Shannon's H index, organizations received different network attribute numbers, too: in cross-regional diversity, 0 for the range between 0 and the mean, 1 for between the mean and 1, and 2 for between 1 and more than 2; in repertoire diversity and target diversity, 0 for less than 1 (rounded-up mean), 1 for the range between 1 and 1.5, and 2 for more than 1.5.

As can be inferred from the summary of the exponential random graph model in Table 5, three out of four included terms are statistically significant at a very low p-value < 0.001. Precisely speaking, edges, repertoire diversity, and cross-regional diversity are strong homophily predictors. Edges tend to have a negative structuring effect. Should one edge between the organizations appear, the probability of a network replicating the structure of the far-right protest network decreases by 0.895. In a similar vein, the term for cross-regional diversity of an organization's activities shows that identical attributes decrease the probability of two organizations cooperating. For instance, if organization A arranges a protest event, it is less likely by –1.547 log-odds that it will join the coalition with organization B with a similar (cross-)regional story. In other words, the heterophily is observed: in Ukraine, regionalists tend to align with cross-regionalists more than with fellow regional associations, and vice-versa. In turn, repertoire diversity's estimate indicates that organizations tend to have stronger ties with the same repertoire with a 1.310 log-odds chance. Thus, if organization A has a rigid repertoire, it is more likely to coalesce in a common alliance with an organization with a similarly rigid repertoire, and so on.

In general, these results make us reject Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 in favor of the null hypothesis. It appears that the ideological subtypes of the Ukrainian far-right social movement and the diversity of targets did not contribute to the structure of the network and thus the alliances it had produced. Nor is influential the factor of

diversity targets: it does not inspire any homophily or heterophily effects in the network.



Fig. 3. Goodness of fit plot for the exponential random graph model with edges as an endogenous term and with ideological type, the repertoire of contention type, and regional concentration as exogenous (homophily) terms.

After interpreting the obtained estimates, we decided to run our model for statistical goodness of fit. As can be deduced from Figure 3 and the output in R, the goodness of fit is relatively plausible, which reassures the statistical significance of our model. On the first graph, we see the overall fitness of the model—i.e., the model statistics—visualized via the box-and-whiskers plot. All Monte Carlo *p*-values are more than 0.05, which is symptomatic of a good fit (even though the proportion of statistics are slightly right-skewed, to upper Quartile 3). On the second

one, goodness-of-fit for degrees is illustrated. Here, the model performed a bit worse, with all *p*-values being more than 0.05 but one of Degree 1: it has $p = 0.00$. Lastly, in the geodesic distance, the model seems to be the best fit: all *p*-values exceed 0.05.

Moreover, the factors were also tested on the community level of the alliances obtained through the Louvain algorithm. As it turned out, neither factor was statistically significant within all three clusters, except for cross-regional diversity in Louvain Community 2 (see Table 6). In this community—the largest of the three—cross-regional diversity had a negative, highly statistically significant impact ($p < 0.001$) over the network formation. Similar regional profiles rather drove organizations away from each other by –2.897 log-odds. Thus, the importance of Hypothesis 2 is partially re-emphasized. In addition, the overall insignificance of the factors as to in-group dynamics may be a sign of alliance-making as a network-wide phenomenon built upon complex relations and numerous homophily–heterophily discrepancies at play between actors.

Table 6. Exponential random graph model run through Louvain Community 2.

Variable	Estimates	Standard Error	*p*-value
Edges	0.551	0.515	0.285
Repertoire diversity	0.881	0.794	0.267
Cross-regional diversity	–2.897	–0.859	< 0.001
Target diversity	–0.772	0.824	0.349
Ideological subtypes	–0.317	0.760	0.677

CONCLUSIONS

1. In terminology, it can be challenging to define far-right parties and social movement organizations due to the intersection of three concepts: right-wing radicalism, right-wing extremism, and right-wing populism. All three emphasize nativism as one of their core concepts, but they can be figuratively distinguished by the order of increasing intensity of violent resistance. According to Mudde, populism is primarily a strategy of mobilization and an ideologeme, rather than an ideology itself. It is based on the fundamental division between "the people" and "the elite." This binary vision relates it to right-wing radicalism and extremism, but right-wing populism does not openly support violence as a tactic to influence the political process. Meanwhile, right-wing radicalism is more conventional than right-wing extremism since the latter sees violence as the only legitimate means of participating in existing politics. Therefore, to avoid such terminological pluralism, it has been decided to use the minimal definition by Mudde. The term "far-right" thus refers to an ideology that encompasses two core concepts: (1) nationalism, which homogenizes domestic politics and promotes an exclusive vision regarding external actors, and (2) nativism, which imperatively advocates for exclusive rule by natives—i.e., local political actors.

2. Per Tilly, contentious politics is a situation when an episodic and collective interaction occurs between individuals making claims and the entities they are making claims about. This interaction takes place when, firstly, a government is involved in claim-making in any form, and secondly, if the claims were to be realized, they would impact the interests of at least one of the claimants. As an overwhelmingly extra-institutional phenomenon, contentious politics itself could be dropped into two types: (1) contained and (2) transgressive. Generally, a criterion for telling the two apart lies in the presence or absence of symmetrical institutionalization of perceptions of contentious performances between all parties, namely the government, extra-institutional actors, and/or their constituents. Contained contention implies an adherence to institutionalized and, to an extent,

conventional methods of contention, whereas transgressive contention brings about approaches *contra* existing norms (from innovations to violence). Two network effects of contentious politics were defined. The first one is diffusion. Diffusion, based on homophily (a sentiment of similarity between actors), entails long-term voluntary emulation, which is a necessary condition for transgressive forms of contention. In turn, brokerage, the second effect based on heterophily (the association based on dissimilarity), forms short-term instrumental connections aimed at the benefit of the involved parties.

3. Social movement alliances or coalitions of contention refer to arrangements among far-right organizations in Ukraine from 2014 to 2021 that aim to mobilize shared resources for a common goal and are informally established not through formal procedures such as membership and statutes but through coincident participation in the same protest events (which are selected as proxies for these arrangements). This definition was derived to expand the maximum (or narrow) definition of coalitions of contention introduced by Levi & Murphy. Their definition is highly limited as it cannot be applied to organizations and alliances with a sufficiently subtle, secretive, and informal structure, which grew out of the high-risk nature of activism in the organization(s). The term "coalition" or "alliance" also needs to be contrasted with "network." A network is a broader concept that stands for a relational structure between actors (expressed through graph vertices and edges) and denotes structure and agency (in simpler terms, the values that precede action and the capacity of individual and/or collective actors to change the *status quo*). Network explains the decision-making process of contending actors, while coalitions of contention, in turn, represent a response to opportunities and threats for these dissent actors. This paper proposes to combine these tasks through the examination of network modularity—the propensity of selected organizations to form dense communities, such as alliances in the cases of contentious performances like protests and violent collective actions—and its exposure to ideology subtype,

diversity of the repertoire of contention, diversity of (cross-)regional cooperation, and target diversity.

4. The quest for viable solutions to research dilemmas sparked by the nature of our subject of inquiry and subjects alike has long troubled paragon minds of contentious politics and social movements studies as well as network analysis fellows of all different academic fields. Generally speaking, we had to deal with the following challenges: (1) *network boundary specification problem*, (2) *description bias*, and (3) *selection bias*. The first one concerns the difficulties of who is to be included in the covert network, the second one concerns the issue of biased media as sources, and the third one points to the media's tendency to selectively tell about protest events. We attempted to mitigate these risks by attending to nominalist network sampling supported by peak listing and data triangulation. Namely, data triangulation anticipated an extensive concomitant use of news articles from the Ukrainian Pravda, Hromadske, Obozrevatel, and Zaxid.net as well as reports from ZMINA.info and posts on social media pages of selected far-right organizations in Ukraine. The rules for coding and data collection were defined by the "Dynamics of Collective Action" codebook.

5. A blossoming interdisciplinary body of literature encompasses using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for multiple exploratory purposes. By exponentiating protest shares and totalizing them, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index lays out an absolute-zero measure that indicates competition in the social movement industry from 0 to 10,000, from the absolute "competition" (0% of shares possessed by all social movement organizations) to the absolute concentration of the protest field (100% of protest shares possessed by one single social movement organization).

6. Degree centrality, betweenness centrality, network centralization, network density, and network distance are seemingly prerequisites for the analysis. These measures are crucial in the identification of key agents. A more novel one is the measure of structural holes. Network-wide indices would be of service in counterbalancing the biases of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The network

centralization index will be a viable alternative measure for the protest concentration, as it calculates the dispersion (farness) of centrality scores. Density is measured in order to confirm the structure. Network transitivity (or clustering coefficient) is used to establish if dense hidden communities had appeared in the protest network of the Ukrainian far-right from 2014 to 2021.

Nevertheless, basic network analytic calculations, such as centrality measures, fall prey when one's research task is to predict between- and within-group dynamics—i.e., between- and within-alliance dynamics in our case. These descriptive statistics are representative of strictly localized node-level capacities or are too descriptive for generalizations. For this reason, the degree of (non-)cooperation on the group level—i.e., on the level coalitions of contention—shall be estimated and analyzed through the venue of community detection algorithms, their modularity, and exponential random graph model analysis. We identified the following factors for ERGM analysis: (1) ideological subtype (23 organizations were identified and categorized within four subtypes); (2) containment–transgressiveness division; (3) diversity of repertoire of an organization; (4) target diversity; and (5) diversity of (cross-)regional concentration. Prominent ERGM scholars attend to edges as a basic starting term for their models, which we also embraced.

7. The top protest participant is Kharkiv-based Sunrise, which leads the ranking with an 18.83% protest share (180 protest events), while the Unknown Patriot group closes the ranking with a 0.11% protest share (1 event). However, the protest shares are relatively even in terms of distribution among the tier-four organizations: the Sunrise, the Street Front (14.44%, 138 protest events), the Right Sector (10.57%, 101 protest events), and Edelweiss (10.46%, 100 protest events). The overall Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 2014–2021 scored 1,036.55, which is symptomatic of low protest activity concentration (> 1,500) and relatively high competition in the Ukrainian far-right social movement industry that gravitates to the mark of moderate competition ([1,500; 2,500] range). This indicates an almost conducive setting for

the creation of coalitions of contention, although the competition is yet high. To access the dynamics of the competition, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index was conducted for each year separately and plotted for the period from 2014 to 2021. The underlying reasons for varying dynamics might be intra- and inter-organizational ecology, as the ups and drops in the index coincided with internal perturbations, which shall be discovered in more depth in future scholarship.

8. The structure of the resultative one-mode socio-centric affiliate valued undirected network of protests is constituted by 66 edges (ties) between 22 vertices (organizations). Only one organization from our sample, Solaris, did not share any protest event with others and thus was excluded. The top four leaders with a more or less equal distribution of degrees are clearly identifiable: the Right Sector (tied to 16 organizations), Freedom (14), Tradition and Order (13), and C14 (13). Similar is the situation with eigenvector and closeness. However, other indices hint at high mutual constraints between the far-right organizations, suggesting that the far-right social movement industry is not monolithic as it seems to many observers. An outstanding record of regionally concentrated far-right organizations in the betweenness (e.g., Edelweiss and the Knights of the City) invited us to test the correlation between the cross-regional diversity network attribute and these scores via the logistic regression. Besides, we tested the relationship between closeness centrality and protest shares via a regular linear regression, which turned out to be positive and statistically significant: the more an organization is embedded in the network, the bigger its protest share. Less robust was the impact of eigenvector centrality (i.e., the measure of ties to central organizations): the more an organization is connected with the core organizations, the more likely it will mobilize its resources and engage in the social movement industry.

Structurally, the network is moderately centralized. Although the coalition formation process is likely to depend on a group of key initiative organizations, clusterization is present: the walktrap algorithm identified 2 alliances and 4 one-actor communities, edge betweenness identified 3 alliances, and Louvain—also 3

alliances. The infomap algorithm did not identify any alliances, which means that information flows between 22 Ukrainian far-right organizations has a constant "green light." Since Louvain performed the highest modularity score (0.15), it was decided to choose this algorithm over others.

The detection of cut points and key actors within the communities is critical. In the full network, such are Edelweiss and Order that bridge three actors with exclusive ties to two facilitators: the UNA-UNSO (to Edelweiss), the Social-National Assembly (to Edelweiss), and the Christian Front (to Order). Having thresholded the network by the mean of edge weight (4.94 coincident protests), eleven actors retained their membership and constitute the "core team." Here, cutting off the National Corps, Freedom, and the Right Sector potentially leads to the loss of the engagement of Edelweiss, CU "Avanguard," the Brotherhood, the Carpathian Sich, and the Street Front, one of the most committed organizations for 2014–2021. Thus, this is in the subset "core" where the existential danger lies for the Ukrainian far-right social movement industry and further coalition-building. Other key agents are observable within three Louvain communities, too. In Community 1 and Community 3, the most central actors are Edelweiss and Freedom, respectively; in Community 2, such are the Right Sector, Tradition and Order, and C14. This implies that should these actors be cut off, their alliance could be in grave danger. However, the accessed community detection shall be treated cautiously and dispassionately. All the obtained networks—the overall one, the subset "core" one, and the communities—are neither highly centralized, nor dense. In combination with the 0 modularity score of infomap and pretty low values of other algorithms, such a setting produces fluidity and opportunities for constant realignment, although the Herfindahl–Hirschman index and Burt's constraint point to competitiveness and mutual restraints.

9. Pursuing the estimation of underlying structuring effects, exponential random graph model analysis was performed with five terms: (1) edges (default term accepted among ERGM scholars), (2) repertoire diversity, (3) cross-regional

diversity, (4) target diversity, and (5) ideological subtypes of the organizations. We had to exclude the containment–transgressiveness variables, for neither of them reached the 50% threshold. Three out of five of these terms are highly statistically significant at a very low *p*-value of < 0.001. Precisely speaking, edges, repertoire diversity, and cross-regional diversity turn out to be strong homophily/heterophily predictors. Edges tend to have a negative structuring effect, and so does the cross-regional concentration. Thus, the heterophily effect, or brokerage mechanism, is in action: the Ukrainian far-right organizations tend to cooperate with those whose regional concentration is different. The "regionalist" far-right tends to align with "cross-regionalists" more than with fellow regional associations, and vice-versa. In turn, repertoire's similarities allured actors alike to each other, indicating the homophily effect: for instance, rigid or absent repertoires forced the hand of alliance with similarly rigid or absent repertoires. The model proved to be statistically significant and passed the goodness of fit. Additionally, it was tested on each community obtained through the Louvain algorithm separately yet did not end up in any prominent in-group predictions, except for cross-regional diversity in Community 2. There, the negative (heterophily) effect of this variable was once more underscored.

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As a final concluding thought, the methods were probably limited because of a lack of resource capacity. In a new study, one would benefit from using realist techniques of network sampling with name generators, interviews, and snowball sampling in addition to nominalism. Data triangulation through protest-event analysis would also be enhanced if there was a group of dozen scholars working on the project. Lastly, it could be useful to go beyond protest events, which would have been out of the scope, abilities, and volume of the present paper for the same resources issue. In the future, it would be my personal task to contribute to the development of a nexus between network analysis and protest-event analysis.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

The Code

```
library("igraph")
library("readxl")
library("ggplot2")
library("ergm")
library("RColorBrewer")
library("intergraph")
library("MASS")
library("hhi")
library("tidyverse")
library("vegan")

#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# HHI
farright_events <- read_xlsx("farright_events.xlsx")

hhi_calc <- data.frame(
    farright_events %>%
        count(grp1
            , sort = TRUE))

n_final <- sum(hhi_calc$n)
hhi_calc$p <- (hhi_calc$n / sum(hhi_calc$n))*100

hhi(hhi_calc, "p")
```

```
# YEARLY
farright_events$eventid <- substr(farright_events$eventid, 1, 4)

yearly <- farright_events %>% count(grp1, eventid,sort = TRUE)

hhi_calc_2014 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2014")
hhi_calc_2014 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2014)
hhi_calc_2014$p <- (hhi_calc_2014$n / sum(hhi_calc_2014$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2014, "p")

hhi_calc_2015 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2015")
hhi_calc_2015 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2015)
hhi_calc_2015$p <- (hhi_calc_2015$n / sum(hhi_calc_2015$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2015, "p")

hhi_calc_2016 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2016")
hhi_calc_2016 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2016)
hhi_calc_2016$p <- (hhi_calc_2016$n / sum(hhi_calc_2016$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2016, "p")

hhi_calc_2017 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2017")
hhi_calc_2017 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2017)
hhi_calc_2017$p <- (hhi_calc_2017$n / sum(hhi_calc_2017$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2017, "p")

hhi_calc_2018 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2018")
hhi_calc_2018 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2018)
hhi_calc_2018$p <- (hhi_calc_2018$n / sum(hhi_calc_2018$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2018, "p")
```

```
hhi_calc_2019 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2019")
hhi_calc_2019 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2019)
hhi_calc_2019$p <- (hhi_calc_2019$n / sum(hhi_calc_2019$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2019, "p")

hhi_calc_2020 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2020")
hhi_calc_2020 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2020)
hhi_calc_2020$p <- (hhi_calc_2020$n / sum(hhi_calc_2020$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2020, "p")

hhi_calc_2021 <- yearly %>% filter(eventid == "2021")
hhi_calc_2021 <- as.data.frame(hhi_calc_2021)
hhi_calc_2021$p <- (hhi_calc_2021$n / sum(hhi_calc_2021$n))*100
hhi(hhi_calc_2021, "p")

year <- c(2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021)
hhi_split <- c(hhi(hhi_calc_2014, "p"), hhi(hhi_calc_2015, "p"),
               hhi(hhi_calc_2016, "p"), hhi(hhi_calc_2017, "p"),
               hhi(hhi_calc_2018, "p"), hhi(hhi_calc_2019, "p"),
               hhi(hhi_calc_2020, "p"), hhi(hhi_calc_2021, "p"))
year <- as.numeric(year)
hhi_split <- as.numeric(hhi_split)
hhi_split <- round(hhi_split, digits = 2)

hhi_yearly <- data.frame(year, hhi_split)

plot_hhi(hhi_yearly, "year", "hhi_split")
```

```
hhiplot <- ggplot(data = hhi_yearly, aes(x = year, y = hhi_split))+
            geom_line()+
            geom_point()+
            geom_text(aes(x = year, y = hhi_split, label = hhi_split,
                          family = "Times New Roman"), vjust = -0.5)+
            ggtitle("Dynamics of competition between the far-right organizations in
Ukraine, 2014–2021")+
            xlab("Years")+
            ylab("Herfindahl-Hirschman Index")+
            theme(axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90, vjust = 0.5))+
            scale_x_continuous("year", labels = as.character(year), breaks = year)+
            scale_color_manual(values=c("#999999", "#E69F00", "#56B4E9"))+
            theme_classic()

# ------------------------------------------------------------------------

# SHANNON'S H

regions <- farright_events %>% count(grp1, where, sort = TRUE)
forms <- farright_events %>% count(grp1, form, sort = TRUE)
target <- farright_events %>% count(grp1, target, sort = TRUE)

# [1] "svitanok"  "streetfr"  "edelweiss" "tradord"   "natcorps"  "rigsec"    "lycmist"
"karpsich"  "avanguard"
# [10] "c14"       "freikor"   "svoboda"   "bratstvo"  "nevpat"    "orden"     "natsprot"
"katehon"   "sna"
# [19] "solaris"   "christfr"  "liutych"   "tryzub"    "unaunso"

# SHANNON FOR REGIONS
```

```
regions_svitanok <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
regions_streetfr <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "streetfr")
regions_edelweiss <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "edelweiss")
regions_tradord <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
regions_natcorps <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "natcorps")
regions_rigsec <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "rigsec")
regions_lycmist <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "lycmist")
regions_karpsich <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "karpsich")
regions_avanguard <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "avanguard")
regions_c14 <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "c14")
regions_freikor <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "freikor")
regions_svoboda <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "svoboda")
regions_bratstvo <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "bratstvo")
regions_nevpat <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "nevpat")
regions_orden <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "orden")
regions_natsprot <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "natsprot")
regions_katehon <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "katehon")
regions_sna <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "sna")
regions_solaris <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "solaris")
regions_christfr <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "christfr")
regions_liutych <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "liutych")
regions_tryzub <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "tryzub")
regions_unaunso <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "unaunso")

svitanok.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_svitanok$n)
streetfr.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_streetfr$n)
edelweiss.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_edelweiss$n)
tradord.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_tradord$n)
```

```
natcorps.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_natcorps$n)
rigsec.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_rigsec$n)
lycmist.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_lycmist$n)
karpsich.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_karpsich$n)
avanguard.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_avanguard$n)
c14.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_c14$n)
freikor.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_freikor$n)
svoboda.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_svoboda$n)
bratstvo.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_bratstvo$n)
nevpat.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_nevpat$n)
orden.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_orden$n)
natsprot.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_natsprot$n)
katehon.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_katehon$n)
sna.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_sna$n)
solaris.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_solaris$n)
christfr.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_christfr$n)
liutych.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_liutych$n)
tryzub.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_tryzub$n)
unaunso.reg.div <- vegan::diversity(regions_unaunso$n)

regions_svitanok <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
regions_streetfr <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "streetfr")
regions_edelweiss <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "edelweiss")
regions_tradord <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
regions_natcorps <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "natcorps")
regions_rigsec <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "rigsec")
regions_lycmist <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "lycmist")
regions_karpsich <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "karpsich")
regions_avanguard <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "avanguard")
```

```
regions_c14 <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "c14")
regions_freikor <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "freikor")
regions_svoboda <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "svoboda")
regions_bratstvo <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "bratstvo")
regions_nevpat <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "nevpat")
regions_orden <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "orden")
regions_natsprot <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "natsprot")
regions_katehon <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "katehon")
regions_sna <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "sna")
regions_solaris <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "solaris")
regions_christfr <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "christfr")
regions_liutych <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "liutych")
regions_tryzub <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "tryzub")
regions_unaunso <- regions %>% filter(grp1 == "unaunso")

reg <- c(svitanok.reg.div,
         streetfr.reg.div,
         rigsec.reg.div,
         edelweiss.reg.div,
         tradord.reg.div,
         natcorps.reg.div,
         svoboda.reg.div,
         avanguard.reg.div,
         karpsich.reg.div,
         lycmist.reg.div,
         c14.reg.div,
         freikor.reg.div,
         bratstvo.reg.div,
         orden.reg.div,
```

```
            natsprot.reg.div,
            nevpat.reg.div,
            sna.reg.div,
            christfr.reg.div,
            katehon.reg.div,
            solaris.reg.div,
            liutych.reg.div,
            tryzub.reg.div,
            unaunso.reg.div)

reg <- reg[c(1:19, 21:23)]
mean(reg)

# H FOR REPERTOIRES

forms_svitanok <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
forms_streetfr <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "streetfr")
forms_edelweiss <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "edelweiss")
forms_tradord <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
forms_natcorps <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "natcorps")
forms_rigsec <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "rigsec")
forms_lycmist <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "lycmist")
forms_karpsich <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "karpsich")
forms_avanguard <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "avanguard")
forms_c14 <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "c14")
forms_freikor <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "freikor")
forms_svoboda <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "svoboda")
forms_bratstvo <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "bratstvo")
forms_nevpat <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "nevpat")
```

```
forms_orden <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "orden")
forms_natsprot <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "natsprot")
forms_katehon <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "katehon")
forms_sna <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "sna")
forms_solaris <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "solaris")
forms_christfr <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "christfr")
forms_liutych <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "liutych")
forms_tryzub <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "tryzub")
forms_unaunso <- forms %>% filter(grp1 == "unaunso")

svitanok.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_svitanok$n)
streetfr.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_streetfr$n)
edelweiss.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_edelweiss$n)
tradord.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_tradord$n)
natcorps.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_natcorps$n)
rigsec.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_rigsec$n)
lycmist.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_lycmist$n)
karpsich.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_karpsich$n)
avanguard.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_avanguard$n)
c14.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_c14$n)
freikor.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_freikor$n)
svoboda.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_svoboda$n)
bratstvo.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_bratstvo$n)
nevpat.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_nevpat$n)
orden.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_orden$n)
natsprot.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_natsprot$n)
katehon.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_katehon$n)
sna.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_sna$n)
solaris.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_solaris$n)
```

```
christfr.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_christfr$n)
liutych.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_liutych$n)
tryzub.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_tryzub$n)
unaunso.rep.div <- vegan::diversity(forms_unaunso$n)

rep <- c(svitanok.rep.div,
         streetfr.rep.div,
         rigsec.rep.div,
         edelweiss.rep.div,
         tradord.rep.div,
         natcorps.rep.div,
         svoboda.rep.div,
         avanguard.rep.div,
         karpsich.rep.div,
         lycmist.rep.div,
         c14.rep.div,
         freikor.rep.div,
         bratstvo.rep.div,
         orden.rep.div,
         natsprot.rep.div,
         nevpat.rep.div,
         sna.rep.div,
         christfr.rep.div,
         katehon.rep.div,
         solaris.rep.div,
         liutych.rep.div,
         tryzub.rep.div,
         unaunso.rep.div)
```

```
rep <- rep[c(1:19, 21:23)]
mean(rep)

target_svitanok <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
target_streetfr <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "streetfr")
target_edelweiss <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "edelweiss")
target_tradord <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "tradord")
target_natcorps <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "natcorps")
target_rigsec <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "rigsec")
target_lycmist <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "lycmist")
target_karpsich <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "karpsich")
target_avanguard <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "avanguard")
target_c14 <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "c14")
target_freikor <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "freikor")
target_svoboda <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "svoboda")
target_bratstvo <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "bratstvo")
target_nevpat <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "nevpat")
target_orden <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "orden")
target_natsprot <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "natsprot")
target_katehon <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "katehon")
target_sna <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "sna")
target_christfr <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "christfr")
target_liutych <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "liutych")
target_tryzub <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "tryzub")
target_unaunso <- target %>% filter(grp1 == "unaunso")

svitanok.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_svitanok$n)
streetfr.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_streetfr$n)
edelweiss.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_edelweiss$n)
```

```
tradord.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_tradord$n)
natcorps.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_natcorps$n)
rigsec.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_rigsec$n)
lycmist.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_lycmist$n)
karpsich.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_karpsich$n)
avanguard.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_avanguard$n)
c14.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_c14$n)
freikor.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_freikor$n)
svoboda.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_svoboda$n)
bratstvo.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_bratstvo$n)
nevpat.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_nevpat$n)
orden.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_orden$n)
natsprot.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_natsprot$n)
katehon.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_katehon$n)
sna.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_sna$n)
christfr.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_christfr$n)
liutych.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_liutych$n)
tryzub.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_tryzub$n)
unaunso.tar.div <- vegan::diversity(target_unaunso$n)

tar <- c(svitanok.tar.div,
         streetfr.tar.div,
         rigsec.tar.div,
         edelweiss.tar.div,
         tradord.tar.div,
         natcorps.tar.div,
         svoboda.tar.div,
         avanguard.tar.div,
         karpsich.tar.div,
```

```
        lycmist.tar.div,
        c14.tar.div,
        freikor.tar.div,
        bratstvo.tar.div,
        orden.tar.div,
        natsprot.tar.div,
        nevpat.tar.div,
        sna.tar.div,
        christfr.tar.div,
        katehon.tar.div,
        liutych.tar.div,
        tryzub.tar.div,
        unaunso.tar.div)

attributes <- data.frame(reg, rep, tar)
attributes$tar <- tar

attributes$group <- c("svitanok.rep.div",
                      "streetfr.rep.div",
                      "rigsec.rep.div",
                      "edelweiss.rep.div",
                      "tradord.rep.div",
                      "natcorps.rep.div",
                      "svoboda.rep.div",
                      "avanguard.rep.div",
                      "karpsich.rep.div",
                      "lycmist.rep.div",
                      "c14.rep.div",
                      "freikor.rep.div",
```

```
                "bratstvo.rep.div",
                "orden.rep.div",
                "natsprot.rep.div",
                "nevpat.rep.div",
                "sna.rep.div",
                "christfr.rep.div",
                "katehon.rep.div",
                "liutych.rep.div",
                "tryzub.rep.div",
                "unaunso.rep.div")

attributes$rep[attributes$rep > mean(attributes$rep) & attributes$rep < 1] <- 1
attributes$rep[attributes$reg > mean(attributes$reg) & attributes$reg < 2 &
                    attributes$reg != 1] <- 2
attributes$reg[attributes$reg > 2] <- 2
attributes$reg[attributes$reg < mean(attributes$reg)] <- 0

attributes$rep <- round(attributes$rep, digits = 1)
attributes$rep[attributes$rep < 1] <- 0
attributes$rep[attributes$rep < 1.5 & attributes$rep > 1] <- 1
attributes$rep[attributes$rep >= 1.5] <- 2

attributes$tar <- round(attributes$tar, digits = 1)
attributes$tar[attributes$tar < mean(attributes$tar)] <- 0
attributes$tar[attributes$tar < 1.5 & attributes$tar > 1] <- 1
attributes$tar[attributes$tar >= 1.5] <- 2

openxlsx::write.xlsx(attributes, "attrs.xlsx")
```

```
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------

test <- read.csv("edgelist_2 - Sheet1.csv")
test <- graph_from_data_frame(test, directed = FALSE)
test <- simplify(test)

weight <- read.csv("edgelist_2 - Sheet1.csv")

E(test)$weight <- weight$X.2

igraph::is.weighted(test)
igraph::is.directed(test)

plot(test)

ecount(test)
vcount(test)
range(E(test)$weight)
mean(E(test)$weight)

deg <- sort(igraph::degree(test))
mean(deg)
min(deg)
max(deg)

weg <- sort(igraph::strength(test)) # weighted degree
mean(weg)
min(weg)
max(weg)
```

```
clo <- sort(igraph::closeness(test)) # embeddedness
mean(clo)
min(clo)
max(clo)

bet <- sort(igraph::betweenness(test)) # connecting 2 communities
mean(bet)
min(bet)
max(bet)

eig <- sort(igraph::eigen_centrality(test)$vector) # eigenvector
mean(eig)
min(eig)
max(eig)

con <- constraint(test)
mean(con)

edge_density(test)
centr_degree(test)
vertex_connectivity(test)

hhi_calc_alt <- data.frame(hhi_calc$grp1, hhi_calc$p)
hhi_calc_alt <- hhi_calc_alt[with(hhi_calc_alt, order(hhi_calc.grp1, hhi_calc.p)),]
hhi_calc_alt <- hhi_calc_alt[c(1:19, 21:23),]
centrality$p <- hhi_calc_alt$hhi_calc.p
centrality$p <- centrality$p / 100
```

```
rownames(hhi_calc_alt) <- hhi_calc_alt$hhi_calc.grp1

centrality <- merge(deg, weg, by = 0)
rownames(centrality) <- centrality$Row.names
centrality <- centrality[, 2:3]
colnames(centrality) <- c("degree", "weighted")

centrality_2 <- merge(clo, con, by = 0)
rownames(centrality_2) <- centrality_2$Row.names
centrality_2 <- centrality_2[, 2:3]
colnames(centrality_2) <- c("closeness", "constraint")

centrality <- merge(centrality, centrality_2, by = 0)
rownames(centrality) <- centrality$Row.names
centrality <- centrality[, 2:5]

centrality <- merge(centrality, hhi_calc_alt, by = 0)
rownames(centrality) <- centrality$Row.names
centrality <- centrality[, c(2:5, 7)]
colnames(centrality) <- c("degree", "weighted", "closeness", "constraint",
                          "protest")

centrality <- merge(centrality, bet, by = 0)
rownames(centrality) <- centrality$Row.names
centrality <- centrality[, c(2:7)]
colnames(centrality) <- c("degree", "weighted", "closeness", "constraint",
                          "protest", "betweenness")
centrality$betweenness[centrality$betweenness == 0] <- NA
```

```
centrality <- merge(centrality, eig, by = 0)
rownames(centrality) <- centrality$Row.names
centrality <- centrality[, c(2:8)]
colnames(centrality) <- c("degree", "weighted", "closeness", "constraint",
                          "protest", "betweenness", "eigenvector")


lineartest2 <- lm(centrality$protest
                  ~ centrality$eigenvector)
                  + centrality$weighted
                  + centrality$closeness
                  + centrality$constraint, na.action = na.exclude)

summary(lineartest2)

lineartest <- lm(centrality$protest ~ centrality$closeness)
summary(lineartest)

ggplot(centrality, aes(y = protest, x = eigenvector, color = constraint))+
    geom_point(size = 2.5) +
    ggtitle("Patterns of protest share in relation to eigenvector and constraint") +
    xlab("Eigenvector centrality") +
    ylab("Protest share") +
    labs(color = "Constraint") +
    stat_smooth(method = lm)

attributes_1 <- attributes

attributes_1$group <- gsub(".rep.div", "", attributes_1$group)
```

```
rownames(attributes_1) <- attributes_1$group

centrality_3 <- merge(centrality, attributes_1, by = 0)
rownames(centrality_3) <- centrality_3$Row.names
centrality_3 <- centrality_3[, c(2:10, 12)]

regionalism_bet <- glm(centrality_3$betweenness ~ centrality_3$reg)
summary(regionalism_bet)

regionalism_con <- glm(centrality_3$constraint ~ centrality_3$reg)
summary(regionalism_bet)

ggplot(centrality_3, aes(y = betweenness, x = reg, color = constraint))+
    geom_point(size = 2.5) +
    ggtitle("Patterns of betweenness and Burt's constraint scores in relation to
regional diversity") +
    xlab("Regional diversity (network attribute)") +
    ylab("Betweenness centrality") +
    labs(color = "Constraint") +
    stat_smooth(method = glm)

test %>%
    articulation_points() %>%
    as.list() %>%
    names() %>%
    as.data.frame() %>%
    `colnames<-`("Cut Points")

barplot(deg,
```

```
        main = "Degree",
        ylab = "Count",
        las = 2)

barplot(clo,
        main = "Closeness",
        ylab = "Count",
        las = 2)

barplot(bet,
        main = "Betweenness",
        ylab = "Count",
        las = 2)

barplot(
      eig,
      main = "Eigenvector",
      ylab = "Count",
      las = 2)

barplot(
      con,
      main = "Constraint",
      ylab = "Count",
      las = 2,
      sort = TRUE)

test_subset <- delete_vertices(test,
                        E(test)[E(test)$weight < mean(E(test)$weight)])
```

```
test_subset <- test_subset - c("liutych", "unaunso", "sna", "tryzub", "orden",
                               "christfr", "orden", "katehon", "svitanok",
                               "nevpat", "lycmist", "natsprot")

test_subset %>%
    articulation_points() %>%
    as.list() %>%
    names() %>%
    as.data.frame() %>%
    `colnames<-`("Cut Points")

transitivity(test, type = "global")

test_bet <- cluster_edge_betweenness(test)
modularity(test_bet)

test_walk <- cluster_walktrap( # creating a walktrap clusterization
    test,
    weights = E(test)$weight,
    steps = 25,
    merges = TRUE,
    modularity = TRUE,
    membership = TRUE)
modularity(test_leiden)

test_leiden <- cluster_leiden(test,
                              weights = E(test)$weight)
modularity(communities(test_leiden))
```

```
test_louvain <- cluster_louvain(test,
                        weights = E(test)$weight)

cluster_optimal(test, weights = E(test)$weight)
modularity(cluster_optimal(test, weights = E(test)$weight))

communities(test_walk)
modularity(test_walk)

communities(test_leiden)

gopt <- layout_with_graphopt(test) # graphopt layout
fr <- layout.fruchterman.reingold(test) # Fruchterman-Reingold layout
grid <- layout_on_grid(test) # grid layout
circle <- layout_in_circle(test) # circle layout

#------------------------------------------------------------------------

new_cols <- c("orangered1",
              "royalblue",
              "palegoldenrod",
              "slategray1",
              "seagreen1",
              "mediumorchid1")[membership(test_walk)] # colors for walktrap
members



V(test)$label.cex <- scales::rescale(igraph::betweenness(test),
```

```
                                to = c(0.5, 0.7))

pdf("far-right plot_new_2.pdf")
plot(test_louvain,
    test,
    vertex.size = scales::rescale(igraph::betweenness(test),
                                  to = c(4, 20)),
    vertex.color = new_cols,
    vertex.label.color = c("black"),
    vertex.label.family = "Helvetica",
    mark.groups = communities(test_louvain),
    mark.border = NA,
    mark.col = c(rgb(229/255, 23.9/255, 23.9/255, alpha = .5), rgb(43.222/255,
92.79/255, 205.8/255, alpha = .5),
                 rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5),
                 rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5)),
    layout = gopt,
    edge.width = scales::rescale(E(test)$weight,
                                 to = c(1.2, 6)),
    edge.color = rgb(.0, .0, .0,
                     alpha = scales::rescale(E(test)$weight,
                                             to = c(.3, .8))),
    edge.arrow.size = .2)
legend('topright', legend = names(communities(test_louvain)),
       col = c(rgb(229/255, 23.9/255, 23.9/255, alpha = .5), rgb(43.222/255,
92.79/255, 205.8/255, alpha = .5),
```

```
            rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5),
            rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5)),
      pch = 15, bty = "n",  pt.cex = 1.5, cex = 0.8,
      text.col = "black", horiz = FALSE)
dev.off()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------

gopt_subset <- layout_with_graphopt(test_subset)
test_subset_louvain <- cluster_louvain(test_subset)

V(test_subset)$label.cex <- scales::rescale(igraph::betweenness(test_subset),
                                    to = c(0.5, 0.7))

new_cols_subset <- c("orangered1",
                     "royalblue",
                     "palegoldenrod",
                     "slategray1",
                     "seagreen1",
                     "mediumorchid1")[membership(test_subset_louvain)] # colors for
louvain members

pdf("far-right subset.pdf")
plot(test_subset_louvain,
    test_subset,
    vertex.size = scales::rescale(igraph::betweenness(test_subset),
                                  to = c(4, 20)),
    vertex.color = new_cols_subset,
```

```
    vertex.label.color = c("black"),
    vertex.label.family = "Helvetica",
    mark.groups = communities(test_subset_louvain),
    mark.border = NA,
    mark.col = c(rgb(229/255, 23.9/255, 23.9/255, alpha = .5), rgb(43.222/255,
92.79/255, 205.8/255, alpha = .5),
                 rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5),
                 rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5)),
    layout = gopt_subset,
    edge.width = scales::rescale(E(test_subset)$weight,
                                 to = c(1.2, 6)),
    edge.color = rgb(.0, .0, .0,
                     alpha = scales::rescale(E(test_subset)$weight,
                                             to = c(.3, .8))),
    edge.arrow.size = .2)
legend('topright', legend = names(communities(test_subset_louvain)),
       col = c(rgb(229/255, 23.9/255, 23.9/255, alpha = .5), rgb(43.222/255,
92.79/255, 205.8/255, alpha = .5),
               rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5),
               rgb(29.129/255, 189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5), rgb(29.129/255,
189.85/255, 45.74/255, alpha = .5)),
       pch = 15, bty = "n",  pt.cex = 1.5, cex = 0.8,
       text.col = "black", horiz = FALSE)
dev.off()

edge_density(test_subset)
```

```
centralization.degree(test_subset)

#------------------------------------------------------------------------

test_conv <- intergraph::asNetwork(test)

network::get.vertex.attribute(test_conv, "vertex.names")

test_conv <- network::set.vertex.attribute(test_conv, "ideology",
                                           c(2, 2, 3, 4, 3,
                                             3, 1, 2, 1, 4,
                                             3, 2, 1, 2, 3,
                                             4, 1, 1, 4, 3,
                                             2, 1))

# 1 - revol, 2 - millenarian, 3 - reactive, 4 - vigilante

test_conv <- network::set.vertex.attribute(test_conv, "repertoire",
                                           c(2, 2, 2, 2, 2,
                                             2, 2, 1, 2, 1,
                                             2, 2, 2, 0, 1,
                                             1, 0, 1, 0, 0,
                                             0, 0))

test_conv <- network::set.vertex.attribute(test_conv, "regions",
                                           c(2, 0, 1, 0, 0,
                                             0, 2, 0, 2, 0,
                                             2, 2, 0, 0, 0,
                                             0, 0, 2, 0, 0,
```

```
                                    1, 0))

test_conv <- network::set.vertex.attribute(test_conv, "targets",
                                    c(0, 1, 2, 1, 1,
                                      0, 1, 0, 1, 0,
                                      1, 2, 2, 0, 1,
                                      0, 0, 1, 0, 0,
                                      0, 0))

network::get.vertex.attribute(test_conv, "ideology") # test

ans0 <- ergm(test_conv ~
             edges +
             nodematch("repertoire") +
             nodematch("regions") +
             nodematch("targets") +
             nodematch("ideology"))

ans0 <- ergm(test_conv ~
             edges +
             nodematch("repertoire") +
             nodematch("regions"))


summary(ans0)

gof_stats <- gof(ans0)
par(mfrow = c(2, 2))
plot(gof_stats,
```

```
    main = '')

vertex_attr_names(test_conv_1)

communities(test_louvain)
test_conv_1 <- intergraph::asIgraph(test_conv)
V(test_conv_1)$name <- V(test)$name
test_conv_1 <- test_conv_1 - c("bratstvo", "c14", "freikor", "orden", "rigsec",
                               "tradord", "katehon", "nevpat", "lycmist",
                               "christfr", "tryzub", "karpsich", "streetfr",
                               "svoboda", "svitanok", "natsprot")

test_conv_1 <- intergraph::asNetwork(test_conv_1)
network::get.vertex.attribute(test_conv_1, "vertex.names")

ans0_1 <- ergm(test_conv_1 ~
                    edges +
                    nodematch("repertoire") +
                    nodematch("regions") +
                    nodematch("targets") +
                    nodematch("ideology"))

summary(ans0_1) # none

test_conv_2 <- intergraph::asIgraph(test_conv)
V(test_conv_2)$name <- V(test)$name
test_conv_2 <- test_conv_2 - c("avanguard", "edelweiss", "natcorps", "sna",
                               "liutych", "karpsich", "streetfr", "svoboda",
                               "svitanok", "natsprot", "unaunso")
```

```
test_conv_2 <- intergraph::asNetwork(test_conv_2)
ans0_2 <- ergm(test_conv_2 ~
                edges +
                nodematch("repertoire") +
                nodematch("regions") +
                nodematch("targets") +
                nodematch("ideology"))

summary(ans0_2) # regions

test_conv_3 <- intergraph::asIgraph(test_conv)
V(test_conv_3)$name <- V(test)$name
test_conv_3 <- test_conv_3 - c("bratstvo", "c14", "freikor", "orden", "rigsec",
                    "tradord", "katehon", "nevpat", "lycmist",
                    "christfr", "tryzub", "avanguard", "edelweiss",
                    "natcorps", "unaunso", "sna", "liutych")

test_conv_3 <- intergraph::asNetwork(test_conv_3)

ans0_3 <- ergm(test_conv_3 ~
                edges +
                nodematch("repertoire") +
                nodematch("regions") +
                nodematch("targets") +
                nodematch("ideology"))

summary(ans0_3)
```

Appendix B

Coding Labels for List of Forms and List of Targets of Collective Action, per Stanford University (2009)

List of Forms

01 = Rally / Demonstration

Demonstration, rally, etc. without reference to marching or walking in a picket line or standing in a vigil. Reference to speeches, speakers, singing, preaching, often verified by indication of sound equipment of PA and sometimes by a platform or stage. Ordinarily will include worship services, speeches, briefings.

02 = March

Reference to moving from one location to another; to be distinguished from rotating or walking in a circle with picket signs which by definition, constitutes a picket.

03 = Vigil

These are almost always designated as such, although sometimes "silent witness," and “meditation” are code words; also see candlelight vigil; hunger/fasting vigil; If you find no designations re: vigils, meditations, silent witness, etc., but also no reference to sound systems or to marches, it may well be a vigil. Most vigils have banners, placards, or leaflets so that people passing by, despite silence from participants, can ascertain for what the vigil stands.

04 = Picket

The modal activity is picketing; there may be references to picket line, to informational picketing; holding signs; "carrying signs and walking around in a circle"). Holding signs or placards or banners is not the defining criteria; rather, it

is holding or carrying those items and walking a circular route, a phrase sometimes surprisingly found in the permit application.

05 = Civil disobedience

Explicit protest that involves crossing barricade, sit-in where prohibited, voter registration drives, crossing barricades, tying up phone lines. Also, violence such as bombing.

06 = Ceremony

These celebrate or protest status transitions ranging from birth, death dates of individuals, organizations or nations, seasons, to re-enlistment or commissioning of military personnel, to the anniversaries of same. These are sometimes referenced by presenting flowers or wreaths commemorating or dedicating or celebrating status transitions or its anniversary.

07 = Dramaturgical demonstration

Code 07 ONLY if this is the modal activity; many demonstration may contain some sequence dramaturgical activity; these may be concerts theatrical, dance, musical, artistic, or some combination of the performing arts.

08 = Motorcade (Electoral campaign and other issues)

09 = Information distribution, tabling/petition gathering, lobbying, letter-writing campaign, teach-ins.

10 = Symbolic Display; e.g. Menorah, Creche Scene, graffiti, cross burnings, signs, standing displays.

11 = Attack, by instigators

Ethnic group victim of physical attack, by collective group (not-one-on-one assault, crime, rape). Boundary motivating attack is "other group's identity," as in gay-bashing, lynching. Can also include verbal attack and/or threats, too.

12 = Riot, Melee, Mob Violence

Large-scale (50+), use of violence by instigators against persons, property, police, or buildings separately or in combination, lasting several hours.

13 = Strike / Slow Down / Sick-Ins

Employee work protest of any kind. Regular strike through failure of negotiations, or wildcat strike. (Make note if a wildcat strike.)

14 = Boycott

Organized refusal to buy or use a product or service, rent strikes.

15 = Press Conference

If specifically named as such in report, and must be the predominant activity form. Could involve disclosure of information to "educate the public" or influence various decision-makers.

16 = Organization Formation Announcement or Meeting

Announcement, meeting or press conference to announce the formation of a new organization.

17 = Conflict, Attack or Clash, no instigator (distinct from codes 11 or 12).

This includes any boundary conflict in which no instigator can be identified, i.e. black/white conflicts, abortion/anti-abortion conflicts. Often, no claims will be discernable in the activity. Form code 17 will most likely be used with "no target" (question 18 on the code sheet).

18 = Lawsuit, legal maneuver by social movement organization or group.

List of Targets of Collective Action

1 = Government/State

2 = Private/Business

3 = University/School

4 = Foreign Government/State

5 = Medical Facility/Organization

6 = Other

7 = Ethnic/Racial/Sexual Group

Appendix C

Tarrow's (2007) Typology of Coalitions of Contention



Appendix D

Levi and Murphy's (2006) "Mapping" of Coalitions of Contention, According to Their Frames and Tactics



Appendix E

Beissinger's (2002) Classification of Political Violence



АНОТАЦІЯ

Дипломної роботи

Тема: «Alliances in the Network of the Far-Right Organizations in Ukraine: Contentious Politics Dimension, 2014–2021»

Студент: Хуторний Кирило Ігорович

Рік навчання, факультет: 4 курс, Факультет соціальних наук та соціальних технологій

Наукові керівники: ст. викладачка, канд. політ. наук Бідочко Л. Я.; канд. політ. наук Рибій О. В.

Рецензент: ст. викладач Шаповалов С. А.

Захищена “____”_____ 20__ р.

Короткий зміст роботи:

У цій дипломній роботі простежено альянси (коаліції незгоди) ультраправих організацій в Україні (2014–2021 рр.) та їхні фактори через призму теорії політики незгоди за допомогою мережевого аналізу. Завдяки понятійно-категоріальному апарату К. Мудде, Ч. Тіллі, Є. Спрінзака, а також методу *peak-listing*, тріангуляції даних та кодувальній схемі Гарварду як дизайну дослідження, було зібрано базу даних про 23 ультраправі організації в Україні та 956 випадків участі в 517 протестних подіях. Через індекс Гірфендаля-Гіршмана було встановлено, що концентрація протестів серед ультраправих падала й тяжіє до слабкої-помірної після 2015 р. Протестна мережа виявилась відносно зв’язаною, але вельми централізованою й змагальницькою. У купі це вказує на сприятливі умови для розбудови альянсів. У роботі виявлено 3 коаліції незгоди, до формування яких доклалися 3 фактори, 2 з яких віддзеркалюють явище гомофілії: (1) структура зв’язків; (2) схожість степеню різноманітності репертуарів незгоди; та (3) схожість степеню регіональної різноманітності. Така модель експоненційного випадкового графу має статистично задовільну пояснювальну здатність.