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- підтверджую, що написана мною бакалаврська робота на тему «Mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada (Ontario) during the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 – 2022» відповідає вимогам академічної доброчесності та не містить порушень, передбачених пунктами 3.1.1 -3.1.6 Положення про академічну доброчесність здобувачів НаУКМА від 07.03.2018 року, зі змістом якого ознайомлена;
- підтверджую, що надана мною електронна версія роботи є остаточною і готовою до перевірки;
- згодна на перевірку моєї роботи на відповідність критеріям академічної доброчесності, у будь-який спосіб, у тому числі порівняння змісту роботи та формування звіту подібності за допомогою електронної системи Unicheck.
- даю згоду на архівування моєї роботи в репозитаріях та базах даних університету для порівняння цієї та майбутніх робіт.

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Тема: «Mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada (Ontario) during the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 – 2022»

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Короткий зміст роботи:

Кваліфікаційна робота є першим комплексним дослідженням українських та кримськотатарських осередків діаспори в Канаді (провінція Онтаріо) та їх діяльності у 2014-2022 роках у відповідь на російсько-українську війну. Ця дипломна робота має на меті дослідити політичну та громадську діяльність представників української та кримськотатарської діаспорних груп та з'ясувати, яким чином та за яких умов діаспора лобіювала українські інтереси на міжнародній політичній арені. Важливим аспектом роботи є розгляд політичного контексту Канади для мобілізації діаспори, де висвітлено як стримуючі фактори, що обмежували мобілізацію, так і можливості для ефективних політичних дій. Новизною роботи є висвітлення взаємовідносин української та кримськотатарської діаспорних груп, яке майже не представлене в історіографії. Для розкриття теми було створено усно-історичну джерельну базу, до якої входять 12 інтерв'ю з

представниками найбільших громадських організацій української та кримськотатарської діаспори в Торонто, серед яких: Ukrainian Resistance Canada, Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Second Front Ukraine Foundation, Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian National Federation of Canada. У якості джерел були також використані офіційні звернення та виступи представників української діаспори, документи громадських організацій, міграційні статистичні дані канадського уряду, а також публічні опитування на тему ставлення до діаспорних груп з боку канадського суспільства.

В результаті у роботі було представлено спогади представників української та кримськотатарської діаспори, історіографічну базу діаспорних студій, а також методологію для аналізу поведінки діаспори в часи кризи в країні-походження. Дослідження дає змогу отримати уявлення про ефективність, дії та мотивацію представників української та кримськотатарської діаспори долучитися до лобювання українських інтересів у канадському політичному просторі. Було також досліджено ті інструменти, які представники діаспори використовували для залучення українців та кримських татар до активізму. Зрештою, праця розширює історіографічну базу, що стосується теми Діаспорних Студій (Diaspora studies) та Досліджень війни і миру (War and Peace Studies).

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	2
CHAPTER 1. HISTORIOGRAPHY, SOURCES AND METHODS	5
1.2. Historiography and theoretical literature.....	5
1.2. Methods and key terms.....	15
1.3. Sources.....	19
CHAPTER 2. THE CONTEXT AND PROCESS OF THE UKRAINIAN & CRIMEAN TATAR DIASPORAS MOBILIZATION	28
2.1. Canadian context: constraints and opportunities	28
2.2. Two decisive years and the process of the mobilization.....	44
2.3. Main activities and the effectiveness of diaspora NGOs	64
CONCLUSIONS	75
REFERENCES	78
APPENDIXS	91

INTRODUCTION

The commencement of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2014 resulted in a significant transformation of world politics and global order. The effects of these events have reached beyond the borders of Ukraine, impacting not only its residents but also the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in various countries. These events served as a catalyst for mobilization within the diaspora, prompting the active utilization of diverse resources to provide assistance to Ukraine during times of crisis. Canada, with its substantial population of ethnic Ukrainians and the largest Slavic diaspora, exemplifies one of the most successful mobilizations among Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars diaspora groups. The well-established institutionalization and enduring historical presence of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada have empowered them to function as a powerful «third force» comprised of international non-state actors, significantly influencing Canada's actions and responses to the conflict. Through their non-governmental organizations (NGOs), they have wielded considerable influence in ensuring that the Russo-Ukrainian war remains a foremost priority on the Canadian agenda, effectively raising funds and engaging in impactful public diplomacy efforts.

The study of diaspora mobilizations and their impact on conflict and post-conflict processes is a relatively recent area of scholarship that emerged in the early 2000s. The majority of scholarship on the effects of diaspora mobilization has been conducted in the disciplines of political science, sociology, and anthropology. Notably, historical research has been relatively underutilized in this field, despite its potential to provide valuable insights. By incorporating a historical perspective, we can uncover the contextual nuances and historical underpinnings that shape the actions of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada during the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the 21st century. Another essential aspect of historical research is the documentation of events, available sources, and oral history interviews, which can become crucial prime research sources for future generations

of historians. This interdisciplinary approach facilitates a more comprehensive understanding, bridging the gap between diaspora studies and the historical analysis of diaspora mobilizations.

The historiographical and methodological basis for the study will be described in detail in the first chapter of the thesis. Drawing from the interdisciplinary field of Diaspora Studies and incorporating insights from scholars of Social movements, the chapter will establish a solid foundation for the subsequent analysis. Additionally, the chapter will provide an in-depth examination of the primary source material, which comprises 12 oral history interviews conducted with representatives of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora NGOs based in Toronto.

Therefore, this thesis **aims** to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mobilization process of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada during the period of 2014-2022. It seeks to explore the contextual factors that influenced their mobilization, examine the strategies and tools used for it, and assess impact of their activities on the war in Ukraine and Canada's policy towards it. Achieving this goal involves the **following tasks**:

- to describe the state of research on this topic and provide the theoretical and methodological framework for the study
- to analyze the process and main activities of the mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada (Ontario) and assess their effectiveness

The **object** of the study is Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada. The **subject** is the activities and actions of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar NGOs in Canada (Ontario) during this period of time.

The **methodological basis** of the study is the principle of historicism, general scientific principles of analysis and synthesis, and the method of critical

analysis of sources. Methodology of Diaspora Studies, Transnational, and Social Movements studies is also involved.

The **geographical** scope covers the province of Ontario, with the central city of Toronto.

The **timeframe** covers the period from 2014 to 2022. The lower boundary corresponds to the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the first wave of diaspora mobilization. The upper boundary is determined by the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the second wave of mobilization. The structure of a thesis is determined by its purpose and objectives.

The thesis **consists of** two chapters, conclusions, a list of references, and appendices.

CHAPTER 1. HISTORIOGRAPHY, SOURCES AND METHODS

1.2. Historiography and theoretical literature

There is substantial historiography and methodological literature on the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, its history of migrations, identity, and various political and social activities. The same cannot be said for the Crimean Tatar diaspora, due to the low profile of their group in Canada and the lack of scholarly interest in them until early 2014. However, in general, the diaspora and its actions have increasingly attracted the attention of historians, sociologists and political scientists in the context of globalization and the transformation of the diasporas into important international non-state actors who started to act as mediators between their home and host countries. Therefore, my historiography and methodological literature are largely based on the works of scholars of diaspora studies that analyse the behaviour of the diaspora in the host country and its interaction with the country of origin. My attention is particularly drawn to those works, where the authors focus on the actions of the Ukrainian/Crimean Tatar diasporas and their organizations during the time of the war in Ukraine in 2014 – 2022.

Thus, I propose to classify all available historiography and literature into two general blocks: *thematic and methodological*. Thematic historical literature is represented by the works of scholars whose subject of study is the Ukrainian or/and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada and their activities in response to the Russo-Ukrainian war of 2014-2022. Separate consideration is also given to the works of historians on the war in Ukraine, which reveal the chronology of events to which the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada responded. Currently, an active process of accumulating information on this issue is underway, which allows to convey a comprehensive analysis of the Ukrainian/Crimean Tatar diasporas' response to the outbreak of war in 2014 and its subsequent actions up to 2022.

The methodological block includes theoretical works by scholars of diaspora studies that describe the approaches used to understand the role and

actions of the diaspora during conflicts, such as war or revolution in their home countries. Some of these studies do not focus on the case of the Ukrainian/Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada but help understand general patterns of diaspora behaviour and offer different methodological tools which historians can use to analyze the diaspora in general. These works focus on such conceptual notions as diaspora, transnationalism, conflict reterritorialization, diaspora mobilisation, and diaspora diplomacy. Theoretical works on oral history and its methodology were also taken into account since oral history became an important source base for this study.

Thematic block

This block of historiography is devoted to practical rather than theoretical works that examined the behaviour of the Ukrainian/Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada in response to the Russo-Ukrainian war. It is worth noting that most of this block focuses on the Ukrainian diaspora, as research on the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada is rare and almost untouched by historiography. In fact, this part of the literature uses the methods and tools from the next section to analyze the case of Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and their response and activities during the Ukrainian-Russian war. In order to reveal the context and background of the events that took place during 2014-2015, I used the work of a Ukrainian Canadian historian Serhy Yekelchuk¹ and Turkish social scientist Filiz Tutku Aydin², where scholars offer a concise and accessible overview of the conflict in Ukraine, which began in 2014 with the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv and the subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia. The case of the Ukrainian diaspora, which was mobilized in Canada in response to the armed conflict in Ukraine that began in 2014, is analyzed in the works of the following researchers: Klavdia Tatar³, Ieva

¹ Yekelchuk S. *The conflict in Ukraine: What everyone needs to know*. Oxford University Press. 2015. 209 p.

² Tutku A.F *Crimean Tatars and Russia's Annexation of Crimea*. Volume 13 Number 3. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. 2014. P. 81 – 92.

³ Tatar K. *Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada's Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine*. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 9(2), 2020. P. 35-51.

Birka⁴, Ivan Kozatchenko⁵, Hans-Joachim Hoppe⁶, Mark MacKinnon⁷, Milana Nikolko⁸ and Oleh Kozachuk⁹. They make important points about diaspora agency and diplomacy, arguing that without organized diaspora's community, including its self-promotion as a politically valuable group, Ukraine would not have received such attention from Canada and Canadian government.

Milana Nikolko¹⁰ and Klavdia Tatar¹¹ particularly examine Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Canada that have been actively lobbying for Ukraine's interests in the Canadian environment. These scholars show how diaspora mobilization became particularly important in times of crisis in Ukraine, and how diaspora mobilization can also have an impact on international politics and policy-making. They conducted a series of interviews with representatives of the largest Ukrainian diaspora's NGOs in Canada in order to trace how Ukrainian Canadians mobilized their direct support for Ukraine on different fronts. Their works are mainly focused on the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC), its actions, political statements, general messages, and the role in lobbying Ukrainian interests on the Canadian political stage.

The topic of Crimean Tatars in Canada is covered by a relatively small number of works, including the following scholars: Milana Nikolko and Fethi

⁴ Birka I. Thinking diaspora diplomacy after Russia's war in Ukraine. *Space and Polity*, 26:1. 2022. P. 53-61.

⁵ Kozatchenko I. "Homeland from Afar: The Ukrainian Diaspora After Euromaidan." Open Lecture at Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton. May 1, 2017. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyF6eIhdzQI> (Accessed 5 March 2023).

⁶ Hoppe H-J. Ukraine's conflict and the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. *Kyiv Post*. 2015. URL: <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/hans-joachim-hoppe-ukraines-conflict-and-the-ukrainian-diaspora-in-canada-397247.html> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

⁷ MacKinnon M. Bypassing Official Channels, Canada's Ukrainian Diaspora Finances and Fights a War Against Russia. *The Globe and Mail*. February 26. 2015. URL: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ukraine-canadas-unofficial-war/article23208129/> (Accessed 5 March 2023).

⁸ Nikolko M. Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis: old traumas and new strategies, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42:11, 2019. P. 1870-1889.

⁹ Kozachuk O. Ukraine in Canadian Foreign Policy After 2014. *TransCanadiana. Polish Journal of Canadian Studies* 9, 2017. P. 305–321.

¹⁰ Nikolko M. Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis: old traumas and new strategies. P. 1870-1889.

¹¹ Tatar K. Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times. P. 35-51.

Kurtiy Şahin¹², David Carment¹³, and Filiz Tutku Aydın¹⁴. In their article, Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin¹⁵, shed light on the diasporas' boundaries between Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey. Scholars particularly focus on the collective actions of these diaspora groups during the unfolding of the Ukrainian war 2014-2016, analyzing how they created a common agenda and shared goals. The catalogue «Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development» (2015)¹⁶ brings together contributions from scholars and experts from various fields to examine the conflict in Crimea and its broader implications for international order and cooperation between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. This work combines research by various scholars on the annexation of Crimea and the behavior of Crimean Tatars in response to these events. Finally, Filiz Tutku Aydın¹⁷ offers political science perspective on the annexation of Crimea, and provides important details about the subsequent migration of Crimean Tatars from the peninsula and the role they played in Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar diplomatic relations.

Methodological Framework for the Study

Comparing the post-war period with the 21st century, the image of the diaspora and immigrants has changed significantly. For a certain period of time, historiography was dominated by the image of immigrants as the uprooted people who left behind country and underwent painful process of incorporation into a new

¹² Nikolko M., Şahin F.K. Overcoming the boundaries: Strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in response to the Ukrainian crisis. *Euxeinos*, Vol. 10, No. 30, 2020. P. 89 – 98.

¹³ Carment D., Nikolko M. (eds). *Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development* (Global Dialogues 11). Duisburg: Centre for Global Cooperation Research, 2015. 47 p.

¹⁴ Tutku F.A. Crimean Tatar Diaspora: Who They Are and What They Mean for Ukraine. *Ukrainian Policymaker*, Volume 8, 2021. P. 11-25.

Tutku A.F Crimean Tatars and Russia's Annexation of Crimea. Volume 13 Number 3. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 2014. P. 81 – 92.

¹⁵ Nikolko M., Şahin F.K. Overcoming the boundaries: Strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in response to the Ukrainian crisis. P. 89 – 98.

¹⁶ Carment D., Nikolko M. (eds). *Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development* (Global Dialogues 11). 47 p.

¹⁷ Tutku F.A. Crimean Tatar Diaspora: Who They Are and What They Mean for Ukraine. P. 11-25.

society¹⁸. This victimization is related to the traumatic experience of migrations, which were associated with wars and economic crises that forced migrants to seek labour or start a new life after the war. Nowadays, there is a qualitative shift in the diasporic studies among scholars who are trying to redefine the terminology and reformulate some of the previous conceptualization. Taking the Ukrainian diaspora as a focus, each wave of migration consisted of a mixture of labour migrants and political refugees. In this case, the victimized description of the diaspora by previous researchers was due to the fact that the third wave consisted of displaced persons and war veterans, which influenced the representation of them as passive victims of traumatic events.

Even more complicated is the situation with the Crimean Tatar diaspora, which was replenished to a large extent by Crimean Tatars whose social and economic life was destroyed as a result of the Russian colonization policy. The Crimean Tatars were subjected to deportation and forced resettlement by the Soviet regime in 1944, and many of them were able to return to their homeland only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 has once again forced many Crimean Tatars to flee their homeland and seek refuge in other countries, including Canada.

To describe the various experiences of different diasporas, Robert Cohen has developed a typology of diasporas, in which he distinguishes 4 types: labour, imperial, victim and reterritorialized diasporas, which can overlap between each other¹⁹. Although the victim diaspora remains in this typology, the author notes that this cannot be equated with passivity: despite their victimized background, diaspora representatives can actively lobby and defend their interests in the destination country²⁰. Thus, the term diaspora encompasses new forms of migration and displacement, as well as the construction of new identities. This new approach is relevant for the Ukrainian case, since the last wave of Ukrainian

¹⁸ Schiller N., Basch L., Blanc C.S. From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration. *Anthropological Quarterly* 68, no. 1: 48, 1995. P. 48.

¹⁹ Cohen R. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2008. P. 160.

²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 160 – 161.

diaspora consisted of new educated and ambitious migrants, who introduced a powerful political agenda to its diasporic discourse. Therefore, their representation as victims of the events would be too oversimplified and would not reflect the reality, where representatives of the diaspora are actively involved in lobbying for Ukrainian interests. Thus, methodological literature, used in this thesis, is based on the new approaches, terminology and vocabulary.

First of all, the concepts of “victims” and “uprooted migrants” have been replaced by the notion of “transmigrants” and “transnationalism,” which are introduced in the works of such researchers as Nina Glick-Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton²¹, Zlatko Skrbis²², Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist²³, and Abramson Yehonatan²⁴. The pioneers of the transnational turn in the early 1990s were Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton²⁵, who moved from the notion of an *immigrant* to that of a *transmigrant*. These scholars started to theorize how diaspora can become firmly rooted in a new country but maintain multiple linkages to the homeland, impacting local and national events in the countries from which they emigrated and political agendas in the host countries. They argue that while in the past immigrants were forced to forget, hide, or even deny their ties to home, in today's world populations developed strong social, economic, and political ties with different countries across borders. Therefore, diaspora can play an important role in political arenas in both the country of destination and country of origin. Similar findings were also made by Zlatko Skrbis²⁶, who explores *long-distance nationalism*, which also refers to the political, linguistic and cultural ties between diaspora communities and their

²¹ Schiller, Basch L, Blanc C. From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 1995. P. 49-50.

²² Skrbis Z. *Long-distance nationalism: Diasporas, “homeland’s” and identities*. London: Ashgate, 1999. 188 p.

²³ Bauböck R., Faist T. *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010. 351 p.

²⁴ Abramson Y. “Making a Homeland, Constructing a Diaspora.” *Political Geography*: 58, 2017. P. 11–23.

²⁵ Schiller, Basch L, Blanc C. From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration. P. 49-50.

²⁶ Skrbis Z. *Long-distance nationalism: Diasporas, “homeland’s” and identities*. 188 p.

homelands. He examines how long-distance nationalism is expressed through various forms of political and cultural activism, including lobbying, fundraising, and media campaigns, which, according to his work, are deeply influenced by a sense of nostalgia for the homeland.

Bauböck Rainer and Thomas Faist in the theoretical book “Diaspora and Transnationalism” (2010) provide a comprehensive overview of the concepts of *diaspora* and *transnationalism* and their usage in the modern world²⁷. The novelty of «Diaspora and Transnationalism» lies in its comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach to defining these two concepts, which brings together contributions from sociology, political science, history, and cultural studies. A new perspective on the diaspora is also offered by Abramson Yehonatan²⁸. Unlike early scholars, who analyzed diasporas as already mobilized actors, Abramson Yehonatan analyzed how governments target diaspora communities to trigger their affective response and accumulate help in times of need.

Having highlighted researchers who define such concepts as diaspora, transnationalism and related terms, we move on to the next part of the methodological literature, focusing on the context in which I analyze diaspora, namely, during the war in the country of origin. Among the researchers who examine the behaviour of the diaspora during conflicts in the country of origin, it is necessary to outline Élise Féron and Bruno Lefort²⁹, Hazel Smith and Paul Stares³⁰,

²⁷ Bauböck R., Faist T. *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. 351 p.

²⁸ Abramson Y. *Making a Homeland, Constructing a Diaspora*. P. 11–23.

²⁹ Féron, É, Lefort, B. *Diasporas and conflicts – understanding the nexus*. *Diaspora Studies*, 12(1), 2019. P. 34–51.

³⁰ Smith H. A., Stares P. *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or peace-wreckers?* United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2017. 300 p.

Jennifer Brinkerhoff³¹, Carment, David and Rachel Calleja³², Jolie Demmers³³, Fiona Adamson³⁴, and Maria Koinova³⁵.

Élise Féron and Bruno Lefort³⁶ offer to unpack the diaspora-conflict nexus with four sets of issues: actors, discourses, time and space. According to this framework, we should first look at actors, who can activate the link between diasporas and conflicts (such as host governments, non-state actors, and the international community); then analyze discourses and narratives that underpin diaspora mobilization, including the role of identity, ideology, transnationalism, and historical grievances; take into account temporal dimension of diaspora mobilization (including the historical context, and the evolution of diaspora movements over time); and, finally, pay attention to the space and political configurations in countries of settlement (including the impact of micro-level (networks, everyday spaces of group socialization, etc.), and macro level (institutions within the country of origin, transnational forums, international meetings).

Scholars analyze not only what influences diaspora mobilization but also what consequences and outcomes this mobilization entails. For instance, the main question in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares³⁷ book is when and why diasporas can act

³¹ Brinkerhoff J. *Diasporas and Conflict Societies*. *Conflict, Security, and Development* 11 (2), 2011. P. 115–143.

³² Carment D., Calleja R. *Diasporas and Fragile States—Beyond Remittances Assessing the Theoretical and Policy Linkages*. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (8), 2018. P. 1270–1288.

³³ Demmers J. *New Wars and Diasporas*. *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development* 11. 2007, P. 1–26.

Demmers, J. *Diaspora and conflict: Locality, long-distance nationalism, and delocalization of conflict dynamics*. *Javnost - The Public*, 9(1), 2002. P. 85–96.

³⁴ Adamson F. *Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. P. 63 – 88.

³⁵ Koinova M. *Sustained vs episodic mobilization among conflict-generated diasporas*. *International Political Science Review*, 37(4), 2016. P. 500–516.

Koinova M., Karabegović D. *Causal mechanisms in diaspora mobilizations for transitional justice*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42:11, 2019. P. 1809-1829.

Koinova, M. *Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: Contextual and comparative dimensions*. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(8), 2018. P. 1251–1269.

³⁶ Féron, É, Lefort, B. *Diasporas and conflicts – understanding the nexus*. P. 34–51.

³⁷ Smith H. A., Stares P. *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or peace-wreckers?* 300 p.

as ‘peace-makers’ and as ‘peace-wreckers’ during the conflict or post-conflict reconstruction in the home country. The authors analyze various cases from around the world to explore the complex dynamics of diaspora engagement in conflict situations. Smith and Stares investigate how diasporas use their influence, resources, and networks to promote peace, reconciliation, and conflict resolution in their home countries. However, they also explore how diasporas can be peace-wreckers, by contributing to conflict through funding, arms transfers, and support for militant groups or engaging in divisive activities that fuel tensions and prolong conflicts. The same question Jennifer Brinkerhoff³⁸ raises in her work, outlining possible diaspora contributions and their specific positive and negative impacts on conflict-affected societies.

For a long time, researchers also have focused on how the diaspora helps its homeland through remittances and economic support. David Carment and Rachel Calleja³⁹ are going beyond remittance contributions, offering to measure diaspora involvement within a new framework consisting of «Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity» (ALC). In a nutshell, this framework focuses on evaluating the governance dimensions of authority, legitimacy, and capacity in fragile states, taking into consideration the contributions of diasporas in these areas. By incorporating these three dimensions, the ALC framework provides a more comprehensive approach to understanding the impact of diasporas on state fragility beyond just their financial remittance contributions.

Jolie Demmers⁴⁰, Fiona Adamson⁴¹ and Maria Koinova⁴² also focus on the wars, conflicts or revolutions and the diaspora's response to them. In this thesis, I

³⁸ Brinkerhoff J. *Diasporas and Conflict Societies*. P. 115–143.

³⁹ Carment D., Calleja R. *Diasporas and Fragile States—Beyond Remittances Assessing the Theoretical and Policy Linkages*. P. 1270–1288.

⁴⁰ Demmers J. *New Wars and Diasporas*. P. 1–26.

Demmers, J. *Diaspora and conflict: Locality, long-distance nationalism, and delocalization of conflict dynamics*. P. 85–96.

⁴¹ Adamson F. *Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war*. P. 63 – 88.

⁴² Koinova M. *Sustained vs episodic mobilization among conflict-generated diasporas*. P. 500–516.

heavily rely on the work of Maria Koinova, who takes the topic of diasporas away from the simplistic perception of them as an immigrant community that will necessarily support their country of origin in times of crisis. Maria Koinova, focusing on the diaspora mobilization for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood, argues that it is wrong to assume that long-distance nationalism and diasporic “obligations” will motivate diasporic groups to support the State in times of long-term crisis. Although diasporas indeed have strong ethnic and cultural ties to a homeland, they cannot be expected to help the home country regardless of the political context in the host country. It is especially difficult for diaspora communities to take any fruitful action in the context of war at home if the government in the host country does not support them in these activities or even takes the opposite position. Thus, the author provides important factors that influence the behaviour of the diaspora, which is useful for a deeper analysis of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and their motivation to support Ukraine during the prolonged war.

Finally, since this historical research will focus on organizations created by the Ukrainian diaspora and their activities, I consider it appropriate to use an interdisciplinary approach and take into account political science tools to conceptualize organizations' activities and explain activists' actions. Therefore, the last part of the conceptual literature considers the works of Doug McAdam⁴³, Sidney Tarrow⁴⁴, Charles Tilly, Davis Snow and Robert Benford⁴⁵. These scholars explore social movements and how diaspora representatives can become activists and dynamic non-government actors. They also investigate how these activists use transnational networks to mobilize and coordinate help to their homeland across

Koinova M., Karabegović D. Causal mechanisms in diaspora mobilizations P. 1809-1829.

Koinova, M. Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. P. 1251–1269.

⁴³ McAdam D., Tarrow S., Tilly Ch. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 411 p.

⁴⁴ Tarrow S. *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 278 p.

⁴⁵ David S., Benford R. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992. P. 133-135.

borders. Thus, their works provide the necessary methodological base to analyze the behaviour, motivation and tools of Ukrainian/ Crimean Tatar diasporas activists.

To sum up, this thesis is based on a wide range of interdisciplinary approaches and research methods. Nevertheless, there is room for new research in historiography. For example, the most recent researcher on the topic of Ukrainian diaspora mobilization, Klavdia Tatar⁴⁶, takes into account events between 2013-2017 without considering the events that took place since 2017 and before 2022. There is also no broader and comprehensive overview of Ukrainian diaspora organizations and their activities in Canada during the Russo-Ukrainian war. Insufficient attention is also paid to the general context in Canada, particularly in Toronto, and how shared history and memories influenced the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora. Almost “terra incognita” in historiography is the topic of the Crimean Tatar diaspora and their actions in Canada. These and other issues will be addressed in the following chapters of the thesis.

1.2. Methods and key terms

To ensure that this study does not have a descriptive character, I use concepts that have long been used only by political scientists, sociologists and scholars of international relations. Historians cannot conduct a comprehensive study on the formation and actions of Ukrainian diaspora or any other diaspora groups without engagement of interdisciplinary research traditions into their surveys because these concepts reveal not only the content but also the motives, reasons, and deeper analysis of the diaspora's actions. Additionally, the approaches from different fields offer a typology, various ways to classify phenomena of diaspora and agreed vocabulary on this topic. and Thus, the methodology chapter aims to define main concepts and terms, and outline how diaspora mobilisation and

⁴⁶ Tatar K. Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times. P. 35-51.

transnationalism can become useful methodological tools to guide empirical analysis, avoiding a conceptually rich but suggestion-poor study.

Diaspora

Diaspora is a central term for this thesis, and, at the same time, the most complex and controversial to define. The problem with defining «Diaspora» is that it is an old concept that has become all-purpose word nowadays. Originally it referred only to the historic experience of particular groups, specifically Jews and Armenians. But in the late 1970s, «Diaspora» has experienced a veritable explosion of applications and interpretations in different academic fields⁴⁷. Robin Cohen offers an influential definition of diaspora in the academic community, using its four main features and explaining it as: «*members of an defined group which have been dispersed to many destinations; construct a shared identity; orient themselves to an original “home” and demonstrate an affinity with other members of the group dispersed to other places.*»⁴⁸

It is crucial to mention that I am not studying migration of Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars to Canada in general, and it is a fundamental error to use diaspora as a synonym for all migrants⁴⁹. The term diaspora is also implied that its members do not fully integrate socially, since assimilation would mean «the end» of diaspora. In this thesis, I do not refer to the diaspora as temporarily displaced persons who have not planned to stay in Canada for long or who are not actively involved in diaspora mobilization efforts. Also, the term diaspora in our case does not include those Ukrainian Canadians who do not identify themselves as diaspora, being second or third-generation, who have fully integrated into Canadian society. As already noted in Robin Cohen's definition, the diaspora must meet certain characteristics, among which self-identification as a member of the diaspora plays

⁴⁷ Bauböck R., Faist T. *Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods*. P. 12.

⁴⁸ Cohen R. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. P. 3-4.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* P.13.

an important role. Therefore, to be as specific as possible, in this study, I am interested in 2 conceptual groups of the diaspora:

- the “old Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas” and its organizations formed before 2014 (i.e. before the start of the migration associated with the Russo-Ukrainian war);
- the “new Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas” and organizations that emerged as a reaction to the events of 2014-2022 in Ukraine.

Consideration of not only previous waves of diaspora and older organizations allows us to trace the evolution of these diasporas in Canada and analyze how it changed in response to the Russo-Ukrainian war. It is also a certain novelty of this study, as I consider not only the already established diaspora and its organizations but a «fresh case» of new transmigrants from Ukraine who are trying to integrate into the diaspora communities and lobby Ukrainian interests in the Canadian political environment.

Crimean Tatar diaspora

By political affiliation, both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars are citizens of Ukraine if they were born in this country. However, in addition to political affiliation, there is also ethnicity, which makes it difficult to simply categorize Crimean Tatars as a subgroup of the Ukrainian diaspora. They have a distinct culture, language, and history, remaining in the position of indigenous people in Ukraine but still being united with the Ukrainian diaspora in their response to Russian aggression. That is why I decided to separate the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas and follow their reactions, interactions and active actions in response to the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Ukraine.

Transnationalism and transmigrants

Rainer Bauböck names the Diaspora and transnationalism as “dance partners”⁵⁰. In many studies, these two analytical notions are sometimes used interchangeably but there are distinct differences in their meanings and applications. While diaspora is a very old concept, transnationalism is relatively new and have been used to describe a range of activities and practices in which migrants are involved on a daily basis⁵¹. Thus, while diaspora is a concept that helps to describe a community, *transnationalism* is a concept that describes the process that takes place within this community, namely political activity, lobbying for the interests of the home country in the destination country, and other activities. Transnationalism can take many forms, including the transfer of money and resources, the exchange of ideas and information, and the maintenance of cultural identities and practices, emphasizing the ways in which people and communities can interact across borders. Using only the concept of diaspora would be a simplification, since transnationalism provides a broader prism for analyzing the daily activities of diaspora representatives and their policies towards the conflict in the homeland.

Transmigrants are immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state⁵². They settle and become incorporated in political institutions and patterns of the daily life of the country in which they reside. However, at the very same time, they are engaged in cross-border activities, such as remitting money to family members, maintaining social and political ties, and participating in cultural practices and events. Unlike traditional migrants who leave their home country and fully assimilate into their new host society, transmigrants maintain connections and relationships in both their home and host countries. The concept of transmigrants has been used to

⁵⁰ Bauböck R., Faist T. Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods. P.33.

⁵¹ Ibid. P. 9.

⁵² Schiller, Basch L, Blanc C. From Immigrant to Transmigrant. P. 49-50.

challenge traditional notions of migration as a one-time event or a linear process, and instead emphasizes the fluidity and complexity of migrant experiences.

Diasporic mobilization

Diaspora mobilization refers to the process by which members of a diaspora community work to promote the interests of their homeland or fellow diaspora members. Diasporas can mobilize as organizations, transnational social movements, acting on political opportunities and constraints in the host country⁵³. Diaspora can mobilize their support on different fronts, such as personal aid, diplomatic involvement, political lobbying, remittances, fundraising, public events and others. In this thesis, the mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas is the main subject of research, as it is their activities played a significant role in developing Canadian agenda on Ukraine.

Thus, all of the above concepts and key terms will help to cover Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups and their activities in Canada (Ontario) during 2014-2022 from all possible angles. These approaches are important for describing both the general context in Canada that facilitated mobilization and the specific mechanisms and strategies used by the diaspora. It is also important that this methodology was used to better understand the sources and oral histories discussed in the next section.

1.3. Sources

During the thesis research, I studied the annual reports, presentations, media publications and other analytical materials of the six organization: Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, BCU Foundation, Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian Resistance Canada and Second Front Ukrainian Foundation, whose activities were assessed. I considered media materials and visuals provided by these organizations' representatives and respondents. An important statistical component of the work is the Census Canada

⁵³ Koinova, M. Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. P. 1253.

data, which takes place every five years and is conducted by Statistics Canada. In this study, I analyzed data for account the years 2001⁵⁴, 2006⁵⁵, 2011⁵⁶, 2016⁵⁷ and 2021⁵⁸. I also remotely conducted and processed 12 interviews with representatives of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada (*Appendix B*). Thus, the source base of the thesis can be roughly divided into *sources of oral history, official reports and data from diaspora organizations, and statistical data from the Government of Canada*.

Oral history sources are presented by a series of thematic semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar organization representatives in the Canadian province of Ontario. The selection of organizations was justified by the fact that the author of the study wanted to trace how the «old» and «new» Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas reacted to the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Thus, both older organizations, which were founded in the 20th century, and new organizations, which were created by the new wave of the Ukrainian diaspora, were taken into account. Notably, three of the six organizations were created in response to the outbreak of war or a full-scale invasion in 2022. It is an important insight into this study which demonstrates the nature of the behaviour of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada and their rapid reaction to the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Objectives and main activities of the listed organizations will be described in section 2.3. of this thesis:

Table 1. Organizations considered in this thesis, years of their establishment and number of interviews:

Organization	Founded in:	Number of the interviews
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⁵⁴ Census Profile, 2001. URL: <https://cutt.ly/95Rkqwh> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

⁵⁵ Census Profile, 2006. URL: <https://cutt.ly/v5RjzKf> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

⁵⁶ Census Profile, 2011. URL: <https://cutt.ly/G5Rhe94> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

⁵⁷ Census Profile, 2016. URL: <https://cutt.ly/v5RjzKf> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

⁵⁸ Census Profile, 2021. URL: <https://cutt.ly/45RkQow> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

1. Ukrainian Canadian Congress	1940	1
2. Ukrainian National Federation of Canada	1978	1
3. BCU Foundation	2006	1
4. Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars	2014	3
5. Ukrainian Resistance Canada	2022	2
6. Second Front Ukrainian Foundation	2022	4
		Total: 12

These materials are being put into scholarly circulation for the first time and are kept in the author's private archive. I also developed a questionnaire for respondents based on the study's objectives⁵⁹. It contained four blocks: 1) Family, childhood, and education; 2) The path of an activist and the main activities of the organization; 3) Personal memories of the events of 2014; 4) Assessment of their own life. Each respondent also signed a statement of consent to the processing of personal data, having the opportunity to keep some parts of the interview confidential. All respondents in the study were representatives of various organizations, providing a diverse perspective on the subject matter. During the analysis of the interviews, I traced the tendency of people's involvement in

⁵⁹ The questionnaire is included in Appendix A.

activism in connection with the «Generation Effect», described by Stephen Lewis, Robert Kraut, and Verne L. Bengston.⁶⁰

According to Stephen Lewis and Robert Kraut, the mobilization process is influenced by an individual's early socialization and personal biography. They argue that individuals who have been raised with values that align with the objectives of specific organizations or have experienced certain biographical circumstances are more likely to respond to mobilization calls. Bengston's empirical research further supports this argument, highlighting the generational effect, indicating that children of activists are more inclined to become activists themselves due to their upbringing within relevant value systems⁶¹. Frequently, the interviewed respondents' parents were involved in Ukrainian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) either in Canada or Ukraine and held pro-Ukrainian stances with active civic engagement. Every activist interviewed consistently acknowledged the impact of their upbringing on shaping the respondents' political views and garnering support from others.

The theoretical basis for the analysis and conduction of the interviews became the work edited by Helinada Hrynchenko, entitled «*Oral History of the War: Questions and Warnings on the Research Method.*»⁶² This book presents practical exercises and methodologies for interviewing by Donald Ritchie, Alessandro Portelli, Gelinada Hrinchenko, and other Oral History experts. This theoretical approach is driven by complexity of the research proposed in this thesis. We are dealing with the «unfinished past», i.e., the events of the Russo-Ukrainian war, resettlement and displacements that have not yet become history and for which there are no established explanations or interpretations in historiography. This topic and study area are relatively new, so discussions about this kind of research

⁶⁰ Gomza I. Social and political movements: Study guide. National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Kyiv. 2018. P. 68 – 69.

⁶¹ Ibid. P. 69.

⁶² Грінченко Г. (Ред.). Слухати, чути, розуміти: усна історія України ХХ–ХХІ століть: збірка наукових праць. Київ: ТОВ «АРТ КНИГА», 2021. 343 с.

are ongoing⁶³. Nevertheless, there are several advantages to conducting oral history interviews now while the conflict is open-ended⁶⁴:

- The opportunity to document «fresh memories.» It allows us to recreate in detail the situations and emotions of people at the time of decision-making or living a specific experience. The further away from the events, the more distorted a person's memory of these events will be. Details are erased, and emotions change, so collecting evidence here and now is essential.

- Subjective experience. It is traditionally considered an «error» of oral history. Still, it is extremely important to trace information not so much about the actual events and facts of the past but about the meaning of these events that respondents put into them.

- Formation of a source base. In the age of technology, it is possible to document historical facts and testimonies more thoroughly. In addition, oral history makes it possible to compare the official version of history with the personal tragedies and experiences of the direct participants in those events. Finally, as Alan Nevins points out in his book «Gateways to History»: We take many measures to find documents about people who are long dead, but only isolated and haphazard efforts are made to obtain even a fraction of the vast array of documents about the recent past⁶⁵.

Limitations of the study.

Despite a relatively broad source base, I faced several challenges during this research, mostly related to Oral history. As Elmira Muratove argues, any analysis of the annexation of Crimea, and the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war, has to take into account the Crimean Tatar perspective⁶⁶. To achieve this goal,

⁶³ Грінченко Г. (Ред.). Слухати, чути, розуміти: усна історія України ХХ–ХХІ століть: збірка наукових праць. Київ: ТОВ «АРТ КНИГА», 2021. Р. 21.

⁶⁴ Ibid. Р. 33 - 34.

⁶⁵ Ibid. Р. 33.

⁶⁶ Carment D., Nikolko M. (eds). Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development (Global Dialogues 11). 47 p.

I gathered evidence of the activism of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada (Ontario) and their reaction to events in 2014-2022. I conducted three interviews with representatives of the «Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars»⁶⁷ - the biggest organization and a representative body of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora in Canada.

However, the difficulty was that some respondents wanted to refrain from giving information on camera about their relationships with friends or relatives who remained on the peninsula. This is, obviously, due to the fact that the lives of many Crimean Tatars in Crimea, and especially the lives of family members of activists, may be under threat of repression and arrests by the Russian Federation. As one of the respondents points out: “*Now all those who stayed in Crimea are hostages of the regime and Russia*”⁶⁸. Thus, after the interviews were recorded, the respondents provided more facts about life under Russian occupation on the peninsula that they knew and which, unfortunately, cannot be used in this study, at least until the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the de-occupation of Crimea.

Difficulties also arose when asking about the interaction of various Ukrainian organizations. Due to the unwillingness to discuss any conflicts that might have occurred during their activities, respondents either refused to give evidence or gave it after the recorded interview. Another difficulty was finding contact with the leading figures of the organizations. Due to the heavy workload and high demand for giving evidence, it took time to organize a meeting with representatives of all the planned organizations. Thus, there is still room for further research on the topic raised in this thesis. However, despite these difficulties, the interviews can be called representative, as they covered a large number of respondents from different waves of emigration with diverse activist experiences.

⁶⁷Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars official website. URL: <http://www.canada-crimea.com/> (Accessed 9 March 2023).

⁶⁸ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

Official reports and data from diaspora organizations are represented by those documents of organizations that are freely available to the public or were provided to the author of the study with further permission to publish them. For convenience, they can be listed according to the organizations analyzed in this study:

- *Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) documents*, which include:
Triennial Report (2013-2016)⁶⁹, Financial highlights (2017 – 2018)⁷⁰,
Triennial Report (2019 – 2016)⁷¹, Winter Newsletter (2020)⁷², Donors Report (Winter 2021)⁷³, Community Engagement Survey (Digital Version, 2021)⁷⁴,
Summer Newsletter (2022)⁷⁵, Winter Newsletter (2022)⁷⁶, UCC Triennial Report (2019 – 2022)⁷⁷, and information from the official website.⁷⁸
- Ukrainian National Federation of Canada publications and information from the official website.⁷⁹

⁶⁹ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

⁷⁰ 2017 - 2018 Financial Highlights - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2017-2018-financial-highlights-2019-winter-newsletter-pg-9/. (Accessed 4 May 2023).

⁷¹ 2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2022-ucc-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

⁷² 2020 Winter Newsletter - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2020-winter-bulletin/. (Accessed 4 May 2023).

⁷³ Winter 2021 Donors Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/winter-2021-donors-report/. (Accessed 4 May 2023).

⁷⁴ Final Report of 2021 Community Engagement Survey - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website.” www.ucc.ca, 13 Dec. 2021. URL: www.ucc.ca/2021/12/13/ukrainian-canadian-congress-presents-results-of-2021-community-engagement-survey/. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

⁷⁵ Summer 2022 Newsletter - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/summer-2022-newsletter/. (Accessed 4 May 2023).

⁷⁶ Winter 2022 Newsletter - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/winter-2022-newsletter/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

⁷⁷ 2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2022-ucc-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

⁷⁸ The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/> (Accessed 8 March 2023).

⁷⁹ UNF Foundation official website. URL: <https://unffoundation.ca/> (Accessed 8 March 2023).

- *BCU Foundation documents, which include: BCU Presentation & FUDF Fund Statistics (May 2022) and information from the official website.*⁸⁰
- *Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars media data, posts and publications from the official website*⁸¹.
- *Second Front Ukrainian Foundation presentation and statistic, which include: Financial Report (2022)*⁸² and information from the official website⁸³.
- *Ukrainian Resistance Canada publications and media data from the social networks*⁸⁴.

Thus, a comprehensive methodological framework is employed to analyze the mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada from 2014 to 2022. The framework in this thesis draws upon the interdisciplinary field of Diaspora Studies and incorporates relevant approaches from History and Social Movements Studies. Additionally, the analysis is informed by thematic works in historiography that focus on the topic of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups. Adopting this multifaceted approach can ensure a thorough understanding of the mobilization process and its impact.

The studied source base is representative, includes sources of diverse content and origin, and makes it possible to fulfill the research tasks set in the work comprehensively. A comprehensive analysis of the source base allowed us to study the context of activities and main directions of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar

⁸⁰ BCU – Foundation official website. URL: <https://bcufoundation.com/> (Accessed 9 March 2023).

⁸¹ Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars official website. URL: <http://www.canada-crimea.com/> (Accessed 9 March 2023).

⁸² Second Front UA Public Presentation. URL: docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TsrRB4Vs8q2wxPjXlrxqDGB6dTdgW17o/edit#slide=id.g22d42c2cf4e_0_41. (Accessed 12 April 2023).

⁸³ Second Front Ukraine Foundation official website. URL: <https://secondfrontukraine.com/> (Accessed 10 March 2023).

⁸⁴ Ukrainian Resistance Canada. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/login/?next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fukrainian.resistance.canada> (Accessed 10 March 2023).

diaspora activities from 2014 to 2022. Additionally, including oral history sources provides valuable insights into the activists' recollections of the events of 2014 and 2022, shedding light on their motivations to engage in socio-political activities and their memories of key events.

CHAPTER 2. THE CONTEXT AND PROCESS OF THE UKRAINIAN & CRIMEAN TATAR DIASPORAS MOBILIZATION

2.1. *Canadian context: constraints and opportunities*

The context and the political environment of the country in which the diaspora finds itself is crucial, as it largely determines the behaviour and ability of the diaspora to mobilize resources to support the home country during the crisis. As Joell Demmers argues, the importance of context is one of the main findings of the young research field of Diaspora and conflict studies⁸⁵. Since diaspora groups live in different contexts, the interest in preserving the idea of a «homeland» and collective identity may also vary⁸⁶. The context explains why the same diaspora can be more or less active and involved in mobilization depending on the country of destination. For instance, states with deep ethnic and religious cleavages in their societies struggle to unite their citizens into a homogeneous community, and thus governments in such countries are less supportive of the pursuit of transnationalism by the diaspora representatives⁸⁷. Therefore, even diasporas with strong sociocultural connections to a homeland may not convert their nostalgic or sentimental feeling into direct actions and not become as active as the home country's government might expect. Meanwhile, more democratic countries with broader rights for national minorities and supportive political elites create a better ground for joint action for representatives of various diaspora groups.

Therefore, diaspora activism cannot be taken for granted and perceived as a logical and the only possible response to the «Home Calling», since host country context plays highly complex and controversial role in diaspora's political actions⁸⁸. These possibilities and limits to diaspora cooperation and reaction toward a conflict at home country political scientists, such as Doug

⁸⁵ Demmers J. *New Wars and Diasporas*. P. 12.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* P. 12 – 13.

⁸⁷ Koinova, M. *Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction*. P. 1255.

⁸⁸ Demmers J. *New Wars and Diasporas*. P.2.

McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly call constraints and opportunities⁸⁹. In a simple words, opportunities and constraints refer to the political, economic, and social conditions that enable or limit the ability of diasporas to engage in political activities related to their homeland. In the context of diaspora politics, opportunities and constraints are dynamic and can shift over time depending on changes in the homeland and a country of arrival, as well as global events and trends.

These concepts were previously used primarily for social and political movements but has been further developed and applied in the study of diaspora politics by scholars such as Sarah Wayland⁹⁰ and Maria Koinova⁹¹. For instance, Koinova argues that diasporas mobilize as transnational social movements, acting on political opportunities and constraints, that allows us to use this framework in our study⁹². In this section, I will look at the context of Canada (Ontario), analyzing the constraints and opportunities for Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas to mobilize in response to the war in Ukraine that began in 2014.

I will describe four factors which help to determine the behaviour of the diaspora in the country of destination: *the presence and consolidation of Ukrainian diaspora, political and public climate, Canada`s foreign policy, the presence of institutional allies*. These factors are partly derived from the work of Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, who call their interplay as an Opportunity Spiral⁹³. The idea behind this spiral is very simple: the origins of activism and its course depend on external factors. It is also crucial to note that all of these factors can be subjectively interpreted by activists and people involved in organizations. As

⁸⁹ McAdam D., Tarrow S., Tilly Ch. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001. 411 p.

Tarrow S. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. P. 52.

⁹⁰ Wayland S. Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities. Review of International Studies 30 (3), 2004. P. 405–426.

⁹¹ Koinova, M. Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: Contextual and comparative dimensions. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(8). 2018. P. 1251–1269.

⁹² Ibid. P. 1253.

⁹³ McAdam D., Tarrow S., Tilly Ch. Dynamics of Contention. P. 267.

Sidney Tarrow emphasizes, there is no such thing as «objective» opportunities – they must be perceived and attributed in order to become a source of mobilization⁹⁴. Simply put, activists can sometimes subjectively interpret an unfavorable political climate as favorable.

The presence and consolidation of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora organizations.

The story of Ukrainians choosing Canada for emigration in 2014 – 2022 is not unique, as Canada is the third largest country by the number of ethnic Ukrainians, who make up one of the largest Slavic diasporas in the country⁹⁵. If we take a deeper look at the broader context of definitions and periodization of the Ukrainians in Canada, we find that researchers roughly divide Ukrainian migration into four waves: the first in the late 19th century from the 1890s to 1914, the second between 1914 and 1930, the third between 1940 and 1954, and the fourth in the late 1980s, in parallel with the collapse of the Soviet Union⁹⁶. As we can see, at the methodological level, there is still no description of the next wave of the Ukrainians in Canada, which is associated with XXI century and the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. In order to estimate the size of the Ukrainian diaspora in Ontario and Canada in the 21st century, I analyzed Census Canada data, which takes place every five years and is conducted by Statistics Canada. I took into account the years 2001⁹⁷, 2006⁹⁸ 2011⁹⁹, 2016¹⁰⁰ and 2021¹⁰¹. These statistics are based on respondents' answers about their Ethnic Origin. As a result, I can provide the following table of the current wave of Ukrainian emigration that took place in the 21st century:

⁹⁴ Tarrow, S. Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics. P. 164-165.

⁹⁵ The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/about-ucc/> (Accessed 8 March 2023).

⁹⁶ Nikolko M., Şahin F.K. Overcoming the boundaries: Strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in response to the Ukrainian crisis. P. 93 – 94.

⁹⁷ Census Profile, 2001. URL: <https://cutt.ly/95RkqWH> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

⁹⁸ Census Profile, 2006. URL: <https://cutt.ly/v5RjzKf> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

⁹⁹ Census Profile, 2011. URL: <https://cutt.ly/G5RhE94> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

¹⁰⁰ Census Profile, 2016. URL: <https://cutt.ly/v5RjzKf> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

¹⁰¹ Census Profile, 2021. URL: <https://cutt.ly/45RkQow> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

Table 2. *The number of ethnic Ukrainians in Canada and Ontario according to Statistics Canada:*

Year	Ontario	Canada
2001	290,925	1,071,060
2006	336,355	1,209,085
2011	342,005	1,251,170
2016	376,440	1,359,655
2021	342,260	1,258,635

As the table shows, the number of Ukrainians in Canada and Toronto grew steadily until 2021. According to the Government of Canada's Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) website, only between between 2022 and 2023, approximately 26,094 Ukrainian citizens and returning Canadian permanent residents of Ukrainian origin entered Canada¹⁰². Such a large influx of new migrants has definitely changed the face of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and added new representatives and voices to it.

Speaking of public activity, The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) alone has more than 30 national member organizations¹⁰³. Notably, the more Ukrainian citizens moved to Canada, the more organizations emerged in response to the crisis in Ukraine. For instance, the Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars was founded only in 2014 after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Meanwhile, organizations such as the Second Front Ukraine Foundation and Ukrainian Resistance Canada did not exist until 2022.

Respondents to the question of why new diaspora representatives did not join existing organizations explained that already existing large organizations that had

¹⁰² Citizenship Canada. Ukraine immigration measures: Key figures - Canada.ca. URL: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html> (Accessed 23 March 2023).

¹⁰³ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report .The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

been around for generations did not always pursue all the goals that new organizations would like to achieve¹⁰⁴. The organization «Second Front», for example, emphasizes that they started out as a military procurement organization, while other organizations focused more on humanitarian issues.¹⁰⁵ Thus, I can state that the Ukrainian diaspora was represented not only in the ethnic sense, but also in the political and public sectors. A sufficient number of Ukrainians allowed them to act as a powerful «third force» and influence the Canadian agenda.

At the same time, when it comes to constraints, due to the large number of Ukrainians and the diversity of viewpoints, there were some disagreements on the question of how the diaspora should help Ukraine during the wartime: whether it should be in the humanitarian or military sphere. Members of smaller organizations also noted that in the beginning they did not have much trust from the long-established Ukrainian communities, and they had to earn that trust¹⁰⁶. There were also some challenges in the context of fundraising for Ukraine's needs: *«It's terrible to say that there is some competition, but it exists in the sense that Canadian citizens have a limited budget and they have to choose one organization to which they will send money.»*¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, activists note that various Ukrainian organizations were more consolidated than fragmented in their efforts to mobilize support for Ukraine during the Russian aggression and mostly acted as a united front¹⁰⁸.

Another important group of former Ukrainian citizens in Canada that researchers often overlook is the Crimean Tatars. In order to estimate the size of the Crimean Tatar diaspora, I also analyzed Census' Canada statistic, since there are no works in terms of their number in historiography. It is noteworthy that in

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Taras Y., 26 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)

Interview with Vadym H., 25 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Yulia K., 21 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Vadym H., 25 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Svitlana N., 24 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Vadym H., 25 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

2001¹⁰⁹ and 2021¹¹⁰, Tatars are not identified as an ethnic community and there is no data on their number in the statistics. Additionally, Tatars are identified as one common group, so they could have included not only people from Crimea, but also other representatives of Tatar ethnicity.

Table 3. The number of ethnic Tatars in Canada and Ontario according to Statistics Canada:

Year	Ontario	Canada
2001	-	-
2006	1, 245	2,300
2011	1, 485	2,850
2016	860	4, 825
2021	-	-

Due to the small number of Tatars, there is no single periodization of their migration to Canada. Indeed, compared to the million-strong Ukrainian diaspora, ethnic Crimean Tatars are not a large diaspora group. However, their activism and cooperation with Ukrainian organizations proved to be decisive in 2014. As Elvira Irsay, one of the board members in the Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, notes in the interview that at the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian war in 2014, up to 10 Crimean Tatars joined them in Toronto, but in a few months, they managed to unite about 150 Crimean Tatars¹¹¹. Other interviewees with activists from Crimean Peninsula also point out that in 2014, there were ambiguous opinions in Toronto about Crimea: the situation looked as if Crimea had deliberately chosen the Russian path¹¹². The same information was offered by Russian media abroad which also influenced the opinion of Western countries.

¹⁰⁹ Census Profile, 2001. URL: <https://cutt.ly/95Rkqwh> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

¹¹⁰ Census Profile, 2016. URL: <https://cutt.ly/v5RjzKf> (Accessed 1 March 2023).

¹¹¹ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹¹² Interview with Milia A., 14 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

That is why, as Elvira recalls: «*We had to become the voice of the Crimean Tatars and emphasize that we see our future with Ukraine, not Russia.*»¹¹³

According to Turkish researcher Filiz Tutku Aydın, who has been studying the Crimean Tatar diaspora for 20 years, Crimean Tatar diaspora is a primarily democratic and pro-Western community¹¹⁴. However, it is important to note that their support cannot be taken for granted as they may potentially align with Russia and Russian diaspora. Also, they may choose to remain neutral in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine like some Crimean Tatar representatives in Turkey, a country whose international policy in recent years has been ambiguous towards Russia. As noted by Milana Nikolko, the use of the Ukrainian language and national symbols in their daily lives has become a notable feature of relations between Ukraine and the Crimean diaspora in Canada. Most members of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada were and are citizens of Ukraine. They often use and display the Ukrainian flag, trident, and sing the Ukrainian national anthem, while having their own national attributes. However, for Crimean Tatars living in Turkey, this was an unusual and difficult step to use Ukrainian national symbols.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, in Canada, the political agendas and forces of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians have been consolidated.

As a result, Crimean Tatars benefited from various interactions with strong and influential Ukrainian community, and formulate requests to Canadian society together with Ukrainians. However, the size of the diaspora is not an automatic and guaranteed success or a pledge of defeat. As Sezai Ozcelik points out in his study, despite the 3 million-strong Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, during the 2014 Crimean crisis, Turkey did not meet any of the nationalist demands of Crimean Tatars in Turkey¹¹⁶. On the contrary, Turkey pursued a pragmatic policy aimed at

¹¹³ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹¹⁴ Tutku F.A. Crimean Tatar Diaspora: Who They Are and What They Mean for Ukraine. P. 14.

¹¹⁵ Nikolko M., Şahin F.K. Overcoming the boundaries: Strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in response to the Ukrainian crisis. P. 103.

¹¹⁶ Ozcelik S. Analysis of The Crimean Tatars Situation During the Occupation of Crimea By Russia in 2014 With the Conflict and Peace Studies Approach. P. 17.

achieving the 2023 goals and becoming a regional power. The importance of the political climate of the host country and its international vector are therefore discussed in the following sections.

Political and public climate.

According to the EIU's Democracy Index 2022, Canada ranks 12th in the world¹¹⁷. This Democracy Index examines five categories: electoral processes, pluralism, government functioning, participation in politics, political culture, and civil liberties. Based on its scores on a range of indicators within these categories, Canada was evaluated as a «full democracy» with a score of 8.88 out of a total of 10¹¹⁸. In general, multiculturalism and tolerance towards immigrants is Canada`s Public Policy at the Federal Level, and in 2022 Canada welcomed historic number of newcomers. In terms of numbers, roughly 75% of Canada`s population growth comes from immigration. Over 1.3 million immigrants settled permanently in Canada between 2016 and 2021, which is the highest number in a Canadian census since 1996¹¹⁹. A respondent who moved to Canada in 2015 due to the war in Ukraine recalls:

*We chose Canada because there is a believe that Canada is a kind and welcoming country that is happy to accept immigrants. In Europe, at least before the war, I encountered negative attitudes towards Ukrainians and comments like “outsiders”. That's why Canada appealed to me the most, with its kind of "cauldron" of different cultures, where everyone is an immigrant or a refugee and no one bullies you because of your accent.*¹²⁰

Indeed, Canada is often referred to as a «country of migrants» or «Ukraine across the ocean» because of the size of the Ukrainian minority and different diasporas in general. This favorable climate for immigration partly explains the number of Ukrainian diaspora groups in Canada and the effectiveness of their activism. Additionally, Environics Institute indicates that majority of Canadians strongly

¹¹⁷ Democracy index 2022. Economist Intelligence Unit. URL: <https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/> (Accessed 18 March 2023).


¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

¹²⁰ Interview with Yulia K., 21 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

support immigrants and refugees and has positive view about immigration¹²¹. According to a survey conducted by Abacus Data on behalf of the CUC in 2022, the majority of Canadians believe that Canada should continue to support Ukraine and expect their government to take tougher measures against Russia¹²².

Chart 1. Canadian public opinion poll. Question: Should the government continue to support Ukraine and get tougher on Russia?



Source: *Canadians Strongly Stand With Ukraine! The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/2022/09/21/canadians-strongly-stand-with-ukraine/> (Accessed 7 March 2023).*

Moreover, there is significant public support for Canada to welcome people from places experiencing major conflicts, especially from Ukraine¹²³.


Chart 2. Canadian public opinion poll on immigration and refugees. Question: Should Canada accept more immigrants from parts of the world that are

¹²¹ Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

¹²² Canadians Strongly Stand With Ukraine! The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/2022/09/21/canadians-strongly-stand-with-ukraine/> (Accessed 7 March 2023).

¹²³ Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).


experiencing major conflicts?



Source: Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

In 2022, the percentage of Canadians who support migration to Canada from countries where armed conflict is taking place was the highest since this question was first asked in 1993. Results demonstrate that the source of refugees makes some difference in Canadians' support: for instance, Canadians are more likely to strongly agree about accepting more refugees from Ukraine (45%) than from Afghanistan (31%)¹²⁴.

Chart 3. Canadian public opinion poll on immigration and refugees. Question: *Do you agree that Canada should accept more immigrants from parts of the world that are experiencing major conflicts (such as Ukraine / such as Afghanistan)*



¹²⁴ Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

Source: Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

However, for much of the past 35 years, Canadians have tended to believe that many people claiming to be refugees are not real refugees, and while this view has diminished over time the public continues to be somewhat divided on this question¹²⁵. Another crucial point is that the democratic political climate in Canada includes an automatic pluralism of opinions and interests of other diaspora groups which may be at odds with the Ukrainian diaspora. This issue is evident in the relations between Ukrainian and Russian diaspora groups. According to the 2016 Canadian census, there were 48,155 individuals in Toronto who identified their ethnic origin as Russian¹²⁶. According to statistics from the same year, there were 39,665 Ukrainians in Toronto, which is even smaller than the Russian diaspora¹²⁷. Therefore, despite the general support for Ukraine in Canada, one activist recalls: *«I was called by some Russians in Canada a «fascist», a «Nazi», a «Führer» because I was against issuing visas to Russians.»*¹²⁸ On the question of whether the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has experienced any negative attitudes from the side of Canadian community, another respondent mentions a similar problem: *«Of course, there was a lot of negative attitudes from Russians who came to spoil our protests or live events.»*¹²⁹ Interestingly, many activists emphasize the difference between Europe and Canada in the context of the behavior of the Russian diaspora:

It feels like they are afraid to be bold here. In Europe, the situation is completely different; in Canada, they are afraid to show their flag. However, there were times when Ukrainian cars with a trident or a flag had their tires slashed, and we were worried about our safety. At some point, we stopped saying our names when giving interviews to the

¹²⁵ Canadian public opinion about Immigration and Refugees. URL: <http://surl.li/hgdhk> (Accessed 2 March 2023).

¹²⁶ Census Profile, 2016. Toronto. URL: <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Geo2=PR&Code2=01&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&TABID=1&B1=All&type=0&Code1=3520005&SearchText=toronto> (Accessed 15 March 2023).

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Interview with Oleksandra S., 28 March 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹²⁹ Interview with Yulia K., 21 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

media.¹³⁰

The memories of a Crimean Tatar activist are also revealing:

They [Russians] had an embassy where we organized demonstrations almost every week at the beginning of the occupation. Then they moved and had their office somewhere on the outskirts, and we went there and rallied there. They are actually very afraid because there is a very powerful Ukrainian community here, and we are part of the Ukrainian community.¹³¹

Russian diaspora groups that also live in Canada (Ontario) advocated for the interests of their country of origin in the same way as representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. Political pluralism also flows into pluralism of academic, historical, and public narratives. Among Canadian academic community, there are also cases of comparing Ukrainian activists to fascists which also influenced the opinion of Canadian society. A striking example is Michael Jabara Carley – a professor of history at the Université de Montréal. In his recent article «*Why Canada Defends Ukrainian Fascism*»¹³² he argues that the Canadian government's support for the Ukrainian government and its armed forces is tantamount to defending «Ukrainian fascists groups». Carley asserts that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), who fought against Soviet forces during World War II, were collaborators with the Nazis and engaged in atrocities against Jews and other minorities¹³³. Based on this historical narrative, he argues that the Lugansk and Donetsk republics are “*of course antifascist resistance movements that emerged in reaction to the violent coup d'état in Kyiv.*”¹³⁴

Michael Jabara Carley mentions former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and Chrystia Freeland, who are of Ukrainian origin, saying that they have turned a blind eye to the fascist and far-right elements of Ukrainian nationalism.

¹³⁰ Interview with Svitlana N., 24 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹³¹ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹³² Carley, M. J. “Why Canada Defends Ukrainian Fascism.” URL: https://www.academia.edu/36208410/Why_Canada_Defends_Ukrainian_Fascism (Accessed 1 April 2023).

¹³³ Carley, M. J. “Why Canada Defends Ukrainian Fascism.” URL: https://www.academia.edu/36208410/Why_Canada_Defends_Ukrainian_Fascism (Accessed 1 April 2023).Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

These views are not exceptional, as evidenced by a number of other publications in the Canadian media in response to the Canadian government's official support for Ukraine. Headlines such as: «*Ottawa's decades-long alliance with the Ukrainian far-right and the NATO war on Russia*»¹³⁵, «*Canada prepares war bonds for Nazi-infested Ukrainian government*»¹³⁶, «*Canadian officials met with Ukrainian unit linked to neo-Nazis*»¹³⁷, and «*Chrystia Freeland's ties to Ukrainian nationalists reveal a double standard*»¹³⁸ indicate that public opinion in Canada is not unambiguous and, in fact, can create additional obstacles to activism or reduce the support of the host-country society. In addition, these articles refer to the history of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, namely the wave of emigration that took place after World War II, when many Ukrainians were accused of collaborating with the German Nazis. The discourse of «Ukrainian fascism» was strategically employed by Russia and pro-Russian countries as a means to mobilize political support and generate antagonism towards the Euromaidan movement and the Ukrainian government during the Russo-Ukrainian war¹³⁹.

In summary, both from official data on Canada's level of democracy and attitudes towards immigrants and from the words of respondents, I can conclude that in Canada in 2014-2022, there was a favorable climate for joint political action by Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups. However, it is important to

¹³⁵ Canadian imperialism's fascist friends—Part 1: Ottawa's decades-long alliance with the Ukrainian far-right and the NATO war on Russia. (n.d.). URL: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/05/16/vxen-m16.html> (Accessed 1 April 2023).

¹³⁶ Regil, L. J., & Mészáros, I. Canada prepares war bonds for Nazi-infested Ukrainian government | MR Online. URL: <https://mronline.org/2022/11/03/canada-prepares-war-bonds-for-nazi-infested-ukrainian-government/> (Accessed 1 April 2023).

¹³⁷ Canadian officials who met with Ukrainian unit linked to neo-Nazis feared exposure by news media: documents. (2021, November 8). URL: <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-officials-who-met-with-ukrainian-unit-linked-to-neo-nazis-feared-exposure-by-news-media-documents> (Accessed 2 April 2023).

¹³⁸ Chrystia Freeland's ties to Ukrainian nationalists reveal a double standard. URL: <https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/chrystia-freelands-deep-seated-ties-to-ukrainian-nationalists-reveal-a-double-standard> (Accessed 6 April 2023).

¹³⁹ Kuzio, T. Competing nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 15(1), 2015. P. 162.

acknowledge that historical narratives can shape public opinion and, in the context of the Ukrainian diaspora, they were employed to constrain mobilization efforts.

Foreign policy of the host-country.

Researchers of diaspora studies cite examples when the foreign policy of the government in the host country limited the mobilization of the diaspora. For example, the organizational capacity of the Palestinian diasporas in Lebanon and Iran suffered from the foreign policy strategies of the governments of the countries that hosted them¹⁴⁰. Canada was the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence in 1991 and has since supported Ukraine in its democratic, economic and defense reforms¹⁴¹. Canada's official international support for Ukraine became particularly visible after 2014, when Russia's armed invasion of Crimea was followed by the beginning of Russia's temporary occupation of the peninsula on February 20, 2014. Since 2014, Canada has provided more than \$890 million in diverse assistance to Ukraine, including humanitarian, development, peace and stabilization assistance¹⁴².

Canada provided even stronger support to Ukraine in 2022, after Russia's full-scale offensive. Since February, Canadian government has provided more than \$1 billion in military assistance to Ukraine¹⁴³. Canadians themselves have been actively involved in the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine, and support for Ukraine's security sector remains one of the key areas of Ukrainian-Canadian international relations. Thus, Canadian foreign policy took into account both the interests of Ukrainians in Canada and the interests of the Ukrainian agenda in Kyiv.

¹⁴⁰ Demmers J. *New Wars and Diasporas*. P. 22.

¹⁴¹ The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/about-ucc/> (Accessed 8 March 2023).

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Defence, N. (2022, November 17). Government of Canada. Canada.ca. URL: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/canadian-military-support-to-ukraine.html> (Accessed 8 March 2023).

The presence of institutional allies

Prominent representatives of institutional allies for the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas can be found within the Canadian government, particularly among ministers of Ukrainian descent. One of the most popular representatives is Chrystia Freeland, a Canadian politician, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada since 2019 and Minister of Finance of Canada since August 2020. During the 2015 election campaign, Chrystia Freeland actively advocated that Canada should show more leadership in the international arena and protect Ukraine's choice of democratic path and Western values from Russia's encroachment¹⁴⁴. Together with the Liberal Party of Canada, she advocated for the provision of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine, the suspension of the SWIFT international payment system in Russia, no exceptions to the sanctions lists, the recognition of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) as terrorist organizations, continued training of the Ukrainian military, and financial support for reforms in Ukraine¹⁴⁵.

In 2022, Chrystia Freeland was awarded the Order of Princess Olga of the First Class *«for significant personal merits in strengthening interstate cooperation, support for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and a significant contribution to the popularization of the Ukrainian state in the world»* which means that her promotion of Ukrainian national interests did not go unnoticed¹⁴⁶.

Noteworthy is also the attitude of Canadian government officials of Ukrainian descent towards the Ukrainian language, which in this case serves not only as a means of communication but rather as an invented tradition that forms a

¹⁴⁴ Town Hall discussion on Canadian Foreign and Defence policy in Ukraine. Remarks by Chrystia Freeland. MP Toronto Centre. (n.d.). URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160405040043/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMIi4pwKeUQ> (Accessed 5 April 2023).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Указ Президента України №595/2022. Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5952022-43765> (Accessed 4 February 2023).

sense of belonging to the country of origin. Mary-Ann Mihychuk, a Canadian politician elected to the Parliament of Canada in October 2015 from the Liberal Party of Canada, ended her oath as a minister with the word «Дякую!(Thank you).»¹⁴⁷

Other representatives of Canadian politicians with Ukrainian roots who have been actively lobbying for the Ukrainian issue in Canada in recent years include John Baker and Gerard Kennedy. Both politicians belong to the Liberal Party of Canada and since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Crimea, as part of their party's activities, they have supported a more decisive position on providing Ukraine with defensive weapons.¹⁴⁸ Another representative of the liberal party whose actions serve as a vivid example of transnationalism is Borys Wrzesniewski. Mr. Wrzesniewski actively supported both the struggle for Ukraine's independence and the first steps of building an independent Ukraine. He has repeatedly advocated for expanding Canada's economic and technical assistance to Ukraine, as well as for tougher sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea. During the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Mr. Wrzesniewski helped organize the deployment of Canadian volunteers to Ukraine who had expressed a desire to join the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine¹⁴⁹.

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Liberal Party of Canada has criticized the government of Stephen Harper, Canada's 22nd Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, for exemptions from Canada's sanctions list against Russian figures. In its overall activities during 2014-

¹⁴⁷ Українська правда. У новому уряді Канади двоє міністрів українського походження. URL:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20151108214805/http://www.euointegration.com.ua/news/2015/11/4/7040349/> (Accessed 4 February 2023).

¹⁴⁸ Baker I. Would it be good if Canada armed Ukraine? YouTube. (2015, August 11). URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160331194050/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1FZPXM8NCI> (Accessed 4 February 2023).

¹⁴⁹ Blackwell, E. So many Canadian fighters in Ukraine, they have their own battalion, source says. World News Era. URL: <https://worldnewsera.com/news/canada/exclusive-so-many-canadian-fighters-in-ukraine-they-have-their-own-battalion-source-says/> (Accessed 4 February 2023).

2022, the Liberal Party maintained a strong course of support for Ukraine in the financial and defense sectors. Thus, the presence of representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora or Canadians of Ukrainian descent in the Canadian government has created strong institutional support for Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Canada.

Having analyzed the constraints and opportunities for Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada (Ontario), I can state that the four factors listed above allowed them to conduct active political and cultural activities, attracting the support of other members of the diaspora, the Canadian community and the Canadian government, and thus promote Ukrainian interests in the international arena. It is also important not to oversimplify the description of activism in Canada, which had its constraints, including certain prejudices against Ukrainians due to historical narratives, competition between different diaspora groups, each pursuing its own goals, and a large number of Ukrainian organizations whose views may have differed. In the following section, I will look at two «windows of opportunity» for mobilizing the Ukrainian diaspora and the events of 2014-2022 that have dramatically changed the activities and vectors of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada.

2.2. Two decisive years and the process of the mobilization

Shortly after the Euromaidan revolution that began in 2013 and following the ouster of Ukraine's former president, Viktor Yanukovich, Russia organized a coup d'état in Crimea on 27 February 2014. During these events, the Russian government installed new local authorities in Simferopol and announced a referendum on 16 March 2014 to determine the political future of Crimea. The Ukrainian government and the international community recognized it as illegitimate, as it contradicted all the norms of referendums: there was no global monitoring; there was no time for free public discussion of the vote results; most of the population who disagreed with the actions of the occupation authorities were

intimidated and persecuted by armed Russian groups. After the referendum, the international community has recognized that the results of 97 percent approval of the unification with Russia were falsified¹⁵⁰. However, Russia claimed that the annexation was necessary to protect the ethnic Russians living in Crimea, and on the next day after the referendum pro-Russian Crimean government declared independence from Ukraine and requested permission to enter the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation granted this request in the Accession Agreement signed in the Kremlin on 18 March¹⁵¹.

In April 2014, violence also erupted in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of eastern Ukraine, which has continued to the present day. The conflict began with the storming of government buildings in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk by separatist forces supported by Russia. These groups declared independence from Ukraine and established the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. However, these self-proclaimed republics are not recognized internationally. These separatist entities held secession referendums on 11 May 2014 based on the Crimean scenario. The results were announced as 89.07% in favour of independence in the Donetsk region and 96.2% in the Luhansk region¹⁵². On 24 May 2014, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics also asked to unite with the Russian Federation, and a month later, they declared a confederation¹⁵³.

From the very beginning of the seizure of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk by the Russian Federation, the mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada has been an essential factor in shaping the international agenda on Ukraine and attitudes in this country towards the conflict. Jolie Demmers argues in her work that the narrative of violence and trauma plays a sustaining role within

¹⁵⁰ Tutku A.F Crimean Tatars and Russia's Annexation of Crimea. P. 86.

¹⁵¹ Yekelchuk S. The conflict in Ukraine: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press. 2015. P. 131.

¹⁵² Yekelchuk S. The conflict in Ukraine: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press. 2015. P. 144.

¹⁵³ Ibid. P. 145.

diaspora communities and is crucial for their mobilization¹⁵⁴. Therefore, quite paradoxically, war and disaster in the country of origin justify, activate and gives a new dimension to diasporic life and its political actions. In theoretical approaches to the study of diaspora mobilization, scholars propose to consider it in via dimensions: the *process* of mobilization and the *impact* of this mobilization on the course and resolution of the conflict¹⁵⁵.

Therefore, in this section, I will examine two stages of mobilization in 2014 and 2022 which include the following elements: *the institutionalization of diaspora, media campaign and protests, networking and partnership building, and framing process*. Following Koinova and Mikolko, this study considers 2014 and 2022 as critical junctures for mobilizing the Ukrainian and Crimean-Tatar diaspora in Canada¹⁵⁶. A critical juncture is a large-scale event that can change social practices, create new meanings, state structures, and influence the global international order. In the theory of diaspora studies, a critical juncture can further strengthen the connection between the diaspora and its country of origin with lasting effects¹⁵⁷.

2014

Institutionalisation of diaspora. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) served as the largest organization within the Ukrainian diaspora, functioning as an umbrella organization that brought together smaller organizations and 17 branches across Canada. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress, which was already considered a fairly strong non-governmental actor, underwent a deepening of its institutionalization. As Klavdiya Tatar proves in her research, UCC has achieved a very high level of engagement in government and public affairs, and the UCC

¹⁵⁴ Demmers J. New Wars and Diasporas. P. 15.

¹⁵⁵ Adamson F. Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war. P. 75.

¹⁵⁶ Nikolko M. Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis: old traumas and new strategies. P. 1882.

¹⁵⁷ Nikolko M. Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis: old traumas and new strategies. P. 1882.

leaders have begun to hold official meetings with the Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials¹⁵⁸. UCC, using public diplomacy tools, ensured that Ukraine received significant attention from the Government of Canada regarding foreign policy. Additionally, UCC strives to reinforce Canada's position as a key supporter and ally of Ukraine on the international stage. This year was crucial for institutionalizing the Crimean Tatar diaspora, which created its organization, the Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, right after the annexation of Crimea. Elvira Irsay recalls: «*We had no experience of civic activity, but we felt we had to do something. There were very few Crimean Tatars in Canada at the time, but when the occupation began, we realized that we had to represent Crimea at the official level.*»¹⁵⁹» The process of institutionalization gave a representative function to Crimean Tatars in Canada, who began to promote the pro-Ukrainian position of the Crimean Tatar diaspora regarding Crimea.

Media campaign and protests. Representatives of the UCC, Ukrainian National Federation of Canada and BCU Foundation recall that they started an extensive media campaign and the cycle of the protests. Respondents for this research mentioned the protests as a way of mobilizing people most often, as they brought together not only members of organizations but also those Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who wanted to join a collective action for a single time¹⁶⁰. At the same time, it also impacted the Canadian audience, who joined the protests and received more information about the situation in Ukraine. The leaders of the organizations tried to make the protests durable: they gathered people in front of the Russian embassy every week and had a small group that stood there every day for two years¹⁶¹. Milana Nikolko, who interviewed 19 representatives of the UCC in her study, notes that the Canadian Ukrainian community was able to mobilize quickly and effectively firstly during the Euromaidan protests that took place from

¹⁵⁸ Tatar K. Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times. P. 38.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Natalia G., 7 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)

¹⁶¹ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

November 2013 to February 2014 and then continue these actions after the annexation of Crimea¹⁶².

As media coverage on Ukraine and the Ukrainian Canadian community intensified, UCC developed consistent talking points distributed among UCC leadership, community representatives, and activists. These actions ensured the community communicated a coordinated message, creating a more substantial impact on the media and the public. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, UCC representatives actively published a series of op-eds in major Canadian newspapers, expressing their views and concerns about the crisis¹⁶³. They also regularly appeared on national and local television, radio news broadcasts and in print and online media, sharing their perspectives on the situation in Ukraine. UCC's media campaign successfully raised awareness, promoted a better understanding of the situation in Ukraine, and garnered widespread support for Ukraine within the Canadian community. The media campaign of the Crimean Tatars played a unique role as they demonstrated their position on the annexation of the indigenous people of Crimea. One of the main vectors for the process of mobilization was countering disinformation. Elvira Irsay describes this in detail in her interview: «*There was a lot of propaganda. For example, Russia Today was actively propagandizing, and Canadians believed that 97% supported unification with Russia. So, we were very active in trying to convey on television and at rallies that we want to be with Ukraine*¹⁶⁴.»

Networking and partnership building.

The study of involving individuals in socio-political activities has shown that networks of informal daily communication between individuals - family ties,

¹⁶² Nikolko M. Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis: old traumas and new strategies. P. 1883.

¹⁶³ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

circle of friends, joint work circle, etc. - are extremely important. A social network can be defined as a set of informational and physical connections between individuals and groups that enhance the circulation of information, optimize resource management, and contribute to forming a collective identity within the network¹⁶⁵. The main point of network theory is that an individual's decision to join a socio-political movement is determined not only by his or her personal position but also by the behavior of the closest actors in the social network. Pamela Oliver even introduces the «critical mass» model, suggesting that mobilization will only occur if a certain number of participants are involved. That is why it was important to use a network to mobilize the Ukrainian diaspora¹⁶⁶.

The primary structural element of networks is ties. Ties connect elements that are called nodes in network theory terminology. Ties can be direct (people or organizations know each other directly) or indirect (when they share a common resource, field of activity or value orientation without directly encountering each other). Each individual node can be more or less centralized in the network, i.e., play a more or less important role. Indicators of the actor's centrality in the network: 1) degree of centrality - the number of connections of a node with other nodes, i.e. a measure of the intensity of involvement; 2) range of centrality - a set of different social elements with which a node is connected, i.e. a measure of social capital. There is a so-called centrality effect: the higher the level of centrality in the two indicators, the stronger the identification with the goals of the social and political movement, the stronger the collective identity, and the more likely mobilization¹⁶⁷.

The UCC has become a central node for the partnerships between different Ukrainian organizations. In Ontario, the UCC branch includes 63 member

¹⁶⁵ Gomza I. Social and political movements: Study guide. National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Kyiv. 2018. P. 67.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. P. 56.

¹⁶⁷ Gomza I. Social and political movements: Study guide. National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Kyiv. 2018. P. 60.

organizations. One of the turning points was the establishment of cooperation between the Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars and the UCC in 2014, which put forward the same demands and statements¹⁶⁸. This cooperation allowed Crimean Tatars to mobilize the necessary resources and involve more people in their activities. Notably, their collaboration was steady during 2014—2022, which the respondents stressed¹⁶⁹. The representatives of the diasporic organizations also emphasize that alliance took place between different generations of the diaspora. They argue that the historical continuity of the Ukrainians in Canada was the key to the success of the rapid and large-scale mobilization, which engaged old and new waves of the Ukrainian diaspora¹⁷⁰. In addition, NGOs recognized the power of shared ethnicity and family ties in mobilizing the diaspora¹⁷¹. By fostering a sense of kinship and unity, these organizations created a strong foundation for mobilization, encouraging diaspora members to actively engage in initiatives to support Ukraine through financial contributions, volunteerism, or political advocacy.

Combining the network segmentation and its centralization level, we can distinguish four ideal types of social networks, as M. Diani does: the polycephalic network, the click network, the mirage network, and the star network¹⁷². The Ukrainian diaspora and its organizations resemble a polycephalic network, which is centralized and segmented. Segmentation means that it is difficult or even unnecessary for specific nodes to communicate with each other, and centralization implies that there are nodes in a more advantageous position relative to others because they control the flow of information and resources. Schematically, the

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).


¹⁷⁰ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁷¹ Koinova, M. *Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: Contextual and comparative dimensions*. P. 1258.

¹⁷² Gomza I. *Social and political movements: Study guide*. National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Kyiv. 2018. P. 62 – 65.

network of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in 2014 in Ontario can be depicted as follows:

Chart 4. *Schematic representation of the network of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora organizations in Canada (Ontario) in 2014.*



Compiled by the author based on data from the official websites of the organisations.

In this diagram, «A» refers to organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora in Ontario, and «B» refers to organizations of the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Those organizations labeled A1.1., A1.2... are member organizations of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. On its official website, the Ontario branch of the UCC divides Ukrainian diaspora organizations into different categories, which I used to construct this chart¹⁷³. We can observe that the network of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in 2014 was characterized by centralization, which allowed for faster mobilization of resources in response to the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

Klavdiya Tatar in her study concludes that in 2014, representatives of the older fraction of the Ukrainian community in Canada mobilized more actively, taking on leadership roles or becoming significant donors¹⁷⁴. This statement is supported by the facts because, unlike in 2022, in 2014, Toronto did not see the

¹⁷³ UCC Toronto - Member Organizations. URL: www.ucctoronto.ca, www.ucctoronto.ca/members. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

¹⁷⁴ Tatar K. *Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times*. P. 50.

emergence of new Ukrainian organizations in response to the war in Ukraine, created by the last wave of the diaspora, which would be a feature of mobilization during a full-scale invasion. It is also important to point out that Ontario played a vital role for the partnership building between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars since this province has the highest number of Crimean Tatars in Canada. Adamson and Koinova (2013) also draw attention to the role of the big cities or provinces, arguing that they provide greater access to important institutions, networks and other resources.

Framing Process. Theorists of social movements and diaspora studies analyze the mobilization of groups of people in response to various events using the analytical tool and the concept of «frame». A frame can be understood as a pattern of interpretations that enables people to identify and arrange facts and events in their personal picture of the world¹⁷⁵. According to this concept, participation in any kind of activities depends on a constant reassessment of oneself and the situation in society. The process of framing has the following main tasks: diagnostic (to identify the problem), prognostic (to plan ways to solve the problem and a strategy for further action) and motivational (to call for participation in collective action)¹⁷⁶. Thus, to effectively mobilize and engage diaspora communities, organizations and their leaders must develop and communicate messages, frames, that resonate with a wide range of individuals and align with their interests, values, and perceptions. This requires the ability to craft compelling narratives and strategies that can effectively connect with diaspora representatives' diverse perspectives and experiences¹⁷⁷.

Considering Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, the representatives of this organization largely noted a desire to become the voice of Crimea in

¹⁷⁵ Adamson F. Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013. P. 70.

¹⁷⁶ Benford R, Snow D. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 26, no. 1, Aug. 2000. P. 615.

¹⁷⁷ Adamson F. Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war. P. 70.

Canada and demonstrate their pro-Ukrainian position¹⁷⁸. This idea of representation of Crimea in Canada became one of the main frames that was able to unite representatives of the Crimean Tatar diaspora. In their social media posts, they often used phrases such as «We are a small piece of Crimea in Canada»,¹⁷⁹ «Crimea is Ukraine»,¹⁸⁰ and «Two flags - one country»,¹⁸¹ emphasizing their responsibility to represent Crimea, even though they were thousands of kilometers away. The success of this frame is evidenced by the fact that if, at the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian, up to 10 Crimean Tatars joined the established organization in Toronto, then in a few months, they managed to unite about 150 Crimean Tatars¹⁸².

Speaking about the main frame for the Ukrainian diaspora, respondents say that for them, it was an idea of helping Ukraine of losing Ukraine¹⁸³. Representatives of Ukrainian diaspora organizations often used the narrative of «another Ukraine on the other side of the planet»¹⁸⁴ and the responsibility to be Ukrainians even being out of Ukraine¹⁸⁵. Respondents also frequently repeated the idea of «another front»: *«I am a man, and you can ask me why I am not in Ukraine and not fighting. In Canada, where I can send funds and conduct cultural*

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁷⁹ Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. A little piece of Crimea in Canada. URL: [www.facebook.com, www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid031tURLkZgoYrLa5S17yW9dEEVtwAhLmESgjWqKNLspA7vPsNxQ7y2EHsqvY4H2AVvl&id=385520748311859&__cft__](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid031tURLkZgoYrLa5S17yW9dEEVtwAhLmESgjWqKNLspA7vPsNxQ7y2EHsqvY4H2AVvl&id=385520748311859&__cft__) (Accessed 5 April 2023).

¹⁸⁰ Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. February 26 - the Day of Resistance to the Russian Occupation in Crimea.. URL: [www.facebook.com, www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02UuripfRJCnuNUHpWEtk9LGLz8WABcujSR4cLK3Z5aXyG4FJJk9ADFBHBLAa8ZBdHI&id=385520748311859&__cft__](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02UuripfRJCnuNUHpWEtk9LGLz8WABcujSR4cLK3Z5aXyG4FJJk9ADFBHBLAa8ZBdHI&id=385520748311859&__cft__) (Accessed 5 April 2023).

¹⁸¹ Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. June 26 is the day of the Crimean Tatar flag. URL: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0tY1TXKaq7yKr44wkPVGycADEkZ64eVyEFAhbTZ3rZZYzUaCMMSqrusDHs8PhPYqrl&id=385520748311859 (Accessed 5 April 2023).

¹⁸² Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁸³ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Pavlo Grod. 27 August 2021. URL: <https://theukrainians.org/pavlo-grod/> (Accessed 5 May 2023).

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Ruslan K., 27 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

*activities, I feel more useful than on the front line.»*¹⁸⁶ The interviews provided evidence of another aspect within the frame, namely the idea of responsibility and guilt. Respondents repeatedly mentioned that they had family members and friends left in Ukraine whom they wanted to help and thus became active¹⁸⁷. They also noted a sense of responsibility to Ukraine as their country of origin and patriotic feelings about it¹⁸⁸.

It is also important to note that while the Crimean Tatars focused more on the situation on the Crimean Peninsula, the Ukrainian diaspora spoke about Ukraine as a whole and thus encouraged as many Ukrainians in Canada as possible to join in the activities and protests. The respondents conditionally distinguish between the existence of their organizations before and after the Russo-Ukrainian war and indicate that the Ukrainian community in 2014 has moved from preserving culture and traditions to political advocacy and public diplomacy¹⁸⁹. In other words, the self-perception of diaspora representatives as a community concerned with preserving culture, language and tradition has shifted to positioning themselves as a political actor who can influence the conflict and its course.

However, despite the information from the interviews that 2014 was indeed a turning point that defined new goals and activities of Ukrainian organizations, their priorities remained largely unchanged. If we analyze the three-year report of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress for 2013-2016, the point about supporting Ukrainians and Ukraine during the Russian aggression was ranked fourth in the category of Plans and Priorities¹⁹⁰. The first and foremost priorities for the most prominent organizations remain to strengthen the Ukrainian diaspora, engage young people, and secure stable funding.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Ruslan K., 27 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Yulia K., 21 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Oleksandra S., 28 March 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

¹⁹⁰ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

Also, after a period of active mobilization in 2014, there was a noticeable decline in mobilization activity within the diaspora starting from 2015¹⁹¹. Among the reasons for the decline in activism, the respondents say that when the open confrontation subsided, it became tough to continue asking for money and support¹⁹². This gives us grounds to agree with the theoretical idea that critical moments and transformational events in the home country may not be sufficient to maintain diasporic activism for a long time¹⁹³. For example, Elizabeth Mavroudi uses the case of Greece and Palestine to demonstrate that crises in vulnerable countries of origin have not led to the expected mobilization of diasporas, as the enduring and long-term fragility of institutions and policies in the original homeland makes diasporas weary and impatient for active engagement¹⁹⁴.

The frustration and demotivation from the conflict in Ukraine during the 2015 – 2021 can be analyzed through the interviews and a study conducted by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress in 2021, just before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine¹⁹⁵. The purpose of this survey was to present a national portrait of Ukrainian Canadians that goes beyond demographic data to reveal more about their identity, priorities and connections to the Ukrainian Canadian community. The sample consists of 4,031 individuals across Canada aged 18 years and older who self-identified as Ukrainian, Ukrainian Canadian, or Canadian of Ukrainian descent¹⁹⁶. Even though at the time of that survey, Russia's occupation of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk had been going on for seven years, there was no mention of diasporic assistance to Ukraine regarding the war. The column Community

¹⁹¹ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

¹⁹² Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada). 19:19.

¹⁹³ Mavroudi E. Deconstructing Diasporic Mobilisation at a Time of Crisis: Perspectives from the Palestinian and Greek Diasporas. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (8). 2018. P. 1309.


¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.* P. 1309–1324.

¹⁹⁵ Final Report of 2021 Community Engagement Survey - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website." www.ucc.ca, 13 Dec. 2021. URL: www.ucc.ca/2021/12/13/ukrainian-canadian-congress-presents-results-of-2021-community-engagement-survey/. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

programmes of most significant interest is particularly illustrative, in which the majority of respondents (63%) demonstrated interest in cultural aspects (dancing, arts, concerts) and the slightest interest in political activity¹⁹⁷. Similarly, the diaspora's priorities in 2021 are dominated by an interest in preserving traditions rather than helping Ukraine resolve the armed conflict:

Chart 5. Community Engagement Survey. Question: choose the most important Ukrainian Canadian community priorities.



Source: *Final Report of 2021 Community Engagement Survey*. URL: [Www.ucc.ca](http://www.ucc.ca), 13 Dec. 2021.

URL: www.ucc.ca/2021/12/13/ukrainian-canadian-congress-presents-results-of-2021-community-engagement-survey/. (Accessed 13 May 2023).


The statistics validate the notion that an extended conflict can lead to heightened frustration within the diaspora, potentially diminishing their motivation to actively engage in conflict resolution efforts if they perceive their assistance to be ineffective¹⁹⁸. This argument is also relevant for the representatives of the

¹⁹⁷ Final Report of 2021 Community Engagement Survey - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website.” [Www.ucc.ca](http://www.ucc.ca), 13 Dec. 2021. URL: www.ucc.ca/2021/12/13/ukrainian-canadian-congress-presents-results-of-2021-community-engagement-survey/. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

¹⁹⁸ Mavroudi E. Deconstructing Diasporic Mobilisation at a Time of Crisis: Perspectives from the Palestinian and Greek Diasporas. P. 1310.

Ukrainian diaspora, who identified the inability to make a long-term commitment as one of the reasons for their inactivity¹⁹⁹.

Chart 6. Community Engagement Survey. Question: name barriers to volunteering.



Source: *Final Report of 2021 Community Engagement Survey*. URL: [Www.ucc.ca](http://www.ucc.ca), 13 Dec. 2021.

URL: www.ucc.ca/2021/12/13/ukrainian-canadian-congress-presents-results-of-2021-community-engagement-survey/. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

Thus, despite the emphasis expressed by the largest organizations in the interviews regarding their priority to assist Ukraine during the war with Russia from 2014 to 2021, the statistics reveal that the issues in Ukraine did not consistently remain at the forefront of their agenda. Moreover, the data indicates that mobilization efforts were not consistently stable during this period. Researchers have identified additional factors contributing to the decline in activism, such as the presence of distrust and perceptions of corrupt institutions within the home country. The relevance of this to the case of the Ukrainian diaspora is also confirmed by the interviews, in which one of the respondents recalls: «*Many Ukrainian politicians*

¹⁹⁹ Final Report of 2021 Community Engagement Survey - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website.” [Www.ucc.ca](http://www.ucc.ca), 13 Dec. 2021. URL: www.ucc.ca/2021/12/13/ukrainian-canadian-congress-presents-results-of-2021-community-engagement-survey/. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

have visited us. I had no trust in them. They are corrupt and do not care about Ukraine; in the end, they will not do anything for Ukraine»²⁰⁰.

The decline in activism among the diaspora was also influenced by the inconsistent steps of the Ukrainian government, which began to pay less attention to the diaspora, including the Crimean Tatar community. For instance, in 2014, Petro Poroshenko, created the post of Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for the Affairs of the Crimean Tatar People and appointed Mustafa Dzhemilev to this position²⁰¹. Mustafa Dzhemilev has become an essential political player in the interaction between Crimean Tatars in Canada and the Ukrainian government by visiting Toronto and Ottawa and meeting with leading Crimean Tatar activists²⁰².

However, despite his rather productive cooperation with the Crimean Tatar diaspora during 2015 - 2016, Mustafa Dzhemilev was dismissed from the post of Presidential Commissioner for Crimean Tatar Affairs in May 2019, and no new Commissioner was appointed. Moreover, the Ukrainian government did not mention anything about the Crimean Tatar diaspora and its participation in the decision «On the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol» of 11 March 2021²⁰³. This is despite the fact that only 250,000 indigenous people remain in Crimea²⁰⁴, and approximately 5 million Crimean Tatars now live outside of Crimea in the role of diaspora due to the Russian

²⁰⁰ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada). 17:27.

²⁰¹ Decree of the President of Ukraine of 20.08.2014 No. 656/2014. On the Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for the Affairs of the Crimean Tatar People: URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/656/2014#Text> (Accessed 1 May 2023).

²⁰² Mustafa Dzhemilev's Visit to Toronto. URL: www.canada-crimea.com/mustafa-dzhemilevvisit-to-toronto/. (Accessed 5 May 2023).

Mustafa Dzhemilev's Visit to Ottawa. URL: www.canada-crimea.com/mustafa-dzhemilevsvisit-to-ottawa/. (Accessed 5 May 2023).

²⁰³ Government website of Ukraine. Implementation of the Policy of Reintegration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. URL: minre.gov.ua/en/project-areas-of-the-ministry-of-reintegration/implementation-of-the-policy-of-reintegration-of-the-autonomous-republic-of-crimea-and-the-city-of-sevastopol/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²⁰⁴ Babin B. Rights and Dignity of Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine in Revolutionary Conditions and Foreign Occupation, *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia*, 53:3, 2014. P. 103.

occupation²⁰⁵. The absence of a person responsible for communication between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean Tatars and inconsistent political policy steps have significantly weakened interaction and potential cooperation between Ukraine and its diaspora, as well as the diaspora's interest in continuing its long-standing activities.

2022

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a major military offensive against Ukraine, targeting multiple cities and regions nationwide. The attack involved a large-scale deployment of troops, tanks, and other military equipment, air strikes and missile attacks. The offensive caused significant damage and loss of life throughout the country, with civilian areas, critical infrastructure, and military installations being targeted. The attack was highly coordinated by Russian Federation and involved deploying large numbers of troops, military equipment, and weapons. The Ukrainian military struggled to respond effectively to the sudden and intense attack. The beginning of the full-scale invasion has profoundly impacted Ukraine, with thousands of people losing their lives and many more being displaced from their homes. This critical event served as a catalyst for mobilization, galvanizing not only the people within Ukraine but also millions of Ukrainians abroad. The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also addressed the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, acknowledging the significance of their help at this crucial moment in history. He urged them to demonstrate their commitment through tangible actions: “*You must prove with your steps that you are a part of the history of Ukraine, the living history of Ukraine*”²⁰⁶.

Institutionalisation of diaspora. In the study on the Canadian Ukrainians' response to the events of 2014, Klavdiya Tatar (2022) finds that newly arrived

²⁰⁵ Tutku A.F Crimean Tatars and Russia's Annexation of Crimea. P. 89.

²⁰⁶ Speech by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Parliament of Canada — Official Website of the President of Ukraine.” Official Website of the President of Ukraine, 2023. URL: www.president.gov.ua/en/news/promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-u-parlamen-73581. (Accessed 17 May 2023).

immigrants exhibited a low activity level during the mobilization²⁰⁷. Tatar suggests that this finding presents an opportunity for further research and exploration of why. Our study goes in a slightly different direction, also taking into account the behavior of the new diaspora. Our argument highlights the significance of post-February 24, 2022 events in institutionalizing a fifth wave of diaspora, marked by the establishment of new organizations and increased engagement in activism. Thus, in contrast to their limited response to the events of 2014, the behavior of the new wave of the diaspora has undergone a notable change in light of the full-scale war, leading to a more proactive and engaged approach. In the province of Ontario, two organizations, namely Second Front and Ukrainian Resistance Canada, emerged in direct response to the invasion. These newly established entities were formed with the objective of addressing and countering the ongoing crisis. The emergence of a new wave of institutionalization and the establishment of diaspora organizations is associated with the concept of *tactical innovations*. In the field of social and political movements, the concept of tactical innovations pertains to the strategic and inventive methods employed by activists to change or advance their objectives for expanding mobilization²⁰⁸.

Tactical innovations play a crucial role in the process of mobilization as they enable activists to respond to shifting circumstances, overcome challenges, and effectively confront existing power structures. When I asked the respondents from the newly formed associations why they created new organizations rather than simply joining existing solid communities, they said they wanted to focus on providing military aid: equipment, weapons and other tactical items. They noted that the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the National Federation of Canada, and other older organizations were devoting more time to humanitarian assistance, which they considered essential but insufficient²⁰⁹. It is essential to acknowledge

²⁰⁷ Tatar K. Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times. P. 42.

²⁰⁸ Benford R, Snow D. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 26, no. 1, Aug. 2000, P. 627.

²⁰⁹ Interview with Vadym H., 25 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

that the proliferation of organizations can potentially lead to negative consequences for mobilization efforts. The emergence of multiple organizations may give rise to tensions between different collective action frames and collective action events, hindering cohesive and unified mobilization²¹⁰. Notably, tactical innovations include not only new organizational structures, but also new forms of protest, partnerships, communication strategies and inventive ways of formulating grievances and demands, which I will discuss further below.

Media campaign. In 2022, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress launched a new media campaign #StandWithUkraine, which was timed to coincide with the start of the full-scale invasion and aimed to work with community leaders on a national public advocacy campaign²¹¹. Their news and media requests to society also show a change in priorities: while in 2014 the emphasis was on humanitarian aid, in 2022 they tried to provide Ukraine with tanks, advanced rocket systems, long-range artillery, air and naval weapons²¹². Their advocacy framework has also expanded: for the first time, they raised the issue of designating Russia a state supporter of terrorism, expelling all Russian diplomats from Canada and implementing a full trade embargo on Russia²¹³. The respondents emphasise that thanks to their media company, there was not a single member of the Canadian parliament who was not aware of the daily events in Ukraine and the position of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora on them²¹⁴. Greater and more effective media campaign is also linked to the experience gained in 2014, as respondents

²¹⁰ Benford R, Snow D. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. P. 627.

²¹¹ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

²¹² 2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2022-ucc-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).


²¹³ 2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2022-ucc-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²¹⁴ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

recalled: «we had gone through a process of "learning" in previous years, and in 2022 we already knew what we were doing and what needed to be done»²¹⁵.

Networking and partnership building. When 2014 marked a significant year for fostering collaboration between the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas, 2022 can be described as a period focused on cultivating relations between the older diaspora (waves 3 and 4) and the new diaspora (wave 5). In interviews, respondents from both old and newly formed organizations say that it was this year when they began to act as a united front, although representatives of the new diaspora had to gain trust and credibility²¹⁶. As of 2022, the network of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Ontario can be depicted as follows:

Chart 7. Schematic representation of the network of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora organizations in Canada (Ontario) in 2022.



Compiled by the author based on data from the official websites of the organisations.

As observed, by 2022, new organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora have emerged that were not members of the UCC. Network also has played a vital role in aiding

²¹⁵ Interview with Mariya S., 13 May, 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

²¹⁶ Interview with Vadym H., 25 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada).

the large number of refugees from Ukraine. In 2022, the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) program facilitated the arrival of 153 thousand Ukrainians in Canada, who were assisted in partnership by various organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora²¹⁷. In 2022, the need for cooperation with other diaspora groups also became noticeable, as not only the Ukrainian diaspora in multicultural Ontario put forward its demands in the Canadian political arena. In 2022, the Iranian diaspora in Toronto, consisting of nearly 90,000 individuals, became actively engaged in raising awareness about the protests and violent crackdowns taking place in Iran. The catalyst for these demonstrations was the tragic custodial death of Mahsa Amini on September 16²¹⁸. Representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora began to join their protests and rallies, declaring they were united in a joint demonstration against the terrorist regimes²¹⁹. During these events, individuals from both communities came together to stand in solidarity, raise awareness about their respective causes, and express their support for each other's struggles.

Framing Process. From a theoretical point of view, a significant increase in the level of mobilization of the Ukrainian&Crimean diasporas in Canada also can be explained by a *frame transformation*: when new ones replace old messages and goals²²⁰. The occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the words «conflict», «crisis», and «unrest», have been replaced by the notion of a full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine²²¹. Thus, to interpret the events in Ukraine in

²¹⁷ Government of Canada. "Ukraine Immigration Measures: Key Figures." www.canada.ca, 30 Mar. 2022. URL: www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html (Accessed 15 March 2023).

²¹⁸ Nicholson K., Morrissette M. A Mix of Worry and Hope as Iranians in Canada Watch an Uprising from Afar." CBC, 22 Nov. 2022. URL: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/iran-protests-toronto-diaspora-1.6659172. (Accessed 15 May 2023).

²¹⁹ Ukrainian Resistance Toronto. Last Saturday, Iranian and Ukrainian Canadians United in a Joint Rally against Terrorist Regimes. URL: www.instagram.com, www.instagram.com/p/C1CclpuOfe1/?igshid=NzJjY2FjNWJiZg%3D%3D. Accessed 18 May 2023. (Accessed 15 May 2023).

²²⁰ Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 26, no. 1, Aug. 2000, pp. 627

²²¹ Benford R, Snow D. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 26, no. 1, Aug. 2000, P. 625.

2022, the leaders of the organizations began to use a «master frame» which covers a broader range of issues and, therefore, can address a wider audience and boost mobilization²²².

In summary, the mobilization process of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada during 2014-2022 exhibited cyclical and unstable patterns. From 2015 to 2021, there was a noticeable decline in activism, attributed primarily to the prolonged nature of the conflict, which led to frustration among the diaspora. This aligns with Godin's argument that mobilization can increase during times of crisis and occur in cycles. Consequently, the two primary cycles of mobilization for the Ukrainian diaspora took place in 2014 and 2022. The years 2014 and 2022 marked crucial turning points for the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, thus qualifying as critical junctures. Notably, the mobilization efforts in 2022 surpassed those of 2014 in terms of scale and success. This can be attributed to two crucial factors: the new full-scale phase of the war in Ukraine and the valuable experience gained from the previous mobilization in 2014. The combination of these factors contributed to a greater and more impactful mobilization campaign in 2022. In the next section, I will examine the effectiveness of those Ukrainian diaspora organizations that mobilized in 2014 and/or 2022 in response to the events in Ukraine.

2.3. Main activities and the effectiveness of diaspora NGOs

In assessing the effectiveness and impact of diaspora mobilization on the war in Ukraine in 2014 – 2022, I will follow Fiona Adamson, who offers to measure it via two mechanisms: *resource mobilization* and *lobbying - persuasion*²²³. Resources encompass capital, financial resources, and human resources. On the other hand, lobbying and persuasion involve advocacy and


²²² Benford R, Snow D. Framing Processes and Social Movements. P. 627.

²²³ Adamson F. Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war. P. 72.

exerting pressure on governments and international organizations to attract their attention or solve a problem in the country of origin²²⁴.

Resource mobilization. At the forefront of our analysis, I will focus on the activities and actions of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, which brings together the most significant number of Ukrainian organizations in Ontario, totalling 63. I have analyzed the three-year reports for 2013-2016²²⁵, 2016-2019²²⁶, and 2019-2022²²⁷, along with the report for donors²²⁸, and have come up with the following graph of the organization's income:

Chart 8. *Ukrainian Canadian Congress of Canada's revenue graph for 2014 - 2022.*



²²⁴ Adamson F. Mechanisms of diaspora mobilization and the transnationalization of civil war. P. 73 -75.

²²⁵ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²²⁶ 2019 - 2016 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2016-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²²⁷ 2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2022-ucc-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²²⁸ Winter 2022 Newsletter - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/winter-2022-newsletter/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

While from 2013 to 2016, the organization's income was almost \$3 million, a decline occurred from 2016 to 2019 with a result of \$840 thousand donations. The amount of donations in 2022 is eloquent, as it exceeded the income of previous years by several times, indicating the maximum point of financial resource mobilization by the Ukrainian diaspora. This graph shows that resource mobilization has picked up significantly in 2022, even compared to 2014. It also serves as a significant illustration of the pivotal moments of both 2022 and 2014. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress not only organized fundraising but also, in partnership with its member organizations, actively influenced the Canadian government to secure substantial financial support for Ukraine during the period of 2013-2016. This support from the Canadian government amounted to \$700 million in low-interest loans, non-lethal military equipment, training of Ukrainian forces by Canadian Armed Forces personnel, significant assistance for economic development, and humanitarian aid²²⁹. In 2022, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress continued its efforts to advocate for Ukraine and successfully obtained additional funding from Canada. This included \$320 million in humanitarian assistance, \$620 million in bilateral loans to Ukraine, \$1.4 billion in loans through the International Monetary Fund, \$35 million in development funding, \$39.7 million in Peace and Stabilization Operations Funding, and \$626 million in military aid, which encompassed the provision of lethal weapons²³⁰.

One of the organizations that is part of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the BCU Foundation, emphasizes the humanitarian component of fundraising in its reports. A successful element of their activities and humanitarian collections was cooperation with a considerable number of Canadian organizations specializing in

²²⁹ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²³⁰ Winter 2022 Newsletter - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/winter-2022-newsletter/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

medical care, including the Canadian Pediatric Spine Society, Canadian Orthopedic Association Global Surgery, Canadian Spine Society, and MacOrtho²³¹. The representatives of the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada implemented tactical innovations to sustain participation and motivation among Canadians, recognizing the growing fatigue from constant meetings and donations. To overcome this challenge, they devised engaging events that would inspire active involvement. A notable success in 2022 was the Whiskey Tasting for Ukraine organized by the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, which effectively rallied support for humanitarian collections²³².

The Second Front organization, which emerged in 2022 and attracted numerous young people to its activities, also stands out for its tactical innovations. In interviews, they emphasize that, unlike the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, their interest was in supporting Ukraine's military, sending weapons, technical equipment, and also those elements that would go exactly to the front line. To raise funds, they organized events such as the Charity Marathon, VIP Ternopil Canadian Tour, and Oleg Skrypka Big Canadian Tour, which aimed not only to raise funds but also to touch upon Ukraine's cultural and educational aspects²³³. For the year of their activity in 2022, they provided the following report:


Chart 9. Financial report of the Second Front organisation

²³¹ BCU Presentation & FUDF Fund Statistics. URL: www.canva.com/design/DAFeB51y_Sk/ZMabo-mwwskJmcCut-FhGg/view?utm_content=DAFeB51y_Sk&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link&utm_source=publishsharelink. (Accessed 23 April 2023).

²³² BCU Presentation & FUDF Fund Statistics. (Accessed 23 April 2023).

²³³ Second Front UA Public Presentation. URL: docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TsrRB4Vs8q2wxPjXlrqDGB6dTdgW17o/edit#slide=id.g22d42c2cf4e_0_41. (Accessed 12 April 2023).

Finance Report/Donation channels



@SecondFrontUA
SecondFrontUkraine.com



Source: Second Front UA Public Presentation. URL:

docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TsRB4Vs8q2wxPjXlrqDGB6dTdgW17o/edit#slide=id.g22d42c2cf4e_0_41. (Accessed 12 April 2023).

During the year of their existence, they earned C\$1 million, which is undoubtedly less than the income of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress in 2022. But considering the 2013-2016 report²³⁴, the UCC's revenue was only \$2 million. So, this result was significant as for an organization that has emerged relatively recently. In their interviews, representatives of the Second Front organization stressed the importance of fundraising by smaller organizations rather than large foundations since it simplifies the bureaucratic process and allows for the prompt fulfillment of specific verified requests²³⁵.

As for the Association of Crimean Tatars in Canada, in 2018 they published a report on the results of their activities during the 2014 - 2018: over four years, they managed to raise more than \$25,000 to help Crimean families and prisoners of war, as well as to support independent media that sought to openly

²³⁴ 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) official website. URL: <https://www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2016-ucc-triennial-report/> (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²³⁵ Interview with Yulia K., 21 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

cover the situation in Crimea²³⁶. Elvira Irsay says that since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, their organization has been actively involved in various fundraisers for Ukrainian funds. Another example of how the Crimean Tatar diaspora tried to financially help Ukraine was the fundraising for the Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR in Ukraine, whose work was blocked by the occupying Russian authorities and moved to Kyiv in 2015²³⁷. Nevertheless, in the case of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada, financial assistance was largely unofficial. It is also important to note that not all organizations focused on fundraising. For example, the Ukrainian organization Resistance in Canada held only very small fundraisers, focusing more on protests and other forms of collective action.

Lobbying and persuasion. The war waged by Russia in Ukraine represents a critical juncture that has thrust the concept of diaspora public advocacy and lobbying onto the global stage. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress had the most significant access to public diplomacy in Canada due to its level of institutionalization. Therefore, representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress have actively advised the Government of Canada for increased assistance to Ukraine. From 2013 to 2016, Paul Grod played a pivotal role in these activities, leveraging his position to champion the cause of Ukraine and secure support. Following his tenure, Alexandra Chyczij took over as the representative from 2016 to 2022, continuing the efforts to strengthen the relationship between Canada and Ukraine and promote increased assistance to address the ongoing challenges faced by Ukraine. One of the main areas of activity for the UCC was advocating for the imposition of sanctions. On 15 March 2019, Canada imposed sanctions on 114 individuals and 15 entities in response to Russia's aggression in the Black Sea and the Kerch Strait, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war between

²³⁶ The Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. It's Been 4 Years since We Officially Started Our Mission. URL: www.facebook.com, www.facebook.com/385520748311859/videos/349425232485418/. (Accessed 24 April 2023).

²³⁷ The Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. ATR Fundraising Event. URL: www.canada-crimea.com/atr-fundraising-event/ (Accessed 24 April 2023).

Russia and Ukraine. In the reports on their activities, members of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress note that this was made possible partly through active advocacy of this issue by members of their organization²³⁸.

However, alongside the successful instances of influencing Canada's sanctions policy, there were also situations that required active efforts to push for the implementation of sanctions. One significant instance of public pressure from the Ukrainian diaspora was connected to Canada's decision to partially exempt Russia from sanctions, allowing the return of Russian turbines to Germany for the Nord Stream gas pipeline. Foreign Minister Melanie Joly made this announcement on July 9, 2022²³⁹. In this regard, the Parliament of Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs held an emergency hearing for ministers and diplomats to understand why the government decided to return the turbines to Germany for use in Nord Stream. UCC President Oleksandra Chyczij spoke at the hearing on August 4, 2022, and on behalf of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, called on the Canadian government to immediately reverse this decision and reimpose full Canadian sanctions on Russian Gazprom²⁴⁰.

Meanwhile, Paul Grod, the former president of the UCC, emphasized that the diaspora, as «global Ukrainians», would serve as monitors of the situation and advocate for the reinstatement and reinforcement of sanctions²⁴¹. The task of monitoring was also emphasized by Canadian-Ukrainian lawyer Daniel Bilak, who filed a lawsuit against the Canadian government: «*Our lawsuit is asking for an injunction to stop the process of transferring these turbines to Germany until the*

²³⁸ 2019 - 2016 UCC Triennial Report - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/2019-2016-triennial-report/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²³⁹ Radio Svoboda. "Canada will return Russian turbines for Nord Stream to Germany." July 10, 2022. URL: www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-kanada-nimechyna-rosiiski-turbiny/31936715.html. (Accessed 18 March 2023).

²⁴⁰ Winter 2022 Newsletter - the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Official Website. URL: www.ucc.ca, www.ucc.ca/annual-report/winter-2022-newsletter/. (Accessed 18 May 2023).

²⁴¹ Grod P. We Won't Allow Sanctions against Russia to Be Dropped – UWC President Paul Grod. URL: [www.facebook.com, www.facebook.com/watch/?v=744250226660980](https://www.facebook.com/www.facebook.com/watch/?v=744250226660980) (Accessed 18 May 2023).

case is resolved on the merits. The main goal of our lawsuit is to ensure that they don't just quietly implement this transfer and send the pipe. We want to see accountability and publicity for the decision.²⁴²»

In the context of the Crimean Tatar diaspora, their sphere of public advocacy has been focused on highlighting the events in Crimea since the beginning of the occupation in 2014. The Crimean Tatars in Toronto played an active role in raising awareness about the situation of political prisoners in Crimea. From 2014 to 2022, they utilized their social media platforms to share publications and petitions related to the issue²⁴³. One notable initiative they supported was the «Bring Back My Dad» project by the Crimean Tatar Resource Center²⁴⁴. This project shed light on the stories of approximately two hundred children whose parents were arrested due to their activism and opposition to the Russian occupation authorities. Thus, Crimean Tatars in Toronto used their platforms to amplify the voices of these children and draw attention to the plight of political prisoners in Crimea.

Ruslan Kurt, a representative of the Crimean Tatar diaspora emphasized the need for cultural projects and advocacy that could influence Canadian policy towards Ukraine²⁴⁵. That's why he created the art installation «Doors», showcased

²⁴² VOA News. Ukrainian organizations sue Canadian government over the transfer of Russian turbine. July 19, 2022. URL: ukrainian.voanews.com/a/6663890.html. (Accessed 1 May 2023).

²⁴³ The Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. More than 200 Children of Crimean Political Prisoners Were Left without Their Parents.” URL: www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02mZAbS3XE4bK98Co2sUJUWcDeufzS4UKXFqajQKDb5h2DLBaKPwpwciWJonuLzjmk1&id=385520748311859&__cft__ (Accessed 1 May 2023).

²⁴⁴ The Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. Amnesty International Calls for the Release of Emir-Usein Kuku and All Prisoners.” URL: www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02s8KT9jnM7LjrQLahaSRcEu69sc8UeNTZFQD7TWuvYUDe7R6e9x438dUGWkQQe5uql&id=385520748311859&__cft__ (Accessed 1 May 2023).

“The Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars. Comprehensive List of Those Killed, Abducted and Detained in the Crimea.” URL: www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0UHGockqro2sdnfTwYB2zNTJkScK8CT6uXFWetasVHWaDivUd8iDY7ex2Q7jStykg1&id=385520748311859 (Accessed 1 May 2023).

²⁴⁵ Interview with Ruslan K., 27 April 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

in Toronto on August 24, 2022 (*Appendix 1*). The central concept of the installation was to depict the stories of millions of Ukrainians who had to leave their homes permanently to escape the war and Russian aggression²⁴⁶. The installation featured a total of 24 doors, symbolizing the 24 regions of Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

In 2022, joint action in the form of demonstrations emerged as one of the most prominent activities embraced by the newly formed diaspora. In the first days of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, all central squares in Toronto were filled with Ukrainian diaspora and rallies organized by the UCC (*Appendix 2*). The scale of the event demonstrates that the UCC was able to mobilize thousands of people through information channels. Another notable example is Ukrainian Resilience Canada, a recently established organization that has successfully organized 15 rallies since the onset of the full-scale war²⁴⁷. These demonstrations, often characterized as rapid response actions, aimed to address and respond promptly to unfolding events in Ukraine. Most of the organization's protests were concerned prisoners of war in Ukraine, especially the defenders of Azovstal (*Appendix 3*). The main messages at the protests were that Russia is a terrorist country and demands to impose more sanctions on various sectors of the Russian economy (*Appendix 4*). Many protests also highlighted the topic of children who died in Ukraine after the full-scale invasion. One of the most famous demonstrations was titled «How many more?» which was organized by the Second Front and brought together many representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora and Canadians. (*Appendix 5*).

The protests provided an opportunity for representatives of various organizations to connect and foster stronger relationships. While some of the rallies may not have gathered large crowds, they were crucial in conveying

²⁴⁶ Kurt R. Doors. Through the Horror of War | Ukraine | Ruslan Kurt. www.ruslankurt.com/home/doors-through-the-horror-of-war-in-ukraine. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

²⁴⁷ Interview with Oleksandra S., 28 March 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

solidarity and raising awareness about the ongoing situation in Ukraine. During interviews, respondents also highlighted the distinct roles of different organizations within the diaspora mobilization efforts²⁴⁸. Larger, more established organizations typically focus on tackling broader issues due to their institutional capacity. In contrast, smaller organizations played a vital role in providing support at the local level and organizing more frequent but smaller events. Their efforts complemented the work of larger organizations by addressing specific community needs and facilitating grassroots engagement.

In this chapter, I examined the context and method of mobilizing the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora, its consequences and its effectiveness. The Canadian political climate and the openness of Canadian society towards immigrants from conflict-affected regions played pivotal roles in this process. The involvement of institutional allies within the Canadian government and political parties also proved crucial in shaping the dynamics of the mobilization efforts. Furthermore, successful mobilization facilitated by strong centralized organizations, strategic media campaigns, networking and collaboration among various diaspora organizations, and framing a shared vision of events and needed responses. The peak moments of mobilization occurred in 2014 and 2022, characterized by the concerted efforts to mobilize people and resources in response to the hostilities in Ukraine.

After a thorough analysis of the mobilization process and its impact on the war in Ukraine from 2014 to 2022, it is evident that the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas played a significant role in various domains. Their collective efforts resulted in a powerful impact, notably in advocating for Ukraine's political interests, shaping media coverage of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Canadian media landscape, and securing increased financial assistance from both the

²⁴⁸ Interview with Ivanna F., 26 March 2023 (Ukraine-Canada)

Canadian government and diaspora-based non-governmental organizations. Through their organized campaigns, lobbying activities, and public engagements, they successfully brought attention to the Ukrainian war since 2014 and promoted the concerns and aspirations of Ukraine. Their collective voice exerted pressure on decision-makers, leading to tangible outcomes and policy shifts supporting Ukraine's position.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis provides a comprehensive case study of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada (Ontario), focusing on its mobilization efforts from 2014 to 2022. Drawing upon theoretical frameworks from Diaspora Studies, the research delves into the intricate dynamics and factors that influenced the diaspora's collective actions in the response to the war in Ukraine. It is important to note that the existing historiography has largely overlooked the subject of collaboration between the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada, despite its significant relevance in fostering a unified response to Russian aggression in Crimea and other occupied territories. Thus, for the first time, the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada (Ontario), the process of its institutionalization after 2014, and collaboration with the Ukrainian diaspora and Ukrainian government were considered.

Additionally, in contrast to previous works that predominantly focused on the actions and position of the Ukrainian Congress of Canada, the largest organization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, this study goes beyond by examining the newly emerged organizations during the second wave of mobilization in 2022. The study presents schemes of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar networks in 2014 and after 2022, which allows us to trace the presence of human resources and mobilization dynamics. This inclusive approach sheds light on the diverse range of organizations that played a significant role in responding to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the mobilization efforts within the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars' diasporas in Canada.

The analysis of the mobilization process uncovered a significant finding regarding the factors contributing to the effectiveness of diaspora mobilization in Canada (Ontario). The significant institutionalization of pre-existing Ukrainian diaspora organizations and their centralized structure was a key contributing factor

to its success. This institutionalization facilitated efficient and productive collaboration, enabling coordinated efforts and strategic initiatives. By harnessing these organizations' established networks and resources, the mobilization process was enhanced, leading to impactful advocacy and tangible outcomes. On the other hand, the mobilization process of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora was not stable and took place in cycles: first in 2014 and then in 2022. In between these years, there was a decline in activism caused by various factors, including the prolonged nature of the conflict, running out of resources, and the emergence of new issues that took precedence.

Another question that this thesis addresses is why the same diaspora, when situated in different contexts, displays varying degrees of mobilization or apathy. By employing the methodological framework of constraints and opportunities, this research unveils the pivotal role played by Canada's context for the Ukrainian political engagement. The historical continuity of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, coupled with the availability of institutional allies, the country's overall democratic climate and openness towards immigrants, emerges as significant factors. Crucially, this study does not seek to present a one-sided portrayal of the Canadian context but also acknowledges and explores the obstacles to diaspora mobilization. It considers challenges such as conflicts with the Russian diaspora, persistent narratives surrounding «fascism» and «collaborationism» that has persisted since World War II, internal contradictions within the Ukrainian diaspora, and various other factors. These findings shed new light on the multifaceted dynamics that drive diaspora mobilization and contribute to the scholarly understanding of transnational activism and its connection to contextual factors.

Oral history interviews play a crucial role in this research, as they provide valuable insights into the motivations of both the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas regarding their involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. These interviews facilitated a comparative examination of how the diaspora responded to the initial

outbreak of war in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion in 2022. This comparative analysis proved instrumental in elucidating the factors contributing to the increased mobilization in 2022 compared to 2014 and what frames of perception the diaspora representatives built to engage as many people as possible in collective action. The documented interviews in this study also hold significant value as a future primary source for scholars exploring the aftermath of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the response of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas to these events. They provide valuable insights into diaspora members' experiences and memories about the actions from 2014 to 2022, offering a deeper understanding of their engagement and impact on the events in Ukraine.

Through an in-depth analysis of the diaspora's activities, advocacy, and engagement, this study provides compelling evidence of the substantial impact exerted by the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada during 2014-2022. Their collective efforts profoundly influenced the course of the war in Ukraine and played a pivotal role in shaping the Canadian government's stance towards these events. Furthermore, this study opens up avenues for future research to explore the diaspora's potential role in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Moreover, engaging in a comparative analysis of the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada with the responses of Ukrainian diaspora communities in other countries to the war in Ukraine holds excellent promise. Such a comparative approach has the potential to enhance our understanding of how various factors, such as context, historical narratives, and mobilization mechanisms, shape diaspora mobilization depending on the host country. By examining these dynamics across different national contexts, we can gain valuable insights into the complex interplay between diaspora communities and their responses to significant events in their homeland. This interdisciplinary research holds significant implications for the fields of Diaspora Studies, Peace and Conflict Studies, and the historiography of the war in Ukraine.

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APPENDIXS

Appendix A

ОПИТНИК

(Проект «Mobilization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas in Canada (Ontario) during the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 – 2022»)

Розкажіть, будь ласка, про своє життя те, що вважаєте за потрібне. Можливо, історію свого життя або короткі біографічні дані.

1 Блок: Сім'я, дитинство, освіта

1. Розкажіть, будь ласка, про своїх батьків: ким вони були, чи народилися вони в Україні? Чи були вони учасниками українських громадських організації в Канаді?
2. Яку шкільну освіту Ви отримали, якою мовою?
3. Яку вищу освіту Ви отримали та за якою спеціальністю?
4. Що батьки розповідали Вам про Україну?
5. Яких національних українських героїв згадували, про які події найбільше розповідали?
6. Пам'ять про 1991 рік: розкажіть, будь ласка, Ваші особисті спогади, чи те, як Ваші батьки розповідали Вам про проголошення незалежності України?
7. Які українські свята Ви святкуєте вдома, якщо святкуєте взагалі?
8. Як підтримує Вас сім'я у Вашій громадській діяльності та організації мітингів, протестів?
9. Чи були Ви в дитинстві учасником/учасницею Пласту, недільної школи, церкви чи інших осередків українською діаспорою?
10. Як би Ви оцінили своє дитинство та навчання? Чому ви так думаєте?

2 Блок: Шлях активіста/активістки та основна діяльність організації.

11. Розкажіть, будь ласка, більше про Вашу організацію: назву, напрямки та ціль діяльності. Які основні лозунги та меседжі транслює Ваша організація?

12. Коли і чому Ви вступили до Вашої організації або ж просто стали соціально/політично активним/активною?
13. Що мотивувало Вас перейматися долею України, знаходячись в Канаді?
14. Як повпливав на Ваше рішення хтось із Вашої родини чи дружнього оточення?
15. Як Ваша організація відреагувала на анексію Криму та Донбасу у 2014 році?
16. Чи змінилась діяльність та ціль Вашої організації після початку російсько-української війни 2014 року? Як саме?
17. Які події Ваша організація проводила найчастіше: протести/мітинги/збори коштів?
18. Чи збільшилась кількість учасників/змінилась чисельність Вашої організації у 2014 році? Чи були серед них канадійці?
19. Чи отримала Ваша організація більшу підтримку з боку канадійців після 2014 року?
20. Як Ваша організація відреагувала на проголошення незалежності “ЛНР” та “ДНР” росією у лютому 2022 року?
21. З якими складнощами зіштовхнулась Ваша організація з якимись складнощами чи перешкодами під час у рамках своєї діяльності?
22. Окресліть головні результати діяльності Вашої організації за період 2014-2022 років?

3 Блок: Особисті спогади про події 2014 року

23. Якою була Ваша особиста реакція та реакція вашого оточення на анексію Криму Росією та Донбасу у 2014 році?
24. Чи відбувалися масштабні виступи чи протести у лютому 2014 року? Чи відвідали Ви якийсь із них?
25. Чи пригадуєте Ви те, як відреагувала канадійська спільнота на початок російсько-української?

26. Якою була Ваша реакція на повномасштабне вторгнення росії в Україну у 2022 році, які зміни можна прослідкувати?
27. Чи відвідували Ви Україну у період з 2014 по 2022 рік?
28. Чи зустрічали ви підтримку дій росії, а не України, з боку представників української діаспори в Канаді?
29. Розкажіть, будь ласка, чи підтримували Ви зв'язок з родичами та друзями в Україні?
30. Що б Ви розповіли дітям/онукам про російсько-українську війну? Яку інформацію, на Вашу думку, важливо передати наступним поколінням?
31. Якою була Ваша реакція на повномасштабне вторгнення росії в Україну у 2022 році, які зміни можна прослідкувати?

4 Блок: Оцінка власного життя

32. Назвіть три найпозитивніші речі, які сталися у вашому житті під час діяльності у Вашій організації?
33. Назвіть принаймні три найнегативніші речі, які сталися у вашому житті під час діяльності у Вашій організації?
34. Якби вас попросили порівняти ваше життя до та після початку російсько-української війни, про що би ви говорили?
35. Чи намагались Ви назавжди повернутися в Україну? Чому так чи ні?
36. Які нові можливості з'явилися у Ваших дітей та онуків? Що вони зараз роблять? Де би Ви хотіли, аби Ваші діти жити і чому?
37. Як би Ви оцінили своє життя та свою долю? Чи життя Вам вдалося?

*Укладено авторкою.

Appendix B

Photos from interviews with respondents. One of the respondents was interviewed with the camera off. All respondents signed a consent to data processing.


Interview with Elvira I., 6 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)




Interview with Natalia G., 7 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)




Interview with Oleksandra S., 28 March 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)



Interview with Ruslan K., 27 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)




Interview with Vadym H., 25 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)



Interview with Nadiya G., 28 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)




Interview with Mariya S., 13 May 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)




Interview with Svitlana N., 24 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)




Interview with Taras Y., 26 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)



Interview with Ivanna F., 26 March 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)



Interview with Milia A., 14 April 2023 (Ukraine - Canada)



Appendix 1

Art – installation «Doors»: Through the Horror of War by Ruslan Kurt.



Source: Kurt R. Doors. Through the Horror of War | Ukraine | Ruslan Kurt.

www.ruslankurt.com/home/doors-through-the-horror-of-war-in-ukraine. (Accessed 13 May 2023).

Appendix 2

Protest on 28 February 2023, organized by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.



Source: Ukrainian Canadian Congress - Toronto Branch. Protest on 28 February 2023. URL:

[Www.facebook.com, www.facebook.com/ucctoronto/photos/pb.100064772315988.-2207520000./2090048574485317/?type=3](https://www.facebook.com/ucctoronto/photos/pb.100064772315988.-2207520000./2090048574485317/?type=3). (Accessed 14 May 2023).

Appendix 3

«Save the people of Azovstal» Demonstration, organized by the Ukrainian Resistance Canada and the Second Front



Source: Save the People of Azovstal. Demonstration. Second Front. URL: secondfrontukraine.com/events. (Accessed 3 May 2023).

Appendix 4


«Stop Russian Terror» Demonstration, organized by the Ukrainian Resistance Canada and the Second Front



Source: Stop Russian Terror. Demonstration. Second Front. URL: secondfrontukraine.com/events. (Accessed 3 May 2023).

Appendix 5

Demonstration «How many more?» on Toronto's central square.



Source: How Many More? Demonstration. URL: www.facebook.com,
www.facebook.com/events/337888561644132/. (Accessed 14 May 2023).