

Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine  
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”  
Faculty of Law  
Andriy Meleshevych Kyiv-Mohyla School of Governance

**Master’s Thesis**

Master’s Degree Program

**“HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: CONTEMPORARY  
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERSECTORAL COLLABORATION”**

Prepared by a second-year graduate student  
Specialization “Communications in  
democratic governance”  
Specialty 281 Public governance and  
administration

**Mariia Lypovchenko**

Supervisor: **Alina Khaletska**,  
Dr. of Science of Public Governance,  
Professor of Public Governance

Reviewer: **Tetiana Pospelova**,  
Dr. of Science of Public Governance,  
Associate Professor

The Master`s thesis grade: \_\_\_\_\_

Secretary: \_\_\_\_\_

“ ” \_\_\_\_\_ 2023

Міністерство освіти і науки України  
Національний університет «Києво-Могилянська академія»  
Факультет правничих наук  
Києво-Могилянська школа врядування імені Андрія Мелешевича

**Магістерська робота**

Освітній ступінь – магістр

на тему: **«ПУБЛІЧНА ДИПЛОМАТІЯ З ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ: СУЧАСНІ  
ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ МІЖСЕКТОРАЛЬНОЇ ВЗАЄМОДІЇ»**

*(англійською мовою)*

Виконала: Студентка 2-го року навчання  
Спеціалізації «Комунікації в  
демократичному врядуванні»  
Спеціальності 281 «Публічне управління  
та адміністрування»

**Липовченко Марія Євгеніївна**

Керівник: **Халецька Аліна Анатоліївна**,  
доктор наук з державного управління,  
професор

Рецензентка: **Поспєлова Тетяна Вадимівна**,  
доктор наук з державного управління,  
доцент

Магістерська робота захищена з оцінкою

«\_\_\_\_\_»

Секретар ЕК \_\_\_\_\_

«\_\_» \_\_\_\_\_ 2023 р.

**DECLARATION OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY****ДЕКЛАРАЦІЯ АКАДЕМІЧНОЇ ДОБРОЧЕСНОСТІ**

Я, Липовченко Марія Євгеніївна, студентка 2 року навчання магістерської програми за спеціальністю «Публічне управління та адміністрування» спеціалізації «Комунікації в демократичному врядуванні» факультету правничих наук НаУКМА (Києво-Могилянська школа врядування імені Андрія Мелешевича), адреса електронної пошти – [maria.lypovchenko@ukma.edu.ua](mailto:maria.lypovchenko@ukma.edu.ua), підтверджую таке:

- написана мною магістерська робота на тему «Публічна дипломатія з прав людини: сучасні перспективи міжсекторальної взаємодії» (англійською мовою: “Human Rights Public Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives on Intersectoral Collaboration”) відповідає вимогам академічної доброчесності та не містить порушень, передбачених п. 3.1 Положення про академічну доброчесність здобувачів освіти у НаУКМА, зі змістом якого я ознайомена;
- заявляю, що надана мною для перевірки електронна версія роботи є ідентичною її друкованій версії;
- я згодна на перевірку моєї роботи на відповідність критеріям академічної доброчесності у будь-який спосіб, у тому числі за допомогою інтернет-системи StrikePlagiarism.com, а також на архівування моєї роботи в базі даних цієї системи.

10 травня 2023 року

*Дата*



*Підпис*

Липовченко М.Є.

*Прізвище, ініціали*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1. HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEORETICAL BASIS: GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT .....</b>	<b>11</b>
1.1. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: CONCEPTS, PARTICIPANTS OF PHENOMENA AND THEIR IMPACT ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS.....	11
1.2. HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZON IN DIPLOMACY .....	17
1.3. THE ROLE OF INTERSECTORAL COLLABORATION IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS.....	23
CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 1.....	28
<b>CHAPTER 2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE PRISM OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND BUSINESS WITH SOCIAL/CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVITIES .....</b>	<b>30</b>
2.1. THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CURRENT POLICY .....	30
2.2. RENEWED EMPHASIS: UKRAINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AFTER FEBRUARY 24, 2022 .....	38
2.3. HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR THE LEGAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES .....	46
CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 2.....	53
<b>CHAPTER 3. IMPROVEMENTS FOR SKILLFUL AND PRINCIPLED HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS A CRUCIAL PART OF A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION .....</b>	<b>56</b>
3.1. THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY OF THE MFA OF UKRAINE: UPDATED NEEDS	56
3.2. THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY OF THE MFA OF UKRAINE: NEW-MADE NARRATIVES .....	64
3.3. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: UKRAINE AS AN EPOCH-MAKING WORLDWIDE PLAYER.....	71
CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 3.....	78
<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>LIST OF SOURCES.....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>ANNEXES .....</b>	<b>111</b>

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Meaning
<b>ALI</b>	Agency for Legislative Initiatives
<b>ATO</b>	Anti-Terrorist Operation
<b>CF</b>	Charitable Foundation
<b>CLS</b>	Center for Civil Liberties
<b>CMU</b>	Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>CSIS</b>	Center for Strategic and International Studies
<b>ECHR</b>	European Court of Human Rights
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>eyeWitness</b>	eyeWitness to Atrocities
<b>H2H organization</b>	Humanitarian to Humanitarian organization
<b>IBA</b>	International Bar Association
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian law
<b>IICIU</b>	Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine
<b>IRCRC Movement</b>	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
<b>IRF</b>	International Renaissance Foundation
<b>ISIS</b>	Islamic State
<b>LLC</b>	Limited Liability Company
<b>MCIP</b>	Ministry of Culture and Information Policy
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MIA</b>	Ministry of Internal Affairs
<b>MIHR</b>	Media Initiative for Human Rights
<b>MIP</b>	Ministry of Information Policy
<b>MOH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>MOI</b>	Ministry of Infrastructure

<b>MOJ</b>	Ministry of Justice
<b>NaUKMA</b>	National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
<b>NCD Office</b>	WHO's European Office for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases
<b>NGO</b>	Non-profit organization
<b>NHRI</b>	National Human Rights Institution
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>PHR</b>	Physicians for Human Rights
<b>PofU</b>	Patients of Ukraine
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable development goals, Global Goals
<b>SSU</b>	Security Service of Ukraine
<b>UDHR</b>	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
<b>UHC</b>	Ukrainian Healthcare Center
<b>UHHRU</b>	Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UN HRC</b>	United Nations Human Rights Council
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## INTRODUCTION

Doubtless, Russia's full-scale invasion of the territory of independent Ukraine has become a real source of challenges for the fulfillment, without exception, of each field of activity for Ukrainians. These challenges have not bypassed the democratic governance theme in Ukraine or the further fate of skillful and principled human rights public diplomacy development.

It also needs to be taken into consideration that February 24, 2022, has become a vivid benchmark for a renewed vector of efficient and effective strategic communications for Ukraine. For this reason, such mentioned up-to-date direction cannot and should not be ignored or omitted when working on a unique "image of the future" [98] for the whole world, that can be provided exclusively by Ukraine and not only by the government but also via civil society and business with social/corporate responsibility activities.

Thus, due to the major upheavals and violations that Ukrainians continue to experience in 2023, as well as the fact that the high dynamism of internal changes (huge and successful volunteer projects and other initiatives of Ukrainians, the intensity of shelling by the Russians, achievements and also military defeat at the frontline, etc.) in Ukraine does not match the speed of changes in the external environment (weak willingness of international organizations and representatives of other states to condemn the actions of the Russians and passivity or delay in isolating Russia from the democratic world, unwillingness to transfer the necessary weapons to Ukraine, etc.), both points (skillful and principled human rights public diplomacy development and the proactive involvement of all three components of the 'government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society' triangle<sup>1</sup>) in relation to the communication process are more important than ever. Hence, these and not only these new narratives should be displayed when updating the five-year Public Diplomacy

---

<sup>1</sup> The mentioned triangle model cannot be considered the author's and the supervisor's of this master's thesis invention. Such expression was widely used within "The Interaction of the Government, Business, and Civil Society" course, taught by Tetiana Andriichuk, which inspired the author to use such wording. However, the expression 'business with social/corporate responsibility' was added to fulfill the needs of this master's study since in the context of this study, not all businesses played a decisive role in the context of the human rights public diplomacy functioning.

Strategy as well as the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine adopted in 2021. The above reasons make the thesis **relevant, determine its choice and highlight the practical importance of the study.**

The present thesis **aims** to disclose the public diplomacy of human rights theme within the modern potential for cross-sectoral cooperation with an emphasis on the expert environment that does not belong to the government sector but can support it. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to present a new Ukrainian vision of human rights public diplomacy based on a holistic approach where each sector`s voice and expertise matters. It is worth mentioning that the author and the supervisor of this thesis deeply focused on the communications issue – and not only on its theoretical aspect but also on the practical aspect. This might indicate the **scientific value and topicality** of this study since the Ukrainian context can provide some non-trivial practical and dynamic solutions as well as the way of their implementation.

This thesis is based not only on **the classic diplomatic texts** of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, William Zartman, Maureen Berman, Harvey Sicherman, Iver B. Neumann, Joseph Nye, Joseph M. Siracusa, etc. but also on **the latest theoretical studies of scholars and practitioners in the field of public diplomacy, human rights diplomacy, humanitarian diplomacy, and strategic communications** by Michael David Clark, Lorna Lloyd, Diana Ingenhoff, Jérôme Chariatte, Andre Oboler, Dmytro Kuleba, Oleksandr Vysotskyi, Tetyana Syvak, etc. It is worth noting that some analyzed themes have not gained enough attention among Ukrainian scholars.

To the purpose mentioned, the author and the supervisor of the thesis set the following **tasks**:

- (i) to analyze human rights public diplomacy theoretical grounds through its genesis and further development by:
  - highlighting concepts, categories, participants of public diplomacy, and their impact on strategic communications;
  - outlining the human rights horizon in diplomacy;

- defining the role of cross-sectoral cooperation in strategic communications.

(ii) to characterize public diplomacy for the protection of human rights via the prism of civil society and business with social/corporate responsibility engagement by:

- studying the legislative and institutional basis for the implementation of the ongoing policy;
- describing the renewed emphasis on Ukrainian human rights public diplomacy after February 24, 2022;
- discussing the human rights public diplomacy theme for the legal prosecution of war crimes.

(iii) to develop improvements for skillful and principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of a holistic approach to human rights protection in the form of recommendations for:

- updated needs of the 2021-2025 Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine;
- new-made narratives of the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine;
- the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) further adjustments within the point that in 2023 Ukraine can be considered an epoch-making global player.

The **research object** of this thesis is the interconnection process between public diplomacy and Ukraine`s ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle.

The **subject matter** of this thesis is the development of a new and essential human rights protection vector through the prism of expert diplomacy functioning, since February 24, 2022, considered by the author and the supervisor as a turning point for Ukraine as a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state<sup>2</sup> [143, Article 1].

---

<sup>2</sup> Within this master`s thesis the term ‘State’ will be used towards Ukraine. The author of this thesis is aware of the difference between the terms ‘nation’, ‘country’ and also other meanings of the ‘state’ as a division of a federal State –

The analysis was based on various methods in order to accomplish the purposes of this master`s thesis, including:

- **general scientific** methods:
  - the *descriptive method* in order to draft an overview of the genesis and further development of human rights public diplomacy, legal and institutional framework, etc.;
  - the *comparative method* in order to provide a vivid distinction between human rights diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy, the process of attack maps creation in Syria and Ukraine, etc.;
  - the *analysis and synthesis method* in order to conduct an overview of the documentation process of russian crimes on the territory of independent Ukraine by different components of triangle, etc.;
  - the hermeneutical method in order to provide the Rome Statute articles and the 17 SDGs interpretation toward Ukraine, etc.
- **qualitative** methods:
  - *content, thematic, and discourse analysis* in order to conduct document analysis toward the 2021-2025 Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, reports, legislation, etc.

In addition, the *dialectical approach* in order to study the phenomena of traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy, etc. was used with the involvement of *comparative historical, analytical, and hypothetical methods*. This master`s thesis was created with a wide usage of the *case study method*.

This thesis consists of the following **elements**: a list of abbreviations, an introduction, three chapters, key conclusions, a list of references, and annexes. The total scope of this master`s thesis is 114 pages.

**Annex 1** represents how schematically the master`s thesis structure looks.

---

e.g., the states of the United States of America (please refer to the <https://www.fortbendisd.com/cms/lib/TX01917858/Centricity/Domain/1006/Country%20State%20Nation.doc> link for greater detail).

The Constitution of Ukraine possesses the highest legal force and in its Article 1 defines Ukraine as a “sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state” (for details refer to the Source [134]).

## **CHAPTER 1. HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEORETICAL BASIS: GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT**

*“The essence of diplomacy is communication. It is the means whereby sovereign states – notional persons – communicate with other states through their human representatives. Being notional they, like all such entities, can do so in no other way. And as virtually no state finds it practical or desirable either to live like a hermit or to engage externally in nothing but unannounced and undiscussed war, there is a universal imperative on states to engage in diplomacy.”*

*~ Lorna Lloyd,*

*“Diplomacy with a Difference: The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner 1880-2006” [82, p. 1].*

### **1.1. Public diplomacy: concepts, participants of phenomena and their impact on strategic communications**

For an in-depth analysis of the selected master`s thesis, firstly it was necessary to outline what is diplomacy, what can be considered as public diplomacy ‘roots’, and what exact role strategic communications occupy in the public diplomacy theme. Without explaining how diplomacy developed, who eventually acquired the status of its actors, how technologies assist in achieving targets, and also why the topic of public diplomacy development is so significant for the analysis of the chosen master`s thesis, the following chapters of this study might seem somewhat broad, however, this diversity of components creates the main idea of the study: to show how dynamic the world of communications can be in 2023 and what a crucial position Ukraine occupies here.

It is important to emphasize the concept of public diplomacy has its origins in traditional (often called “official” [116, p. 5] or “conventional” [78, p. 2]) diplomacy. The very word ‘diplomacy’ originates from Ancient Greece, and a little later the French

began to use the word ‘diplomatie’ to refer to professional negotiators [116, p. 2]. While the earliest record connected with diplomacy dates around 2500 BC – such a letter made on a tablet was found in northern Iran (present-day territories) – a new era of diplomacy tentatively began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 [116, p. 2]. Within the framework of this Chapter’s Paragraph, the need for a detailed description of all the past events that have taken place over thousands of years regarding the development of diplomacy has not been identified as a major. However, for the purposes of this study it should be noted that already at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the European style of diplomacy as a phenomenon was borrowed by the entire international community: embassies and missions, which become institutionalized throughout Europe [116, p. 3], helped a lot in the foreign policy performing and became a successful example to follow for other countries. The notion of diplomacy became even more intriguing when a US career diplomat and a former Dean of The Fletcher School – Edmund A. Gullion – decided to name some government actions that “deal with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies” as a “public diplomacy” [117, p. 189] in the mid-1960s. Importantly, this naming included different options in order to fully cover the context: some components of propaganda, public relations, and also press relations were taken into consideration [117, p. 189]. According to Edmund A. Gullion, public diplomacy goes beyond traditional diplomacy, and also contributes (“openly sponsors”) [116, p. 5] the engagement between private groups and intentions in one particular country with those of another – this is facilitated by the transnational informational flow and rapid flow of ideas [116, p. 5]. Jan Melissen in his book “The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations” mentioned the words of a Canadian ambassador to Washington that indicated the following: the new diplomacy – public diplomacy – requires special attitudes, techniques, and skills in comparison with those discovered within traditional diplomacy [87, p. 11]. Such a statement inspired the author of this master’s study to create a scheme submitted as **Annex 2**.

Coercion has always been opposed to encouragement and vice versa. In the late 1980s, Joseph Nye – an American political scientist, Harvard University Professor, and

a former US assistant secretary of defense [72] – introduced a completely new term that opposed the concept of hard power – soft power. According to Joseph Nye, while soft power can be considered the ability to engage and convince and derives from the attractiveness of policies, political ideals, and the culture of the country, hard power is focused on the ability to force and derives from economic or military strength [73]. The concept of soft power acquires particular relevance after the US invasion of Iraq – and generally that invasion was a major lesson for the US [27, p. 219]. Additionally, regarding this concept, there is an opinion that soft power is actually much more than just nation branding and public diplomacy [67]. But what can be obtained in the case of soft power and hard power connection? Definitely, smart power, an approach with an exclusively American context determined by the CSIS as the combination of both hard power and soft power components [130].

At the same time, according to Oleksandr Vysotsky, a Ukrainian political scientist who, perhaps, analyzes the concept of public diplomacy in the most detail among modern Ukrainian scholars, public and traditional diplomacy should be distinguished as two different foreign policy tools that simultaneously aim to achieve a common goal: the exercise of political influence on the governments of other countries, which will further influence the political decision-making of such countries [183, p. 3]. However, taking into account the opinions of Snow Crocker and Alan Henrikson, public diplomacy should be distinguished from traditional diplomacy due to the fact that it influences the policy of another state by forming the public opinion of its society [117, p. 191] while interacting with open media, and also (which is especially important to note within the framework of this master`s research) through cooperation with a wide range of other actors – not only governmental but also non-governmental [58, p. 8]. All these actors, according to Vysotsky, are guided by the overall comprehensive diplomatic strategy of the state [183, p. 3].

The approach of Alice Srugies to the actors of public diplomacy analysis on Germany in the 2013 example is noteworthy and illustrative in order to demonstrate a wide range of potential actors of public diplomacy. To begin with, the researcher divided her analysis of actors into four categories: layer, type, manifestation, and

influential structure. Three layers were taken into consideration: micro, meso, and macro. Each of the layers mentioned has its own type: micro is focused on the individual actor, meso – on the complex actor, while macro combined “type” and “manifestation categories” for which the social subsystem as an actor (e.g., politics) and also the nation as an actor were highlighted. Importantly, the nation as an actor additionally covered the “influential structure” category. For the micro layer and the individual actor type, ‘role keeper’ (e.g., citizen, organizational role) was mentioned as a “manifestation” with a ‘constellation of an actor’ in the “influential structure” category. For the meso layer and the complex actor type, several groups of actors have been chosen: economical/political solidarity groups/organizations (e.g., political parties, associations), organizations focused on the common good (e.g., groups, society, clubs), interest organizations (e.g., social and protest movements, NGOs), public organizations (e.g., elected councils, public administration) and also economic single organization/company with an ‘institutional structures’ in the “influential structure” category. Finally, for the macro layer, the researcher highlighted the ‘subsystematic orientation horizon’ in the “influential structure” category [119]. At the same moment, some researchers make proposals to analyze public diplomacy as government communication where non-states are considered actors in “the global public sphere” and the government is mentioned as the one and only actor in public diplomacy [114, p. 3047]. This gives reason to believe that it is quite unrealistic to create a clear and unambiguous division of all potential actors: each state is unique, while time is dynamic.

Thus, over the course of time, diplomacy has become something much more of a relationship between states and governments [116, p. 1]. However, not only the passage of time encouraged diplomacy to reach the next new level. With the inclusion of new subjects as an addition to the expert community, focus on the topic of human rights and the fate of humanity, as well as with the development of technology, diplomacy is gaining renewed momentum, becoming more civil, social, and inclusive. Undoubtedly, in the context of dispersion and breadth of the public diplomacy topic, one can lose the expert potential and also attention to the subjects` expertise – detailed

information on this is given in the following Paragraphs. According to the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, owing to the combination of traditional diplomacy described above and the rapid development of digitalization [68, p. 16], modern public diplomacy was created, which we are dealing with in 2023. “Modern public diplomacy” according to the author and the supervisor of this master`s study implies the process of involving a larger number of participants, while such participants receive some kind of subjectivity; people-to-people connections are growing in popularity within such public diplomacy. Digitalization as a “multifaceted process” [120, p. 25] includes not only the adjustment of diplomacy to hybrid media landscapes but also the adoption of innovative digital solutions aimed at engaging foreign publics [120, p. 25]. Almost similar technological breakthroughs already had happened before with the invention of the printing press in the 15<sup>th</sup> century which forever changed the scope of official communication with foreign publics [87, p. 3]. Quite interesting, that the COVID-19 pandemic has also brought to the fore the issue of formats changing in order to work properly with public diplomacy tools: at the end of 2021, it was reported that Ukraine urgently needed the creation of high-quality digital content for the proper functioning of public diplomacy in new turbulent conditions [30, p. 5].

At the same time, the ‘strategic communication’ term history draws its origins not only from World War I [109, p. 124] but acquired particular significance because of one of the most devastating terrorist attacks of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – the US 9/11 terrorist attacks [110, p. 2]. This does not mean that before September 11, 2001, there was nothing like long-term communications planning, or that such communications have not been aimed at promoting US interests. Especially after the US 9/11 tragedy (that in no way diminishes World War I contribution, experience and lessons), which shattered the US all-powerful status, the context changed significantly with a solid understanding of a “brand new strategic landscape” [110, p. 2] itself and also a valuable question: who should become the audience of the US government – the external audience who will receive a message about American friendship only, or also the internal audience who will obtain a message about the strength of the US armed service [110, p. 2]. Remarkably, the international war on terror [116, p. 5] once expanded the practice of

diplomacy by including in it the bond between the government and the people – one of the main characteristics of public diplomacy – which eventually led to the public diplomacy concept usage. Such significant changes occurred for a variety of reasons among which was the end of World War II and also the influence of the Cold War [116, p. 5]. As can be seen, war can become a driving force of progress for significant changes in the communication field. However, the war might lead to another significant process – the tribunal establishment. For instance, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that followed World War II recognized the crime of aggression as a part of customary international law for the first time – and that is where another completely new level-up of human rights diplomacy was reached [5]. Detailed information on this will be given in Paragraph 2.3, Chapter 2.

On the other hand, in the scientific world, it is possible to find the opinion that the ‘strategic communication’ term skillfully outlines the methods of the Roman emperor Augustus to formulate and advocate his new world order concept [44, p. 3], in other words, such a term existed long before our time.

In accordance with the Ukrainian Information Security Doctrine (adopted on February 25, 2017), strategic communications are distinguished from government communications, crisis communications, and strategic narrative [36]. The last one is defined as a text prepared on purpose which is intended for verbal presentation in the process of strategic communications in order to accomplish informational impact on the target audience. Crisis communications are used as a set of measures carried out by the public bodies of Ukraine in a crisis situation and also include the dialogue between the public bodies and the target audience on issues related to the crisis situation. Government communications also considered a set of measures, however, these actions aimed at the dialogue between authorized representatives of the CMU and the target audience in order to clarify the government’s position and/or policy on certain challenging issues, while strategic communications foresee coordinated and adequate usage of the state’s communication capabilities aimed at promoting the goals of the state. The author and the supervisor of this master’s thesis clearly observe the smart power approach usage there. Among such capabilities public diplomacy, public

relations, military communications, and also information, psychological operations and measures [36] should be mentioned – and this promotion of the state`s goals within the strategic communications cannot survive apart from participants involved in the capabilities mentioned or be conducted without expert actors that should fully understand their key role in the strategic communications process. Yet, looking ahead, the expressed opinion of Chernenko T., chief consultant of the Department of information security and cyber security of the Center of security research of NISS, should be mentioned. At the end of 2021, the chief consultant stated that the formation of the strategic communications system in Ukraine was taking place slowly, despite the fact the Roadmap of the Strategic Communications Partnership program was signed back in September 2015 [30, p. 2] [93].

Hence, the subjects of public diplomacy (both governmental and non-governmental) are directly related to strategic communications and can be considered a unique link in this nexus. According to such vision, strategic communications include public diplomacy [30, p. 1], which is intensively used in national and foreign policies [123, p. 83] as a skillful instrument of the democratic world (**Annex 3**).

## **1.2. Human rights horizon in diplomacy**

Human rights public diplomacy is defined by the author and the supervisor of this thesis as a new and promising research topic. Certainly, diplomacy as a phenomenon directly concerns a *person*, her/his life, and activities, because it is through diplomacy that the particular state achieves its aims, and it is the state that consists of a society, which in its turn consists of *people*. Therefore, the human rights horizon in diplomacy was always visible, but not always in the vanguard, which would directly concern the coverage of human rights violations and the protection of such rights, etc.

Firstly, it is believed that it is highly important to distinguish human rights diplomacy from traditional diplomacy [63, p. 1]. While the first one is considered the usage of the negotiation process and the power of persuasion in order to achieve some particular goal connected with human rights promotion and protection, the second one

is intended to pursue defined national interests by states within foreign policy conduction of such states [63, p. 1]. However, according to the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, such a statement does not exclude the possibility that human rights diplomacy does not come out of the same goals as traditional diplomacy as the Ukrainian context might demonstrate that national interests can be directly related to human rights protection (**Annex 4**). Therefore, both actors of the phenomena are united by the agenda of human rights promotion protection.

Secondly, it is also believed that it is essential to differentiate human rights diplomacy from humanitarian diplomacy [63, p. 2] despite some similarities. While the last one has been identified as an emergency policy (as a short-term aim) that might involve some humanitarian actors in “negotiating access to vulnerable populations or combating a culture of impunity in armed conflicts where widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law occur” [90, p. 2] [63, p. 2], the first one is considered having a long-term aim with the intention of designing new developed and amended policies, laws, systems, and practices in order to accomplish the permanent implementation of human rights [63, p. 2]. By the ‘humanitarian actors’ term a variety of international humanitarian actors meant including the UN, the IRCRC Movement, foreign militaries, NGOs, regional intergovernmental bodies, assisting Governments, and the private sector [66].

Thirdly, when the difference between traditional & human rights diplomacy and also human rights & humanitarian diplomacy has already been analyzed, it is important to note the role of participants (actors, players) in human rights diplomacy. According to the “Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives” study [63, p. 3], human rights diplomacy includes a strategy of involvement with a variety of potential actors whose aims and intentions towards human rights theme may differ. This research also states that human rights diplomacy has two major and extremely connected goals: persuasion of colleagues in order to present measures to promote human rights implementation and conviction of such counterparts to act appropriately and respectfully towards human rights [63, p. 3]. In the context of this particular master`s thesis, it would be essential to note that when it comes to inter-state communication,

the reciprocity component can be considered a valuable part [63, p. 3]. Nowadays, a wide range of players can be involved in human rights diplomacy, which once again makes clear the major difference between the concepts of traditional diplomacy and the diplomacy analyzed in this Paragraph. There, it is important to mention besides inter-governmental organizations and representatives of states quite modern and flexible subjects such as academic institutions, religious groups, parliamentarians, NGOs, other vivid and active representatives of civil society, NHRIs, experts in the human rights field, and actually a business [63, p. 4].

Fourthly, for an in-depth analysis of the human rights public diplomacy topic, it is important to determine the chronology of this concept development. It is believed, that there have been decades of attempts to use the human rights diplomacy concept among inter-governmental organizations and states. Nevertheless, the ‘human rights public diplomacy’ term does not have a vivid specific origin date as public diplomacy itself comprises some gradual efforts of human rights promotion and protection as time passes. The power of human rights is enormous: individuals do not have to wait for some state’s permission or proactively ensure recognition from such states – human rights are not granted by any state – the person exists, thus, such a human being by default possesses human rights [186]. The Constitution of Ukraine within Section II on Human and Citizens’ Rights, Freedoms and Duties focuses primarily on the issue mentioned [134, Section II]. Moreover, such universally recognized rules form the international system [64].

At the same time, looking back to the past, the author and the supervisor of this master’s study can trace precise transformations of the human rights public diplomacy theme as a phenomenon. In this way, the UDHR approval by the UN General Assembly in 1948 considered by the author and the supervisor of this master’s thesis an outstanding event in the human rights public diplomacy sustainable building since the first-ever legal document designed to establish the universality of the fundamental human rights protection was adopted [186]. Nowadays, this document remains to be the international human rights law base, and with the 2 other documents (the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, and also the International

Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) the International Bill of Rights was formed [52]. Notable, that until the 1970s human rights were still in the shadows of other themes within international relations. Later, human rights began to be considered a prominent topic for real actions and discourse of diplomacy, as human rights violations widely continued to happen all around the world. Later, the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 [53, p. 2] and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights post establishment [108] gave a major push to human rights diplomacy development. Since that time, the variety of actors engaged has expanded vastly, and diplomatic initiatives on the theme analyzed began to spread at different (bilateral, multilateral, and regional) levels [63, p. 2]. According to the author and the supervisor of this study opinions, human rights diplomacy finally started to demonstrate how skillfully public diplomacy techniques and instruments can achieve human rights aims with the help of a wide range of actors, including NGOs (analyzed in detail in the next Paragraph).

Talking about human rights and diplomacy discourse, it would be appropriate to point out its role in the advocacy process. While some researchers state that nowadays most frequently diplomacy is applied within an armed conflict context [32, p. 75], it can be assumed by the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis that special attention, in that case, is paid to the protection of human rights. This assumption is confirmed by the statement of Michael David Clark, the researcher and “Humanitarian multi-track diplomacy” study author [32]. He believes that while analyzing the connection between actors involved in diplomacy, human rights diplomacy can be included in the “Diplomacy through Advocacy” track. Clark explained his statement by citing Michael O’Flaherty who believed, that human rights diplomacy usually equates to negotiation and persuasion power, that in this context is used in order to achieve the aim determined – the promotion and protection of human rights [63, p. 25] [32, p. 119]. At the same time, he cited the opinion of Kelly-Kate Pease and Kelly McBride while talking about humanitarian diplomacy: Clark agreed with the view that advocacy is necessary for the UN within this type of diplomacy [75] [32, p. 254].

According to the author and the supervisor of this master`s study, the protection of human rights and public diplomacy are indeed inextricably linked. These two phenomena are capable of uniting the gap between ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ in a cohesive context – and this possibility should be taken into account when analyzing the prospects for intersectoral cooperation, described in detail in Paragraph 1.3 of this Chapter and in Paragraph 3.1, Chapter 3.

Since the topic of human rights protection constitutes the basis for every democratic society, but at the same time such a theme is quite difficult to understand and analyze due to its branching and scale, the question of the need for expertise appears on the agenda. How can public diplomacy on human rights achieve its goals? The answer lies precisely in the level of involved actors` expertise, skillfulness, and integrity – without such notions, human rights public diplomacy as well as strategic communications will not be able to achieve the goals of the state within international relations in the long term.

However, talking about expertise, can expert diplomacy be considered a special area of public diplomacy? The five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine (analyzed in detail in Paragraph 2.1, Chapter 2) reply in the affirmative, although it is worth noting that foreign sources do not distinguish expert diplomacy among the types of diplomacy. Notably, in the end of 2021 (i.e., after the Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine adoption) it was still believed that the problem of expert diplomacy is acute [30, p. 5].

It seems that in foreign practice, different fields of diplomacy already presuppose the presence of an expert environment that works on the design and communication of policies. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis believe that in Ukrainian realities, distinguishing expert diplomacy (especially in the human rights promotion and protection context) as a separate area of public diplomacy is one of the most important achievements since it implies the following: it is worth talking not only about the presence of the necessary knowledge and skills of individuals who are involved in public diplomacy (which in fact is not an achievement and should be considered a plain

truth) but about proactive and stable cooperation with niche (highly specialized) representatives (public organizations and business models with social/corporate responsibility, for instance) using formal and informal communication channels. Such a division of communication channels is already indicated [151, p. 13] in the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine and it plays an important role both in the communication of the MFA of Ukraine with a certain subject, and in the communication of such a subject with other actors. Remarkably, such a division was made only in relation to expert diplomacy, which indicates the importance of informal communication channels for this area of public diplomacy.<sup>3</sup>

Hennadiy Maksak, the Ukrainian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum coordinator and chairman of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”, in May 2016 presented “Expert Diplomacy as Part of a Foreign Policy Success Story” study [83], the most comprehensive publication in the Ukrainian scholar space on the expert diplomacy topic. He mentioned, that the ‘expert diplomacy’ term somehow reflects attempts to transform the ‘track two diplomacy’ (“backchannel diplomacy”) [74, p. 7] term known since the 70-80s of the last century, in accordance with the renewed environment – however, they are not the same [83, p. 3]. Track two diplomacy concept focused on the peacekeeping aspect and conflict resolution – and they considered the dominant directions for the initiation of unofficial communication attempts between representatives of the conflicting parties in case the track one diplomacy concept failed or was unavailable in such a situation [83, p. 3]. At the same time, expert diplomacy implies well-designed activities with expert communities, separate institutions, and think tanks both inside the state and abroad, which can lead to becoming one of the driving forces for bringing Ukraine’s foreign policy into line with the requirements of the urgent challenges, including the evidence collection and the coverage of Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine.

---

<sup>3</sup> Highly important: the author of this master’s thesis opposes any negotiation processes with Russia as barbarian quasi-empire-occupier. Exception: negotiations on the exchange of prisoners of war. In the context of this study, informal communications are seen as an opportunity of the MFA of Ukraine to communicate widely with civil society and business subjects internally, and also the opportunity for such subjects to use both formal and informal communications freely externally in order to achieve Ukraine’s goals, especially in the human rights protection sphere.

The human rights issue can become a common link (and not only on paper) that will combine resilience and also flexibility between states and actors since every representative of the democratic part of the world has at the heart of his thinking the idea that among the greatest challenges facing humanity are human rights abuses especially in those situations where it can be prevented.

### **1.3. The role of intersectoral collaboration in strategic communications**

While Peter Pomarantsev in his famous book “This Is Not Propaganda” [101] mentioned a short story of a video activist from Aleppo, some pretty bitter words can be read: “*Facts* didn't save Aleppo. And now he thinks *telling stories* is more powerful.” [107]. Needless to say, the notion that the whole contemporary world had all the facts (and still has) about events in Syria and still ignored all of them can be frustrating. However, according to the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, this is not at all a reason to give preference to just one of the two such important tools: powerful facts or no less powerful storytelling ability – and it is for this balance that strategic communications exist in action and should be taken into account while the role of cross-sectoral cooperation analysis conducting.

Within the First International Strategic Communications Forum “Kyiv Stratcom Forum” (analyzed in detail in Paragraph 2.1, Chapter 2), Emine Dzhappar mentioned that the state can achieve impressive own experience in case this state permanently counteracts russian hybrid threat for years [104] [105]. She additionally stated that not only classic diplomacy tools in the form of regional and global cooperation are needed but also some soft tools that can assist in Ukraine`s narratives abroad effective promotion when working on resilience strengthening [104] [105]. Such state`s narratives – success stories – present facts behind which are not just numbers and statistics covered, but real lives and experiences. The First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine also stressed that public diplomacy tools can help Ukraine to establish resilience as well as spread the truth during efforts joining and tight cooperation with civil society and international stakeholders [104] [105]. Such

statements can be supplemented by the idea of Nasir Javaid that the NGOs have been extremely valuable in the new public diplomacy vision establishment [71, p. 1].

Since the author of this study already examined the strategic communications concept (analyzed in detail in Paragraph 1.1, Chapter 1), in this Paragraph it is necessary to identify the concept of intersectoral collaboration. Under the notion of cross-sectoral cooperation, most researchers [16] [26] [86] (especially in the healthcare sphere) understand the quite strong partnership between different individuals, organizations, and sectors aimed at joint complex issues solving. A key feature of such collaboration is mutual benefit. However, this is not the only characteristic that can fully explain the significance of intersectoral collaboration in strategic communications planning: these interactions always bring together versatile perspectives, skills, and pieces of knowledge in order to increase efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and quality [70] – thus, major positive changes can be achieved by the state, that really takes care of ‘government – civil society – business with social/corporate responsibility’ collaboration triangle. Similar observations were made in 2002 by Steve Waddell in his “Core Competences: a Key Force in Business-Government-Civil Society Collaborations” research [184].

Surprisingly, in 2008 the daring idea was raised in the US: at that time, it was already considered that the best and also the most effective public diplomacy initiatives proceeded from the non-governmental and private sectors [117, p. 191]. Snow Crocker stated, that a wide range of actors (from media outlets, business enterprises, and NGOs to individual philanthropists) tended to facilitate a broader list of initiatives, programs, and also priorities that contributed a greater effect on overseas foreign perceptions of the US in comparison with those steps and actions produced in Washington [117, p. 191]. The other opinion, announced years later, in 2020, emphasized that within public diplomacy it is essential to have respect for the variety of sources, dimensions, and perspectives [68, p. 16]. More importantly, it is vital to be active listeners when it comes to different voices that can be helpful in reaching external policy goals within public diplomacy [68, p. 16]. Also, the role of think tanks in intersectoral collaborations is frequently mentioned in some research [87, p. 7] [80]. Additionally, the role of

international technical assistance to Ukraine, support of some major foundations like the IRF [13], or initiative organizations that develop civil society and a culture of strategic philanthropy [11.] like Isar Ednannia also contributes to stable intersectoral cooperation.

However, in the framework of this master`s thesis, it is extremely important to note the cross-sectoral dynamic collaboration and its impact on human rights promotion and protection. States, while working on their human rights diplomacy development, may encounter a contradiction: is such a state legitimate to raise issues with other states on the protection of human rights? In the context of Ukraine, this issue is extremely essential, because russian propaganda does not get tired of spreading narratives that Ukraine itself is shelling its schools and hospitals, etc. – and this is where civil society plays a huge role: the insistence of local NGOs on human rights issues gives greater legitimacy to international efforts to address such issues. In layman`s terms: russia shelled this particular school and also this particular hospital, this is evidenced by such data, satellite images, and witness statements. Moreover, the author of this study was convinced from her own experience that individuals often open up, want to share what they see, and feel trust in expert representatives of civil society, and not in bodies and representatives of state power [63, p. 221].

The presence of such proactive organizations in Ukraine that play a crucial role in cross-sectoral collaboration can be assessed by analyzing some of their activities. Mentioning the human rights theme, it is worth noting the functioning of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union – UHHRU [175], the most prominent Ukrainian association of 27 NGOs focused on human rights promotion and protection. The UHHRU itself is a part of the Helsinki movement, thereby Union honors the Ukrainian Helsinki Group traditions and aims at the Helsinki Accords promotion. The UHHRU has quite a wide range of legal activities, among them pro bono qualified legal assistance available to individuals not only in Ukrainian courts but also in the ECHR and other international jurisdictions. Worth to mention that such assistance is available to those, who can be considered victims whose human rights were violated in circumstances that these cases will have some strategic value [173].

The creation of the UHHRU Documentation Center [40] was announced back in 2016 [174], the presentation of the Center took place on October 25, 2016 [103]. The event was organized by the MIP of Ukraine (the MCIP these days). At that time, the executive director of UHHRU, Arkadiy Bushchenko, noted the need for an urgent “before the end of the war” creation of such a Center, since delaying time makes it difficult to obtain timely and complete evidence so that potential criminals will avoid responsibility. The experience of Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that the benefits of such centers are significant. Already in 2016, the question was raised of the extreme value of cooperation of all organizations related to the topic of documentation, as well as the fact that public authorities should cooperate with initiatives such as the UHHRU Documentation Center in fulfilling its aims [174]. During the presentation of the Center, representatives of the foreign diplomatic corps were among the representatives of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, the SSU, as well as experts from international and Ukrainian organizations. Among the three points submitted for discussion, the possibilities of implementing the principles of objectivity, apolitical nature, and justice at the national level, the issues of the state`s interest in objective documentation of violation facts, as well as the most important in the context of this master`s thesis – the possibility of exchanging information between non-governmental organizations and government agencies to reproduce an unbiased pattern of events – were mentioned. At that time, the UHHRU Documentation Center operated within the framework of the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy for the period until 2020, which focused on recording and investigating facts of human rights violations and international humanitarian law in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and in the area of the ATO with the involvement of public authorities, law enforcement agencies, and representatives of international organizations. As of 2016, there was no unified database at the national level that would help to establish a reliable overall picture of the conflict, restore justice, and receive satisfaction for the victims [103]. The Center is an example of an expert institution aimed at promoting the national interests of Ukraine.

Using the example of the UHHRU Documentation Center, one can be convinced of the following: the more civil society develops, the more public organizations (and not only NGOs) arise, which acquire subjectivity in public diplomacy. Such organizations act proactively, obtain expertise in their environment (in terms of networking) and also in their field (in terms of their recognition as professionals) – and under such circumstances, they enter the ‘arena’ of communications (including strategic ones), both national and international, and finally can be considered expert subjects. Moreover, no area has as many stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental) as the field of human rights promotion and protection. Therefore, the more such expert (focus on expertise, not quantity) organizations in Ukraine, the stronger the image and reputation of Ukraine – and there the author of this master`s thesis reaches the conclusion that Dmytro Kuleba reasonably stated in the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine that the positive image of Ukraine forming process demands close coordination with all relevant institutions, both governmental and non-governmental [151, p. 8].

As part of this master`s thesis, the author and the supervisor propose to consider intersectoral collaboration that contributes to the development of Ukrainian expert diplomacy as an area of human rights public diplomacy using the example of documenting and spreading information about cases of russian attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system, which will further contribute to the judicial investigation of potential war crimes and crimes against humanity and the prosecution of russian military and political leaders. In addition, in terms of these activities, there is an appeal to international organizations, in particular, to the UN and WHO, with a message to actively oppose the mass destruction of healthcare in Ukraine [61]. Without a doubt, to carry out such activities, representatives of civil society and business with social/corporate responsibility must have a high level of expertise and relevant knowledge – and such importance was also stated in the previous Paragraph. The author and the supervisor of this master`s research believe that for the statement outlined previously, the ideal formula of expertise should look like a combination of skillfulness (i.e., acquired knowledge as a result of learning, training, etc., which is

additionally mastered in practice) and integrity when it comes to human rights public diplomacy (i.e., this is not just a grant activity with multiple reports for the donor that funded the project – it is a socially responsible matter that requires endurance, moral preparation, and readiness to work towards the future since the evidence collection and advocacy do not occur instantly). A schematic representation of the ‘expertise’ definition can be seen in **Annex 5**.

### **Conclusions to Chapter 1**

The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis within Chapter 1 came to the following conclusions while analyzing human rights public diplomacy theoretical grounds through its genesis and further development.

Firstly, while highlighting concepts, categories, actors of public diplomacy, and their impact on strategic communications, it was deduced that the public diplomacy approach has its origins in traditional diplomacy, and both aim to achieve some common goals. In contrast to traditional diplomacy, the public diplomacy concept needs particular skills and techniques in order to be relevant, dynamic and fulfill all the modern requirements of the society and state. It was discovered, that soft power can be something more than just public diplomacy and national branding power. Technology development and digitalization lead to a wide range of not only governmental but also non-governmental actors` emergence. This contributed to something more than just the track one diplomacy. Over the course of time, renewed diplomacy is obtaining more points in its inclusive, civil, and social checklist. Additionally, it was observed that the war process can be considered a driving force of progress for major changes in the communications area.

Secondly, while outlining the human rights horizon in diplomacy, human rights diplomacy should be distinguished from traditional diplomacy and also humanitarian diplomacy which is observed while analyzing the chronology of such concepts` development. The unique Ukrainian context is able to demonstrate the point that human rights protection can be considered among the national interests of the state. Flexible NGOs, business models with social/corporate responsibility, and other actors play a

significant role in human rights public diplomacy. However, the expertise, skillfulness, and integrity of such initiatives should exceed their number, the activity vector should be clear.

Thirdly, while defining the role of cross-sectoral cooperation in strategic communications both power of facts and story-telling should be taken into account. The strong and dynamic partnership built between different individuals, organizations, and sectors aimed at joint complex issues solving is vital for a particular state, especially taking about expert human rights public diplomacy in the documenting and spreading the information about cases of russian attacks on the Ukrainian context. Nowadays public diplomacy directly affects the process of strategic communications as one of the communication capabilities of the state. Both governmental and non-governmental subjects can be considered essential links between public diplomacy and strategic communications.

## **CHAPTER 2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE PRISM OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND BUSINESS WITH SOCIAL/CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVITIES**

*“We often say that swords determine outcomes, but it’s minds that determine the hands that wield the swords.”*

*~ Joseph Nye,*

*Discussion on the Future of Soft Power and Public*

*Diplomacy [178].*

### **2.1. The legislative and institutional basis for the implementation of the current policy**

The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis determined, that the legislative and institutional framework for the implementation of the current policy toward public diplomacy in Ukraine exists. It should also be noted that less than 5 years have passed since the drafting and adoption of certain documents which represent the basis for Ukrainian public diplomacy – the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine. Both Strategies were approved by the decision of the Board of the MFA of Ukraine on March 24, 2021, in one package due to the direct connection of such documents. In order to prepare such Strategies, consultations were held with public authorities and experts – not only national but also international. The elaboration of both documents was accompanied by the support of experts from the UNDP Crisis Coordination and Management Unit [34] in Ukraine under the MFA of Ukraine. The drafting process of mentioned documents lasted almost a year [39].

It is believed that the process of public diplomacy institutionalization in Ukraine was started in December 2015 with the creation of the Public Diplomacy Department within the MFA of Ukraine and later a number of important documents were adopted containing tasks for Ukraine`s public diplomacy [30, p. 3]. Additionally to some significant documents, the operation of the Ukrainian Institute started fully in 2019 [30, p. 3].

The adoption of the Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine was preceded by an event no less important for modern Ukrainian diplomacy. On December 7, 2021, the First International Strategic Communications Forum “Kyiv Stratcom Forum” was held featuring Emine Dzheppar – First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine – at which, in addition to the presentation of two mentioned Strategies, the launch of the web page Ukraine.ua [167] for foreign audiences, the official English-language pages of Ukraine in the social networks Facebook and Instagram was announced. Such an online event was based on the experience exchange in strengthening the resistance to disinformation [118] – a topic that has been key for Ukraine since at least February 20, 2014, when Russia's premeditated armed aggression against Ukraine began with the Russian military operation targeted at seizing a part of Ukrainian territory – the Crimean Peninsula, the continuation of which was the war in the Ukrainian Donbas [76].

2021 has become a truly outstanding year for the development of public diplomacy in Ukraine: the first five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine were developed and adopted with a planning horizon for 2021-2025 [39]. The Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine identified seven areas of public diplomacy in Ukraine: cultural, economic, scientific and academic, sport, culinary, digital, and expert diplomacy (the last one is especially important for the preparation of this master's thesis). The Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine became the first document in the history of Ukrainian diplomacy that managed to unify the list of key messages, audiences, formats, and communication channels, while the national brand Ukraine Now remained the foundation for the document [39]. It is important to note that such a successfully developed brand of Ukraine as the national brand Ukraine Now at the heart of the Strategy is intended to ensure maintaining the permanence of the state's strategic communications [39].

For the practical feasibility to implement the Strategy, precise and measurable goals and objectives were defined within 2021-2025. The peculiarity of the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy was the fact that it defined five principles of public

diplomacy, among which one can note project management, innovation, respect for cultural diversity, human centricity, and responsibility. Within this master`s study, it is especially necessary to take into account the principle of innovation, due to which the interests of Ukraine are widely promoted and its reputation and image are strengthened using the most modern methods, and the principle of human centricity, which demonstrates that in Ukraine the interests of any person throughout the public diplomacy implementation form the foundation of such diplomacy, and the principle of responsibility, designed to ensure respect not only for national legislation but also for foreign legislation, international law and generally recognized ethical standards [39].

According to Dmytro Kuleba, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the approval of the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy was intended to strengthen the reputation of Ukraine, as well as to work on this strengthening in a consistent, systemic, and holistic way. Within this master`s thesis, it will be extremely valuable to note that Dmytro Kuleba in 2021 already noted that efficient public diplomacy requires the interaction of not only all involved public bodies but also non-governmental organizations, as well as other potential subjects of public diplomacy [39]. More information on the analysis of the document for relevance, as well as the details about recommendations submitted by the author and the supervisor of this master`s study regarding the updating of the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine are set out in Paragraph 3.1, Chapter 3.

In addition to this outlined document, the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine was also drafted and presented. This document is based on the lessons learned and previous communication experience of the MFA of Ukraine: at that time, in 2021, the biggest communication challenge was the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic [131], which led to the forced transition of diplomacy to an online dimension, a short planning horizon, limited funding, and quite shortened available tools for the diplomatic activities. However, such challenges did not make the Strategy abstract or, on the contrary, too narrow: the document created a coherent, distinct (which is especially important for further monitoring and evaluation process), as well

as a powerful system of external and internal activities of the MFA of Ukraine regarding the communication process, aimed at achieving the strategic goals of such Ministry [39].

As of 2021, the document defined digital and remote communications as a priority, formed established procedures for planning, implementing, and evaluating the efficiency of communications, designed to be flexible, but at the same time not bypassing the vector of the foundations of Ukraine`s foreign policy. In addition, the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine framed an algorithm for the actions of the diplomatic service employees upon the occurrence of various communication situations, which indicates in-depth effort during the preparation of this document [39]. More information on the analysis of the document for relevance, as well as the details about recommendations submitted by the author and the supervisor of this master`s study regarding the updating of the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine are set out in Paragraph 3.2, Chapter 3.

Both of these documents have become a significant shift for Ukraine in the diplomacy field also for the reason that, for instance, the tools of cultural and, most importantly in the context of this master`s study, expert diplomacy are widely used to promote the topic of counteracting russian aggression (in particular, on issues of de-occupation, violations of human rights, disinformation, etc.) for foreign politicians, civil servants, experts, and scholars, and also within the framework of international organizations, etc. [151, p.10]. The author and the supervisor of master`s research notes that attention should be paid to the quite soft wording (even as of 2021 – i.e., a year before russia`s full-scale invasion of the territory of independent Ukraine) with regard to the description of the russian federation actions. At that time the ‘war’ word was mentioned 4 times in the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, while the term ‘aggression’ was mentioned 6 times in the same document [151]. In the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, the ‘war’ word was never mentioned, while the term ‘aggression’ was mentioned twice [131]. Since 2022 and as of 2023, the situation has changed dramatically. More information on how policies should meet the

challenges of our time is given by the author and the supervisor of this master`s study in Chapter 3.

The main legislative framework on the diplomacy and strategic communications issue in Ukraine has the following form:

- The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine in terms of Chapter X. International relations (adopted on July 16, 1990) [35] – this particular document marked the beginning of Ukraine`s development as a player in the international arena and can be considered the ‘sources’ for the further development of diplomacy, as this development happened gradually and for a long time;
- The Declaration of Independence of Ukraine in terms of the possibility to be recognizable by the international community [141] (adopted on August 24, 1991) [14];
- The Basic Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine (adopted on July 2, 1993) are no longer valid [127] due to the Law “On the principles of domestic and foreign policy” adopted on July 1, 2010 [140];
- The Constitution of Ukraine in terms of Article 106 states that the President of Ukraine is in charge of the foreign policy of the State (adopted on June 28, 1996) [134];
- The Regulations on the MFA of Ukraine (adopted on March 30, 2016) [152];<sup>4</sup>
- The Concept of Ukraine's Popularization in the World and Promotion of Ukraine's Interests in the Global Information Space (adopted on October 11, 2016) [133];
- The Concept of Strategic Communications of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (adopted on November 22, 2017) [132];
- The Information Security Doctrine (adopted on February 25, 2017) [136];
- The Law of Ukraine “On the Diplomatic Service” (adopted on June 7, 2018) [139];

---

<sup>4</sup> <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/281-2016-П#Text>

- The Ukrainian Institute 2020-2024 Strategy (adopted on June, 2020) [165];
- The Strategy for National Security of Ukraine (adopted on September 14, 2020) [154];
- The Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine for 2021-2025 (adopted on March 24, 2021) [151];
- The Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine (adopted on March 24, 2021) [131];
- The Priorities of Interparliamentary Cooperation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2021 (published on March 5, 2021) [149].

Additionally, for the purposes of this master's thesis, it should be noted about the legislative framework regarding the analyzed issue on non-profit organizations' activities in Ukraine:

- The Law of Ukraine “On Civil Associations” (adopted on March 22, 2012) [138];
- The Law of Ukraine “On Charity Work and Charity Organizations” (adopted on July 5, 2012) [137].

The main institutional framework on the diplomacy and strategic communications issue in Ukraine has the following form:

- The MFA of Ukraine [142];
- The Ukrainian Institute – is the sole specialized Ukrainian institution in the cultural diplomacy field [165] [105];
- The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine [143];
- The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine [146] (especially in the context of relevant professionals preparation);
- The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine [144] (especially in the context of relevant professionals preparation);
- The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security [129];
- The Ukrainian Cultural Foundation [164];

- The Ministry of Economy of Ukraine [145];
- The Ukrainian Book Institute [163];
- The European Integration Portal [135];
- The Public Diplomacy Foundation [150];
- The Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine [147];
- Additionally, all ministries and departments are working on joint projects to promote the Ukraine NOW brand all around the world [30, p. 4].

Within the scope of this master`s thesis, the diplomatic and consular missions list would not be referenced. However, it is worth noting Ukraine is considered a member of more than 90 international organizations [88], including the UN where Ukraine is considered one of the founders [15] and also a full member with Sergiy Kyslytsya as a Permanent Representative of Ukraine since February 2020 [115].

While analyzing the existing institutional, and especially the legislative framework, not only the existence of such elements should be taken into account, but also their compliance with the context of the turbulent present time, as well as the challenges and goals that Ukraine has outlined, defines and plans to determine further. Until 2021 (inclusively) Ukraine sought to strengthen its reputation, image, separation from russia in the information field, etc. However, starting from February 24, 2022, such goals of Ukraine's public diplomacy were automatically replenished with renewed equally serious benchmarks and needs. According to the author`s and the supervisor`s visions, the proactive development and support of expert diplomacy as one of the most important vectors of public diplomacy in Ukraine can be included in the new needs and milestones 'list' of Ukrainian public diplomacy not only among the government but also among the active civil society and expert business with social/corporate responsibility representatives engaged in high-quality analytical activities and advocacy process. Support for such activities, which have already demonstrated some achievements (these activities and results outlined in Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Chapter 2) since the beginning of the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine, can be considered working toward the future of Ukraine regarding the restoration of justice as far as public institutions do not have the same level of flexibility and funding as two other

components of the triangle. The activities of actors with high-quality expertise in certain public areas (for instance, in the healthcare system in Ukraine) should not be omitted when it comes to protecting the interests of Ukraine by highlighting the Russian war crimes.

In 2023 an urgent need to revise and, as a result, update both of the analyzed documents – the Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine – arises as they should correspond to dynamic internal and even more dynamic external changes in the environment. When the static model loses its power, communication, and diplomacy lose their skillfulness. By the ‘static model’ the author and the supervisor of this master’s thesis mean usage of “traditional modes of state-to-state diplomacy”, and at the same time, by the ‘dynamic model’ the author and the supervisor of this master’s thesis mean the diplomacy that takes into account technological innovations as well as globalization that both created a special “transboundary character” – the author and the supervisor of this master study agreeing with such definitions provided by Md. Azmal Mahmud Khan [77]. Therefore, the static model should be replaced by a dynamic model designed to respond flexibly to urgent challenges and anticipate potential issues, which especially affects strategic communications planning. Volodymyr Yermolenko, Ukrainian philosopher, journalist, chief editor at Ukraine World, and president at PEN Ukraine [182], once said that modernists reinvent traditions while Bohdana Neborak, Ukrainian journalist, lawyer, cultural manager, and literary critic [28], stated about the need for new ideas instead of old clichés. Both ideas were presented within the Ukrainian Summer Swiss Club “People at War: Human Capital and its Recovery. Visions of the Future” organized by the Ukrainian-Swiss Project “Medical Education Development” in September 2022 and both ideas are more topical than ever before. Detailed information on the dynamic model is given in Paragraph 3.1, Chapter 3.

The skillful and flexible Ukrainian expert community, which has a valuable niche<sup>5</sup> non-abstract experience and has been working specifically in its field since 2022 to cover potential Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity on the territory of

---

<sup>5</sup> I.e., for a certain area (the healthcare system in Ukraine etc.)

Ukraine, might be considered a valuable adviser when updating the mentioned documents.

## **2.2. Renewed emphasis: Ukrainian human rights public diplomacy after February 24, 2022**

The beginning of russia`s full-scale invasion of the territory of independent Ukraine with extreme force affected the usual functioning, without any exceptions, of all Ukrainian organizations. At the same time, the human centricity principle stated in the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, under which the person, her or his life, and the rights of a such individual are considered the ultimate value [151, p. 15] has become even more important for the ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle activities.

This Paragraph will focus more on civil society (usually supported by grant funding) and business with social/corporate responsibility activities since the author of this master`s study has a direct professional background in these fields as a think tank project manager, a person, that documented russian potential war crimes and crimes against humanity, a co-author of some essential reports on russian devastating actions toward Ukrainian healthcare sphere. Additionally, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis have the intention to demonstrate clearly the contribution of civil society and proactive business models with social/corporate responsibility to the expert diplomacy within human rights public diplomacy theme development in Ukraine.

Firstly, it is worth noting that for some civil society organizations, human rights activities before February 24, 2022, were already fundamental, as for the Documentation Center at the UHHRU, which activities are analyzed in detail in Paragraph 1.3, Chapter 1. Thus, since 2016 and in 2023 Center`s activities united the gap between ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ and the Ukrainian past within human rights protection, expert diplomacy, and public diplomacy. Also, it is worth mentioning the achievements of the CLS, a Ukrainian organization headed by Oleksandra Matviychuk, NaUKMA alumnus [96], which was established in 2007 exclusively for human rights promotion and on December 10, 2022, was awarded the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize for

“representation of civil society in their countries” in the war crimes documenting context [148].

Secondly, in Ukraine, some civil society organizations specialized in certain areas of public life, within which the protection of the rights of the individual as a patient took place. For instance, such organizations include the PofU CF, the most prominent Ukrainian association of patients which functioning in Ukraine for more than 10 years. The aim of this organization lies in ensuring effective treatment with access to medicines for all Ukrainian patients and such activity is committed by bringing together activists in order to make an impact on Ukrainian policies and laws [97]. With the start of a full-scale russian invasion, the activities of the PofU CF intensified even more, and acquired new content and forms, including the Humanitarian Hub opening in early March 2022 as a response to russian brutality. Therefore, since that time the PofU CF provides emergency support to healthcare facilities all over Ukraine via the Humanitarian Hub operation enabling them to ensure Ukrainians with healthcare services and life-saving treatment [45].

In terms of expert public diplomacy, the mentioned organization has made significant efforts to isolate russia from the democratic world. The PofU CF in May 2022 supported the decision of the WHO regarding the transfer of the NCD Office outside russia and also the shutdown of all WHO-sponsored events in russian federation. The association believes that the position of the WHO should be even more strict and lead to the exclusion of russia from the WHO. These statements were made by the representative of the PofU CF, Tetyana Khan, at a meeting of public organizations with the director of the WHO Regional Office for Europe [49].

Later, the PofU CF in partnership with the UHC LLC think tank within the grant “Support and capacity building of civil society organizations in documenting war crimes” in the context of the project “Urgent support of the EU for civil society” implemented by ISAR Ednannia with the financial support of the European Union started to document and spread the information about cases of russian attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system [56].

Thirdly, one more essential organization will be mentioned, which was established in 2000 and obtained considerable experience when it comes to the fulfillment of projects focused on the legislative process and the role of public engagement in such a process [12]. The ALI think tank activities focused on the multi-year Parliament`s work monitoring and proposing some evidence-based improvements of the efficiency of the Verkhovna Rada [12], however, since the beginning of russian full-scale invasion this think tank also started to document and spread the information about cases of russian attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system in the partnership with the mentioned above UHC think tank and with the financial support of the IRF within the program “Public Health”.

Notably, each of the organizations` teams mentioned above in this Paragraph consists of or was created or is headed by proactive NaUKMA alumni.

Witnessing, that the UHC think tank organization has been mentioned more than once as a partner, it is worth noting the high level of expertise and potential of such a think tank. In this case, the expertise and skillfulness of the non-governmental think tank as a business model with social/corporate responsibility and a partner have played a key role.

Therefore, fourthly, it should be noted about the mentioned UHC think tank, a business model that expertly provides consultancy, policy advice, analytics, and educational services for healthcare policy and governance since March 2021 [10]. As it can be observed since the full-scale russian invasion started, this non-governmental think tank made a responsible decision to begin the documentation process.

It was stated in 2018 that the best way to be visible and achieve recognition in the global diplomacy context for several NGOs lies in an opportunity to present their activities via coalition so that the efforts of each organization will be considered influential and truly evident [32, p. 85]. For Ukrainian initiative organizations after February 24, 2022, these words took on special meaning on the next day, when out of expert and concerned organizations that joined the documentation process, a joint platform was launched, Ukraine 5 AM Coalition [41]. The purpose of the Coalition is based on bringing to justice the top leadership of russia with the direct perpetrators of

war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as protecting the victims of Russian armed aggression [166]. The main goal of the Coalition is to work also at the national level and when it comes to the international level, the usage of the international mechanisms of the UN, the ECHR, and the ICC is expected [43]. Among the participants of Ukraine 5 AM Coalition, already mentioned above organizations can be found (the UHHRU and the UHC think tank) [41].

According to the author and the supervisor of the master's thesis, nowadays the UHC as a think tank plays an extremely important role, demonstrating a proactive stance not only at the national level via cooperation with the government but also via communication and cooperation with international partners in the context of expert diplomacy focused directly on human rights. This statement is confirmed by the fact that since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the UHC think tank has established partnerships with several expert and well-known international and domestic organizations specializing in the protection of human rights. Thus, after the beginning of the full-scale invasion, a coalition [23] of eyeWitness (NGO, that in 2015 with the help of the IBA created the eyeWitness to Atrocities app – a tool that aimed at supporting human rights defenders in collecting footage that is verifiable in order to further submission of such data in legal proceedings toward international atrocity crimes) [48], Insecurity Insight (H2H NGO, that since 2007 provides services and data products to advocacy groups, aid and humanitarian organizations, and also researchers in order to assist in human rights protection via innovative methodologies and tools) [69], PHR (charitable organization that operates since 1986, investigates and documents violations of human rights by creating the basis for further perpetrators accountability for their crimes) [9] and also MIHR (well-known Ukrainian NGO, that since 2016 works on changing domestic and foreign policy in order to integrate Ukraine into the democratic world) [89] and the UHC think tank was established. In addition to these collaborations, the UHC think tank also established partnerships with the following specialized organizations: Yale School of Public Health (Humanitarian Research Lab), Atlantic Council's Strategic Litigation Project, Chatham House, Clooney Foundation, Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), Trial International, WHO,

HRW, MSF, etc.). Within the next Paragraph, there will be given information on the achievements of such cooperation that aimed at further prosecution of russian crimes support.

Meanwhile, what is the exact role of the non-governmental organization in the documentation process and, therefore, in the expert diplomacy within human rights public diplomacy? No doubts, such organizations provide assistance to public bodies, as well as conduct some ‘abroad’ activities on raising awareness of the real situation in Ukraine. Since the very beginning of the full-scale war, it turned out that foreigners started Googling Ukraine [169, p. 7] and became interested in (or even concerned about) the full-scale russian invasion – finally, the whole world made some attempts to make a clear division between Ukraine and russia in their minds. Thus, one of the most important conclusions that can be observed from February 24, 2022, is as follows: ‘Ukraine’ began to be searched more than ‘russia’, and this should be taken advantage of [168, statement by Maria Lypiatska]. This conclusion makes the UHC position even stronger: not only national and international judicial bodies should see what happened and is happening in Ukraine right now – Ukrainian citizens and the wider international stakeholders community should also get a clear understanding of russia`s actions on the territory of Ukraine, the scale and consequences of such unlawful actions.

In general, the documentation process in Ukraine takes place with the help of representatives of law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor`s office. However, the list of involved representatives does not end there: as can be observed, international experts and representatives of the public sector of Ukraine are added to it [43]. The MFA of Ukraine reported that from the very start of the war, russia has been severely violating international law rules with war crimes and crimes against humanity “massive scale” commitment, killing civilians, infrastructure destroying, and deporting the Ukrainian population [76]. Under such circumstances, it becomes obvious that public bodies are not able to cope with a significant amount of work and dispersion of areas for high-quality and full-fledged documentation without overlooking important details. Moreover, sometimes the public bodies cannot communicate conclusions of their observations in such a skillful way as some civil society organizations or business

models with social/corporate responsibility can. In contrast, one of the outstanding and since February 2022 permanent vectors of the UHC think tank work, specializing in operating with the Ukrainian healthcare system, has proved that it is capable of high-quality activities implementation in the field of documenting russian crimes, and is also capable of sharing and communicating such activities results and achievements. Additionally, this type of work cannot be considered a short-term process: documentation for the UHC is a strategically planned process aimed at achieving not only short-term goals (coverage of crimes in the media, etc.) but also long-term goals (advocacy and further use of collected evidence in international courts and etc.).

Another example is the attempts of the MOH of Ukraine toward their efforts to start and continue the process of documentation that was accompanied by duplication of half-empty databases, vague guidance to the Departments of Health, and the absence of those responsible for such bases. Moreover, such databases have begun to be used exclusively to indicate data for the purpose of compensation for damage, which radically changes the methodology of data collection. In this case, representatives of civil society and business models with social/corporate responsibility do have some advantages over the activities of the Prosecutor General`s Office of Ukraine, and MOH of Ukraine – and this under no circumstances opposes them, however, on the contrary, promotes cooperation and close communication. Therefore, the issue of the necessity of stable communication between Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and civil society organizations was raised during the interview of Serhiy Hamayko, prosecutor of the Chernihiv District Prosecutor`s Office, and Dmytro Naumenko, head of the public reception of the MART NGO [43].

Going back to the subject of the UHC functioning since the start of the full-scale invasion, the vector of the think tank activity, aimed at recording and spreading information on the destructive actions of the russian federation in the healthcare system in Ukraine, can be divided into the following forms:

- Work dedicated to the isolation of russia from the worldwide medical community, designed to eliminate the influence of russia on such a medical community, in particular, by organizing events dedicated to discussions on how this

can be done [3], by speaking at national and further international conferences (e.g., within “European Conference on Youth Safety”, Munich [50] or Aspen Ideas Festival: Health 2022 [51]), as well as by drafting relevant statements (more details can be found in the next Paragraph).

- Work dedicated to the media coverage of attacks toward medical facilities in Ukraine in order to draw the attention of non-professional domestic and foreign audiences to the facts of such russian brutal attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system and their consequences.

- Work dedicated to the cohesive with national and international partners process of protected evidence bases completion, which is already forming and will continue to form information array of evidence to punish russian military and political leaders for what has been committed on the territory of independent Ukraine, as well as the creation of joint relevant statements.

- Work dedicated to the transfer of data collected and statements prepared to authorized international institutions.

- Work dedicated to the joint statements conducted with international partners within authorized international institutions` activities.

It should be noted that some of the above types of one vector of the think tank activity often overlap, however, media coverage and data exchange happen with strict respect for confidentiality and data security.

Under this Paragraph, analytical materials created by the UHC and partners will be mentioned, whose target audience consists of profile international communities and organizations, public authorities; Ukrainian and international media (journalists); documenters of war crimes of the russian federation; researchers studying war crimes, in particular against the healthcare sphere; lawyers working on the topic of war crimes; advocacy experts, etc.

Thus, certain foundational analytical products within the renewed Ukrainian human rights public diplomacy were created by the UHC and partners:

- The issue brief by the UHC and the Atlantic Council Strategic Litigation Project “Attacks on hospitals from Syria to Ukraine: Improving prevention and accountability

mechanisms” (by Elise Baker and Gissou Nia) was drafted on June 14, 2022. Within this issue brief, recommendations to the WHO, UN bodies, decision makers, national governments, and other institutions were presented in order to encourage specific actions to prevent potential future attacks and also “advance accountability for past ones” [24]. This document was created within the ALI support and the IRF funding.

- A Report by the UHC “Massive. Brutal. Deliberate. Attacks on Hospitals in the Russia-Ukraine War during the First Phase of the Invasion (February 24-April 7, 2022)” was presented in October 2022. This report focused on the first 42 days of the full-scale invasion and describes the importance of the special protection given to healthcare infrastructure, including medical personnel, under IHL. The observations from the field missions, conducted by the members of the UHC team and by the author of this master`s thesis to Sumy Oblast, Chernihiv Oblast, and Kyiv Oblast were included in this Report [85]. This document was created within the ALI support and the IRF funding.

- A Report by the UHC “Destruction of Healthcare in Mariupol (February 24 – May 20, 2022)” was presented in December 2022. As was stated in the Report, the destruction of this Ukrainian city can only be compared with Aleppo in Syria or Grozny in Chechnya tragedies [156, p. 3]. Moreover, it was analyzed by the team, that in Mariupol, 86 out of 106 healthcare facilities were damaged or completely destroyed [161]. The Report is also available in Ukrainian [159]. Ukrainian version of the Report was created with the ALI support and the IRF funding, while the English version of the document was created with the PoFU CF support and project “EU Emergency Support 4 Civil Society”, implemented by the ISAR Ednannia with the financial support of the EU.

- A Report by the UHC in partnership with eyeWitness, Insecurity Insight, MIHR, and PHR “Destruction and Devastation. One Year of Russia’s Assault on Ukraine’s Health Care System” was presented in February, 2023 [6]. The Report is also available in Ukrainian [7]. This Report included recommendations to the ICC`s Office of the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the IICIU, other National Prosecutors, the Government of Ukraine, the Diplomatic Community (Member States of the EU,

the UN Security Council, the OSCE, etc.), the UN HRC and its Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the WHO and its Member States [6, p. 63-64].

- A Report by the UHC “In the Line of Fire: How Russian Troops Are Destroying Medical Infrastructure of Kharkiv Oblast (February 24, 2022 – March 2023)” in Ukrainian was presented in March, 2023 [157]. The observations from the field missions, conducted by the members of the UHC team to Kharkiv Oblast were included in this Report [160]. This document was created within the ALI support and the IRF funding.

Such analytical materials were proactively shared with the MFA of Ukraine, domestic and international partners, and the media. The main message of such documents is a demonstration that Russia's war crimes should be considered not as single episodes, but as a massive and systematic terror of the civilian population [161]. The list of materials above is not exhaustive. In order to reach the widest possible national and foreign audience, the UHC team regularly works on information columns [79], articles [59] [38] [57], etc., involving authoritative Ukrainian and foreign media.

As can be observed, the contribution of proactive and flexible civil society organizations and business models with social/corporate responsibility to the expert diplomacy field within modern human rights public diplomacy can be considered significant. Such organizations were not only able to restructure their work and engage in rather responsible and morally complicated activities regarding documentation but also to strengthen this activity, which already brings certain results and achievements that are truly important for Ukraine. The role of proactive and flexible civil society and business models with social/corporate responsibility is also significant because it has become an essential addition to the activities of public bodies, which sometimes cannot qualitatively and timely cover the entire spectrum and specifics of Russian crimes documenting process on the territory of Ukraine.

### **2.3. Human rights public diplomacy for the legal prosecution of war crimes**

The author of this master's thesis while studying the International Criminal Law course within the last year of her bachelor's degree in law, NaUKMA, that has been

taught by Dr. Gaiane Nuridzhanian, an international lawyer that worked at the ECHR, CoE, and the ICC [94], came to the following conclusion. No matter what massive evidence base the state (that suffered and is suffering and, in some cases, will continue to suffer from the armed conflict) has, the preparation, prosecution, and adjudication processes can persist for many years. Additionally, the power of the ICC`s jurisdiction is quite tricky and limited, so Ukraine and especially Ukrainian human rights diplomacy might struggle in that case as already today it is worth thinking about making russia fully responsible for everything that was done since February 24, 2022, on the territory of Ukraine.

The role of the Rome Statute of the ICC [33] drafted in the 1990s [5] in the context of the legal prosecution of war crimes plays a major role despite the fact Ukraine still has not ratified the Statute (despite the fact that according to the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (Articles 8 and 24), Ukraine is obliged to ratify and implement the Rome Statute) [19] but has submitted the ICC`s jurisdiction [5]. Denis Maluska, Minister of Justice of Ukraine [37], explained this as “the result of internal Ukrainian problems with communications, so the Ukrainian military formed a false opinion about this document, which cannot be changed under the conditions of martial law” [106]. Ukraine 5 AM Coalition on March 21, 2022, submitted a Statement calling on the President of Ukraine to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC [31].

Remarkably, the Rome Statute of the ICC in its Article 5 defines crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, among which “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” [33, Article 5] can be found: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of aggression. This information is extremely essential within this master`s thesis Paragraph since the ICC has jurisdiction under this Statute with respect to the crimes mentioned above [33, Article 5] and precisely these crimes russia commits on the territory of independent Ukraine.

However, the major problem lies within the jurisdiction of the ICC, as was mentioned at the beginning of this Paragraph. In other words, the Court is able to

prosecute individuals (and even political and military leaders) only for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide – but is not able to do so for the crime of aggression [95]. That can be explained by the following fact. Some amendments to the Rome Statute toward the crime of aggression have been made back in 2010, however, such amendments came into effect only in 2018 [5]. Unfortunately for Ukraine and fortunately for the occupier, the mentioned Kampala amendments provide the fact that for non-parties states to the Statute (i.e., for Russia in this context), the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction regarding the crime of aggression when committed by that State's nationals (i.e., by Russians) or on its territory [5]. Therefore, under the ICC's jurisdiction and additionally as a non-party state, Ukraine is limited to prosecution of non-aggression crimes only [5]. They include the list of crimes already mentioned above within Article 5 of the Rome Statute prior to 2018 (i.e., war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide but not the crime of aggression) [5].

On March 13, 2023, it was reported that the ICC is planning to initiate the first two cases against Russia and toward the war crimes conducted by Russia: regarding the deportation of children and attacks on infrastructure [95]. Worth noting, the civil infrastructure includes healthcare facilities [187] that since February 2022 have been damaged or completely destroyed by the Russian military.

Importantly, targeting healthcare infrastructure that can be considered functioning (and also its personnel) in the context of an armed conflict constitute war crimes, therefore, Russia, by carrying out even indiscriminate attacks that affect medical facilities (i.e., civilian infrastructure) commits war crimes [20]. The MFA of Ukraine reported that the occupier country temporarily seized and tries to hold almost 20% of Ukrainian territories [76]. One can reasonably conclude that medical facilities in these territories either work for the benefit of the occupiers or are completely destroyed.

Nevertheless, not only the ICC might have some impact on the Russian political and military leadership prosecution process. Since the beginning of Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, among international lawyers, scholars, former government officials, and a core group consisting of more than 30 states, advocacy began on the possibility to establish a new tribunal in order to prosecute Russia's unlawful acts

preliminarily qualified as the crime of aggression [5]. It is important to understand that this possible concept of the tribunal establishment will lead to the recognition of flexible experts not only from the Ukrainian government but also from the proactive and organized civil society (and some business models with social/corporate responsibility) which are already filling the databases and documenting the crimes of russia on the territory of Ukraine. Subsequently, there will also be a need for skillful and principled experts who can convey the main messages of the Ukrainian party, thereby making expert diplomacy within public diplomacy in Ukraine cohesive and able to bring all sectors together to achieve the state`s goals. Since the intention to influence foreign citizens in achieving a particular state`s foreign policy goal is considered the fundamental public diplomacy objective [67], for Ukraine such a goal is to promote and protect the human rights of its citizens as was already mentioned in the framework of this master`s thesis.

As it was stated previously by the author and the supervisor of this thesis, human rights public diplomacy for the legal prosecution of war crimes within the scope of this master`s thesis is analyzed in the context of documenting and spreading information about cases of russian attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system since February 24, 2022. The gathering of pieces of evidence and the spreading of meaningful facts and stories can be considered extremely important and irreplaceable phases [43] as they form the initial stage of a long-lasting prosecution process that will be conducted by the potential future tribunal and the ICC as the themes of a person`s health [33, Point (k), Paragraph 1 of Article 7 (Crimes against humanity)] [33, Point (iii), Paragraph 2 (a), Point (x) Paragraph 2 (b), Point (xi) Paragraph 2 (e) of Article 8 (War crimes)], access to medicine [33, Point (b), Paragraph 2 of Article 7 (Crimes against humanity)], and also intentional “directing of attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law” [33, Point (xxiv), Paragraph 2 (b) of Article 8 (War crimes)] mentioned widely in the Rome Statute. In addition, the process of recording and documenting the crimes of the russia`n army in Ukraine definitely has a strategic significance for Ukraine itself.

It should be noted about an important combination that expands the capabilities of civil society and business with social/corporate responsibility, closely working with the healthcare sector in Ukraine in the context of documentation. A developed network with medical institutions throughout the country, as well as the availability of relevant knowledge on the functioning of the medical system in Ukraine (primary, secondary, and specialized health care features, etc.), and also knowledge acquired in the process of mastering the skills of documenters (pieces of training by Mnemonic on documentation & monitoring and achieving process with user-generated evidence, online monitoring, and contention preservation workflow, etc.), makes the data collection process more flexible, reliable, valid and secure. While documenting, the Berkeley protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations [25] created by the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, with the UN representatives is used by the UHC [153]. Detailed methodology can be found in each document created by the UHC in partnership with other organizations [172].

As of April 15, 2023, the UHC analysts have documented 318 Russian attacks on medical facilities in Ukraine [158] and in this Paragraph, the author of the master's thesis would like to mention the specific achievements that the UHC managed to accomplish since February 24, 2022, in the context of civil society and business model with social/corporate responsibility contribution to the human rights public diplomacy development in Ukraine, aimed at further legal prosecution of war crimes within the ICC, potential tribunal, the ECHR, etc.

Such achievements, whose target audience mainly consists of the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the ICC, the ECHR, public authorities, lawyers working on the topic of war crimes, etc., in addition to the activities and results outlined in the previous Paragraph, include the following.

On April 3, 2022, the essential statement [171] of the Ukraine 5 AM Coalition to the Ukrainian authorities was published, due to the scale and mass nature of war crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred on the territories temporarily occupied by Russian army, as well as problems with staffing in the context of the

ongoing war. The statement also contained an appeal to the partner states, as well as to international organizations [162].

In August 2022, the UHC submitted a Joint Submission to the UN HRC, ahead of the assembly, which was held from September 12 to October 7, 2022, in partnership with PHR and Truth Hounds.

Later, in September 2022, the UHC in partnership with PHR, eyeWitness, and Insecurity Insight made the Joint Submission “Attacks on Hospitals and Healthcare in Ukraine” to the UN IICIU [155]. Additionally, within the UN HRC 51<sup>st</sup>, Pavlo Kovtoniuk, co-founder of the UHC, had the possibility to make an oral presentation and also to lead a series of meetings with Geneva-based UN and non-governmental officials, principally at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Joint Submission was based on the Report by the UHC “Massive. Brutal. Deliberate. Attacks on Hospitals in the Russia-Ukraine War during the First Phase of the Invasion (February 24-April 7, 2022)”, mentioned in the previous Paragraph. This Submission once again demonstrated the clear position of Ukraine. Moreover, such achievements promote the use of verified data in documents and events of the UN IICIU.

In March 2023, the UHC representative and PHR Delegation brought evidence and advocacy to the 52<sup>nd</sup> Session of the UN HRC [100] [65]. There PHR prioritized the adoption of the recommendations related not only to Ukraine but also to Syria, Ethiopia, and the US. In the context of the war in Ukraine, PHR in partnership with other organizations suggested perpetuating a Russian attack pattern on healthcare in multiple jurisdictions, including in Ukraine [100]. Within this event the Report “Destruction and Devastation. One Year of Russia’s Assault on Ukraine’s Health Care System”, mentioned in the previous Paragraph was presented. The UHC team member, Diana Rusnak, in partnership with other organizations, was able to communicate with investigators, humanitarian groups, and diplomats. According to Diana Rusnak, the formal part of the Session takes approximately 10% of time and attention, while 90% is given to informal communication and networking “behind the scenes” [47].

As was stated in the previous Paragraph, some types of the UHC activities might overlap, so they can be useful not only for media coverage but also for the further

prosecution of russian crimes on the territory of independent Ukraine. Such activities may include the creation of an interactive map [84] that reflects the shortened database of russian attacks on Ukrainian healthcare facilities in an accessible format in Ukrainian. The map was presented on April 18, 2023. Such a database will be updated through open-source reports about new attacks on healthcare. The interactive map shows the patterns of attacks on the healthcare system, as well as the principles of warfare by russian troops, helping to understand the chronology of the attacks and prove that the russians deliberately shelled medical facilities in order to cause a humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine.

This resource is important given that it can be used by national and regional prosecution authorities, human rights organizations, investigative journalists, as well as by the government (for instance, the MOH of Ukraine, the MOI of Ukraine, the MIA of Ukraine, the MOJ of Ukraine and the MFA of Ukraine) [158].<sup>6</sup> It is important that such a map can be useful for scientific papers drafting in the field of law, criminology, epidemiology, etc. The web resource was developed by the think tank in partnership with ALI and with the support of IRF [158]. Previously, on February 22, 2023, the other map (both in English and Ukrainian) was presented. This database was created by the UHC in cooperation with international organizations like eyeWitness, Insecurity Insight, MIHR, and PHR [22] [23].

The creation of these maps in Ukraine demonstrates the close cooperation of experts from the Ukrainian public sector and business with social/corporate responsibility with foreign experts, as well as in-depth analysis by the Ukrainian expert community of the experience of other countries that suffered from armed conflicts and other countries that still experiencing armed conflicts, and, as a result, are affected by the destruction of medical infrastructure. The UHC partner – PHR – has been documenting attacks on medical infrastructure in Syria since the start of the conflict in 2011 [21]. Remarkably, the data collected by PHR reflects that among the 601 attacks on Syrian medical facilities as of April 29, 2023, the ‘Syrian Government or Russian Forces’ attacker (244 attacks committed) is ranked second after the ‘Syrian

---

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/uhcteam/videos/570003265110466>

Government Forces' attacker (298 attacks committed) [4]. Other attack cases show 24 attacks were committed by an 'Anti-Government Armed Groups' attacker, 21 attacks by an 'Unknown' attacker, 10 attacks by an 'ISIS' attacker, and only 4 by an 'International Coalition Forces' attacker [4]. The scale of the tragedy in Syria and also the pressure on the PHR is impressive: the organization notes that the mentioned confirmed attacks on healthcare facilities represent the "absolute minimum" of the total number of attacks that Syria actually suffers from: averagely the PHR organization can corroborate "approximately 30-40 percent of all received reports" [4]. Collaboration with such a specialized international organization as PHR helped the Ukrainian think tank UHC to focus on the unique experience of data collection in Syria, as well as to understand the subtleties of digitalization processes, further transfer of data to the international judiciary, etc. Earlier in the scientific literature, questions have already been raised about the importance of documenting attacks on health workers and facilities in armed conflicts and the role of Human rights NGOs in that process, specifically on the example of Syria [42].

As can be seen, skilled Ukrainian and international civil society organizations and business models with social/corporate responsibility are ready to make significant contributions to human rights public diplomacy field development. And developed human rights public diplomacy, especially in Ukraine, in turn, could lead to the further successful and high-quality legal prosecution of war crimes committed on the territory of independent Ukraine by russia. Undoubtedly, russia`s intentions are aimed at causing a humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine. With a large but precise database produced by organized and skillful civil society and some business models with social/corporate responsibility, it is possible to build a fundament for a high-quality legal prosecution of russia`s war crimes.

## **Conclusions to Chapter 2**

The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis within Chapter 2 came to the following conclusions while characterizing public diplomacy for the protection of

human rights via the prism of civil society and business with social/corporate responsibility engagement.

Firstly, while studying the legislative and institutional basis for the implementation of the ongoing policy, it was deduced that the legislative and institutional framework in the context of public diplomacy, strategic communications, and non-profit organizations exists in Ukraine. Particular documents, such as the first Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, have been adopted less than 5 years ago, despite the fact the institutionalization of Ukrainian public diplomacy has its roots in December 2015. However, 2021 became the new count for Ukrainian diplomacy, as the mentioned documents for the first time in the history of Ukrainian diplomacy identified seven areas of public diplomacy as well as principles, key messages, audiences, formats, and communication channels list. The lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic & interaction between public bodies and non-governmental organizations, as well as other potential subjects of public diplomacy, were put on the agenda. Meanwhile, not only the COVID-19 pandemic but also the full-scale Russian invasion significantly impacted the goals of Ukrainian public diplomacy. It is important to understand that, surely, the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine could be created as far-sighted and as those that do not require changes, however, the author and the supervisor of this master's study suggest to dig deep while thinking about switching between concepts: from the static model inherent in traditional diplomacy to the dynamic model which might take into account globalization and digitalization processes as well as a wide range of expert actors-players, their self-sufficiency, and human rights promotion and protection theme, what especially needs to be taken into consideration for Ukraine in 2023. Therefore, new serious needs appeared – and revision with updating of both Strategies will play a major role under conditions of constant and sometimes unpredictable challenges and changes for Ukrainian public diplomacy operation.

Secondly, while describing the renewed emphasis on Ukrainian human rights public diplomacy after February 24, 2022, the human centricity principle stated in the

Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine has become more important than ever for the ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle activities. The beginning of the full-scale invasion demonstrated the major contribution of civil society and proactive business models with social/corporate responsibility to the expert diplomacy within human rights public diplomacy theme development in Ukraine, showing its high-level expertise and skillfulness toward challenging themes like documenting and spreading information about cases of Russian attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system. The achievements of organized civil society, some business models with social/corporate responsibility, and the level of assistance to public bodies are impressive. Remarkably, each of the organizations’ teams analyzed in the framework of this Paragraph consists of or was created or is headed by proactive NaUKMA alumni.

Thirdly, while discussing the human rights public diplomacy theme for the legal prosecution of war crimes, it should be highlighted that international law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law can be extremely tricky when it comes to jurisdiction issues. Therefore, only individuals with high-level expertise and awareness are capable to operate within expert diplomacy in the framework of human rights public diplomacy aimed at the legal prosecution of Russian war crimes. Not only skilled Ukrainian civil society organizations and business models with social/corporate responsibility but also international already making significant contributions to human rights public diplomacy field development and to the further successful and high-quality legal prosecution of Russian war crimes.

**CHAPTER 3. IMPROVEMENTS FOR SKILLFUL AND PRINCIPLED  
HUMAN RIGHTS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS A CRUCIAL PART OF A  
HOLISTIC APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION**

*“War is a tragedy. War is an opportunity.”*

*~ Yaroslav Hrytsak,*

*Lecture within the Ukrainian Summer Swiss Club “People at  
War: Human Capital and its Recovery. Visions of the Future”,  
the Ukrainian-Swiss Project “Medical Education Development”.*

**3.1. The Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine: updated needs**

The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis believe the existing legislative and institutional bases outlined in detail in Paragraph 2.1, Chapter 2 – mainly the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine – were relevant in 2021 (as completely new documents based on lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic [131, p. 7]), partly in 2022 (as a permanent base for further Ukrainian national brand development), and almost irrelevant in 2023 (as nowadays the list of lessons from the COVID-19 was supplemented by the list of communicational lessons experienced since the full-scale russian invasion). Such a statement can be supported by the following observations.

To begin with, in 2023 not only the COVID-19 pandemic (as was stated in 2021 within the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine [131, p. 7]) but also the full-scale russian invasion lessons should be taken into account. Since February 24, 2022, a couple of significant initiatives and products regarding the renewed Ukrainian international communications, the national branding of Ukraine perception, and also the power of Ukrainian strategic communications were presented – one of them originated from foreign researchers. Therefore, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis tend to think such valuable documents should be taken into consideration while updating the first Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy (outlined in detail in the next Paragraph) of the MFA of Ukraine.

For a deep understanding of this Paragraph, it is important to realize that different models of public diplomacy exist. Thus, some models consider public diplomacy more as foreign economic relations, while others may provide for a certain centralization, mixed or decentralized nature of such diplomacy [54]. Each country has its own institutions, which are the first responsible for the development and also for the strategic communications of public diplomacy. In most cases, these institutions are identified as the MFA. Ukraine is no exception in this matter, which is why this Paragraph discusses the reviewing and updating of the first Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, and the next Paragraph – the similar actions toward the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine.

First and foremost, the achievements of Brand Ukraine NGO in partnership with the MFA of Ukraine should form the renewed basis for both Strategies of the MFA of “Ukraine. Ukraine`s Global Perception Report” presented on February 22, 2023, highlighted the significant changes toward the national brand power: during 2022 the national brand of Ukraine has extremely strengthened – the recognition of the state has grown by 44%, influence by 24%, and the brand strength indicator has grown by more than 5 points [29]. However, the team working on the Report drafting emphasized that the unprecedented surge of attention to the country has a natural downward trend, therefore, Ukraine`s external communications in 2023 might face a number of serious challenges [29]. Obviously, such a statement cannot be omitted while thinking about updating both Strategies with a five-year planning horizon.

Secondly, as was stated in the “Ukraine`s Information Front – Strategic Communication during russia`s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine” Report published on April 21, 2023, and prepared by FOI (a Swedish organization), which analyzed communication efforts of the Ukrainian party during 2022 [185], since the beginning of the full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine, “the Ukrainian war effort superseded expectations” while the fact of invasion outlines the importance of strategic communication in the context of full-scale war [170, p. 3]. Some of the ideas from this Report can be considered relevant and almost unprecedented.

For instance, the opinion stated by the researchers – the need to be proactive instead of reactive. The Report concluded that the success of Ukraine`s communicational efforts was driven by “preparations, coordination, speed, and transparency”, while a high enough level of trust between various actors created “flexibility and speed” that played a major role in the fight for information field control [185]. This is partly explained by the vision under which different actors produce the division of communications capabilities that actually might lead to competitions between such actors aimed at resources – and unfortunately, this situation may appear in Ukraine sooner with the continuation of the russian war [185]. In other words, after the full-scale russian invasion experience and some progress of Ukraine in the communicational field, some other challenges might arise. For instance, the issue of Ukrainian ‘exceptional’ West emphasis, analyzed in Paragraph 3.3 of this Chapter also discussed by FOI researchers: “... the picture looks different in other parts of the world” [185] which means that Ukraine is mainly focused and used to rely on the EU and the US, however, when it comes to other parts of the world the situation differs greatly.

Some statements of FOI researchers also resonate with the Brand Ukraine statements mentioned above, for instance, relatively the further need to maintain a permanent level of trust with the creation of a continued level of support and interest toward themes significant for Ukraine [185]. Finally, the Report states that war efforts in Ukraine depend on ongoing outside support while permanent success in the information area “is of the utmost importance” [185]. According to the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, such a statement can pretty accurately demonstrate the clear reference to the smart power concept, already mentioned in Paragraph 1.1, Chapter 1. Moreover, David Haigh, Chairman and CEO at Brand Finance, stated that nowadays Ukraine is demonstrating to the world such a precious lesson on how soft power “can serve the ultimate purpose” of providing the nation`s survival in times of strongest difficulty with a skillful usage of soft power that assists hard power aims [169, p. 39].

As can be seen, the documents analyzed above should be considered while forming the renewed era for Ukrainian public diplomacy since some mentioned follow-ups and recommendations aimed at the future communicational development of Ukraine, which can be provided at the strategic communications level and hence on the public diplomacy level as well.

Furthermore, the author and the supervisor of this master`s study agree with the statement that investment in public diplomacy can have long-term benefits [46]. In the context of this master`s research, such long-term benefits are extremely essential to the expert diplomacy focused on the real promotion and protection of human rights and also to the gradual development of the renewed vector of public diplomacy. However, without the harmonious involvement of all the ‘government – civil society – business with social/corporate responsibility’ triangle`s components such development can be complicated. In support of this statement, the article mentioned previously within this master`s thesis can be referenced. Thus, Chernenko T., chief consultant of the Department of information security and cyber security of the Center of security research of NISS, stated that at the end of 2021 in some cases there was a lack of proper inter-institutional cooperation and understanding of the importance of the integrated use of public diplomacy tools. Chernenko stated, that the documents determining the activities of public bodies in the field of public diplomacy do not always meet modern requirements, and the interaction between them can be defined as fragmented and situational – this does not allow using the potential of synergy and also does not contribute to increasing the efficiency of public diplomacy [30, p. 5].

Since the Ukrainian context can provide some non-trivial practical and dynamic solutions as well as the way of their implementation, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis suggest their own dynamic model scheme (**Annex 6**) inspired by Diana Ingenhoff and Jérôme Chariatte approach within their Listening and Evaluation (Public Diplomacy) Compass (LEC measuring model) [68, p. 21]. The dynamic model, suggested by the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, takes into account that each component of the ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle has its own speed and various tools and approaches when it

comes to development issues, decision-making processes, etc. Each of the triangle components is unique and can approach the planning and execution of certain tasks and aims in its own way, has its own strengths and weaknesses, and without a doubt, each component does its best in its own operational area. The dynamic model, suggested by the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, ‘legitimizes’ these irregularities, respecting the characteristics of each sector, as well as the diversity of each of them while giving special emphasis on the human rights promotion and protection theme & the expertise of every sector representative. As a result, among other things, this model is able to provide skillful, principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of the holistic approach to human rights protection.

In addition to the recommendations given above, within this Paragraph, it is essential to present some recommendations for such Sections of the analyzed Strategy.

- Section 1. Public diplomacy: basic approaches and concepts.

Information on updating basic approaches has been partly presented at the beginning of this Paragraph. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis suggest adding some specific information on non-governmental actors of public diplomacy that can join the implementation of the Strategy in order to form a holistic positive image of Ukraine in the world [151, p. 10].

In the context of expert diplomacy as an area of public diplomacy, it is worth mentioning that measurements of public diplomacy subjects work in the field of expert diplomacy [151, p. 13] should be supplemented by some expanded information and reference to a specific document concerning the principles of work with organizations connected with the protection of human rights theme.

Probably it will be appropriate to add principles of openness, proactivity and expertise among already mentioned principles of human centrality, respect for cultural diversity, project management, responsibility, and innovation [151, p. 15].

- Section 2. Comprehensive analysis of the internal and external environment.

This Section should be reviewed and updated. Therefore, each element of the SWOT analysis can be reconsidered with an emphasis on the Ukrainian experience of

the russian full-scale invasion (and also with an expert focus on the long-term vision of public diplomacy development, its main narratives aimed at forming and national brand promotion). For instance, among strengths nowadays the MFA of Ukraine can mention that Ukraine can be considered a courageous and skillful barrier between a civilized democratic world and total terroristic evil; among possibilities, points about the revision of logistics, trade, and economic ties around the world due to the coronavirus crisis and also point about the global food crisis as an opportunity for Ukraine to obtain the status of a guarantor of global food supply security [151, p. 16] cannot be considered relevant anymore and should be adjusted. Some information about risks also should be adjusted – thus, “disinformation attacks and hybrid forms of war by the russian federation” [151, p. 16] obtained new shapes. It is important to understand, the russian war can last for years, which should also be taken into account as a potential risk.

This Section also contains some outdated information on a public opinion poll [151, p. 17], conducted by the New Europe Center in 2020 regarding the most persistent associations with Ukraine (detailed information on this is given in Paragraph 3.3). The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis believe that it is possible to update some relevant information about modern Ukraine according to the newest Brand Ukraine Report, created on January 31, 2023, and mentioned at the beginning of this Paragraph.

- Section 3. Purpose, strategic goals, and tasks of public diplomacy of the MFA.

Firstly, analyzing the purpose of public diplomacy of the MFA it is worth mentioning that not only the positive image should be taken care of but also the reputation of Ukraine.

Secondly, analyzing the strategic goals and tasks of public diplomacy of the MFA, it can be seen that nowadays The Strategy operates with 3 strategic goals: “The world knows more about Ukraine”; “Ukraine is perceived in the world as a democratic European country moving to full membership in the EU and NATO in conditions of external aggression”; and “In its foreign policy activities, Ukraine relies on an effective

system to counter harmful narratives directed against it” [151, p. 18-19]. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis suggest the following strategic goal: “In its foreign policy activities, Ukraine relies on dynamic cooperation between the sectors of government, business models with social/corporate responsibility, and organized civil society”. In addition, it is possible to add one more strategic goal, which might be a matter of debate: “The world knows more about russian unlawful acts on the territory of independent Ukraine”. In accordance with these strategic goals, special relevant tasks should be drafted.

- Section 4. Positioning of Ukraine: Ukraine Now brand and key messages.

According to the opinion of the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, general characteristics and narratives for positioning Ukraine abroad should be adjusted to match fully 2023. Thus, some key narratives will be mentioned in the next Paragraph, however, within this Section it is essential to point out the message from Mykhailo Vinnitskiy, a social scientist and public intellectual [91], that within the Ukrainian Summer Swiss Club “People at War: Human Capital and its Recovery. Visions of the Future” organized by the Ukrainian-Swiss Project “Medical Education Development” in September 2022 stated the following: “Freedom is the religion of Ukraine”.

In addition, the key messages like “Unstoppable country”, “Hero country”, and “Epoch-making country” might be included. When it comes to renewed narratives, it is necessary to mention that Ukraine is not only “the guarantor of the food security of the world” [151, p. 22], but also the guarantor of the democratic security of the world.

However, it is worth mentioning that the narratives stated in the Strategy are relevant and precise as of 2023.

- Section 5. Target audiences, tools, and channels of public diplomacy.

Target audiences of public diplomacy are relevant as of 2023. While updating, greater attention should be paid to expert environments and journalists.

Tools and channels of public diplomacy are relevant as of 2023.

The subsection “Ukraine abroad” became even more relevant as of 2023.

- Section 6. Geographical priorities.

Detailed information on this Section can be found in Paragraph 3.3, Chapter 3, especially about cultural diplomacy geographical priorities and challenges.

Nowadays, different areas of public diplomacy require reviewing in the context of the full-scale russian invasion and the level of passivity in countries and regions outlined as of 2021.

- Section 7. Resources.

This Section is relevant as of 2023.

- Section 8. Cooperation and coordination with other public bodies of Ukraine.

As part of the drafting of this master`s thesis, the analysis, revision, and updating of this Section of the Strategy is extremely important. It can be seen that in the specifics of public diplomacy, the involvement of a larger range of participating actors can be included. Accordingly, the Strategy provides not only efficient coordination and interaction of the MFA with foreign diplomatic institutions of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Institute but also interdepartmental interaction with other ministries, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. At the same time, the analyzed Section “Cooperation and coordination with other public bodies of Ukraine” contains one single proposal for interagency cooperation with other ministries, public institutions, and non-governmental organizations: “The Ministry also interacts with non-governmental organizations involved in the formation of a positive image of Ukraine in the world” [151, p. 29].

According to the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, it is necessary to analyze the cooperation of the MFA with such non-governmental organizations (and, for instance, think tanks that are business models with social/corporate responsibility) that has taken place since the adoption of the Strategy, and analyze the impact of such cooperation on the functioning of the MFA and, therefore, the achievement of strategic goals. Moreover, in his preface to the Strategy, Dmytro Kuleba encouraged all other subjects of public diplomacy to join the implementation of the strategy and the formation of a positive image of Ukraine in the world, because this goal can only be achieved through joint efforts [151, p. 8].

It can be concluded that the Strategy should be supplemented with clear information about the MFA`s experience of cooperation with organized civil society and business models with social/corporate responsibility, especially paying attention to the expertise of the environment and noting the persistence of such partnerships.

Perhaps, conducting a SWOT analysis of such relationships since the adoption of the Strategy will help determine the prospects for cooperation between the MFA and other subjects of public diplomacy, except for the MFA itself, foreign diplomatic institutions of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Institute.

- Section 9. Monitoring and key indicators of the strategic objectives.

Basic indicators for monitoring the implementation of the Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine as well as tools used for such monitoring will depend on renewed and approved strategic goals of the MFA of Ukraine.

As can be seen, the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine adopted in 2021 as of 2023 obtained needs to be reviewed and updated. The lessons based on which the Strategy should be updated should not be limited to the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic and analyzed valuable documents can assist when reviewing and updating the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine. Almost every Section should be adjusted in order to comply with Ukraine`s actualized needs and narratives in 2023 caused by the russian full-scale invasion. To achieve such needs, the dynamic model of communications between the ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle was presented by the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis.

### **3.2. The Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine: new-made narratives**

Since some of the recommendations for reviewing and updating the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine have been set out above in the previous Paragraph, this Paragraph will briefly note such recommendations, as well as provide more details about the recommendations specifically to the Communication Strategy of MFA of Ukraine, which, inter alia, in turn, will provide skillful and

principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of a holistic approach to human rights protection.

It is worth mentioning again that the current Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine is based on lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic [131, p. 7]. The learning from these lessons as of 2021 was considered an important achievement so the document was regarded as up-to-date. Also, such Strategy defined that activities in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic were forced to take place in the conditions of a short-term planning horizon, limited funding, and a reduction in the available tools for diplomacy [131, p. 7]. According to the opinion of the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, as of 2023, it is quite risky to only rely on short-term achievements that might derive from a close planning horizon. As was stated previously with reference to the FOI Report, the success of Ukraine depends not only on ongoing support from foreign partners but also on stable achievements in the communication field [185], however, the first reason might arise from the second one.

In support of this statement, the observations of Diana Ingenhoff and Jérôme Chariatte should be mentioned. In 2020 they claimed, that the ability to listen is not confined to acknowledging the ongoing challenges a country has to endure [68, p. 8]. Therefore, to ‘perceive’ other lessons than from the COVID-19 pandemic in order to update the current Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, it might be useful to refer to Luigi Di Martino's ideas, mentioned by Diana Ingenhoff and Jérôme Chariatte in their study: for reaching short-term goals Di Martino emphasized the tactical listening, that is especially important talking about specific stakeholders [68, p. 8]. However, according to the opinions of Diana Ingenhoff and Jérôme Chariatte, active listening should be implemented while analyzing the possibility of a long-term relationship of trust establishment. According to them, true listening lies in “paying real attention to people`s voices” [68, p. 8]. Therefore, the author and the supervisor of this master`s study believe that permanent gains in the communication area are possible only while conducting short-term, medium-term, and also long-term planning in combination with tactical and active listening. This idea becomes even more formidable when it comes to stable partnerships establishments within the expert public

diplomacy sphere and also human rights promotion and protection theme, widely analyzed in previous Chapters.

As can be seen, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis are paying special attention to principled human rights public diplomacy and also expert diplomacy development, the renewed vector of efficient and effective strategic communications in Ukraine, the cross-sectoral cooperation within public diplomacy theme, and a particular focus on the high dynamism of internal changes & the low speed of changes in the external environment. In this way, the updated Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine shall include relevant accents and renewed narratives since the focus on mentioned themes plays a major role in the context of further diplomacy development since February 24, 2022.

For such reasons, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis suggest a review and an updating of the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine in accordance with the following information.

- Section 1. Basic approaches and principles.

Information on updating basic approaches has been partly presented within Paragraph 3.1 and the current Paragraph.

The list of principles is relevant. However, it might be useful to revise the order of such principles: from ‘human centrality – respect for cultural diversity – project management – responsibility – innovation’ to ‘human centrality – responsibility – innovation – project management – respect for cultural diversity’. Such order can be explained in the following: human centrality principle already may imply the respect for cultural diversity principle. However, for the MFA of Ukraine, it is quite essential to highlight the significance of the responsibility principle since Ukraine not only complies with the laws of Ukraine but also with the norms of international law, and generally recognized ethical standards – and shows it vividly. Especially this statement is important in the context of russian war on the territory of independent Ukraine. After the responsibility principle, it might be useful to place the innovation principle, because the role of innovative development and new technologies and approaches, as was already analyzed in Chapter 1, can be considered a key to communicational success.

Next, the principle of project management should be placed with a major focus on dynamic planning. Such an order might demonstrate the combination of innovative approaches within project management. Finally, the significant role of respect for cultural diversity should be mentioned – and right after this, it is reasonable to make a transition to the values, reputational and individual characteristics, and also to the visual identity of the MFA of Ukraine.

- Section 2. Analysis of the current situation.

There the renewed SWOT analysis should be conducted based on the relevant audit of the organization of the work of the communication team of the MFA of Ukraine. The reason for this is quite outdated information (the last audit was conducted between May and July 2020) [131, p. 10] on the key strengths and weaknesses mentioned. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis suggest paying special attention to opportunities (e.g., what kind of new approaches to communications can significantly change and improve the reputation of the ministry as previously [131, p. 10] this point was mentioned quite vague) and risks (e.g., the activity of other players in commenting on foreign policy, which either does not coincide with the official position of the state or may contribute to the impression that the policy of the ministry is dependent on other authorities [131, p. 10]) while reviewing this SWOT analysis. Additionally, a particular emphasis should be made on the demonstration of the MFA of Ukraine as a link between international organizations and human rights protection.

- Section 3. Mission, vision, goals, and tasks of the MFA of Ukraine in the communications field.

The current mission of the MFA of Ukraine is “to make the world safe and favorable for the Ukrainian state, society, economy, and citizen, and to support the unity of Ukrainians in the world” [131, p. 11] – might seem quite relevant but at the same time soft enough. Probably, the renewed mission of the MFA of Ukraine might be inspired by the message said by Volodymyr Yermolenko within the Ukrainian Summer Swiss Club “People at War: Human Capital and its Recovery. Visions of the Future” organized by the Ukrainian-Swiss Project “Medical Education Development” in September 2022. Yermolenko stated: “Expanding the space for dignity, we

[Ukraine] narrow it for violence”. Such a message can be supported by the message of Mykhailo Vinnitskiy, that stated within the same event the following: “Ukraine demonstrates a collective fight for individual freedoms”.

The current vision of the MFA of Ukraine might seem quite outdated (e.g., “... a Ukrainian citizen travels freely around the world and feels under the protection of the state in any critical situation”). The current vision includes some information about the role of partnership between business and the MFA of Ukraine, however, as of 2021 this mentioned cooperation consisted of contribution to the growth of Ukrainian exports and attraction of investments to Ukraine only. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis suggest adding some information on the importance of the contribution made by business models with social/corporate responsibility and organized civil society to the activities of the governmental sector, in particular, to the human rights promotion and protection theme and expert diplomacy development.

In terms of the goals and tasks of the MFA of Ukraine in the communications field, the focus not only on economic diplomacy should be made but also on expert diplomacy as the last one can be considered an area of human rights public diplomacy that is able to ensure some of the Ukrainian goals as the goals of the state (i.e., promotion and protection of human rights).

Certain communication goals, tasks, and key messages of the MFA of Ukraine should be supplemented by provisions not only about awareness of foreign audiences about Ukraine as a country attractive for tourism, education and investment, business and trade [131, p. 13] but also as a country that fights and holds back the barbarian quasi-empire-occupier while sacrificing the lives of Ukrainian citizens so at least the EU can still live peacefully.

- Section 4. Key audiences and communication channels.

In the lists of key audiences with which the Ukrainian language is used, it is important to clarify the line “Ukrainian experts” [131, p. 13] by dividing particular areas of expertise. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis also suggest adding business with social/corporate responsibility and an organized civil society as two important players and key audiences. Additionally, in relation to the lists of key

audiences with which English is used, it is important to separate the line “political leadership of foreign countries, foreign and international organizations” [131, p. 13] into two lines, that is, to form two key audiences. Also, it is worth adding a line like “foreign experts and managers in the field of cultural projects” [131, p. 13], but in the field of human rights – “foreign experts in the field of human rights promotion and protection”.

- Section 5. Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine.

Basic indicators for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the Communication strategy of the MFA of Ukraine will depend on renewed and approved communication goals of the MFA of Ukraine.

- Section 6. Final provisions of the Communication strategy of the MFA of Ukraine.

This Section is relevant as of 2023, however, might be adjusted in case some new Annexes will be added.

In addition to the information given above, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis believe it is worth mentioning some general recommendations that might assist in reviewing and updating the Communication strategy of the MFA of Ukraine.

Firstly, according to Brand Ukraine Report, mentioned in the previous Paragraph, a natural downward trend toward a positive perception of Ukraine should be taken into consideration when developing a strategy for future diplomatic and communication activities in order to slow down the decline in awareness and positive attitudes and convert them into enthusiasm in new topics about Ukraine [169, p. 24]. In addition, the Global Soft Power Index 2023 conducted by Brand Finance and mentioned in the same Report can be used while reviewing and updating the Communication strategy of the MFA of Ukraine. Such an Index is able not only to preserve what already has been done but also to increase these achievements [169, p. 30].

Secondly, the one-voice concept should be taken into account when establishing close cooperation and consistency in external communications of all public authorities of Ukraine [169, p. 24]. To illustrate such a need it is worth mentioning the opinion of Denis Malyuska, stated in Paragraph 2.3 Chapter 2, toward quite poor-quality communication about the Rome Statute ratification, which led to the confusion and resistance of those Ukrainians who would allegedly be directly affected by the ratification of such a Statute [106]. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis believe that the one-voice concept is able to help in that kind of sensitive topic. Moreover, the one-voice concept nowadays is appropriate in ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle activities, when it comes to human rights public diplomacy.

Thirdly, as Chernenko T. stated, the most important features and principles of strategic communications – clear coordination, the synchronicity of efforts, and focus on certain key audiences – provide a synergistic effect in resisting negative influences both within the country and from outside [30, p. 2]. Additionally, Chernenko mentioned that the efficiency of public diplomacy largely lies in the attention to positive and negative judgments examination that exist about the country in the framework of a foreign audience, and the establishment of dialogue both at the interstate and at the level of civil society [30, p. 3]. All of that can be achieved with the reviewed relevant Communication strategy of the MFA of Ukraine.

As of 2021, the MFA of Ukraine has already discussed a new reality that dictates updated approaches to communications and strategic planning. Even then, attention was paid not only to the preference for digital and remote solutions in communications but also to the importance of developing sustainable procedures in planning, implementing, and evaluating the effectiveness of communications that would be flexible enough to promote the interests of Ukraine regardless of changes in the external environment [131, p. 7]. In 2023 new-made narratives and recommendations outlined in this Paragraph are able to supplement such ideas.

### **3.3. The global context of strategic communications: Ukraine as an epoch-making worldwide player**

First and foremost, as pointed out previously by the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis, Ukraine cannot and should no more be associated with russia – and for the external strategic communications process establishment at various levels, this statement ought to be considered an extremely important claim. Ukraine, as an example of a country in transition and also a democratic state [111], even with its serious enough level of internal issues (an extremely high level of corruption of various forms and types [188], etc.) under no circumstances cannot be identified with a barbarian quasi-empire-occupier or referred to as russia`s brotherly nation.

Secondly, the “Ukraine`s Information Front – Strategic Communication during russia`s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine” Report by FOI mentioned in the previous Paragraph concluded not only the fact that strategic communications of Ukraine have been one of the most prominent efforts in this war framework but also that such success in communications during 2022 can be considered “a whole-of-society endeavor”, that derive from a “strong sense of national unity and resilience that translates into a polyphonic, nonhierarchical, and creative strategic communication effort” [170, p. 3]. These statements once again confirm the author`s and the supervisor`s of this master`s study idea on the importance and indispensability of the entire Ukrainian society, each part of it: from the involvement of business models with social/corporate responsibility and organized civil society to the activities of the governmental sector – and that created the “beehive”, as one of the Report`s respondents characterized it [170, p. 9]. Moreover, Ivar Ekman and Per-Erik Nilsson – analyst and researcher from FOI – the Swedish Defence Research Agency [8] that prepared this Report, clearly stated the following: their aim was to understand better not only the cause of Ukrainian success talking about the strategic communications field but additionally what the whole world can learn from Ukrainian efforts [185]. In its turn, this statement confirms the idea of the author of this master`s thesis that Ukraine can be considered an epoch-making worldwide player when speaking about strategic communications and the state`s influence on some world processes.

Thirdly, according to a public opinion poll, conducted by the New Europe Center in France, Germany, Italy, and Poland in 2020, the three most persistent associations with Ukraine were indicated as war, poverty/unemployment, and seasonal employees/immigration. It is essential to mention, that this mentioned survey was based on a similar poll, conducted by the same organization in 2015. Notably, these two versions of the same poll showed some unpromising characteristics: in 2015 and 2020, Ukraine was associated with the war. However, in 2020 the results showed an almost fourfold decrease in this indicator [60, p. 6], as the war topic gradually faded as a newsbreak. The author and the supervisor of this thesis assume in 2023 a similar prospective survey would show completely different results regarding the seriousness of the topic of war and the consequences arising from this devastating process. This assumption may indicate that Ukraine, as a highlighted and vivid evidence-based speaker, still obtains some broadcasting time, and can demonstrate to the whole world that tends to be democratic or at least declares it, the ratio between the deadly force of war and the poverty issue. Moreover, regarding russia`s war in Ukraine, it is incredibly vital to use the correct ‘war’ terminology: not just aggression, crisis, conflict, emergency, situation, difficult times, and challenges. Additionally, terms like attack, hostilities, and violence should not be used without clear indications of russia as the initiator.

Fourthly, for the reason above, the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis believe the 17 UN SDGs that are planned to be achieved by 2030 [126] have already lost their value for a certain part of humanity. Moreover, such goals are based on a quite insidious methodology that for real does not take war seriously as an obstacle and as a major challenge. Cases like this usually happen owing to the passivity of international organizations that partly have lost their vision – and now some of their activities focused on human rights protection are more like an imitation of the mandate fulfillment. The poverty issue (“End poverty in all its forms, everywhere” [126]) is considered the first one of the 17 UN SDGs. However, is it possible to bring the issue of war to the fore as a unique and catastrophic root cause of poverty and other hardships? Perhaps this heavy dilemma can be put on the agenda by Ukraine in the

context of expert human rights public diplomacy with tight intersectoral cooperation involved and external strategic communications development.

According to the OCHA [2], ‘conflict’ is considered one of the 11 causes of poverty among inequality and marginalization; hunger, malnutrition, and stunting; poor healthcare systems (especially for mothers and kids); little or no access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene; climate change; lack of education; poor public works and infrastructure; lack of government support, jobs or livelihoods or even reserves.

The tragedy of war and its consequences lies in the fact that a certain state does not suffer from the forces of nature, which are almost always not controlled, as, for instance, in the earthquake, etc. cases. In the event of war, one of the international law subjects suffers from the destructive unjustified actions of another subject of international law. No doubt, each of these subjects has rights and responsibilities – and the underlying problem has the following form: one of such subjects, as a result of action or inaction, avoids fulfilling its own commitments while the other one suffers enormously from it. At the same time, other states and organizations might simply observe while the last one even can find a hideaway in the principle of neutrality.

Ukraine`s experience might indicate the following: the war theme as a national tragedy should be considered as the root cause of poverty and the 10 other causes of poverty mentioned above (**Annex 7**). Under such circumstances, the permanent list of 17 UN SDGs becomes even more contradictory and does not meet the urgent challenges of 2023. Accordingly, the final document named “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” from the UN Sustainable Development Summit conducted in September 2015 during the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in New York [122], appears to be slightly outdated and even meaningless for Ukraine as the UN Member State in 2023 reality. Without a doubt, during 2016 each of the 169 targets of 17 SDGs was reviewed, and the specific national context was taken into consideration while Ukraine has committed itself to reaching the STGs, therefore since 2015, the reform process was also aimed at this goal. As a consequence, Ukraine established a national SDGs system with 86 national targets accompanied by 183 monitoring indicators [113, Report in English, p. 4].

For Ukraine in 2023, times changed as well as context which leads to some major amendments towards the goals the UN is trying to operate with in our country. Remarkably, discussions about outdated, contradictory SDGs all around the world have been going on for a long time [17] [92], however, right now Ukraine is able to demonstrate the depth and inevitability of the problem that arose with the power of its own dynamic and holistic approaches as well as a strict narrative based of difference between the concepts of war, poverty issues, and the UN damaging concept of peace. In that regard, the SDG No. 16 named “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” is in charge of extremely incompatible elements: peaceful and inclusive societies` promotion, access to justice promotion for all, and effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions establishment [121]. Despite the fact that more than 90% of the aims and targets of SDGs conform to obligations tightly connected with human rights [62], while the SDGs and Human rights are considered “two sides of the same coin” [62] somewhere in the world without the full-scale russian experience, the author of this master`s thesis tends to insist on some contradictions inherent to, for instance, the mentioned SDG No. 16.

According to the Ukrainian SDG budget tagging, which includes methodology and report on SDG budget tagging [113], and was presented right before the full-scale invasion, on February 8, 2022, in the report the analysis has been conducted of what exact position was held by Ukraine in the framework of implementation the SDGs into the national strategic planning, policy formulation, budgeting, and also monitoring and evaluation processes [113, p. 10]. The author of this master`s thesis believes that the mentioned documents need to be revised and updated taking into account the environment established in Ukraine as of 2023. This does not negate the fact that while achieving the SDGs, a strong partnership between civil society, government agencies, and the private sector is required [1].

At the same time, nowadays, the inconsistency of the theoretical slogan “leave no one behind” [177] introduced by the UN with the cruel reality that Ukrainians face daily reinforces the abovementioned thoughts. Moreover, such a principle can be considered a pretty accurate description of what happens when a barbarian quasi-

empire-occupier commits numerous war, etc. crimes and is still capable of taking over the presidency of the UN Security Council [112].

In this regard, by analyzing the recent “Ukraine’s Information Front – Strategic Communication during Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine” Report by FOI, long-standing war associations while speaking of Ukraine, the concept of the difference between the war and the poverty issue, and, as a result, the need to revise the overall methodology of the 17 UN SDGs, it is worth to reflect ideas, once expressed by Volodymyr Ogrysko (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2007-2009) and civil activist) [181], Yaroslav Hrytsak (a leading Ukrainian historian and public intellectual) [189], and Valerii Pekar (Ukrainian entrepreneur and business school lecturer) [179].

Volodymyr Ogrysko, during the debate on the new model of the world conducted on March 22, 2023, in the framework of discussion provided by KMBS Presidents` MBA program, focused on the significance of strategy for Ukrainian success [180]. According to Ogrysko, the experience obtained since February 24, 2022, questioned the established system of international relations because of its inefficiency and incompetence and to illustrate that statement Ukrainian diplomat cited the example of the OSCE and UN Security Council (mentioned previously by the author of this master`s thesis) operation. According to Volodymyr Ogrysko, a renewed model is needed [180].

Yaroslav Hrytsak, in the context of his participation as a lecturer within the Ukrainian Summer Swiss Club “People at War: Human Capital and its Recovery. Visions of the Future” organized by the Ukrainian-Swiss Project “Medical Education Development” in September 2022, was deeply focused on the transition from the zone of war to the zone of peace theme. According to the author of this master`s thesis, this transition mentioned by Hrytsak is really important. However, additionally, it is important to think about the following fact, suggested by the author of this study: the peace zone cannot be fair enough without punishment of those who are guilty of the war zone establishment. Such statements can be used by Ukraine not only while forming its messages within the global context of strategic communications and human

rights public diplomacy theme but also regarding somewhat meaningless aims of the UN SDGs in 2023 in terms of the 2030 Agenda.

Several messages presented by Valerii Pekar on April 4, 2023, can be considered extremely valuable for Ukraine as an epoch-making worldwide player.

Firstly, Pekar stated: Ukraine is the only one that is now able to offer the world a clear picture of the future while now the end of the war depends on how the Ukrainian voice will be understood by the West. According to Pekar, the main danger lies in the fact that at the beginning of the full-scale russian invasion, the West started by appeasing the occupier, then moved on to containment, and then decided to ease these measures – and nowadays it is unclear what exact measures will be the next move of the West. Valerii Pekar is concerned that nowadays it is also unclear what exact measures will be considered the next move of Ukraine, at the state level. The entrepreneur believes Ukraine should cope with uncertainty promptly, as time can play against Ukraine – so the best way to succeed – be ahead of time [98]. In accordance with the author of this master`s thesis opinion, such statements genuinely need to be used while analyzing the global context of Ukrainian strategic communications in 2023 – and also planning them.

Secondly, Pekar believes nowadays the world needs moral leadership [99] and exemplifies this idea by highlighting the collective position of the editors of The Wall Street Journal relatively international situation and the complete destruction of the global order due to russian presidency over the UN Security Council [81], already mentioned by the author of this master`s thesis previously in this Paragraph. The Wall Street Journal collective position of the editors` states the fact that russia headed the UN Security Council as the next chairman can vividly underline how helpless the UN is in maintaining international order. Thus, as was stated by the Kyiv Security Forum, “the UN hit yet another grotesque moral bottom” [81] which is pretty hard to argue with.

Additionally, Ukraine as a global player according to the view of Katya Taylor, should not narrow the world to Europe [124]. Katya Taylor, co-founder of Artists Support Ukraine Foundation [18], founder of Port Agency [102], and curator of The

Captured House – a traveling exhibition about the war in Ukraine [128] –since the beginning of the full-scale russian invasion does a lot in the field of Ukrainian cultural diplomacy development. Thus, within the activities of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Kenya and the Ukrainian Institute, Katya Taylor gained experience in organizing and opening Ukrainian cultural projects in Nairobi, connected with russian war – and it turned out that almost no one cares about Ukraine there [125]. According to Taylor, speaking about the cultural representation of Ukraine in the world, Ukrainians often have in mind only Europe or the US, because from there we used to obtain some stable support and there are some changes conducted in favor of Ukraine. However, echoes of news reach Ukraine from China, India, Africa, and Latin America, which Ukrainians actually call the global south – a very dangerous generalization for Ukraine, Taylor states. She added, that while 48 European countries will support us, 54 countries in Africa prefer not to pay attention to Ukraine, even in case the official position of these states is on the Ukrainian side [124]. These reflections from Katya Taylor prompted the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis to assume that not only Ukrainian cultural diplomacy as an area of public diplomacy might struggle with such neglect in China, India, Africa, and Latin America but also every other sphere of Ukrainian agenda, each of which is so important for Ukraine (e.g., promotion and protection of human rights – topics that are particularly sensitive for African peoples). However, such an attitude toward Ukraine was quite predictable because previously Ukraine really did not pay enough attention to strengthen its status in African countries, for instance. Nowadays, in such cases, the basis of the integrated communications and engagement model proposed by Golan, G.J., Yang, S.U., & Kinsey, D. in 2014 [55] can be used. According to this vision, the whole process of communication and engagement can be conditionally divided into 3 stages: familiarization and informing, involvement, as well as the further formation of policy and vision; and while doing so, all tasks should be divided into short-, medium-, long-termed outcomes of public diplomacy [55, p. 433].

As can be seen, Ukraine, experiencing devastating grief, got something truly unique: the chance to be heard by dictating sharp truth based on uncomfortable facts.

Undoubtedly, only a truly epoch-making worldwide player can do such. For certain states and international organizations, this truth can be a destructive force in the name of good for states and international organizations, that obey their rights and duties steadily. The global values of mankind can no longer be abstract and detached from reality formulations. Already now it is worth thinking not only about short-term and medium-term prospects but also about long-term prospects regarding mentioned in this Paragraph issues without losing valuable time and without deviating from holistic ideas and goals to both public bodies and organized civil society and business with social/corporate responsibility in Ukraine.

### **Conclusions to Chapter 3**

The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis within Chapter 3 came to the following conclusions while developing improvements for skillful and principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of a holistic approach to human rights protection in the form of recommendations.

Firstly, while creating recommendations in the context of updated needs of the 2021-2025 Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, both the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic and the russian full-scale invasion of the territory of independent Ukraine should be taken into consideration. The dynamic model, presented by the author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis is designed to achieve the actualized needs and narratives of Ukraine in 2023, taking into account features of the ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle, human rights promotion and protecting agenda, and also expertise issue. Consequently, this model is able to provide skillful, principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of the holistic approach to human rights protection. The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis additionally emphasize the importance of a detailed analysis of Section 8 on cooperation and coordination with other public bodies of Ukraine.

Secondly, while creating recommendations in the context of new-made narratives of the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, it was specified that

it is quite risky to only rely on short-term achievements that might derive from a close planning horizon. Therefore, short-term, medium-term, and also long-term communication planning should be conducted with an emphasis on active listening. This idea becomes even more vivid when it comes to stable partnerships establishments within the expert public diplomacy sphere and also human rights promotion and protection theme in the renewed vector of efficient and effective strategic communications in Ukraine. New and clear narratives that demonstrate Ukraine's invincibility are able to strengthen the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine. It was examined that already now Ukraine should be thinking about the potential decline in the international community's enthusiasm for a positive perception of Ukraine.

Thirdly, while creating recommendations in the context of the UN SDGs further adjustments within the point that in 2023 Ukraine can be considered an epoch-making global player, it is worth mentioning Ukraine under no circumstances cannot be identified with a barbarian quasi-empire-occupier or referred to as Russia's brotherly nation. Within this part of the master's thesis the author's and the supervisor's ideas on the importance and indispensability of the entire Ukrainian society, each part of it – from the involvement of business models with social/corporate responsibility and organized civil society to the activities of the governmental sector – was confirmed. Moreover, it has been shown that Ukraine can be considered an epoch-making worldwide player when speaking about strategic communications and the state's influence on some world processes. As of 2023, Ukraine, as a highlighted and vivid evidence-based speaker, still obtains some broadcasting time, and can demonstrate to the whole world that tends to be democratic or at least declares it, the ratio between the deadly force of war and the poverty issue, when debating on the 17 UN SDGs methodology's loss of value for a certain part of humanity, additionally emphasizing the usage of the correct 'war' terminology. Moreover, Ukraine is capable to demonstrate the inconsistency of the theoretical slogan "leave no one behind" introduced by the UN. The global values of mankind can no longer be abstract and detached from reality formulations. This heavy dilemma can be put on the agenda by

Ukraine in the context of expert human rights public diplomacy with tight intersectoral cooperation involved and external strategic communications development.

## CONCLUSIONS

The author and the supervisor of this master`s thesis reached significant conclusions according to the tasks set while conducting the study.

*Firstly*, within the analysis of human rights public diplomacy theoretical grounds through its genesis and further development, the following findings were noted.

While highlighting concepts, categories, actors of public diplomacy, and their impact on strategic communications, it was deduced that the public diplomacy approach has its origins in traditional diplomacy, and both aim to achieve some common goals. In contrast to traditional diplomacy, the public diplomacy concept needs particular skills and techniques in order to be relevant, dynamic and fulfill all the modern requirements of the society and state. It was discovered, that soft power can be something more than just public diplomacy and national branding power. Technology development and digitalization lead to a wide range of not only governmental but also non-governmental actors` emergence. This contributed to something more than just the track one diplomacy. Over the course of time, renewed diplomacy is obtaining more points in its inclusive, civil, and social checklist. Additionally, it was observed that the war process can be considered a driving force of progress for major changes in the communications area.

While outlining the human rights horizon in diplomacy, human rights diplomacy should be distinguished from traditional diplomacy and also humanitarian diplomacy which is observed while analyzing the chronology of such concepts` development. The unique Ukrainian context is able to demonstrate the point that human rights protection can be considered among the national interests of the state. Flexible NGOs, business models with social/corporate responsibility, and other actors play a significant role in human rights public diplomacy. However, the expertise, skillfulness, and integrity of such initiatives should exceed their number, the activity vector should be clear.

While defining the role of cross-sectoral cooperation in strategic communications both power of facts and story-telling should be taken into account. The strong and dynamic partnership built between different individuals, organizations, and sectors aimed at joint complex issues solving is vital for a particular state,

especially taking about expert human rights public diplomacy in the documenting and spreading the information about cases of russian attacks on the Ukrainian context. Nowadays public diplomacy directly affects the process of strategic communications as one of the communication capabilities of the state. Both governmental and non-governmental subjects can be considered essential links between public diplomacy and strategic communications.

*Secondly*, within characterizing public diplomacy for the protection of human rights via the prism of civil society and business engagement, the following findings were noted.

While studying the legislative and institutional basis for the implementation of the ongoing policy, it was deduced that the legislative and institutional framework in the context of public diplomacy, strategic communications, and non-profit organizations exists in Ukraine. Particular documents, such as the first Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, have been adopted less than 5 years ago, despite the fact the institutionalization of Ukrainian public diplomacy has its roots in December 2015. However, 2021 become the new count for Ukrainian diplomacy, as the mentioned documents for the first time in the history of Ukrainian diplomacy identified seven areas of public diplomacy as well as principles, key messages, audiences, formats, and communication channels list. The lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic & interaction between public bodies and non-governmental organizations, as well as other potential subjects of public diplomacy, were put on the agenda. Meanwhile, not only the COVID-19 pandemic but also the full-scale russian invasion significantly impacted the goals of Ukrainian public diplomacy. It is important to understand that, surely, the five-year Public Diplomacy Strategy and the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine could be created as far-sighted and as those that do not require changes, however, the author and the supervisor of this master`s study suggest to dig deep while thinking about switching between concepts: from the static model inherent in traditional diplomacy to the dynamic model which might take into account globalization and digitalization processes as well as a wide range of expert actors-players, their self-sufficiency, and

human rights promotion and protection theme, what especially needs to be taken into consideration for Ukraine in 2023. Therefore, new serious needs appeared – and revision with updating of both Strategies will play a major role under conditions of constant and sometimes unpredictable challenges and changes for Ukrainian public diplomacy operation.

While describing the renewed emphasis on Ukrainian human rights public diplomacy after February 24, 2022, the human centricity principle stated in the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine has become more important than ever for the ‘government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society’ triangle activities. The beginning of the full-scale invasion demonstrated the major contribution of civil society and proactive business models with social/corporate responsibility to the expert diplomacy within human rights public diplomacy theme development in Ukraine, showing its high-level expertise and skillfulness toward challenging themes like documenting and spreading information about cases of Russian attacks on the Ukrainian healthcare system. The achievements of organized civil society, some business models with social/corporate responsibility, and the level of assistance to public bodies are impressive. Remarkably, each of the organizations’ teams analyzed in the framework of this Paragraph consists of or was created or is headed by proactive NaUKMA alumni.

While discussing the human rights public diplomacy theme for the legal prosecution of war crimes, it should be highlighted that international law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law can be extremely tricky when it comes to jurisdiction issues. Therefore, only individuals with high-level expertise and awareness are capable to operate within expert diplomacy in the framework of human rights public diplomacy aimed at the legal prosecution of Russian war crimes. Not only skilled Ukrainian civil society organizations and business models with social/corporate responsibility but also international already making significant contributions to human rights public diplomacy field development and to the further successful and high-quality legal prosecution of Russian war crimes.

*Thirdly*, within the development of improvements for skillful and principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of a holistic approach to human rights protection in the form of recommendations, the following findings were noted.

While creating recommendations in the context of updated needs of the 2021-2025 Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, both the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian full-scale invasion of the territory of independent Ukraine should be taken into consideration. The dynamic model, presented by the author and the supervisor of this master's thesis is designed to achieve the actualized needs and narratives of Ukraine in 2023, taking into account features of the 'government – business with social/corporate responsibility – civil society' triangle, human rights promotion and protecting agenda, and also expertise issue. Consequently, this model is able to provide skillful, principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of the holistic approach to human rights protection. The author and the supervisor of this master's thesis additionally emphasize the importance of a detailed analysis of Section 8 on cooperation and coordination with other public bodies of Ukraine.

While creating recommendations in the context of new-made narratives of the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, it was specified that it is quite risky to only rely on short-term achievements that might derive from a close planning horizon. Therefore, short-term, medium-term, and also long-term communication planning should be conducted with an emphasis on active listening. This idea becomes even more vivid when it comes to stable partnerships establishments within the expert public diplomacy sphere and also human rights promotion and protection theme in the renewed vector of efficient and effective strategic communications in Ukraine. New and clear narratives that demonstrate Ukraine's invincibility are able to strengthen the Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine. It was examined that already now Ukraine should be thinking about the potential decline in the international community's enthusiasm for a positive perception of Ukraine.

While creating recommendations in the context of the UN SDGs further adjustments within the point that in 2023 Ukraine can be considered an epoch-making global player, it is worth mentioning Ukraine under no circumstances cannot be identified with a barbarian quasi-empire-occupier or referred to as Russia's brotherly nation. Within this part of the master's thesis the author's and the supervisor's ideas on the importance and indispensability of the entire Ukrainian society, each part of it – from the involvement of business models with social/corporate responsibility and organized civil society to the activities of the governmental sector – was confirmed. Moreover, it has been shown that Ukraine can be considered an epoch-making worldwide player when speaking about strategic communications and the state's influence on some world processes. As of 2023, Ukraine, as a highlighted and vivid evidence-based speaker, still obtains some broadcasting time, and can demonstrate to the whole world that tends to be democratic or at least declares it, the ratio between the deadly force of war and the poverty issue, when debating on the 17 UN SDGs methodology's loss of value for a certain part of humanity, additionally emphasizing the usage of the correct 'war' terminology. Moreover, Ukraine is capable to demonstrate the inconsistency of the theoretical slogan "leave no one behind" introduced by the UN. The global values of mankind can no longer be abstract and detached from reality formulations. This heavy dilemma can be put on the agenda by Ukraine in the context of expert human rights public diplomacy with tight intersectoral cooperation involved and external strategic communications development.

The analyzed ideas of Mykhailo Vinnitskiy, Volodymyr Yermolenko, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Volodymyr Ogrysko, Valerii Pekar, Katya Taylor, and Bohdana Neborak and the crucial role of NaUKMA are capable of proving that the renewed narratives of Ukraine are strong and viable, inter alia, for improvements for skillful and principled human rights public diplomacy as a crucial part of a holistic approach to human rights protection.

## LIST OF SOURCES

1. #GlobalGoals: Sustainable Development Days across Ukraine | United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. URL: <https://www.undp.org/ukraine/press-releases/globalgoals-sustainable-development-days-across-ukraine> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
2. 11 Top Causes of Global Poverty - World. ReliefWeb. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/11-top-causes-global-poverty> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
3. A global medical community without Russians: how doctors and the public sector can help. Facebook Event. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/events/1720005845022928/> (date of access: 28.03.2023).
4. A Map of Attacks on Health Care in Syria. A Map of Attacks on Health Care in Syria. URL: <http://syriamap.phr.org/#/en> (date of access: 26.02.2023).
5. A New Court to Prosecute Russia's Illegal War?. International Crisis Group. URL: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global-ukraine/new-court-prosecute-russias-illegal-war> (date of access: 20.04.2023).
6. A Report by the UHC in partnership with eyeWitness, Insecurity Insight, MIHR, and PHR "Destruction and Devastation. One Year of Russia's Assault on Ukraine's Health Care System". URL: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kj6oRRfj8Al\\_oNuhiHjdeAT6PQ5sVHw4/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kj6oRRfj8Al_oNuhiHjdeAT6PQ5sVHw4/view) (date of access: 25.03.2023).
7. A Report by the UHC in partnership with eyeWitness, Insecurity Insight, MIHR, and PHR "Destruction and Devastation. One Year of Russia's Assault on Ukraine's Health Care System" (Ukrainian version) URL: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VxH4ThSdMN5oN5oC0CGRxtcmNIBSs3P3/view> (date of access: 25.03.2023).
8. About FOI. Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut - FOI. URL: <https://foi.se/en/foi/about-foi.html> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
9. About PHR. PHR. URL: <https://phr.org/about/> (date of access: 25.03.2023).

10. About us - UHC. UHC. URL: <https://uhc.org.ua/en/about-en/> (date of access: 23.03.2023).
11. About us – Ednannia. News – Ednannia. URL: <https://ednannia.ua/en/about-us> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
12. About Us | Agency of legislative initiatives. Agency of legislative initiatives. URL: <https://parlament.org.ua/en/organisation-us/> (date of access: 23.03.2023).
13. About us. International Renaissance Foundation. URL: <https://www.irf.ua/en/about/> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
14. Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine : Declaration of 24.08.1991 no. #1427-XII. URL: [https://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova\\_eng/Rres\\_Declaration\\_Independence\\_rev12.htm](https://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm) (date of access: 17.03.2023).
15. Activities in the UN. Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations. URL: <https://ukraineun.org/en/ukraine-and-un/activities-in-un/> (date of access: 20.03.2023).
16. Arbeiter J., Bucar M. Cross-Sectoral Cooperation for Sustainable Futures. 2021. P. 23. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354209431\\_Cross-Sectoral\\_Cooperation\\_for\\_Sustainable\\_Futures](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354209431_Cross-Sectoral_Cooperation_for_Sustainable_Futures) (date of access: 17.02.2023).
17. Are the Sustainable Development Goals the Best Approach to Sustainability?. FutureLearn. URL: <https://www.futurelearn.com/info/courses/achieving-sustainable-development/0/steps/35496> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
18. Artists Support Ukraine Foundation. Artists Support Ukraine Foundation. URL: <https://artistssupportukraine.today> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
19. ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part : of 27.06.2014 no. 984\_011. URL: [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984\\_011#Text](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011#Text) (date of access: 01.05.2023).
20. At Least 707 Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine During One Year of Russia's Assault on Civilians: Report - UHC. The UHC. URL:

- <https://uhc.org.ua/en/2023/02/21/russias-assault-ukraine-report/> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
21. Attacks in Syria - PHR. PHR. URL: <https://phr.org/issues/health-under-attack/attacks-in-syria/> (date of access: 12.01.2023).
22. Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine. Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine. URL: [http://attacksonhealthukraine.org/?fbclid=IwAR0DtBbFrJVP7jKj9SQ-eYy\\_opCTT7AjosrEj1g-PjKEGcOerv5T7U8Tm2M](http://attacksonhealthukraine.org/?fbclid=IwAR0DtBbFrJVP7jKj9SQ-eYy_opCTT7AjosrEj1g-PjKEGcOerv5T7U8Tm2M) (date of access: 01.05.2023).
23. Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine. Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine. URL: [http://attacksonhealthukraine.org/?fbclid=IwAR0DtBbFrJVP7jKj9SQ-eYy\\_opCTT7AjosrEj1g-PjKEGcOerv5T7U8Tm2M](http://attacksonhealthukraine.org/?fbclid=IwAR0DtBbFrJVP7jKj9SQ-eYy_opCTT7AjosrEj1g-PjKEGcOerv5T7U8Tm2M) (date of access: 24.03.2023).
24. Attacks on hospitals from Syria to Ukraine: Improving prevention and accountability mechanisms. Atlantic Council. URL: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/attacks-on-hospitals-from-syria-to-ukraine-improving-prevention-and-accountability-mechanisms/> (date of access: 28.03.2023).
25. Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations: A Practical Guide on the Effective Use of Digital Open Source and Information in Investigating Violations of International Criminal, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN. URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/berkeley-protocol-digital-open-source> (date of access: 16.03.2023).
26. Betting Scenario for the Management of University Professional Practices from the Conformation of Intersectoral Cooperation Networks / Freddy Marín González et al. Sustainability. 2023. Vol. 15, no. 7. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369832710\\_Betting\\_Scenario\\_for\\_the\\_Management\\_of\\_University\\_Professional\\_Practices\\_from\\_the\\_Conformation\\_of\\_Intersectoral\\_Cooperation\\_Networks](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369832710_Betting_Scenario_for_the_Management_of_University_Professional_Practices_from_the_Conformation_of_Intersectoral_Cooperation_Networks) (date of access: 27.04.2023).

27. Bigler G. Strategic Communications and the Decline of US Soft Power. *International Law Studies*. 2007. Vol. 83, no. 13. P. 218–234. URL: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=ils> (date of access: 03.04.2023).
28. Bohdana Neborak. Chytomo. URL: <https://chytomo.com/authors/bohdana-neborak/> (date of access: 21.03.2023).
29. BRAND UKRAINE. About Ukraine`s Global Perception Report 2022 presentation by Brand Ukraine. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/lovemark.ukraine/posts/pfbid02eHHWUxnLaGKxMpTy6PPhvP6zVF1Zd1XCiq2oHsR1EV6HDhbHJcDgsoUYq9cSVtxRl> (date of access: 16.03.2023).
30. Chernenko T. THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS A COMPONENT OF THE SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS. NISS, CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES. 2021. P. 1–5. URL: [https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-12/az-publiczna-diplomatiya\\_chernenko\\_20122021.pdf?cfchl tk=W9FrvS8zDWQt.MLHIkUpHm\\_NYMBjDRzvUvJ9v4.g.GA-1682584133-0-gaNycGzNC1A](https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-12/az-publiczna-diplomatiya_chernenko_20122021.pdf?cfchl tk=W9FrvS8zDWQt.MLHIkUpHm_NYMBjDRzvUvJ9v4.g.GA-1682584133-0-gaNycGzNC1A) (date of access: 26.02.2023).
31. Civil society calls on Zelenskyy to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | ZMINA - Center for Human Rights. URL: <https://zmina.ua/en/statements-en/civil-society-calls-on-zelenskyy-to-ratify-the-rome-statute-of-the-international-criminal-court/> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
32. Clark M. Humanitarian multi-track diplomacy: Conceptualizing the Definitive, Particular, and Critical Role of Diplomatic Function in Humanitarian Action. Thesis fully internal (DIV), University of Groningen, 2018. 308 p. URL: [https://pure.rug.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/62239488/Complete\\_thesis.pdf](https://pure.rug.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/62239488/Complete_thesis.pdf) (date of access: 16.02.2023).

33. Court I. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Independently Published, 2021.
34. Crisis Units to Ramp Up Coordinated Government Response to the Pandemic in Ukraine | United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. URL: <https://www.undp.org/ukraine/press-releases/crisis-units-ramp-coordinated-government-response-pandemic-ukraine> (date of access: 02.05.2023).
35. Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine : Declaration of 16.07.1990 no. Document 55-XII. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/55-12#Text> (date of access: 16.03.2023).
36. DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No. 47/2017 On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated December 29, 2016 "On the Information Security Doctrine of Ukraine". PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE. Official Website. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017-21374> (date of access: 04.04.2023).
37. Denis Malyuska. Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. URL: <https://minjust.gov.ua/en/people/denis-malyuska> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
38. Destruction of Ukraine's Healthcare Facilities Violates International Humanitarian Law – Report - Ukraine. ReliefWeb. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/destruction-ukraines-healthcare-facilities-violates-international-humanitarian-law-report> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
39. Dmytro Kuleba presented the first Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine and named its seven directions. The MFA of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/news/dmitro-kuleba-predstaviv-pershu-strategiyu-publichnoyi-diplomatiyi-mzs-ukrayini-ta-nazvav-sim-yiyi-napryamiv> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
40. Documentation Center – Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. 52. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. URL: <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/en/activities/documentation-center/> (date of access: 02.05.2023).

41. Documentation of War Crimes - Ukraine.5am. Ukraine 5am. URL: <https://www.5am.in.ua> (date of access: 24.03.2023).
42. Documenting attacks on health workers and facilities in armed conflicts / P. Patel et al. Bull World Health Organ. 2017. Vol. 95, no. 1. P. 79–81. URL: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5180349/> (date of access: 23.03.2023).
43. Documenting the crimes of the russian army in the Chernihiv region: differences in the work of the state and civil society. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. URL: <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/articles/dokumentuvannia-zlochyniv-armii-rf-na-chernihivshchyni-vidminnosti-u-roboti-derzhavy-ta-hromadianskoho-suspilstva/> (date of access: 15.12.2022).
44. Duell Z. Strategic Communications in History: The Emperor Augustus. Defence Strategic Communications, Academic Journal. 2022. Vol. 10. P. 45. URL: <https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/strategic-communications-in-history-the-emperor-augustus/229> (date of access: 16.03.2023).
45. During the year of the full-scale war, “Patients of Ukraine” provided medical facilities with medicines and equipment worth about UAH 114 million. Patients of Ukraine. URL: <https://patients.org.ua/2023/03/06/pacziyenty-ukrayiny-za-rik-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijny-zabezpechyly-medzaklady-likamy-ta-obladnanniam-na-blyzko-114-mln-grn/> (date of access: 21.03.2023).
46. Evan H. Potter. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Canada and the New Public Diplomacy. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2002. 19 p. URL: [https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20020700\\_cli\\_paper\\_dip\\_issue81.pdf](https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20020700_cli_paper_dip_issue81.pdf) (date of access: 08.01.2023).
47. Event by the UHC. Behind the scenes of the Geneva conference: will there be a fair punishment for russia?. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/events/104121109303619> (date of access: 30.03.2023).

48. eyeWitness to Atrocities app surpasses collection of 20,000 verifiable items of potential human rights violations in Ukraine, and group submits evidence to UN COI. International Bar Association | International Bar Association. URL: <https://www.ibanet.org/eyeWitness-to-atrocities-app-surpasses-collection-of-20000-verifiable-items-of-potential-human-rights-violations-in-Ukraine-and-group-submits-evidence-to-UN-COI> (date of access: 25.03.2023).
49. Facebook post Patients of Ukraine CF from 18.05.2022. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/patients.org.ua/posts/pfbid0mnA3vre4NwkKRdJwqhGMqhRSw8qaHVn1knaX9aTktMkHrYBhZGMCNFzDKEExXLB42l> (date of access: 23.03.2023).
50. Facebook Post UHC from 15.06.2022. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/uhcteam/posts/pfbid0yKWQKBcFYv9mXR2kxuRPbQmnGQnNHbAqY3ZKZigFnZZEJH1v7Bcs8f2WTjEo1nrl> (date of access: 28.03.2023).
51. Facebook Post UHC from 5.07.2022. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/uhcteam/posts/pfbid0kW1GBRNbDMePVz1eVJx9k1nHT6cfG1sbHpV9DVk1PNRPusvqp73xnXwr6dLDfZ6Wl> (date of access: 28.03.2023).
52. Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights. URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf> (date of access: 15.02.2023).
53. Ghosal A., Pal S. The Politics of Human Rights Diplomacy. Sage Journals, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations. 2021. Vol. 25, no. 1. P. 101–123. URL: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0973598420943437> (date of access: 12.01.2023).
54. Golan G. An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy. American Behavioral Scientist. 2013. Vol. 57, no. 9. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274306860\\_An\\_Integrated\\_Approach\\_to\\_Public\\_Diplomacy](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274306860_An_Integrated_Approach_to_Public_Diplomacy) (date of access: 20.04.2023).

55. Golan G., Kinsey D., Yang S. *International Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Communication and Engagement*. New York : Peter Lang, 2014. 451 p. URL: [https://www.academia.edu/9689764/International\\_Public\\_Relations\\_and\\_Public\\_Diplomacy\\_Communication\\_and\\_Engagement](https://www.academia.edu/9689764/International_Public_Relations_and_Public_Diplomacy_Communication_and_Engagement) (date of access: 13.01.2023).
56. Grant competition "Support and capacity building of CSOs in documenting war crimes". Euprostrir. URL: [https://euprostrir.org.ua/opportunities/206351?fbclid=IwAR1xVXqhKMXJfURfEE40A\\_X9QV\\_pS-xwy\\_5kkpmdLsKXzGXikhYeqdUazhE&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=UniSender&utm\\_campaign=280630157](https://euprostrir.org.ua/opportunities/206351?fbclid=IwAR1xVXqhKMXJfURfEE40A_X9QV_pS-xwy_5kkpmdLsKXzGXikhYeqdUazhE&utm_medium=email&utm_source=UniSender&utm_campaign=280630157) (date of access: 23.03.2023).
57. Heisler M, Kovtonyuk P, De Vos C. Attacks on Health Care Used as a Weapon of War in Ukraine and Globally: The Demand for Accountability. *JAMA*. 2023. 329(12):973–974. doi:10.1001/jama.2023.2787. URL: <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2801937> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
58. Henrikson A. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?* Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2006. 38 p. URL: [https://www.jura.fu-berlin.de/fachbereich/einrichtungen/oeffentliches-recht/lehrende/bolewskiw/dokumente/1\\_Creative-Diplomacy/Henrikson\\_what\\_can\\_public\\_diplomacy\\_achieve.pdf](https://www.jura.fu-berlin.de/fachbereich/einrichtungen/oeffentliches-recht/lehrende/bolewskiw/dokumente/1_Creative-Diplomacy/Henrikson_what_can_public_diplomacy_achieve.pdf) (date of access: 08.01.2023).
59. Holt E. Ukraine's Healthcare Facility Destruction Violates Intl Humanitarian Law. Inter Press Service. URL: <https://www.ipsnews.net/2023/01/destruction-of-ukraines-healthcare-facilities-violates-international-humanitarian-law/> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
60. How is Ukraine perceived in European countries?. Kyiv : The New Europe Center, 2020. 39 p. URL: <http://neweurope.org.ua/wp->

[content/uploads/2020/11/What-is-Ukraine-s-perception-in-the-EU\\_ukr\\_web-1.pdf](https://content/uploads/2020/11/What-is-Ukraine-s-perception-in-the-EU_ukr_web-1.pdf) (date of access: 16.02.2023).

61. How the Russian military attacked Ukraine's healthcare system during the first phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war (February 24 - April 7, 2022). The UHC. URL: <https://hospitalsunderattacks.org.ua/page/case-1> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
62. Human rights and the SDGs - two sides of the same coin | United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. URL: <https://www.undp.org/blog/human-rights-and-sdgs-two-sides-same-coin> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
63. Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives / M. O'Flaherty et al. BRILL, the Human Rights Law Center of the University of Nottingham, 2011. 320 p. URL: [https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=z\\_N5DwAAQBAJ&hl=uk&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=z_N5DwAAQBAJ&hl=uk&source=gbs_navlinks_s) (date of access: 19.01.2023).
64. Human Rights Diplomacy. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA. URL: <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/human-rights-policy.html> (date of access: 15.03.2023).
65. ID: Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (Cont'd) - 35th meeting, 52nd Regular Session of Human Rights Council. UN Web TV. URL: <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1r/k1rkkqt2bb?fbclid=IwAR2s45rbjIEBkqvHpMv37mGNyImbL-bwjcwRNng1O-YqF711PAzCuIyqHaRU> (date of access: 30.03.2023).
66. III. HUMANITARIAN ACTORS. OCHA - United Nations. URL: <https://asiadisasterguide.unocha.org/III-humanitarian-actors.html> (date of access: 16.03.2023).
67. Influence and reputation in international affairs: Soft Power and Nation Branding. Consular and Public Diplomacies Blog. URL: <https://www.consulardiplomacy.com/home/influence-and-reputation-in-international-affairs-soft-power-and-nation-branding> (date of access: 09.03.2023).

68. Inghoff D., Charatte J. Solving the Public Diplomacy Puzzle – Developing a 360-degree Listening and Evaluation Approach to Assess Country Images. 2nd ed. Los Angeles : Figueroa Press, 2020. 90 p. URL: [https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/useruploads/u47441/Solving%20the%20Public%20Diplomacy%20Puzzle\\_1.9.21.pdf](https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/useruploads/u47441/Solving%20the%20Public%20Diplomacy%20Puzzle_1.9.21.pdf) (date of access: 28.01.2023).
69. Insecurity Insight Official Website. Insecurity Insight. URL: <https://insecurityinsight.org> (date of access: 25.03.2023).
70. Intersectoral Collaboration – AICBR. AICBR. URL: <https://www.aicbr.ca/capacity-building> (date of access: 18.01.2023).
71. Javid N. Public Diplomacy in Comparison to Traditional Diplomacy. Academia.edu. P. 11. URL: [https://www.academia.edu/11292698/Public\\_Diplomacy\\_in\\_Comparison\\_to\\_Traditional\\_Diplomacy](https://www.academia.edu/11292698/Public_Diplomacy_in_Comparison_to_Traditional_Diplomacy) (date of access: 18.02.2023).
72. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. Project Syndicate. URL: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-s-nye> (date of access: 01.04.2023).
73. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Harvard University. PublicAffairs Books, 2005. URL: <https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/soft-power-means-success-world-politics> (date of access: 01.04.2023).
74. Kaye, D. D. Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy. In Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (1st ed., pp. 1–30). RAND Corporation. (2007). 30 p. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg592nsrd.8> (date of access: 16.02.2023).
75. Kelly-Kate Pease and Kelly McBride, “Human Rights.”
76. Key Q&A on Russia’s Agression. The MFA of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/key-questions-answers-on-russias-agression> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
77. Khan M. A. M. Diplomacy in the Twenty First Century: Changing Dimensions and New Realities. Academia.edu. URL:

[https://www.academia.edu/42637630/Diplomacy\\_in\\_the\\_Twenty\\_First\\_Century\\_Changing\\_Dimensions\\_and\\_New\\_Realities](https://www.academia.edu/42637630/Diplomacy_in_the_Twenty_First_Century_Changing_Dimensions_and_New_Realities) (date of access: 20.03.2023).

78. Khomeriki D. Benefits and Risks of Digital Diplomacy: Is Traditional Diplomacy in Decline?. *World Politics and the Challenges for International Security* : Georgia, 2022. P. 427. URL: <https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/benefits-and-risks-of-digital-diplomacy/107183> (date of access: 29.04.2023).
79. Kravchenko M. How the russian federation is destroying the healthcare system of Ukraine. *Ukrainer*. URL: [https://ukrainer.net/rf-ruynuie-medsystemu/?fbclid=IwAR3uqWwQCn9oe8T8x4983gzsrJPu5f\\_wiE-mw10Ypzm0gRU3JheZVJW6dUw](https://ukrainer.net/rf-ruynuie-medsystemu/?fbclid=IwAR3uqWwQCn9oe8T8x4983gzsrJPu5f_wiE-mw10Ypzm0gRU3JheZVJW6dUw) (date of access: 10.05.2023).
80. Kuhn B., Margellos D. The Role of Think Tanks in Megatrends Analysis and Future Research. 2023. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370095040\\_The\\_Role\\_of\\_Think\\_Tanks\\_in\\_Megatrends\\_Analysis\\_and\\_Future\\_Research](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370095040_The_Role_of_Think_Tanks_in_Megatrends_Analysis_and_Future_Research) (date of access: 02.05.2023).
81. Kyiv Security Forum. The UN has reached another grotesque moral bottom – putin's russia presides over the Security Council. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/ksfopenukraine/posts/pfbid0v7XP8yrTu2oxqJHTwod8EArXPCmSa1rNiyRHJ2LwhQx7uc3djc6APpXQj5t3ZBf4l> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
82. Lloyd L. *Diplomacy With a Difference*, The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner 1880-2006 (Diplomatic Studies). Boston : BRILL, 2007. 353 p. URL: [https://www.google.com.ua/books/edition/Diplomacy\\_with\\_a\\_Difference/4z5Qj-7HZ68C?hl=uk&gbpv=0&kptab=overview](https://www.google.com.ua/books/edition/Diplomacy_with_a_Difference/4z5Qj-7HZ68C?hl=uk&gbpv=0&kptab=overview) (date of access: 05.04.2023).
83. Maksak H. *Expert Diplomacy as Part of a Foreign Policy Success Story*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”, 2016. 12 p. URL:

- [http://fes.kiev.ua/n/cms/fileadmin/upload2/prism\\_diplomacy\\_maksak\\_ukr.pdf](http://fes.kiev.ua/n/cms/fileadmin/upload2/prism_diplomacy_maksak_ukr.pdf)  
(date of access: 16.02.2023).
84. Map of attacks on healthcare facilities in Ukraine. The UHC. URL: <https://hospitalsunderattacks.org.ua/?fbclid=IwAR0wdilSNMujr3Zs3BjyYJ8u8gZczB9Zn2L0Q1BI9e6qBrfNcl-Jy-NbSmc> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
85. Massive. Brutal. Deliberate. Attacks on Hospitals in the Russia-Ukraine War during the First Phase of the Invasion (February 24-April 7, 2022). Report by UHC. 2022. P. 50. URL: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JOIdXaVJCBZ4G-Z-m36pitsdrXigHVkF/view> (date of access: 30.03.2023).
86. Matinheikki K., Liinamo A. Identifying cross-sectoral cooperation for urban health. The European Journal of Public Health. 2022. Vol. 32. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364703504\\_Identifying\\_cross-sectoral\\_cooperation\\_for\\_urban\\_health](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364703504_Identifying_cross-sectoral_cooperation_for_urban_health) (date of access: 16.03.2023).
87. Melissen J. The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations : Palgrave Macmillan London, 2005. 221 p. URL: [https://culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/pdf/research/books/soft\\_power/The\\_New\\_Public\\_Diplomacy.pdf](https://culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/pdf/research/books/soft_power/The_New_Public_Diplomacy.pdf) (date of access: 02.04.2023).
88. MFA History. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-mfa/mfa-history> (date of access: 17.03.2023).
89. MIHR Official Website. MIHR. URL: <https://mipl.org.ua/en/mission/> (date of access: 25.03.2023).
90. Minear L., Smith H. Humanitarian diplomacy : practitioners and their craft. United Nations University Press, 2006. 382 p. URL: <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Humanitarian-diplomacy-:-practitioners-and-their-Minear-Smith/bd98d5548165ade69292a07a2384e364307a9752> (date of access: 15.03.2023).
91. Mykhailo Vinnitskiy. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/mychailo.wynnyckyj/?locale=uk-UA> (date of access: 01.05.2023).

92. Newman C. Key challenges to sustainable development. FutureLearn. URL: <https://www.futurelearn.com/info/courses/achieving-sustainable-development/0/steps/35495> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
93. NSDC Secretary Oleksandr Turchynov and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg signed the Road Map of Partnership Program on Strategic Communications. National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. URL: <https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/Diialnist/2266.html> (date of access: 21.02.2023).
94. Nuridzhanian, Gaiane | UiT. UiT – Norges arktiske universitet. URL: [https://en.uit.no/ansatte/person?p\\_document\\_id=771921](https://en.uit.no/ansatte/person?p_document_id=771921) (date of access: 10.05.2023).
95. NYT: The International Criminal Court is going to start its first cases against Russia. Babel. URL: <https://babel.ua/news/91518-nyt-mizhnarodniy-sud-zbirayetsya-porushiti-proti-rosiji-pershi-spravi-cherez-deportaciyu-ditey-ta-udari-po-infrastrukturi> (date of access: 23.03.2023).
96. Oleksandra Matviychuk, a student of NaUKMA, is on the list of the 100 most influential people in the world. telegra.ph. URL: <https://telegra.ph/Studentka-NaUKMA-Oleksandra-Matvijchuk--u-spisku-100-najvplivovishih-lyudej-svitu-04-15> (date of access: 22.03.2023).
97. Patients of Ukraine CF Official Website. Patients of Ukraine. URL: <https://patients.org.ua/en/> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
98. Pekar V. The main word that defines the situation around Ukraine is uncertainty. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/valerii.pekar/posts/pfbid035VGKZ97SkfViVEAijb8xTyYt1gjjgbZ4CVZZs6x82K1hqcQPsp7R3o5RwVq4Ah72l> (date of access: 05.04.2023).
99. Pekar V. The world is in desperate need of moral leadership. An editorial (collective editorial position) of The Wall Street Journal demonstrates. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/1673359536/posts/pfbid0c9eJebNhMBn2sMSRSX>

mCrE8SPLxKUs7EHAGRVDQj3noPDFSXaurdcvjsojwsKup9l/ (date of access: 06.04.2023).

100. PHR Delegation Brings Evidence and Advocacy to the 52nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council - PHR. PHR. URL: <https://phr.org/our-work/resources/phrs-delegation-to-the-52nd-session-of-the-human-rights-council/> (date of access: 27.04.2023).
101. Pomerantsev, P. This is not propaganda: adventures in the war against reality. First edition. New York, PublicAffairs. 2019.
102. Port of culture. Port of culture. URL: <https://port.agency> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
103. Presentation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union Documentation Center. Ukrinform - current news of Ukraine and the world. URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-presshall/2106030-prezentacia-centru-dokumentuvanna-ukrainskoi-gelsinskoi-spilki-z-prav-ludini.html> (date of access: 24.03.2023).
104. Public diplomacy is a tool for building Ukraine's resilience to hybrid threats and an effective way to promote positive image abroad. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/public-diplomacy-tool-building-ukraines-resilience-hybrid-threats-and-effective-way-promote-positive-image-abroad> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
105. Public diplomacy is a tool for building Ukraine's resilience to hybrid threats and an effective way to promote positive image abroad. The MFA of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/public-diplomacy-tool-building-ukraines-resilience-hybrid-threats-and-effective-way-promote-positive-image-abroad> (date of access: 15.02.2023).
106. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Malyuska explained why Ukraine cannot ratify the Rome Statute during the war. Радіо Свобода. URL: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-maluska-ukraina-rymskyy-statut/31880061.html> (date of access: 01.05.2023).

107. Ratings & Reviews for Pomerantsev, P. This is not propaganda. Goodreads. A review by Laura Gembolis. URL: [https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/54684857/reviews?reviewFilters=%7B"workId":"kca://work/amzn1.gr.work.v1.1s1Mx0o6DKC6LRvpAt\\_rpw", "after":"NTg2LDE2NTYwOTQ0NTEExMjA"%7D](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/54684857/reviews?reviewFilters=%7B%22workId%22%3A%22kca%3A%2Fwork%2Famzn1%2Egr%2Ework%2Ev1%2E1s1Mx0o6DKC6LRvpAt_rpw%22%2C%22after%22%3A%22NTg2LDE2NTYwOTQ0NTEExMjA%22%7D) (date of access: 15.12.2022).
108. Research Guides: UN Human Rights Documentation: High Commissioner for Human Rights. Home - Research Guides at United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. URL: <https://research.un.org/en/docs/humanrights/OHCHR> (date of access: 19.01.2023).
109. Rielage D., Winkler J. R. Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I. Naval War College Review. 2009. Vol. 62, no. 2. P. 124–125. URL: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1785&context=nwc-review> (date of access: 12.04.2023).
110. Robinson, John A. A Brief History of Strategic Communication. Communicating Airpower: Strategic Communication and the United States Air Force since 9/11, Air University Press. 2011. P. 2–8. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13809.6> (date of access: 13.04.2023).
111. Roche D. Is Ukraine a Democracy? Separating Fact From Fiction. Newsweek. URL: <https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-democracy-separating-fact-fiction-russia-1690505> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
112. Russia takes over the presidency of the UN Security Council. euronews. URL: <https://www.euronews.com/2023/04/01/russia-takes-over-the-presidency-of-the-un-security-council> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
113. SDG budget tagging (includes methodology and report on SDG budget tagging) | United Nations Development Programme. UNDP. URL: <https://www.undp.org/ukraine/publications/sdg-budget-tagging-includes-methodology-and-report-sdg-budget-tagging> (date of access: 10.05.2023).

114. SEONG-HUN YUN. Against the Current: Back to Public Diplomacy as Government Communication. *International Journal of Communication*. 2022. Vol. 16. P. 3047–3064. URL: <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/18621/3806> (date of access: 21.02.2023).
115. Sergiy Kyslytsya. Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations. URL: <https://ukraineun.org/en/ukraine-and-unsc/> (date of access: 20.03.2023).
116. Siracusa J. M. *Diplomatic History: A Very Short Introduction* : Oxford University Press, 2021. Vol. 242 : Very short introductions. 149 p. URL: [https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=bPAxEAAAQBAJ&hl=uk&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=bPAxEAAAQBAJ&hl=uk&source=gbs_navlinks_s) (date of access: 06.04.2023).
117. Snow C. The Privatization of U.S. Public Diplomacy. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. 2008. Vol. 1, no. 32. P. 189–199. URL: [https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289431?read-now=1&seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289431?read-now=1&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) (date of access: 01.04.2023).
118. SPRAVDI. Kyiv StratCom Forum LIVE [in Ukrainian], 2021. YouTube. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rQEKtJkLjQk> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
119. Srugies A., Auer C. *Public Diplomacy in Germany*. CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Figueroa Press. 2013. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262004458\\_Public\\_Diplomacy\\_in\\_Germany](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262004458_Public_Diplomacy_in_Germany) (date of access: 19.01.2023).
120. Surowiec-Capell P. *Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy*. The ASEF Public Diplomacy Handbook. 2nd ed. 2021. P. 23–34. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357476836\\_Strategic\\_Communications\\_and\\_Public\\_Diplomacy](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357476836_Strategic_Communications_and_Public_Diplomacy) (date of access: 06.01.2023).
121. Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Sustainable Development Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions | The United Nations in Ukraine. URL: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/sdgs/16> (date of access: 10.05.2023).

122. Sustainable Development Goals. Sustainable Development Goals | The United Nations in Ukraine. URL: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/sdgs> (date of access: 22.04.2023).
123. Syvak T. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF FORMATION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PAPER RESUME. Actual problems of public administration. 2019. Vol. 78, no. 2. P. 81–86. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337736956\\_Publicna\\_diplomatia\\_ak\\_integracijnij\\_komponent\\_strategicnih\\_komunikacij\\_u\\_publicnomu\\_upravlinn\\_i](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337736956_Publicna_diplomatia_ak_integracijnij_komponent_strategicnih_komunikacij_u_publicnomu_upravlinn_i) (date of access: 20.04.2023).
124. Taylor K. Do not narrow the world to Europe. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/kateryna.taylor.5/posts/pfbid0DvmBKeJNdfMDRRbb12935DU28ynzV4bCHHpDwQdDZzU7KdZcMKex26DBR2Sz5o6xl> (date of access: 14.04.2023).
125. Taylor K. I had an illusion about working in Nairobi. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/kateryna.taylor.5/posts/pfbid0voPPJByJbK1DJhCfyVfCTNySdAL5x8UddBRWvGt4UGXwkfMRwR5hG7TEudJZyzMMl> (date of access: 02.05.2023).
126. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations | 2023 Solution Challenge Timeline | Google Developers. Google Developers. URL: <https://developers.google.com/community/gdsc-solution-challenge/UN-goals> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
127. The Basic Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine : Resolution of 2.07.1993 no. 3360-XII. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12#Text> (date of access: 17.03.2023).
128. The Capture House. The Capture House. URL: <https://thecapturedhouse.com> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
129. The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security Official Website. The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security. URL: <https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/about-us/> (date of access: 19.03.2023).

130. The Chinese Smart Power Strategy. Harvard Political Review. URL: <https://harvardpolitics.com/chinese-smart-power-strategy/> (date of access: 25.02.2023).
131. The Communication Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, 2021-2025. The MFA of Ukraine, 2021. 26 p. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/1/Стратегія/communication-strategy.pdf> (date of access: 01.02.2023).
132. The Concept of Strategic Communications of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine : Order of the Ministry of defense of Ukraine of 22.11.2017 no. v0612322-17. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/rada/show/v0612322-17#n9> (date of access: 18.03.2023).
133. The Concept of Ukraine's Popularization in the World and Promotion of Ukraine's Interests in the Global Information Space : Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 11.10.2016 no. 739-2016-p. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/739-2016-p#n8> (date of access: 17.03.2023).
134. The Constitution of Ukraine : Constitution, Law of 28.06.1996 no. 254к/96-BP : as of 1 January 2020. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/254к/96-бп#Text> (date of access: 05.04.2023).
135. The European Integration Portal Official Website. The European Integration Portal. URL: <https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/en> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
136. The Information Security Doctrine : Decree of the President of Ukraine of 25.02.2017 no. №47/2017. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017-21374> (date of access: 18.03.2023).
137. The Law of Ukraine “On Charity Work and Charity Organizations” : The Law of Ukraine of 05.07.2012 no. 5073-VI. URL:

- <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/5073-17#Text> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
138. The Law of Ukraine “On Civil Associations” : The Law of Ukraine of 22.03.2012 no. 4572-VI. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/4572-17#Text> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
139. The Law of Ukraine “On the Diplomatic Service” : The Law of Ukraine of 07.06.2018 no. 2449-VIII. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2449-19#Text> (date of access: 18.03.2023).
140. The Law of Ukraine “On the principles of domestic and foreign policy” : of 01.07.2010 no. 2411-VI. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17#Text> (date of access: 17.03.2023).
141. The MFA History. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-mfa/mfa-history> (date of access: 17.03.2023).
142. The MFA of Ukraine Official Website. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
143. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine Official Website. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. URL: <https://mkip.gov.ua> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
144. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Official Website. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. URL: <https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
145. The Ministry of Economy of Ukraine Official Website. The Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. URL: <https://www.me.gov.ua/?lang=en-GB> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
146. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine Official Website. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. URL: <https://mon.gov.ua/eng> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
147. The Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine Official Website. The Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine. URL:

[https://mms.gov.ua/?fbclid=IwAR0MosXnFPEedi3UbK6JSUaF6\\_z1H\\_G1TO8rnqrqufofdmgUUjQnN5VaBXQ](https://mms.gov.ua/?fbclid=IwAR0MosXnFPEedi3UbK6JSUaF6_z1H_G1TO8rnqrqufofdmgUUjQnN5VaBXQ) (date of access: 19.03.2023).

148. The Nobel Peace Prize 2022. NobelPrize.org. URL: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2022/center-for-civil-liberties/lecture/> (date of access: 22.03.2023).
149. The Priorities of Interparliamentary Cooperation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2021 : of 05.03.2021. URL: [https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/news\\_kom/204493.html](https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/news_kom/204493.html) (date of access: 20.03.2023).
150. The Public Diplomacy Foundation Official Website. The Public Diplomacy Foundation. URL: <https://civildiplomat.com> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
151. The Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine, 2021-2025. The MFA of Ukraine, 2021. 31 p. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/1/Српатеріі/public-diplomacy-strategy.pdf> (date of access: 01.02.2023).
152. The Regulations on the MFA of Ukraine : Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 30.03.2016 no. 281-2016-п. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/281-2016-п#Text> (date of access: 18.03.2023).
153. The Report by the UHC. URL: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JOIdXaVJCBZ4G-Z-m36pitsdrXigHVkF/view> (date of access: 01.02.2023).
154. The Strategy for National Security of Ukraine : Decree of the President of Ukraine of 14.09.2020 no. 392/2020. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/392/2020#Text> (date of access: 18.03.2023).
155. The UHC, together with other organizations, submitted a statement to the UN IICIU: text of the document. The UHC. URL: <https://uhc.org.ua/2022/09/21/uhc-podala-zaiavu-do-mizhnarodnoi-slidchoi->

[komisiidocument/?fbclid=IwAR2sZuNnG6NBr1T3ZWqpi5L3iw6\\_ND4xUTI-K81Mc3TN7s8mJYNelQ0Ymic](https://komisiidocument/?fbclid=IwAR2sZuNnG6NBr1T3ZWqpi5L3iw6_ND4xUTI-K81Mc3TN7s8mJYNelQ0Ymic) (date of access: 01.05.2023).

156. The UHC. A Report by the UHC “Destruction of Healthcare in Mariupol (February 24 – May 20, 2022)”. URL: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tJyyae\\_9eBF\\_IfkPiDb5i9D2Bqb-2n5w/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tJyyae_9eBF_IfkPiDb5i9D2Bqb-2n5w/view) (date of access: 25.03.2023).
157. The UHC. Before the start of the full-scale war, the hospital received about 100,000 small patients, performed 800,000 diagnostic procedures and 7,000. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/uhcteam/posts/pfbid0q6oewJYUNvDJF65efF34kbg4MgojvJSKF9H52rJzaAyBJSHZXGeYK6dyYVoo1RWA1> (date of access: 25.03.2023).
158. The UHC. In recent months, the UHC team has been working to make our database of attacks by the russian federation on. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=570003265110466> (date of access: 20.04.2023).
159. The UHC. Report by the UHC “Destruction of Healthcare in Mariupol (February 24 – May 20, 2022)” (Ukrainian version). URL: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OMe6xjLA5owmP8v\\_QhbNIKpafD8Tmwik/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OMe6xjLA5owmP8v_QhbNIKpafD8Tmwik/view) (date of access: 25.03.2023).
160. The UHC. Report by the UHC “In the Line of Fire: How russian Troops Are Destroying Medical Infrastructure of Kharkiv Oblast (February 24, 2022 – March 2023)”. URL: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B2ija2K23x0OEzZtpEkqDAzaEs\\_PJ0tp/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B2ija2K23x0OEzZtpEkqDAzaEs_PJ0tp/view) (date of access: 01.05.2023).
161. The UHC. The russian federation continues to destroy civilian objects, medical infrastructure and people's lives, in violation of the Geneva Convention. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/uhcteam/posts/pfbid0caLeXA45s4bAiaiGEQxTLu>

- 1GtxiTvSkmUXUpX74Q1ZZv7wXOCTrQdxfQkiQ9V5nol (date of access: 01.05.2023).
162. The UHC. The withdrawal of the russian army from the occupied settlements of the Kyiv region revealed to Ukrainians and the world. Facebook. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/uhcteam/posts/pfbid026yLY2prLSwfXzyyeAnATDUyx52He98PamDQ9X79Bam2Jcc9AohSrNfieZoyDPgMSl> (date of access: 23.03.2023).
163. The Ukrainian Book Institute Official Website. The Ukrainian Book Institute. URL: <https://ubi.org.ua/en> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
164. The Ukrainian Cultural Foundation Official Website. The Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. URL: <https://ucf.in.ua/en/> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
165. The Ukrainian Institute 2020-2024 Strategy. Ukrainian Institute. URL: <https://ui.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/strategy-ukrainian-institute-3.pdf> (date of access: 18.03.2023).
166. Ukraine 5 AM Coalition devoted to documenting war crimes is launched in Ukraine. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. URL: <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/ukraine-5-am-coalition-devoted-to-documenting-war-crimes-is-launched-in-ukraine/> date of access: 24.03.2023).
167. Ukraine NOW UA. URL: <https://ukraine.ua> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
168. Ukraine's global perception report 2022 presentation - Brand Ukraine. Facebook Event. URL: <https://www.facebook.com/events/3301405400189245> (date of access: 25.03.2023).
169. Ukraine`s Global Perception Report 2022 - Brand Ukraine. Brand Ukraine. URL: [https://brandukraine.org.ua/en/analytics/zvit-pro-sprijnyattya-ukrayini-u-sviti-2022/?fbclid=IwAR1pcRMTRQ3h1afKV4PQwccq0hLGOAMVzXTe1-7sS9zgU2f-r\\_5qARk4eA7A](https://brandukraine.org.ua/en/analytics/zvit-pro-sprijnyattya-ukrayini-u-sviti-2022/?fbclid=IwAR1pcRMTRQ3h1afKV4PQwccq0hLGOAMVzXTe1-7sS9zgU2f-r_5qARk4eA7A) (date of access: 01.05.2023).
170. Ukraine`s Information Front – Strategic Communication during Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine Report. FOI, 2023. 97 p. URL:

<https://foi.se/en/foi/reports/report-summary.html?reportNo=FOI-R--5451--SE>  
(date of access: 14.04.2023).


171. Ukrainian authorities must urgently create an algorithm to investigate bloody atrocities in the liberated territories – human rights defenders | ZMINA - Center for Human Rights. URL: <https://zmina.ua/en/statements-en/ukrainian-authorities-must-urgently-create-an-algorithm-to-investigate-bloody-atrocities-in-the-liberated-territories-human-rights-defenders/> (date of access: 22.12.2022).
172. Ukrainian Healthcare Center | Linktree. Linktree. URL: <https://linktr.ee/ukrainianhealthcarecenter> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
173. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) | CivilMPlus. CivilMPlus. URL: <https://civilmplus.org/en/organizations/ukrainian-helsinki-human-rights-union-uhhru/> (date of access: 02.05.2023).
174. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union initiates the creation of a center for documenting war crimes. News of Ukraine - the latest news of Ukraine today - UNIAN. URL: <https://www.unian.ua/society/1589006-ukrajinska-gelsinska-spilka-initsiyue-stvorenniya-tsentru-dokumentuvannya-voennih-zlochiv.html> (date of access: 20.01.2023).
175. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. URL: <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/en/> (date of access: 01.05.2023).
176. Ukrainian Institute Official Website. Ukrainian Institute. URL: <https://ui.org.ua/en/> (date of access: 19.03.2023).
177. UNSDG | Leave No One Behind. United Nations Sustainable Development Group: Home. URL: <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/leave-no-one-behind> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
178. USC Annenberg. Joseph Nye on the Future of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy. YouTube. Jun. 07, 2019. [Online]. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q75uTqz5XS4> (date of access: 01.05.2023).

179. Valerii Pekar. Facebook. URL: [https://www.facebook.com/valerii.pekar/?locale=ru\\_RU](https://www.facebook.com/valerii.pekar/?locale=ru_RU) (date of access: 01.05.2023).
180. Volodymyr Ogrysko on the new model of the world. KMBS. URL: [https://kmbis.ua/ua/news/post28032023?utm\\_source=facebook&utm\\_medium=post&utm\\_campaign=ogryzko&fbclid=IwAR2mCv0AYjKIpN7HbSG8rHBci9ZJ4qaiLaCRieI0pH85uukip6jASeo9po](https://kmbis.ua/ua/news/post28032023?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=post&utm_campaign=ogryzko&fbclid=IwAR2mCv0AYjKIpN7HbSG8rHBci9ZJ4qaiLaCRieI0pH85uukip6jASeo9po) (date of access: 30.03.2023).
181. Volodymyr Ogrysko. Twitter. URL: [https://twitter.com/Ogrysko?ref\\_src=twsrc^google|twcamp^serp|twgr^author](https://twitter.com/Ogrysko?ref_src=twsrc^google|twcamp^serp|twgr^author) (date of access: 01.05.2023).
182. Volodymyr Yermolenko`s Official Twitter-account. Twitter. URL: [https://twitter.com/yermolenko\\_v](https://twitter.com/yermolenko_v) (date of access: 20.03.2023).
183. Vysotsky O. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: synopsis of lectures : Dnipro : Okhotnyk, 2020. 56 p. URL: [https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Vysotskyi\\_Oleksandr/Publichna\\_dyplomatiia\\_kon\\_spekt\\_lektsii\\_Chastyna\\_I.pdf](https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Vysotskyi_Oleksandr/Publichna_dyplomatiia_kon_spekt_lektsii_Chastyna_I.pdf) (date of access: 22.04.2023).
184. Waddell S. Core Competences A Key Force in Business-Government-Civil Society Collaborations. Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance. 2002. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239610995\\_Core\\_Competences\\_A\\_Key\\_Force\\_in\\_Business-Government-Civil\\_Society\\_Collaborations](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239610995_Core_Competences_A_Key_Force_in_Business-Government-Civil_Society_Collaborations) (date of access: 23.12.2022).
185. War of words - how Ukraine uses strategic communication to beat Russia on the information front. Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut - FOI. URL: <https://foi.se/en/foi/news-and-pressroom/news/2023-04-21-war-of-words---how-ukraine-uses-strategic-communication-to-beat-russia-on-the-information-front.html> (date of access: 10.05.2023).


186. What are human rights?. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations. URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/what-are-human-rights> (date of access: 16.02.2023).
187. What is infrastructure: how does civil differ from critical. FACTS ICTV. URL: <https://fakty.com.ua/ua/ukraine/20221101-shho-take-infrastruktura-chym-czyvilna-vidriznyayetsya-vid-krytychnoyi/> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
188. World Corruption Perceptions Index - 2022. World Corruption Perceptions Index - 2022. URL: <https://cpi.ti-ukraine.org/en/> (date of access: 10.05.2023).
189. Yaroslav Hrytsak. Goodreads | Meet your next favorite book. URL: [https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/20543955.Yaroslav\\_Hrytsak](https://www.goodreads.com/author/show/20543955.Yaroslav_Hrytsak) (date of access: 01.05.2023).

ANNEXES


Annex 1. The Master`s Thesis Structure



Annex 2. Traditional Diplomacy's Impact on Public Diplomacy



**Annex 3.** Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy within the Democratic World



**Annex 4.** Ukrainian Goals & Human Rights



**Annex 5.** The 'Expertise' Definition




Annex 6. The Dynamic Model



\*The true meaning of the “leave no one behind” theoretical slogan

Annex 7. The 'Poverty' and the 'War' Ratio



**The poverty issue might not be the 1<sup>st</sup> SDG**

**The war issue causes poverty + etc.**