

ontology of human existence justifying an open, active, embodiment, unfinalized, dialogical subjectivity" [2; p. 46], leisure also should get its philosophical and ontological interpretation through which philosophy will get the new understanding of itself.

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Significance of the late medieval epistemology for contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science

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The development of epistemology during the late Middle Ages in Europe (13-15 cent.) provided highly elaborated conceptual framework and influenced the issues and themes within 16-century and, to some extent, 17-century epistemology. Increasing interest to the legacy of late scholasticism over last decades grew into a series of studies thoroughly analyzing tenets of the late medievals regarding intentionality, mental representation, mental language and other core terms.

A particular area where the focus of contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science seems to coincide with the late medieval thought is the central role of concept in explaining relationships between signs and objects they signify. Current philosophy of mind is

largely naturalistic in this regard, and usually explains such relations in terms of causality. This line of thought resonates with cognitivist attitudes of late medievals, inspired by Aristotle.

Another aspect of late medieval reasoning about concepts and cognition, which influenced contemporary phenomenology, is the supporting role of intentionality in the model of cognitive content. Intentional nature of concepts facilitates the late medieval account of concepts as building blocks of mental language.

In the book, Concepts J. Fodor formulated five theses together making up the Representative Theory of Mind, which is the foundation for his theory of concepts [1, p. 7]. Some of his theses are very close to the late medieval models of concepts, cognitive content, and mental language. For instance, his first thesis relates to the psychological explanation as 'typically nomic' and 'intentional through and through', which is in line with anti-physicalist conceptions of late medievals.

The second thesis by Fodor, on 'mental representations' as the primitive bearers of intentional content, receives coherent support from the late medieval models of mental representation. For William Ockham and for later thinkers the mental aspect is prior and explanatory of relations between signs and real objects they signify. In 14 and 15 centuries there appeared several innovative semiotic models that went beyond the two traditional approaches, based on Boethius and St. Augustine, respectively.

Paradoxically, the third Fodor's thesis, namely that 'Thinking is computation' reveals the contemporary relevance of the late medieval semiotic and semantic models even more. It largely relates to Turing's concept of effective computation, which, in its turn, depends on interpreting mental representations as symbols. This revolutionary idea appeared in 13 century and greatly influenced the development of semantic theory in 14 century [2, p. 18-21].

The fourth thesis by Fodor, identifying meaning as information (more or less), is also close in intention to the late medieval understanding of concept as an outcome of its causal relationship to the objects that fall under it. The formulation of this idea usually involves seeing cognitions as "naturally signifying" the things, which are included in them. Moreover, as it is generally known, medieval description of concepts formation by means of sensory and intellectual mechanisms based on Aristotelian and Avicennian models, was very

advanced.

Another reason why late medieval semiotics and semantics are relevant for contemporary philosophy of mind is the general internalist conception, which, again, J. Fodor shares. Thus, his fifth thesis states that 'whatever distinguishes coextensive concepts is ipso facto in the head'. This completely corresponds to the prevalent medieval model demanding that if the objects signified are the same, the difference between coextensive concepts will lie in the cognitions.

This outline shows that medieval epistemological models, albeit deserving attention from the historical point of view, are also valuable as the ones that demonstrate a lot of affinity with contemporary search in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

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