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LANGUAGE WEAPONIZATION IN THE RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

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INTRODUCTION

We exist in the Being we constructed by ourselves and for ourselves through the means of language. Not just by using grammatical constructions or a new vocabulary, but through the deeper levels of language usage and understanding, which can be described only as a "language totality." Language as a shared narrative cannot be reduced to mere verbal communication. Beyond question, these are the words we use every day, the music we listen to, the art we observe, the memes we are laughing at, etc. Yet more importantly, language is the truth and knowledge we bear. And when the war arises, language as a "House of Being" becomes a weapon. The Russian war against Ukraine is a prominent example of such a phenomenon, as wartime narratives, thanks to easy access to information, reshape and maintain the accepted discourses, affecting the society's Being-there.

In the first chapter, the role language plays in discourse formation will be analyzed and four instruments through which language is usually being weaponized (exhortation, offense, deception, and mediation) will be determined. Then, the usage of these instruments by the Russian war correspondents and Ukrainian bloggers who write about the war on Telegram will be examined. In the last chapter, the changes in the mentioned instruments of language weaponization usage amid the two Ukrainian Armed Forces' counteroffensives will be traced. The similarities in Russia's and Ukraine's approaches to language weaponization will be analyzed as well.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The key objective of this thesis is to determine through what instruments language is being weaponized during the full-scale Russian intervention in Ukraine.

The aims of this paper are to highlight the interconnectedness between language and Being and, through the notion of the relativity of the truth, understand the role language plays in society; indicate the most frequent ways of making language a weapon and figure out how the Russian and Ukrainian war correspondents and bloggers apply them; and to determine how the weaponization of language affects the formation and transformation of discourses on the Russian-Ukrainian war in the societies of both countries (more precisely, to trace the changes in language amid the Ukrainian army's advancement and their influence on the relevant discourses).

The **object** of this work is language as a prerequisite of the Being, and the **subject** is its weaponization during the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The theoretical foundation of this research is the post-structuralist theory of international relations and the study of Mary Louise Pratt on the instruments of language instrumentalization during the war named "Harm’s Way: Language and the Contemporary Arts of War."

In the context of the language as a "house of Being," a **phenomenological method** proposed by Maring Heidegger was used. The core principle of this method is that each quality of the subject should be questioned and examined without any prejudices. The purpose of this method is to answer not the question "What is the subject?" but "What are the roots of our current perception of 'what' of the subject?" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 49-58). To analyze the examples of the language weaponization and construction of the different realities of the Russian war against Ukraine, I referred to **discourse analysis**, a "research into the historical conditions which permitted, but did not guarantee its appearance" (Childs & Fowler, 2006, pp. 48-49). To analyze the

peculiarities of language weaponization and changes in narratives of Russian and Ukrainian war correspondents and bloggers, the data from their Telegram channel publications were collected and entered into MAXQDA for further categorization and analysis. As the development of language instrumentalization amid the Ukrainian Armed Forces' counteroffensives was analyzed, the focus was made on the posts published during three periods: from August to September 2022, from November to December 2022, and from April to May 2023.

To analyze the Russian discourses on the war with Ukraine, the following Telegram channels were picked:

Name **(as of May 23, 2023)**	**Author**	**Link**	**Number of Subscribers** **(as of May 23, 2023)**	**Number of analyzed publications**
Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition [Поддубный |Z|O|V| edition]	Evgenyi Poddubny	https://t.me/epoddubny	890,179	≈ 2,500
Sladkov + [Сладков +]	Alexander Sladkov	https://t.me/Sladkov_plus	1,001,836	≈ 1,000
Kotsnews	Alexander Kots	https://t.me/sashakots	656,289	≈ 3,700

Figure 1: The Russian Telegram Channels and their Authors

The sample of Russian Telegram channels is based on the ratings of the most cited Russian journalists in October 2022, where Poddubny, Sladkov, and Kots were ranked third, fifth, and sixth correspondingly (Journalists - October 2022 | Media Studies [Zhurnalisty - Oktiabr' 2022 | Medialogiia], 2022). The journalists ranked first, second, and fourth were Ksenia Sobchak, Margarita Simonyan, and Dmitry Guberniev correspondingly, who work as politicians and/or state-own media reporters and, thus, are not suitable for this analysis.

To analyze the Ukrainian discourses on the war, the following Telegram channels were considered:

Name **(as of May 23, 2023)**	**Author**	**Link**	**Number of Subscribers** **(as of May 23, 2023)**	**Number of analyzed publications**
STERNENKO	Serhii Sternenko	https://t.me/sternenko	533,516	≈ 5,000
Nikolaev Vanek	*Anonymous author*	https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev	634,804	≈ 5,150
TSAPLIENKO_UKRAINE FIGHTS [ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS]	Andryi Tsaplienko	https://t.me/Tsaplienko	303,014	≈ 10,350

Figure 2: The Ukrainian Telegram Channels and their Authors

In September 2022, Detector Media listed Serhii Sternenko and Andryi Tsaplienko among the 100 most famous Telegram channels in Ukraine, ranked 90th and 100th correspondingly. Almost all Telegram channels in higher positions were labeled as government, media, or pro-Russian. Sternenko and Tsaplienko were one of the few who were categorized as bloggers (Detector Media, 2022). Nikolaev Vanek was included in this investigation because of two factors: Firstly, he runs his Telegram channel in Russian which is of interest in the context of the instrument of mediation, which is explained below. Secondly, he also has a large number of subscribers compared to other Ukrainian Telegram bloggers.

Two concerns may arise regarding these samples. The first one is that war correspondents are analyzed along with bloggers. In Russia, the culture of war correspondents is developed and popular as such reporters offer more detailed and fresh information about the events at the frontline than Russian official media (Shevchenko, 2023). However, in Ukraine, the line between war correspondents and mere bloggers has blurred: famous Ukrainian bloggers visit the frontline to report the latest news, fundraise money to support the AFU, and share any other type of news ("War and Bloggers": Interview with Inna Miroshnychenko, 2023). Therefore, in this case, the sample of Telegram channels is more or less homogeneous.

The second possible concern is that the number of subscribers to Ukrainian Telegram channels is lower than that of Russian ones. According to TGStat, the average reach of one post on Poddubny's channel is 447,224 people, which is 50.2% of all subscribers (*Telegram Channel "Поддубный |Z|O|V| Edition" — @Epoddubny Statistics — TGStat*). At the same time, one post published by Sternenko reaches 271,857 on average, which is 51% of all subscribers (*Telegram Channel "Поддубный |Z|O|v| Edition" — @Epoddubny Statistics — TGStat*). Other Telegram channels

analyzed in this thesis have a similar situation. Thus, in the dimension of the channels' audience, they are comparable as well.

To achieve the main objective of this thesis, that is to investigate the usage of the language weaponization instruments, the relevant Telegram posts were categorized into eight groups: Deception, Domestic Deception, External Deception, Offense, Exhortation, Domestic Exhortation, External Exhortation, and Mediation. Deception, Offense, Exhortation, and Mediation categories were proposed by Mary Louise Pratt in the article on language weaponization named "Harm's Way: Language and the Contemporary Arts of War". For the purpose of this analysis, the subcategories "Domestic" and "External" were added. This enables a more accurate analysis of narrative changes in Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels, as their audience orientation (domestic, external, or both) is more clearly traced. Offense and Mediation, being a priori enemy-oriented, do not require additional subcategories.

The categorization was made according to the following criteria:

1. Deception:
    a. Narratives aimed at both shaking the enemy's beliefs regarding the purpose of the Russian war against Ukraine and reinforcing the public's mindset on the justice and significance of this "military campaign";
    b. Speculations on who started the war and what was its main cause.
2. Domestic Deception
    a. Bloggers' narratives aimed at convincing their society of the righteousness and holiness of their participation and role in the war;
    b. Efforts to "hide" the unfavorable incidents on the battlefield and repercussions and find the positive in the negative;
    c. Efforts to calm society when something bad happens on the battlefield, for example, by convincing that it is temporary.

3. External Deception
    a. Narratives intended to impose the "right" view of the war's origin on the enemy's army and society;
    b. Narratives aimed at undermining the morale and motivation of the enemy's army and society.
4. Offense
    a. Insults and harmful narratives designed to devastate the morale of the adversary's army and society;
    b. Narratives about the inability of the opposing army to win the war;
    c. Posts that abuse the topic of the prisoners of the war (for example, by humiliating them) and dead soldiers to promote narratives, beneficial for the state's ideology.
5. Exhortation
    a. Narratives aimed at both provoking the enemy's society to rebel against its government, army, and allies and inspiring the supporters to take actions in favor of their army and country.
6. Domestic Exhortation
    a. Appeals to join the army of the blogger's country to destroy the enemy;
    b. Narratives aimed at inspiring people to fight for their country;
    c. Appeals to the country's government and law enforcement officers punish those who oppose the respective army, state's decisions, etc.
7. External Exhortation
    a. Narratives aimed at making the enemy's society rebel against its government, army commanders, soldiers, and allies;
    b. Narratives designed to make the enemy's society oppose the decisions of its government, army, and allies;
    c. Appeals to the opposing soldiers to surrender.
8. Mediation

a. Posts using distortion of another side's language and culture;
b. Narratives that impose one country's views on the language, culture, politics, economy, geography, etc. of another;
c. Publications in which journalists/bloggers propose their interpretation of news, articles, statements, etc.

These instruments can be interconnected and/or create a sort of causal relationship, thus, one post can be attributed to several categories. For example, posts describing the life of the prisoners of war can relate to both *offense* (because the topic of the POWs is always painful for society) and *external exhortation* (when highlighting the POWs' good living conditions, Telegram channels can persuade soldiers to choose surrender over possible death).

The relevance of this paper is constituted by the modified character of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Today, this war does not only pertain to weaponry and military equipment overall. Russians and Ukrainians are fighting on an information front as well, where language is the main weapon. However, the majority of the works devoted to language instrumentalization and/or weaponization are mostly focused on the topics of education, racism, discrimination, colonialism, cultural representation, and more. A lot of authors raise the topic of the weaponization of the English language, for example, Luis Javier Pentón Herrera in the article named "Is the Language You Teach Racist?" talks about the need to decolonize the Spanish and English languages education, which have been extensively used to dehumanize and colonize other peoples (Pentón Herrera, 2022). Such works are concerned about the language as a weapon that makes other languages extinct.

Another vast part of such articles analyzes language weaponization with regard to its instrumentalization in the hands of those in power and the further influence of media on societies. Merrie Spaeth in her opinion article "Language is a weapon in

political warfare — if the media play along" writes about the role of language in political warfare in the US. She, among other things, concentrates on the Democrats' language strategy against then President Donald Trump and provides an example: after they characterized the building of the wall on the US – Mexican border as a "manufactured crisis," this term has spread all over the media and right to the people minds (Spaeth, 2019). Such articles, despite discussing the majority of discourses and how they are shaped by those who "shape" the language, omit the approach to the language as the prerequisite of Being, which will be the theoretical basis of this paper.

According to Deborah Cameron, who studied language ideologies, modern linguists perceive language as "either as pre-existing raw material for the fashioning of ideologies or as a post-hoc vehicle for their expression" (Cameron, 2006, p.143). Thus, a better understanding of the link between language and ideology can provide political theorists with a better foundation for studies on how ideologies are constructed and maintained through language and the ways in which language is shaped by ideologies. To better understand the latter, the concept of "verbal hygiene" will be examined.

From this point, **the novelty** of this paper derives. In the literature mentioned above little attention was given to the weaponization of the language during a real full-scale war, especially one that is fully technological with the representatives of both sides having access to the internet, where the narratives war is being waged. Moreover, language was perceived as a mere instrument in the hands of those in power, while it should be treated in a more complex way.

In the article "The Instrumentalization of the Language Issue in Ukraine," Marianna Novosolova conducted research on the instrumentalization of the language in the ideological war between Russia and Ukraine before and after 2014. Even though her study is extremely useful for understanding the interconnections among the concepts of language, nation, and territory and thus the role of language in the state-building

processes, it does not observe the direct usage of the language as a weapon during the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Since this thesis is aimed at covering the role of language in forming our being and how it is used during the war, **the processed literature** concerned such domains as linguistics, philosophy, political science, international relations, and history. The most comprehensive analysis of language weaponization was made by Mary Louise Pratt. "Harm’s Way: Language and the Contemporary Arts of War" became the basis for exploring the means and cases of language instrumentalization in politics and international conflicts.

George Orwell's and Noam Chomsky's approaches to language and power, being very popular when it comes to similar studies, were scrutinized in this thesis. Unfortunately, at this time, the sphere of theorizing language usage from a postmodernist perspective suffers from a lack of scientific works. Therefore, we referred to Martin Heidegger to form the ground for analyzing discourses from the perspective of language as a prerequisite of Being. Michel Foucault's "regime of truth," reinforcing Heidegger's statements, served as a strong theoretical foundation for this paper as well.

To "dilute" the number of philosophical sources of this work, we studied the approaches to language of linguistic professors, such as Kathryn Woolard and Deborah Cameron. They introduced and elaborated the concept of Language Ideologies and "verbal hygiene", which add to the understanding of the language as "the house of Being" yet linking it to the context of ideology and power (different from the Foucauldian one).

To add a more theoretical basis for our analysis of the Ukrainian and Russian language's instrumentalization during the war, we referred to Lara Ryazanova-Clarke, who investigated Russian language instrumentalization aimed at forming transnational discourses profitable for Russia under the prism of globalization sociolinguistics.

Last but not least, to make our interpretation of Heidegger's approach to linguistics as deep and comprehensive as possible, we referred to the scholars who devoted themselves to the research on Heidegger's ontology, namely Duane Williams and Guy Bennet-Hunter.

The following **vocabulary** will be used extensively in this paper:

- **Discourse,** as assumed by Michele Foucault, is not simply the way we think or what we believe, it is "a totality in which the dispersion of the subject, and his discontinuity with himself may be determined' (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1972, p. 55).
- **Language Weaponization** is the process by which language, as an essence of discourse, is used and affected in order to make narratives fit the community's mainstream policies during the war; the process by which language is used to inflict damage on others and affect the Being of a group of people (Bryan & Gerald, 2020); the part of the "verbal hygiene" procedure.
- **Language ideologies** are the "ideas and beliefs about what a language is, how it works, and how it should work, which are widely accepted in particular communities…" (Cameron, 2006, pp. 142-143).
- The **regime of truth** – the concept proposed by Foucault which comprises the society's "general politics of truth," which it accepts and protects (Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1969).

CHAPTER I. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE DISCOURSE FORMATION

In this chapter, we will grasp the most prominent philosophical thoughts around the concept of language and its role in forming the Being. At first, the interconnectedness between language and Being will be analyzed. Then, we will refer to Michele's Foucault concept of the regime of truth to cover the process of the constitution of appropriate discourse (power) in a particular society and its reinforcement. In the third subchapter, the connection between language as an instrument and ideology will be established and discussed. At the end of this chapter, the means of using language as a weapon will be studied on the basis of the article written by Mary Louise Pratt.

1.1. Martin Heidegger's Approach to Language

German philosopher Martin Heidegger is famous for his special approach to understanding Being (Dasein) by deconstructing the very concept of it to explore the ontology of the Self. In the process of tracing the genealogy of Being and finding the role philosophy plays in it, Heidegger explores the dimensions of language, which, in his opinion, is the medium of philosophy.

In relation to language and Being, Heidegger extensively uses two terms: correspondence and attunement. In philosophy, the Correspondence theory of the Truth exists. Shortly, it stipulates that all the truth is relative. Therefore, correspondence solely can be understood as a person's involvement in one's Being (David, 2002). George Steiner makes a good summary of this term: correspondence is “a response, a vital echo, a „re-sponsion“ in the liturgical sense of a participatory engagement” (Steiner, 1992, p. 29). Attunement, as Heidegger views it, is how we perceive ourselves toward the environment. In other words, it is the same as the Being-there concept. Thus, we can

make an assumption that correspondence and attunement are inextricably linked. Moreover, Heidegger himself states that “correspondence...is in an attunement.” According to him, it is through language that "we become attuned to Being" (Bennett-Hunter, 2007, p. 5-9). Thus, language is a part of correspondence and one of the constituents of the Being-there concept. While Being cannot be expressed solely through language, the latter can be the main instrument of the Being disclosure.

It becomes quite obvious when making parallels between "discourse" and "Being-with" notions. While discourse is a shared knowledge that exists among a particular number of people, "Being-with" is a state of mind of the Self that exists between (with) people. And only through the means of language such experience (Being and Being-with) becomes possible: Guy Bennett-Hunter draws an interesting parallel between the German words "entsprechung" (correspondence), "entsprechen" (correspond), and "sprechen" (speak) (Bennett-Hunter, 2007, p.7). Based on this, we shall analyze Heidegger's thought that speaking is a result of hearing: "We are only able to speak because we have already listened to language. What do we hear there? We hear language speaking” (Heidegger, 1978, p. 411). He links language to Being as we undergo every experience with the help of language (today, language means not only words but also music, videos (even silent), photos, art, etc) and, thus, it can be considered to be a "House of Being."

Language speaks. It is a source of "sprechen" (and, consequently, "entsprechung"). Here, we face a conflict: what is the source of what? Previously, we stated that language is a constituent of the Being. Heidegger just weaves a web of concepts that, as a result, just causes even more questions. He comes to the conclusion that "saying" ("sprechen") is equal to Being. David Cooper elaborates on this notion and concludes that "Being is a Saying" (Cooper, 1996, p. 84). And when we are apprehending the language, we are listening to "the voice of Being" (Bennett-Hunter, 2007, p.7). Bennett-Hunter states that for Heidegger, "the language is… the “language of Being” as clouds are the “clouds of the sky” (Bennet-Hunter, 2007, p. 8). When we

are using language in daily communication (by listening or speaking), we are producing and reproducing the Being. On the one hand, we influence the discourse through language, and, on the other, language is affected by the discourse.

"Heidegger's approach to language is to not think or speak *about* language, but to think or speak *from out of* language's reality with the intention that in this way we are led to its reality" (Williams, 2017, 7-8). Based on this, this is not a society that uses and controls language. Instead, it is a language that speaks through people and brings them to the understanding of subjectivity.

Apart from this, Heidegger focuses on the instrumentalization of language in philosophy, namely on the approach to language as an instrument of the dictatorship or the masses who decide "what is intelligible and what must be rejected as unintelligible" (Heidegger, 1978, p. 221). He also reasons about modern linguistics, which, in his opinion, also analyzes language through such an "instrumental" perspective. Alternatively, if linguists devote themselves to the more "primordial foundation," namely the ontology of language, it will be re-established as a new field of study. Language instrumentalization is dangerous as it diverts our attention from the totality of language and narrows its usage to a mere instrument of communication and control. Moreover, it limits linguistics to a specific set of instruments and approaches focused on language. Instead, we should concentrate on "being-with-language" which allows us to more-or-less understand the essence of Being. Duane Williams addresses this problem from the perspective of "forgetting of Being" by the "homeless" modern society, which approaches language as nothing more than a tool or method of expressing their inner thoughts (Williams, 2017, p.65). By "forgetting of Being" we understand the omittance of understanding and admitting one's subjectivity. "Homelessness" of modern human beings is rather a result of such relation to language, as, once again, this is the language that is considered to be the "House of Being."

The assumption of Heidegger that we cannot move beyond the language resonates with Jacques Derrida's opinion that a person cannot step outside one's discourse (Derrida, 1967). As follows, “It is not the man who determines Being, but Being that via language discloses itself to and in man” (Steiner, 1992, p.128). “Language… is appropriated by Being and pervaded by Being… Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells (Heidegger, 1978, p. 217 – 237).

1.2. Michel Foucault and the "Regime of Truth"

The concept of truth and knowledge was the central topic of a bunch of Michele Foucault's lectures, such as "Subjectivity and Truth" and "Christianity and Confession" at Dartmouth University, and "On the Government of the Living" at the collège de France in 1980.

Modern societies consider truth to be an absolute subject, "inscribed in the heart of reality" (Lorenzini, 2016, p. 221). However, according to Foucault, the common belief that truth exists in an absolute realm is misleading. In fact, truth is always tied to a specific reality (discourse) it is created in. The truth we believe in is perceived as if it is inscribed in our Being. Here, Foucault introduces the idea of a "regime of truth," which is "the type of discourse [a society] harbors and causes to function as true" (Lorenzini, 2016, p. 225). He links truth with power and names it the "regime of truth." However, he uses "power" not in the sense of the people who control the distribution of knowledge within this regime. Not in the context of government, dominance, coercion, etc. Instead, Foucault's power is a synonym for knowledge and at the same time its result, however under no circumstances is its prerequisite or cause. Other theorists who analyze Foucault's approach to power assume that "power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and ‘truth’" (Gaventa, 2010).

Foucault states that power is everywhere: it is dispersed and embodied in our discourse. He elaborates that it is a power that makes us the society we are. It is a power that produces discourse, yet in a way, very uncommon for other theorists. "Regime of truth," which can also be formulated as "meta power," provides for the discourse society acknowledge and perceives to be appropriate. And within this discourse, we can distinguish what is correct and incorrect; determine the characteristics of the people who believe in what we consider to be wrong; "suitable" means to defend our truth; who are the people in charge of defending it, and more.

Discourse, obviously, is reinforced through the sharing of knowledge by the media, cultural heritage, education, socializing, etc. For some, it can have a negative connotation: for example, the educational system in the USSR was shaped specifically to reproduce and inculcate the communist ideology. However, for Michele Foucault, power is not connected with something evil and coercive. He states that it is also useful and productive for society: "In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (Foucault, 1991, p.194).

Foucault writes about "a procedure of manifestation of truth," as a result of which the discourse is formed (Foucault, 2016, p. 96). Yet, not only this "manifestation" is relative (corresponds) to the discourse within which it is being constituted, but also the discourse itself, as Being, determines the "truth" and how it is manifested.

1.3. Language Ideologies and Identity Formation

Linguists approach the issue of language and ideology through the prism of language manipulation aimed at promoting a particular ideology or belief system, whether consciously or not. The most prominent scholars analyzing language from this perspective are George Orwell and Noam Chomsky, who analyzed the power of

language to convey political messages. They considered language to be a tool that could be used with good or bad intentions depending on who was wielding it (and, accordingly, political power). Orwell's work "Politics and the English Language" demonstrates how language can be used to shape public opinion, control it, maintain power differentials between social groups, and even challenge dominant political ideologies (Ostrom & Haltom, 2018, p. 20-21). During his lecture "On Power and Ideology" at the New School, Chomsky touches the problem of how language is converted into a tool used by governments to manipulate society's perception of reality and maintain control over it (Noam Chomsky: On Power and Ideology | the New School, 2015). In the book "Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies," he elaborates on the role of the mainstream media, controlled by the elite, in maintaining social control and perpetuating the interests of those in power by manipulating language, controlling the flow of information and the way it is presented (Noam Chomsky, 1989, pp. 2-8). However, we should not focus only on the language's impact on the spread of ideology or how it is used to convey ideological narratives. Another important aspect we should consider is how language is influenced by ideology. Deborah Cameron, the Rupert Murdoch Professor of Language and Communication at Oxford University, explores this often overlooked fact that language itself is shaped by ideological processes.

One of the means of exploring such a relationship is by examining "language ideologies," the morally, culturally, and politically established perception of the function, structure, and role of language by a particular society (Irvine, 1989, p.254-255). In other words, these are widely accepted norms of language and their establishment in a community. Yet they encompass more than just language itself. For example, certain language ideologies may influence attitudes towards dialects, accents, and other languages, or shape perceptions of what constitutes proper grammar or vocabulary. Thus, they create connections between language and other social phenomena related to identity formation: ethnicity, gender, race, appropriate behavior,

intelligence, aesthetics, morality, etc. Even when language is represented in strictly linguistic terms, such as formal grammar (however, its "formality" can be questioned as well), it involves social relations. According to Cameron, "just the act of categorizing linguistic varieties as dialects of the same language, or of selecting one variety as the standard to be codified, legitimizes boundaries between ethnic or national groups, and channels the power relations among them." For instance, a language ideology that places standard English over other dialects may be used to reinforce social hierarchies in one community. Another example is the use of euphemisms or other forms of language manipulation that have a positive connotation to obscure or downplay certain (mostly negative) political realities, such as the use of terms like "enhanced interrogation" instead of "torture" (Cameron, 2006, pp. 142-143).

Cameron proposes another important term – "verbal hygiene," which describes linguistic and metalinguistic practices aimed at "cleaning up" and regulating language in accordance with particular value judgments. The means of "verbal hygiene" can vary from correcting grammar and pronunciation to censoring other dialects and languages treated as offensive.

In addition, according to Cameron, "verbal hygiene" can be seen as a form of language ideology that reflects broader social and political values and beliefs through language: "Linguistic values mask social and moral ones; putting language to rights is a surrogate for putting the world to rights" (Cameron, 2006, pp. 149).

In 1939, such effects on language were made by the Nazi regime, which was described in detail by Victor Klemperer in his book named "The Language of the Third Reich." From then till the end of the Third Reich, "anything and everything heroic on land, at sea and in the air wore a military uniform." The language of German society at that time was "heroized": the war-time vocabulary (or, in other words, means of expression) was filled with neo-romantic adjectives, such as "kämpferisch" (belligerent). In addition, the new prefix "ent-" (de-) was added to the words:

"entnazifizierung" (denazification), "entmenschlichung" (dehumanization), "entrümpelt" (declutter), and more. Such "modernization" of language was to reinforce new Nazi values and justify their actions, while also creating a sense of unity among Germans who were encouraged to adopt this discourse (Klemperer, 2000, pp. 1-10). This is also the case for both Russian and Ukrainian discourses which were formed after the Russian full-scale intervention of Ukraine in 2022.

To disclose how language pertains to ideology in Russian Federation, we will refer to Lara Ryazanova-Clarke's article, in which she explores Russia's prevailing transnational discourses and the role of the Russian language in spreading the "compatriots" narrative outside of the country and contextualizing the Russian-Ukrainian war in its way. She mainly connects the Russian language to the "pride" and "profit" values, emphasizing its instrumental role: "... the discursive construction of Russian as a means for material advancement is constantly intertwined with manufacturing the transnational semantics of belonging to Russia (the transnational "pride")... This is often overlaid with the instrumental value-attribution for Russian for establishing and perpetuating power relations, exerting control, and warmongering" (Ryazanova-Clarke, 2015, p. 1). The study utilizes commodification theory, suggesting that language is increasingly viewed as a "commodity" in particular economic, political, and socio-cultural situations. Ryazanova-Clarke also refers to Bourdieu's concept of the symbolic significance of linguistic resources, which then can be converted into practical and material values.

The analysis shows that following the Soviet Union's collapse, modern Russia mixed its imperial and nationalistic tendencies and traits and made its own policy of identity formation with the aim of the Russian language. First of all, the Russian language was considered to bear a historical role of a "transnational connector," which complemented the trend of a Russian nation's pride. "In the imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet epochs, Russian was that legitimate language which was called upon to structure the ideology of integration and coherence" (Ryazanova-Clarke, 2015, p. 3). Then, after

2012, when Vladimir Putin became the President of Russia for the third time, such a hegemonic attitude was supplemented by the "patriotic" narratives. As a result, *Russkii Mir*, or the Russian World ideology was revived and reinforced. This created a new discourse that legitimized Russian hegemony over the Russian-speaking people beyond the country "by the claims of linguistic, 'spiritual' (dukhovnyi), and cultural unity". The narrative of "compatriots" was devised, and in the minds of the Russian people, it included all the countries where the Russian-speaking people lived in the realm of the states Russia controls, either culturally, politically, or economically (Ryazanova-Clarke, 2015, p. 3-4). Even if the Russian language was dominant in the region, after 2012 other languages and cultures were marginalized even more. This was the result of the language policy aka "verbal hygiene," which made all the people living in Russia speak Russian. It was about the pride of the Russian nation, which Putin's ideology propagated, and when speaking Russian you must feel belonging to something majestic. As a consequence, loyalty to the Russian culture leads to loyalty to the Russian government. The vicious circle of the Russian ideology (discourse) reinforcement. As Ryazanova-Clarke states, Russia views and instrumentalizes its language "as a source of symbolic added value [which] may be amenable to patterns that could be called imitational commodification in which the language use or knowledge has a veneer of economic gain but also fulfills other instrumental purposes and objectives" (Ryazanova-Clarke, 2015, p. 1-2).

Regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war, the research reveals that Putin utilizes the "transnational pride" discourse to eliminate the difference between the two countries, constructing the spirit of "one people" (*odin narod*). For example, by appealing to the history of the Kievan Rus: "Kievan Rus originated as a foundation of the future majestic Russian state. We have a common tradition, a common mentality, a common history, and a common culture! Our languages are similar… and we are one people! This is part of our large Russian world, the Russian-Ukrainian world" (Rossiia Budet Zashchishchat' Svoi Rynok Ot Deshevykh Ukrainskikh Tovarov Posle Sozdaniia ZST

Ukrainy S ES, - Putin, 2013). In his speech, "Russian-Ukrainian world" is used as a synonym or even equivalent to the "Russian world." In the beginning, language was the basis of the ideology formation. After, it became its inverted instrument.

To conclude, language is not simply a tool for conveying ideological narratives but is itself a consequence of such processes. Russian ideology was built on the language grounds. Yet then, Russia constructed a discoursive value of its language to ensure "profit" (political and economic advancements) and construct the semantics of belonging to the Russian state – "pride." Unsurprisingly, it reiterates the main thought of subchapter 2.1.: language is both the basis of reality and its product.

1.4. Means of Language Instrumentalization in Warfare

Mary Louise Pratt argues that language plays a crucial role in shaping people's understanding of the war and its consequences: the way we discuss it influences public opinion, justifies military actions, and impacts how we remember, describe, and transfer this knowledge to the next generations. By examining the usage of language during the war, we can gain a deeper understanding of its impact on society (Pratt, 2009, pp.1515-1516). According to Pratt, four linguistic operations play fundamental roles in waging war, that is *exhortation* (the act of persuasion), *offense* (using language to influence public opinion), *deception* (spreading misinformation to mislead the enemy), and *mediation* (manipulating the language through translation) (Pratt, 2009, p.1517). Within these four domains, she analyzes language weaponization during the American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We will dive deeper into understanding these linguistic instruments based on the examples of language weaponization.

In October 2005, Stephen Dupont, an Australian photojournalist, was filming the US military unit's operations in Afghanistan. He filmed the US and Afghan military convoys' journey to a village near Kandahar, intending to locate a group of Taliban

fighters. As the convoy approaches the village, loudspeakers on the US Humvees blast Pink Floyd. It is worth mentioning that music is forbidden by the Taliban. Upon arrival, the soldiers demand that villagers turn in any Taliban collaborators, but nobody does it. The search of the houses yielded no results. US Sergeant Jim Baker, a psychological operations specialist, then proceeds with a controversial tactic. The bodies of two Taliban fighters killed the day before were set on fire on a hill above the village, while an interpreter spoke into a loudspeaker a series of insults to provoke the Taliban and make them reveal themselves: “You allowed your fighters to be laid down facing west and burned. You are too scared to come down and retrieve the bodies. This just proves you are the lady boys we always believed you to be” (Pratt, 2009, p.1517). The interpreter emphasized the procedure of the Talibs' cremation, knowing that it is forbidden by Islamic law. Here, language becomes essential weaponry against the Talibs' discourse, where burning the corpses is a non-verbal weapon too: "By harming them mentally, we will be able to kill them physically." Moreover, the US unit exploited Islam (Muslim knowledge) as a weapon by "strategically" violating its norms.

This operation was directed not only toward the Taliban but also toward the US Army itself. Pink Floyd was played not just to irritate Talibs. It was a means of encouraging and energizing the soldiers. Just like using language against the enemy, in this case, it also influences rationale, behavior, feelings, morale, etc. As war is waged, it must be sustained by the transcendent objective behind it, by the meanings assigned to it, and by the purpose of suffering of both sides. Elaine Scarry in her book "The Body in Pain. The Making and Unmaking of the World" elaborates on the term "framing language," referring to the discourses each side of the conflict constructs to frame the purpose of fighting and dying. All the perception of physical reality is shaped by the "unreality of language" (Scarry, 1985, p.136-137). It is not about what we observe. It is about how or through which narratives we observe this reality. Language builds (frames) the Being of the army, within which it fights and distinguishes allies and

enemies. After defeating the opponent, the validity of the "winning" discourse is confirmed.

Mary Louise Pratt states that Sergeant Baker's insults against the Taliban were not mere true-false statements but interpellations (Pratt, 2009, p.1521). These are the linguistic mechanisms that impose pre-given structures on a person's Being. "By being named or ‘hailed’ as a member of a group, a person is led to see themselves as an ideological subject… the people in those situations are being asked to adopt a certain subject position or social role that is conducive to the maintenance of the social order" (Chandler & Munday, 2016). Citing Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Pratt considers interpellations to be the central operations (or constitutive) of language in society. According to her, interpellation is always about a battle of forces but never an exchange of knowledge, and a war "serves as a force multiplier of language, with war speaking and waging itself through civilian subjects, setting the terms for confrontations." It can also be discussed under the umbrella of "fighting words," a category of language that includes obscene, profane, and insulting speech that tends to inflict harm, equated to the physical one (Pratt, 2009, p.1522). According to the book "The Force of Language", written by Denise Riley and Jean-Jacques Lecercle, we need to shift the focus from a person who insults via language to the one who is being insulted. While the "speaker controls the repercussions of his words," the hearer has less control over it and decodes the speech one perceives rather involuntarily (Riley & Lecercle, 2004, pp. 10-15, 60). As "God forgot to put eyelids on our ears" (Pratt, 2009, p.1523), language becomes a very efficient instrument of offense.

As Pratt argues, the core aim of deception during the military conflict is to undermine society's beliefs, sow doubt about the roots of the war, and impose another regime of truth as genuine (Pratt, 2009, p.1524). The study on the means of radicalization of young Muslims in Arabic and Western countries by ISIS, made by Esra’ M. Abdelzaher and Bacem A. Essam, proves that deception is an efficient way of performing military operations or preparing for them. The authors note that ISIS

performs the deception operation systematically in their Arabic corpus, such as spreading false information about their enemies or their own capabilities. This is needed both to create confusion and fear among their opponents (however, it is hard to measure its effectiveness in this case) and convince young people to join the ranks of terrorists. To achieve the latter objective, ISIS uses false interpretations of religious Muslim texts to deceive its target audience. For example, they interpret the Koran in a way that obliges Muslims to attack people of other nationalities and argues against their safe life in Arab countries. In their publications, they mostly quote texts promoting a just way of life and provide distorted quotes from Koran to refute them (Abdelzaher & Essam, 2019, pp.900-901).

Deception is often unachievable without mediation. Pratt's understanding of mediation is interesting as it drastically differs from the term's definition in international relations, where mediation is considered to be related to the conflict resolution domain. However, for Mary Pratt, mediation is about engaging translators (mediators) in fueling the war. The translator, being acquainted with the rules of the psychological operation, will instrumentalize the discourse (language) of the enemy to harm it, often "invisible" for one (Pratt, 2009, p.1525). It is also interesting to take a look at multilingualism from such perspective. As interpreters have access to several discourses (Beings), they have multiple identities, which are constantly unfolding. If we deal with multinational conflict, mediation aka translation becomes an integral part of other language operations, discussed above.

CHAPTER II. LANGUAGE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR. RUSSIAN TELEGRAM CHANNELS

In this and the following chapters, we will focus on language weaponization during the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Here, the usage of the instruments of language weaponization, that are Deception, Offense, Exhortation, and Mediation, by the Russian war correspondents, namely Evgenii Poddubny, Sladkov, and Alexandr Kots, will be analyzed.

2.1. Language and Deception

Deception, as a part of the linguistic weaponry of the Russian Federation, covers 50% of all coded text. It is mostly used to impose Russian narratives on the cause of the war on others, including their society. As deception can be directed toward either both sides, only adversaries, or only inner society, this category was divided into three parts: Deception, Domestic Deception, and External Deception. The basis of this instrument is the narrative that the Armed Forces of Ukraine target mainly civilians and purposefully kill them, while the Russian army is fighting to protect them at all costs. This way, they are trying to undermine the Ukrainians' beliefs of the bravery and prudence of their army and remind Russian soldiers what they are dying for. An example of such a narrative is the post of the Russian war correspondent Alexander Sladkov:

"What is the AFU doing [after leaving the city]? That's right, they're shooting up Donetsk, killing civilians. Not trying to counterattack, not trying to, say, march on Kherson. No. They just

shoot unarmed people. Taking out all the anger on them for their local defeat" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 4664). [1]

Another example is Evgenyi Poddubny's post blaming Ukraine for destroying infrastructure in the self-proclaimed DPR:

"In Lysychansk, which is trying to recover from the hell it went through by winter, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have trashed a water pipeline and equipment used to rebuild critical infrastructure. Kyiv wants the city's residents to sit without water, heat, and light in winter as well" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 4664).

These publications are aimed at affecting both Ukraine and its allies (by promoting accusations that Ukraine is indeed a terrorist state) and Russians, trying to give them a direct reason to join the army and fight against terrorism. Moreover, they disseminate a sort of explanation for Russians why this war has started and why it should be waged further.

As part of the Deception general category (40% of all coded text), Russian war correspondents spread the viewpoint that only NATO is interested in making this war protracted and this is the US that gives the Armed Forces of Ukraine orders on where and when to attack and, for example, bomb civilians:

"Why does Ukraine bomb Donbas? Well, let's start with the fact that military decisions in Ukraine are made by the Pentagon" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 522).

This is most likely made to perceive Ukrainians that the war in their country is caused because of the West (Pivtorak et al., 2023). By using examples of other military conflicts in which the US has participated, Russian journalists elaborate on this notion:

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[1] This and the following quotations were translated from Ukrainian or Russian into English by the author of the thesis.

"The United States and Iraq, the US and Libya, the US and Syria, the US and Ukraine, the US and Afghanistan, the US and chaos, war, economic ruin, and suffering… of leaders of the countries and their peoples" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 1592).

Therefore, in this point of view, Russia is actually Ukraine's ally trying to defend it from the "Western regime." This is evidenced by, for instance, this publication: "Colonizers need Ukrainian slaves, Russia prevents this" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 1175). This point is also used to persuade Russians that their army fights NATO but not Ukraine both to justify some failures on the front and reinforce the discourse about "brother nations."

External deception (1%) of the Russian war correspondents is focused on persuading Ukraine and Western countries that they are, in fact, antagonists in this war. This includes narratives that Ukraine is just an instrument in the hands of the US and NATO overall, fighting for their interests, reinforced by the accusations of NATO for directing Ukrainian artillery missiles to hit civilians in Donetsk and other cities. In addition, they write about the ineffectiveness of the weaponry, which the Western partners transferred to Ukraine:

"American Javelins turned out to be ineffective in Ukraine. At our disposal are internal documents of Raytheon company, which produces these missile launchers" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 216).

As part of the domestic deception (9%), narratives about "liberated territories" are spread. As the primary cause for Russia to launch a full-scale invasion was the defense of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine (Pivtorak et al., 2023), they call the territories they conquer "liberated." The Referendums for the so-called People's Republics joining Russian Federations were the fruitful ground for awakening and reinforcing the bond between Russia and Ukraine:

"All of us have felt and known that Donbas is Russia. We have been fighting for it for the long eight years, we endured daily strikes on our homes, streets, hospitals, schools,

and kindergartens for it. It is time to erase the non-existent border between our states, as it has long been erased in our hearts, and hold a referendum on the issue of the Donetsk People's Republic becoming a part of the Russian Federation" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 3298).

"Donbas is coming home" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 3418).

Deception is aimed at not only building a discourse but also maintaining its strength (Pratt, 2009, p.1524). This is evidenced by the endeavors of the Russian war correspondents to affect their community's perception of the AFU's successful operations or other ambiguous events. For example, the POWs exchange during which some of the "Azov" soldiers and their commanders were exchanged, caused a strongly negative reaction from Russians (Coles & Vtorygina, 2022). Poddubny, Sladkov, and Kots provided arguments about why their readers should not be concerned about it. Instead, they should be happy that the Russian soldiers came back home.

2.2. Language and Offense

The Russian war correspondents use offense (20% of all coded messages) extensively to hit the pain points of Ukrainians and undermine their morale. One of the means of offense is using insults and harmful words, creating and emphasizing a negative perception of the adversary. Almost every publication in the Russian Telegram channel on the news about the war contains such insults as "nazi" ("нацисты"), "the Kyiv regime" ("Киевский режим"), "the Ukrainian regime" ("украинский режим"), "khokhly" ("хохлы", Russian slur for Ukrainians), "boyeviki" ("боевики", negative connotation of militants), "terrorists" ("террористы"), and more. By using such characteristics, the Russian discourse about the Ukrainian terrorist regime that purposefully targets civilians is reinforced both inside Russia and in the minds of people sympathizing with it.

Another tactic of "attacking" the Ukrainian discourse is by doubting or denying the ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to successfully launch any counteroffensive and eventually win the war. The most common way to do this is to emphasize the allegedly dramatic losses of the Ukrainian soldiers, usually connecting it to the incompetence of the command. Sladkov, citing the unnamed Ukrainian militant, said that "a group of seventeen people went [for a combat mission], and [as a result,] four people came back" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 540).

As we discussed before, Russia blames the Western countries for the war in Ukraine. In this context, Russian war correspondents link the US to the alleged failures of the Ukrainian military operations:

> "This is reminiscent of the shameful history of the American campaign in Afghanistan when the collective West hoped for a quick victory and ended up with a protracted war and an inglorious flight" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 1574).

In addition, Russian war correspondents often spread narratives that Ukraine as a state can function only with support from the US and other Western partners.

In the Russian Telegram channels covering the war, the topic of the prisoners of war is utilized extensively. One of the most spread points is that the AFU tortures everyone: Russian prisoners of war, civilians supporting Russia, and even its own soldiers who do not want to fight. For example, Poddubny states that the Aidar Battalion organized dozens of torture chambers throughout the country. In one of such chambers, "... about 150 people were tortured and killed" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 4628). Other messages about Ukrainian POWs carry a narrative that Russian captivity is safe for Ukrainian soldiers who do not want to die (as opposed to Ukrainian captivity aka torture chamber).

Everything that happens to the Ukrainian soldiers in Russian captivity is described as a terrorist attack prepared by Ukraine. For instance, after the massacre in Olenivka, where 50 Ukrainian POWs were killed, Russian officials have claimed that it was done

by the AFU with the aim of the US-supplied HIMARS missiles (Lister et al., 2022). This case was picked up by the Russian Telegram:

> "Why does the AFU kill the Ukrainian soldiers captured in Yelenivka [Olenivka in Russian]? I have the following assumptions: The first purpose is to kill some prisoners of war, who may bear important and most likely tactical information of the Main Directorate of Intelligence, the State Security Department, Zelensky, or Zaluzhny personally… The third one is they aimed to punish the "traitors of Ukraine, who surrendered to these hated Russians (prevention of further surrender)" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 1298).

The major part of "offensive" publications is notions of the Ukrainian POWs. By humiliating Ukrainian soldiers who, after all, may suffer in Russian captivity, the Russian war correspondents are most likely seeking to negatively affect the morale of the Ukrainian people and army.

2.3. Language and Exhortation

The exhortation in the Russian telegram channels is as widespread as the previous two instruments, covering 24% of all coded publications. The general category of exhortation (1%) includes the narrative that must enrage Ukrainian soldiers and motivate Russian citizens to join the army:

> "A hoard of khokhols is pushing the Oskol front, despite their losses. Their equipment is on fire, their corpses cover settlements and wooded areas. A "thin red line" of Russian guardsmen holds back Ukraine's offensive, fertilizing the already fertile black soil of Slobozhanshchyna with the AFU soldiers. Soon, very soon, newly formed units and subunits will arrive, and the enemy will be defeated, humiliated, and destroyed" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 4403).

The external exhortation is much more common, reaching 6% of all coded texts. It mostly covers messages about the terroristic and authoritarian character of the Ukrainian government, its unprofessionalism, selfishness, and tendency to nepotism, calling Ukrainians for overthrowing this "regime." Moreover, they spread information about the

negligence of the AFU commanders who abandon their soldiers on the battlefield and do not supply weapons to the hot spots:

"Soldiers of the 93rd AFU Brigade who left their positions in Soledar describe the criminal carelessness of their command: the latter disarmed and returned them to the front line with no supplies. They can only leave their positions if they die or are wounded" (Poddubnyy, August - September, par. 1315).

Often, the West is blamed for such tragedy:

"'Combat diet' is an American term. All actions of the AFU and the Ukrainian national battalions take place at the beck and call of a "Yankee magic wand"… this is the West manipulating the 37 million conquered Ukrainians' lives. We will set you free" (Sladkov, August - September, par. 363).

Such publications can include narratives about the Ukrainian barrier troops, tortures of soldiers who refuse to fight, "hunting" for people during mobilization, etc. As such messages are usually accompanied by calls to surrender to Russia, it can be assumed that the accusations described above intended to make more Ukrainians take the side of Russia and the AFU soldiers surrender, believing that in the Russian captivity, they will find peace and security. These statements are reinforced by providing quotes from the Ukrainian POWs.

Within domestic exhortation (17%), language is used to physically engage more people in the war. For example, the Russian war correspondents urge them to join the Russian army by portraying the deeds of their combatants:

"Mobilized Donetsk guys, who were not afraid to give the enemy a decent fight, are now successfully carrying out all the assigned combat tasks. Citizen of the Republic, be like them! Stand up for your people!" (Poddubny, August - September, par. 2030).

Another objective is to make citizens negative towards "traitors" who support Ukraine and bring their punishment closer. Alexandr Kots blames Saint Petersburg's authorities for not imprisoning (or at least claiming foreign agents) people who agitate

Russian soldiers to desert. "The attitude toward SMO [special military operation] should be different… Betrayed? Take it!" (Kotsnews, November - December, par. 1387). The success of the army depends not only on the military strength but also on the unity of the home front. By distributing such messages, Russian journalists strive to achieve this. Consequently, it may positively affect the morale of the soldiers.

Another interesting way of instrumentalizing language as domestic exhortation is proposing ways of instrumentalizing other languages, especially those of national minorities. Sladkov, reminiscing his military experience in Dagestan, stated that then, nobody understood the local languages, which, thus, were used as ciphers.

2.4. Language and Mediation

According to Pratt, language as an instrument of mediation is used mostly by interpreters (Pratt, 2009, p.1525). However, in the Russian-Ukrainian war, when all Ukrainians know the Russian language fluently, and a majority of Russians can understand basic Ukrainian, all of us play the role of interpreters.

Russian war correspondents, despite not speaking Ukrainian, still try to "occupy" it. Thus, the usage of mediation covers 6% of all coded Telegram posts. Mostly, they use Ukrainian words and images with negative connotations and distort them by mixing them with Russian. For example, the Ukrainian word *nezalezhna*, which means "independent," is mentioned as *nezalezhnaya* (the Russian ending "ya" is added). This linguistic technique is utilized to downplay the importance of Ukraine's independence and the struggle for it. The same goes for the word *peremoga*, which means "victory." They distort it by simply pronouncing it in a Russian manner. Another aspect of occupying the Ukrainian language and culture by Russia is replacing Ukrainian toponyms with their own names. The examples are "Bakhmut (Ukrainian variant) – Artemovsk (Russian

variant)," "Lyman – Krasnyi Liman," "Dnipro – Dnepropetrovsk," "Toretsk – Dzerzhinsk," and others[2].

Mediation, according to these examples, is a part of the deception and internal exhortation processes. By occupying and distorting the discourse of the Ukrainian people, Russian war correspondents give their compatriots more solid ground for constructing their beliefs and language ideology.



Figure 2.1. Comparison of the language weaponization instruments usage by the Russian war correspondents

[2] It is important to note that the publications that contain solely Russian toponyms weren't categorized as Mediation as an absolute majority of the posts related to Ukraine's cities were mere news but not narratives aimed at affecting Ukrainians from the Mediation perspective. Only publications containing complete syntactic constructions indicating the Ukrainian language occupation were included in this category.

CHAPTER III. LANGUAGE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR. UKRAINIAN TELEGRAM CHANNELS

In this chapter, we will focus on how Ukrainian bloggers who cover the war weaponize language during the Russian-Ukrainian war. To be precise, the usage of Deception, Offense, Exhortation, and Mediation in the Telegram channels owned by Serhii Sternenko, Nikolayev Vanek (anonymous Telegram channel), and Andriy Tsaplienko will be analyzed.

3.1. Language and Deception

In the Ukrainian Telegram, Deception is the most common instrument of language weaponization, covering 51% of all coded publications. The general category (35% of all codes) is the prevailing one. First of all, through this instrument, the Ukrainian bloggers spread the perception of the war's cause, accepted by the country's citizens: the Russian army invaded Ukraine to wipe Ukrainian culture off the face of the earth. For Ukrainians, it should serve as an inspiration to fight for themselves, their descendants, and all democratic world (Zakharchenko, 2022). At the same time, by distributing this point of view, bloggers "encourage" Russian people to perceive their country as an aggressor. These narratives are reinforced by the notion that Ukraine was a thriving country until Russia came there. Now, hundreds of cities are destroyed, the state's economic development is halted, thousands of people are killed, and hundreds of thousands of people are forced to live far from home:

"I don't want to be shot with bombs" - a poignant video of a little girl from the Kherson region who is forced to hide from shelling" (Tsaplienko, November - December, par. 1109).

"After the Russian "liberators" came to Severodonetsk, life became much better there. There is no electricity, no food, no water" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 218).

Each post about the terrible repercussions of the war mentions Russia as a primary reason for this. It is the Russian army that is shelling peaceful cities and killing civilians, it is the Russians who are using prohibited weaponry such as phosphorus munitions, and it is Russia that is bombing the territories it temporarily controls:

"The rashist media called the shelling of civilians in Voznesensk "effective strikes on the concentrated enemy forces." What is important for our readers to understand is that was a real missile strike on a civilian building on a civilian building where no military units were located. Among the victims were pensioners, women, and children" (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 3385).

In Ukraine, a culture of donations is highly developed as people are donating unreal amounts of money to help their army with the necessary equipment (*The Phenomenon of Ukrainian Donations, or How Ukrainians Collect Millions in a War-Torn Country*, 2022). Therefore, you can find countless Telegram posts about the results of fundraisings, such as "Congratulations, my friends, you have just destroyed the occupiers' ammunition depot" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 43). On the one side, they contain phrases designed to inspire the Ukrainians to keep supporting their army and make them feel valuable and useful in bringing Ukraine closer to victory. On the other, they deliberately emphasize to the Russians the resilience and the unity of the Ukrainians, who, for example, managed to raise UAH 296 million for two Bayraktar drones in just one day (The Phenomenon of Ukrainian Donations, or How Ukrainians Collect Millions in a War-Torn Country, 2022). Au contraire, the Russian population is presented as poor, Soviet-minded, mostly alcoholic, prone to criminal offenses, and passive in terms of political and social activity:

"We all had a rough idea of the kind of misery Russians live in. … an alcoholic who beats his wife, gives bribes, and lives in a … Soviet cultural space… It is about poverty (not because the state does not care about its citizens, but because no one wants to work), constant crime, violence against women and children, and the indifference of every government agency to what they are supposed to be doing. The absence of public morality (which they like to squeal about

endlessly), and hatred for each other. And they call all of this either "greatness" or "mysterious Russian soul", depending on the depth of their swamp" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 8733).

Another objective of the General Deception instrument is to debunk the narratives propagated by Russian officials and journalists. The Russian media spread accusations that the Ukrainian army has been bombing Donbas for eight years (Zubchenko, 2022). The Ukrainian bloggers "laugh" at such statements, for example, by quoting Donetsk residents who claim that "this rocket attack was the first in their lives" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 315). In addition, Ukrainian bloggers deny statements about the Russian army's success on the battlefield, providing their proof and argumentation.

The next strong narrative in the context of Deception pertains to the Ukrainians who live in the territories temporarily occupied by Russia. Firstly, the publications about the Ukrainians who live in the captured cities and wait for the AFU are spread extensively: "Temporarily occupied Mariupol. The Ukrainians are unconquered. They are singing the anthem of Ukraine" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 8358). Such messages both reassure the Ukrainian audience that there is still a point in liberating these territories and demoralize the Russian audience by demolishing their initial beliefs about the Russian population in Ukraine. Furthermore, Sternenko and Nikolaev Vaner call Ukrainians under occupation to wage guerrilla warfare against the Russian army, share the coordinates of the Russian troops and warehouses, assess the damage caused by Ukrainian missiles hitting these locations, etc.

Narratives built around Domestic Deception (10%) are similar to those discussed in the context of General Deception with one difference: they are concentrated solely on the allied audience. Messages we did not mention before pertain to the topic of the Ukrainian prisoners of war and Ukraine's setback at the frontline. The posts about the POWs are mostly triggered by the Russian war correspondents spreading the videos of Ukrainian POWs, on which the latter declare anti-Ukrainian positions. "In order to

survive, a soldier in captivity must say everything the enemy demands of him", – Sternenko reassures Ukrainians (Sternenko, August - September, par. 32). "Do not lose heart", – Nikolaev Vanek states (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 690). If Ukraine loses its territory or another unpleasant situation happens on the battlefield, bloggers immediately begin to calm down the audience: We will win. But at an extremely high price" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 10275).

External Deception (6%) in the hands of the Ukrainian bloggers is mostly aimed at diminishing Russians' morale regarding their position in this war. First of all, the confirmations about a poor supply of their troops and an awful attitude of the commanders to their military are provided. The notion of the Russian army as the army of criminals is distributed after the news about Russia mobilizing the prisoners (Pavlova, 2022): "Murderers, cannibals, rapists, and other criminals will now officially become Russian military personnel" (Tsaplienko, November - December, par. 1214). The Ukrainian bloggers concentrate a lot of attention on the failures of the Russian army and their inability to achieve previously set goals. In fact, they state that Russia achieves the exact opposite of their goals: instead of respect and fear, Russians are hated and banned abroad.

"Soon, all normal countries will have signs saying "Animals are allowed in. Russians are not." This is victory, Russians" (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 1379).

3.2. Language and Offense

The offense is Ukraine's second most-used instrument of language weaponization which covers 30% of all coded texts. The Ukrainian bloggers are prone to dehumanizing their enemy by using such insults as "orks" ("орки"), "cannon fodder" ("гарматне м’ясо"), "swines" ("свині"), "flock" ("стадо"), "chmobiks" ("чмобіки", a combination of the words "shmuck" and "mobilized men"), "the army of corpses" ("армія трупів") and more. The emojis of clowns and pigs are often used in conjunction with references to

the Russian army. By doing this, the Ukrainians want to show Russians that they mock their army and do not consider it to be as great as it was shown to be until February 2022 (Soric, 2022). In addition, considered bloggers deride Russian "Z" and "V" symbols of the war, which have become a crucial part of Russia's discourse (Sauer, 2022), by comparing them to the Nazi swastika.

The announcements of any successes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, made by Sternenko, Nikolaev Vanek, and Tsaplienko, contained the humiliation of the Russian army and statements about its inability to defend itself against the attacks made by the army several times smaller in size (Statista, 2023). It especially pertains to the explosions of the points of troop deployment and weapons depots in Russia and the territories it temporarily controls. Moreover, the topic of the high mortality rate of the Russian army and Russian private military companies is raised derisively: "Well done! The cemetery near Luhansk has no more free space" (Tsaplienko, November - December, par. 1897) or "Russians, thank you for coming to the South! This is where you all gonna die" (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 1583). All these messages come with smiling and partying emojis.

Language as an offense is also used to disgrace the Russian people in comparison to the Ukrainians. Bloggers emphasize the poor quality of life in Russia, such as the lack of indoor bathrooms, power and gas supply in the villages, basic appliances, etc. In July, there was news about the Russian family that bought a new LADA Granta using the allowance they received after their son was killed in Ukraine (*Parents Bought a LADA Using the Allowance Paid for Their Son Who Died in Ukraine*, 2022). After this, the narratives about parents willing to send their sons to the war in order to get a car were constructed. The Ukrainian Telegram channels also focus on the Russians' Soviet mentality and a lack of respect for their compatriots. As an example, Nikolaev Vanek writes about the Russian commanders cremating the corpses of Russian soldiers:

"Why are you even surprised that they cremate the corpses?.. It's normal for them. I'm not surprised, considering what scum they are. They cannot be called human beings " (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 6923).

In combination with deception, such offensive narratives may lead to the enemy's low morale, a lack of desire to keep waging the war, and a decline in the trust of the Russian citizens in their government (Zakharchenko, 2022).

The Ukrainians direct offensive messages not only to Russia, their main enemy, but also to the countries, institutions, and personalities that do not support Ukraine as much as its people want them to. For example, Tsaplienko accuses Pope Francis of believing in the innocence of the Russian people in the context of supporting the war (Tsaplienko, November - December, par. 2195), while Nikolaev Vanek is enraged because of the fruitless IAEA mission to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, where, according to him, Russia stores his military equipment, violating international law (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 7300).

3.3. Language and Exhortation

Exhortation, which accounts for 17% of all coded messages, is another important instrument for the Ukrainian opinion leaders. The main difference from the Russian usage of exhortation is that the Ukrainian bloggers direct it solely to the domestic audience. Within the general category of exhortation (1%), disinformation can be classified. Occasionally, Sternenko, Vanek, and Tsaplienko encourage their subscribers to share disinformation, aimed at distressing the enemy and provoking it to do something, in Russian chats, groups, and channels in Telegram and other social media:

"SAKI!!! YEVPATORIA!!! BEWARE!!!

The Ukrainian diversionists have stolen a police car and uniforms, and are prowling around the neighborhood hoping to escape. An interception plan has been launched.

If you see a police car speeding, shoot at its wheels, block the road, or throw a rock! PLEASE SHARE!

Ukrainians, share it in the Russian chats"

(Sternenko, August - September, par. 1019-1020).

Domestic exhortation (14%) is used the most. In this analysis, the domestic audience includes not only Ukrainians and people living in Ukraine but also their allies from other countries. Thus, the appeals to Western partners to provide Ukraine with more weaponry were included in this category. Some of them are "hidden" in the statements that Russia can attack any country it wants at any time. Here, Ukraine is presented as a defender of the democratic world:

We need more artillery because we are facing a superior enemy… Because it is Ukraine that is now defending the whole of Europe" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 183).

Despite the war, Ukrainian bloggers demand drastic changes in Ukraine's judicial system:

"While our soldiers are defending the country, there must be a strong judicial system in the rear. Because dishonest courts lead to enemy accomplices remaining at large and innocent people being imprisoned" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 1418).

Much attention is given to the need to punish betrayers, who help Russia by passing on the coordinates of the AFU troops, weapon warehouses, oil depots, electrical substations, and other Ukrainian strategic objects, which are being bombed as a result. In Sternenko's and Tsaplienko's opinion, pro-Russian officials in Ukraine should also be arrested. In fact, all Ukrainians should give up and destroy everything related to Russia, be it music, monuments, or mere nostalgia. Another topic raised in exhortation publications is tightening restrictions on Russians abroad. As Russia is considered to commit war crimes in Ukraine (European Commission, 2023), Ukrainian opinion leaders are concerned that Russian citizens are traveling abroad freely. They call on countries all

over the world to ban any kind of visas for Russians. Moreover, they insist that the Ukrainian government should ban Russians from visiting its territory. Russians should be allowed to enter Ukraine only if they want to join the International Legion of Territorial Defence of Ukraine.

"The policy of allowing "good Russians" to come to Ukraine is wrong and will only lead to playing along with the enemy" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 645).

External exhortation (2%) is directed mainly toward Russian soldiers and newly mobilized men who are looking for ways to surrender. The Ukrainian bloggers share phone numbers and email addresses that Russians can contact to "stay alive, not die" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 9940). Besides, Sternenko and Tsaplienko call on peoples from the Russian Federation Republics, such as Buryatia and Dagestan, to rebel and gain independence:

"Let me remind you that Dagestan should not be Russia. Dagestanis are separate peoples who are now under occupation. They should have their own separate state if they do not want to die for Putin in someone else's war" (Sternenko, August - September, par. 10475).

3.4. Language and Mediation

As mentioned above, most Ukrainians are fluent in Russian and, when speaking it, become interpreters in the context of Pratt's mediation. Even though mediation techniques cover only 2% of all coded messages, all the Ukrainian Telegram channels' publications in Russian, such as those made by Nikolaev Vanek, can become a weapon. The Ukrainians can speak their language all the time and switch to Russian when they need the enemy to understand the message. The Ukrainian army can spend seconds formulating a convincing statement to affect the enemy while Russian soldiers will need to engage a trained Russian-Ukrainian interpreter. Moreover, the role of language fluency during military operations behind enemy lines cannot be underestimated.

As for the precise cases of the usage of mediation in the publications of the analyzed Ukrainian bloggers, these are mostly copying the statements of Russians to ridicule them. For instance, after Russian President Vladimir Putin cautioned that Russia "has barely started" its operation in Ukraine (*Putin Says Russia Hasn't Even Started in Ukraine as He Dares West to Try to Defeat Russia on Battlefield*, 2022), the Ukrainians began using this phrase to describe their military actions against Russia. After a successful missile launch on a Russian weaponry depot in temporarily occupied Melitopol that caused a strong reaction among Russians, Nikolaev Vanek wrote: "Melitopol, we have barely started" (Vanek_Nikolaev, August - September, par. 1245). This also applies to such statements of Russian officials as "nothing has happened" ("ничего не случилось"), "everything is going according to plan" ("все идет по плану"), "goodwill gesture" ("жест доброй воли"), and others.



Figure 3.1. Comparison of the language weaponization instruments usage by the Ukrainian bloggers

CHAPTER IV. RESHAPING THE DISCOURSE AMID UKRAINE'S COUNTEROFFENSIVES

The Ukrainian Armed Forces launched two large-scale counteroffensives in September and November 2022, which resulted in the de-occupation of the Slobozhanshchyna region, Mykolayiv oblast, and a part of the Kherson oblast. In this chapter, we will analyze how the narratives of both sides, Russian and Ukrainian, changed in the course of those military operations. More precisely, we will study the peculiarities of addressing specific instruments of language weaponization before, during, and after Ukraine's advancements on the battlefield. After this, the role of language in forming and transforming the discourses during the war will be discussed.

4.1. Changes in the Narratives on the Russian-Ukrainian War

In early August, which was a rather "quiet" period in the context of developments on the battlefield, Sladkov, Poddubny, and Kots referred mainly to the General or External subtypes of Deception and Exhortation. The accusations of the Ukrainian and Western authorities in the Russian-Ukrainian War outbreak and the sufferings of "the People of Donbas" constitute the majority of such texts. According to these publications, it can be assumed that the Russian war correspondents wanted to affect the morale of the Ukrainians and direct them against their government in order to avert a possible offensive. At the same time, they strived to maintain the Russian mainstream sentiments toward the cause of the war and the "evil nazi Kyiv regime" both in Russia and in Ukraine, so that the high level of support of the Russian government is ensured.

On the contrary, Sternenko, Nikolaev Vanek, and Tsaplienko, representing the Ukrainian Telegram, preferred the General and Domestic categories of Deception and Domestic Exhortation. First of all, a country with a war on its territory needs to build and

execute a strong information policy to unite its citizens to work in favor of the state, reduce panic, increase awareness of fakes, increase military and financial support of Ukraine, and more. In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it became the responsibility not only of the Ukrainian officials and media but also of the bloggers in Telegram (Karpchuk, 2022). Another reason why the Ukrainian Telegram channels were focused on the domestic audience is that at the beginning of the full-scale war, Ukraine and the collective West realized the passive mentality of Russians and halted any attempts to incite them to rebel against the authorities and the war in general (Kolesnikov, 2023).

In September and November, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine's counteroffensives were launched, Internal instruments became a core of the Russian Telegram channels' publications. A solid reaction to Ukraine's actions was needed. Thus, the Russian war correspondents directed their resources to inform their citizens about the events on the front line, explain certain events (for example, justify the Russian army's withdrawal from the city it has previously captured), debunk the alleged fakes spread by the Ukrainian media, reassure the Russian people of the credibility of their President and Defence Ministry, and more. Moreover, in such narratives, they inspired people to unite for the sake of the victory and economic recovery of the country after the war.

On the contrary, the Ukrainian side of Telegram kept spreading publications attributed to General and Domestic Deception and Domestic Exhortation. The usage of Offense has slightly increased, as an emotional response to successful advancements in the Slobozhanshchyna and Kherson regions was overly strong (Osadcha, 2022), and all the small victories were "celebrated" by insulting an enemy.

After the information boom around Ukraine's counteroffensives subsided, the dissemination of specific narratives returned to its "pre-offensive" form. the Russian war correspondents again focused on the General and External audiences through Deception and Exhortation, while the Ukrainian bloggers who cover the war published messages of the General and Domestics Deception and Dometic Exhortation.

4.2. Language as the "House of Being" of the War

The Russian-Ukrainian War is an exceptional phenomenon in the context of language weaponization as all people in Ukraine, Russia, and abroad have access to updates about the situation on the battlefield twenty-four hours a day. In other words, this is the war on the air. Society needs this information not just to know who wins and who loses but to have an *understanding* of how and for the sake of what it can and should function (Butsko, 2023).

Even though the Ukrainian and Russian Telegram channels propagate different narratives, their role is similar. That is, to form the discourse on the war. To do this, they use similar instruments, described above, and often to the same extent. The General category of Deception covers 40% of all coded publications of the Russian war correspondents and 35% – of the Ukrainian bloggers, which means that in a major part of their publications, they target both audiences, domestic (country's citizens and their allies) and external (enemy's citizens and their allies). The Domestic category of Exhortation comprises 17% of all the Russian channels' coded texts and 14% – of the Ukrainian ones, while Domestic Deception accounts for 9% of the Russian correspondents' texts and 10% of the Ukrainian bloggers' ones. In such a way, the citizens of either Russia or Ukraine are called for any actions for the sake of their country and are imposed the attitude to the war, dominant in their society. The usage of Offense is also much the same: 30% of the analyzed texts of the Ukrainian Telegram channels and 20% – of the Russian ones. According to this, both sides are eager to enrage the enemy and hit its pain points.

Furthermore, both Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels often use identical words and phrases to achieve some goals. For example, the similarities between the statements about the inability to advance on the battlefield and the countless casualties of the Russian army or the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be traced:

"The Russians conduct unsuccessful attacks near Pavlivka and do not take into account their losses. The approaches to the town are littered with the bodies of Nazis" (Tsaplienko, November - December, Pos. 1323).

versus

"The Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to take control of the Svatovo-Liman road. So far, the Russian Armed Forces have successfully repulsed these attempts. Nevertheless, Ukrainian units do not relent in their pressure, not taking into account their losses" (Poddubny, August - September, Pos. 4673).

By weaponizing the language, both sides reinforce their own regimes of truth, accepted by their people. The Russian war correspondents propagate the discourse that the goal of Russian society is to destroy the evil Kyiv regime that, being influenced by the West, occupied the minds of Ukrainians. Au countraire, the Ukrainian bloggers build their discourse around the Russian occupiers who invaded Ukraine to subjugate its citizens and bring them the poverty and decay prevalent in Russia.

Both Russia and Ukraine manifest their discourses, distinguishing what is good and what is evil, correct and incorrect. As part of these different regimes of truth, diverse language ideologies are used. Russia produces new words and phrases, such as "denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine" and makes them widespread in the lexicon of an average Russian (Savchuk, 2022). After analyzing the publications of the Ukrainian bloggers it can be assumed that the Ukrainians' war vocabulary is filled with phrases that accentuate the defensive role of the AFU (pointing to Russia as the aggressor) and the majestic role of Ukraine in defending the democratic world. Moreover, verbal hygiene influences the way Ukrainians and Russians perceive themselves and each other. For example, in Ukraine, Russian-speaking citizens prefer to switch to the Ukrainian language in order not to be associated with the occupier (Ratsybarska, 2023). Russia, instead, makes Ukrainians who live in the territories Russia temporarily occupies speak only the Russian language. In addition, it relapses Ukrainian books, educational programs, storefront signages, etc. by the Russian ones

(Harding, 2023). As stated in the first chapter, as an instrument of ideology, language transforms and, consequently, rebuilds the way people perceive reality. Both Ukraine and Russia use language to build a wartime discourse necessary for a particular country's victory.

By the described means of language weaponization, Being and Being-with of the Ukrainians and Russians are adjusted to the conditions they live in. Only because of the chosen language ideologies and, thus, regimes of truth an average Ukrainian may perceive an average Russian as an enemy. Heidegger's attunement comes into play at this point as we define ourselves toward the environment, explained and characterized by language. Here, language becomes the "House of Being" of the war.

CONCLUSIONS

Language forms the way we apprehend the discourse we live in. Martin Heidegger examines this from the perspective of a person's attunement to one's Being. According to him, only through the means of language, we can define ourselves in relation to our environment. Thus, language becomes the "House of Being" and, consequently, Being-there. Michel Foucault approaches the role of language in discourse construction, proposing the notion of a "regime of truth." That is, the discourse society acknowledges to be appropriate and, thus, dominant. Language ideologies are often an integral part of a regime of truth as they represent the preferred language norms in a community and, consequently, create a bond between language and identity formation phenomenon. In addition, "verbal hygiene" can be used when it comes to regulating language to make it comply with established societal values.

During the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is being waged in times of fast and easy access to information, language inevitably becomes a weapon. Government officials, media, bloggers, and even ordinary citizens begin weaponizing language, whether consciously or not. Mary Louise Pratt distinguishes 4 instruments of language weaponization, namely *deception* – the usage of language aimed at shacking the beliefs of an enemy and giving allies a moral ground to keep waging war; *offense* – the usage of language to enrage and/or morally destroy the enemy; *exhortation* – the usage of language to make adversaries or allies take certain actions; and *mediation* – the process of "occupying" and manipulating the enemy's language. To determine how precisely language as weaponry is used during the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the publications from the Russian Telegram channels (owned by the war correspondents Evgenyi Poddubny, Alexander Sladkov, and Alexander Kots) and the Ukrainian Telegram channels (owned by bloggers Serhii Sternenko, Nikolaev Vanek, and Andryi Tsaplienko) were analyzed. To better understand the targeting of a specific audience,

the Deception and Exhortation categories were divided into General, Domestic, and External subcategories.

To summarize, the Russian war correspondents mainly refer to General Deception (40% of all coded texts), Offense (20%), and Domestic Exhortation (17%), while Domestic Deception (9%), External Exhortation (6%), Mediation (6%), External Deception (1%), and General Exhortation (1%) are utilized more seldom, dedicated to specific causes, such as the liberation of Kherson city by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Similar to the Russians, Ukrainian bloggers mostly weaponize language through General Deception (375% of all coded publications), Offense (30%), and Domestic Exhortation (14%). However, in contrast to the Russian Telegram channels, the usage of Domestic Deception (10%) and External Deception (6%) is more prevalent. External Exhortation (2%), General Exhortation (1%), and Mediation (2%) are rarely utilized.

Amid the AFU's counteroffensives in September and November, preferences Russia and Ukraine gave for specific instruments varied. Before the active military actions on the battlefield, the Russian war correspondents used mainly the General or External subtypes of Deception and Exhortation, while the Ukrainian bloggers preferred the General and Domestic categories of Deception and Domestic Exhortation. Right during the offensives, Russia switched solely to Domestic categories of Deception and Exhortaiton. On the contrary, Ukraine kept publishing texts categorized as General and Domestic Deception and Domestic Exhortation with a slight increase in the share of Offense.

By weaponizing language, both sides form and maintain discourses valuable and necessary for a specific country's advantage (both physical and moral). In Russia, narratives about the Kyiv regime that must be destroyed for the sake of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are common. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the perception of Russia as an aggressor state that wants to occupy the harmless country and subjugate

Ukrainians is prevalent. Consequently, the Being and Being-there of the Ukrainians and Russians are constructed, and language emerges as the "House of Being" of the war.

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ANNOTATION

Тема: «Language Weaponization in the Russian War Against Ukraine»

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Захищена “____” _____2023 р.

Короткий зміст роботи

Метою цієї роботи є визначити, за допомогою яких інструментів мова стає зброєю під час повномасштабного російського вторгнення в Україну. За допомогою методів дискурс-аналізу та феноменології було проаналізовано наративи, поширювані російськими та українськими військовими кореспондентами та блогерами, а саме використання таких інструментів мовної зброї, як обман, образа, заклик та медіація. В результаті категоризації даних можна припустити, що в Росії та Україні переважно використовують обман, спрямований на аудиторії союзників та ворогів, образу та заклик, спрямований лише на супротивника. На тлі контрнаступів Збройних сил України мова як зброя, спрямована на внутрішню аудиторію, стала основою публікацій російських військових кореспондентів. В українських телеграм каналах продовжували поширюватися публікації, спрямовані на загальну (обман) та внутрішню аудиторію (обман та заклик), з незначним збільшенням використання образи. Використовуючи мову як зброю, обидві

сторони формують та підтримують дискурси, які є необхідними для отримання переваги тієї чи іншої країни. Таким чином, мова стає "Будинком буття" війни.

Ключові слова: інструменталізація мови як зброї, обман, заклик, образа, медіація, дім буття, режим правди, мовні ідеології, російсько-українська війна.

Short summary

The purpose of this thesis is to determine through what instruments language is being weaponized during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. By employing discourse analysis and phenomenological methods, the narratives disseminated by the Russian and Ukrainian war correspondents and bloggers were analyzed for the use of such instruments of language weaponization as deception, offense, exhortation, and mediation. As a result of data categorization, it can be assumed that Russia and Ukraine mainly refer to General Deception, which targets both allies and enemies, Offense, and Domestic Exhortation, which targets solely the adversary. Amid the Armed Forces of Ukraine's counteroffensives, Domestic instruments became a core of the Russian war correspondents' publications. Ukraine kept spreading publications attributed to General and Domestic Deception and Domestic Exhortation with a slight increase in the usage of Offense. By weaponizing language, both sides form and maintain discourses valuable and necessary for a specific country's advantage. Consequently, language becomes the "House of Being" of the war.

Key words: Language Weaponization, Deception, Exhortation, Offense, Mediation, House of Being, Regime of Truth, Language Ideologies, Russian-Ukrainian War.