

GLOBAL TRENDS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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Abstract

The article examines global trends in the process of forming a new world order, which the authors interpret as a generalised name for a set of processes, phenomena, development trends and political practices that determine systemic global shifts (their sequence, content, nature, subjectivity, perspectives). Among them, the authors pinpoint three established and cross-cutting trends, such as the asynchronous dynamics of political regimes, with democratisation serving as a conventional focal point; the asymmetric patterns of global migration movements; and the rethinking of the borderlands role, notably in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine. Having local specifics of implementation (at the level of states and regions), these trends in a core are subjectless and do not depend on specific political figures who come to power or lead the world rankings of influence.

Key words: *World Order, Asynchrony (Non-Linearity) of the World Order, Subjectlessness of Trends, Subjects of World Political Processes, Migration, Democratisation, Borderlands.*

INTRODUCTION

Russia's recent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has surfaced as a pivotal juncture for current world order with anticipated implications stretching across a spectrum of domains, from trade, production and supply to global security and the international community's capacity to address urgent challenges such as climate change, poverty, and global health. Simultaneously, Europe has witnessed a migration phenomenon of an unparalleled magnitude since World War II, with approximately 6 million Ukrainians, as reported by the UN, seeking temporary refuge across borders. In this regard, the very concept of border areas needs to be rethought, as they fluctuate between fostering cooperation and cross-cultural interactions to becoming geopolitical flashpoints, as can be seen in the case of Crimea and Donbas.

The broader European context is beset with multifaceted challenges. Growing scepticism surrounding the efficacy of contemporary democratic paradigms is evident, with a notable ascendancy of regimes labelled as authoritarian or hybrid. These challenges are accentuated by the strategic utilisation of migration narratives for political polarisation. Historical border disputes, previously subdued through diplomatic endeavours, are now becoming pronounced against the Ukraine conflict's backdrop. The escalating dynamics of such conflicts are discernible beyond the post-Soviet territories, as manifested in the Balkans, particularly in the rising tensions between Kosovo and Serbia. Concurrently, the global landscape is marred by a protracted economic downturn post the COVID-19 pandemic, China's continual ascent in military and economic spheres, and the emergence of new contention zones, notably in Africa. The media and scientific discourse concerning the evolving world order is gaining traction. For example, as of September 2023, a Google search for the key phrase "putin to change world order" yields 29.9 million results, including those from reputable media, think tanks and experts. If the name of the Russian dictator is replaced with

the word “China” in the exact phrase, more than 1 billion links will be searched. While it might be facile to attribute world order transformations to specific political leaders, institutions or territories, underpinned by their strategic objectives and aspirations, it becomes evident that the global political trajectory is influenced by a multitude of factors, often transcending an individual or institutional control. The increasing interdependence and intricacy of global systems further compound this complexity. Central to this research is the *hypothesis* that in the presence of decision-making centres (subjects) that act according to their intentions and strategies, the transformation of the world order as a dynamic system takes place subjectlessly. Such changes represent a complex and multi-level mosaic of asynchronous changes at different levels and spheres of world order. The decisions or actions of individual actors can temporarily affect the dynamics of changes, delaying or, on the contrary, accelerating them, but they are not capable of completely changing the subjectless trends that determine the general dynamics and direction of transformation of the world order.

The research aims to determine the qualitative shifts in the world order resulting from overarching global development trajectories. To realise this objective, the research embarks on *a set of tasks*, such as elucidating the world order concept, tracing contemporary political regimes pathways, identifying pivotal migration trends, and discerning the role of border territories in this transformation. While the shifting world order encompasses an array of alterations spanning political, economic, technological, and ethical realms, the authors prioritise the aforementioned trends as they aptly illustrate the asynchronous nature of the world order and underscore its inherent, subjectless attributes of development, which operate independently of the intentions and actions of individual actors. Understanding these intricate dynamics is quintessential for devising informed policy frameworks.

1. THEORETICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The term “world order” is frequently used to discuss alterations in the global hierarchy and potential shifts in light of recent transformations. Analytically, this notion delineates the structure of power and authority that shapes global diplomacy and politics. Prescriptively, it pertains to an envisioned alignment of power and authority that fosters peace, economic prosperity, human rights, and environmental sustainability. In the academic realm, world order is extensively studied within International Relations (IR). The English school (H.Bull. A.Linklater) differentiates between *order as a condition* to achieve fundamental goals (related to life, truth and property) and *order as an object*, constituted by a set of actions and practices associated with a particular set of actors. The realist approach argues the interactions of dominant actors (states and their alliances, regions, civilisations, etc.), balancing and contending for a share of global power. It hinges on universally acknowledged rules that dictate permissible actions and maintains a power equilibrium that inhibits the domination

of one political entity over others [Kissinger 2015]. Neoliberal thinkers champion a world order grounded in partnership and legality, reflected in the functioning of international organisations and cooperative institutions established through treaties and charters [Ikenberry 2020].

Given the multifaceted nature of the world order and the rich pool of empirical data, different interpretations are inevitable and may mirror diverse political and theoretical lenses. However, as T.Flockhart underlines, it is also possible that each narrative has a valid point, but that much like “the blind men trying to describe an elephant by touching different parts of it, they are ‘feeling’ different parts of an overall process of change that is difficult to grasp in its entirety” [Flockhart 2016]. The modern global order is considered multilayered, as it consists of the *liberal international order* that is based on the solidarity of liberal values (democracy, the rule of law, economic and political freedoms) and a *rules-based global order* which prioritising more pluralistic state-centric principles such as sovereignty and equality, with more room for cultural and political diversity. These orders are deeply intertwined as both have been shaped by centuries of liberal/western power. The two terms are often used interchangeably, but the rules-based global order is “unconstrained” and universal, while the liberal international order is “constrained” and limited to those who share its core values.

In contemplating the multifaceted scholarly perspectives, the authors posit that an understanding of world order confined strictly to the IRs could circumscribe the analytical depth of this concept. As such, it may miss the complex realities of what might be perceived as a ‘new political’ discourse, including, but not limited to, migration dynamics, rethinking borderlands’ role, environmental discourse, as well as proliferative technological advancements. Each of these dimensions introduces a new layer of complexity and interdependency, demanding a more holistic, integrative approach to the conceptualisation of world order. On the other hand, understanding the world order as a product of the activity of exclusively dominant actors (subjects) does not take into account the effect of subjectless processes, which can take place objectively and independently of the will and intentions of key actors. Therefore, the authors advocate for an enriched interpretative approach that aims to encourage a discourse that is more reflective of the multilayered and interconnected world.

Thus, **world order** is considered to be a generalised notion for a set of processes, phenomena, development trends and political practices that determine systemic global shifts and are embodied through the system of relationships between the subjects (individuals, institutions, networks and territories) and objective processes that can take place subjectlessly. Similar to P. Bourdieu’s fields [Bourdieu 2012], order can be political, social, economic, legal, etc., depending on the nature of the global issues it addresses. In particular, the *political order* addresses such issues as the legitimacy of political institutions and the publicness of administration, information protection and legality of political practices, civic activism, the democratisation of political systems, political leadership, etc. Each of these orders may have its specifics at the *local*

level within a community, city or other local area (including border areas); the *level of national sovereignty* as a consequence of state policy in a particular area; *the regional level*, i.e. civilisational areas or clusters of states or territories, as well as *the global level* as a set of actions and interactions that have a global scale or global impact.

The authors conceptualise the term “**new world order**” as a transitional model of global structures evolving due to systemic changes across various spheres and levels of order. Influenced by the multilayered nature and distinct characteristics of individual practices, these transformative processes produce intermediary outcomes in modernising the world order. The outcomes manifest as a *global political system* that governs the distribution of power; a *prevailing mode of power organisation* championing a global discourse in support of democratic values; an *economic blueprint* governing the rules of interaction among key players, which in turn influences contemporary migration trends; and *the dominant moral and ethical tenets* underpinning the developmental paradigm.

Contrary to the realist and neoliberal paradigms that conceptualise the global order as predominantly actor-centred, the authors demonstrate a predilection for a *systems-oriented perspective*. This perspective is rooted in a robust theoretical foundation, as exemplified by the world-system theory advanced by post-Marxist scholars (I. Wallerstein). Within the synergetic paradigm (H. Haken, I. Pryhozhyn, I. Strangers), also known as a complexity theory, the world order operates as a *dynamic system*, perpetually undergoing its structure, functionalities, attributes and properties alterations. Dynamic systems inherently possess the capacity for self-evolution, navigating through alternating phases of chaos (or imbalance) and order (or equilibrium). Periodically, the world order encounters bifurcation states, positioning itself in continual criticality, removed from equilibrium. During these junctures, it discerns potential trajectories for further development, cognizant of multiple prospective scenarios. Yet, a deterministic sequence of alternating order and chaos phases remains unverified in social systems; chaos does not invariably succeed an orderly phase. Evolutions propelling the system towards a transformed state might also unfold in a linear, gradual manner.

Within globalisation, the world emerges as a paramount complex dynamic system, aptly characterised as the “era of bifurcations” [Laszlo 1991]. These moments catalyse the world order’s self-organisation and self-evolution, prompted by both external and internal attractors - distinct events, processes, and phenomena that can pivot the system’s state, either teleologically (via typical or traditional attractors) or unconsciously (via strange attractors). While electoral processes in world republics exemplify such typical attractors, the COVID-19 pandemic or Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine is seen as strange attractors, or ‘black swans’. They are rare and unpredictable events with a significant socio-economic and political impact [Taleb 2007]. In particular, the war in Ukraine can be estimated as the final stage of transforming the rule-based global order into a new architecture characterised by diversity

and pluralism. On the other hand, it can equally lead to reinforcing the liberal world order [Flockhart, Korosteleva 2022].

The authors argued that each order, be it political, economic, social, or otherwise, maintains its own dynamics and pattern of development, forming a general complex mosaic of *asynchronous* (or non-linear) changes. The timelines for the cycles within individual spheres of the world order are mainly situational. For instance, the lifespan of historical empires roughly spanned 250 years [Dalio 2021], while the oscillatory phases of the global economy, termed M. Kondratiev's K-cycles, typically run for 45-60 years. Consequently, it is posited that even amidst decision-making centres (or subjects) operating based on their deliberate intentions and strategies, the transformation of the world order occurs subjectless.

To delineate with greater precision within the conceptual framework, it should be noted that while the terms 'subject' and 'agent' might often be utilised synonymously, within the purview of this research, 'subjectivity' (or subjectness) denotes the capability to initiate transformative actions. Herein, a political subject is understood as an entity of effective political decisions and actions, capable of modernising the political space, shaping collective meanings and values, institutionalising processes, and constructing social reality. The notion of **subjectlessness** suggests that, although political subjects may possess the will, competence and resources to mould an envisioned future, the prevailing tendencies inherent in the non-linear dynamics of the world order either constrain or amplify this potential. In scenarios with congruence with systemic attributes, the influence exerted by a seemingly weaker subject might generate more profound outcomes than a potent but incongruent force. This perspective enriches the understanding of political agency, advocating for the intrinsic subjectlessness embedded within the world order system. Though not widely incorporated in European political science discourses, this concept is grounded in the synergistic approach and reflects postmodernist thought.

Asynchronous dynamics of the world order means that their forecasting, centralised management, and control possibilities are limited. The priority is trend analysis models that give an idea of what is happening and what the corridor of potential opportunities is. World processes has been studied by identifying *global megatrends* as sustainable, long-term and covering the world of development trends since the 1980s [Naisbitt 1982]. Today, various government agencies (e.g., [Global 2012]), private technological and consulting companies, and international organisations are engaged in forecasting global development megatrends. It enables governments, businesses, and the public to prepare for change and make strategic decisions to effectively meet the challenges and seize the opportunities presented by global development.

It is overly ambitious to cover all existing trends in the world order, so the authors focus on the trajectories of political regime dynamics (democratisation), the nuances of global migration, and the rethinking of border areas. These trends have been well researched in political science and other disciplines. For instance, literature on

democratisation delineates myriad pivotal facets, encompassing transitional phases, institutional fortification, and the pivotal role of civil society. Notable scholars contributing to this dialogue include S. Huntington, H. Linz, A. Stepan, R. Dahl, and L. Diamond, among others. Migration dynamics have captivated numerous research collectives, with seminal contributions from scholars such as H.de Haas, D. Massey, K. Pren, M. J., Piore, R. Skeldon, P. Bezugliy, and more. Border areas, shaped by diverse historical contexts, vary considerably in their essence, identity, and aspirations, reinforcing the interdisciplinary nature of this issue. The rich tapestry of literature consulted for this study spans works of political geographers and geopolitical scholars (I. Wallerstein, S. Rockan), cultural discourses interpreting the notion of borderland, sociological and historical inquiries into borderland identities and their evolution. However, these trends tend to be considered individually while the authors endeavour to discern the asynchronous interplay of these world-order trends to demonstrate the subjectlessness of its transformation.

Methodically, the research is based on the following methods:


- *Method assemblage* as accompaniment and continuous refinement of discursive practices in the general “flow” of socio-humanitarian research [Low 2004:157]. This method involves encountering multiple realities and allows us to recognise similarities between cases even though they might not be identical.
- *Applied political and correlational analysis methods* were used to achieve the set tasks in terms of finding the correspondence between subjectless global trends and local subject manifestations of the formation of a new world order.
- *Analysis and synthesis of empirical indicators of democracy and world migration* presented in studies by such organisations as the Economist Intelligence Unit, Fletcher School at Tufts University, Freedom House, OECD, UN DESA, UNHCR, World Bank, and World Economic Forum. Computer programs IBM SPSS Statistics and Google Excel were used to generalise and correlate data, and the Flourish app for visualisation.

2. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL REGIMES DYNAMICS

As a process of spreading political democracy in society, democratisation involves forming institutions to ensure citizens’ participation in decision-making and spreading democratic values and practices among the population [Huntington 1991]. Democratic political culture reflects such political behaviour and norms that correspond to the values of respect for the rights and freedoms of every citizen, tolerance for other opinions and views, active civic participation. Historically, three significant democratisation waves are discerned. From 1820-1920, the first observed the emergence of democracies like France, Great Britain, and the USA amidst monarchical dominions. This was followed by a period characterised by the rise of ideologies leading to totalitarian regimes. The second wave (1940-1960) saw the democratisation of nations’ post-WWII and the birth of democracies in post-colonial regions. However, this

wave was unstable, primarily due to oversights in cultural assimilation and economic asymmetries. The third wave began in the 1970s, with the downfall of authoritarian regimes in countries like Greece and Spain. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of democratic regimes in the world (at least in form) outnumbered autocracies, allowing proponents of liberal ideology to proclaim “the end of history”. This triumph was somewhat premature. Since the 2010s, global authoritarian backsliding has been seen. In fact, as of 2022, only 15% of modern states (24) are labelled as ‘full’ democracies [Economist Intelligence Unit 2023]. Other 48 states are described as ‘flawed’ democracies. They generally hold free and fair elections and respect basic civil liberties, but there are significant deficiencies in other aspects of democracy, including governance problems, an underdeveloped political culture, or low levels of political participation. States with an authoritarian regime (59) cover over a third of the world’s population (36.9%). Other 36 countries have a hybrid regime (17.9% of the world’s population).

Figure 1. Political regimes types dynamic by the number of countries, 2006-2022



Source: Compiled by authors based on Economist Intelligence Unit data (2023).

Drawing from J. Ikenberry’s apt analogy, the contemporary world order can be compared to a vast shopping centre. Here, nations are free to wander, evaluating and selecting the political institutions that resonate most closely with their preferences and aspirations [Ikenberry 2020]. The COVID-19 pandemic challenged democratic institutions and deepened doubts about whether modern institutions of representative democracy can distinguish the formulated interests of the public and bear responsibility [Farrell, Han, 2020]. Empirical data underscores that democratic regimes often exhibit superior governance and management. However, citizens within autocracies tend to perceive their regimes as more adept at ensuring political stability and offer-


ing a consistent, long-term vision for the future. This sentiment has contributed to the notable rise in institutional trust within autocratic regimes [Natalina 2022].

However, despite repeated subject authoritarian rollbacks in individual states or entire regions, the authors argue that *democratisation remains a subjectless upward trend in the world order over the past 200 years*. It is characterised by its dynamics and rhythm, which leads to the asynchrony of political transformations in the modern world order. It manifests itself in the following:

1. *Asynchrony of political regimes dynamics*. The global spread of democratic regimes is disparate. By evaluating factors like elections, civil rights, political participation, and more, we find regions like North America (with an average EUI democracy index in 2022 of 8.37) and Western Europe (8.36) traditionally at the vanguard. Conversely, the Middle East and North Africa (3.34) and Sub-Saharan Africa (4.14) are at the lower end. Eastern Europe (5.39), Latin America (5.79), and Asia & Australasia (5.46) display varied democratisation trajectories, both at regional and state levels. Such variations are sculpted by leadership choices, historical precedence, cultural nuances, economic conditions, and other intricacies. In Latin America, while many regimes are transitioning from authoritarianism to 'flawed' democracy, personalistic authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and Cuba distinguish themselves. Amid Asia's authoritarian tide, countries like India and Malaysia, with British colonial imprints on their political culture, uphold democratic values. The electoral process score [Freedom House 2023a] demonstrates this asynchrony of the democratisation trend on the world map.

Notably, states with the most deficient democratisation indicators, as gauged by the electoral process, cluster as follows:

- One-party systems in China and Southeast Asian nations (e.g., Laos, Vietnam) dominated by communist parties without universal elections;
- Post-Soviet personalist regimes like Russia, Belarus, and Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) where elections, primarily controlled by the government, serve more as an authoritarian stamp of approval;
- Monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula (e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait) and Southeast Asia (e.g. Thailand, Cambodia, Brunei);
- Personalist dictatorships in post-colonial African nations (e.g. Libya, Sudan, Chad) and Latin America (e.g. Venezuela, Cuba);
- Regimes that are either theocratic, as in Afghanistan, or secularly totalitarian, like North Korea.

Figure 2. Map of the world order according to the electoral process index

Source: Compiled by the authors based on the data by Freedom in the World, where 1 means non-free elections or their absence, 12 – free competitive elections [Freedom House, 2023a]

While states with a longer tradition of democracy tend to remain free for decades, unfree and partly free countries are less static, often experiencing waves of liberalisation or repression that move them from one category to another. Notably, such an “anti-democratic turn” was prominently observed in regions like the Balkans, Central-Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, which embarked on democratic transitions after the Soviet Union’s fall in the 1990s [Freedom House 2023b]. Examining the democratic landscape between 2005 and 2022, the average democracy score (DS) for 29 transitioning states, listed as the Nations in Transit, dwindled from 3.85 to 3.42, marking an 11.8% decline. In a more detailed perspective, nations recognised as consolidated democracies in 2005 experienced a 10% erosion in their democratic scores over 17 years. Likewise, semi-consolidated democracies witnessed a decrease of 6.5%. Notably, Poland (-1.46 DS) and Hungary (-2.47 DS) lost their acclaimed statuses as consolidated democracies. The Balkan states of Serbia (-0.46 DS), Montenegro (-0.42 DS), and North Macedonia (-0.25 DS) moved from the status of semi-consolidated democracies to hybrid regimes. This resulted in an augmentation in the number of hybrid regimes in the region, rising from 4 to 11. Contrarily, there was a consolidation of authoritarianism in nations like Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. States firmly seated as consolidated authoritarians in 2005, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan showed a decrease in their democratisation index, averaging a decline of 0.27. One of the factors (if not the most significant) for the observed authoritarian tilt in the region has been Russia’s multi-faceted influence in the political, economic and communications spheres. Moscow’s leadership is focused on reviving its imperial ambitions and re-establishing itself as

a formidable decision-making epicentre in the global arena. It is against this backdrop that Ukrainian resistance to Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2024 gains prominence. This struggle goes beyond a mere regional skirmish; it symbolises a pivotal position in the global effort to uphold the principles of a democratic world order.

2. *Asynchrony of state government forms.* Notwithstanding the preeminence of republican governments, monarchies persistently maintain their relevance in the global arena. Contemporary legal studies indicate over 40 recognised monarchies globally, with some reports suggesting a count of 45. A significant portion of these (16) falls under the British Commonwealth, where the symbolic head of state remains the British monarch; this includes nations like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Notably, many monarchies have transitioned into largely ceremonial roles, acting as cultural supplements to their predominantly democratic frameworks. A case in point is Malaysia, which boasts a unique federal system wherein the king and vice-king are elected from nine monarchs in a quinquennial cycle. Although the Malaysian king's role leans towards the ceremonial, governance is principally overseen by the parliament and the prime minister. As per the 2022 EUI democratisation index, Malaysia is categorised under 'flawed democracies' with a 7.3 out of 10 score. It also possesses an impressive electoral process and pluralism index of 9.58, in contrast to the 9.17 score of the USA.

As democratic governance further entrenches itself, European monarchies will likely see a greater convergence with these modern institutions. However, expecting similar democratisation trajectories from the absolute monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf is impractical. These states grapple with multiple factors hindering democratisation, such as the multifaceted nature of Islam, potential radical threats, distinct political structures, and an entrenched tradition of authoritarianism, among others. Even with some characteristics reminiscent of medieval feudal systems and clericalism, the inexorable dynamics of global order are compelling these Arab monarchies towards transformation. Modern economic paradigms, increasingly shifting towards digital economies, demand political transparency and adherence to established conventions to draw investors and human resources. Fletcher School at Tufts University's 2020 research classified the UAE and Qatar as standout digital economies, paralleling long-established democracies like Germany and the USA and newer democratic entrants such as South Korea, Malaysia, Israel, and others. This success is largely attributed to the assimilation of specific democratic institutions and attributes, encompassing governance efficiency, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption oversight.

3. *Authoritarian mimicry under democracy.* For at least 50 years, democratisation has been proclaimed the ultimate goal of any political regime transformation. Strikingly, no single regime, whether personalist, theocratic or militarist, has openly embraced authoritarianism as its *de jure* intention. Even the leadership of nations such as North Korea, which may show totalitarian tendencies, professes

a commitment to democratic principles - at least de jure - through its constitution, which describes it as a democratic republic with a parliament elected by direct, universal and confidential suffrage. As described in the framework of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ [Levitsky, Way 2010], such regimes often replicate the entire institutional architecture characteristic of representative democracies. Such elements may include the institution of elections, certain political and civil liberties, or even overt commitments to the rule of law or the fight against corruption. These gestures often aim to cultivate a veneer of legitimacy and foster global economic cooperation. However, the true democratic essence is often missing. Elections, for example, are marred by state-driven manipulations, including biased electoral laws, denial of registration to threatening candidates, restricted access to mass media, and even direct vote rigging. To describe them as genuinely democratic would, therefore, be a misnomer. For many contemporary authoritarian states, introducing a multi-party electoral system is not so much an embrace of democratic ideals as a strategic move by the regime. Recent decades have seen the emergence of ‘spin dictators’ who, with their skill at manipulating the media, have subtly reconfigured authoritarian governance in line with global interconnectedness [Guriev, Treisman 2022]. Early in their tenures, figures such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Viktor Orbán have eschewed overt mass repression, opting to control their citizens by distorting information dissemination and mimicking democratic processes.

4. *Democratic institutions and values are evolving* by various global elements: the world’s economic structure, advances in information and communication systems, migration flows, and more. This transformation manifests in several distinct ways:
 - *Decentralisation of control over symbolic fields and production of political discourses.* With burgeoning digital communication, symbolic power disperses into multifaceted, shape-shifting networks influencing states and global communities [Global, 2012: 48]. Initially hailed as democratising tools, digital technologies now prompt the question, “How to save democracy from technology” [Fukuyama, Richman, Goel 2021]. Governments grapple with controlling tech giants and their citizenries, evidenced by the 12-year continual dip in global internet freedom [Freedom House, 2023c]. Evidently, the emerging global order is sculpted by the escalating contest for discourse control through novel communication technologies played out among states, tech conglomerates, and civil society.
 - *Searching for new models of public policy and building consensus against the background of increasing polarisation and antagonism.* Empirical findings spotlight a surging and persistent political polarisation intra-state and globally [Carothers, O’Donohue 2019]. Even seasoned democracies grapple with bridging polarised value rifts, often culminating in violent civil clashes, as witnessed during the 2021 US elections. According to the agonistic democracy framework [Mouffe 2000], so-

cietal consensus emerges only when conflicting parties perceive themselves in a shared symbolic arena. Escalating antagonism challenges this shared space, complicating consensus-building and reconciliation. The increasing complexity of the policy-making process and the inability to find solutions to some of the most pressing policy problems are prompting politicians and civil society to think about how collective public decisions should be made [OECD 2020].

- *Political representation crisis and the pursuit of innovative participation formats.* Empirical data indicates an 11.5% global uptick in large-scale anti-government protests from 2009-2019, with Europe witnessing a 12.2% rise [Brannen, Haig, Schmidt 2020]. Approximately 54% of all protests between 2006 and 2020 were related to the failure of political systems and lack of political representation. Over 30% of all protests included a global justice component as one of their main issues [Berrada et al. 2022]. Amidst this backdrop, traditional electoral mechanisms appear increasingly flawed as the primary political participation avenue [World Bank 2017: 24]. Political parties, experiencing membership decline, are losing their pivotal role in channelling political interests. Digital networks emerge as the new political participation avenue, forging a fresh political culture impacting traditional political institutions. The evolution of political institutions in the Industry 4.0 era, undriven by individual actors' political will, is discernible. E-governance technologies expand state capabilities, enabling efficient administrative services, evolving from the functions of a 'night watchman' to a private 'concierge service', as exemplified by Ukraine's Diia service initiated in 2020. However, this digital shift also impacts political leaders' communication modes with their citizens, offering increased transparency but also potential political chaos. The subsequent frontier seems poised to integrate artificial intelligence and virtual metaverses into political endeavours, with figures like French President E. Macron venturing into platforms like Minecraft for electoral outreach in 2022. Such technologies promise efficient data analytics and voter behaviour predictions but risk alienating the public from the political process by elevating technocracy.
- *Redefining civil liberties and the "cultural counterattack".* Political freedoms and minority rights, such as women's and LGBTQ+ rights, inclusivity and multiculturalism, are coming to the fore in global discourse. However, segments of the populace, especially those affected by authoritarian populism, feel besieged by these shifting ethical paradigms. Norris and Inglehart [2019] delve into the "cultural counterattack" phenomenon as society's reactive stance to these shifts. This counteraction is especially palpable in authoritarian leaders' endorsement of "traditional" values, which is employed to craft a divisive "us-versus-them" narrative, solidifying and legitimising their hold on power. Such divisions, pitching emerging ethical norms against traditionalist propaganda, engender political tensions and rifts at both the societal and global levels.

3. MIGRATION OF HUMAN AND INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL

Factors like the education standards, adoption of cutting-edge technologies, innovative prowess, and workforce quality directly influence the competitive edge of nations in modern world order. Parallely, migration, representing either voluntary or involuntary movements of individuals or groups on a temporary or permanent basis, significantly contributes to the reallocation of this human capital globally. UN data showcases a notable uptick in international migration over recent decades: from 153 million international migrants in 1990 to approximately 281 million by 2022, representing 3.6% of the global population [United Nations 2022]. In contrast, the World Bank's 2023 report provides a modest estimate, putting the figure at 184 million (2.3% of the global population), including 37 million refugees. Notably, nearly half of these migrants, 43%, are settled in low to middle-income countries [World Bank 2023].

Within political science, evidence suggests that migration processes serve as objective indicators of the non-linear evolution of global order, inherently political. These processes are shaped not only by the domestic policies of the origin country, where migration motivations arise but also by the deliberate political strategies of states desiring to accumulate new human capital [Bezuglyi, Nagornyak, Pachos 2020]. Therefore, while migrants are central to migration processes, they are not the sole subjects. Donor and recipient states, along with an intricate web of migration networks that facilitate the transnational movement of individuals, are equally crucial. This nexus includes employers, human traffickers, human rights advocates, volunteers, and various intermediaries. Each of these subjects operates based on specific objectives, translating their intentions into distinct practices and policies, which, in turn, mould the nature and magnitude of migratory trends. However, it is worth noting that migration, akin to democratisation, can be perceived as an overarching, subjectless trend shaping the global landscape. When viewed as a system, the global migration dynamic reveals a fluidity marked by evolving elements, the emergence of new migratory hubs, and shifts in its structure. Contemporary migration trends, which significantly influence the structure of the global order, exhibit several distinct characteristics:

1. *Asymmetry in global migration flows.* The movement of people across borders is notably imbalanced and tends to converge within a few persistent migration pathways. Historical political and economic affiliations can influence the dynamics and trajectories of migration flows. For instance, vestiges of colonial relationships can be pivotal determinants. Similarly, preceding migratory movements that establish systems of information exchange, capital accumulations, and the genesis of diasporas and cultural hubs also play a significant role, as outlined in the theories of migration networks. The intensity of migration flows and their direction can also be determined by previous migration waves that create exchange systems of information, capital, form diasporas and cultural centres. For example, one of

these streams connects Ukraine with Germany; geographically, it passes through Poland [Stepura et al. 2022].

De Haas et al. [2019], drawing from a comprehensive empirical dataset, have underscored a shift towards increased concentration of international migrants along primary migration routes. From 1960 to 2000, countries experiencing net emigration surged from 124 to 148, whereas those witnessing net immigration receded from 102 to 78. Remarkably, 20% of all global migrations transpire within just 15 primary bilateral corridors. Moreover, there is an observable agglomeration of migrants, predominantly from diverse non-European origins, in a diminishing group of primary destination countries, predominantly in Western Europe, North America, and the Persian Gulf. Thus, migration processes reflect the asymmetric nature of the processes of economic globalisation and are consistent with trends in migration policy, which increasingly gives immigration privileges to the skilled and wealthy, as well as to citizens of regional blocs, while maintaining (and not necessarily increasing) migration barriers for less skilled migrants, asylum seekers, and non-regional citizens.

2. *Divergence of world migration and decision-making centres.* Notably, the primary hubs of global migration are distinct from the principal decision-making epicentres of the contemporary world order. According to the World Bank's International migrant stock level as a percentage of the population in 2015 (the latest available data) [World Bank 2015], leading countries in terms of migration concentration are:

- *Arabian Peninsula's Oil-Wealthy Nations:* Predominantly drawing labour migrants for the oil industry and related sectors. To enumerate: United Arab Emirates (88.4%), Qatar (75.4%), Kuwait (73.6%), Bahrain (51.1%), Oman (41%), Jordan (40.9%), Lebanon (34.1%), and Saudi Arabia (32.2%).
- *Caribbean Islands with Tax Advantages:* Such as St. Maarten (70.4%), British Virgin Islands (57.4%), Cayman Islands (39.5%), Aruba (34.7%), and Antigua and Barbuda (30.5%).
- *Smaller European Nations:* Including Liechtenstein (62.5%), Andorra (59.7%), Monaco (55.7%), Luxembourg (43.9%), and Cyprus (16.8%).
- *Economic Hubs in Proximity to China and Southeast Asia:* Namely, Macau (58.3%), Singapore (45.3%), and Hong Kong (38.9%). Contrastingly, China maintains a minimal migrant proportion relative to its overall population, a mere 0.07%, a figure that has remained consistent since 1990.

Figure 3. Map of the world order according to the international migrant stock (World Bank, 2015)



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from *International migrant stock, % of the population* (World Bank, 2015), where 0.07 is the lowest percentage of migrants among the population (China), 88.4% is the highest (UAE)

Beyond those above, other countries with significant migrant populations as of 2015 include Switzerland (29.3%), Australia (28.2%), Israel (24.9%), New Zealand (22.9%), Canada (21.8%), Austria (17.4%), Sweden (16.7%), Ireland (15.9%), and Estonia (15.4%). It is pivotal to observe that these migration hubs are not synonymous with the foremost political decision-making centres like the USA, China, or Russia. Through strategic migration policies, branding of territories, ensuring a high quality of life, and innovation promotion, these nations attract human capital without necessarily being the most politically influential on the global stage.

3. *The migration outcomes are not solely determined by the subjects' efforts.* The theory of the double labour market [Piore, 1979] posits that the primary motivation for labour migration is not necessarily driven by deficiencies or underdevelopment in the donor country's labour market. Instead, migration patterns are intrinsically linked to the ebb and flow of business cycles and employment prospects in destination nations, especially amid liberalised migration regulations [Chaika and de Haas 2014]. Through strategic migration policies, recipient countries aim to entice the "right" migrants—those encompassing skilled workers, students, and individuals from prioritised sectors—while concurrently fortifying barriers against "undesirable" entrants. A case in point is the UK's 2020 introduction of the Global Talent Visa, tailored for individuals with notable expertise in science, digital technology, arts, and culture. Analogous initiatives have been unveiled in countries like the USA and Canada. Spain is set to launch a 'digital nomad' visa in 2023, catering to professionals adept at working in the digital domain from virtually anywhere. Over the past ten years, nearly all OECD nations, accommodating ap-

proximately 4.4 million international students as of 2020 (constituting roughly 10% of their tertiary institution enrollments), have adopted comprehensive post-study retention strategies [OECD 2023].

While recipient countries actively shape migration policies to manage the influx of preferred migrants, they do not solely dictate the outcomes. Despite policy barriers, persistent or escalating international migration does not necessarily indicate policy failure. A downturn in migration does not inherently validate the efficacy of policy restrictions. It could also signify an economic downturn in destination nations or the cessation of hostilities in source countries [de Haas et al. 2019]. For instance, US-imposed immigration curbs on Mexicans and other Latin Americans inadvertently spurred a sequence of events over subsequent years, paradoxically augmenting the volume of Latin American immigrants rather than diminishing it [Massey and Pren 2012]. Comparable dynamics have been observed regarding migration across several prominent South-North 'labour borders', like those between Morocco and Turkey vis-à-vis the EU [Skeldon 1997].

4. *Strange attractors (the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine) are changing the dynamics and directions of world migration.* The flux and rhythm of global migration are often shaped by certain "strange attractors" or unforeseen significant events that have exhibited transformative power over these processes. Notably, the Covid-19 pandemic caused global migration to decelerate by nearly 30% [OECD 2023]. Meanwhile, the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine in 2022 drastically accelerated the redistribution of human capital both regionally in Europe and globally. In particular, as of June 2023, almost 6 million forcibly displaced persons from Ukraine were registered in Europe (with 300,000 outside Europe) [UNHCR 2023], of which 4.8 million received temporary protection status. Central and Eastern European nations, such as Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, which had experienced prolonged periods of negative to moderate net migration (for some since the 1960s), became primary recipients of this exodus. However, these often served as conduits for the onward migration of Ukrainians to other European destinations. In particular, as of June 2023, only 994,000 of 3,000,000 Ukrainian refugees remained in Poland, while their number increased to 1.2 million in Germany, 345,000 in the Czech Republic, 200,000 in Great Britain; Italy and Spain – 180,000 each [UNHCR 2023]. Thus, the human capital of Ukrainian refugees is being redistributed between European countries. According to the European Central Bank calculations (2022), 25% to 55% of Ukrainian displaced people are employed or actively looking for work in recipient countries. This will increase the EU labour force by 0.2-0.8% or 0.3-1.3 million people. Consequently, *migration has become a force of stratification for Ukraine and simultaneously a force of equalisation and redistribution of human capital at the level of the European Union as a whole.*

2022 also saw other global strange attractors impacting migration. Factors like the economic aftershocks of the pandemic, which intensified political unrest and governmental challenges, birthed new migration donor countries. For instance, Sri Lanka, which defaulted in 2022, continued its substantial migration rate of up to -100,000 annually. Additionally, nations like Uganda, Vietnam, Chile, Peru, and others faced unprecedented migration shifts due to internal political and economic challenges post-pandemic. On the other hand, the USA, as a traditional destination country, witnessed a revival of its net migration numbers: from an average of +1.3 million annually pre-pandemic, a slump to 500-600,000 during 2019-2020, and then a recovery close to pre-pandemic figures (+998,000 in 2022). Comparable migration resurgence post-pandemic was observed in nations like Canada, Australia, Japan, Italy, and those in the Arabian Peninsula. Amid the pandemic, several Arabian states, in addition to sealing their borders, repatriated migrant workers, resulting in a dip in net migration. Territories affected by military conflicts also showcased shifting migration dynamics. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's ascendance reversed the positive net migration growth of 2020, with negative values in subsequent years. Conversely, nations like Syria and Venezuela, previously known for significant outflows, started observing positive net migration figures, with Syria witnessing +734,000 in 2022 and Venezuela +297,000.

Thus, global migration emerges as a complex interplay, a synergetic outcome combining the deliberate decisions of specific actors—namely migrants, migration networks, donor states, and recipient states—and a number of subjectless trends. Additionally, a series of unpredictable, random events influence the overarching structure of the world order. In this matrix, the very dynamics of migration processes reciprocate by becoming integral to the world order, shaping its economic underpinnings and spurring new avenues for democratisation and evolving socio-cultural discourses. Migration flows induce profound socio-cultural and political changes in recipient nations. However, establishing a direct causal relationship between migration dynamics and the democratisation of political regimes—both within individual states and on a global scale—remains elusive and mandates further scholarly exploration.

4. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF BORDERLANDS

The evolving global landscape, marked by political regimes and migration dynamics, has prompted a reevaluation of the role and perception of border areas. Such regions stand at a crossroads; they can be potential flashpoints of interstate conflicts, threaten global peace, or serve as conduits for intercultural dialogue, bolstering the stability of the world order. As globalisation unfolds, the world seems to oscillate between the increasing borderlessness and a predilection for a more gated paradigm.

Border areas are the spaces where two or more spheres of hegemony intersect, seeking to control resources and extend their sphere of influence. Their formation is rooted in various chronological and spatial contexts, with historical factors significantly

influencing their nature. Consequently, these territories exhibit diversity in their essence, character, and interaction with political entities. The formation of borderlands is a non-linear process primarily determined by temporal and spatial factors. As a result, even within the same region, borders can carry distinct roles and meanings across different epochs. For instance, modern borders in Africa, Asia, and Europe have substantial variances.

The current borderlands dynamics are based, first of all, on *rethinking the nature of 'hard borders'*. Historically, border formation reflected diverse temporal and spatial contexts. Before the creation of nation-states, geographical factors played a crucial role in dictating resource potential, defence mechanisms, and even early political frameworks. For example, Catalonia and Bavaria's strategic locations made them vital European trade centres. The mountainous terrain of Wales made it impossible to conquer and absorb this territory. Geographical influences were pronounced in Europe during the Middle Ages, but such influences lasted longer in areas like the Donbas and are still evident in regions like Chechnya.

The 16th and 17th centuries saw empires use strategic violence to control their peripheries. Borders then represented not only territorial demarcations but also power dynamics [Goodhand 2018: 10-11]. As states sought to solidify their territorial claims, the distinctions between them and the "others" became more pronounced. However, the hard borders approach was not universally beneficial. While delineating territories, these borders sometimes exacerbated internal conflicts, potentially escalating to interstate confrontations. While leaders of emerging nations endeavoured to position the state as the paramount entity within their societies, this was only sometimes feasible, especially in border areas [Baud, Schendel 1997: 213-215]. In some instances, these borders further debilitated already fragile states, stripping them of the coercive capacities typically associated with territorial warfare threats. They inadvertently set up unfavourable catalysts for nation-building and removed the systems that traditionally filtered out weak states while fortifying more robust ones. Consequently, there has been a surge in internal conflicts, notably ethnic skirmishes, heightening the risk of blossoming into more significant interstate confrontations [Atzili 2007: 146, 162].

Modern times witness a diminishing emphasis on hard borders. Globalisation drives a more interconnected world, weakening traditional border concepts. Catalysts such as trade liberalisation, fluid capital movements, and technological progress in communications have been pinpointed as instrumental in the erosion of borders [Andreas 2003: 82]. These economic and technological transitions augment cross-border interactions and lessen the salience of traditional security paradigms, leading some scholars to conceptualise these transformations as the "de-bordering of the world of states" [Blatter, 2003]. As traditional borders wane, power shifts to both supra-national organisations and sub-national entities. Examples like the Schengen Agree-

ment in Europe or trade pacts like NAFTA and its successor, USMCA, demonstrate how borders are being redefined in the context of greater global cooperation.

On the other hand, *borderlands remain conflict zones, and this trend is also asynchronous*. During the rise of empires, while preserving border sanctity in Europe and sidestepping direct confrontations amongst themselves, global hegemony has essentially redirected confrontations to the territories of less developed and evolving nations. The world wars of the XX century, which largely erupted due to attempts to redistribute borderlands, both in Europe and on the periphery of empires, were the culmination of attempts to establish power over certain regions by force. The outcome of WWII was attempted to be consolidated by introducing the inviolability of borders as one of the basic principles of international relations. However, this principle worked only in Europe and North America, while the world hegemony continued to “export” violence to other regions.

Within Europe and North America, the ‘Great Zone of Peace’, as identified by historian Y. Hrytsak, boasts economic growth and effective reconciliation policies, evading armed conflict for decades despite inherent border tensions [The Ukrainians 2023]. Noteworthy examples include the Ireland-Northern Ireland border, which, after 30 years of “The Troubles”, saw the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 curtail violence and the ongoing diplomatic approaches amidst Brexit-related challenges. The Gibraltar-Spain and U.S.-Mexico borders too, despite tensions, rely on diplomatic and cooperative solutions rather than military confrontations. Kosovo’s intricate identity and contentious borders remain delicate, especially with Serbia. Despite historical and ethnic disputes and its declaration of independence in 2008, mechanisms like the EU-mediated dialogues, NATO-led Kosovo Force, and the European Union Rule of Law Mission have averted major hostilities, though uncertainties persist.

Conversely, in other parts of the world, young sovereign states’ borders, influenced by adverse economic, geographical, and political circumstances, evolve into conflict zones, progressively destabilising these nascent nations. While some arise from historical grievances, others manifest newer geopolitical or resource-driven ambitions. In contemporary war and political violence studies, border area conflicts are often not distinctly categorised. However, the number of ‘events’ (a term to describe instances of political violence or protest) in many border regions has increased over the past decade [ACLED 2023].

Using a descriptive method, it becomes evident that the landscape of border conflicts aligns with the asynchronous global dynamics of democratisation previously discussed. For instance, the India-Pakistan border, especially the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, witnessed a marked increase in violent events from 2016 to 2019. Similarly, the number of reported violent events in the Ethiopia-Sudan border region increased notably during the 2020-2022. In North and West Africa, there has been a consistent escalation in border violence. In 2021, 23% of all violent incidents occurred within a 20-kilometre radius of state borders, and in the first half of that same

year, 60% of violent episodes resulting in casualties took place within a hundred kilometres of these boundaries [OECD 2022]. The rise of non-state militant groups has also complicated traditional border conflicts. Boko Haram has been active in the Lake Chad region, affecting the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The rapid rise of the terrorist organisation Islamic State (ISIL) between 2014 and 2017 blurred the borders between Iraq and Syria, as the group captured vast territories in both nations.

Since 1991, the post-Soviet space has witnessed escalating border area conflicts, mainly initiated or supported by the former imperial centre. Thus, Transnistria's 1990 independence declaration from Moldova resulted in a 1992 war, with Russia maintaining a military presence and underlying tensions persisting. Post the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia controls Abkhazia and South Ossetia, intensifying its "borderization" efforts. The 2014 annexation of Ukrainian Crimea led to a war in eastern Ukraine, culminating in a full-scale Russian invasion by 2022. Nagorno-Karabakh's ethnic Armenian majority amidst its recognition as Azerbaijani territory has been a contention point since the 1980s with outbreaks of significant escalations, including in September 2023. Tensions along the Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan borders, especially in 2021, led to skirmishes, casualties and significant displacements.

Borderlands entrenched in their historical narratives of statehood, predominantly characterised by ethnic or religious identity but devoid of substantial economic assets, risk succumbing to external financial dependencies. Absent sufficient resources, their sovereignty aspirations may seem unattainable. However, neglect from their 'parent' state can catalyse separatist or irredentist sentiments, as was observed in Chechnya. This contested borderlands became *arenas of external influence*, potentially destabilising the sovereignty to which they belong. Such regions, notably Donbas and Crimea, have witnessed targeted ethnic and migration manoeuvres by Russia, intending to amplify the Russian demographic. These territories serve as strategic levers for Russia, threatening not just the sovereignty of Ukraine but also global political equilibrium. Russia's efforts hold these border areas together with the centre – by military aggression, symbolic control, cultural assimilation or even deportations, as was the case in historical retrospect and is happening in occupied Ukrainian territories.

At the same time, subjectless trends lead to the fact that the borderlands, with opportunities for free trade, the inflow of intellectual capital, and identity preservation, benefit more from remaining within their statehood than from coming into conflict with the center. Moreover, *border areas can themselves become subjects of the world order*. Such regions, exemplified by Catalonia, Bavaria, Quebec, or Scotland, have successfully harnessed economic potential and maintained a robust national identity. Furthermore, they have instituted political bodies adept at championing their territorial interests at both national and international levels. Interestingly, many of these

influential borderlands reside within the “Great Zone of Peace,” where strategies to foster intercultural dialogue are vigorously pursued, as evidenced by the “Europe of the Regions” initiative and Quebec’s interculturalism policy.

Conclusively, the development and role of border areas are determined by subjectless factors such as historical heritage, geographical characteristics, proximity or remoteness to imperial centres of power. However, amidst the backdrop of a transforming global order, border erosion, and intensifying cross-border affiliations, borderlands are evolving from mere territorial expanses to active political subjects. Depending on their historical, economic, and political contexts, they will either fortify or perturb the world order.

CONCLUSIONS

The new world order, as a transitional model of world processes, is formed due to systemic transformations at the global level. Among the trends that prove it are the dynamics of modern political regimes, human and intellectual capital migration, and rethinking the role of border areas as conflict zones and spaces for cross-border dialogue.

The authors proved that in the presence of decision-making centres (subjects) that act according to their intentions and strategies, the transformation of the world order as a dynamic system takes place subjectlessly. Such changes represent a complex and multi-level mosaic of asynchronous changes at different levels and spheres of order. The decisions or actions of individual actors can temporarily affect the dynamics of changes, delaying or, on the contrary, accelerating them, but they are not capable of completely changing the impersonal trends that determine the general dynamics and direction of transformation of the world order. Under the conditions of variability and uncertainty of the world order, erosion of borders, and strengthening of cross-border ties, borderlands will turn from objects of expansion into subjects of the political process, which, depending on the history of their formation, the current economic and political state, will contribute to the stabilisation or destabilisation of the world order.

The process of forming a new world order demonstrates the following patterns:

1. *The asynchrony of political regimes dynamics*, manifested by the uneven distribution of democratic institutes and values at the level of individual regions and states, the coexistence of monarchical and republican forms of government, as well as the borrowing of certain democratic institutions and practices by authoritarian regimes has a significant impact on the formation of a new world order. This asynchrony and diversity of the world’s political systems dictate the need for adaptation and transformation of democratic institutions under the influence of other elements of the world order, such as the economic framework of the world, the development of information and communication systems, and migration flows. However, despite the forces of stratification, such as authoritarian rollbacks and

the backlash of traditional values, democratisation continues to be the dominant subjectless trend of the world order. Democratic institutions themselves are transformed under the influence of other components of the world order and become the subject of competition for control over political discourses. Increasing polarisation, antagonism, crises of political representation, and the rise of direct action for global justice are prompting the search for new public policy and consensus-building models.

2. *Asymmetry migration processes*, in turn, affect the world order by redistributing human and intellectual capital. Migration as a system is characterised by a dynamic change in its constituents, the appearance of new migration centres, and change structures. However, global migration is asymmetric and highly concentrated in specific migration corridors, which do not always coincide with key power centres in the world order. Another factor affecting world migrations is strange attractors such as pandemics COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. They change the direction and intensity of migration flows, which leads to stratification for individual states and equalisation for regions. Migration processes at the level of the world order contribute to the redistribution of human capital, influence the economic framework of the world, and bring momentum to the process of democratisation and socio-cultural discourses.
3. *Rethinking the role of border territories in forming a new world order*, which for a long time remained outside the attention of researchers and from the point of view of political practice, did not have subjectivity and were the object of expansion. In the second half of the 20th century, the approach to the status and significance of borders changed significantly - for several decades, world hegemony has maintained the inviolability of borders within their spheres of influence, preventing armed conflicts on these territories. A zone of peace was formed in a large part of Europe and North America, within which armed conflicts did not occur for decades. This was facilitated by economic growth and purposeful efforts to rebuild the "reconciliation system" in the political and symbolic realm. In developed countries, in the process of forming this system, they are trying to overcome, in particular, the problems of the border areas around which international conflicts have lasted for hundreds of years. At the same time, the least developed countries become hostages of 'hard borders', which were determined without their direct participation, limit development opportunities and contribute to internal conflicts. Under the pressure of globalisation processes, the importance of borders is decreasing; instead, cross-border cooperation and the role of new political actors, such as border areas, are increasing.

Self-sufficient borderlands with significant resources and de facto formed nations, in the conditions of the transformation of the world order and the weakening of the sovereignty of the existing states, can claim the right to their subjectivity. However, to acquire it, it is not necessary for them to destabilise the states within which they

are located. These territories mostly have a certain level of autonomy, and the sovereignties to which they belong and the supranational formations formed by them implement policies aimed at forming zones of intercultural dialogue. On the other hand, borderlands, which do not have their own civil identity and were historically formed as geographical frontiers in conditions of uncertainty, can pose a threat to the states within which they are located and the world order as a whole.

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