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Serhiy Kvit

THE BATTLEFRONT
OF CIVILIZATIONS:
Education
in Ukraine

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This compendium of previously published articles, blogs, speeches, reviews, and essays of Serhiy Kvit is intended to inform a foreign audience about events and issues in Ukraine and related to Ukraine since 2008. Some of the blogs were published in *University World News* over 2012–2014. Other materials in this collection were published or presented to audiences in Australia, the US, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Finland, Poland, Belgium, and, of course, Ukraine.

The writing is divided into four sections: *Ideology, University World News, The Meaning of University, and Hermeneutics and Mass Communications*. The themes cover current developments, such as educational reform and the dramatic social changes of recent years, and more philosophical and global issues. As the oldest university in Ukraine and an institution that has led by example as both an agent and a catalyst for critical educational and social changes, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is the focus and even the locus of many of the issues and changes presented here.

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CONTENTS

Ukraine: The Battlefield of Civilizations	5
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CHAPTER 1: IDEOLOGY

Ideology and Euromaidan	12
No Dialog with the 'Empty Place'	26
Ukraine in the World: Finding its rightful place	31
When Stalin Starved Ukraine	35
Education: Between Russia and the European Union	40

CHAPTER 2: UNIVERSITY WORLD NEWS

Bill on higher education: Regressive and obstructive	46
A new Dawn for Ukraine's Higher Education?	50
Irrational Funding Practices	54
What More Eurointegration could Mean for Education	58
The Vital Role of Student Groups	63
New Education Bill: Breathing Life into Higher Education	67
University Rankings in Ukraine	70
Plus ça Change: The New Old Struggle in Education	74
Modern European, not Marginal Post-Soviet Universities Needed	77
The Anti-Education Minister of Education	81
A Parallel Higher Education World	85
Admissions Weaknesses Highlight System Failings	88
What the Ukrainian Protests Mean	92
A European Revolution in Ukraine	97
Science: At the Heart of Educational Reform	100

CHAPTER 3: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNIVERSITY

Challenges in Post-Secondary Education for Post-Independence Ukraine	104
KMA President's Appeal	108
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Needs Public Support	109
KMA Files Suit Against the Ministry of Education	111
Prospects for Higher Education in Post-Orange Ukraine	113
Speech for Academy Day, 2011	117
Public Debate in Higher Education: The Case of KMA	118
Social Responsibility and Ukraine's Universities	126
Declaration from KMA Faculty and Students	129
On Events in Ukraine	130
Reforming Ukraine's Universities During a Crisis	131
How Reforming Higher Education Can Benefit Science	138
Reform in a Time of Cholera	143

CHAPTER 4: HERMENEUTICS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Universities as Agents of Understanding in a Global Age	156
Saint Augustine's Hermeneutical Universality	161
The Hermeneutics of Style	169
Truth: Philosophy in Transit	177
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy as a Medium for Free Speech	184
Mass Communications in Independent Ukraine in the Context of Normative Theories and as Evidence of Modernization Theory	191
Networked Communities: Strategies for Digital Collaboration	202

Ukraine: The Battlefield of Civilizations

The land of revolutions

Despite corruption fatigue and countless failed attempts at making its state more effective, modern Ukraine is no longer simply a back-tracking, average post-soviet country. The key word here is “countless:” there has been much debate over the number of times Ukrainians have carried out revolutions since the late 1980s. At a minimum, we can count three major ones: the Granite Revolution of 1990, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013–14, also known as the Revolution of Dignity.

For academics specializing in a country traditionally more associated with folklore and the village, Ukraine has unexpectedly acquired global significance. Now it is associated with the protection of key contemporary values: justice, truth, dignity, and political choice—issues common to all national interests. And yet, these concepts, clear enough to the international community, have been promoted alongside the anti-imperial liberationist rhetoric of Ukrainian nationalism—or at least they are seen as colored by its language. Civil society in Ukraine has become closely associated with seemingly illiberal slogans like “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!,” “Ukraine above all!” and sometimes even “Glory to the Nation! Death to Enemies!”

The ultimate image of social change could be seen at the finale of enormous rallies in which Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant priests prayed alongside rabbis and mullahs. The Ukrainian political nation

has become a society of volunteers in which the main criterion for membership is not the answer to “Who are you? What kind of person are you?” but the answer to “What have you done to make sure Ukraine wins and remains free?”

Hybrid wars, hybrid civilizations

Meanwhile, Russia has unleashed what is now recognized as a “hybrid” war against Ukraine, a uniquely contemporary phenomenon whereby an aggressor can occupy the territory of an independent state, finance terrorism, organize mass killings, and yet continue to maintain a certain legitimacy in the international community thanks to a massive army constantly bombarding it, not with shells and bombs, but with disinformation. It is as if everything has become relative, including international law. Several justified parallels have been made between the regimes of Putin and Hitler, both their *modus operandi* and self-justifications, and their propaganda machines. The passivity and tolerance shown by our western partners and the weakness of international organizations today is reminiscent of the situation just before the outbreak of World War II.

In the early 21st century, this concept of hybrid warfare in some ways approximates postmodern ideas of total relativity—used specifically in political terms. It cultivates irresponsibility, legitimizes disengagement from key social processes, and places the individual beyond the reach of the most basic humanist endeavors.

Yet, the current “hybridism” has significant inherent features. Among them is the Putin regime’s parallel media reality. In contrast with Goebbels’s propaganda, this is a qualitatively different phenomenon, in technological terms, that presents, not just a parallel way of thinking, but a parallel way of living. According to its logic, black can be white, white can be grey, and so on. The thesis is not novel, but the hybrid use of motivation makes a claim on originality. From the hybrid point of view, the criminal becomes a “just” criminal, not because of good intentions, but because the crime is directed against the “wrong kind” of person, society or culture. And this leaves no room for dialogue. The subtext enables humanity to live, at a minimum, on two different planets—one of them imagined—, in which people see but do not listen, do not hear and do not understand one another.

We are dealing with the hybridization or ideologically-motivated mixture of several system coordinates: the religious, the moral and ethical, and the judicial and rationalist. Strategically, the rules of this game are ruled by the barrel of a gun. And if rules are relative, they effectively do not exist. As a result, the players can do anything they want. In short, everything is permitted... for those prepared to use the gun.

Achieving mutual misinterpretation is the purpose for disseminating parallel or hybrid realities. In this, a special role was reserved for Putin's "Russian Orthodox Civilization." It is a barbaric, backward concept, no different from the medieval world of Ivan the Terrible, who murdered his own son in a fit of pique. This kind of corporatism deprives people of a common language, rebuilds the Tower of Babel, and represents the latest embodiment of evil. People are unable to understand one another, come to an agreement, or determine what it is that prevents them from joining forces to build something new, rather than destroying their world.

To call things by their names

Western European fear of a resurgent "great" Russia hides behind polished political rhetoric and time-wasting attempts to establish some logic to this game, at the same time as they lose face and fundamental values to corrupt politicians and publicists. Given this situation, Ukraine must call things by their names, in other words, call a spade a spade. The country is at war because its centuries-long struggle for independence has developed immunity among Ukrainians against Russian imperial propaganda, which has not changed in real terms one iota.

Still, revolutions do come to an end and life does go on. It is not possible to maintain the tension of revolutionary events as a substitute for building an effective state. The ability to gradually establish a normal civilized life in their own society will allow Ukrainians to explain to others how they can implement change and even win.

On a deeper level, the current Russo-Ukrainian war is, in many ways, a reflection of what has been lacking in Ukrainian education, the widespread lack of communication from top to bottom, the lingering soviet mentality among a good portion of Ukrainian society, and the inability, through ignorance and brainwashing, to compare their standard of living with the best international standards.

Development requires a new quality of mass communications based on enshrining and institutionalizing freedom of speech, which Ukrainian society has achieved through its many revolutions. In fact, Ukrainians need freedom of speech—and that holds great promise for the future. However, mass communications must include accountable governments that offer transparent, highly professional solutions.

The European Union must be strengthened with a new member—a properly functioning Ukrainian state, this, a country that has shown an admirable ability to not only survive political and economic crises, but to recover with rapid, quality growth. If Ukrainians fail this time, all their revolutions will be, at best, interesting, even hubristic, case studies in history textbooks. There is one truth: in places where ignorance and corruption remain, “Russian Orthodox Civilization” and “Russian World” will surely follow!

The global conversation

Ukrainian revolutions are of global significance for a simple reason: Ukrainians believe in justice, not rhetorically, but literally. Without a doubt, this belief has much in common with religious faith that is reflected in the search for ideal rules of the game in an ideal country. Yet this is a discourse that should not and cannot remain Ukraine’s alone.

In the wake of the Euromaidan, Ukrainian society has been forming a new political culture, demanding genuine political competition that requires individuals to question government authority—however ironic that might sound—and to be unwilling to suppress individual rights and freedoms that provide us all with the space for self-realization. We can, of course, attempt to identify the historical origins of this modern Ukrainian political culture, such as the democratic traditions of the middle and late medieval period, that shaped the idea of the Maidan.

The militarized rhetoric prevalent in Ukraine’s public sphere, honoring the achievements of the Revolution of Dignity and the heroes of Heaven’s Hundred, directly corresponds to the different eras of its national liberation struggle, from the Kozak state and Haidamachyna, right up to the 20th century, with its Ukrainian and Western Ukrainian National Republics, the insurrection movements of the 1920s, Carpatho-Ukraine, and the armed resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army known as UPA.

Typically in such situations, historical truth is often punctuated by idealized and metaphorical historical memory from the public sphere. In this, the arts and mass media play a significant role. Professional historians take part in shaping the public discourse, going beyond academic boundaries and offering new political arguments. Indeed, the notion of historical truth cannot be confined to a framework that claims objectivity and was established using methodologies typical of the natural sciences.

This brings the need for a civilized conversation to the forefront. Globalization without the free and open exchange of ideas and conclusions inevitably leads to global misunderstandings and thence to conflicts. Given the situation in Ukraine today, this timely and important dialog brings us to the traditions of philosophical hermeneutics, which stand as a guarantor of justice.

In the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution, also called the Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainians wanted to rid themselves of their totalitarian colonial heritage. On April 9, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada passed four bills, collectively referred to as “the laws on decommunization,” banning soviet and nazi symbols while upholding the right of Ukrainians to defend their own state. In response, an open letter was sent to the President of Ukraine and the Speaker of the legislature, asking them not to sign this bill into law.¹ Stirred up by the “Ukrainophobic Academic International,”² a phenomenon that mainly relies on Russian/soviet anti-Ukrainian propaganda, especially in the humanities, it, demonstrated that Putin continues the work of his imperial predecessors.

A proper reading of this “open” letter makes clear its manipulative nature, because it puts forward a thesis that claims the “anti-communist” laws are directed against free academic and media debate, which is not the case. Meanwhile, the real thesis underlying the letter is the “criminality”

¹ Open Letter from Scholars and Experts on Ukraine regarding the Anti-Communist Law. Accessed: <http://m.krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law>.

² I discuss the phenomenon of this group of Western academics who base their publications on myths cultivated by soviet propaganda in *Dmytro Dontsov: An Ideological Portrait*, 2nd edition, Lviv, 2013, p. 15. The “Ukrainophobic Academic International” merits particular attention, along with its ideological foundations and sources of funding. Accessed: <http://kvit.ukma.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Dmytro-Dontsov.-Ideological-Portrait3.pdf>.

of OUN and UPA,¹ something the letter treats as an indisputable “fact.” The vast majority of signatories responded to the first argument, believing fairly in the unacceptability of any ban on professional dialog.

The purpose of these kinds of manipulations is to demonstratively denigrate the Ukrainian people who “dared” to fight for their own independent state. The widespread assumption in the West is that Ukraine is the only country in Europe without combatants in WWII and that it only emerged as a result of the “natural” evolution of the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic after the collapse of the USSR. In fact, OUN’s military arm, the UPA, fought both the Nazis and the Soviets in WWII and continued to resist the colonization of Ukraine by Moscow until the mid-1950s. Its unusual role in fighting both sides has tended to be distorted to only being “pro-Nazi,” and hence its legacy of resistance and the fight for liberation is not recognized.

Yet, the underlying problem is significantly larger and not limited to Ukraine.

Consider the question, put forward by Alexander Motyl:² Why it is possible to open a “KGB Bar” in New York as a “literary institution” while it would be completely unacceptable to legally establish a similar “institution” named “Waffen SS Bar.”³ Stalin—and his heir, Vladimir Putin—is still considered more acceptable than Hitler for the West, and communism is more “humane” than nazism. All the soviet lawyers who participated in the Nuremberg trials were involved in the mass repressions of the 1930s in the USSR. In reality, they should have been sitting alongside the defendants, together with Hitler’s accomplices, who were the nearest and dearest allies of Stalin during the first phase of World War II.⁴

However, this is not sufficiently clear to many Western experts and the general public. As a result, the sacrifices of Ukrainians in the strug-

¹ The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

² Ukrainian-American historian, poet, writer, translator and artist-painter. He is professor of political science at Rutgers University and a political commentator for the *World Affairs* journal.

³ Motyl, Alexander, “Why is the ‘KGB Bar’ possible? Binary morality and its consequences,” *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol. 38, Issue 5, 2010.

⁴ The soviet concept of “The Great Patriotic War,” which is considered to have begun with the so-called Soviet-German War in 1941, rather than 1939, when the USSR and Nazi Germany jointly attacked and dismembered Poland, was intended to gloss over this collaboration for domestic consumption.

gle against the neo-soviet/ Russian empire are not sufficiently evident and meaningful to them. In addition, the half-hearted opposition of Western governments and intellectuals to the global propaganda machine called Russia Today and all its siblings means Putin's propaganda remains far more powerful in the West than in Ukraine.

An interesting example of the success of Putin's influence in the West is Marvin Kalb, a doyen of American journalism. I got to know Kalb in Washington DC in 2012. At that time, he was worried about the fate of freedom of speech and the education of journalists in Ukraine. He was also following with interest the desire of Ukrainians to build a democratic society and to defend their independence. After all, his father was born in the Podil district of Kyiv, which Marvin first visited in 1953 and where he met people who still remembered his father. I'm talking about a highly educated person with well-developed critical thinking: not just any journalist, but a well-known intellectual.

Yet, in October 2015, Marvin Kalb suddenly expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin and called on the US not to support Ukraine inasmuch as it was a "hopeless case," to use his words. There are only two possible explanations for sudden amnesia regarding such fundamental American values as democracy and civil society in a professional intellectual who previously supported them. The first possibility is a personal interest in demonstrating an about-face. The second is to promote the geopolitical interests of specific political forces in Washington. In either case, a well-known and well-respected individual has crossed to the side of such Kremlin mouthpieces as RT and is now supporting a rogue state that tramples all these ideals both at home and abroad, that has occupied the territory of a sovereign nation, that has western media outlets in its pocket and is conning a vast audience, including Americans.

What should humanity's global conversation look like? Perhaps it was suggested by Paul Ricoeur, an outstanding 20th century philosopher and honorary professor at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, who has looked for ways to overcome conflicts related to political media discourse and actual historical discourse: "We should not forget anything, but neither should we be held hostage by our own memory." The conversation is important in itself. When we truly start to communicate, humanity will begin to move toward understanding and toward truth.

CHAPTER 1

IDEOLOGY

Ideology and Euromaidan¹

The revolutionary events known as Euromaidan fundamentally restructured political life in Ukraine and brought progress to its political culture. As with the Orange Revolution, the roots of Euromaidan can be found in idealism: the desire of Ukrainians to have a state that respects the ideals associated with freedom in its broadest sense. This focus on ideals was more than political rhetoric: it was almost religious. And the level of dedication the world saw demonstrates the powerful motivation of those who took to the streets en masse to protest.

Moving from Orange to Blue & Yellow

There are a number of important differences between the Maidan of 2013–2014, Euromaidan, and the Maidan of 2004, known as the Orange Revolution. Firstly, during the Orange Revolution, the major “battlegrounds” were the cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv; 10 years later, Euromaidan spread to all of Ukraine’s regions. Secondly, the protests in 2004 focused on a free and fair presidential election. Euromaidan was far

¹ The original version of this article was published in “Contemporary Ukraine: The case of Euromaidan,” *Social, Health and Communication Studies Journal*, Vol. 1(1), November 2014. MacEwan University, Canada; National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine; Ternopil State Medical University, Ukraine. Newspaper version: *Kyiv Post*, March 24, 2014.

more complex and its demands broader, essentially calling for a reformation of the entire political system.

Thirdly, in 2004, the protesters' demands focused primarily on one individual, Viktor Yushchenko. Hopes were pinned on him as the primary agent to affect positive change. In 2014, Ukraine's protesters wanted more than a change of faces. They wanted a complete overhaul of the system of government. The notion that one person, or even a small group, could bring about meaningful change was relegated to the past. Ukrainians had begun to recognize that change started with them.

Fourth, the Orange Revolution reached its goal after some three weeks of mass protests. Euromaidan had already lasted more than three months at the time this article was written. This sustained protest, which was expected to peter out, but did not, was unprecedented in Ukraine's 22-year history as an independent, post-soviet state.

Fifth, the political elites governing Ukraine in 2013 were very different from the first generation of post-soviet administrators who had been raised in soviet times. Sixth, Euromaidan saw a broad ideological consensus emerge among a wide range of social groups with different demands. That consensus led, in late 2013, to the collapse of anti-Ukrainian propaganda based on soviet myths and stereotypes.

Staging a revolution

Euromaidan was born on November 21, 2013, when it became clear that President Viktor Yanukovich and the Government of Premier Mykola Azarov did not, in fact, plan to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, despite having spent the previous three years promising Ukrainians—and the EU—that they would. At the eleventh hour, the government backed out. Mustafa Nayyem, a Ukrainian with Afghan and Iranian roots and a respected journalist who was a mainstay of the political talk-show circuit, published an appeal on his Facebook page calling on people to rally in support of the Ukraine-EU Agreement. His appeal went viral and the first peaceful demonstrations ensued. Some 50,000 people took to Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv and rallies were held in other cities. The most vocal participants were Ukrainian

students in their teens and twenties who had never known life under soviet rule and supported European integration as a given.

This stage of Euromaidan ended when Berkut riot police brutally beat some students and dispersed their encampment on Kyiv's main square in the early morning hours of November 30, 2013. The following day, over one million protesters took to the streets in Kyiv. The protest was no longer just about European integration. It was against a government that had attacked its own citizens—and defenseless young people at that. During this second stage, “Euromaidans” popped up across Ukraine. Tensions continued to escalate as riot police attacked those on the Maidan in Kyiv.

The transition from the second to the third stage began on January 16, after a package of legislation immediately called the “dictatorship laws” because they curbed freedom of speech and assembly, and other democratic rights, was pushed through the legislature illegally by the pro-Yanukovich majority.¹ At this point, the protests stopped being strictly peaceful. People began to don helmets, put on bulletproof vests and take up shields and bats. Molotov cocktails and paving stones began flying, massive heaps of tires were lit and improvised trebuchets began throwing missiles. In response, the government unleashed a country-wide campaign of kidnapping, arresting, beating, torturing and murdering. Independent Ukraine had never seen anything like this. Police hunted down civic activists, journalists and even hospital workers. But growing political repression evoked only greater anger among Ukrainians.

The territory of the Maidan in Kyiv rapidly transformed into a fortress, complete with barricades and watchtowers. People started referring to it as the “Sich,” the historical name for headquarters the Kozaks set up in times of war. The Maidan rapidly became a miniature state onto itself, with its own systems of security, food delivery, medicine, and even education. It was the territory of freedom—free of corruption and the oppressive police presence. This phenomenon of self-

¹ “Declaration of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy on the Events in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on January 16, 2014” [Zaiava Kyievo-Mohylianskoi akademii shchodo podii u Verkhovnii Radi Ukrainy 16 sichnia 2014 r.]. Retrieved from <http://www.ukma.edu.ua/index.php/news/1112-zaiava-shchodo-podii-u-verkhovnii-radi-ukrainy-16-sichnia-2014-r>.

organization became the hallmark of the Ukrainian people around the world.

Numerous Maidan-related civic communities and organizations also sprang up: Maidan Self-Defense, AutoMaidan with its mobile groups of car owners that functioned like the Maidan's cavalry, Euromaidan SOS, Maidan Open University, the Hospital Guard, the All-Ukrainian Maidan Association, the Maidan Civic Council, the Civic Committee for Investigating Human Rights Abuses in Ukraine, the MaidanPost Media Guard, and "Ne Zliy Maidan," meaning "Don't anger the Maidan," "Don't betray the Maidan," and even "The Maidan is not evil" in Ukrainian.

This explosive mobilization of civil society led to the emergence of new leaders, most of them already activists: politician Andriy Parubiy, singer Ruslana Lyzhychko, historian Volodymyr Viatrovych, muckraking journalist Tetiana Chornovol, Democratic Alliance leader Vasyl Hatsko, Road Control's Andriy Dzyndzia, NGO director Viktoriya Siumar, writer Serhiy Zhadan, nationalist leader Dmytro Yarosh, independent activist Ihor Lutsenko, and many others. Euromaidan was now a powerful political force outside, and independent of, the government.

Reaching ideological consensus

For the first time since 1991, a consolidation of opposition parties took place in the Verkhovna Rada that was real, not just declarative. Opposition leaders Vitaliy Klitschko, Arseniy Yatseniuk and Oleh Tiahnybok agreed on their key messages prior to joint press conferences. Although they differed on some issues, the public perceived them as genuinely trying to work together and present a united front. The leftish Batkivshchyna, more liberal UDAR and right-wing Svoboda—keeping in mind that these labels are relative to the realities of post-soviet politics—found common ground in their opposition to the Yanukovich regime and desire to build a new state system.

When they began unifying their political messages, the signal went out that they were prepared to concentrate on an agreed-upon set of objectives: an effective state, civil society and European integration. The

promotion of their individual positions was secondary. In this, Euro-maidan recalled the experience of the Ukrainian movement for *perestroika*, Rukh, in the late 1980s, and the Nasha Ukrayina coalition in 2002–2004.

When the All-Ukrainian Maidan Association was launched, many compared it to Poland's Solidarity movement in the early 1980s. Euro-maidan's purpose was to establish a broad popular movement whose goals included the restoration of the 2004 Constitution, transparent elections and complete reformation of public administration at all levels. Notably, the Euromaidan movement emerged as a result, not of conflicts among different regions of Ukraine as government propaganda at the time tried to portray it, but of a confrontation between the governed and their government.

Parliamentary parties were not the only ones involved in the Maidan. Extra-parliamentary parties, most notably the Democratic Alliance (Demalians), were active as well. One key force that emerged as part of the Maidan Self-defense was Praviy Sektor (Right Sector). It was based on several existing organizations, mainly Tryzub (Trident) and UNSO (Ukrainian National Self-Defense), both established in the 1990s.

On the Maidan, activists identified themselves with a rainbow of political groups: nationalists, New Left—a force not previously represented on the Ukrainian political spectrum—, nationally-conscious liberals, or simply liberals. They represented dozens, if not hundreds, of different associations. Altogether, they contributed to the “dialog of freedom” that had become a fundamental characteristic of Euromaidan.

Numerous civic organizations involved in issues they felt the government had been neglecting took to the Maidan. Ukraine's politicians began to feel the insistence of this broad civic movement. In addition to civic organizations, much depended on the will of Euromaidan participants. During the huge rallies held on the Maidan, individual citizens voiced demands to their political and civic leaders. On the Maidan stage, clergy representing various Christian churches, Jews and Muslims prayed together.

Political differences, social status and ethnic barriers all came down on Euromaidan. Ethnic Ukrainians waving their flags were joined by

Crimean Tatars, Jews, Poles, Belarusians, Georgians, Armenians, and many others. Women in fancy furs brought tires down to the Maidan, taxi drivers took activists around for free, martial artists offered self-defense training. The legendary leader of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Dzhemilyev, said he was proud to be Ukrainian. Not only were Russian-speaking Ukrainians welcome on the Maidan, but so were ethnic Russians and even Russian flags. At one point, the Maidan organized a flash mob of umbrella-wielding protesters to support the Russian television channel Dozhd (Rain). Foreign diplomats, politicians and journalists came out to the Maidan. Students, industrial workers, farmers, business professionals, educators, artists, doctors, and office workers, from Kyiv and across Ukraine, stood shoulder-to-shoulder on the Maidan. National and social revolutions were taking place simultaneously. What united these disparate groups was the idea of overturning the status quo and establishing a fair state in its stead.


Ideologically, not just physically, Euromaidan was open to everyone. There was no division based on language or ethnicity. Provocations aimed at exploiting LGBT issues failed repeatedly as LGBT community leaders and leaders of socially conservative groups found common ground on the Maidan.¹ Many were surprised when ultra football fans across the country mobilized for Euromaidan, protecting peaceful protesters from provocateurs called *titushky* in cities controlled by Party of the Regions.

Fighting “counter-revolutionary” forces

At the height of anti-Maidan provocations, there were repeated attempts to exploit the question of anti-Semitism. In response, Euromaidan provided security guards² to synagogues in Kyiv after reports that Jews were being attacked. Leonid Finberg, director of the Kyiv-

¹ “A Declaration by LGBT organizations in Ukraine regarding the latest attempt to exploit the LGBT issue to discredit Euromaidan” [Zaiava LHBT-orhanisatsii v Ukraini shchodo cherhovoї sproby vykorystannia LHBT dlia dyskredytatsii Ievromaidanu]: http://lgbt.org.ua/ua/news/show_1046/.

² “Euromaidan Takes Synagogues under its Protection” [Ievromaidan beret pod okhranu sinagogi], January 25, 2014. Retrieved from <http://eajc.org/page16/news42881.html>.



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Mohyla Center for Jewish Studies, criticized those Jewish community representatives who incited hatred. Viacheslav Likhachev placed Euro-maidan on the Ukrainian Jewish agenda¹ and later wrote an article called “The Jewish Division of Ukraine’s Heaven’s Hundred.”² Josef Zisels, president of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine, stated that he had not encountered any anti-Semitism at Maidan³ and his proclamation “For Your and Our Freedom” is historic in Ukrainian-Jewish relations.⁴ It was also no secret that Jews, including some combat-experienced Israelis, joined the ranks of the Maidan Self-Defense.⁵

Provocations aside, there was no anti-Semitism on the Maidan because there was no need for it, and those who monitor anti-Semitism in Ukraine confirmed this. In the early days of the Maidan, the silly slogan “Whoever isn’t jumping’s a *moskal* [Muscovite]” that people chanted as while jumping up and down to keep warm. This slogan quickly disappeared after Russian intellectuals appeared in Ukrainian media and on the Maidan expressing support for Ukraine. The Maidan dispelled the longstanding myth of “xenophobic Ukrainians.” The historical animosity between Ukrainians and Poles was also nowhere to be seen on the Maidan, where Poles stood side-by-side with Ukrainian “right wing radicals.” The Maidan turned out to be a great instrument for resolving historical differences, leading to mutual respect among peoples who hoped to be together in a common Europe.

¹ Likhachev V., “Maidan: The Jewish Agenda” [Maidan: ievreiskaia povestka dnia], March 11, 2014. Retrieved from <http://eajc.org/page18/news42507.html>.

² Likhachev V., “The Jewish Division of Ukraine’s Heaven’s Hundred,” March 11, 2014. Retrieved from <http://eajc.org/page34/news43797.html>.

³ Zisels I., “Anti-Semitism on the Maidan: What I hear about, but have never seen” [Antisemitizm na Maidane: ia ne vizhu togo, o chiom slyshu]. Retrieved from http://booknik.ru/context/litsa/antisemitizm-na-mayidane-ya-ne-viju-togo-o-chiom-slyshu/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=page_booknik.

⁴ Zisels, I., “For Your and Our Freedom” [Za Vashu i nashu svobodu], December 2013: <http://www.vaadua.org/news/iosif-zisels-vistup-na-narodnomu-viche-ievromaydan-pid-chas-dnya-gidnosti>.

⁵ “Jewish Heroes of the New UPA [Evreiski heroi novoi UPA], February 14, 2014. Retrieved from <http://volnodum.livejournal.com/879170.html>.

In fact, Euromaidan rejected intolerance. This, of course, caused its opponents to froth at the mouth. Examples of this can be found in the writings of Volodymyr Ishchenko, whose articles disparaged the Maidan from a radical left-wing position. He opposed the stance of leading Western intellectuals who supported Euromaidan, saying “support Ukrainians and they can help us build a fairer Europe”.¹ According to Ishchenko, the Yanukovych regime may have been bad, but the opposition consisted of discredited politicians and “neo-fascists,” so why change horses in mid-stream?

Instead of European values, which he said were just an illusion, Ishchenko proposed an alternative: “Ukraine’s progressive grassroots movements and civic organizations really need international support to defend the basic socio-economic rights of impoverished Ukrainian citizens and to build genuine political representation from below.”² His “progressive fanaticism” prevented him from understanding the root causes that led brought all strata of Ukrainian society to Euromaidan. Wealthy Ukrainians, middle-class Ukrainians, Ukrainian laborers, and Ukrainians living below the poverty line all took part—not just the “impoverished” to whom Ishchenko appealed in a tone reminiscent of Lenin’s demagoguery.

It is easy enough to find fault with Ukraine’s political and civic leaders, and with their actions and programs, particularly if you accept post-soviet taboos and the disinformation that has permeated the social consciousness of many Ukrainians. But Euromaidan brought national unity in the quest for an effective, democratic state to the forefront. During France’s many religious wars, it was Henry IV—likely borrowing from Michel de Montaigne—who reminded his people that they were French first of all, and that being Catholic or Huguenot was secondary. Although that sentiment was expressed centuries ago, a society’s ability to respect individual freedoms and rid itself of corruption is still deter-

¹ “Support Ukrainians and they can help us build a fairer Europe,” *The Guardian*, January 3, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/03/support-ukrainians-build-fairer-europe>.

² Ishchenko, V., “Support Ukrainians but do not legitimize the far-right and discredited politicians!”, January 7, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/support-ukrainians-but-not-far-right>.

mined at the national level, within the boundaries of independent states, not at the global level.

This ideological consensus does not mean that political competition is dead. Ideological debates continue. The important thing is that Ukrainian liberals, right- and left-wing politicians, activists and apolitical individuals have become united in the struggle to establish a new, just state. One of Euromaidan's enduring slogans is "Razom—Syla!" meaning "Together, we're a Force!" A new civil society is emerging in Ukraine. Everyone can find a spot on the Euromaidan barricades. In this way, political, inter-confessional, inter-cultural, and inter-ethnic dialogs flourish on the Maidan. This is the ideology of a new state emerging.

Using and abusing history

Euromaidan is a continuation of the centuries-long national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. Although an independent state was declared in 1991, it did not automatically lead to an effective state, and corruption grew to menacing proportions. As these negative processes in Ukraine picked up pace, Putin's Russia embarked on a campaign to restore the "Great Russian Empire" on the territories of the former USSR. The information war against Ukraine, economic blackmail, the unpunished activities of Russia's secret service agents and their Ukrainian fifth column directly undermined the independence of Ukraine's state and its economy for years.

By pursuing such policies in its "near abroad," the Kremlin is trying to distract its own citizens from social problems that their government cannot resolve. In terms of ideology, Putin's system has promoted the idea of *Russkiy Mir* or Russian World among Ukrainians, a campaign proved largely unsuccessful, but nevertheless had destructive effects. The tenets of this ideology are that Ukrainians and Russians are "one people" who share a "common history" including both the imperial "greatness" of the Russian Tsars and the "glory" of the soviet period—especially through the ideological construct of the "Great Patriotic War"—and the "consolidating" power of Russian Orthodox Christianity, which has historically always served Russia's authoritarian state system.

The world has grown accustomed to ignoring the fact that World War II destroyed only one of the two most totalitarian systems Europe has known, German Nazism. Soviet totalitarianism, or “Russian Communism,” to borrow a term from Kyiv philosopher Mykola Berdiayev, survived. It continues along similar lines under the guise of “Putinism,” with Tsarist-Leninist-Stalinist ideological underpinnings. It should be a source of global concern because of its aggressive nature. Historian Timothy Snyder has equated Nazism and Communism in the context of Euromaidan as an ideological phenomenon and expressed concern over the Kremlin’s Eurasian ideology as totalitarian and neo-bolshevik.

French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy put it differently, saying that all Europeans should feel themselves “Ukrainians.” Speaking on the Maidan in Kyiv, he said, “In Paris, the Bastille Square became the cradle of the French nation. You have the Maidan, where the Ukrainian nation is now being born.”¹ But this statement is only partly true. Ukrainian independence did not fall from the sky in 1991. It was the result, not of evolutionary processes within the USSR, but of the bitter ongoing struggle of many generations of Ukrainians. The Russian Empire attempted to discredit the names of those leaders who were symbols of Ukraine’s national liberation struggle by labeling Ukrainians *mazepyntsi*, *petliurovtsi*, and *banderovtsi* in an extremely pejorative manner, demonizing the names of historic figures who fought Russian imperialism: Hetman Ivan Mazepa, Gen. Symon Petliura, and nationalist leader Stepan Bandera.

“Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” became the Maidan’s refrain, repeated over and over again by Ukrainians of all political stripes in all of the country’s regions. Based on the idea that national and social liberation can be achieved only by establishing a Ukrainian independent, unified state, this slogan was inherited from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or UPA. The concept of a Ukrainian unified state was critical in the 20th century when half of Ukraine, known as “Greater Ukraine” was

¹ Lévy, B.-H., “Nous sommes tous des Ukrainiens,” *Le Monde*, February 10, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/10/nous-sommes-tous-des-ukrainiens_4363410_3232.html?xtmc=poutine&xtcr.

under Russia, while the western half was, at various times and in various configurations, under Austria-Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. The struggle for genuine independence resumed on Euro-maidan and quickly adopted the ideological legacy, and the organizational and structural forms of 20th century Ukrainian nationalism. Today, this has turned into an integrating process for all of Ukrainian society.

Andreas Umland, a leading voice in the study of contemporary totalitarian movements, was incorrect to relegate this slogan to “specifically nationalistic topics, symbols and slogans.”¹ It gained popularity, not just because it was repeated countless times from the Maidan stage and not at all because of some campaign of ethnic superiority, but because of its association with the defiant spirit of a struggle against all odds. Actually, the previous generation of Kyivites first took up the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to her heroes!” during Gorbachev’s *perestroika*, when Viacheslav Chornovil first shouted it on Sofiyivska Ploshcha during a rally in 1989.

“Paranoid interpretations,” to borrow a term from Umberto Eco, are often verbalized, such as equating the popular Euromaidan slogan “Ukraine above all!” with the Nazi slogan “Deutschland über alles!” But historians shouldn’t try to compare apples and oranges. They would do well to listen, instead, to AutoMaidan leader Serhiy Koba, who announced from the Maidan stage on February 23 that his organization had gone into opposition to those who just a few days earlier had been in opposition to Yanukovich, “in order to oversee the new government’s activities.” He shouted to the masses gathered before the stage: “Ukraine!” and the Maidan replied: “Above all!” “That is what every official of the new government must remember,” Koba then said. “They must work for the interests of the country, not for their own pockets.” In fact, all of the Maidan slogans have a social, not a discriminatory meaning.

¹ Umland, A., “Is Tiahnybok a Patriot? How the Spread of Banderite Slogans and Symbols Undermines Ukrainian Nation-Building,” *Foreign Policy Journal*, January 1, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/01/01/is-tiahnybok-a-patriot-how-the-spread-of-banderite-slogans-and-symbols-undermines-ukrainian-nation-building/>.

The renowned historian Norman Davies mentioned “a vexatious ideological trap,” in which the UPA and other participants in Eastern European resistance movements against the Nazis had, “as long as struggling for national liberty demanded it of them, to fight not only against Hitler, but also against Stalin”.¹ The latter has the image—even today—of a great anti-fascist and the West’s ally in World War II, leading many experts and politicians to take a simplistic view that, if the UPA fought against the USSR, it must be considered a supporter of national-socialism. Such a conclusion that is completely absurd.

Respected works published in English by Orest Subtelny² and Paul Robert Magocsi,³ among others, testify that the UPA was established in 1942 as an army to fight against the Hitler’s occupation forces. The national resistance continued its active struggle against Russian communism until the mid-1950s. Decades later, many descendants of the participants and supporters of this resistance movement came to the Maidan.

Dueling symbols

The rebirth of symbols of national liberty was greatly advanced by the “Revolution on Granite” led by Ukrainian students in 1990. Indeed, journalists from a Soviet Union-wide progressive TV program called *Vzgliad* or View promised they would pay special attention to national symbols in their coverage of the protests, but the broadcast version of the report avoided the issue of symbols altogether. A few years later, Yaroslava Stetsko thanked Chornovil for promoting the UPA slogan. The Ukrainian dissident replied that the slogan united various generations of those who were fighting for Ukraine’s freedom.

Through this historic slogan, “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” Euromaidan undertook to defend and develop the Ukrainian state. Those who accuse Maidan activists of extremism are either being

¹ Davies Norman, “Europe. A History” [Ievropa. Istoria], Kyiv, 2001, p. 1060.

² Subtelny, O., “Ukraine. A History,” University of Toronto Press in association with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Toronto/Buffalo/London, 1988, p. 473.

³ Magocsi, P. R., “A History of Ukraine. The Land and Its People,” University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London, p. 679.

provocative or are incompetent.¹ Moreover, after February 20, when the number of protesters killed during clashes in downtown Kyiv suddenly grew to over 100, the slogan gained a special meaning, especially in the media. At this point, those who died on the Maidan were given the name “Heaven’s Hundred.” Fighting in the spirit of their predecessors, these “Maidaners” of all ages, all walks in life, different nationalities, faiths and regions, fought heroically in defense, ultimately, of “European” values—something Europeans should try to remember today.

To counter the powerful, swiftly permeating symbols of Euromaidan and set up a confrontation at the ideological level, counter-symbols were devised by the enemies of the Maidan. The best-known of these was, as might have been expected, a symbol right out of Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist fantasies. This anti-symbol was the “Georgian ribbon,” historically awarded by the defunct Tsarist Order of St. George the Victorious and intended to symbolize a warrior’s courage—and a particularly Russian kind of patriotism. Although the orange-and-black ribbon somewhat resembles the “Ribbon of the Guards” of the soviet period, a direct link with the soviet ribbon was never emphasized. Yet in 2005, the modern-day Georgian ribbon began to appear and to be awarded in a number of countries with large Russian populations, primarily FSU countries.

This propaganda vehicle has nothing in common with honoring the memory of WWII heroes who genuinely contributed to the victory over Nazism—indeed, the Georgian ribbon was not promoted in the soviet period. The main task of the current campaign is to find a simple symbol that combines the military “greatness” of the Russian Empire before and after 1917, and gives its supporters a cheap, mass-scale means of identifying themselves in public as Russian chauvinists. And so this symbol was exported to Ukraine under the pretext of “fighting the fascists on the Maidan.”

In point of fact, the Georgian ribbon is more a symbol of the anti-humanism and totalitarianism of the Russian Empire that was neither

¹ Wynnyckyj, M., “Response to Washington Post article by Keith Darden and Lucan Way,” February 15, 2014. Retrieved from <https://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/02/15/response-to-washington-post-article-by-keith-darden-and-lucan-way-2/>.

discredited in a process like the postwar “denazification” that took place in Germany, nor criminalized and prosecuted like the trials at Nuremberg. The orange-and-black ribbon’s main purpose is to visually mark the territory “occupied” by the expansionist “Russian world,” a reincarnation of communism and fascism that is hostile to humanism, national self-identification, freedom, and civil society. This revived and revised imperial symbol stands against all symbols of national liberation, including the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!”

Euromaidan is a threat, not to Russia, but to Russian autocracy. In January 2012, the well-known Russian intellectual Yuriy Afanasiev, speaking at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, said that Russia’s main problem was not its leader personally—Putin—, but autocracy—Putinism—, and it needed to be eliminated completely. All Russian intellectuals who spoke from the stage at Euromaidan and commented on it for the press, were aware of that. In fact, at opposition rallies in Moscow, Russians themselves began to chant “Bandu het!” meaning “Away with the gang!” in Ukrainian, a classic example of democracy being exported, indeed, of Ukrainian national and political culture being exported.

Euromaidan is the latest phase of the long struggle of the Ukrainian people for national liberation, with its primary principle unity in diversity. In fact, it is not easy to briefly say what unites all the participants. Clearly, it is less about individual interests, which run the gamut, and more about individual Ukrainians striving to feel themselves a people in their own state. Hence the epithet, “revolution of dignity.” After 23 years of independence, Ukraine’s statehood remains under threat: a fairly unstable country whose society is in transition, its economy depressed, corruption widespread, and its value system haphazardly espoused.

Russia’s interference has most clearly confirmed that Euromaidan is an ideological phenomenon. Timothy Snyder, one of the most reputable Ukraine scholars, was himself astounded by this “unification of the unconnectable,”¹ that is, the collaboration and consolidation of different groups with seemingly contradictory ideological orientations and

¹ Snyder, T., “Ukraine: The Haze of Propaganda,” *The New York Review of Books*, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/mar/01/ukraine-haze-propaganda/>.

social foundations. This was evident on the Maidan until the regime of Viktor Yanukovich ended, and it was evident again when Russia invaded Ukraine. Far from indulging in anti-Russian hysteria, Ukrainians have shown that they are very diverse, but united. Today, their views are extremely broad, even universal. Only a mature nation can demonstrate this. So it seems that invasion arrived too late.

No Dialog with the 'Empty Place'¹

The key word in the title of our conference is “dialog.” The question is, are we talking about dialog as a cultural value, or about negotiating with terrorists? Let’s leave the last to the police. Since the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops in February 2014, there has been widespread talk about a return to the atmosphere and rhetoric of the Cold War. I would like to talk about what we should not return to.

We should not return to a dialog with the Devil.

Aided and abetted by Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the Yanukovich regime deepened systematic corruption, pressured the press politically, and attempted to destroy civil society and civil freedoms in Ukraine. It also brought Ukraine’s economy to the brink of collapse. Small wonder the people of Ukraine wanted no more of this regime.

Following the Euromaidan revolution, the new Ukrainian government implemented a series of policies designed to fight corruption and establish favorable conditions for doing business in Ukraine in order to attract foreign investment.

In education, we share the new government’s goals of democratization, accountability, transparency, and other key changes. Reforms in higher education include replacing authoritarian state control over universities with university autonomy, introducing interdisciplinary integration, and integrating Ukraine’s higher education system into Europe’s Higher Education Area.

¹ Original speech at the “How to strengthen the relations between European Union and Ukraine? What about the renewal of dialog with Russia?” Conference organized by Confrontations Europe in Brussels, April 24, 2014. Accessed: <http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/serhiy-kvit-no-dialog-with-the-empty-place-345024.html>.

First of all, we need to restore public confidence in the Ministry of Education and Science, which had become extremely corrupt. Second, we have to push through the legislature a new law “On Higher Education” that has been under development by Ukraine’s educational community over the last few years, together with additional new laws “On Education” and “On Science and Research.” Third, we need to streamline the licensing and accreditation system, whose unduly complicated procedures fostered more corruption. Overall, our goal is to improve the quality of education and research in Ukraine.

Following this path, we will separate Ukraine from Russia’s authoritarian practices of governance. To the current Russian regime, this is the greatest threat to its own autocracy.

Many intellectuals in the West once called for dialog with the Soviet Union as a sign of “respect” for the “choice of the soviet people,” first to change the old regime through the Russian Revolution in 1917 and, later, to build communism.

That’s simply not true.¹

First, the Bolshevik takeover in 1917 was a project to renew and re-establish the Russian Empire that had nothing in common with ideas of rights and social justice.

Second, the faceless masses of so-called “soviet people” were the result of terrible repressions, brainwashing and russification across all the territories of the USSR. These masses had neither their own will nor the option of choosing between different models of social, political and economic development.

Third, the West often identified the USSR with Russia, which ignored the right to self-determination of other nations forced into the Soviet Union through invasions and occupations. Finally, international dialog was held with a clique of international terrorists who had seized power and established a single-party communist dictatorship.

¹ To understand current events better, the diaries of Zinaida Gippius, a Russian intellectual who was a democratic thinker, offer food for thought. There is a Ukrainian saying that Russian democracy ends where Ukraine begins. Gippius’s emigrant diaries convince us that she was a real democrat while at the same time tracing the tragedy of her political marginality. The truth was that people like her never had real political power in Russia.

Today we should carry on dialog only with people who genuinely want to find a way out of the political deadlock of the Cold War. But in that case, what do we mean by “dialog with Russia”? If we communicate with responsible intellectuals, they are not the people who can influence Vladimir Putin and his clique. Dialog with Putin is impossible not only from the point of ethics and morality, but also because it is a totally senseless enterprise. Just listen to the phrase, “Putin and dialog.” ... Come on, this is no time for kidding.

Based on the centuries-long experience of Ukrainians in relations with the Russian political system, let's try to explain it in visual terms. This is important for many “neutral” western intellectuals who live in countries that do not border Russia.

The Russian tradition of a strong state means Russians respect the hierarchy of a state bureaucracy. This kind of hierarchic consciousness tends to respect any leader who gets to the top of the pyramid of power. The leader, be it Tsar, President, or Secretary-General of the Communist Party's Central Committee, must be “strong,” which means “able to keep this pyramid solid,” since it is associated with the country, with the people and, at the same time, with the “happiness” of the people.

Crimes against humanity or the denial of human rights and freedoms are not considered wrong, but rather demonstrate the ability to preserve unlimited power. This is what Russians have inherited from the times of Mongol rule. The one who holds the power is beyond good and evil, and anything he does will be tolerated, including such a “minor” fault as corruption.

In Putin's terms, we are dealing with the “sovereign democracy” of Russia, very close in certain aspects to the ideological principles of Nazism. We can observe now a phenomenon of collective psychosis, resembling what Carl Jung described and explained. During the tsarist period of Russian history, the phenomenon was characterized by the phrase, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality.”

In short, it does not really matter who is at the top of Russia's pyramid of power, only what position the pyramid maintains. This pyramid has the autonomous ability to transmit “unchallenged” ideas from the top person to the entire society. So, Russian society, hypno-

tized by information wars and monopolist media, respects not the person, but the seat of power occupied by this person. Correspondingly, hopes for dialog with Russia are effectively hopes for dialog with this “empty place.”

It should be noted that there is no fundamental difference between totalitarianism and pyramidal Russian authoritarianism. They are both based on the old principle, “Might makes right.”

Five main reasons have made the Russian government return to the practices of the Dark Ages.

First, the regime of “sovereign democracy” has demonstrated its total ineffectiveness, so that its top dog, Putin, has to demonstrate “achievements” in the international arena by pretending to be an “integrator” and “retriever” of the lands of the Russian Empire in the eyes of its exalted, chauvinist majority.

Second, there is a desperate quality to Putin’s anti-Ukrainian politics. During the nearly four years of Yanukovich’s rule, Ukraine was totally infiltrated by Russian operatives. Russian agents or venal bureaucrats were appointed to key positions. A significant portion of the Ukrainian political elite was amenable to psychological addiction to the soviet, that is, Russian imperial heritage. Russia spent huge amounts to enervate Ukraine’s military forces and to keep it in thrall to Russian politics. But Euromaidan’s victory took the entire geopolitical project of Ukrainian Anschluss out of Putin’s hands.

Third, Euromaidan became the most evident Ukrainian “virus of freedom” to threaten Russian autocracy. This is a historical conflict between different political cultures and mentalities. The 106 members of Heaven’s Hundred gave their lives for fundamentally European human values and justice. Meanwhile, the number of victims in the Russian-Ukrainian war keeps growing.

Fourth, to even consider undermining and usurping a sovereign country in this manner is a reflection of the specific political culture of the majority of Russian society, of a nation hung up on a primitive, mythological vision of reality. Lack of elementary political freedoms coupled with a general tolerance for authoritarianism is compensated by a neverending, aggressive search for “the enemy.”

Fifth, Putinism is characterized by official denial of the conscientious, thinking part of Russian society. The personality of Putin himself is significant: a KGB agent with a primitive soviet education who is convinced of his all-powerfulness. He sees Russian society as a faceless, base creature that can be lied to and manipulated, over and over again.

Going back to the idea of “renewing dialog” with Russia, we should recognize the impossibility of “dialog with Devil.” Would Europe be able to have a dialog with Russia, if Russia had annexed Brussels, where we are gathered right now?

In terms of diplomatic dialog, Ukraine might agree to a referendum on a unitary or federal state structure. It is our position that any democratic choice by Ukrainians is perfectly fine. The problem is that Russia ignores democratic processes, operating under one of Josef Stalin’s key principles: “It’s not who votes that counts, it’s who counts the votes.” In other words, if any referendum results deny Russia’s position, Russia will not recognize them. It understands only the language of force.

So, does anyone need a dialog? Of course we do. But it must be a dialog between sides that genuinely want results. I would like to remember the great European tradition of philosophical hermeneutics from St. Augustine to Gadamer and Ricoeur, about the personal involvement and responsibility of each and every participant. This is the kind of productive conversation that gives us the opportunity to discover something new that did not exist at the beginning of the dialog—something that is both a solution and a truth.

That is why I suggest that we should look at the objective of such a conversation as broader than just the professional work of diplomats or the police. This dialog has to become an intellectual bridge between nations, cultures and civilizations.

As to the Russian side, it must be represented not by the promoters of Putinism, but by critically thinking intellectuals who have a natural aversion to the “holy” power of the “empty place.” These are the individuals who can properly represent their people. We should also be thinking in terms of many different dialogs: between academics, students, serious politicians and others who are interested in the process of mutual understanding and its positive potential. The Ukrainian side

should be represented by the Euromaidan generation, with its foundation in the idea of diversity. For Europeans, such a conversation would be the starting point for self-examination coming from the idea of mutual understanding as the single most important value of Europe.

Ukraine in the World: Finding its rightful place¹

After several hundred years of statelessness, neglect and struggles for independence, Ukraine re-emerged in the world consciousness through a global tragedy—the disaster at the Chornobyl nuclear plant in 1986. After it gained independence in 1991, Ukraine set two important historic precedents that placed it in the international media spotlight: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Euromaidan of 2013–2014.

The victories of these two revolutions testify to both the strengths and the weaknesses of Ukrainians. Why was the second revolution necessary? Simply because the first did not yield the desired results. Today, Ukrainians have to demonstrate their ability to build an effective state. To this day, the people of Ukraine are not looked upon as a nation-state that can fend for itself—not by Russia, nor by the West.

The Euromaidan, also called the Revolution of Dignity,² has significance not only for Ukraine, but for the entire world community. First and foremost, this is a revolution of values, just as the Orange Revolution was. Many opinion leaders say Ukrainians are in the front lines defending the values of the civilized world, standing up for the rights and the future of everyone else on the planet. If Ukrainians lose, it will be a defeat for the entire civilized world, which has been building a system of global security for many years in the hopes of a better, shared future.

Instead, at this time, we have deep, shared disenchantment, similar to the social climate in Europe at the start of World War I. The civilized,

¹ Original speech at the US-UA Working Group Yearly Summit, “Providing Ukraine with an Annual Report Card,” June 19, 2014, Washington DC. Accessed at: <http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/serhiy-kvit-putins-russia-is-modern-day-evil-empire-352876.html>.

² The term “гідність” in Ukrainian can also be interpreted as “worthiness.”

rational, progressive world has proved to be helpless in the face of barbarian actions amplified by the latest in technology. Technology itself is neither good nor bad: its value depends entirely on how a given technology is used.

Seeing Russia for what it is

A discussion about Ukraine's revolutions inevitably leads us to the topic of Russia. The metaphors used by Winston Churchill, who called communism "the regression of mankind," and Ronald Reagan, who referred to the Soviet Union as "the Evil Empire," apply directly to the Russian Federation today. Aggression, corruption, violence, deceit, domination. These are the primary features of the "alternative Russian civilization" represented today by Vladimir Putin—and they pose a threat to the entire world.

The ideological battle taking place today is also challenging stereotypes. Stereotypes are not to be feared, as they are a part of each of us. Walter Lippmann said that in their desire to understand the world, people create images in their minds, and later they modify these images when they receive new information. Lippmann also speaks of the pseudo-environment that mass media help create.

Although it is viewed by the international community primarily as a local Ukrainian-Russian conflict, this is a global conflict of values that deserves to be cracked open and released from its ideological pseudo-environmental shell. Let's consider a few important hypotheses:

First. Russia has rejected all the rules established by the global community to provide a system of security, including conventions, agreements, treaties and memoranda to which it is a signatory. Vladimir Putin has misappropriated and distorted well-understood political terms, fundamentally changing their meaning, in a form of Orwellian double-speak. For example, he draws analogies between events in Ukraine and those in Kosovo in the late 1990s. His proxies in Crimea and Donbas imitate Euromaidan tactics, such as calling their paramilitary units "self-defense," using tires for barricades and more. He attempts to mirror the Euro-Atlantic world, which is based on rule of law, and the Eurasian world, which based on rule of force and fear.

Second. The Russian state is oriented on the supposed “greatness” of the Russian Empire, including the Soviet Union, and draws parallels between Stalinist and Tsarist ideologies—Moscow as “the third Rome” and “Autocracy, orthodoxy, nationality.” As a result, we are now dealing, not with a monkey armed with a grenade, but with an ever-more-barbaric horde armed with the buttons of a nuclear arsenal.

Third. Russia is winning the global information war, in as much as it has so far not been confronted by any unified opposition in the international community. The impact of journalists who sell out and of politicians who cave in can be seen the world over.

Fourth. The indecisiveness of the international community reflects a cowardly reluctance to look cold truth in the eye. Just because there are no Kremlin leaders with the surnames “Hitler” and “Goebbels” does not mean that the resurgence of a Russian “sovereign democracy” moving westward over Ukrainian territories differs from the Nazi “*Drang nach Osten*,” as it is driven by very similar xenophobic principles.

Fifth. The acceptance by the West of contemporary Russia as a nation of great literature, superb ballet, and brave, articulate intellectuals misses the underlying dangers of deeply felt xenophobia. According to an All-Russian Center survey of national sentiment published in the middle of May, Putin’s approval rating is at 85.9%. This brings to mind Carl Jung’s assessment of Nazism as “the collective psychosis of German society between the two world wars.”

Sixth. The apparent successes of Putinist Russia so far rely on a fundamental indifference towards the civilized world, on the principle “Might makes right,” and on utter contempt for international rights and rules that are supposed to apply equally to all.

Seventh. The time for the West to separate Ukraine from Russia in its collective mind is long overdue.

The Free Person vs the Empire

Everyone has heard of the kozaks. This phenomenon arose in the 16th century, and possibly even earlier, in what is today the Ukrainian oblast of Zaporizhzhia. According to the stereotypes in Ukrainian historical memory, kozaks symbolize freedom and dedication to serving

their people. When I was a young boy, my grandmother would often tell me, "Remember, you come from kozaks. You are a free person." Yet, the Russian version of history deforms Ukrainian history, presents the kozak as a mercenary in the service of monarchs, destroying everything that might stand in the way of an aggressive empire.

The totalitarian mythology of Putinist Russia is based on specific stereotypes, permeating the public consciousness through state-controlled mass media. In the absence of free speech, the persistent terrorizing of critical thought leads to Russian society becoming "zombified" with totalitarian concepts. For example, what was a "single correct" soviet truth is now an exclusively anti-western truth. A majority of Russians in the public sphere are no longer able to apply basic logic and answer a simple question such as why Orthodox Bulgarians, Greeks and Romanians became members of NATO.

For Russian political mythology, Ukraine is exceptionally significant. After all, Kyiv is the "Mother of Russian cities." In contrast to the Russian positioning of Moscow as the "Third Rome," a symbol of imperial power, the Ukrainian historical stereotype treats Kyiv as a "second Jerusalem," a symbol of justice.

Governing Kyiv lends legitimacy to the Moscow-based empire calling itself "Russia." This name was taken from the Middle Ages, when Ukraine called itself "Kyivan Rus." The history of the Muscovite empire dates back only to the 15th century, but the discourse of the empire hides and refuses to acknowledge this fact. The Russian neurosis that "If we do not possess Ukraine and Kyiv, we will not be 'great' enough" obsesses Putin and his entire propaganda media machine.

Russia initiated a war with Ukraine in its quest for "Greatness." This fact must be taken seriously. We need to understand not only what drives the information wars, but also the imperial mythology and collective psychosis now engulfing Russian society. Most Russians now do not wish to hear, and will not tolerate hearing, anything that does not match official discourse and propaganda. Most Russians prefer to hide in the fog of "Greatness," so as not to see the economic and political problems, the isolation, the violation of human rights, and the sheer depravity of the country in which they live.

Great metaphorical significance in the Ukrainian collective consciousness is found in the meaning of “Maidan.” The Maidan is a place where serious social problems are discussed, where answers to the key issues that affect each citizen are found collectively. Maidan symbolizes justice and the strength to defend this justice. In Kyiv, people say, “Are you unable to find Truth and Justice? Go to the Maidan. Seek help at the Maidan.” Currently, a special group of lawyers and political analysts are at work to institutionalize the Maidan as a political entity in the Ukrainian legal system.

Thanks to Euromaidan, there are new social and political processes taking place in Ukraine today. We have concerns before us that are dramatically different from those of Russian political culture. Ukrainians are assembling and coming together in social and civil groups based on their rights as citizens. There is no division or discrimination along linguistic, religious, cultural or territorial lines. Opinion leaders from the Crimean Tatar, Jewish and Russian communities rejoice repeatedly that they are, indeed, Ukrainian.

The war has strengthened Ukraine and unified its people. Ukraine is building a new military structure and a new nation. We do have tremendous challenges with material resources, war and corruption, but we are determined to establish a just nation based on rule of law for all its citizens. If Ukraine and the Maidan win this war, the world will be a better place.

Ukraine needs the support of the United States to defend itself. We’re not asking for “boots on the ground,” however. We’re asking for the means to defend ourselves. We’re asking for support to build a strong civil society, to improve our educational system, and to rebuild our country economically.

When Stalin Starved Ukraine¹

The Great Famine of 1932–33, known in Ukrainian as the Holodomor, was a horrendous event and a turning point in the history of the Ukrainian people that has no parallel in world history. But my purpose is not

¹ The original article was based on an open lecture at the University of Western Australia, May 9, 2012, Perth: http://www.ias.uwa.edu.au/lectures/2012_lectures/kvit

to compare the genocide of the Ukrainian people to genocides elsewhere, as the horrors of this kind of tragedy are, on principle, not a matter for comparison or competition. The historical uniqueness of the Holodomor rests in the fact that the Yanukovich Administration has been expressing official doubts about the scope of the Holodomor and refuses to recognize it as a genocide. Rather than being the subject of serious historical and sociological research that would help frame the Holodomor in proper legal terms, the Great Famine, instead, continues to be the subject of political posturing and is even being used as a bargaining chip in international negotiations.

One of the main objectives of any totalitarian system is total control over access to information among its citizens, which is why soviet historiography did not acknowledge the Holodomor of 1932–33. Needless to say, for ordinary Ukrainians, no alternative sources of information were available outside the government. Meanwhile, those who had survived the Great Famine were afraid to even remember the hell that had visited agriculturally rich Ukraine in the 1930s, much less talk about it.

Still, my personal experience suggests that Ukrainians were very much aware of the Holodomor and it could hardly have been otherwise. My grandmother Natalia told me about the Holodomor from the time I was 10. My grandmother was born in Lykhvari, a village in Reshytylivka County, Poltava Oblast, and she spoke of such horrors from our family's, neighbors' and relatives' lives during these terrible years that I will probably never dare to speak about them publicly.

What happened in Ukraine in 1932–33? Josef Stalin and other soviet leaders engineered and imposed a huge artificial famine on Ukraine whose purpose was the total extermination of Ukraine's farming class. From a rational point of view, it is difficult to understand why a totalitarian system needed to kill people whom it could force to be its slaves. In order to get some perspective on what happened in 1932–33, the history of the Russian empire and Ukraine's relationship to it need to be understood, especially the fact that Ukraine was a Russian colony for more than 300 years.

Russia has historically done everything to claim as its own, not only Ukraine's territory and its resources, but also the country's history and

even its name. The medieval principality known as Kyivan Rus underwent a startling, even bizarre transformation concocted to please the political whims of the imperial Russian state and was renamed as Russia. In a similar vein, the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv was proclaimed the “Mother of Russian cities” in order to leverage more legitimacy for Russia’s rule over it. In this political climate, Ukrainian nationalism posed a danger to the imperial ideology by rejecting Russian as an occupant and arguing in favor of an independent Ukrainian state. As Ukrainians at this point were mostly farmers, Stalin directed his main attack at the Ukrainian countryside.

The Ukrainian nation had developed without a proper, full-fledged social structure. Most of those who called themselves Ukrainians lived in rural areas and were farmers, but there was also a very small group of Ukrainian intellectuals. Ukraine was not a modern nation, but rather a traditionally patriarchal one, and for centuries it lacked a state of its own. Since farmers and peasants did not read papers, let alone listen to radio or watch television, it was difficult to brainwash this rural population with state propaganda and mass media.

For centuries, Ukraine’s rural population followed a traditional way of life. To effectively rule these people, the soviet propaganda machine had to destroy their society, depriving communities of political will, individuals of private property, and all of them of the notion of ownership, a natural goal for every European. In other words, the purpose of the Holodomor was to turn Ukrainians into slaves of the communist reincarnation of the Russian empire.

Stalin fueled lightning-fast industrialization in the USSR by stripping the countryside of its resources. The Ukrainian countryside, in particular, was a potential base for nationalist and anti-soviet movements so, beginning in August 1932 Stalin had a number of laws passed to increase the quotas of grain that farmers were required to surrender to the state. Any farmer who failed to meet the quota was considered guilty of treason and subjected to seizure to compensate the shortfall. Later, as Ukrainian farmers increasingly fell short of ever-higher quotas, they were punished for any attempt to keep even the tiniest quantity of grain for themselves—grain that they had grown by the sweat of their

own brows to feed themselves and their families. In November 1932, communist officials started a wholesale rooting out of any food they could find. The result was an unprecedented famine, with many cases of cannibalism, in the very center of Europe, in the middle of the 20th century.

It is difficult to calculate the exact death toll of the Holodomor years because of the soviet policy of concealing the victims of its repressions. In 1984, on the initiative of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–1933 Famine in Ukraine was established. The following year, a similar commission was set up by the US Congress. Among the best known Holodomor researchers were James Mace, the chair of the US Congressional Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, and Robert Conquest, author of the well-known 1987 book “The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine.” Both researchers agree that the Holodomor met the definition of genocide, as did the originator of the term “genocide” itself, Rafai Lemkin.

In 2006, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s legislature, passed a special law recognizing the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian people. The Security Bureau of Ukraine launched a special investigation into crimes against Ukrainians associated with this man-made famine. In 2010, the Court of Appeals of the City of Kyiv confirmed the investigation’s findings and accused the soviet leaders Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovych, Postyshev, Kosior, Chubar, and Khatayevych of criminal acts. The Court confirmed that the number of those who died during the Holodomor was 3,941,000 persons. The projected number of Ukrainians who were never born because of Holodomor has been calculated as up to 6,122,000. Investigations into the number who perished continue and available evidence suggests an even larger number of victims.

The Holodomor was a political operation orchestrated by Stalin and his henchmen. It coincided with linguicide, total collectivization and full-scale russification. Several dozen countries around the world, Australia among them, have recognized the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian people. Nevertheless, the question has not been completely settled as a historical fact. The Russian Federation, with its tsar-

rist and soviet imperial heritage, has been able to influence and even threaten the leaders of smaller countries to rescind their recognition of the Holodomor as genocide.

The Yanukovich Administration began referring to the Holodomor as a “tragedy common to all those who lived on the territory of the Soviet Union.” People were starving everywhere, they argue. However, research findings confirm that massive deaths by starvation took place only on the territories where Ukrainians were the dominant ethnic group. Notions that Russia will provide Ukraine with cheap natural gas, so it is better not to irritate its leadership with “unpleasant memories” about crimes of the communist regime, likely explain why it is possible for this Administration to make such unacceptable compromises regarding their own nation’s historical memory.

Despite this special law, multiple research projects and international recognition, the Holodomor of 1932–1933 is not officially treated as genocide in Ukraine. That is why, since its rebirth in 1991, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has been conducting its own research, educational, publishing and public projects on the subject of the Holodomor. James Mace was a KMA Professor until his death in 2004. The James Mace Museum and Archives were established at Mohyla University. Kyiv Mohyla Academy has also been sponsoring translations and publications of internationally-recognized research on the Holodomor. A few Ukrainian monographs have been translated into English.

One book worth particular mention is Andrea Graziosi’s 2008 “Letters from Kharkiv. Famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus in the reports of Italian diplomats, 1932–33,” translated from Italian into Ukrainian. According to the Italian consul in Kharkiv at the time, the purpose of the Holodomor was the physical extermination of the Ukrainian people and their replacement in the newly desolate lands with an influx of Russian settlers. The publication of the book “Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials” was translated from Ukrainian into English and was published by the Kyiv-Mohyla Publishing House in 2008.

Two recent publications include the 8th volume in the series “The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1932–1933. Testimony from survivors” (2012),

which is based on evidence collected through a multi-year oral history project and testimony from witnesses collected by KMA students and faculty and edited by Prof. Yuriy Mytsyk; and the Ukrainian translation and publication of Norman M. Naimark's "Stalin's Genocides" (Princeton University Press; Princeton & Oxford, 2010), published by Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 2011, just a few months after the publication of the American edition. The Ukrainian edition was broadly promoted in Ukraine by Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and by the author himself at numerous meetings, open lectures and press conferences in Kyiv. Partly due to such publications and lectures, public debate of the Holodomor was brought to a new level.

The historical memory of a people is an essential cornerstone for the construction of their future. This self-evident truth remains unrealized in modern-day Ukraine, and until it is accepted, we will never emerge from the never-ending post-soviet "transition period" of our national history. The current socio-political and economic travails of contemporary Ukraine are inseparable from its historical experience. The national discourse of truth and liberty we have been struggling for in Ukraine requires a proper level of self-understanding and self-confidence. Certainly, the issues surrounding the 1932–33 Holodomor cannot occupy the entire historical discourse of the nation. But without these lessons learned in an open and free environment, the shadows of the past will prevent Ukrainians from shaping their history and their future with their own hands.

Education: Between Russia and the European Union¹

I represent a country that has been fighting for its independence for the last few centuries. That is why, after the Euromaidan victory, Russia's aggression come as no surprise to many of us in Ukraine. This war has been going on for many generations, with only the occasional tempo-

¹ Original speech at the World Affairs Council of Northern California, February 12, 2015. Accessed at: http://www.worldaffairs.org/media-library/event/1416#.VORG_vm-sXvA.

rary break. Earlier, it was conducted through bans on the Ukrainian language, culture and history, and through occupation and genocide, like the Holodomor.

Today, Ukrainians must establish an effective Ukrainian state, a state free of corruption that will defend the interests of each and every one of its citizens. This is a tremendously difficult task, given the post-colonial legacy of the Russian empire, with its system of governance system and political culture historically based on corruption. Still, I can point to key evidence that Ukrainians are ready for change.

For this, I only need to mention two main achievements of the 2004 Orange Revolution: freedom of speech and real political competition. The Yanukovich regime fell because it was ignoring and violating these principled demands from Ukrainian society. The Euromaidan was how Ukrainians chose to defend their right of a free choice, the victory of a new political culture. That's why Ukrainians were able to topple Viktor Yanukovich: they chose freedom first despite huge losses in street fighting, despite the annexation of Crimea, and despite the high cost of holding back the Russian army and Russia's militant proxies in eastern Ukraine.

Euromaidan began in November in response to then-President Yanukovich's sudden decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union after publicly talking about doing so for many months. Under pressure from Russian President Putin, he shifted in favor of the Customs Union, where Russia dominates.

We are now witnessing a fateful historical period when Ukrainians are making their civilizational choice with their hard work and their struggle. The question of integration into the European Union is not an easy one. On one hand, Europe and the European Union are somewhat idealized by Ukrainians. On the other, the history of Ukraine-Russia relations has led to a growing perception of Russia as a "prison of nations," to quote Ukraine's great bard, Taras Shevchenko. We are witnessing a conflict between idealization and demonization.

The bedrock of such this sharp difference of attitudes towards East and West lies in the long-lasting confrontation between more collectivist Russian culture and more individualistic Ukrainian culture, which

is closer to Western European practices. Belonging to common cultural roots in Eastern Christianity has ultimately not produced the foundation for political unity between Ukraine and Russia. In fact, it seems that the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches are much closer one to each other, than to Russian Orthodoxy, which has long been part and parcel of the totalitarian bureaucratic system.

The Ukrainian tradition of tolerance and consideration are evident in relations with the Crimean Tatars, a Muslim group that is nevertheless perceived in public opinion as an organic part of the Ukrainian nation. Much has been written about Euromaidan as the meeting place of numerous ethnic minorities: Poles, Jews, Tatars, Greeks, Russians, Georgians, Azeris, Armenians, Belarusians, and more. Today we can truly talk about a united Ukrainian political nation standing up to the aggression of the Russian Empire.

At the same time, it would be wrong to emphasize only the differences and contradictions between Ukraine and Russia. During the Gorbachev's *perestroika* and in the early 1990s, Russians enjoyed real freedom of speech. Independent intellectuals were seen regularly on TV screens—dissidents, writers and politicians—and a fruitful public dialog emerged. Ukrainians and Russians alike began to feel comfortable with this new media phenomenon. Indeed, the English language gained another new word, *glasnost*, just as it had adopted the word *sputnik* in the late 1950s.

But the genocide of the Chechen people in the mid-1990s drove a wedge between the two audiences. Russia moved to gradually freeze democratic processes and to destroy independent media built with the money of its tycoons, another socio-economic feature peculiar to both post-soviet countries. On one hand, they embodied the principle of market competition; on the other, they were a key source of corruption. What the oligarchs did do was to bring exciting, professional media to Russia.

But Russians failed to fight for freedom of speech when the Putin-led KGB forces began to take over and establish absolute power. This is where it became evident that Ukrainian society held a free press and freedom of speech paramount. The gradual accumulation of differences between the two political cultures moved towards critical mass.

Some hypothesize that Russia could have launched a special operation to return Ukraine to its clutches much earlier, if not for Chechnya. The restoration of a neo-Russian empire was halted by Russia's two Chechen wars. Incidentally, the author of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Mikhail Gorbachev, publicly defended and justified Russia's aggressive politics towards Ukraine in 2014, reaffirming a well-known saying: "Russian democracy ends where Ukraine starts."

The occupation of Ukraine is the cornerstone to restoring a "great" Russian empire, based as it is on a mythological foundation. Russian propaganda keeps harping on these issues, whereas Ukrainians tend to ridicule the notion of a "special path" for Russia, its Orthodox mission and the mythical spiritual values that can only be understood by those inside the "Russian world" (Russki Mir). Ukrainians treat high-level political power with irony, while the Russians embellish it with extraordinary qualities. This may, in part, be precisely because Ukrainians lacked a proper state of their own for a long time and were in opposition to the states they found themselves in.

Euromaidan's victory was seen by Putin as a threat to his plans and he pushed for active countermeasures. With the partial restoration of Russia's military capacities, Ukraine became a target, despite the fact that Russia remains an extremely poor, corrupt country. Indeed, the huge scale of post-soviet corruption is a common feature in both Ukraine and Russia.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's army, police and intelligence service had become largely dysfunctional under Yanukovich. Ukraine's occupation by Russian armed forces was planned for 2015, when the next presidential elections were slated. To Yanukovich, Ukraine was nothing more than a small-sized Russia, where he could continue to enrich himself and his family forever. He was proved wrong.

Ukraine's two democratic revolutions, the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, which took place as democratic processes faced complete containment in Russia, brought Ukrainian society's social and political demands in line with the rhetoric of European Union countries, especially the newer members that previously belonged to the so-called "socialist camp."

Popular statements by numerous politicians, experts and journalists suggest that the “window of opportunity” is wide open for Ukraine during this historical period. This country rejects and condemns the Russian authoritarian style of government as tending towards totalitarianism. The Ukrainian political culture tends towards democracy, attentive to differing opinion and extremely sensitive towards injustice.

Academic freedom is perceived as a continuation of other civil rights. The zeal to reform higher education and scientific research attests to a wish to get rid of the soviet colonial legacy. Higher education reform and the reform of scientific research currently led by the Ministry of Education and Science is a good example of a pro-European policy. In the summer of 2014, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s legislature, passed a new Law “On Higher Education.” This launched much-needed reforms, as, during soviet times and in independent Ukraine until now, research was carried on outside the university, in a completely separate system called the Institutes of the National Academy of Sciences, while scientific criteria were not an element of quality in higher education.

This new law introduces the concept of university autonomy, which calls for the active involvement of the academic community, with autonomy covering all academic, financial and organizational dimensions. The battle for university autonomy began in 2005 and brought together the academic community, expert circles, voters, professional student organizations, trade unions, journalists and politicians. This bill was a real victory for Ukraine’s civil society.

The new Law “On Higher Education” is also intended to overcome post-soviet self-imposed isolation and bring Ukraine’s universities into the global arena. Of course, this means integrating the structure of these universities and research infrastructure currently under the National Academy of Science. For this purpose, the next reform will be linked with a new Bill “On Science and Research” that the Ministry plans to submit to the Rada in March 2015.

Well-known researchers should then have the opportunity to teach in new MA and structured PhD programs. This should also give university students and researchers access to modern labs. Along with that, the Ministry plans to establish several strong research centers that will oper-

are outside the university system in areas of narrower specialization where Ukraine has a critical mass of quality researchers. This will cover both fundamental and applied sciences.

Ironically, Ukrainians appear to identify themselves with a wider spectrum of European values than Europeans themselves admit. During the undeclared war that is going on between Ukraine and Russia, the European Union has lacked sufficient awareness that Ukraine is defending not just its own territory and independence against the aggressor. In reality, Ukrainians are defending the territory and civilizational values of all of Europe. From this perspective, Russia has a particularly negative image as a hostile, evil empire, if you will. The success of Ukraine in democratic and economic transformation is directly linked to the failure of Russia's current international politics.

Ukraine is in the process of rupturing the remains of its economic relations with Russia. By knocking down statues of Lenin, the country is rejecting all links with the colonial communist past. At the beginning of 21st century, the Ukrainian people have chosen European political culture, rather than Russian manipulations based on a murky notion of "brotherly nations." The European Union is increasingly aware of this, but appears to be not ready to stand up to fight with Ukraine as its natural, if not *de jure*, member.

Comfort is always more attractive and appealing than the massive problems that recognition of Ukraine and its struggle entails. Still, Ukrainians firmly believe in European values as a truth that has to be guarded because it is a truth. They are giving their European neighbors an opportunity to recognize that values aren't just a comforting aphorism, private interest or political rhetoric, but require the willingness and resoluteness to stand in their defense when necessary. Otherwise, Europeans will eventually discover the "uniqueness" of ancient "Russian Orthodox civilization" at their borders.

We have high hopes and big plans, and I am confident that Ukraine will soon win this hybrid, yet anti-colonial war for national liberation. This country will defend its own values, which are the values of western civilization, and will eventually occupy a leading position in higher education and science on the world stage.

CHAPTER 2

UNIVERSITY WORLD NEWS

Bill on higher education: Regressive and obstructive¹

Ukraine's new bill on higher education is a regressive step that will obstruct integration with the European Union. The country needs to promote autonomy for universities and freedom of speech, not indulge in continuing lack of accountability. Contemporary Ukraine is a testing ground, not just for educational reforms, but also for the fierce struggle being waged against its soviet and Russian colonial past and for the right to be part of a united Europe—especially to be part of the European higher education network. The appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk, a one-time journalist and publicist, as Minister of Education and Science in March 2010 was a clear move to turn back all of Ukraine's efforts towards integration with Europe in education.

Minister Tabachnyk's education policy is based on his political views, which are pro-communist and russophilic. In his attitudes towards the Ukrainian language, culture and historical memory, Tabachnyk is an unrepentant Russian chauvinist perceived by many to be one of several fifth columnists for the Kremlin in the Azarov Cabinet. As represented

¹ Original published in University World News, January 29, 2012, Issue #206. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120124154939502>

in the new bill “On Higher Education,” Tabachnyk’s policy is shaped primarily by the technical approaches of the Russian model of governance, meaning complete state control of the academic and financial activities of universities, ignoring the principles of the Bologna process and denying university autonomy.

Along with restoring autocracy, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has reinforced many features of the soviet system, including lack of free speech. Russia’s current system of government is based on the centralized distribution of substantial domestic financial resources –mainly from oil and gas–to the best universities, which allows them to compete in the international arena in various university rankings.

The situation in Ukraine is dramatically different.

Ukrainian society is typified by a number of features: a desire for freedom of speech, a natural suspicion towards any form of official authority–and the lack of public funding specifically aimed at supporting higher education.

This means Ukraine should develop its universities on the basis of real market conditions, that is, real competition, and university autonomy. This would encourage universities themselves to take the initiative and to compete for resources from business and industry, and the academic community to speak to its Western counterparts in the same language.

Post-soviet stagnation

A separate but no less important issue is the antiquated, bizarre structure of all post-soviet universities, not just in Ukraine, which dates back to a concept from the early years of the bolsheviks. In the 1920s, the soviet government separated education from research. It required that training take place in institutes of public education–what universities were then called–, but that research take place separately in institutes under the Academy of Sciences. Such a system is anomalous with the rest of the world and prevents universities from increasing their competitiveness and rising up in international rankings. It also cuts them off from the research grants available in both the public and private sectors that often fund post-graduate studies in the sciences and engineering universities.

With the exception of the Baltic countries and Georgia, all post-soviet universities, including Ukraine's, continue to suffer from this legacy. These institutions have extremely inadequate laboratory facilities, lack research funding, and carry a very large teaching workload—often more than 900 hours per academic year. This means that academics cannot compete in publications for peer-reviewed journals, which is a key criterion in world university rankings.

The Tabachnyk Bill: A new Iron Curtain

The aim of Tabachnyk's bill on higher education is to place insurmountable obstacles, a kind of new 'iron curtain,' you might say, to prevent Ukraine's integration into the world educational community, starting with the integration of the country's universities into Europe.

Ukraine will not be able to align its education with international standards as long as the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports continues to block university autonomy and to preserve all the worst policies of soviet totalitarianism. Under these conditions, Ukraine will remain a post-soviet anachronism dominated by Russia, with poor quality education and a high level of corruption.

Another element makes it impossible to integrate Ukraine into the European Higher Education Area: the English language. Generally speaking, the Ukrainian academic community lacks a suitable level of English because only Russian was considered a language of international discourse during the soviet period. Indeed, English is perceived by the current authorities as a "destructive factor" that might undermine the supposedly "progressive" Ukrainian (read "post-soviet") system of higher education and research. Poor knowledge of English, and even the lack of it, is a problem of all post-soviet states and is being completely ignored by the Ukrainian Government today.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: A historic model

The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (KMA) is the only Ukrainian university that has two working languages: Ukrainian and English. It is also the only university that openly opposed Tabachnyk's bill. In 2011 and 2012, for the first time since Ukraine became inde-

pendent in late 1991, the ministry not merely dropped but actually prohibited universities from requiring English of their applicants. The conflict between the Ministry and Kyiv-Mohyla Academy reached a peak in late 2010 and continues to date.

There was serious talk about rejecting the university's by-laws and even about its closure. So far, the main result has been a major reduction in the university's budget. Kyiv-Mohyla Academy continues to defend its rights and continues to promote national educational reforms based on autonomy, academic freedom and international standards of higher education.

Despite the fact that Ukraine's current law does not provide for university autonomy, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, established in 1615, considers the concept of freedom a fundamental principle, continuing the university's tradition and legacy. It has defended its rights against the Ministry in court, a fact that is singular, even remarkable in a post-soviet country.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's efforts have received international support from independent intellectuals and dozens of partner universities around the world, in particular from Jan Petter Myklebust in *University World News*, and from governments across Europe and North America. Support was also expressed at the international conference called Roads to Freedom, held in Kyiv in October 2011.

International and national attention to the university, along with Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's resolute position and repeated waves of strong student protests against current education policy in Ukraine, has resulted in a massive, much-needed public debate and proposals for two alternative bills, one prepared by Deputy Yuriy Miroschnyenko and the other by Deputies Arseniy Yatseniuk and Lesia Orobets.

Autonomy: Via freedom lies development

The main focus of media, experts and the public is establishing university autonomy, including the right of universities to determine their approach to education: the right to introduce interdisciplinary programs, to have structured doctoral programs, to recognize international diplomas, to award diplomas that are internationally recognized in return, to manage their own budgets and funds, to take responsibility for

the quality of education that they offer, to include student government, to be accountable to their own university community and the public.

Today, Ukrainian universities have none of these rights and responsibilities.

There is universal agreement that reform is needed. But the paradox is that any changes are called “reforms” in Ukraine, even if they are actually retrograde. Right now, there is no consensus about what changes should be instituted to reform higher education to make universities competitive in the international arena. The problem is that contemporary Ukraine does not yet have a strong civil society to support and even initiate social change.

Opinion polls show that neither rectors, nor teachers, nor students, nor parents, nor politicians are willing to assume the role of agents of change. They all want “stability,” in contrast to the turbulent situation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, public opinion does strongly favor reforms that will take the country away from corruption and privilege for the few to a more equitable society that provides equal opportunities based on merit, freedom and participation in civil society.

A new system has not been established yet. There is no understanding among Ukrainian politicians about the importance of education and research as key issues for the development, competitiveness and stability of the country in the contemporary, globalized world.

Up to now, all educational reforms have been focused on process rather than results. But the future of Ukraine’s universities needs to be considered in the context of rejecting Ukraine’s status as a perpetual “country in transition,” a label that has become an excuse for the country’s politicians to milk the system for their own private gain.

A new Dawn for Ukraine's Higher Education?¹

In an unprecedented move earlier this year, the Ukrainian premier called on academics to review some bills that would decide the future of

¹ Original published in *University World News*, April 8, 2012, Issue #216. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120405132528872>.

higher education. Could this mark a dramatic change in how universities are run? In my previous blog, I wrote about Ukraine's new law on higher education. This has now developed in quite an unexpected way.

To understand the way things work in Ukraine, the key point is that this is a post-soviet state with characteristics that cannot easily be compared to any other system in the world. For example, it is quite natural for an official, even one not considered to be corrupt, to think one thing, say another and act in a way that reflects neither what he thinks nor his proclaimed position. Under these conditions, laws are not so much by-passed as they are devised to be so flexible that they can support totally opposite positions.

Once I asked two rectors from really good post-secondary institutions: "Why do you support any decision made by our Ministry of Education and Science, including the obviously absurd bill on higher education?" They responded that I was worrying about the wrong things because it would not matter what the new law said.

So, whether it is very good or very bad, no one will obey it, either because it will be ineffective or because it will be impossible to follow its provisions. What will happen is that a kind of middle road will be forged, based on the need to keep Ukrainian universities alive by continuing to provide minimal financial support from the state budget.

Seeing light at the end of a tunnel

In late February 2012, something unexpected happened. Premier Mykola Azarov took part in a roundtable with representatives from the academic community, where he announced that he wanted them to review the pending bill on higher education. At that point, one bill prepared by Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk and two bills prepared by MPs had already been submitted to Verkhovna Rada.

The PM admitted that the Minister's bill needed work and asked Mykhailo Zhurovskiy, rector of the National Technical University¹ to organize a working group to look at the document immediately and bring it in line with the country's economic needs. Also present at the roundtable were leaders of student organizations that had earlier taken

¹ Kyiv Polytechnic Institute or KPI.

part in mass protests. The Minister himself was not allowed to be present at the roundtable. Despite this, he remained in his post.

The formation of a working group was like a bolt out of the blue for the Ukrainian academic community, for several reasons. First, Minister Tabachnyk had been trying to remove the rector of KPI from his post. Secondly, the Government had previously ignored all alternative opinions regarding the proposed bill, dismissing them as politically motivated rather than taking into account the professional experience of those offering alternatives. Third, by organizing the roundtable, Azarov took the side of those who had been protesting against Tabachnyk's position and against his authoritarian vision for the future of Ukrainian science and higher education.

The members of the working group and the way they worked under Zhurovskiy's leadership were also unprecedented. The group consisted mainly of KPI and KMA representatives, student leaders and independent experts, plus representatives of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the Presidential Administration, the Union of Employers, trade unions and non-government educational organizations.

The working group considered about 4,000 proposals from more than 100 organizations and institutions. Literally everyone could participate. As things went on, the academic community began to realize that this group was shaping the future of Ukrainian universities.

A key factor in altering the bill, which brought both positives and negatives, was that it had to be done by consensus. This meant that no controversial issues could be left in the text of the new bill. This was necessary, to make sure that no professional group could criticize the document.

Working in new paradigms

The working group focused on improving the quality of education and academic research to meet the needs of Ukraine's economy and society, and to help the country integrate into the EU Higher Education Area. The very way the working group functioned showed that the Ukrainian academic community was able to think independently and stand up for itself.

And of course, the new bill establishes the academic, organizational and financial autonomy of universities. It keeps distinctly separate the powers of the state, which deals with educational policy, and institutions of higher learning, which are responsible for the quality of education. Its guiding principle is that universities are autonomous from the state.

The working group paid particular attention to integrating science, education and innovation, protecting intellectual property, producing PhDs, and reducing the teaching load of faculty so they could spend more time on research.

The work of the State Accreditation Committee (SAC), which is responsible for licensing and accrediting institutions, setting educational standards and overseeing professional qualifications, will also be based on new principles. It is now expected to cooperate with the European Association for Quality Assurance. The SAC will operate on the basis of quotas and report to the Cabinet. It will include representatives of state universities, private and community institutions of higher learning, students and the Education Ministry itself. Special independent agencies will be set up to monitor the quality of education.

The new bill rejects the authoritarian trends of recent years and is expected to help develop links between higher education and the labor market. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union's 'planned economies' in the late 1980s, the work of Ukrainian universities has been totally disconnected from the needs of the domestic economy.

Promising but not permanent

Political instability is the main threat to the development of higher education in Ukraine. The academic community does not know what made the PM change his attitude to educational politics so dramatically. Just as it changed positively without warning, the situation could as easily revert to what it was and authoritarianism could return along the lines of the Russian model of centralizing state government.

Another threat is that a radically liberal new Law on Higher Education cannot be passed without recognizing the likelihood of soviet-like relapses. The bill prepared by the working group includes too many

social guarantees, but it did reject the obligatory ranking of Ukrainian universities.

In general, the vision of what we want for our universities as a consequence of educational reform has not been spelled out, and so there are some questions about it. The group's eagerness to overcome corruption led to a number of contradictions in the principles of university autonomy.

To fundamentally reform Ukrainian universities, we need to look first at the quality of what is on offer, tangibly reduce the number of post-secondary institutions, and implement new rules that the European Higher Education Area and the Western world can understand. Only radical market self-regulation will enable us not to fall back into the old ways of the soviet system. Keeping state politics transparent runs side-by-side with these aims.

The working group submitted its version of the bill to the Cabinet on March 7. Premier Azarov and the authors of alternative bills promised that previous versions would be withdrawn from the VR agenda, so that we could submit the working group's draft instead.

Today, Ukraine has a unique chance to adopt a progressive higher education law. It is the result of broad public discourse and a tribute to Ukrainian civil society. We need urgent action on this issue, as the problems in Ukraine's higher education need to be resolved without delay. It would be most unfortunate if politicians were now to turn around and criticize the demands of the academic community. If that does happen, what has been a professional debate will inevitably return to the political arena.

Irrational Funding Practices¹

The dismantling of the soviet system of public administration over 20 years ago has resulted in anomalies and lack of transparency in the way Ukraine's higher education system is funded today—compounded

¹ Original published in *University World News*, May 27, 2012, Issue #223. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=2012052314121089>.

by the fact that the country's many governments have failed so far to replace it with a new one. The old totalitarian model of financial distribution is in conflict with new market principles. It may not work, but at least the old system was based on a logic derived from the dominant ideology of the time. Today, the pattern of funding for higher education in Ukraine is not based on any logic at all: neither market nor central planning. And the main problem is that it goes against the needs of Ukrainian society and its national interests.

Funding the future

Ukrainian universities are being funded through a system in which the state requests that a specified number of specialists be trained in different institutions of higher education.

The budget for training one specialist in a given profession is then calculated, including professors' salaries, equipment, utilities and so on. The total sum needed depends on the state's requirements for specialists in that profession. This sum is then transferred from the state budget to the university account. The students who are taught on the basis of these funds do not pay for their education themselves.

But that only accounts for 'basic funding' in the university budget. This is supplemented by a 'special fund,' made up of money brought in by students who pay for their education themselves or through scholarships from sponsors. The government automatically includes the special fund money in the state budget. The university can only spend this money after the state approves the costs estimated and gives special permission. The funds are held in the Treasury and not deposited to bank accounts. The state thus controls every penny that universities spend during every calendar year.

Another, much smaller part of a university's budget, the item called 'other income,' is mainly income from leasing university premises and providing additional services.

Private universities do not receive basic state funding: their budgets are made up only of tuition fees paid by students and sponsors. Most Ukrainian families cannot afford to pay tuition fees, so private post-secondary institutions enroll only those applicants who can pay and do

not apply any selection criteria. As a result, they cannot compete with state universities academically.

No more ministerial largesse?

The main problem is the bureaucracy associated with the basic state funding system. Funds allocated by the government from the state budget go to the Ministry of Education and Science. After that, nobody has any appeal against the minister's decisions, which can be very subjective. The minister basically has sole discretion over how much money each state university gets. The situation looks like the plot of a satirical play, but it is actually like this.

Arthur Hauptman, a well-known American expert in the funding of higher education, worked in Ukraine 2012 and wrote about the main principles that should be reflected in state funding of higher education. Nearly all of them are being ignored by the Ukrainian state, so I will mention only some key principles.

First, the amount of funding available should be determined by elected officials. In the distribution of taxpayer money, civil servants cannot be empowered to make decisions. In Ukraine, elected officials can participate in the process only at the stage of voting the state budget in the legislature. But they do not discuss real needs during this process, they can only expand or cut the budget. The amount of basic funding for higher education is decided by professional bureaucrats.

Second, according to Hauptman, the process of distributing public funds must be kept well away from any sniff of political influence. 'Buffer' bodies need to be established to make the distribution of public funds a transparent, appropriate process. These bodies must be made up of representatives from government and from educational institutions. Educational institutions distribute funds more effectively than government bodies. Nevertheless, in Ukraine the distribution of state funding for higher education is decided by the Minister of Education and Science at his discretion.

Third, there are different visions of the aims of state funding in Ukraine. Is the priority to provide broader access to higher education for young people or to improve the quality of higher education? It is

unclear. This issue was debated during the discussion of the Bill on Higher Education, with the former being favored by the participants.

Fourth, state funding must balance both quality and access. But quality control is still an issue in Ukraine. The government ignores university rankings, and the Education Ministry is viewed as the expert on quality issues, despite the fact that it does not possess any objective data on quality and does not commission any research into this. The authors of the Bill on Higher Education, which would replace the current rules in Ukrainian higher education with more transparent ones corresponding to Western funding practices, tried to take into account both quality and access.

Faculty teaching loads were considerably decreased by reducing the ratio of students to professors. For Bachelor level, the maximum ratio of professors to students is 1:10. At the Masters level, it is 1:6, and it is 1:3 for the PhD level. This will help improve the quality of higher education.

According to the bill, state funding of universities must correlate with the real demands of the labor market and the domestic economy.

Funding from the state budget for undergraduate degrees must correlate with the amount of money needed to train 100 students in vocational schools and 180 students in universities, academies and institutes per 10,000 attendees. In addition, the total amount of state funding must cover no fewer than 51% of secondary school graduates every year.

Distribution of state funding must also correlate, according to the bill, with the status of the institution. The working group did not include such important market criteria as national and international rankings. Many experts and government officials were not ready for such an innovation and the working group was set up to work by consensus.

The squeaky wheel gets cut

The bill proposes distributing state funding under a procedure determined by the Government. In a struggle to assert university autonomy in Ukraine, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (KMA) came into conflict with the then-Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk. In 2011, he cut state funding to the academy without providing a proper reason. The irony

was that KMA held leading positions in all Ukrainian rankings of higher education institutions, and many of its educational programs are unique in Ukraine today.

So, the university applied to the Circuit Administrative Court of the City of Kyiv with a claim against the Ministry, setting a precedent for the whole post-soviet region. The KMA claim is based on its aim of asserting the public interest in higher education—including the interest of Ukrainian taxpayers—, and the need for the state to be transparent in the way it finances higher education, because that has an impact on its quality.

The Circuit Administrative Court of Kyiv came down on the side of the Ministry. In a decision dated February 8, 2012, it said that distribution of state funding is the exclusive prerogative of the Ministry of Education. The court did not take into account that by cutting funding to one of the best Ukrainian universities, the Minister was acting against the need of the labor market for high-quality specialists.

Nevertheless, the court ruling pushed the Ministry to publish information on how state funding is distributed among universities for the first time. In addition, the court acknowledged that there was no system for distributing state funding in Ukraine, and no explicit rules or guidelines that bureaucrats are required to follow.

So the court's ruling to back the Minister's right to dispose of public funds at his discretion seems paradoxical. KMA lodged a complaint at the Circuit Appeals Court in Kyiv, but it has not yet been considered.

What More Eurointegration could Mean for Education¹

Ukraine's higher education system needs reform and its integration into the European Higher Education Area would help considerably, by boosting standards and the quality of what universities offer, and countering corruption. I have previously noted the flaws in the Bill on Higher

¹ Original published in University World News Global Edition, July 08, 2012, Issue #229. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120705122144461>.

Education presented by the Ministry of Education and I described how some circles were advancing a more progressive version of the bill, one that would promote the integration of Ukraine into the European Higher Education Area. Unfortunately, Ukraine's inefficient, bureaucratic system means that the revised bill is still circulating among the different ministries, awaiting approval.

I would like to look this time at Ukraine's integration into the European Higher Education Area, how the process is going, what Ukraine can do to help EU academic institutions understand what and how Ukrainian students are being taught in universities, and whether Ukrainian quality standards in education, teaching and research will change in the course of the Bologna process.

A report called *Inclusion of the Ukrainian System of Higher Education in the European Higher Education and Research Area* can help us find answers to these questions.

Prepared by a team headed by Taras Finikov, with the support of the International Foundation for Education Policy Research, the Ukrainian Association of Student Governments, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the study is based on the principles of interdisciplinarity and comparisons across education systems. Using questionnaires, polling and interviewing, it identifies the specific features of Ukrainian higher education, taking into account social, political, economic, historical, and psychological factors.

The report covers legislative and regulatory support for education, and compares the European and Ukrainian systems of higher education: degrees or cycles, the European credit transfer system, the diploma supplement, and the recognition of qualifications. It provides recommendations regarding quality standards. The report also discusses the National Qualification Framework, lifelong study, higher education economics, social issues in higher education, students and problems associated with corruption.

Flubbing the Bologna process

As to historical and social factors, the changes that occurred in Ukrainian higher education from 1991 until the early 2000s did not aim to

develop a new system – only to destroy the old soviet heritage. For instance, there was a move from elite to mass education, and an attempt to humanize the education process and professional training, as well as to introduce private sector actors in higher education. A multi-level degree system was implemented, and systems of licensing and accreditation, of educational standards and of new regulations launched.

The institutionalization of the European Higher Education and Research Area, better known as the Bologna process, was completed by the core EU countries in the late 1990s. In Ukraine, all of the transformative shifts were backed by legislation by the 2002 Law on Higher Education. But this legislation turned out to be self-contradictory, and the necessary tool for reforms was not developed. Instead, many soviet practices continued.

Despite formally joining the Bologna process in 2005, Ukraine did not understand the need to reform its education system and did not implement any reforms. There was no attempt to get national consensus on reform, either. What's more, those in middle- and lower-level management in universities did not fully understand the opportunities presented by joining the process.

Rectors still consider lobbying for government support as the only thing they need to do in order to move their universities forward. Students have been denied access to unbiased information about the process and have thus not become active participants in it.

The anti-Bologna pull

The Bologna process is often associated with increased social injustice through the “privatization” of universities and unnecessary bureaucracy. These outdated stereotypes are largely sustained because a portion of Ukraine's political elite does not like the idea of autonomy for universities, it is skeptical about European integration, and its basic commitment is to the authoritarian Russian model of governance, which includes state patronage of universities.

This also explains the peculiarities characterizing the post-soviet, post-colonial, post-totalitarian status of today's Ukraine. The “comfort” of the status quo serves the interests of the country's political elites,

whether they are in power or in opposition, and so, they find endless excuses for inaction or for avoiding Western standards of responsibility, quality, efficiency and anti-corruption measures. This unwillingness to embrace the positive potential of reforms can be explained by the tendency of all Ukrainian governments to change the titles of people within the higher education sector without changing its (post-)soviet fundamentals.

For example, the current structure of professional education includes an entire series of educational and qualification levels: junior specialist, bachelor, specialist, and master. It was formed in accordance with Art. 30 of the Law on Higher Education and Cabinet Regulation on Educational and Qualification Degrees (Degree Education), confirmed on January 20, 1998.

The question of duration

Another issue that the Bologna process raises is the duration of study. In Ukraine, it takes four years for a bachelor degree, an extra year for specialists, and one or one-and-a-half years for masters—with the exception of rare two-year programs. These divergences from the rest of the world are due to a compromise on the transfer from soviet educational programs. Keeping the specialist qualification level has conserved the old model of professional training.

Masters degrees were instituted in programs in the late 1990s. But they had no academic purpose, they did not meet any interdisciplinary principles, and they were inflexible. The post-soviet system also lacked the kind of structured PhD programs found in Western Europe. Indeed, only the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy doctoral school attempts to provide this kind of program.

Higher-than-average funding

The funds that the Ukrainian government spends on higher education appear at first quite substantial. The government has spent around 2% to 2.3% of gross domestic product, or 6% to 6.8% of general budget funds on higher education in recent years. These percentages are comparable to the highest in the EU. In addition, around 30% of state

spending on education goes to higher education. However, Ukraine's GDP is small, so the average yearly spending per student in the 2010–2011 academic year amounted to around €2,270 or US \$2,840. This is around half of what is spent on students in Estonia, which has the smallest per-student budget in the EU, and 28% of average EU spending per student according to 2008 figures. Clearly, the current level of funding makes achieving higher quality in Ukraine unlikely.

Salary policies for teaching staff merit particular attention. Consider salary figures for the main faculty categories in two standard state universities in 2011 calculated in euro per year, where 1€=10.6 UAH.¹ A professor at a university in Kyiv, the capital Ukraine, can earn €10,224 a year, a professor of a leading regional university just €6,035; associate professors in the capital make €9,198 a year, vs €4,362 for those in an oblast university; and assistant professors holding academic degrees make €4,793 in the capital while those in the regions make only €2,779 a year.

It is easy to see that these salaries are very small even compared to faculty salaries in Eastern European members of the EU. The difference in payments for academics should be also weighed against their workloads. Many staff have excessive teaching loads, which makes it difficult or impossible for them to engage in research.

The C-factor

Then there is corruption. The most widespread forms of corruption are nepotism, influence peddling, barter, opaque “charitable” or other kinds of payments, and bribe-taking. Some 33.2% of those surveyed had direct experience of corruption, while 29.1% said they had heard about corruption from people who had faced it personally. As many as 40% of people in the education sector have offered bribes.

“Voluntary bribes,” that is, bribes made without being asked to do so, constitute 25.5% of all bribes, “bribes on demand” comprise 49.7%. Of all respondents, 20.5% have used personal connections to get ahead. A surprising discovery is that there are more students willing to give bribes than teachers ready to take them.

¹ This blog is from 2012, when the hryvnia was a stable UAH 8/USD.

In fact, the presence of corruption in higher education reflects the lack of reforms in this area. Every year, the media provide us with more and more information about arrests of university bribe-takers or intensified anti-corruption drives against corruption in education. But we need real reform that tackles corruption by improving the quality and professional reputation of our universities within the wider world of education.

The Vital Role of Student Groups¹

To have a complete view of the system of higher education in Ukraine, student movements need to be understood. Ukraine has a large number of youth organizations that have been pointing out problems in higher education. The website of the Ministry of Education and Science lists 88 organizations, but these represent only a small proportion of the real number. Among them are professional, union, scout and political groups, as well as various student-led organizations.

Their main shared feature is that they were established by young people or launched by those who work with youth. This means that the agenda of these organizations is generally formed either by independent volunteers or directly by the government.

What is the “voice of the universities”?

Active Ukrainian students don't always understand the different constituencies that universities represent. On July 21, 2012, at the All-Ukrainian Student Forum of Regional Coordinators, I answered this question thus: first, universities represent the research body; second, they represent expert knowledge; third, they are official institutions with their own established positions; and finally, they represent student voices. In some cases, representatives of student movements can participate in the expert knowledge process. They did so when the bill on higher education was being revised.

¹ Original published in University World News, August 19, 2012, Issue #235. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=2012081513363667>.

In the report called *Inclusion of the Ukrainian System of Higher Education in the European Higher Education and Research Area*, the Ukrainian Association of Student Governments was featured. Ukrainian universities normally dare not speak as public experts on issues that are of interest to the whole society. It is a popular misconception in Ukrainian society that universities have their own expert opinion, when, in fact, the state generally speaks for them.

That is why the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Kyiv Polytechnic Institute were the only higher education institutions participating in the struggle for the new progressive bill on higher education.

Only a handful of universities protested against the bill on the basis of language policy in Ukraine, which is now being actively promoted in the Verkhovna Rada by forces that favor the ruling party. This legislation is aimed at furthering the Russification policy that was started in Ukraine more than 300 years ago. Among the protesting universities were the Ukrainian Catholic University, Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, and the Ostroh Academy. Nevertheless, only Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is currently working on an in-depth analysis of the new bill.

Taking the bull by the horns

When post-secondary institutions are passive, students' voices sometimes become the voice of Ukrainian universities. Student movements should not just focus on external social transformation. The universities themselves need drastic change, so student activity should target universities more. But first, students need to focus on democratizing the administrative processes, introducing university autonomy and establishing high-quality Ukrainian universities.

The Center for Social Research says the Ukrainian student movement is the most successful in Europe. In 2011, CSR documented student participation in 121 public protests in Ukraine. Most of these protests were part of the Campaign against the Degradation of Higher Education, and were aimed at preventing the enactment of the new bill on higher education initiated by the Ministry of Education and Science in 2010. The campaign was initiated by the independent student union

Priama Diya (Direct Action), the public movement *Vidsich* (Rebuff), and the Foundation for Regional Initiatives.

Other youth groups, as well as public school and post-secondary students, their parents and teachers, participated in the rallies held in Kyiv and different parts of Ukraine. Among other organizations, the authors of the study mentioned the All-Ukrainian *Svoboda* (Freedom) Union, *Opir* (Resistance) and the Democratic Alliance.

In 2011–12, the Ukrainian student movement took the day. For one thing, they stopped the authoritarian bill on higher education, a new working group was organized, and the text of the new progressive bill was drafted and approved by the Ukrainian Government on July 25. Students also managed to get most of their social and economic demands met, either by public bodies or by university administrators.

Although the achievements of the student movement in Ukraine are quite considerable, the study concludes that it is still far from being as strong as European student movements. European students are better at communicating with other protest groups, their actions are much more radical, and their protests engage many more participants.

Ultimately, the victories of Ukraine's students are due to the fragility of the Government rather than the strength of a well-organized movement.

Movements but no movement

What keeps a proper student movement from developing in Ukraine?

At first sight, the cause is obvious: students in general lack an understanding of current Ukrainian social, economic and political realities. As a result, they often forget how important qualitative transformations in their own universities are. In spite of being successful at a national level, they do not have enough rights in their universities. Second, this has a negative impact on university autonomy, because autonomy can only be achieved through common efforts by the whole university community: academics, students and staff.

Third, the student movement often copies Western models without critically analyzing them. For example, its representatives tend to con-

nect negative processes in higher education with neo-liberal trends in politics. Ukrainian realities are quite different. Discussions on the “disadvantages of liberalism” are not the most pressing issue in Ukraine now. The problems of Ukraine’s higher education are connected with post-soviet and post-colonial throwbacks such as corruption, fear of real competition at the national and global levels, a distorted infrastructure, and the post-colonial narrowness of Ukrainian political leaders, who are not able to understand the importance of science and educational development for the formation of an effective modern state.

Fourth, a Ukrainian university has special importance as a social institution that has a central role in the state reformation process. Ukraine’s students tend to neglect the social weight and impact of the country’s universities and are too influenced by ideological factors.

Fifth, these ideological factors misinform the broader student body. For example, critical theory is confused with critical thinking in general. Ukrainian universities are often presented as an objectification of power in a wholly negative way and as an instrument for personal enrichment at the students’ cost.

Market mechanisms in post-totalitarian Ukraine should be considered from the liberal position of a “free market of ideas” and free market principles for relations among higher education institutions. This could allow universities to grow in quality and competitiveness. Corruption should not be presented as a demon or an invincible evil; instead, it must be eliminated by the necessary reforms.

One revolution, many aspects

Young people love talking about revolution. But in Ukraine, it’s not just about one revolution. The first revolution is a social one and is about making the system of government fairer and more effective. The second is a national revolution, focused on the struggle for Ukrainian independence, language and culture.

But dividing them is a huge mistake. A national revolution cannot happen without a social one and vice-versa. The success of the Campaign against the Degradation of Higher Education can be explained by the coming together of rightish (*Vidsich*) and leftish (*Priama Diya*) organizations.

The provocative bill on the basis of language policy proposed by Party of the Regions and the Communist Party as VR elections approached was vigorously opposed by *Vidsich*, while *Priama Diya* was completely indifferent. A properly functioning civil society would never ignore a government's attempts to discriminate against the Ukrainian language, especially in higher education and research. This issue is of the same importance as social needs in areas such as healthcare. It also resulted in student hunger strikes in Kyiv, which gained media coverage.

Social, economic, national and cultural demands in post-colonial Ukraine should be part of one big movement. By coming together, Ukrainians can help the country emerge from the politics of 'blackmail' and from a state that is corrupted by oligarchs, and move towards a more effective and fairer democratic system. There is no doubt that student movements will play a really important, maybe even a decisive, role in such a transformation.

New Education Bill: Breathing Life into Higher Education¹

Higher education in Ukraine will not progress without an overall strategy setting out its aims. The Bill on Higher Education offers just that strategy, but analysts fear it could be kicked into the long grass. Because of the Verkhovna Rada elections scheduled for October 28, public debate on higher education has had a certain spin. Instead of debating the reforms that are very much needed, the ruling political forces have engaged in a series of publicity stunts.

These stunts have included russification measures and attempts to reshape Ukrainians' historical memory of Russia. In part, they have been fuelled by vain hopes of getting cheap gas from Russia. Opposition politicians are right to criticize the Government for failing to improve its education policies. Since the Orange Revolution, there haven't

¹ Original published in University World News Global Edition, September 30, 2012, Issue #241. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120928113702377>.

been any reforms in education, although there has been a lot of talk about them.

The new academic year began with a celebration of the Day of Knowledge on September 1, the traditional start of the school year. A few days earlier, the working group responsible for revising the bill on higher education held its last meeting to sum up all the remarks and proposals that had come from various ministries. A final report was submitted to the Government.

On August 28, the group officially stood down. Its participants emphasized that they would support the passing of this extremely important bill through the legislature. Conversely, if there were attempts to alter it, the academic and student communities said they would resume public protests. As a way of forestalling possible sabotage by the Government or Rada, the final version of the bill was published on the websites of KPI and Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Experts pessimistically predict that the Government will postpone the bill until after the election—and then shelve it indefinitely. Still, there is hope that the ruling party might pass the bill in order to boost its ratings.

Decline and discrimination

In 2012, over 90% of those who wanted to study at university applied to only 50 of Ukraine's more than 250 universities. This means that Ukrainians are increasingly responding to the inefficiency of the higher education system. The search for better universities has become a kind of unofficial ranking of high-school graduates' preferences. However, the quality of Ukrainian universities can properly only be judged if they participate in international rankings and are compared to the world's best universities. Right now, this is not possible.

In fact, the standards of secondary education are in decline. Every year, universities accept fewer properly prepared applicants, especially in the natural sciences and mathematics. At the same time, although the education system is weak, its graduates are strong. Young people are aware that they have to take responsibility for their own lives amid the current economic, educational and social turmoil. Graduates often pos-

sess knowledge and skills that are not taught in universities. And as the national education system continues to stagnate, there is a growing brain drain.

Meanwhile, the new Law on National Language Policies took effect in August. Now the language of teaching can be changed in regions where minorities make up more than 10 % of the total population. It is obvious that the law was designed to provide special status to Russian. Attempts by Crimean Tatars and Bulgarians to proclaim their language a 'regional' one in Crimea and some cities in Odesa Oblast have been ignored, confirming that the law was written only to promote Russian. The potential for inter-ethnic conflict caused by the law could be problematic for universities if groups demand to be taught in one of the unofficial languages.

At present, for lack of teachers, textbooks and classrooms, Russian is the only language that can be used instead of Ukrainian. This had led to discrimination against the Ukrainian language in some regions. The Government's reaction has only been to intensify its russification policies. The Ministry of Education, as the leader in this process, has published 1.9 million of 2.06mn public school textbooks in Russian.

Other trends

According to Pavlo Polyanskiy, Director of the Center for Monitoring Education, a number of trends can be seen in Ukrainian education. One is growing centralization and ad hoc rather than proper management, with all important decisions being made by the education minister personally or by a circle of insiders. At the same time, those who disagree with the minister's position tend to pay for it and the public is misinformed about the real state of affairs in education. There are also corruption scandals, the most highly publicized of which was the Government's purchase of poor quality, dangerous school buses.

Meanwhile, experts are not being involved in discussions of socially important issues. In 2009, the Ministry of Education website published 62 documents showcasing public expertise. That number went down to 49 in 2010, when Viktor Yanukovich became president, then to 28 in 2011, and further down to 18 in the first eight months of 2012. At the

same time, the government's approach to curricula is chaotic. Independent education analyst Inna Sovsun,¹ says that Ukraine has not yet defined what the long- and short-term aims are of its education system.

Demand for IT specialists has gone up in 2012, but the number of natural science and mathematics places were cut by 6.6% in Ukraine's universities, amounting to a 12% decrease since 2007. On one hand, it is clear that Government projections for engineering, natural sciences and technical places were not met. On the other, the quantity of university graduates who pay to obtain diplomas in law, economics, science, and political science is growing. This means that the government's aim to increase the number of students in selected fields that are important for the national economy does not match the preferences of incoming students, who are more driven by a desire to make money.

Then there is the issue of funding. The Ministry claims that education funding is at its highest since independence, although in 2012 public funding of education was not even at 2010 levels: UAH 19 billion or US \$3.3bn versus UAH 19.7bn. What's more, UAH 19bn today does not go as far as it did two years ago. Still, funding education is a local issue, not a strategic one. The Government first needs to define what it wants from the system of higher education. Action on even the most important of local issues does not make sense before a national education policy has been formulated.

Right now, Ukraine needs to look at the whole picture and understand what the results should be. Only then can the country choose the tools it needs to achieve those objectives. Enacting the new bill on higher education would be an important first step.

University Rankings in Ukraine²

Because of the way it conducts research, Ukraine does not take part in global rankings of universities. But that has not stopped it from produc-

¹ Ms. Sovsun is currently Deputy Minister of Education.

² Original published in *University World News*, November 2012, Issue #247. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=2012110714460817>.

ing a number of domestic ranking systems that are valued and trusted by the public. And any attempts to impose a centralized ranking system would undermine that trust. The paradoxical structure of universities instituted by the soviet government in the early 1920s still holds sway: academic research takes place outside universities, formally at the institutes of the National Academy of Sciences. Universities are reserved for teaching.

Ukraine's Ministry of Science and Education considers university researchers' publications in peer-review journals an example of their international activity, rather than as the academic achievement of the institutions where they work. But Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk has stated that he believes the main reason why Ukrainian universities are absent in global ratings is because they are too lazy to fill out the necessary application forms!

Top 200 Ukraine

Given the circumstances, a domestic market in university rankings has developed in Ukraine. Nearly all of the rankings have a good reputation. The closest to global rankings in terms of academic criteria is Top 200 Ukraine. It is drawn up by the UNESCO office working at Kyiv Polytechnical University. The methodology involves estimating professors' and teachers' research achievements, the quality of the educational process, websites and international recognition.

Universities participating in the ranking fill in application forms and the organizers compile information from accessible official sources. Both an estimate of total verifiable indexes and expert opinion are taken into account.

Compass

The Compass Ranking, prepared for the SCM Group, questions employers, experts and graduates. The sociologically-based research methodology is openly available on the Compass website. Its measure show how competitive a degree from a particular university is on the labor market and how much cooperation there is between post-secondary institutions and employers.

The Compass Ranking includes professions that, in the organizer's opinion, are vital to the general competitiveness of Ukraine's economy. These are commerce and economics, law, engineering and technical specializations, information technologies, architecture and construction.

Dengi Magazine

The Dengi [Money] Magazine Ranking assesses the number of university graduates with degrees in economics, law, humanities, engineering and technical specializations based on employer opinions. First, a list of institutions that graduate people in these fields is drawn up, and then the list is sent to leading employers. The employers rank the list using a 10-point scale. This ranking pays special attention to specialists in the humanities, which most other rankings normally ignore.

Employers do not generally agree on the professional value of university diplomas. Some of them say that the only thing they take into account is an applicant's ability to work effectively. Others acknowledge that a university diploma can cast a positive or—sometimes—negative light on an applicant.

Korrespondent Magazine

Korrespondent, a popular Russian-language weekly, ranks the best post-secondary institutions in Ukraine by surveying human resource managers at the best Ukrainian companies and comparing this with the views of those employers. The ranking covers typical specializations: law, economics, finance, marketing, PR and advertising, humanities, engineering and technical professions. Like all the other independent national ratings, Korrespondent ranks institutions both in different specializations and overall, on the basis of complex indexes.

Fokus Magazine

Fokus, a Russian-language business weekly, considers the best educational programs at Ukrainian universities for its ranking based on educational projects with foreign universities and programs linked to leading Ukrainian companies. It also considers the number of foreign pro-

fessors and teachers hired by universities, and training opportunities in western partner universities or Ukrainian companies.

Kyiv Post

Kyiv Post, an English-language weekly newspaper, ranks companies in different fields of business every year. Its list also includes a “Best MBA” nomination for business education. Its methodology is based on internet voting, which is then reviewed by an expert group. The experts can give their own opinions, which sometimes change the results of the online vote.

Osvita.ua: A consolidated ranking

The Osvita.ua site is a consolidated ranking of post-secondary institutions in Ukraine. This ranking summarizes data from three other rankings: Top 200 Ukraine, Compass and Webometrics, all of them with their own criteria. The consolidated ranking offers a general ranking of Ukrainian universities and four sub-categories: best classic universities; best private institutions; best institutions in Kyiv; and best regional institutions.

How Ukrainian rankings differ

There are several notable features in Ukrainian university rankings. First, there is no clear understanding of the fact that Ukraine can no longer ignore global competition. The ongoing brain drain is the strongest argument against relying exclusively on domestic rankings.

Second, the market for university rankings in Ukraine grew in response to the needs of a particular time. Ukraine needed to have objective information about its universities. Although these rankings differ in their methodologies and their levels of scientific rigor, the public trusts them because all of them are independent.

Third, repeated attempts by the Government to allow the Ministry of Education to have exclusive rights to rank Ukrainian universities are intended to take Ukraine back to the soviet days of centralized control over academia. Such a ranking would not be independent and so would not garner any trust among Ukrainians.

Fourth, Ukrainian university rankings have a considerable impact on both the labor market and the academic community. Applicants and their parents increasingly take them into account.

University rankings have become a part of the media discourse on educational issues as well. As long as Ukraine keeps following an isolationist policy in higher education, they will at least provide a balance sheet of quality among domestic post-secondary institutions.

Plus ça Change: The New Old Struggle in Education¹

The Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has filed a lawsuit to defend its admissions policy in the face of moves by the Minister of Education to standardize entry requirements for Master's courses and erode university autonomy. At least three events that could influence the future of higher education have taken place recently in Ukraine. This impact could not only lead to a change in how the sector develops, but also possibly speed up its post-soviet demise.

The October 2012 elections to the Verkhovna Rada strengthened opposition forces, although they remain in the minority and are unable to push through important legislation. Just before the New Year, the Cabinet approved the progressive Bill on Higher Education prepared by the working group. Still, its implementation is not a *fait accompli*, given the competing views of Government and opposition members. However, both bills, the one from the opposition and that from the working group, have a common conceptual basis.

The old new Minister

After the elections, the Cabinet resigned en masse. In the new Cabinet, the post of Minister of Education went again to Dmytro Tabachnyk, who immediately attempted to amend the bill developed by the working group chaired by Mykhailo Zhurovskiy. The new Government's policy on higher education remains very unclear. That is why the work-

¹ Original published in University World News, February 2, 2013, Issue #257. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130130155258817>.

ing group registered the bill in the Rada with the support of independent MP Viktor Baloha.

This is Dmytro Tabachnyk's second appointment to the post of Minister of Education and Science, which he has held since 2010, and was not unexpected inside Ukraine. From the outside, however, it's not easy to follow the logic. The post was given back to a person who has made a major contribution to the decline of Ukraine's education and research system. This same Minister is now using every possible opportunity to discredit the Bill on Higher Education—and to oppose European integration in general. Moreover, the principles of university autonomy, embedded in the document go against Tabachnyk's preference to control the administration of institutions of higher learning, which would prevent any improvement in their academic quality and competitiveness.

Tabachnyk also continues with his imperial ravings and promotes the ideology of "Russki Mir" or "Russian World," which in my view verges on racism with its thesis about the importance of supposed "friendship" with a "brotherly" Russian people. This could result in Ukraine forfeiting some of its cultural, economic and political independence. Examples include attempts to rewrite Ukrainian history to present it as just a part of Russian history and the repression of the Ukrainian language. Tabachnyk remains in power despite high-profile corruption scandals linked to the publication of school textbooks, the purchase of unsafe school buses, and the opaque distribution of public funds, among others.

Meanwhile, the Government continues to divide Ukrainian citizens based on their regions and languages, in order to distract public attention from Ukraine's pressing economic and social problems.

The public is worried that the original version of the bill was hastily prepared and registered in the Rada by three rectors who are members of Party of the Regions, and is not the bill proposed by the working group in 2012. According to Yegor Stadniy, the rectors' bill is in the same format as the document from Mykhailo Zhurovskiy's working group, but the content is fundamentally different. The rectors' bill proposes stronger centralization of administrative and academic management, both at the ministerial and rector levels. Under its provisions,

university lecturers, staff and students would be deprived of any ability to influence important decisions. Any possibility of integration with European higher education would be effectively killed and new avenues for corruption would open up.

It seems a clear attempt to continue Tabachnyk's policy of isolation and authoritarianism, which he first unveiled in March 2010.

New protests, old struggle

Protesting Tabachnyk's appointment as Minister in 2010 and defending its autonomy, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy applied for support from the academic community and received numerous official documents from its Ukrainian and foreign partners.

Yet, the European University Association, of which KMA is a member, ignored our appeals and did not take any position on Tabachnyk's policies. At the beginning of his second term, KMA filed a new lawsuit against the Ministry of Education over admissions to its cross-over Master's degree programs. The Academy had introduced cross-over Master's level courses in 1996, two years before any other Ukrainian university.

Since 1998, students in Ukraine have not been able to take a Master's program in any subject other than what they studied at the undergraduate level, even though cross-over study is completely acceptable in other countries and the Ukrainian policy contravenes legislation on higher education. In Ukraine, a graduate with a Bachelor's, degree in physics can only enroll in a Master's in physics program, a historian can only take a Master's in history, a financial specialist is not allowed to enter a program on economic theory, and an arts and performance specialist cannot take a Master's in philosophy.

This absurd approach contradicts the policy of mobility and interdisciplinarity in the European Higher Education Area—even Russian education policy—and affects the educational process and the quality of higher education in Ukraine. During the past two and a half years, Tabachnyk has been trying to stop KMA from using English as a second working language and to curb the Academy's autonomy by changing its statutes.

Today KMA and other Ukrainian institutions cannot adapt their admissions criteria to allow in students who do not have the standard list of qualifications, in violation of their institutional autonomy. Universities know better than the state what certificates and how many of them should be required from applicants.

A bill in limbo

The farce of Tabachnyk's re-appointment as Minister of Education will inevitably result in a further decline in higher education in Ukraine, and the discrediting of the achievements of the academic community and public during independent admissions testing, as well as the Bill on Higher Education prepared by Zhurovskiy's working group.

KMA sees the Ministry of Education's prohibition of cross-over admissions to its Master's programs as an attack on the system of liberal arts education functioning at KMA and on the right of students to shape their own path of studies. This system lies at the very heart of quality education at the Academy.

Instead of learning and implementing policies based on successful foreign and domestic practice, Tabachnyk continues to support self-isolating policies by promoting a soviet-style standardized approach to higher education in Ukraine. KMA's lawsuit intends to protect public and state interests, promote the integration of Ukraine's higher education into that of Europe, and improve the quality and international competitiveness of Ukrainian universities.

The struggle for a new higher education law in Ukraine is entering a new phase. We are now waiting for responses from academia, the media, expert communities, politicians and civil society organizations.

Modern European, not Marginal Post-Soviet Universities Needed¹

To start, let's sketch out the main features of a post-soviet university, based on Ukraine's most recent experience. I'll take the liberty of

¹ Original published in University World News, April 13, 2013, Issue #267. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130411130006882>.

presuming that these features are universal across the region, although the situation in Ukraine may well reflect the worst of all the post-soviet systems. Compared to some of the achievements attained by universities in Russia, Belarus or Kazakhstan, possibly a result of government patronage or strong oversight, Ukraine has not demonstrated any serious improvements in connection with post-soviet changes to its higher education system since 1991.

To begin with, Ukrainians probably take the idea of freedom, including freedom of speech and political rights, too seriously, which makes it difficult for them to accept an authoritarian model. Moreover, their government doesn't have any surplus resources to invest in science and education in order to follow the "Russian model," with its emphasis on top-down state control.

In all the former soviet republics apart from the Baltics, the legacy of the soviet era remains. They have similar rules still in force, have structurally similar institutions of higher learning, and a similar research infrastructure. They also have post-soviet nostalgic patriotism and corruption in common.

The post-soviet university

Post-soviet universities are unique because the circumstances that enable their continuing existence are unique. First, government officials pay little attention to universities. Post-secondary institutions do not really have any value for politicians, since politicians are concerned with retaining power, not about developing their society. And so, the state is ineffective.

What's worse, universities are not considered necessary for generating quality human capital or new knowledge. The state machine is mostly there for personal enrichment, so the country's political elites are operating with an exclusively short-term view. Long-term planning does not even enter the picture. Ukraine's governments have never even defined what their long-term aims are.

Second, phrases like "European integration," "the Bologna process" and "the knowledge society" are treated like mere utopian concepts in

present-day Ukraine. Whenever the academic community argues in favor of educational standards based on European and global practice, government officials laugh. They say such standards are unnecessary and even "harmful."

Third, hostility against Bologna standards is rooted in a sense of pride in the 'glorious' soviet legacy, and the governing principle is to find 'our own way' in contemporary higher education, following the example of those who are 'closer' to us, meaning Russia and other post-soviet satellites. This means that English must be rejected in favor of Russian, Ukraine's history must be rewritten to match the Kremlin's line, and so on. The current Minister of Education and Science, Dmytro Tabachnyk, makes xenophobic statements about Ukrainian culture and ridicules the achievements of the American education system. His main goal is to integrate Ukraine into a resurrected Russian empire, not to improve the quality of his country's universities.

Fourth, rectors are not members of their university communities. This is not because they are administrators at universities, but because they totally depend on those in power, first and foremost the Minister of Education and Science. Not surprisingly, rectors do not consider their main task to be raising academic quality, but holding onto their jobs. Some Ukrainian rectors have been in position since the soviet era, and this is not considered extraordinary. Their idea of success is not based on their university's development, but on their own survival. Rectors are thus easily manipulated, and, being totally dependent on politicians, will call 'white' 'black' if they are told by the government to do so.

Fifth, the Minister of Education, and indeed government officials at all levels, hire and fire rectors, put financial pressure on universities, make various visits to "inspect" the institution that paralyze university activities, take university property, blackmail institutions, and misinform the public.

Sixth, rectors and the academic community do not come together to promote their rights and protect the national interest by improving

the quality of science and education. Student movements are somewhat more effective, but academics in Ukraine are not involved in any public activity. Educational institutions that are called universities are not real universities. They are far from achieving their professed visions or carrying out their missions. Indeed, they cannot even properly define these.

Finally, the ruling Party of the Regions considers higher education from the perspective of the 'power vertical,' that is, the top-down chain-of-command. The president holds power over the minister, the minister holds power over the rectors, and rectors, in turn, are the absolute powers in their institutions. Universities have become hostage to rectors. This is the 'Russian model' of governance, which presupposes that only one person at the very top of the power pyramid can decide what the whole country does.

The Ukrainian university

It is sometimes not easy to distinguish our soviet or Russian colonialist heritage from what we'd like to consider original Ukrainian traditions. So, I will take the liberty of sketching out some features that could form part of a modern Ukrainian university.

First, it is based on a discourse of freedom, openness to the global world and progressive change. One of those changes is university autonomy and academic freedom, which need to be instituted as soon as possible. The university is a free forum for discussing new ideas and concepts.

Second, the Ukrainian university plays a major role in society by disseminating new ideas and fostering a proactive attitude and critical thinking in students as young citizens.

Finally, in addition to meeting high academic and professional standards and being globally oriented, the Ukrainian university must truly be a Ukrainian university. From this perspective it should play the role the future of the nation requires it to play, one where Ukraine keeps up with modern European standards and not marginal post-soviet ones.

The Anti-Education Minister of Education¹

Recent proposals from Ukraine's Ministry of Education and opinions expressed by the Minister suggest that the higher education agenda is not centered on boosting academic quality. Instead, education is being undermined. News about higher education in Ukraine over the past few years has been mostly about whether or not the Ministry has managed to undo the achievements of the previous Administration. In fact, Ukraine's system of higher education desperately needs fundamental reforms.

There is no demand in the job market today for some 20% of professions offered by the higher education system and 18% of graduates cannot find work. Yet some political analysts continue to claim that Western standards are 'harmful' to education and that Ukraine should focus more on soviet practices.

The new law on higher education

Over the past two years, experts and the public have focused their attention on the proposed Bill on Higher Education. On June 12, 2013, the Verkhovna Rada's Science and Education Committee voted to recommend passing the Bill drafted by the Zhurovskiy working group and submitted by independent MP Viktor Baloha. Although most members of the committee belong to opposition parties and there was another bill submitted by opposition MPs, the committee supported the Zhurovskiy bill, which was based on expert views and not associated with any particular political faction. This shows that Ukraine's politicians are capable of accepting a compromise on reforms to higher education.

The Ministry of Education, which supports a soviet-style bill devised by three rectors, was not happy with the decision and started a new backroom campaign to discredit the alternative bills. Its main position is to oppose anything that promotes university autonomy.

¹ Original published in University World News, July 13, 2013, Global Edition Issue #280. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130712102512854>.

Meanwhile, the Zhurovskiy bill enjoys broad support among experts, politicians and journalists, which is a considerable achievement. The bill also has the full support of students, except for student organizations controlled by the Ministry. In most instances, it also has the support of the media.

Higher education reform is supported not only by independent experts and the political opposition, such as the chair of the Science and Education Committee Liliya Hrynevych, but also by socialists such as former education minister Stanislav Nikolayenko, members of the ruling Party of the Regions like MP Serhiy Tihipko, and even some communists.

Cross-over admissions

The issue of cross-over admissions is an important indicator of Education Minister Tabachnyk's attitude towards higher education. The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (KMA), of which I am rector, has allowed cross-over admissions since 1996, the year it launched Ukraine's first master's programs. The system of cross-over admissions is based on Western university practice and allows graduates of any bachelor program to apply to any master's program. Students simply need to meet university entrance requirements and be aware of any exceptions established by law.

The Soviet Union never had cross-over admissions: students were not allowed to decide their own path of studies and had to follow a universal curriculum, depending on their specialization. The term 'cross-over admissions' appeared in Ukraine as part of the debate on student mobility and interdisciplinarity. Other post-soviet countries, like Russia and Belarus, began allowing cross-over admissions even without revising any laws. Their Minister of Education simply issued decrees and their Cabinet executive orders.

But the situation in Ukraine is totally different. Despite 17 years of positive experience at KMA, the Ministry has decided to prohibit cross-over admissions. In court, the lawyer representing the ministry argued that cross-over admissions were "illegal" and would "undermine professionalism." The ministry also launched a media campaign against cross-

sover admissions. Dignified rectors told television viewers such admissions were “impossible” and “harmed higher education” and that Ukraine was “not ready” for such changes.

Under pressure from experts and the media, however, the Ministry finally announced a trial of cross-over admissions in June to see whether they could be “useful.” This experiment will start on September 1, 2013, at 12 Ukrainian universities. KMA, of course, has not been included in this list. In short, the Minister is sloughing off any responsibility for blocking the implementation of this progressive move.

Independent external evaluations

Ukrainian experts are also worried about attempts by the current Minister to compromise or abolish the system of independent external evaluations, the centralized examinations testing the knowledge of high-school graduates in order to be admitted to university. With corruption in the education system high, this testing is conducted independently of schools and universities and is, in fact, the only innovation in Ukraine’s education system since the Soviet Union collapsed. All of Ukrainian society supports it and sees its implementation as a major reform to higher education.

But the Ministry, supported by a large number of rectors, is hoping to dilute independent external evaluation and downplay its significance in order to reinstate the old system of admissions procedures, which were the biggest source of corruption in soviet education. Those lobbying against independent external evaluation use specious arguments about the right of western universities to establish their own admissions requirements.

Western universities do have this right, but it is both transparent and not compromised by corruption. To implement a similar system in Ukraine requires reforms that shifts the focus of universities to academic quality and rids them of corruption. The Ministry’s actions towards such reforms, especially its promotion of the three rectors’ bill, will not lead towards competitive, high quality universities in Ukraine any time soon.

Academic teaching loads

A major achievement of the education community was blocking an initiative that would have increased teaching loads. Currently, teaching loads are calculated based on the number of students per academic, with the average being one academic to 11 students.

Even under existing standards, many university teaching staff are completely overworked. They spend too much time in the classroom and have little or no time for research. On average, Ukraine's academics spend over 80% of their working hours teaching. The remaining 20% must be shared between administrative work and research. Very often teaching takes up all of their time and research flies out the window.

It is difficult to find out who exactly suggested increasing the teaching load to an average ratio of 1:18. But in April 2013, Minister Tabachnyk stated that the standard teaching load in Ukraine was lower than that in Western Europe and should be increased. He argued that lecturers in other countries were responsible for a higher number of students and based his assertions on UNESCO reports.

Unfortunately, Mr. Tabachnyk does not seem to understand the difference between the compulsory standards that apply in Ukraine and statistical information that includes large first-year maths and science courses that sometimes have 100–200 students at a lecture. Moreover, only in the post-soviet region are salaries of professors based on the number of students at the university where they work, not on an employment contract they sign with the university, reflecting their professional achievements—including research and publications.

Trade unions, experts, politicians, the media, and student organizations immediately spoke out against Mr. Tabachnyk's proposals. They fear that this kind of 'reform' would end up with over 30% of university faculty fired, a further and rapid decline in education quality, and a damaging impact on society.

Minister Tabachnyk's plan failed this time. But what can those working in higher education in Ukraine expect in the future?

A Parallel Higher Education World¹

Ukraine is supposedly moving closer to the European Union through an Association Agreement, but it is still far from the standards required to meet European norms. Higher education reforms are needed to tackle everything from bribery to preparing PhDs. Ukraine's higher education is in a parallel world, compared to contemporary standards of educational process and research, and the criteria for assessing academic quality.

An Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union has been the central topic in the domestic press for quite some time. Hopes of educational reform are now being placed on the signing of this document, which may take place on November 28, 2013. The AA not only presupposes a comprehensive deep free trade area between Ukraine and the EU, but Art. 431 specifically mentions reforms to higher education and the standards expected in the Bologna process.

This new cooperation between Ukraine and the EU presupposes establishing international institutions that include civil society, and empowering institutions to make binding decisions. Hopefully, we may soon see debate in the media about the Agreement going beyond political and economic issues.

The education community is still waiting for the pro-European rhetoric of state officials to convert into real actions in regard to higher education reform. Passing the Zhurovskiy Bill on Higher Education in the Verkhovna Rada would be the first step. But Ukraine is a country of paradoxes, as are many unstable states with transitional economies and marginal political cultures.

As a result of actions by the Ministry of Education and Science, Ukraine's institutions of higher learning are being kept in a parallel world compared to the rules governing European universities. While the Ministry promoted cooperation with Russia in the past, as an alternative to European standards of higher education, it has kept quiet about this lately.

¹ Original published in University World News Global Edition, October 25, 2013, Issue #293. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20131023125453378>.

The third cycle

On September 27, 2013, at Maastricht University, a graduate of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Tetiana Stepurko, defended her PhD dissertation entitled “Informal Payments for Healthcare Services—Corruption or gratitude? A study of public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six Central and Eastern European countries.” Is this not normal? Not in Ukraine. There is no third cycle of higher education yet.

The state does not recognize structured Western-style PhD programs. In Ukraine, such programs are available only at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy so far. That is why our university decided to work in partnership with other universities to prepare PhD students to defend their theses.

Besides Maastricht University, our students have also defended their dissertations at the Autonomous University of Barcelona in Spain, and will do so at the University of Paris Est in France, at Western University in Canada, Macquarie University in Australia, and other West European and North American universities. In the meantime, on October 10, 2013, the Ministry granted 1,427 first stage *Candidate* degrees, 776 second stage *Doctor* degrees and 15 PhDs. Where do the PhDs come from? In short, Ukraine has not implemented educational reforms in line with its Bologna obligations with regard to implementing a third cycle of higher education but has been sticking to the soviet degree system.

Instead, the Ministry has invented new bureaucratic practices to convert the title of a post-soviet candidate of science into a PhD. It has translated ‘diplomas’ into English, merely changing the title without altering the methods of postgraduate education and integrating it into the European system. This is what Bologna ‘reform’ looks like in Ukraine today.

Corruption and other systemic roadblocks

Corruption in post-soviet states infests the field of higher education as well. The student movement is tackling some aspects of it. On September 14, 2013, the Ukrainian Association of Student Governments held a panel discussion in Kyiv entitled “A Student Vision of Legislative Re-

forms to Higher Education in Ukraine.” Student leaders discussed the bill on higher education currently registered for consideration in the legislature. They also discussed motions regarding the bill, collected during roundtable discussions held in different areas of Ukraine earlier in the year.

Numerous problems include bribery, the low quality of learning and teaching, and the centralization of higher education administration, which makes it impossible for universities, students and employers to have input into the educational process. Participants declared their support for the VR Science and Education Committee, which considers the Zhurovskiy Bill rather than the alternative bill before the legislature, the one that would best support the development of higher education and defend the interests of students.

More work also needs to be done on admissions to Ukrainian universities. Maksym Opanasenko, a journalist for the *Svidomo* website, noted that in the admission rules that higher education institutions will need to conform to in 2014, the independent online system, *Konkurs* or Competition, is not mentioned at all. Over the last two years, this system has enabled applicants to follow changes in the admissions ratings of different universities during the admissions process. This significantly curbed corruption.

But bribery easily shifts shape in Ukraine.

Previously, bribes were mainly paid to get applicants enrolled at universities. Now they are paid to ensure students stay there. Passing a test costs on average UAH 50 (US \$6¹) and the successful defense of course work costs UAH 2,000 (US \$245). The main factors fostering bribery in higher education are low salaries and the depreciation of Ukrainian diplomas in the eyes of employers, who now prefer to retrain university graduates so that they suit their company’s needs.

According to the HeadHunter portal, 52% of recruitment interviews have HR managers only ask candidates whether they have diplomas certifying their education level. Only a quarter of those who participated in the survey said the employer questioned them in detail about their specialization and skills.

¹ Based on the exchange rate of UAH 8/USD at the time of publication in 2013.

For students, it does not matter how they get marks, as it will not influence their future employment. Only their skills are important, but these skills are often obtained outside universities through informal educational systems and moonlighting, according to the head of the Ukrainian Association of Student Governments, Yelyzaveta Shchepetylnykova.

What kind of reforms?

The current state of educational reform in Ukraine can be illustrated by a special page on the government website, which includes the promising heading, “Educational Reforms.” It contains information on two issues: pre-school education levels, where we can see progress from 73.3% in 2010 to 81.0% in 2012; and the number of vehicles bought through the School Bus Program—112 in 2010 and 900 in 2012. The buses take children living in the countryside to schools in neighboring villages.

The website states that this reform was implemented with the aim of integrating Ukrainian education into the common European education area.

What more is there to say?

Admissions Weaknesses Highlight System Failings¹

This year’s student admissions process in Ukraine has highlighted key problems with the country’s overly centralized system of higher education, its incomprehensible funding policies, and corruption. The admissions campaign has shown all the weaknesses inherent in the system of higher education. As always, education NGOs were active in monitoring the situation. From their publications and public actions, we can get a general view of what is going on in the country.

¹ Original published in University World News Global Edition, September 14, 2013, Issue #287. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130912164013962>.

The 2014 admissions campaign

The *Opora* [Holdfast] Public Network has been tracking annual admissions campaigns for some years now. This year, its activists monitored the work of admissions committees in 40 post-secondary institutions. Indeed, more than 1,500 applicants from different parts of Ukraine called the *Opora* hotline service with questions and complaints.

According to *Opora*, the state database used for admissions worked better this year than last year. Due to this, admissions committees were able to access applications easily and applicants had no problems sending electronic applications to universities.

The work of these admissions committees is highly centralized. This has certain advantages, but it's important to understand the strategy of the Ministry of Education and Science. All post-secondary operations continue to be centralized, without any focus on the quality and competence of individual universities. The Ministry wants to force universities to work accountably and transparently by being nothing more than passive operators. In fact, the Ministry would prefer to make all administrative decisions on behalf of the country's universities, even the most minor ones. This means that any success coming out of greater centralization is considered an achievement.

Various abuses by university admissions committees, as well as improprieties in the work of the Ministry itself, also occurred this year. For instance, some of the new regulations confused universities and applicants alike.

Untransparent distribution of funds

Meanwhile, *Opora* reports that the distribution of budget funds among universities to train specialists lacks transparency and is poorly organized. The Ministry of Education and Science takes responsibility for this distribution of funds, along with the ministries that have their own sector-based post-secondary institutions: healthcare, defense, agricultural policy, internal affairs, culture, and so on. So, although the education database functions openly, information on how funding is distributed among state universities is considered a national secret!

The Center for Social Research (CSR) published the results of an investigation into the distribution of funds among post-secondary institutions this year. In general, applying the inflation index, state spending on education has declined every year. This year total expenses amounted to UAH 20.3 billion or about US \$2.6bn.¹

The state plans to provide 104,000 grants for full-time bachelor students in 2013. In its resolution, the Ministry plans further cuts in the following years, down to 99,000 in 2014 and 97,000 in 2015. This year, the number of student grants funded by the state was cut in most sectors: 4.46% in engineering, 5.54% in social sciences, 3.27% in the humanities and 4.24% in teaching. Only IT saw a significant increase, 3.67%, and agriculture received a 1.09% increase.

The Ministry shields information about the allocation of funds among universities from the public eye, despite a court order to publish the information on its website. Last year, as part of a case brought by Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, the court ordered the Ministry to make public all materials on the distribution of funds for student grants among universities. So far, this has not been done.

The only source of information on funding is the online *Konkurs* [Competition] system, where institutions have to submit information on the number of student grants funded by the state that are available to their applicants. Notably, a special Law on Preparing and Placing State Commissions [grant funding] in Training, Upgrading and Retraining Professionals, Academics, Teachers and Specialists was enacted last year. The Ministry has published a list of “competition requirements” for universities, saying this would make the process “open and transparent.” A special competition committee was established.

However, CSR experts say university funding is still not based on common principles or even simple logic. For instance, at a time when state funding of practically all institutions of higher learning has been cut, some universities, including institutions not in the top 10 of university rankings, were unexpectedly given increased funding: the National University of Dnipropetrovsk saw a 16 % rise in student grants from the state budget compared to the previous year. In particular, some

¹ Based on an exchange rate of UAH 8 to the US dollar at the time of publication.

institutions got 43% more state orders (grants) for students majoring in law, 25% more for journalism and 66% more for international economics while funding for these same bachelor programs was cut in universities recognized as national leaders.

CSR concluded that Ukraine needs new, alternative models of funding that are transparent, easy to understand, and related to a strategic vision for higher education in Ukraine.

Other trends in admissions

This year, 2,172,000 applications were received from 695,700 high-school graduates. According to the Center for Education Monitoring (CEM), one oddity of this year's campaign was that some institutions received only a few applications. Indeed, some got only one! On the one hand, this is quite predictable, given the excessive number of institutions in Ukraine,—around 820. As in the past three years, the 2013 admissions campaign was restricted by various 'instructions' from the Ministry.

Due to the current demographic decline in the university entrance age group, anyone whose goal is just getting a diploma, instead of obtaining a good education, can become a student. This year, around 300,000 applicants took part in an External Independent Evaluation for which 310,000 state grants were available, which means the state grants exceeded the number of applicants.

Meanwhile, there is growing interest among bachelor and masters applicants in applying to foreign universities. The institutions most actively promoted in Ukraine are Polish. In general, interest in masters programs at Ukrainian institutions has fallen, probably due to the lack of substantive reforms, the declining quality of the higher education system, and greater access to universities outside Ukraine.

A public campaign under the motto "Against declining quality in higher education" was established in 2010. During this year's admissions round, the most active group was the *Vidsich* [Rebuff] Civic Movement. *Vidsich* activists campaigned against the soviet-like authoritarian bill on higher education drawn up by three rectors from Party

of the Regions (!), supported by the Ministry of Education and Science. Vidsich also promoted external independent evaluation.

Experts believe this bill is likely to damage the quality of higher education and encourage greater corruption. Vidsich combined these concerns with support for Ukraine's association with the European Union and protests against joining the Customs Union with Russia. They held demonstrations near universities and circulated campaign materials.

The arrest of a rector

In July 2013, Petro Melnyk, rector of the National Academy of Taxation, was caught red-handed taking bribes to guarantee two applicants admission to the academy. The case did not cause any ripples in Ukraine. Experts merely considered it further evidence that the situation in higher education has not changed one iota.

This state of affairs is very discouraging, as no Ukrainian believes that this was a one-off event. Melnyk lost his position as rector and was placed under house arrest, although he has been spotted outside his home since then. According to some media, he was "a victim of political score-settling." Otherwise, his 'business' would have kept going with impunity.

On August 8, 2013, Melnyk escaped from his house and is now wanted by the police. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian people are looking at the actions of the government in terms of reforming the system of higher education.

What the Ukrainian Protests Mean ¹

The current protests in Ukraine, led by students, especially in the early stages, have been about much more than just integration with Europe. They are about the desire for justice and freedom. The Ukrainian word *maidan*² has Turkish roots. Its closest English synonym is the word

¹ Original published in University World News Global Edition, January 03, 2014, Issue #301. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140103090224420>.

² Pronounced "my-dan."

“square,” but in Ukraine, *Maidan* is a place for debating and solving problems that matter to every member of the community. People do not gather for those reasons regularly—only when something goes wrong and a solution urgently needs to be found.

Maidan Nezalezhnosti or Independence Square is in the heart of Kyiv and has played a major role in the history of independent Ukraine. But its role began more than a generation ago. In the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union was in collapse, the first free press was available there. In 1990, the Granite Revolution of Ukrainian students, which called for de-communization and the establishment of an independent Ukraine, took place there. Within a year, Ukraine was an independent country. In 2004, the glorious but short-lived Orange Revolution began there. It succeeded in stopping Viktor Yanukovich, the current President of Ukraine, from stealing an election.

Today, Euromaidan is the buzz in the heart of Kyiv, as well as in other major cities in Ukraine: Kharkiv, Lviv and Dnipropetrovsk. And it is no longer mainly a student movement.

Police brutality as contrast to European standards

Over November 21–30, 2013, the protests in Ukraine that started on the Kyiv Maidan were focused on demands that the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union be signed as planned. This step did not mean membership in the EU, but it would fundamentally focus the country’s further development towards European values and standards.

Quite unexpectedly, students became the strongest driver of Euro-maidan. They did not make up the majority of the protesters, but were the most motivated and persistent members of the demonstrations. These young people were clear that they wanted to live in a different, European Ukraine and they were protesting against corruption and ineffectiveness of the government system in general and the education system in particular.

After deceiving Ukrainians about its intentions regarding European integration, the Yanukovich Administration swung its geopolitical

focus 180 degrees and declared, instead, that it wanted even closer relations with Russia through the Eurasian Customs Union.

Just as they had done in 2004, the residents of Kyiv supported Euro-maidan wholeheartedly. Initially, the biggest rallies drew up to 150,000. The movement grew stronger ahead of the EU Summit in Vilnius on November 28–29, but it looked likely to decline afterwards.

Then, during the night of November 29, a riot police unit called Berkut [Golden Eagle] not only dispersed a small group of young people and journalists hanging out on the Maidan, but brutally beat some of the young people. Some students were arrested, others checked into emergency wards and several people even went missing.

Trying to escape armed police who continued hunting young people down, beating and maiming them even after they left the Maidan, some of the young people who had participated in the peaceful rallies hid behind the wall of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery, established in the 12th century. The monks gave them shelter and hot food, and allowed them to stay in the cathedral.

The last time such events had taken place there was in 1240, when the inhabitants of Kyiv found shelter in the monastery during an attack by the Mongol Horde.

Ukrainian society was shocked, as events related to Maidan were highly symbolic for Ukrainians.

The Euromaidan as community

The next day, tens of thousands more flocked to the Euromaidan protests. As many as one million protesters gathered every Sunday in Kyiv for *viche*, which is what town meetings were called in medieval Ukraine. Civil society activists, writers unions, students, journalists, athletes, analysts, show business stars, ecologists, medical professionals, lawyers, veterans, trade unions, and the leaders of the opposition parties and their supporters, all came out to the Maidan.

The focus of the protests had changed in the face of brutality. Now Ukrainians demanded, not only Eurointegration but also political change, including the immediate resignation of the Yanukovych Administration.

Security, food provision, medical care and cleaning were organized very quickly. The Maidan Open University was set up in the open air and welcomed anyone who was interested to join. Functioning student organizations joined forces and new ones, like the Student Coordination Council, were established. Local university strike committees were organized across the country.

Rectors at western Ukrainian institutions openly supported student protests. Several universities went to the Maidan openly and officially, such as Borys Hrinchenko Pedagogic University in Kyiv, the Kyiv Polytechnical University, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the Ukrainian Catholic University of Lviv. It became clear that, without Maidan as an embodiment of Ukraine's aspiration for change, there would not be any reforms in Ukraine or in higher education.

On the night of December 10, police tried to attack the Maidan protests once more, but failed. The Maidan persevered, putting up barricades in the city center and preparing for a long-term campaign as winter set in.

Over 80% of Euromaidan participants originally joined the protests because they objected to the brutality against the students. Over 70% of these people—there are some distinctions between those who join specific rallies and viche, and those who are prepared to “stay to the bitter end”—have a degree or are studying for one.

Destroying symbols of tyranny

Natalia Humeniuk, a lecturer at Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism and a journalist at Hromadske.tv, a public broadcaster that operates as an NGO, points to the emotional and idealistic nature of Euromaidan. Most Ukrainians do not know much about the EU's internal problems and “speak through symbols without any context.”

She notes that there were no specifically “European” values and no uniquely “European” human rights in 2013. These concepts are universal. And the protests were not about love for of EU vs hatred of Russia. They were about every individual's right to go out onto the street when their opinions were brutally ignored, since the people are the only source of power, according to Ukraine's Constitution.

Ukrainians simply did the same as the citizens of Turkey, Brazil, the United States, Tunisia and other countries have done in the past, trying to defend values that were important to all of them. It just so happens that refusing the “European choice” in Ukraine meant remaining a country of lawlessness, despotism, kleptocracy and ignorance.

The vision of the current President and Government—keeping Ukraine within the post-soviet region dominated by Vladimir Putin’s Russia, with its obvious imperial ambitions—upsets Ukrainians, who mostly see themselves as part of a European world, not a Eurasian one. Pulling down the Lenin statue in downtown Kyiv during Euromaidan was the clearest symbol of the difference between Ukrainian society’s historical and geopolitical self-identification, and that of the current political leadership in the capital.

As the symbol of a foreign totalitarianism and new imperial threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty, the Lenin monument deserved to be taken down. Yet many Ukrainians did not support such a spontaneous, essentially “illegal” removal—and not just those for whom Lenin was a symbol of a “common history” with Russia.

A revolution in thinking

Volodymyr Yermolenko, a lecturer at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, offers an original comment on the relativity of ideologies in the world today. At the Maidan, he writes, you can see a mix of anarchic communism, nationalism and liberalism.

Elements of anarchic communism in the Maidan’s organization: with no money in circulation, everything is based on volunteerism, solidarity and donations, people embrace the community, and the collective body dominates over individuals. The Maidan is nationalist in its emotional component: singing the national anthem, prayers from different Ukrainian faiths, nationalist slogans and salutes, the dominance of blue and yellow, the colors of the Ukrainian flag, and the use of blue and yellow ribbons for visual self-identification. But the Maidan is also liberal in its philosophical component: EU flags, an emphasis on human rights and democracy, appeals to liberal Europe, and aspirations to build a “European country.”

Anarchic and communal organization, nationalist fervor and liberal debate—this is the strange hybrid creature that is our Maidan, Yermolenko writes.

We should also mention the vanishing of ethnic, religious and social barriers, for example, with Crimean Tatars, liberal Jews and Russian intellectuals joining forces with Ukrainians, and with the support given by small and medium businesses and instances like Microsoft-Ukraine General Manager Dmytro Shymkiv personally shoveling snow on the Maidan.

This makes it possible to understand that the main meaning of the European revolution in Ukraine is taking place in people's heads. It's about the real, not merely declarative, belief in freedom and justice.

A European Revolution in Ukraine¹

Terms like the Maidan, Euromaidan and Eurorevolution have been used to label what has happened in Ukraine. But for me “European Revolution” better describes the tectonic shifts in mass consciousness that have taken place in these last months in Ukraine.

Only three months ago, Viktor Yanukovych seemed strong, even invincible. He controlled and exploited all of the country's resources. The army, fleet, air force, special forces, and police were all under his command. Journalists and students who talked about their desire to live in a united Europe, sharing its values and professional standards, seemed very naive.

A government against its people

On February 19, 2014, however, the people's anger was whipped up to the maximum when their government started shooting its citizens. Here is the statement of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy regarding those events:

¹ Original published in University World News Global Edition, March 14, 2014, Issue #311. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140311231130571>.

“The bloody events of February 18–19 have moved the Yanukovich regime to a position outside of the law once and for all. Ukraine’s government has begun a war against its own people, who have been defending their dignity and their rights. Therefore, we call on:

- our compatriots – to stop the fratricide and bloodshed.
- police officials – to not comply with criminal orders, and to remember the oath of duty they made to the people of Ukraine.
- Ukrainian officers – to remember their honor and dignity, to protect the lives of their compatriots and the sovereignty of Ukraine, and to defend the Ukrainian people against the threat of dictatorship.
- University academic communities – to stop the study process until this bloodshed is over.

Glory to Ukraine!”

A similar statement was issued by Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, the Ukrainian Catholic University, and the Borys Hrinchenko Pedagogical University in Kyiv. In fact, the European Revolution was supported by the entire professional academic community.

Today it is hard to explain to a foreign reader the measure of determination in Ukrainian society, a determination that leaves no hope for tyrants.

On February 18, special units of the army and police forced protesters back from their barricaded positions and set fire to the Trade Union Building, where the Euromaidan headquarters and medical units were located. During the heavy street battles, several combat vehicles were burnt when they tried to take down the barricades. On February 19, the day before that final violent onslaught, the citizens of Kyiv—including students, professors and pensioners—were preparing Molotov cocktails, digging out paving bricks to build barriers, providing food to protesters, and treating the wounded.

And so, February 20 became the day of a cruel victory for the Euro-maidan.

Protesters, armed mostly with shields—hand-made or seized from internal forces—, sticks, helmets of varying degrees of durability, and a negligible number of firearms. They moved against armed riot police

and special forces. Even when professional snipers began to mow them down, they kept moving ahead.

And Viktor Yanukovych blinked.

First, police began leaving their posts. Two days later, Yanukovych fled, followed by loyal members of his corrupt government, including the infamous former Education Minister, Dmytro Tabachnyk.

It looked like a miraculous event straight out of the Bible, a victory of strong-spirited people struggling for Good and Truth. The number of those who died topped 100 two weeks after those events and people began to call those heroes "Heaven's Hundred."

Taking over the Ministry

Since students were an extremely important component of the European Revolution, it was completely expected that they would get directly involved in reforming education. On February 21, student activists blocked the Ministry of Science and Education and ministry officials had to leave their posts.

In the blockaded building, students organized a daily protest modeled on what happened at the Maidan and prepared to keep the blockade going for as long as necessary. That really meant until new administrators were appointed in the Ministry and their demands were met.

Order and discipline were strict in the blockaded building. All the offices were sealed. Nothing was stolen or destroyed during the weeks of "student administration" there. Meanwhile, candidates for the position of Minister arrived at the blockaded Ministry for talks with students.

It was a unique situation.

The three-year-long struggle of the Ukrainian academic community against policies working to degrade science and education ended with the students taking charge. They wrote a "road map" of demands, priority among which were democratization, transparency, accountability and new professional standards.

New policies in education

It so happened that I was appointed to the position of Minister of Education and Science in the post-Maidan "Government of National Trust."

We all understand that it is not a good moment for high-sounding words and that we probably have a very short time to make something happen.

The Treasury has been totally ransacked by Viktor Yanukovich and his fellow criminals, many of whom are now wanted by Interpol. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has begun invading Ukrainian territory.

Vladimir Putin understands very well that Ukraine's European Revolution does not threaten Russia or Russians, as he claims, but it may threaten his authoritarian regime. He is trying to promote the 'greatness' of the Russian Empire by aggressive, illegal actions, including occupying a neighboring country's territory and engaging in virulent propaganda worthy of Dr. Goebbels.

Under these conditions, the renewed Ministry of Education and Science has announced the first of its new policies. They include: integrating into the common European higher education area, instituting university autonomy, passing a new Bill on Higher Education, refusing to continue the Ministry's micro-management and restrictiveness, establishing a proper partnership between the Ministry and the country's universities, and moving towards fiscal transparency and accountability.

The academic community, civic organizations and independent experts are to play a special role in this revolution. The main task of the Ministry today is to carry out systemic reforms that will lead to world quality education in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, this blog will be handed over to one of Ukraine's leading experts on education, Yegor Stadniy.

Science: At the Heart of Educational Reform¹

In the summer of 2014, a new law on higher education was finally adopted, becoming a real victory for the academic community, civil society and the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine.

¹ Original published in University World News, March 20, 2015, Issue #359. Accessed: <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20150320010227788>.

University World News has addressed issues around the passing of this law many times. Currently we are focusing on implementing this law, which aims, among others, to give Ukraine's universities greater academic, fiscal and organizational autonomy. The reality on the ground is not straightforward, however.

Tough times, tough decisions

Tough time call for tough decisions. Firstly, Ukraine's reforms—including those in education and science—are being carried out in a climate of undeclared war between Russia and Ukraine, and at a time of economic recession and falling GDP. That is why, more often than not, the agenda for higher education is dominated by the need to cut expenditures rather than fund reforms. In addition, some 26 academic institutions have been evacuated from the combat zone, including 16 universities.

Second, the adoption of the new law on higher education has demonstrated the persistence of post-soviet thinking, which considers scientific activity in isolation from the rest of higher education. It would have been better to pass a higher education and research law, but that was not possible at the time.

Third, the corrupt bureaucratic system in Ukraine needs special attention. The current policy of decentralization and deregulation, and reforms in the legal and police systems, are gradually yielding results. Still, it's a very slow process.

Fourth, the conservative National Academy of Sciences is the greatest obstacle to successful reform. The Academy is headed by an outstanding scientist, Borys Paton, who was born in the year of its founding, 1918. Thanks to his consistent position, the Academy was not ruined in the 1990s. But now, its refusal to act decisively is condemning the system of scientific research to inevitable decline.

Fifth, we are seeing our institutions of higher learning being renewed and strengthened, their numbers cut, and new quality standards being introduced, especially in relation to scientific criteria.

Since the passing of the law on higher education, the total number of universities has plunged from 802 to 317, although some universities

simply changed category and are now technical-vocational colleges. By the end of this academic year, the total number of universities should fall even further, mainly due to the withdrawal of licenses from low-quality institutions.

Ukraine's scientific research infrastructure for scientific research is outdated. It was developed mostly during the soviet era, mainly to meet the needs of the military-industrial complex and currently has four major components: the National Academy of Sciences, the universities, research institutions, and corporate R&D centers. In total, this adds up to 1,143 research institutions, 51% of them specialized R&D centers, 28% the NAS, 15% universities and 6% industrial research. Meanwhile, the main emphasis of scientific research is 42% on engineering sciences, 34% natural sciences, 13% social sciences, 7% inter-disciplinary research, and 4% humanities.

But the total number of researchers working in the R&D sector has plummeted from 449,900 in 1991 to 123,200 in 2013. The age distribution of the nation's scientists shows that 8.5% are 70 and over, 18% are 60–69, 22% are 50–59, 15% are 40–49, 21% are 30–39, and 16% are under 29. The percentage of non-state budget spent on scientific research has almost halved since 2005, with state funding also declining, though not to the same extent. Not surprisingly, in 2012, Ukraine was 40th in the world for publications and 42nd for citations.

The change agenda

Ukraine has enormous scientific potential. The country is facing an important challenge to remain an active player at the global level. We should begin with a special audit of all our existing research infrastructure involving recognized experts from abroad.

We need to understand, not only what real scientific potential there is and what laboratories we have, but also to determine our priorities for future research. It's high time to also implement evidence-based criteria for evaluating the performance of research institutions and give up purely bureaucratic soviet traditions inside the NAS.

All scientific research projects should be financed by public funds from the National Science Foundation. Specialized research institu-

tions and universities should jointly submit their research projects for grant funding. The rapprochement of higher education and scientific research centers should be continued partly by bringing together universities with the NAS institutes and partly through joint MA and PhD programs.

The main focus should be on creating specialized centers that follow global best practice. This requires not only the purchase of expensive equipment and paying scientists competitive salaries, but also creating an intellectual ecosystem where researchers can grow, communicate, work on projects with business, and aspire to produce rapid and successful results.

The funding system will change as these new approaches take hold and innovative activity comes to the fore. Significant changes in the organization of scientific research will have a positive impact on higher education—and not just by fostering world-class universities. For example, Ukraine should witness the emergence of a new category of quality liberal arts universities with no research component.

This week Carlos Moedas, European Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation, and I signed an Agreement for the Association of Ukraine with Horizon 2020. Horizon 2020 is the first EU program in which Ukraine has chosen to participate with the launch of provisional application of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and represents an important stage in the development of research in Ukraine.

Only a fully-functioning state can organize national research that has global aspirations. However, an innovative economy and the emergence of a knowledge society will be impossible without modern science and education. That is why Ukraine cannot do without them. Scientific development is intrinsically linked to all the major reforms that the nation needs.

CHAPTER 3

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNIVERSITY

Challenges in Post-Secondary Education for Post-Independence Ukraine¹

Today I would like to talk about the challenges of post-secondary education in post-independence Ukraine, both its problems and its prospects. When Kyiv-Mohyla Academy reopened in 1991 as a national university, it was based on the Western model of a university. As a result, we have been on a collision course with the old soviet system of education that prevails in Ukraine to this day.

The state of post-secondary education in Ukraine today can be seen in other post-soviet countries, except perhaps for the Baltic states. This means there's been no qualitative change to the educational system or to the scientific research system since the Soviet Union collapsed. Instead, corruption has expanded enormously. Rather than restructuring of post-secondary education, Ukraine's political leadership only offers rhetoric and an ongoing competition among politicians and the conservative leadership of the academic community, who are not prepared to make any substantive changes. As a result, Ukraine and Ukrainians have no university of sufficient quality represented in international ratings.

¹ Original lecture at the University of Manitoba, May 2009.

Here are what I consider to be the five key post-secondary education challenges in Ukraine today.

The first challenge lies in the role of scientific research. In the 1920s, all universities in Ukraine were closed, to be replaced by “institutes of public education”. The soviet government simply revised the professional and social aims of the university. Scientific research was separated from the teaching and learning processes, and concentrated in the system of academies of science. This gave the state total control over scientific research, on one hand, and over intellectuals, on the other. To this day, the general opinion in Ukraine is that the aim of the university is teaching, not expanding knowledge. This means, ultimately, that the country’s universities cannot influence the domestic economy.

The second challenge is the total absence of university autonomy in Ukraine. For decades, Ukrainians witnessed growing authoritarian state control over all aspects of university life. Since independence in 1991, and especially the Orange Revolution in 2004, however, the ideological pressure slowly began to disappear. We can still see it occasionally in some parts of the country during election campaigns.

At the same time, there is no talk of academic, organizational, or financial autonomy. Universities cannot grant their own diplomas, they cannot confer degrees, they cannot manage their own funding, and they have no control over the educational process and personnel policy: The state does all of that. But the state cannot properly fund universities because of lack of revenues and post-secondary education institutions cannot diversify their sources of funding. This vicious cycle means that being a Maecenas in Ukraine is a thankless job.

The third challenge is a decline in teaching and educational quality since soviet times. Interestingly, the soviet secondary school level was quite high, including Ukrainian schools. The same could be said about the universities, although this was not thanks to the soviet system but to the older Russian and Austrian traditions. Today, there are 904 post-secondary education institutions in Ukraine, including 351 universities. The state does not focus on quality or research results but simply distributes a shrinking budget among them in a manner that has little logic and seems strange at best. Just to compare, for instance,

studying costs for one student at the bachelor or master level in US equal €36,500, including the research component; in the European Union, it's €8,700, and in Ukraine it's only about UAH 15,000, which is €1,400.¹

Regretfully, private education has not become a competitor to the state institutions because most Ukrainians currently cannot pay for a private education. This means that private universities cannot afford to be selective and simply accept anyone who can pay. Needless to say, they do not engage in any scientific research. All of this has led to widespread buying of university degrees in Ukraine.

The fourth challenge lies in overcoming provincialism and isolation. For starters, Ukrainian universities do not feel themselves part of the world academic community and do not think globally. The concepts of a knowledge society and the Bologna process with its European Higher Education Area, which Ukraine has officially joined, have not penetrated in reality. The post-soviet mentality is to shirk responsibilities, to talk about one thing, do another and think something completely different. Ukrainian universities cannot compete on the international stage because of their abysmal ratings, so the tendency is to talk about "national peculiarities," "our own way" in education, or to compare the country only with other post-soviet countries, like Russia.

No essential reforms are being undertaken, while corruption has been given the welcome mat, adding its own jokes to the traditional humor about bad roads and bureaucratic idiots. In fact, Ukrainian and Russian realities look absolutely different. For one thing, Russia, with its centrally managed imperial tradition is able to provide ample financial support to professional scientific studies and key university campuses. Nevertheless, Ukrainian universities can and should develop according to world market mechanisms as autonomous institutions in close connection and collaboration with Western partners.

The fifth and final challenge is lack of flexibility and connection to existing economic and social targets. Ukrainian universities are not linked to the labor market, domestic economy or national development

¹ At an exchange rate of UAH 10.70/EUR.

goals. They have no research component internally and no complete cycle to prepare highly qualified specialists: bachelor's, master's, PhD. Ukraine still follows post-soviet system of academic qualifications, slightly upgraded. After four years of studying, the student is granted a bachelor's degree, which is considered an "incomplete" higher education. The fifth year will typically qualify them as a "specialist" or—sometimes involving a sixth year—a master's, depending on which program they choose. They can then continue in post-graduate studies to become a "candidate," which takes another three years, and there is a higher "doctoral degree" that takes a further five years, bringing the total number of years in university to 14–15. In addition, the contemporary Ukrainian system does not require young researchers to place any articles in international peer-review journals. So those Ukrainians who want to be involved in "great science" often apply to western universities. This means that Ukraine, with its huge economic problems, is effectively investing good resources in Western education and research, instead of its own.

Today, Ukraine urgently needs university autonomy. The government also needs to correctly establish the main national priorities, reflecting the needs of post-secondary education and learning how important it is to defend them. Universities must have the right to self-regulation and be mandated to produce qualitatively new knowledge that will have a positive impact on the development of the entire society, not just the system of post-secondary education. This is the only way for Ukraine to reach a European level of self-sufficiency and finally rid itself of the cumbersome, backward-looking, embarrassing epithets, "post-soviet," "post-totalitarian" and "post-colonial."

The Orange Revolution led to a dramatic change in public awareness, despite its political failures. We should consider the current global crisis as a chance to change for good and to reject everything that pulls us back towards the past. Ukraine failed to kill the soviet system in 1991 and it lingered on until 2004. I'm convinced that the change of Ukrainian intellectual, political and economical generations, all of us will witness drastically positive changes, including in the system of post-secondary education, in the next five years.

KMA President's Appeal¹

Dear colleagues,

The appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk as Minister of Education and Science has been a complete shock to the academic community, as this is a man who doubts the very existence of a Ukrainian identity, espousing instead the concept to a bizarre hybrid called "Ukrainian-Russian culture."

In Tabachnyk's opinion, the Law of Ukraine "On the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine" places our country "in the same line as the most repulsive totalitarian dictatorships." The Minister of Education and Science thinks that "the desire to play dirty tricks on a neighbor, betray and invent things to deceive those close to you, and the willingness to lose one eye if it means the neighbor will go blind—these are the typical characteristics of the emerging Ukrainian nation."

His dictums include such statements as "The people of Halychyna² are lackeys who have barely learned to wash their hands," who "have almost nothing in common with the people of greater Ukraine in the mental, religious, linguistic, or political arenas." Other statements of Tabachnyk's refer to a "struggle between the two types of ethnic groups, Roman-Catholic-Halychyna and Russian-Orthodox" that is supposedly taking place on the territory of Ukraine make one wonder how he possibly ever qualified for a PhD in history.

This intolerance towards other nations and cultures is normally called "xenophobia." In this particular case, we're talking about hatred towards Ukrainians and Ukrainian culture by a minister responsible for state policy—in the Ukrainian education system.

Sensitivity towards intolerance is a distinguishing feature of the entire post-war world, but especially Europe. That's why a man like this cannot sit at the negotiations table with the ministers of any civilized country and cannot be allowed to be in charge of science and education in our country.

¹ Issued March 16, 2010.

² Sometimes called "Galicia," although its name derives from its historic capital, Halych.

Ukraine needs greater unification and more culture. Our education and science need a real leap in quality. We need to improve our ability to compete in the global arena. Our universities need more autonomy. These are the tasks that cannot be undertaken by someone like Dmytro Tabachnyk because the humanities cannot be built on hatred and lies.

Let's not be indifferent today because our pupils and students will never forgive us tomorrow! Real teaching starts by example, including standing up for your own dignity. We're calling on you to publicly come out against Dmytro Tabachnyk, a person who is unacceptable in the important, responsible post of Science and Education Minister.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Needs Public Support¹

Dear colleagues and partners,

Ukraine's Minister of Education and Science Dmytro Tabachnyk—an individual well known for his xenophobic pronouncements regarding the Ukrainian language, culture and people widely disseminated through YouTube.com—has launched an open attack on the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (KMA).

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is not just one of the oldest universities in eastern and southern Europe, soon to mark its 400th anniversary, but today this institution is one of the most prestigious universities in Ukraine, one where research and education work together according to the highest of world standards. KMA is currently the one Ukrainian university that is most integrated into the European Higher Education Area, as well as the first in independent Ukraine to introduce bachelor's, master's, and now PhD programs. We are the only Ukrainian university to be officially bilingual: in addition to Ukrainian, our second working language is English. KMA offers a system of liberal arts education that allows students to freely choose courses and to design their own educational trajectory. KMA is the only university in Ukraine where corruption does not work.

¹ Issued December 10, 2010.

Minister of Education Tabachnyk seeks to nullify all of these achievements in the following manner:

Firstly, by forbidding English as a second language of instruction at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Since Kyiv-Mohyla Academy reopened in 1991, every applicant to the university has been required to demonstrate a working knowledge of English, that is, a level sufficient to be able to understand lectures, fully utilize the university library, access international research publications, and—after several years of study in their subject-area—to eventually embark on joint research with colleagues from Western European and North American universities.

Mr. Tabachnyk believes that knowledge of English at the entry level in university is “unnecessary” and has threatened to cause problems if Kyiv-Mohyla Academy continues to require proficiency in English as part of its admissions policies.

Secondly, by forbidding the inclusion of certain declared rights in Kyiv-Mohyla Academy’s statutes. These currently allow the University to independently set its own human resource policy, including to independently determine academic ranks and to independently determine teaching, research and other loads for which its faculty and staff are paid salaries; to establish PhD programs; to allow students to freely choose their specialty area from educational cycle to cycle (for example, to apply to a Master’s program in a different field than that completed at the bachelor’s level—a generally accepted practice worldwide).

Thirdly, through his efforts to promote a new Law “On Higher Education” that negates the principle of university autonomy, whether academic, fiscal or organizational, and is therefore antithetical to the principles of the European Higher Education Area. For example, the proposed bill simply renames the soviet-era degree of “candidate of sciences” as a “PhD” without introducing structured programming; interdisciplinary education becomes legally impossible at the program level; and it ignores the needs of the domestic economy and employers completely. The bill also makes no mention of the European Credit Transfer System and proposes no national strategy for life-long learning. According to this bill, the status of a university will be deter-

mined, not according to quality and performance, but exclusively according to quantitative measures. Thus, only an institution with at least 10,000 full-time students will be a “classical university.” With a student body of just over 3,500, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is likely to lose its “university” status.

We appeal to you to publicly support the position of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in our stand against the self-isolation of Ukrainian universities, and against the further degradation of research and education in Ukraine.

KMA Files Suit Against the Ministry of Education¹

The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has filed a lawsuit at the district Administrative Court in Kyiv to challenge the efforts of the Ministry of Education to prohibit cross-over admissions into Master’s degree programs at KMA.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy introduced its Master’s program, two years prior to Ukraine’s nationwide implementation, as a second tier of higher learning in 1996, based on models implemented throughout the world. Since 1998, the anomalous principle of direct correspondence between Bachelor and Master Degree program qualifications is being adhered to even though it violates Ukraine’s current law “On Higher Education.”

For example, in Ukraine, a person with a Bachelor in physics can only apply to a Master’s program in physics, a history student to a Master’s in history. A financial advisor does not have the right to apply for a program in economic theory; a specialist in culture cannot cross over to philosophy, and so on. This idiosyncratic approach is in contradiction to multi-disciplinary and mobility strategies that are practiced in the European Union’s higher education and even in Russia. It also impacts the educational process negatively, as well as the quality of higher learning. Nowhere in the world, except in Ukraine, is a Master’s pro-

¹ Original release issued in December 2012.

gram applicant challenged over the discipline of their Bachelor's. They simply need to successfully pass the entrance exam and have the necessary credits.

Over the past 30 months, Dmytro Tabachnyk has attempted to eliminate the requirement of English as a second working language at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and to rewrite the Statutes of this University. Currently, Mohylyanka—and all Ukrainian institutions of higher learning—cannot increase, or even make more flexible, their requirements of graduates. These must uniformly conform to the “List of competitive subjects in the Ukrainian Center for Assessing Educational Quality certification, indicating the number of points with which an applicant is allowed to compete for admission to study in the areas of.” For instance, English language certification is obviously necessary for all of our graduates. The very existence of such a government list cripples the autonomous functioning of universities. Institutions of higher learning are quite capable of assessing how many and what kinds of certification they require.

The reappointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk as Minister of Education will inevitably lead to a further degradation in Ukraine's higher education, and to the discreditation of the achievements of its academic world and the general public—especially independent external evaluation and the Bill “On Higher Education” drafted by a working group led by Kyiv Polytechnical University Rector Mykhailo Zhurovskiy.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy considers the demands of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport that KMA cancel “cross-over” rights for Master's programs to be an encroachment on its educational process in which students shape their own learning trajectory. This system became the basis of the quality of education at KMA. Instead of studying and implementing successful foreign and domestic models of higher learning in Ukraine, Mr. Tabachnyk continues a strategy of isolation through a crude unification policy in higher education in Ukraine.

Our lawsuit seeks to protect the public and national interest with regard to the need to improve the quality of Ukrainian universities and their competitiveness in the international arena.

Prospects for Higher Education in Post-Orange Ukraine¹

I'd like to talk about changes in higher education in Ukraine, following the gains of the new ruling team led by Party of the Regions and President Yanukovich. For professionals, a close analysis of the situation provides a lot of news and surprises. To some extent, the processes in Ukraine today are helpful to better understand the situation in the entire post-soviet region. At the end, I will try to clarify how exactly a program of radical reforms in science and education might be implemented in Ukraine.

What I should mention, first of all, is that the victorious Orange Revolution in 2004, which was a reflection of the Ukrainian nation's ambition to develop a more effective democratic state, did not lead to the necessary reforms in any area—and science and education were no exception. Centuries of being part of the Russian empire, and especially the soviet decades where the empire showed its worst face, numbed Ukrainians to the tyrannical, unresponsive kind of leader who treats corruption as the norm and, no matter what the conditions, cares only about personal aggrandizement, not about the development of the country, let alone undertaking reforms or serving the public interest. That's how colonial Ukraine lived and it moved into its post-colonial phase largely unchanged. That is why a change of ruling parties in Ukraine has not actually meant qualitative change among politicians and their programs. Whether they voted for one political force or another, Ukrainians often just found that one corrupt set-up had changed into another one, nothing more.

For higher education, all the old post-totalitarian aspects are still in place, including rampant corruption, no university autonomy, a complete separation of scientific research from the study process—there is a firm conviction that universities are for studying and that “real” research takes place at the institutes of the National Academy of Sciences—, and insufficient command of English in the academic community. At the

¹ Original speech at the University of Western Ontario and the University of Toronto. Post date: April 22, 2011.

same time, the new people in power have somewhat changed their attitude towards educational policy.

Unlike the “Orange” government, the “Blue&White” team has largely abandoned the rhetoric of reform. There is no longer even much lip service to the idea of change and reform. What we typically see is quite the reverse: those who oppose reforms defend them ardently in public. But, in our case, the last Education Minister¹ harassed university rectors so much through his inability to understand administrative processes and his penchant for window-dressing, that the new Minister rushed to assure the academic community that there would be no reforms, that everything would stay the way it was before, ensuring the loyalty of the academic community is Job 1. Unfortunately, these promises are in line with the reasoning of most Ukrainian rectors, who believe that “we used to live happily before, and everything used to be all right,” meaning that soviet education was great and there was no need at all to trouble anyone’s head about the Bologna process. By the way, for Ukraine, this process means not only European integration in science and education, but a total change of the rules of the game through integration into the western system.

One feature of the new reality is that there are no causes to resent the abolishment of educational reforms compared to previous administrations. The fact is that the Orange team failed to undertake deep enough reforms in science and education. One educational reform, changing entrance rules, was passed but the post-soviet nature of Ukraine’s universities remained unchanged. The Orange government did not understand that only high-quality, autonomous universities were in a position to request this kind of change and that reforms needed to start with such institutions. Instead, an honest and transparent entrance procedure was introduced at corrupt, poor-quality universities. Today’s leaders are not strategic thinkers, either. Like their predecessors, they have no idea what Ukraine should be in 5, 20 or 50 years. And they don’t see universities as the core of shaping a knowledge society.

Abandoning the rhetoric of reform means coming up with another agenda, basically a new concept. Rapprochement with Russia is being

¹ Ivan Vakarchuk, former rector of Ivan Franko National University in Lviv.

proposed as an alternative to European integration, and devotion to the so-called “Russian model” is being demonstrated. Vladimir Putin has found a very dubious name for his model: sovereign democracy. In practice, it is based on corruption and kleptocracy, rigidly centralized authority—essentially a revival of the tsarist regime—, along with state capitalism, restricted civic freedoms—especially free speech—, propaganda, an aggressive foreign policy, and xenophobia. For the current government in Ukraine, the “effectiveness” of the Russian model is associated with hopes of a strong state authority to replace the “Orange chaos.” But the reality is demonstrating, step by step, that this model is totally ineffective for Ukraine.

Why? Because, unlike Russian society, Ukrainian society demands freedom of speech, takes authority with a grain of salt, and defers political interests to business interests. Although Ukrainian culture can be identified as post-totalitarian and post-colonial, it is not imperial. For now, Viktor Yanukovich’s ambitions to develop a strong central authority in the Russian fashion involve abasing the Ukrainian language and culture, disregarding the collective memory of Ukrainians, and rejecting historical evidence, in particular regarding the Holodomor.¹ Nevertheless, it would be not appropriate to perceive Party of the Regions as simply a network of Russian agents, even if some of them do nothing to hide their subordination to the Kremlin. The problem is that post-soviet political elites have no inkling of the factors that consolidate a nation, a society or a state. In education, the “Russian model” means no university autonomy and leaving all the leverage in the hands of state authorities, including fiscal, administrative and political control over universities. For me, the Ukrainian model will soon force political leaders to find new, pluralistic models, which will inevitably affect educational policy.

The style of the new Ukrainian administration, in many aspects, is not especially new. In education, we also see a continuation of the practice of focusing on processes, not results. The main thing is not developing high-quality, competitive universities, but looking busy for the purpose of avoiding real changes. Every political force in Ukraine is

¹ The soviet-made famine of 1933 that killed an estimated 3 to 7 million rural Ukrainians, mostly in central and eastern Ukraine.

afraid of radical changes, because such changes might have a negative impact on the image of the political force during the next election. Here, Party of the Regions is demonstrating the same flaws as the Orange administration. That is why the prefix “post-” in the term “post-Orange reality” indicates not quality, but simply a relationship in time.

The best example of imitation of activity is the continuation of fruitless, dilatory work on a new bill on higher education. The real purpose of this law, now, seems to be to introduce new terms for malingering soviet concepts, without any fundamental changes. In establishing a nominal three-cycle system of higher education (bachelor’s-master’s-PhD degrees), the government and Verkhovna Rada are, in fact, conserving the old soviet system. On one hand, the “candidate of sciences” degree, which was a transitional degree, has now been declared equal to PhD. On the other, the degree of “doctor of sciences” is preserved, which is a strictly soviet concept.

Another typically soviet anachronism, the All-Ukrainian Attestation Committee with its highly centralized authority over the defense of all dissertations, has been given new life. Any innovations in the bill are so exotic, that there is often no professional or even logical reasoning behind them. For example, in defiance of Ukraine’s Bologna commitments, Ukraine has reintroduced an 11-year public school term instead of 12 years. And to gain the status of university, an institution of higher education must now have at least 6,000 or 8,000 full-time students, depending on the level. Once again, quantitative criteria override qualitative ones.

The reform of science and higher education in Ukraine can happen in two ways: by radically changing the whole system, or by developing successful pilot projects. If the political team that came to power in Ukraine together with President Yanukovich continues to concentrate on self-aggrandizement and a rollback of civil liberties, a new social uprising will occur, which could finally lead to the radical reforms ignored by the Yushchenko Administration after the Orange Revolution. I am more inclined to believe that the real power in this Administration will gradually shift to the more pragmatic wing of Party of the Regions, represented by big business. Once that happens, the question of educational reforms will be placed on the agenda once more—but strictly on a pragmatic basis.

In this case, the market concept of university autonomy as a way to success will become important for those who can take advantage of it.

The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy shows how a post-secondary institution can work effectively and be free of corruption in Ukraine today. In some sense, KMA is a pilot project, but it is not the result of a state initiative. All the positive changes that have taken place in Ukraine's higher education since independence have been tested at our university, including launching the first Bachelor's, Master's and PhD programs. Today, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has the only Doctoral School in Ukraine, including the first 7 PhD programs, all on its own resources. The step-by-step implementation of a three-cycle system of higher education and the launching of some innovative programs at KMA both took place despite state policy, not thanks to it, and the university has found itself in conflict with the government at various points. Among the KMA's unique features are: two working languages (Ukrainian and English), the Liberal Arts principle that allows students to determine their own trajectory of study, and an original system of entrance exams that test both the level of knowledge and level of aptitude.

The success of the KMA project is the result of the efforts of the entire Ukrainian nation or, using modern terms, of Ukrainian civil society, which has long deserved a qualitative breakthrough to the knowledge society. For one thing, all Ukrainian governments after 2004 will be called "post-Orange." It means that their success, as well as the success of their political opponents, will depend directly on their understanding of this fact, and how well they carry out the tasks that the Ukrainian people placed on the national agenda during the days of the Orange Revolution.

Speech for Academy Day, 2011¹

This has not been an easy year for us at Kyiv-Mohyla. It was a year of opposition and struggle. But I want to stress that we are not just speaking out "against" something, but first of all "in support of" something.

¹ October 2011.

In support of our rights and freedoms, in support of our achievements, in support of the uniqueness of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, in support of reforms in science and education in Ukraine—so that we can live in a just and prosperous country.

Today, I want to stress two things.

First, no matter what, the main purpose of our university is to provide academic excellence and rigor. This is the foundation upon which all our plans stand: plans for development, for reduced academic loads, for our campus in Podil to expand, for promoting the progressive bill “On Higher Education,” and finally, for KMA to join international rankings. Academic excellence is the way forward and our vision, so that is why we must concentrate the efforts of the Mohyla community, of the Board of Trustees, of the Alumni Association on these goals.

Second, Mohylyanka’s main capital is its people: our unique staff, our professional faculty and our hard-working students. This is how it has been, and this is how it must always be. Therefore, I want to express sincere gratitude to our faculty and staff members for their devoted work and professionalism, to our students for their active position and intellectual curiosity, and to our friends in Ukraine and all over the world for their support of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

The past year has confirmed our steadfastness and our ability to survive. Congratulations to all of you on Academy Day and all the best to you.

Public Debate in Higher Education: The Case of KMA¹

In 2005, soon after the Orange Revolution, I participated in a seminar on university autonomy at the University of Cambridge. While there, I asked the Vice Rector of the university what he considered the key factors for starting innovative projects or implementing radical reform in higher education. His response was that there were three things

¹ Original speech at the Mykola Zerov Center for Ukrainian Studies, Monash University, Australia, April 26, 2012.

necessary for the success of any such initiative: tradition, the right people and trust. I then turned to a member of our delegation, an official from the Presidential Administration, and said, "Did you hear that? That's about trust." The official's response was quite predictable: "There is no such concept in Ukrainian law!"

This response is a good illustration of the typical response of a government official to the academic community's desire for university autonomy in Ukraine. At that time, we were dealing with the political reality of the Orange government, which declared a policy of renewal of public institutions, including higher education, and enjoyed a huge level of public trust, giving it broad support among Ukrainian voters. Unfortunately, educational reforms did not take place then—and have not started to this day.

KMA as a role model

On the other hand, I can state with a degree of pride in our university, as a matter of fact, that all the most important innovations introduced into Ukraine's system of higher education began at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Our university was the first to establish western-style Bachelor's, Master's and PhD programs in Ukraine. Although the government committed to complying with the principles and requirements of the Bologna process to replace its soviet-style postgraduate education with western curricula and PhD programs in all universities by 2010, it still has not done so, so the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is not just the first, but also the only Ukrainian institution of higher learning that has established eight PhD programs, which are integrated in the Doctoral School.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's Liberal Arts program enables our students to choose their own path of study. They can also complete additional certified programs, known in the West as minors, in other specialties and departments, and they can enter Master's programs in specialties that differ from their Bachelor's majors. These options are not available at other universities in Ukraine.

But what is really amazing, our university has kept corruption at bay, it has two working languages—Ukrainian and English—, and it has a

unique system of entrance testing. All these very important changes in higher education brought our university to leading positions in all national rankings of post-secondary institutions. Some of these changes were adapted later at the national level, but many are still not available at other universities in the country.

The KMA educational system enabled us to form a unique community of students and faculty, for whom values like quality, integrity, ethics, patriotism, openness to the world, innovation, and critical thinking shape goals. Our goals include reaching the ranks of the world's best universities and being a catalyst of fundamental change for the betterment of Ukraine's system of education and for building our state and civil society. It was at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy that the press center and headquarters of the Orange Revolution operated in late 2004 and early 2005.

When the Vice Rector of Cambridge University noted that "tradition, the right people, and trust" are needed to implement innovation and change successfully, I realized that we at KMA have a very strong basis for success because our university was founded on these fundamental principles in 1615—and these traditions have been carried forth for centuries and generations.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's graduates include many prominent political leaders, academics, philosophers, writers, and artists throughout the ages. Yet both tsarist and soviet governments treated the first university in the Russian Empire—situated in Ukraine—with great suspicion and attempted to suppress dissidence and opposition. During the soviet period, a Naval Political School was opened on the premises of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in order to prevent free scholarship—despite the fact that Kyiv is more than 500 km from the sea!

KMA's first president, Viacheslav Briukhovetskiy, re-opened the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine proclaimed its independence. The almost-mythical image of the "ancient Academy" was preserved in the historical memory of the Ukrainian people. We at the Academy have assumed the mantle of the experience of our nation and the facts of history to continue the traditions of our cultural heritage for future generations.

KMA gained its unique position among the rest of Ukrainian universities due to its responsible stance towards society, so Ukrainian society has given us back public trust in our actions. Trust is also the intangible bond that holds the academic community of our university in a cohesive unit of mutual understanding and intellectual growth. Every event at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy instantly becomes a newsmaker. We have calculated that, during the last academic year, there were over 17 posts about the university published daily in Ukrainian media.

The coming of the anti-Ukrainian Education Minister

With this combination of history and accomplishments, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy entered 2010, when Party of the Regions won the presidential election and took over power. The new political reality was marked by a change in approach and the virtual absence of an educational policy. A new, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric took the stage, voiced by Dmytro Tabachnyk, the current Minister of Education. A man known for his anti-Ukrainian position and regressive preference for centralized control, he poses a threat to Ukraine's democratic future.

The new threats required us to act decisively. On March 16, 2010, I appealed to our academic community to oppose the appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk to the Ministry, and his damaging policies toward Ukrainian education and the entire field of humanities. His statements demeaning the Ukrainian people and language, denying Ukraine's history, even rewriting it, are an attack on our nation and deny the young generation of Ukrainians a sense of identity and future.

Moreover, Minister Tabachnyk tried to ban the use of English as the second working language at KMA. He also attempted to change the university statutes, depriving us of those distinctions that enabled Kyiv-Mohyla Academy to be a leader and a test-site for innovations in higher education in Ukraine.

Later, on Dec. 10, after Tabachnyk presented a new Bill "On Higher Education," hoping to rush it through the Verkhovna Rada by the end of 2010, I called a press conference and presented two documents. The first one was an open letter to the President of Ukraine, the Speaker and

the Premier, in which I stated that the bill was designed to degrade higher education in Ukraine. The second was an appeal to our colleagues and partners for support. In a short time, we received letters of support from dozens of foreign partner universities. In Ukraine, the only university that declared public support to our position was the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. And since that time, the struggle for a better Bill "On Higher Education" became the primary objective of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Our call was supported by various public initiatives, including student protests, which proved the most effective. These efforts grew into a broad public debate with the participation of the academic community, independent experts, journalists, and leaders of student organizations. These activities attracted public attention to the problems in education. As part of this process, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy published a book titled, "The Time of the Cheap Clown. Education in Ukraine: A challenge through pseudo-reforms" (2011). The title refers to a colloquial expression used about Minister Tabachnyk.

Through this active campaign, we managed to defend English as a working language at the university, as well as other distinguishing features that were codified in the new university statute approved in March 2011. Four times, we managed to block Tabachnyk's pro-soviet, Russian model of bill on its way to the legislature. We defended academic freedom, university autonomy and the right to innovate and reform an outdated system.

The Minister's purpose is clearly to keep Ukraine within the post-soviet mental and political zone dominated by Russia, and to put obstacles in the way of Ukraine's integration into the European Higher Education Area.

But Ukraine is fundamentally different from Russia. Despite all the threats to democracy in recent years, we have two important achievements from the Orange Revolution: freedom of speech and political competition. Ukrainian voters do not accept authoritarianism. Moreover, unlike the Russian state, which relies on oil resources, the Ukrainian government has no surplus natural resources, so the country has to rely on other sources of capital to develop science and education. And these

must be based in real market-based policies and structural changes in the domestic economy, which means opening to the world and integrating into the European Union and global economies. This integration is also the way to raise the competitiveness of Ukraine's universities.

The birth of a better bill on education

Broad public debate and the determined efforts of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy have resulted in three Bills "On Higher Education:" the first one from the Cabinet, that is, Tabachnyk's, and two alternative bills presented by Deputy Yuriy Myroshnichenko and another by Deputies Arseniy Yatseniuk and Lesia Orobets. KMA experts actively participated in all the related working groups, offering their own visions of the necessary changes.

The Government's change of attitude toward the Bill "On Higher Education" was a turning point that can be considered a victory in our struggle on this issue. Quite unexpectedly, in January 2012, Premier Mykola Azarov sent the bill back to the academic community for revision, and appointed Mykhailo Zhurovskiy, Rector of the National Technical University at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (KPI), chair of the Working Group. Ironically, Minister Tabachnyk had been trying unsuccessfully for months to remove Dr. Zhurovskiy from his rectorship.

This working group consisted mainly of members of KPI and KMA, leaders of student organizations, and independent experts. There were also members from other universities, the National Academy of Sciences, the Presidential Administration, the Union of Employers, trade unions, and educational NGOs. The group prepared a new version of the bill, which was largely based on the concept offered by Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. The group worked by consensus, to assure that all interested parties would feel included and would support the final document. We considered some 4,000 proposals from over 100 different organizations and institutions.

The new bill properly provides academic, organizational and financial autonomy for universities. It is based on the understanding that reform of higher education means reform of universities, that university autonomy reflects the autonomy of the state, that the main task of all

these reforms is to ensure better equality education, teaching and research, and, finally, that the level of academic research is the main factor of merit for a modern university.

These concepts seem like a revolutionary approach in Ukrainian society today. The soviets separated higher education from academic research back in the 1920s. Their concept was that universities were for learning, and “academic institutions” for research. In the new bill, special attention is paid to the re-integration of research and education, quality assurance, the protection of intellectual property, social security for students, the development of links between higher education and domestic industry, business and labor markets.

European integration as part of the Bologna process was also among the main objectives of the new bill. The new draft introduces a third cycle of education, the PhD, cultivates the principle of interdisciplinary studies, and grants universities the right to recognize the foreign diplomas of potential faculty and to develop their own programs and curricula.

After over six weeks of work, the consensus-based working group presented the new bill to the Government on March 7. The Premier publicly promised several times that this bill would be introduced in the Rada. If that indeed happens, Ukraine will gain a progressive law “On Higher Education” and this will be a major achievement with the involvement of civil society. Still, we cannot consider our work done, because a good law is not enough. The next step is to ensure that it works.

KMA as independent, innovative platform

I would like to bring up some other activities of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy with several cases that are emblematic both for our university and for Ukrainian education today. These are part of our university’s daily activities. KMA functions as an independent platform for a variety of public initiatives, especially for those that can find no other venue in Ukraine because of their opposition positions. For example, the civic movements “Stop Censorship” [Stop Tsenzuri] and “Honestly” [Chesno] were started and presented at KMA.

Another example of research, exhibits and presentations that are considered “controversial” in the current political climate is research into the historical memory of the Ukrainian people that extends far beyond the strictly academic areas, because it challenges the official position of the Ministry of Education and the President, who deny internationally that the Great Artificial Famine known as the Holodomor of 1932–1933 was genocide. In these areas, KMA follows on its internal scientific, educational and publishing policies. For example, in October 2010, the well-known American historian Norman Naimark presented his new book, *Stalin’s Genocides*.¹ Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Press obtained rights to translate it into Ukrainian and publish it, and in the spring of 2011, the Ukrainian edition of *Stalin’s Genocides* was presented in Kyiv with the participation of the author. Naimark also attended several meetings, lectured in public and held press conferences. These events were highlighted in the domestic press and provoked discussions in both professional and political circles.

The university’s Doctoral School, the first to introduce PhD programs in Ukraine is demonstrating its first results. The School has agreements with the Universities of Maastricht and Barcelona in Europe, and with the University of Western Ontario in Canada, in recognition of its professional level. This means that, in addition to their PhD degrees from KMA, our graduates can obtain degrees from these universities. Each of the PhD programs has its own partners abroad. In December 2011, EU Education Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou presented the first PhD Diploma in Ukraine to Hanna Bielienka, the first recipient of a KMA PhD degree.

KMA was the first in Ukraine to establish many innovative academic programs, including Social Work, Ecology, Public Health, and Crimean Tatar Studies. Within a short time, we plan to launch new Master Programs in Biotechnology, Theology and Jewish Studies, and a Center for the Advanced Training of IT Specialists.

The Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism is also uniquely for its content: a two-year Master’s Program, a PhD program in Mass Communications, and special programs in New Media for working journalists and

¹ Princeton University Press.

instructors from other universities. This program was developed in close cooperation with our partners in Great Britain, the US, France, Germany, Holland, and Spain.

All of this, every issue and program, in its own way, influences the development of higher education in Ukraine. KMA has become an agent of change, shaping trends and fostering a new agenda for educational reform as part of European integration. Interestingly for Ukraine, rapprochement with the European Union is now primarily associated with values and professional standards.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has lived for nearly 400 years. No other Ukrainian institution has such a long history. In 2015, the Academy will celebrate its 400th anniversary in a new era, with new challenges and new plans for the future.

Social Responsibility and Ukraine's Universities¹

It's not just higher education in Ukraine that reflects a "parallel world" compared to the best standards recognized globally. The whole post-soviet world, except perhaps the Baltic countries, is a unique phenomenon that has not yet been investigated properly. Its typical features include widespread everyday and high-level corruption, contradictory and inconsistent legislation, the policies that are implemented and the way the political elites implementing these policies think, and their tendency to self-isolation.

Ten steps to a better university system

First, Ukrainians must overcome this self-isolation. There is an illusion in Ukraine that it's possible to have quality domestic educational and professional standards that differ from global ones. The glorification of soviet "achievements" seems to ignore the fact that this totalitarian sys-

¹ Original speech at the Annual Conference of Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) in Vancouver, *Education for a Better World: Our Global Social Responsibility*, November 2013.

tem died in and of itself in late 1980s. Instead, the Ukrainian system of education must become a part of the western system, primarily through the Bologna process, because the ability to integrate now is a guarantee and a necessary condition for Ukraine's universities to be competitive.

Second, the goal of integration is to harmonize, not to unify different national systems of education. Establishing independent universities is possible only in independent countries. Although we talk a lot about "globalization," we often forget that the implementation or, conversely, the blockage of different social projects happens not on a global level, but at the national level. Some societies need freedom of speech and modern universities; some have no such a need at all.

Third, the global social responsibility of Ukraine's HEIs is, first of all, part of the constructive role that they can play in society. We won't be able to propose anything valuable to the external world, if we cannot establish a "knowledge society" in Ukraine first. Besides that, this role must be in harmony with those larger tasks that all modern universities assign for themselves in order to change our world for the better.

Fourth, a modern university must have not only global and national visions, but a local mission as well, as it should play an important role in the community in which it is located. Any educational reforms must be based on consensus not just between the academic community and political forces. Society must be the third partner in this consensus. After all, voters are the ones who pay taxes, so they must be active participants in educational reforms.

Fifth, as long as there is no understanding of the meaning and purpose of reforms in post-secondary education in Ukraine and instead of proper state policy we have total chaos in defining priorities, our top priority task must be to pass a new progressive bill "On Higher Education." This issue has been actively debated in Ukraine over the past few years. The rhetoric of European integration must lead to the passage of the bill developed by the Zhurovskiy working group and supported by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Education and Science.

Sixth, Ukraine should reject the soviet notion of universities as an extra burden on the public purse once and for all. The contemporary vision of education presents it, not as just a sector or field, but as the

basis for the complex, sustainable development of an economy, state and society.

Seventh, to accomplish #6, science and education, research and the learning process, need to be integrated. The soviet university and now the post-soviet HEI is not intended for research. In the 1920s, the soviet leadership decided that education was to take place in HEIs, while research was to be conducted in a separate system known as the institutes of the National Academy of Science. We need to end this unnecessary division by changing the structure of universities and the infrastructure of research.

Eighth, Ukrainian universities need to free themselves of the total control of the Ministry on the academic, organizational and financial levels. We have to divide the proper responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science, which is to formulate educational policy, such as education for high-quality human capital, and the responsibility of universities, which is to provide the necessary quality of education. But universities must have full freedom in devising and managing their programs to achieve the proper level of quality.

Ninth, developing innovation and economic potential is also among the tasks of the university. There are two ways to reach this goal: high-quality human capital and up-to-date research. Professional expertise in different fields should play an important role in resolving urgent social problems, such as corruption. In fact, the Ukrainian state needs the support of universities in all aspects of its future development.

Last, but not least, the English language is an important tool for reform, quality improvement and integration. Both the academic community and state officials should properly master this instrument. Real competence in English is a key step away from post-soviet self-isolation, as it offers direct access to information about contemporary educational standards, and globally-recognized forms and methods of learning and teaching.

The matter of reform

Today, Ukraine has about 830 institutions of higher learning, 250 of them universities—a number far beyond what Ukraine's economy can

really afford. Nearly all these HEIs are producing graduates with identical “state standard” diplomas, on the assumption that the state guarantees equal quality among all the HEIs, which is impossible. The domestic industry and labor market do not have any tools to influence the learning process, either.

On the other hand, we hear calls for a “market approach” to higher education, but what is meant is not real competition among universities, but simply a demand that they bring in more income. This concept of self-financing is being circulated despite a total absence of university autonomy. The state wants to have full control over the universities, even in terms of political preferences, while being unable to fund them.

Meanwhile, financial instability in post-soviet and post-totalitarian countries is a factor that has a backhanded positive impact because this is making it possible for HEIs to move towards autonomy and responsibility for their own quality. The problem is that Ukraine had no concept of reforming higher education after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most changes appeared by accident, without any particular planning, and certain innovations have been implemented only at a few universities. The soviet heritage has never been completely eliminated in Ukraine.

That is why Ukraine needs more quality academic cooperation projects, more communication, and greater exchange of experience, knowledge and skills. We also need the academic community and civil society to be more active and the state to pay particular attention to the reformation of higher education. I believe that real reforms in education will take place soon.

Declaration from KMA Faculty and Students¹

We hereby protest strongly against the latest in a series of violent actions undertaken by the government of Ukraine in order to suppress the peaceful protests of the Ukrainian people.

We also call the government’s bluff: having changed constitutional order in Ukraine in an unconstitutional way in September 2010, and

¹ Affirmed at a general meeting of faculty and students at 13:00, December 11, 2013.

having cancelled self-government in the Ukrainian capital, it is only imitating legitimacy.

We know the value of decisions made by kangaroo courts.

We know that Ukrainian police are forced to defend corrupt politicians instead of defending the Law.

We are outraged by the cynicism of the President of Ukraine, who announces his readiness to start a dialog and in the next breath sets riot police against peaceful protesters.

We demand that our government come to its senses and stop the violence immediately.

We call on the academic community of Kyiv and Ukraine and all people who feel concern for Ukraine's future to defend democracy and our future together.

Glory to Ukraine! Slava Ukraini!

On Events in Ukraine¹

The bloody events of February 18–19 have moved Viktor Yanukovich's regime to a position completely outside of the law. Ukraine's governing politicians have begun a war against their own people, who have been defending their dignity and their rights.

In view of this, we call on:

- Our compatriots – to stop the fratricide and bloodshed!
- Police authorities – to refuse to follow criminal orders and to remember the oath of duty they made to the people of Ukraine;
- Ukrainian officers – to recall their honor and dignity, to protect the lives of their compatriots, the sovereignty of Ukraine, and to defend the Ukrainian people from the onslaught of dictatorship;
- The academic community – to stop the teaching process until the bloodshed is over.

Glory to Ukraine!

On behalf of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy:

Serhiy Kvit

Viacheslav Briukhovetskiy

¹ February 19, 2014.

Volodymyr Vasylenko
Liudmyla Diachenko
Volodymyr Morenets
Vasyl Ozhogan
Volodymyr Panchenko
Larysa Chovniuk
Natalia Shumkova
Tetiana Yaroshenko

Reforming Ukraine's Universities During a Crisis¹

First of all, let's decide what we mean by "crisis." Since the Soviet Union collapsed, the entire political and economic life of Ukraine could be considered in a permanent crisis. Even those brief periods that were originally assessed positively, later were labeled as crises. This was particularly true of the disappointing non-performance of the Orange Administration.

Under the next president, Viktor Yanukovych, with ukrainophobe Dmytro Tabachnyk appointed Minister of Education and Science and responsible for humanitarian policy, there was a clear crisis among domestic universities. This time was characterized by xenophobic attacks on the Ukrainian language, history and culture by Russian chauvinists. At the same time, corruption spread incredibly and was controlled right from the Ministry.

From a professional point of view, the public policy of that time was not what we would call self-sufficient, but stemmed more from an attitude of isolation—a siege mentality. We can see the same in Vladimir Putin's behavior today, but there is one significant difference: Putin puts the interests of Russia—as he understands them—at the center. Viktor Yanukovych's main goal was self-aggrandizement. And so, Ukrainian universities were doomed to decline.

¹ Original lecture at the Center for Russian, East European and Russian Studies (CREERS) at Stanford University, February 11, 2015. Accessed: <https://creers.stanford.edu/event/reforming-ukraine%E2%80%99s-universities-during-crisis>.

It's important to understand that the soviet system of higher education and scientific research actually ceased to exist at the end of 1980s, along with the totalitarian soviet system's loss of control over all aspects of university life. A new system is in the process of being built since the Euromaidan, starting with the new progressive law "On Higher Education" that was passed by the Verkhovna Rada last summer. Its implementation is one of the main objectives of the Ministry of Education and Science today.

Job 1: Integration and Autonomy

Let's start by looking at several elements that are likely to characterize this process.

The first one is the very name of our Ministry, the Ministry of Education and Science. It contains a serious contradiction. In the 1920's the soviet government separated scientific research from higher education, dramatically breaking the structure of Ukrainian universities and the infrastructure of scientific research. But the goal was to have easier control over intellectual life and scientific work at universities and the research institutes of the National Academy of Sciences.

It means that now we have to a really important mission: to integrate higher education into scientific research, and research into universities, because they cannot effectively exist apart. Our plan is to unite research and educational institutions, to encourage joint Master's and PhD programs, to finance all research projects in Ukraine from one consolidated fund. The newly passed Law "On Higher Education" helps us in this, as well as a Bill "On Science and Scientific Research" that will be considered by the Rada in March. We need to change the structure of Ukrainian universities and the infrastructure of scientific research, as well as to overcome post-soviet isolation and integrate into global educational and research efforts.

The second major step is to introduce university autonomy in Ukraine. The Law "On Higher Education" is based on the principle of university autonomy—academic, financial and organizational. The academic community, experts, social activists, leaders of student organiza-

tions, trade unions, and journalists have worked together to draft this Concept of Higher Education since 2005, immediately after the Orange Revolution. We worked on the text of this Law for 3 years during the Yanukovich Administration and that was not easy. And finally, this Law was adopted, becoming one of the first fruits of the Euromaidan revolution.

Job 2: After revolution, resolution

The problem is that Ukrainians are very active when it comes to participation in the protest process, in making the revolution, but they are not active enough in participating in the political process, in ensuring resolution. We have no problem with organizing victorious revolutions, only with their consequences. I mean that Ukrainians sometimes lack a healthy rationalism. In short, university autonomy is important for Ukrainians mostly as an ideal towards which we must strive. It is a goal, not just a reasonable way of achieving quality learning, teaching and research. Such attitudes need to be changed.

For example, a big media debate over “certain mandatory humanities subjects” has just ended in Ukraine. During the soviet period, all universities had to teach a special set of mandatory ideological Marxist-Leninist disciplines. The goal was to demonstrate the political advantages of the totalitarian communist system, including the centralized, planned economy, and the “exceptional” international significance of the Russian language and culture. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this set was exchanged for a new one: mandatory disciplines with the main focus being the history of Ukraine, the Ukrainian language, philosophy and the history of Ukrainian culture.

Such an approach could be justified in post-soviet Ukraine, with its heritage of a couple of centuries of russification, communist brainwashing, colonialism and totalitarianism. Meanwhile, soviet political consciousness was largely conserved in eastern Ukraine, where the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian war is being waged right now. This means that local people, affected by the influence of Russian propaganda, felt, not like Russians opposing Ukraine, but primarily soviet people—sovky—

who cannot accept the loss of the Soviet Union, with all its symbols and attributes.

We are talking about a humanitarian and ideological problem that could specifically be resolved with the help of a good education, language skills, the ability to travel the world—and deep economic reforms, of course. After the new Law “On Higher Education” was adopted, we began to look at reorganizing the educational process to global standards.

Among others, this is about the freedom of students to choose disciplines that are not directly related to their specialization and about competition among faculties within a university. The entire idea of mandatory subjects should disappear, ultimately. But a huge wave of protests arose in response, with people arguing that this is not the time for university autonomy in Ukraine if students lose the opportunity to listen to mandatory courses in the humanities.

In fact, it is time for freedom of choice, especially considering the price that has been paid for the opportunity to choose. However, it is very likely that there will be a certain number of rectors who will say that their universities do not need English or Ukrainian or the humanities. And indeed, some threats that might accompany the institution of university autonomy in Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, the Ministry of Education and Science decided to provide guidelines for a transition period, on how the procedures of “choosing” should be carried out at universities, that is, how students will choose and register for the disciplines that they choose freely, and how to reduce the teacher workload from 900 to 600 hours per year, in order to allow more time for research and other professional work.

For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, the Ministry of Education is in a strange position: we have been encouraging and sometimes even coercing universities into being autonomous. We refuse to provide total control, the way conservative university management used to. Such inconsistencies are temporary. They point to real changes that are taking place in the academic life of Ukraine.

Reforms are finally going deeper and bringing changes. Within one school year after the adoption of the Law “On Higher Education,” the

number of HEIs dropped from 802 to 317. By the summer, there will be about 270 universities. This reduction in the number of HEIs is correlated with an increase in quality, provided by various new professional requirements, such as the third cycle of education and structured PhD programs. Another change was setting up a fundamentally new body under the Cabinet of Ministers: the National Agency for Quality Assurance, which will function professionally independent of the Government and the universities alike.

Job 3: Mitigating the risks of reform

The third issue concerns the risks that the new Law brings. The reform of higher education is primarily the reform of universities themselves, by increasing university quality and competitiveness on a global scale. Ukrainian universities are moving away from the obsessive patronage of the state, including political control, to complete autonomy in decision-making. Yet this reform also contains a number of serious threats, the biggest of which is the possibility that some rectors will create medieval fiefdoms, once they are allowed to decide basic issues on their own.

That's why we not only have to encourage the activity of university communities, but also to provide the conditions for their true will to be reflected in the election of rectors. Previously, there was much room for manipulation of public opinion at universities by incumbents who wanted to be re-elected for another term. The Ministry of Education and Science also used to intervene in the process at the stage of signing contracts.

The new Law "On Higher Education" introduces direct elections of rectors at Ukrainian universities. The right to vote is granted to all full-time professors, as well as staffers and students on a quota basis, each group having 15% of the vote. This system replaces voting by a general assembly composed of delegates from various departments, as the most manipulation occurred during the selection of delegates.

Ukrainians today do not trust local or central governments, which could appoint rectors to universities. Similarly, boards of trustees lack any real influence because it is currently impossible to support a univer-

sity through open fundraising. So, the opinion shared by the university community today is the most appropriate instrument in the selection of an acceptable main candidate.

Soviet anomalies inside the public administration system pose another big threat. A lot of government employees show an absolute failure to understand why it is essential that universities be financially independent. Thus, along with implementing new regulations and laws, it's important to replace people responsible for executive decisions across the board.

Job 4: Financial autonomy and the case of VW

Meanwhile, private universities are not yet in a position to compete with the state-run ones. The majority of Ukrainians cannot afford to pay the cost of a higher education. Because private institutions have been deprived of any state support, the admissions process is based on who can pay for tuition. Like state-run institutions, there is nearly no academic research conducted there, either. The new Law "On Higher Education" gives the state an opportunity to fund private universities. For now, however, most high-quality universities in Ukraine are state-run, with few exceptions.

Since the beginning of 2015, Ukraine's state universities and research institutes finally have the right to open accounts in banks and to be served at banks. Before, financial matters could only be handled through the Treasury. This decision was preceded by a real lobbying war, but eventually the Government made the right decision. After all, academic autonomy is impossible without financial autonomy.

Raising additional funds for the development of higher education and research is one of the primary tasks for leaders of scientific schools and heads of educational institutions. A very interesting example is the relationship between the Ministry of Education and Science and the Volkswagen International Corporation. In January 2015, VW representatives appealed to the Ministry for support for the carmaker's traditional project, which for years funded cooperation among Ukrainian, Russian and German research institutions.

We responded with a proposal to slightly shift the emphasis of the project and to support cooperation between Ukrainian and German institutions, including those of our institutions that have been evacuated from the occupied territories and from war-torn regions of Ukraine. There are already 25 such institutions, including 16 universities. However, Volkswagen ended the dialog with the Ministry and announced the call for proposals in its original version, which included the participation of Russians.

As it was not a question of supporting cooperation among independent, critical-thinking intellectuals from the three countries, but the question of scientific and technical cooperation, the Ministry issued a public statement and called Ukrainian researchers to boycott the Volkswagen competition. We must remember that Putin's Russia is the aggressor country. Ukraine is in the midst of an undeclared war with an active military front, fending off the Russian army and its proxies. This is also a struggle for essential reforms across the entire society.

Crisis? What crisis? We have a war!

Getting back to the title of my speech, I would like to point out that there is no crisis in Ukraine. This word is nothing but a euphemism that is widespread in the West. This country was first robbed by a president and his gang, then infiltrated by foreign soldiers and territory illegally annexed, then attacked by the largest army in Europe, and now we are fighting a war for real independence. Ukraine is in the midst of a real war, even if undeclared. So we really need help. Expressing our gratitude to the American people and to the entire international community for their various support, I would like to talk about the kind of help we need in the academic community. This applies to those spheres in which Ukraine is not experienced enough.

First of all, increased innovation culture should be promoted through sharing experience, seminars, roundtables and workshops involving international experts. The necessary innovative disciplines such as innovation and investment management, competitiveness management, innovative economy, and so on, should be implemented at Ukrainian universities.

Next is the development of venture business. US companies engaged in venture capital activities could contribute to the partnership with a “small business innovation support fund,” an innovative non-bank state financial and credit institution managed by the Ministry of Education and Science.

Thirdly, we are ready to discuss the possibility of establishing a joint Ukrainian-American project to organize foresight research, to familiarize Ukrainian university supervisors and departments heads dealing with intellectual property protection and technology transfer with how technical advances are commercialized at major US universities.

Fourthly, the state support mechanisms and tools to commercialize cutting-edge technological advances should be studied by experts from those Ukrainian ministries that form innovative and economic policy: the Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance.

The fifth is that university labs and special research institutions require significant hardware upgrades. The equipment does not necessarily have to be new, but it is really important for us to get support for this today.

These are our main proposals for support and cooperation. Ukrainians won the Euromaidan Revolution. We crushed Yanukovich’s totalitarian regime, which was backed by Putin. And now we are on the right path to the most important reforms. I believe that Ukraine’s universities will go through the necessary systemic changes and will compete with the best universities in the world.

How Reforming Higher Education Can Benefit Science¹

Once in a while, Ukraine breaks into the global news with a dramatic event: the first was the 1985 accident at Chornobyl (1986), then came the Orange Revolution in 2004, and nearly 10 years later, Euromaidan

¹ Original speech at the American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting, February 14, 2015, San Jose. Accessed: <https://aaas.confex.com/aaas/2015/webprogram/Paper14309.html>.

captured the world's attention. While they seem to have no problem with arranging truly grand revolutions, Ukrainians seem to have real difficulties carrying out the changes on whose behalf these revolutions took place. And the reform of higher education is one of these changes.

Let's start with some recent statistics. Education in Ukraine was ranked 42nd in the 2014 Ranking of Higher Education Systems. In the 2013 World Economic Forum rankings, Ukraine was 10th for the percentage of its population with a higher education, 28th for the quality of maths and sciences education, 46th for the presence of scientific and engineering personnel, and 69th for the quality of its research institutions.

Back in 2000, total public spending on education was 4.2% of GDP, while spending on higher education was 1.3%. By 2010, it had risen to 7.4% and 2.3%, and in 2013, it contracted slightly, to 7.3% and 2.1%. As one report notes, "Ukraine constantly puts a high level of public spending into education, with a tendency to increase, which is in line with best world practice. It is a pity that Ukraine's GDP is low, which prevents educational funding from reaching a level of that could ensure sustainable development."¹ Private investment in education, and particularly in higher education, is quite low, since domestic legislation is extremely discouraging in this respect.

The average annual cost of higher education per person is low in Ukraine: US \$1,500 compared to Poland, which spends US \$2,800, Japan at US \$9,800, the UK at US \$10,100, and the US at US \$11,100. In part, the low figure in Ukraine reflects low incomes and the scarce funding of laboratory facilities.

Despite spending, education has ceased to be the social elevator in Ukraine. Only 18% of graduates from Ukrainian HEIs are satisfied with their salaries, and 31% are generally satisfied with their jobs. Meanwhile, 67% had to retrain, 43% had a hard time finding a job, 38% were

¹ Monitoring the Integration of the Ukrainian Higher Education System into the European Higher Education and Scientific Research Area, International Foundation for Education Policy Research, edited by Taras Finikov and Oleh Sharov, Kyiv, 2014, pp. 20–21.

dissatisfied with their salaries, 27% complained about the lack of prospects, and 23% said they had lost motivation.¹

An inefficient state that was also not self-sufficient and suffered from rampant corruption was the norm in post-soviet times. Glimmers of hope for a change in priorities for the development of the economy and society emerged after the Orange Revolution. With Euromaidan, the pressure has become more broad-based and determined.

Only the IT industry, with its educational and research component, has continued to grow, despite the economic crisis and war. Ukraine's IT industry, valued at over US \$5 billion, boasts more than 500 outsourcing companies, over 100 global R&D centers, more than 100 e-commerce companies, and some 2,000 start-ups. More than 50,000 engineers are employed by Ukrainian IT firms.² In many cases, it's a matter of global R&D centers that have deals with Ukraine involving IT specialists, establishing labs and collaborating with universities.

The link between science and universities

Before the adoption of the new Law "On Higher Education" in 2014, more than 800 institutions were listed as HEIs, the vast majority of whom did not carry out any scientific research. As of the end of this academic year, this number may go down to less than 300, with a simultaneous broadening of university autonomy and improvements in institutional quality. At last, we have a tool for the reformation of Ukraine's universities.

There is a direct link between the quality of universities and scientific research levels. But in Ukraine, we have yet to overcome the soviet notion of universities as only educational institutions, where someone is teaching something to someone. Scientific research is not a part of the education process in Ukraine—yet. According to a soviet concept implemented in the 1920s, scientific research is supposed to take place not at universities, but at the institutes belonging to the National Academy of Science.

¹ Educational development in Ukraine as a pledge of national economic development, October 2014, Ukrainian Association for the Development of Innovation. <http://uaaid.com.ua/analytic/rozvytok-osvity-v-ukrajini/>.

² Bozhena Sheremeta, "Ukraine's IT industry makes progress in 2014 despite war," *Kyiv Post*, Dec. 27, 2014.

The NAS is the largest research organization in Europe, employing about 40,000 people. However, the annual scientific output of the Academy is similar to the results of one medium-sized European university. In part, this is due to lack of funding, and in part to the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian war.

In 2012, Ukraine was in 40th place in the world for publications and 42nd for citations:¹

Growth in the number of publications by national scientists

Country	1992	2000	2008	2012
Ukraine	5,105	5,220	6,531	6,317
Poland	6,340	12,941	25,336	29,750
Romania	912	2,780	9,544	12,371
Turkey	1,748	6,984	25,339	32,964
Russia	33,462	32,681	33,766	34,406

Source: Web of Science²

When Ukraine first became independent, it clearly outstripped Romania, Turkey, South Korea and dozens of other major countries for both publications and citations. Indeed, it appears that 20 years ago, the success of scientists in Romania and Turkey was insignificant compared to ours. Yet today, Ukraine produces only 20% of the scientific papers that Poland and Turkey do, and half as many as Romania. Countries like Iran, South Africa and Argentina have also pulled ahead of Ukraine.

Russia's indicators show that the preservation of the soviet model of science leads to nothing but stagnation. President Putin's answer was to subordinate the academic research system to the state bureaucracy.

Recent trends show that Ukraine has, on average, over 6,000 publications in international peer-reviewed journals per year. Compared to the US, Germany or France, where the cost of one such publication is about US \$1 million, in Ukraine it is worth about US \$50,000. This shows the dedication and intensity of research activity on the part of

¹ Raj Kumar Pan, Kimmo Kaski, and Santo Fortunato, World Citation and Collaboration Networks: Uncovering the role of geography in science, *Nature*, Dec. 17, 2012, pp. 13–14.

² Web of Science, // <http://thomsonreuters.com/thomson-reuters-web-of-science/>.

the country's researchers and their capacity to organize the research process in extremely adverse conditions.

Ultimately, the Ukrainian government cannot fund scientific research at the necessary level, while legislated incentives for fundraising are practically nonexistent. We are, meanwhile, witnessing a certain increase in the participation of Ukrainian universities and research institutions in international grant projects. But the issue is not only about funds: it's also about reforming Ukrainian universities and the country's scientific research system.

Building a new university through science

Today, we have a situation where the majority of university students have no access to the labs of the National Academy of Science during their studies. Meanwhile, the average age of Doctors of Science who work in the research system is around 65 and the proportion of young scientists is under 15%.¹ There is a real need for science and higher education to be integrated using scientific measures and indicators as the main criteria for the quality of universities and specialized research institutions. Otherwise, domestic universities will never become competitive in the global arena.

This integration can take place in several ways: by funding research through grants, where proposals are jointly applied for by universities and NAS institutes; by properly amalgamating universities and academic research institutions; by launching joint Master's and PhD programs; and by developing laboratory facilities in the universities.

Higher education must be seen as closely connected to research, which it currently is not. The task of integrating Ukraine's HEIs and scientific research centers into global competition and cooperation, introducing cross-disciplinarity, and developing higher professional standards all require an understanding of certain key issues. These pose challenges to the Government of Ukraine, but they all boil down to one thing: education must be regarded, not as just spending but also as an investment to the future of the country's economy, society and state.

¹ Anton Naumets, Vice President of the National Academy of Sciences, about the age breakdown of Ukraine's researchers, Ukrainian National News: <http://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1279593-v-ukrayinskiy-nautsi-lishe-10-15-molodi>.

This brings the specific role of university to the fore as an institution that promotes social change and develops scientific research. Ukraine has to institute the autonomous university with an active, demanding academic community in which corruption has no place as a platform for the free exchange of ideas. In short, universities in Ukraine can take on the role of media.

Universities have to be focused on quality of education, teaching and research. The university should aim at restoring human capital, developing society, and an innovative, knowledge-based economy. These are places where we should cherish critical and alternative thinking, where different views on society and the world can co-exist. So, what kind of universities should we build? Modern, or postmodern ones? Leftist ones, or ones that shape the rules and structures of society?

Ukraine needs flexible universities: universities that institutionalize freedom of speech, research and thought, universities that draw attention to critical social and scientific issues, and come up with realistic solutions. We see the establishment of quality, self-regulated and responsible Ukrainian universities that can be competitive on a global scale as the main purpose of higher education reform.

The state should delegate all decision-making burdens to the university itself. Each university has to invent its own unique entity and turn it into a brand. Unfortunately, there is still little understanding of the concept of the university as an institution, and little recognition of the enormous role of fundamental and applied research.

After all, the viability of a modern state depends on the ability to make discoveries and produce knowledge that is qualitatively new, no matter how unrealistic this notion still sounds in Ukraine.

Reform in a Time of Cholera¹

Reform is not the romantic process that love between the young Gabriel and his beloved Mercedes was, but the troubled, protracted course of educational reform in Ukraine could possibly produce three novels were it as

¹ Based on a open lecture presented at the University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies: December, 8, 2015.

entertaining. In order to understand the convoluted, stop-start process of reforming education in Ukraine, we must first consider the various choleras under which they have been taking place and the place from which they began.

The cholera of transition

When Ukraine is referred to as a post-soviet society or a transitional economy, these terms may be correct, but they do not provide us with concrete information or deeper understanding of the country and its people. They may suggest corruption, which is a defining feature of transitional societies, bringing Ukraine closer to third-world countries, “transitional” in this case meaning a state where a country spends more than it earns and earned wealth is allocated unjustly. This is a true, but discouraging view.

I’d like to attempt to expand understanding of Ukraine in a way that considers the realities, but also highlights the many things that merit being optimistic. First, Ukraine is most definitely not a third-world country, especially if we consider its highly educated population. This suggests an untapped potential that will allow Ukraine to rebuild itself. Secondly, the idea of Europeanization or modernization that fails to gain traction in third-world countries is a driving force in Ukraine. Thirdly, the Euromaidan Revolution was, in fact, a revolution of values that cemented the foundations for an active civil society and turned the country into a nation of volunteers.

If education is one distinguishing feature of a developed nation, what role does it actually play in a society? How do we determine the nature of education: Is it revolutionary force or a conservative one? Does reforming education need shock therapy or is an evolutionary path better? Obviously, there are supporters of both approaches who are equally right. These are some of the questions that Ukraine is trying to understand within the context of its own history and present-day realities.

To adequately determine the role that education plays in Ukrainian society, we must also consider the context in which the current educational system emerged. Ukraine’s system of education was irrevocably

changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, those changes were not planned, conceptual changes, but rather chaotic changes fueled by necessity and the times.

Mostly these changes were simply to ensure the physical survival of schools and to commercialize education. As it was implemented in Ukraine, commercialization largely translated into the sale of diplomas and resulted in what we can now see as the criminalization of the system. Tolerance for corruption in schools and violations of academic integrity are inextricably connected to the ambivalent attitudes towards corruption seen in Ukraine today and to the creeping corruption of the entire state system.

In Ukraine today, various advertisements sell everything, from simple essays and research articles to complete dissertations that students can simply hand in to their teachers or professors. The impact of various forms of “educational capitalism” as it emerged in Ukraine manifests itself at the student level according to a 2011 study by Democratic Initiatives, a think-tank in Ukraine. DI asked students to express their opinion about corruption by completing the sentence, “For you, corruption is...,” with one of several options. Only 31% of students chose “a crime.” By contrast, 20.8% of students considered corruption “a normal fact of life,” while an additional 35.1% said it was “one of the options for solving problems.”¹

Another study on the academic culture among Ukrainian students shows that 78% believe that their colleagues do not pass exams at universities through their own abilities, but resort to different types of academic fraud.²

The cholera of the post-soviet 21st century

Among the obstacles standing in the way of endeavors to reform this educational system, the post-soviet mentality may well be the biggest

¹ Corruption in Higher Education, Democratic initiatives, Kyiv, 2011. http://www.dif.org.ua/modules/pages/files/1345098675_1911.pdf

² *Ukrainian Student Academic Culture: Key factors of the formation and development*, Karazin National University in Kharkiv, East Ukrainian Foundation of Social Research, International Renaissance Foundation, Kyiv, 2015, p. 34.

challenge. This legacy is so strong that the ordinary Ukrainians do not believe that basic education is a *national* priority. This fundamental lack of faith in the work that the Government is trying to accomplish serves as one of the most difficult challenges that we face. We must now move the nation and its system of education forward from this legacy.

A second challenge is the conservatism of university administrations, which stands in the way of reforms at the implementation level. Without the support of those charged with actually educating our young people, no laws or policies can be effective.

The third challenge is funding. Ukraine's the education system suffers from a steady decline in funding over recent years. In 2014–2015, the country understandably expanded its defense budget significantly, so, for the most part, we have seen financial resources withdrawn even further from education. This means that key programs to implement educational reforms are not being funded now. Although we are able to adopt new laws and change the rules, we cannot put any of these changes into effect until the financial capacity to do so appears.

A fourth obstacle is in the poor network of secondary and technical-vocational institutions. Formed mostly in soviet times, they do not match the needs of Ukraine's economy today. In the first years of independence, a huge number of new, mostly private, but low-grade institutions of higher education sprouted like mushrooms after the rain. To this day, however, Ukraine's private universities are unable to compete with state institutions because they need every penny that they can get from tuition, which means they can't afford to be picky about whom they admit. What's more, they pay virtually no attention to research.

Poverty and its many ills

Since the occupation of Crimea and parts of Donbas, Ukraine's population is about 42 million, of whom 7,780,000 are studying at any given time and 1,490,000 are working in the education system. The

country has 15,002 kindergartens, 17,604 schools, 382 boarding schools, 940 vocational schools, and 317 high schools. Meanwhile, the entire educational budget is about US \$4.34 billion, which is 5.15% of GDP. Of this, 28.3% goes to higher education, while 42.4% goes to general public education, 17.0% to pre-school education, and 5.9% to vocational schools.

Annually, less than US \$200 million is spent on research in Ukraine, 0.25% of GDP, of which 60% goes to the National Academy of Sciences and its institutes. Only 10% of the money for research goes to Ukrainian universities. The undeclared war in the east and an ongoing economic crisis explain this extreme lack of funding.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education and Science must consider higher education in relation to other levels of education: pre-school, after-school, elementary, secondary, vocational, and adult education. Normally, research is part and parcel of higher education, which is inextricably tied to the caliber of the students that are graduating from secondary schools. For this reason, the reform of higher education depends on positive changes throughout all the levels of education in Ukraine.

Developing a cure

With this in mind, the legal framework of reforms is being developed. Last year, a new Law "On higher education" came into force. Right now, several more bills are passing through the legislature: the basic law "On education," "On vocational education," and "On science and research."

Our priorities now are:

1. Universal access to quality education
2. Decentralization
3. Autonomy for educational institutions
4. Deregulation
5. Reduction of bureaucracy
6. Public-private partnerships and state-community management

Graduates of teaching universities earn a salary that is equivalent to US \$65 per month with the collapse of the hryvnia, giving teachers in

secondary schools little social status. The average salary in the education sector is significantly higher, at US \$145 but still exceedingly poor. At the same time, education curricula also need profound reform. To that end, we are currently revising conceptual approaches to the forms and methods of teaching. With the adoption of the revised basic law "On education," we plan to transition to a 12-year schools with streaming in the final three years.

In vocational education, the right to make key decisions is being devolved to the regional level. As part of this process, we are setting up regional councils of stakeholders, including members from the business community, local government, educational institutions and experts. These councils will look into appropriate solutions aimed at developing vocational education and providing adequate resources. At the same time, new types of vocational education are being considered. The entire network and professional orientation of vocational education are intended to meet the demands of the labor market and the domestic economy.

The Ministry of Education and Science has been studying the experiences of its partners and drawing what can be learned from those who have successfully done what we are trying to do. For example, we have the experience and expertise of Poland, which similarly undertook educational reform after 1991, to guide some of our own reforms. The United Kingdom offers a model for an entire national educational system, the US offers a good concept for higher education, Canada and Finland have strong secondary education systems, and the Netherlands interest us for their vocational education.

Reforming higher education

For us in Ukraine, the main principle underlying the reform of higher education is the autonomy of universities. By this, we mean academic, financial and organizational autonomy. The adoption of the law "On Higher Education" in summer 2014 was preceded by several years of hard work among the academic community, politicians and experts on the text of the document, beginning in 2011 under the Yanukovich Administration.

The struggle to get this reform started actually began at the end of 2010 when I, as President of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, had the opportunity to publicly oppose the bill of the then-Minister of Education and Science Dmytro Tabachnyk. His document replicated the top-down style of Russian imperial education, where all decisions within the university were made by the rector, the minister, or even the Head of State. There was no room for debate and no autonomy whatsoever.

The present ministerial team was formed from one time members of the opposition who believe that the Ministry of Education and Science has no other interests than public ones, to serve Ukrainian citizens with the highest caliber of education possible. But the Ministry of Education and Science must also serve the interests of those charged with educating young Ukrainians: educational institutions and educators themselves. Our first victories we won in the sphere of public rhetoric, but now we face opposition to university autonomy, ironically, among those who consider the task too complicated, too daunting and requiring too much work.

In spite of this, the implementation of the law “On higher education” has gone forward with great momentum. A real battle unfolded around the new list of fields and specialties. The soviet government deemed the work of a teacher as nothing more than communicating with students in a classroom. Personal professional growth, participation in research and preparing for lectures and practical workshops were not taken into account at all. There were very few, if any, methods for controlling or regulating the quality of student work or the professional quality of teachers. As a by-product of this approach to education and educators, teaching hours were unreasonably high and the number of subjects, specialties and fields was increased—essentially to fill teaching load requirements.

The Ministry of Education and Science is keen to bring all legislation regulating the educational process in line with modern Western standards. We want to give more time to teachers and students that they can manage themselves. Yet, this process has come into

conflict with established practice and the inertia of university administrations—and even of most teachers. People want change but they don't want to have to do what it takes to implement change on their own.

For example, the Ministry decided to abolish compulsory subjects, a step that evoked great opposition from some stakeholders in the educational system. This list of 34 mandatory university courses was a hangover from soviet times: only the names of the courses had changed. Today, universities should determine their own curricula, they should decide for themselves how and what they will teach their students. The Ministry is encouraging universities to freely embrace the opportunities and growth that autonomy brings. The universities often respond: yes, we will be autonomous, but we need guidelines. So the Ministry is now working on policies that will serve to guide Ukraine's universities through the understandably confusing transition period to a new level of autonomy.

Establishing university autonomy is possible only with the support of the entire academic community, especially universities. The Ministry has encouraged university communities to be active, as they represent the students, teachers and staff. We are supporting stronger student government and special training programs. A good example is a training project for Ukrainian university management that is starting in conjunction with Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, with the support of the British Council.

The perceptual function of language

A key component in reform has been the development of the English language, which is crucial to improve the global competitiveness, not only of Ukraine's education and science, but also of the state itself. In 2015, the Ministry organized a national project called the English Summer School open to all secondary schools, involving both Ukrainian and international volunteers. Once again, the British Council was immensely supportive in providing valuable methodological assistance.

The Government will soon adopt a special program for the English language to take place over the course of the next three years. The number of hours for English instruction in public schools has been increased and new requirements for the level of spoken English have been set for high-school and university graduates, as well as for researchers and scientists.

In fact, the English language, being the most developed on the planet, can serve to enrich and expand Ukrainian perceptions of the world in which we live. Consider the word “public” as it is used in the English language. “Public” is derived from the Latin “publicus,” meaning people. In English, “public” refers to “the people or community as a whole” and when used as an adjective, it refers to that which concerns or affects “the people or community as a whole.” Thus, we find constructions like “public funds,” “public spaces,” and the “public good.” Civil servants endeavor to serve “the public.” The state exists as a system of “public servants” working for the needs and wishes of the “public.”

In Ukrainian, the concept of “public” exists in a kind of dual state that is apparent at both the lexical and the conceptual levels. In Ukrainian we have two words “*derzhavniy*,” meaning of the state, and “*suspilniy*,” meaning of the society or the public. When the government provides funding, it is perceived as “state funding,” meaning funding for the state, and not as synonymous with “public funding,” meaning funding for the people. Often times, that which resides in the “*suspilniy*” sphere, the public sphere, seems to almost exist in a separate space, unrelated to the state.

While this example is less about lexicon and more about perception, something occurs in the formulation of ideas and concepts when a new language is brought into a field of knowledge. Indeed, linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf suggested that language could shape thought. Without getting into the specific merits or complexities of such an argument at this time, I would just like to say that my experience with the understanding of the word “public” among Ukrainians, with two derivations, “*derzhavniy*” and

“suspilniy,” suggests that learning a new language, at the very least, opens up the mind to reconsider something that was otherwise fixed—such as the role of the public and the state, and their relationship to each other.

In our endeavor to shape ideas, we also hope to change the post-soviet notions that leadership means a charismatic individual from whom all laws flow and who is the unipolar center of power and decision-making. It's high time to replace this understanding with a new one, a more democratic concept of leadership where teamwork plays more central role in both government and education.

By incorporating new terminology, like the English language, we create a new space from which ideas can be developed and changed, one that is largely detached from outdated concepts. In this way, we can slowly stop using the familiar words “state” and “society” in a manner that treated them as separate entities and allowed state agencies to have their own interests, separate from the public interest. We can bring the relationship between the state and the public closer together as the state begins to be understood as an agency of the public that seeks to serve public needs. In much the same way, we can begin to change the understanding of leadership and the relationship between leaders and those whom they serve.

Shaping the future through structure

Our next important task is to internationalize Ukrainian universities. In Ukraine, it is still widely believed that Ukraine can develop its own domestic quality standards—without looking to global expectations of the modern university to help shape them. This is a big mistake. Ukrainian universities need to be included in the competitive global arena. Any other approach would mean a conscious or unconscious move towards isolation, which is especially dangerous in our times.

Ukrainian universities still cannot compete internationally because the way they are organized and structured does not meet modern challenges and requirements. Since the 1920s, the widespread notion pro-

moted by the Soviet Union has been that universities are for studying and research should take place within the National Academy of Sciences. Today, the NAS includes 178 research institutes and has 19,300 researchers. The bill “On science and research” is specifically intended to change the structure of Ukraine’s universities and research infrastructure.

Plans are for national research policy to be developed by a future National Council for the Development of Science and Technology. This will also serve to establish a National Research Fund. We want to integrate education and science, bringing together universities and research institutions, with joint Master’s and PhD programs, and a special grants policy.

A separate challenge for the Ministry of Education and Science is the undeclared war and its consequences. At this point, some 1.5 million Ukrainians have moved from Russian occupied territories in Crimea and the Donbas. More than 50,000 children of internally displaced persons (IDPs) completed their latest school year in other oblasts and 16 universities and 10 research institutes have been evacuated from the occupied territories.

The Ministry is in a serious struggle against various kinds of corruption, including plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty—problems that developed countries also have to deal with these days. For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine every meeting of the Board of Certification of the Ministry of Education and Science finishes by rescinding degrees from some members of the academic community whose works contained plagiarized materials. Yet this effort must not only focus on the punitive aspects, but must also involve teaching and encouraging academic integrity in our institutions. So, while promoting intolerance towards academic dishonesty in the research community, we must simultaneously teach the skills necessary to write rigorous academic works, conduct research, and cite the sources from which these ideas come.

The new law “On education” has led the Ministry to set up several new independent bodies that did not exist before. Among them is the

National Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education. Unfortunately, the election of the agency's board was corrupted, so as Minister, I rejected its results and the board is still not functioning. The Ministry plans to resolve this difficult situation by amending the current law "On higher education," in particular through a detailed description of the election procedure and a clear definition of requirements for candidates.

We have also able to move slightly towards financial autonomy for Ukraine's universities and research institutions. Beginning in 2015, universities have the right to open their own bank accounts and deposit the money that they earn as institutions into these accounts. This is only a first step, but it is essential. Before this, universities were served only by the State Treasury and they had to negotiate each transaction with the State. We believe that universities should have full financial autonomy, regardless of the public or private origin of the funds they use and this is the direction that Ministry policy is taking. Along with this, of course, is the requirement for full transparency and accountability in the use of all funds. At this time, all the key financial documents of post-secondary institutions are now available on-line.

Real reform: a process, not an event

Finally, that eternal component of the true university: a free platform from which any independent intellectual can express any opinion. In this sense, universities have a lot in common with the press. Ukraine's basic bill "On education" makes clear that education is the main priority of state policy. I hope this idea will soon be actualized through specific measures and indicators of success.

If I am to leave with you one idea, it is that Ukraine is fully capable of reforming and evolving. It may be a post-soviet state, but it is also the country where the Euromaidan Revolution took root, drove political change, and led to the emergence of a new, robust civil society. While it is possible to choose a date in which we commemorate the beginning and the end of the Euromaidan Revolution, isolating the date and time when reforms began and end is not so easy, because real

reform is a process, not an event, and real reform should not come to an end.

Reform is taking place in Ukraine, but there are obstacles that need to be overcome, and mentalities that need to be informed by the realities of our world and what it means for our country. Ukraine is full of well-educated people who are ready to make the transformation that we are working to foster. Bills are passing through the legislature to further align Ukraine with international standards and position us to contribute to a world that is changing more rapidly than ever before. Ukraine's system of education is a part of that change. The policies that we are writing will contribute to strengthening this system and, by extension, Ukraine as a whole—and the world to which Ukraine is increasingly contributing.

CHAPTER 4 | HERMENEUTICS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Universities as Agents of Understanding in a Global Age¹

The time has come for every human being to consider profound questions about the Global Age. Reading futuristic publications on economics, geopolitics or information technologies is not enough to gain a real sense of the times we are living in and our place in them. There is a feeling of substantial, truly global, changes that are making it impossible to go back to the comfort of earlier concepts like “Man and his World.” Indeed, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the ideological cacophony of postmodern conflict seems to be overwhelming. Yet, the conflict of interpretation² is quite unlikely to yield further results, and may even be irrelevant now, while the inability to listen and understand each other raises the risk of permanent global conflict with the worst possible consequences.

At the same time, new media developments give hope that global society will be formed as a public space, making the concept of the

¹ Based on a speech presented at the University of Helsinki’s Aleksanteri Institute in September 2008 and originally published in *Academic Notes*, Volume 89, Philosophy and Religious Studies, pp. 3–5.

² Ricoeur, P., *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, Northwestern University Press, 1974.

knowledge society especially significant. The universal drive to a great conversation of everybody with everyone brings with it a need to restore the basics of hermeneutics. Yet it's not just the hermeneutical phenomenon itself, with its aim of reaching understanding, that needs paying attention to. We must be aware of the conditions in which hermeneutical dialog can take place, as German philosopher H-G. Gadamer¹ pointed out. Gadamer meant the special "truth-seeking" mindedness of all the participants in the conversation: "The inner word"² of the truth does not belong to any language but only to God, and it can be reached and heard only as the result of such a proper conversation.

The biggest problem—and one that needs, if not solving, then at least constant attention—is the interaction of the two dimensions: everyday life connected with the public sphere and phenomenological thinking about essentiality. In other words, whether phenomenological generalizations can be formulated from our experience or our experience is connected instead with some phenomenological construct that M. Heidegger named "Dasein" or "being there." These two dimensions can be regarded as closely connected, if certain necessary conditions are taken into consideration when hermeneutical discourse takes place. Then it becomes more about hermeneutical discussion or a discursive demand for hermeneutics.

These special demands of hermeneutical conversation force us to consider the concept of hermeneutical space. Even from the point of view of human beings, we immediately find ourselves in the conventional phenomenological dimension, with its system of rules that differs from daily experience. In this dimension, with its limits of time, space and rules, there exist athletes who participate in a football match. Let's now take the next step and connect these conventions with some actual, existing social institution.

¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) was a German philosopher of the continental tradition. His magnum opus, *Truth and Method*, elaborated the concept of philosophical hermeneutics.

² St. Augustine, *On the Trinity* (10), New Advent. Accessed: <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1301.htm>.

First, let's look at the concept of wisdom raised by St. Augustine, the founder of philosophical hermeneutics. He notes that wisdom does not exist on its own but belongs to God, because it is based on humanness, which brings truth. St. Augustine treats humanness as a human phenomenological essence that includes the immortal soul. At first sight, this kind of criteria of human spirit seem ephemeral, but, in fact, they lead to the human ability to understand and to hear in their native language that "inner word" of the truth that does not belong to any language until it is found during hermeneutical dialog. Thanks to St. Augustine, hermeneutics is based on the Christian coordinate system, although, in fact, the philosophical workings of these ideas can be seen in various cultures.

A good illustration of how the rules of the hermeneutical game provide the conditions under which "the greatest enlightenment of the greatest truth"¹ comes from the life of the Sufi Rumi, when he met a wandering sheikh, Shamsuddin from Tebriz, in November 26, 1244. However, the evidence differs in the details. Either, having heard Rumi's answer, Shamsuddin swooned from the light of Revelation, or vice versa, Rumi swooned and, having realized the truth during his ecstasy, was able to answer Shamsuddin. Rumi's leap of wisdom took place after a deep hermeneutical discourse.

From the point of view of philosophical hermeneutics, the most important here is not the sequence of events or the sense of questions and answers. The truth can be found inside a good, structured hermeneutical conversation that includes the prejudices of the participants, their willingness to look for the truth, their ability to listen to and hear each other, and the truth they find that did not exist before the conversation started. Such a talk not only makes it possible to find the truth, but it also changes all its participants—and equally, with an active reader, the text and its interpreter.

The concept of hermeneutical space can be represented by the metaphor of the Sophia to which Sergei Averintsev² referred. Divine wisdom

¹ Rumi, *The Path of Transformation: Sufi parables*, Moscow: Oklik, 2007 (in Russian).

² Sergei Averintsev (1937–2004) was a Russian cultural historian and philosopher.

lies apart from the rest of the world, in the same way that culture separates the human world from chaos. The Sophia is neither transcendence nor immanence: it is the point where they meet. It is where the joy of great Creator joins the creation and perceives it. It is the secret of the birth of humanness, including human dignity in its Christian interpretation. Divine wisdom enables us to perceive and understand the truth. The Sophia unites different human thought into one well-disciplined intellectual universe. It unites lands, cities and countries in a centralized sacral state, making the state its "sweet home."¹ Thus is created the image of a spiritually enlightened society that personifies the greatest sense.

The Sophia metaphor refers to wisdom as a human ability not only to understand and realize, but also to find mutual comprehension. Accepting this convention, philosophical hermeneutics also takes place in the public sphere. Even more, the Sophia reconciles all the irreconcilabilities of the phenomenological and the public.

Here we come back to our original aim, to illustrate a social phenomenon that also involves phenomenological criteria. There can be no doubt that this is the University. This is where wisdom lives, but not only as a sum of scientific answers to questions asked. Wisdom is the possibility of producing answers that can entirely fulfill the human need, not only for knowledge but also for understanding and mutual comprehension. This means the ability to find the truth.

The University is expected to produce a new quality of knowledge. Together with technological innovations, we can talk about the humanization of scientific and intellectual life, and, through mass and new media, the involvement of different societies, nationally and globally, in the great conversation. The questions once raised in narrow intellectual circles are now becoming "hot" and significant to broader society.

The idea of the university continues to have meaning where the principles of academic freedom are respected, including the right not

¹ Averintsev, S., *Sofia-Logos*, Dictionary, Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 1999.

only to carry out scientific experiments, but to also freely express individual points of view on any important public event. This emphasis on humanness, raised by St. Augustine many centuries ago, is becoming extremely important today. In the university, it is not somebody's mercantile interests, but concern for the essence that brings people closer to wisdom, humanness and morality, and plays a key role. So, the new knowledge will belong, not to some private select owner or system, but to all people.

Discussions at the Higher Educational Summit for Global Development,¹ whose participants were mostly rectors and presidents of different post-secondary institutions from all over the world, confirmed the anxiety of the academic community over the integration of universities and society. Knowledge was proclaimed to be the only real and global value, yet the production, communication and sharing of knowledge do not ensure mutual understanding and greater wisdom. In his report called "The Global Crisis in Education," Sam Pitroda, Chair of National Knowledge Commission of India, used India as an example to conclude that all people have equal rights from birth, but not all people have equal opportunities.

Yet this crisis can be seen from the other side as well. Pitroda sought an explanation for why more than three million people are imprisoned in the US. Where is the positive influence of higher education and new knowledge? Why does such a large number of criminals appear to be outside the positive moral context offered by a rich society?

This is one reason why we must turn from a materialistic and statistical view of education and science, back to the idea and purpose of the university. Only then, will we be able to properly care for the hermeneutical space of humanized wisdom that makes us feel absolutely free in our constant search for truth. It gives hope that global problems can be solved and all possible world threats avoided. But this can become reality only if "Sophia's home," including our ability to think and talk the right way, is enlarged and broadened.

¹ Washington DC, April 29–30, 2008.

Saint Augustine's Hermeneutical Universality¹

The assertion that philosophical hermeneutics are universal in meaning needs further interpretation, not only in the theoretical realm, but also from a practical point of view. Focusing on the writings of Saint Augustine may help clarify many important theses firsthand. In this essay, I propose an in-depth look at this thinker in his capacity as the founder of philosophical hermeneutics. St. Augustine's works must be read, not only in their religious, or historical and philosophical contexts, but with a view to looking for answers to modern challenges, particularly searching for the all-important quality of human and global mutual understanding.

St. Augustine belongs to a circle of key European thinkers. So, an in-depth study of his heritage is important, not only for theology, but also for branches of scholarship such as the philosophy of communication, and the social and political sciences. Readiness to engage in deep conversation, and the ability to listen to and understand an interlocutor in order to seek out and find truth together, or to answer questions that had not existed prior to the start of the conversation, being born during its course, are the skills that relate to factors that determine the survival of our civilization. What are we looking for? Terms used by St. Augustine, such as "the true inner word" belonging to God, have an aesthetic value that reminds us of things eternal, something so critical to us during this era of vanity.

Philosophical hermeneutics is based on a metaphorical hermeneutical circle, which, according to H-G. Gadamer, represents discourse aimed, not at making an opponent change their mind, but at developing "a common language,"² that is, a search for the truth. Jean Grondin³ focuses attention on the special meaning that Gadamer accords Saint

¹ Kyiv-Mohyla Journal, Philosophy, 2010, Vol. 1, pp. 1–4. Accessed: http://kvit.ukma.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Saint-Augustines-Hermeneutical-Universalism_2010.pdf.

² Gadamer, H-G., *Truth and Method* ["Істина і метод" in Ukrainian], Volume #1, Kyiv: Universe, 2000, 457 pp., p. 359. (Translation author's).

³ Jean Grondin (1955) is a philosopher and Canadian professor specializing in Kant, Gadamer and Heidegger.

Augustine's writings in defining philosophical hermeneutics, in distilling it to the concept of the inner word¹ that belongs to no language and can be found through the search for the truth. According to Grondin, Gadamer attributes St. Augustine with hermeneutics gaining universality.²

The inner word of truth

The inner word belongs to St. Augustine's clearly and precisely presented inner or spiritual world. His description includes such notions as inner nourishment,³ inner justice,⁴ mental vision,⁵ spiritual sense,⁶ mental strength,⁷ the human within,⁸ inward shelter,⁹ internal form,¹⁰ and the inner ear.¹¹ In his *Confessions*, the author shows his "inner self", inaccessible to the physical "eye", "ear", and "understanding."¹² In contrast to the unstable outer world where we live, inner life is permanent. It opens itself to the eternal spirit, which is a sign of humanness. This concept includes two main components, religious approach and hermeneutical strategy—the two being closely inter-related.

Christian determination of faith enables a specific attitude towards the world. Hence, an aspiration for seeing something essential, spiritual, and belonging to eternity—beyond the exterior and material—emerges. St. Augustine confesses, "My human within is where infinite light shines in my soul, where ringing melodies can never be seized by time, where

¹ Grondin, J., *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994, 231 pp., p. XIII.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ St. Augustine, *Confessions* (in Ukrainian), Kyiv: Osnovy, 2007, 319 pp., p. 32. (Translation author's).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 135.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

unknown scents permeate...where embrace is so tight that no penetration can destroy it.”¹ The metaphor of light is not accidental here. It has a very important conceptual sense.

According to Gadamer, light, beauty and truth are interconnected. He claims that the “metaphysics of light clarifies the connection between the revelation of beauty and evidence of the comprehensible.”² In his comments on Genesis, St. Augustine uses the metaphor of light in an ontological context, which was later drawn upon by Martin Heidegger. The Divine Word does not take part in the creation of heaven and earth. Only after having created light does God begin to speak, making it possible to distinguish things. In other words, language is the first creation by means of which “the mentally infinite is first revealed through the unity of the word.”³ Speech as word play allows for the revelation, differentiation and realization of essential meanings that are usually not evident on the surface and require separate colloquial reflection on their genuine, inner sense.

The phenomenological foundations of hermeneutical conversation

For his part, Heidegger discusses the luminescence of the truth⁴ that is formed during a discussion that arises “on a specific occasion and in a specific field.”⁵ Here, we again see the motif of the hermeneutical circle, which is particular speech aimed at finding the truth—that third element not present prior to the discourse of two interlocutors, or between the text and its interpreter. Among the theoretical parallels that exist between St. Augustine and Heidegger, a phenomenological grounding in ontology, namely an ecstatic horizontal structure of temporariness, should be taken into account.⁶

¹ Ibid, p. 174.

² Op cit., Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 446. (Translation author's).

³ Ibid., p. 446.

⁴ Heidegger, M., *Works and Thoughts From Different Years* [Pisma i Razmyshlenia Raznykh Liet in Russian], Moscow: Gnosyz, 1993, p. 86. (Translation author's).

⁵ Ibid., p. 92. (Translation author's).

⁶ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (in German), Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993, 445 pp., p. 422.

In a like manner, St. Augustine claims “future time, which is not, is not therefore long; but a ‘long future’ is ‘a long expectation of the future.’ Nor is time past, which is now no longer, long; but a long past is ‘a long memory of the past.’ (...) The life of this action of mine is divided between my memory, on account of what I have repeated, and my expectation, on account of what I am about to repeat; yet my consideration is present with me, through which that which was future may be carried over so that it may become past.”¹ A horizontal way of understanding and institutionalizing the world confirms such a human characteristic as mortality. In other words, beauty, truth and light expand the horizons of the living person, whose existence in this world is only temporary.

St. Augustine mentions two more characteristics of human nature: the ability to think and the capacity to believe. The human being has an immortal soul and, because of it, the ability to become one with the divine truth that penetrates the essence of words. But significant effort is required to achieve this. In particular, it is necessary to ponder humanness itself—the human within each one of us—, and to use our own minds. St. Augustine explains the functions of the soul and of the mind, both of which have an immortal nature.² Moreover, they play equally important roles in the process of understanding. Inasmuch as we cannot arrive at correct conclusions without the help of science,³ our mind functions as the eye of our soul. With its help, the soul can contemplate truth⁴ without the mediation of the body. Thus, truth is glimpsed, not through physical means, the eyes, but through pure thought.⁵

In other words, St. Augustine demonstrates that Christianity instills in the mind something very important for understanding human existence. Attention is focused on the immortal soul as the realization of humanity itself. That is why, according to St. Augustine, we have to

¹ *Confessions*, p. 234 (Translation author's).

² St. Augustine, *Enchiridion or On Faith, Hope and Love* (in Russian), Kyiv, 1996, 413 pp., p. 213. (Translation author's).

³ *Ibid.* p. 208.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 214.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 227.

know “the reasons behind good and bad things.”¹ The presence of the immortal soul as the human within enables cognition of the truth. “Let religion connect us with the one Almighty God, because no animal can be a mediator between our mind, with the help of which we perceive the Lord, and the Truth, the inner Light, through which we comprehend It. And together with the Lord we will hold in high respect the Truth, which is connected with Him, and which has the shape of everything made by the One and towards a single whole.”² Immortal souls, together with the mind, delineate the universality of philosophical hermeneutics.

This exclusively religious aspect is incorporated into the Greek philosophical tradition and expands it. St. Augustine reflects on the features of the human soul and of memory: “Does the soul contain something which momentarily does not occur to it, or does a learned soul have no knowledge of music when it is occupied only with geometry? Since the latter is wrong, the first is true. The soul is master only of that which comes to its mind. That is why the soul may contain something, the presence of which it doesn’t feel.”³ In other words, the soul uses inner memory to contain knowledge that, at the opportune moment, can point to the truth. We are left with finding this knowledge.

Appealing to God, St. Augustine says: “Oh light that enlightened me, now I see that in using my external feelings, I have not been searching correctly; You are inside of me and they knew not how You entered me.”⁴ The Lord is the only true light.⁵ St. Augustine asks Him to not let himself be dispersed from the singularly significant “into the numerous, but collect me from the outward into myself, and from myself to You.”⁶ This inner word is not connected with the possession of par-

¹ St. Augustine, *Enchiridion or On Faith, Hope and Love* (in Russian), Kyiv, 1996, 413 pp., p. 213. (Translation author’s).

² Ibid. p. 288.

³ Ibid. p. 212.

⁴ St. Augustine, *The Soul’s Conversations with God* [“БЕСЕДЫ ДУШИ С БОГОМ” in Russian], Moscow, 2006, 159 pp., p. 116. (Translation author’s).

⁵ Ibid., p. 132.

⁶ Ibid., p. 152.

ticular concrete information. It now opens the way to the truth, the sense of which is much more complex.

The truth is connected with God, therefore with humanness, in the sense that human beings are both godlike and mortal simultaneously. They need the truth to perfect both themselves and the entire human world—human culture. The correlation of the inner and outer signifies something more than just meaning encapsulated in words. Theologian John C. Cavadini emphasizes that the main question is “How effectively our cultures show or even symbolize eternal forms of justice.”¹ The truth takes on special mental and ethical significance that is consonant with the concepts of goodness, light and beauty.

According to St. Augustine, “who doubts the existence of the truth has something true inside that gives him no reasons to doubt because all which is true can be true only from the truth. Thus, one who, for some reason, may have reason to doubt should not doubt the truth. Light that is boundless, timeless and even free out of the apparitions of all these conditions is in the one who has such uncertainty (...). Thinking does not create truth, but finds it ready. Thus, before it is found, the truth exists in and of itself, and when it is revealed it serves our renovation.”² Similarly, “Christ teaches the inner and man recalls the outer with the help of words.”³ It is important to understand that the dialectic of the inner and outer in St. Augustine’s texts introduces not only theological problems, but also the nature of hermeneutical realization itself.

Boris Hennig⁴ discusses the accordances with the outer (visible) and the inner (essential): true Christian, the human within, view—knowledge, hearing, understanding, belief—truth.⁵ As we can see, it is not coincidental that truth correlates with faith. This speculative Christian

¹ Cavadini, J., *The Quest for Truth in Augustine’s De Trinitate* [On The Trinity], Theological Studies, #58, 1997, p. 436.

² St. Augustine, *On the Immortal Soul* [“О бессмертии души” in Russian], Moscow, AST, 2004, 512 pp., p. 481. (Translation author’s).

³ Ibid., p. 426. (Translation author’s).

⁴ Professor of philosophy at Ryerson University, Toronto.

⁵ Hennig, B., *The Inner Man as Substantial Form*, First International ESEMP Congress, Essen, March 28, 2007.

proposition frees room for the universal application of hermeneutics. Returning to the creation of the divine world, St. Augustine turns to idea of the original word: "God the Begetter, Who has, in some way, spoken with His own co-eternal Word all things that He has in His substance; and God His Word Himself, Who Himself has nothing either more or less in substance than is in Him, Who, not falsely but truly, has begotten the Word."¹ In a similar way, Heidegger interprets poetry phenomenologically, as "coming into being with the help of the Word."² He calls for the destructuring of language in order to reach the original and essential meanings of words.

Gadamer points out that, in Christianity, the Word exists in the realm of the miracle—creation, redemption, the sending of the Son, and incarnation. "The greatest miracle of language is not the fact that the word takes on 'flesh' and acquires outer being, but the fact that what emerges and finds itself in outward flesh is always the Word. (...) The Word was always with God for eternity. This doctrine also introduces the language question into the inner spheres of thought."³ We have already determined that this initial essential Word can be discovered by the human within. It does not belong to any one language, but is spoken as though it encapsulates the light of truth. In other words, a living human being displays not only external personification, but can also be engage inner essential resources.

This inner word of the spirit is as indivisibly essential to thought as God the Son is to God the Father. This entails searching for and finding the inner Word, corresponding to the truth. "Despite all distinctions, there is accordance, not only the unity of human cognition with language, but also the connection of all human languages with things—which is extremely important. Cognition is only a prism through which the light of the only one truth creases."⁴ St. Augustine divides the pro-

¹ St. Augustine, *On the Trinity* (40), New Advent at <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1301.htm>.

² Heidegger, M., *Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry* ["Гельдерлін та сутність поезії" in Ukrainian], from T. Vozniak's *Texts and Translations*, Kharkiv: Folio, 1998, p. 353. (Translation author's).

³ Op cit., Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 388–389. (Translation author's).

⁴ Ibid., p. 405.

cess of searching for the inner word into two stages. The first stage touches upon some particular person who has individual tastes and ideas, so we initially deal with an interlocutor whose expressions are based on personal experience. As we begin to “refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind,” we come to the word that “cannot be without a thought... even if it be said by that inner word that belongs to no separate language” and this, according to St. Augustine, recognizes only three things: memory, intelligence and will.¹

The next step is the reduction of the human to humanness, which leads to a “more hidden depth of our memory, wherein we found this also first when we thought of it, and wherein an inner word is begotten such as belongs to no tongue—as it were, knowledge of knowledge, vision of vision, and the understanding that appears in [reflective] thought; of understanding that had indeed existed before in the memory, but was latent there. However, unless the thought itself had also some sort of memory of its own, it would not return to those things which it had left in the memory while it turned to think of other things.”² St. Augustine interprets thinking, not as a separate capability, but in its firsthand connection with humanness. The mind and the soul interact in the process of inner word revelation as a manifestation of humanness.

Conclusion

Based on the essentials of St. Augustine’s hermeneutical heritage, we can emphasize at least three things. First, he points out that, not only can we find the truth, but that this truth potentially exists even prior to our particular hermeneutical discussion. Such substantial presence points, not to metaphysical transcendence, but to hermeneutical reality in the manner of Heidegger and Gadamer, that is, as a result of correlative introspection, riding on phenomenology. Similarly, a work of art, waiting for its author to “find” it, can hide inside a slab of marble. Of course, such an analogy is insufficient in considering all of the prerequi-

¹ St. Augustine, *On the Trinity* (40), New Advent at <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1301.htm>.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

sites of a hermeneutical circle—among which is an appropriately asked question requiring a true answer according to that inner word specified by and born of hermeneutical discourse.

Second, the hermeneutical way of inner true word revelation is determined by humanness. In other words, focusing on the truth is simultaneously a reflection on humanness as such. Individuals can find a common language with any other person if they need the truth, not victory over an opponent. An ability to understand and listen to any other person leads to the common revelation of the inner word, which does not belong to any language and was unknown to either discussant prior to their discourse. This is proof that the discourse has changed the discussants in the process of heading toward the truth. This word does not belong to some specific person or metaphorical human within, it belongs to individuals as such—if they are courageous enough to meditate on their own essence.

Third, the universal use of philosophical hermeneutics takes on special significance according to the new challenges facing civilization, brought about by globalization, beginning with the need for a hermeneutical generalization of the methodological partition of “the spiritual sciences” such as social studies and the arts, and ending with the mass media aspect of global mutual understanding and accord. A monological way of thinking and ideological motives for any kind of behavior are a dead-end threat to human civilization. The practical application of philosophical hermeneutics requires the depths of phenomenological convention of this particular kind of discourse to be considered and mastered—with the reward being truth itself.

The Hermeneutics of Style¹

My proposition for a hermeneutics of style is based on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s ideas about the hermeneutic phenomenon. In his understanding of the history of hermeneutics, Gadamer sees philosophical

¹ Based on a paper by Serhiy Kvit presented at the International Congress on Hermeneutics, Warsaw, September 5–8, 2011.

hermeneutics not solely as a developmental stage. The hermeneutic phenomenon presents itself as an important feature in a person, defining the natural human ability to understand. Based on this position, we can conclude that some elements of the concept of philosophical hermeneutics have been suggested and substantiated ever since the Greeks started applying the term in philosophy.

Hermeneutics and culture

As soon as we presuppose a connection between the hermeneutic phenomenon and human nature, we can try to follow this line of thinking and consider the entirety and cohesiveness of culture to be the main source of a human's inner comfort. Many contemporary trends in philosophy and criticism refer to the qualitative sophistication of intellectual and social life today, yet totally disable any linear understanding of culture. "Linearity" is seen as synonymous, not only with simplification and one-dimensionality, but with cohesiveness and epicism as well. The assumption is that the contemporary world has attained such sophistication, that it has long ago—at least since World War II—become inappropriate to propose old and simplistic constructs of western metaphysics and logocentrism. In addition, these constructs pretend to have power over the person, as a consequence of their schematicism, static nature and rhetorical relation to certain discursive practices.

We are supposed to try to understand only part of the person, keeping in mind their humanness, unpredictability and insolence—a permanent balance between rationality, irrationality and indifference, and all the possible and impossible degrees of a given person's interests and concerns. This means that we will emerge from human nature, as being neither fond of nor afraid of anything. The individual will then be, first, a myth, based on what they think about themselves, which correlates with the opinions of those around them. Secondly, they will have certain characteristics and capabilities related to the way that human mental processes are structured. For example, people move from simple to complex, speak in a consecutive order, need to find answers to their questions, and change the overall picture of their understanding of the surrounding world based on new information received. And thirdly, the

person's process of understanding will follow a certain algorithm, which unites them with other people.

In this case, the hermeneutic phenomenon is one of the possible names for the third component. It is based, on one hand, on the physiological nature of the human brain and, on the other, on the embodiment of the individual's own world in culture—a world created inside of and, to some extent in spite of, the natural world. The concept of humanness as something characterizing the individual as such derives from this vision of culture. At this stage, we cannot avoid a degree of speculation, not through intent to create new metaphysical constructs, but through a need to describe the object of our consideration. That is why we should mark the Christian origin of the concept of humanness in how we understand it. This concept segregates the individual from the natural world, emphasizing, first of all, their Godly likeness, which differentiates the human from the animal world, regardless of biological similarities, because some behavior that is quite normal for animals is inappropriate for humans.

At the risk of approaching almost critical speculation, let's sum up what we have to deal with. The hermeneutic phenomenon is related to the individual, to humanness and to culture. It meets the person's need to understand the world around them. This understanding includes answering questions raised or being aroused by the person. The human understands culture through the standard human story told by people about other people. The stories of ancient Greek myths and the stories of William Shakespeare's plays are universal. We perceive the world epically through these stories, living through and experiencing them as part of our own lives. The person understands what can be verbalized, but is interested only in what can be represented epically.

Culture as hermeneutics of the human

The understanding of culture is, by its nature, the understanding of humans by other humans. As a consequence, someone who wants to understand the texts of culture—a variety of human stories—is, basically, a reader and a critic of these texts. Sometimes this person is just a reader, sometimes an active reader who not only reads the texts, but also has

something regarding these texts to tell others about, creating critical—some would say secondary—texts of culture. Texts of that kind belong to a synthetic essay genre, in which the person of the author, with their original style of thinking and writing, come to the fore. The philosopher is also a thinking reader so, under some circumstances, these roles coincide. Both are looking for keys to the person and to culture. The hermeneutic phenomenon can be applied to those intellectuals who are looking for such keys.

Traditionally, Michel de Montaigne is considered to be the founder of the essay genre, which developed from essay-like elements of different “non-classic” genres, such as letters, diaries, notes and confessions. Prior to de Montaigne, we can mention at least Marcus Aurelius and St. Augustine. Previously-written texts encompassing cultural aspects are prerequisites for an essayistic text. This is what led Tadeusz Breza¹ to call Michel de Montaigne “an active reader.”² Neither the content of a piece of writing, nor the information presented in it is the main object of our interest. The author’s person and style come to the fore, regardless if we agree or disagree with them. An essay is driven by the author’s ability to have a broad, intertextual and interdisciplinary view of things, finding hidden immanent connections between phenomena and events. Essays are philosophy’s agent in the individual’s attempt to live through culture on the pathway to completing their life’s tasks. Essayists are active readers interpreting culture by expressing their attitude towards cultural texts, as if they were communicating with both the authors they read and their own readers, bridging the gap of time.

The essay is a synthetic genre, opening a range of opportunities for philosophy that we call essayism. From this position, essayism can suggest some individual characteristics of thinking and writing, being a different stylistic feature for the critical evaluation of essayistic works. Moreover, it follows from the elements of the genre, equipping the author with philosophical tools and at the same time demanding from the author a certain effort. Essayism can be seen as a kind of philosophic

¹ Polish essayist and fiction writer Tadeusz Breza (1905–1970).

² Breza, Tadeusz, *Reflections on the Essay*, Ukrainian Issues, 1995, #2, p. 49 (in Ukrainian).

and critical strategy, the externalization of modernist tendencies within a distinct historical period. For example, essayism has a number of characteristics in common with post-modernism, such as the aesthetics of eclecticism and the special role of the author's person, but based on the author's internal determination and focus on a goal—the search for truth. This places essayism in dialectic opposition to post-modernism, as it reflects the elaborateness of the national culture and the language used in writing essays.

Let's make a short review of the continuity of this notion. We can discuss the pre-phenomenology and pre-existentialism of ancient authors and Christian mystics. Since none of the ancient Greeks, according to Wilhelm Dilthey,¹ “left positions of objectivity for the positions of self-consciousness,”² Marcus Aurelius was the first in whose writings we find subjectivism by itself, in conjunction with a rigorous ethic that was later developed by Christian thinkers. Truth began being associated with goodness and illumination. After St. Augustine, it becomes clear that truth is situated only where it is looked for. St. Augustine's “inner word of truth” draws out the possibility of finding truth. The corresponding “word of the heart,” “God's word does not belong to any language”³ and does not exist *a priori*, before discussion begins. The thinking person has an opportunity to find truth, verbalizing it through their own language when asking a suitable question that generates a need for the correct answer.

The essay as hermeneutic tool

An extremely important contribution to the development of the understanding of philosophical hermeneutics was made by Ignatius of Loyola,⁴ who was ahead of Dilthey in forming the strategy of “co-understanding through empathy.” St. Ignatius offers a hermeneutic notion of the whole-

¹ German historian and philosopher of hermeneutics (1833–1911).

² Dilthey, Wilhelm, *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Moscow: House of Intellectual Books, 2000, p. 461 (in Russian).

³ St. Augustine, *The Trinity*, Catholic University of America Press, 1963, p. 476.

⁴ The founder of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556), was a Basque nobleman who became a priest and theologian.

ness and harmony that should be characteristic of the hermeneutic conversation. He focuses on forming the thinking human being's personality, looking for truth in meaning that French philosopher Michel Foucault later termed "taking care of oneself:" not only does the philosopher define the truth, but truth shapes the thinker. Such Dilthey concepts as life, inner experience, singular descriptive psychology, and historical consciousness build the process of understanding—co-understanding, common understanding, mutual understanding—through empathy. And so, Dilthey's advice is to trust the written testimony of a thinking person. Finally, philosophical hermeneutics is based on the presence of a thoughtful attitude towards what is said by an intellectual.

What constitutes Heidegger's essayistic turn, then? It consists of placing all responsibility for interpretation on the author, namely on the philosophers themselves. In this, Heidegger is almost in line with romantic hermeneutics. If we take into account that Umberto Eco's term "over-interpretation" contains negative characteristics that he says are based on "incidental and illusory" similarity¹ and, as a consequence, indicate the author's deliberate distancing from the text being studied, in Heidegger's works this phenomenon—if we are going to use the term—has only positive connotations. Heidegger's over-interpretation or essayism does not deny the demand for factualism. Rather, it engages the interpreter in the process of thinking launched by the author of the text being studied. For instance, in meditating on Anaximander's statements, Heidegger presents his own translation/interpretation from the Greek, noting that he cannot provide scientific proof for his interpretation. He goes on to admit that we cannot allow ourselves to just believe the version proposed.

As Heidegger puts it, "Scientific evidence would be one-dimensional. There is no place for faith in thinking. This translation only allows thinking itself, at that by thinking within the limits of this statement. Thinking is the versification of the truth of being in a historically possible interlocution of two thinking people in the past. [...] That is why

¹ Eco, Umberto, *Over-interpreting texts*, Anthology of World Literary and Critical Thought, Lviv: Litopys, 2002, p. 551 (in Ukrainian).

this verbalization will not call for us as long as we are clarifying it only historically, scientifically and philologically.”¹ The concept of the “thinkers’ conversation” also involves a hermeneutic conversation or co-thinking between those Dilthey intellectuals who are worthy of trust and, thus, of empathy and co-understanding. Gadamer wrote about Heidegger’s co-thinking with Nietzsche and Hölderlin. Mykhailo Minakov² also mentions Heidegger’s conversations with Novalis and Trakl.³ Thanks to the essayism of his thinking, Heidegger does not veer off the analyzed text when interpreting, but continues his thinking from the point at which the author left off. The idea that “a statement calls for” an interpreter by setting the frame of its own factuality is important. This presence can coincide in its hermeneutic participation with Dasein, when the language of a philosopher or a poet resonates and is able to embody the phenomenological in the individual. The individual, in turn, opens for us the way to the stylistic and biographical.

The image of Dilthey, with his tendency to anchor himself in the process of cultural understanding in a thinking witness, appears again and again as we consider the postulates of philosophical hermeneutics. Even Gadamer unwittingly takes Heidegger’s positions in his own biographical reminiscences about Heidegger. “The only thing we have left is the witness of the person who was present at the place where the event happened and is now passing on the witness to others. The eye-witness relates what happened, moreover, what happened in reality. Therefore, the eye-witness witnessing the moment has every right to say what everybody who has met Heidegger knows: he is a master of thinking, the unknown art of thinking.”⁴ We constitute, renew and create, again and again, the sense of the message in our own manner. In addition to the interpreter, the “participants” in the conversation include the text

¹ Heidegger, Martin, *Discourse on Thinking*, Moscow: Higher School, 1991, p. 67 (in Russian).

² Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

³ Novalis (Georg Friedrich Phillipp Freiherr von Hardenberg) (1772–1801) was a philosopher and poet of early German Romanticism. Georg Trakl (1887–1914) was an Austrian poet and leading expressionist.

⁴ Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Heidegger’s Ways*, Minsk: Propylaeum, 2007, p. 73 (in Russian).

itself, its author and other people, and the historical horizons that can be changed, influencing our prejudgments. Providing we reach understanding, the sense we are looking can present itself as something new.

Essayism as personal engagement

And so, the hermeneutics of style emerges from the dialogical nature of philosophical hermeneutics, being related to the essayism of the statements of intellectuals. Essayism means a specific personal engagement on the part of the author—a thinking witness of events, a philosopher or a poet—in the object of conversation, which generates the passion in essayism. This provides a signal to readers that causes them to respect the proposed point of view and to reflect and listen attentively. Reading an essay, we always imagine the author with their emotions and aspirations, and communicate with them through reading. Because of that, we also seem to be looking at ourselves in a mirror. The significance and impact of an essay is not the result of the sources it is based on, or the accuracy of the facts or topic chosen. The essay's validity is related to the author's person, to their capacity and ability to see something common in the tangles of phenomena and events that would never be noticed by other people.

The essay can never be a monolog. It is based on and laid out as a dialog. Meeting an appropriately represented different proposition—including the author's conviction, theoretical base, scientific arguments and ability to listen and to hear the other—the essay does not oppose, but is enriched by a different understanding and forms an integral polyphonic discourse. The resonance of this discourse is truthful inasmuch as it leads us to correct thinking in correlation with known facts. This strategy best fits the foundation of philosophical hermeneutics.

Essayism makes "backward reduction" possible, engaging in a properly hermeneutic conversation. It overcomes the necessary phenomenological conventionalities, helping the participant to maintain their way toward an answer to the question asked, remembering it and remembering themselves, all in line with the truth. The hermeneutics of style analyzes a text in the context of never-ending exchanges of thought within culture. From this point of view, the readers' writings are always

of utmost importance. The wish to express always arises from something that has really touched the author, causing them to react through their own vision, prevision and style.

Truth: Philosophy in Transit¹

The title of John Caputo's book, *Truth: Philosophy in Transit* (Penguin Press, 2013) refers to the extremely dynamic pace of our lives, where "the trip is the destination,"² and in the course of his book, Caputo reveals the nature of modern philosophizing. These days, we can fly like a bird and travel to any corner of the world without any problems—provided, of course, that we have the money to do so. Modern mass communications and the internet instantly connect a person anywhere, even if they are physically at home.

To Caputo, this is how angels move in heaven. But no one knows how to exit this perpetual-motion train with no set destination. Constantly moving through space, time and information—which often equates to moving in space and time—, we go nowhere in particular. Similarly, it is difficult for us to identify and find an important, central and ultimate truth, since its exact place is unknown. Constant movement seemingly denies the existence of any possible location of truth that matters.

We recognize the fact that the modern world is overly dynamic and pluralistic. Anyone can be introduced to anyone else with ease. Similarly, any amount of information about someone can be found if desired. The author presents two main views on this diversity: a universal concept, as a product of modernism, and correspondingly, difference as a post-modern motif.

Modernists appeal to a system created by some central authority. This may be God or nature, depending on whether we go to church or not. Postmodernists consider a combination of things in the world like

¹ Original published in *Kyiv-Mohyla Journal of the Humanities* #1 (2014), pp. 267–273, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Press.

² *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 19.

a web, with no definite beginning and end. If the first group prefers rules and mathematical certainty, in its understanding of the world, the second one approaches the metaphor of James Joyce, which includes the notions of both chaos and cosmos. In a sense, then, the post-modern ideal can be formulated as “chaosmopolitanism.”

While modernity adheres to specific rules and methods in ethics and science, postmodernism offers us flexibility and adaptability by proposing the idea of relativity—a world with no one truth. As Caputo puts it, “The best way to think of post-modern thought is as a style, rather than as a body of doctrines.”¹ In this view, many different truths jostle with each other, depending on language, culture, gender, needs, tastes, and the like. In a way, he writes, “contemporary transportation systems do not merely cause traffic jams, they also jam our idea of truth.”²

Caputo draws a parallel between the polytheism of the ancient world and the Roman practice of tolerance, and today’s religious pluralism. Today’s tolerance, in other words, is not something entirely new. In antiquity, religious rites were a symbol of national self-identity. By the Middle Ages, quests for wisdom virtually equated quests for God. A single Divine Plan was seen to link beauty and truth, which were both religious and philosophical at the same time.

The integrity of centrality for the Fathers of the Church of St. Augustine lies in the notion that the exercise of truth for him occurred together with the utterance, location and voicing of the “inner word of truth.” “That is what his confessions are, both in the sense that by confessing, he is making something, making a book, producing the truth in the form of a public document that can be read by all of us, but also in the sense that he is doing something, namely, making a confession. Augustine is not only producing something made out of words but also doing something with his words...”³ It’s important to understand that we are not referencing only the Christian faith itself here. Augustine’s process of determining truth shows a special connectedness between

¹ *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

his pre-existentialism, pre-phenomenology, and the tradition of ancient philosophizing, based on skepticism and critical thinking.

In a search for the truth, faith wages war against reason and the scientific approach championed by the Enlightenment that denied religion. The elevated calls of the French Revolution for “liberty, equality and fraternity” led not only to the liberation of the oppressed sectors of society, but also to an attitude about mass murder as a mere “statistic,” to use Stalin’s apocryphal phrase. We have every reason to associate the invention of the guillotine at the end of 18th century with genocides of the 20th, which marked the beginning of the Russian Revolution of 1917. In both cases, we encounter mass murder, ideologically presented as the removal of certain obstacles on the road to “benefiting” all humanity. Clearly, common sense and Pure Reason alone do not suffice.

And so, John Caputo reminds us: “Pure Reason has a low tolerance for anything that is not Pure Reason, which is, I offer, a bit unreasonable.”¹ He warns against the rejection of religion in favor of Pure Reason, referring not to a denominational approach, but Augustine’s idea of “the restless searching heart in the midst of a mysterious world.”² The author does not want to deal with the variety of reasons for religious hatred, turning, instead, to the metaphor of frogs, whose population is being reduced and who have become an object of interest for ecologists. In order to save the frogs, we need to pay attention to the issues and phenomena of an entire ecosystem.

To Caputo, religion appears as a hybrid of specific elements of knowledge (truth), ethics (good) and art (beauty). All these components, combined together into a single whole, offer a key to understanding what is happening in broader culture. Everything we say about religion is repeated in other areas, such as art and ethics, and that creates a wider conception of our lives. “My hypothesis is that religion is a clue to the travels and travails of truth, not the truth of assertions, but truth as a thing to love, to live, and to die...”³ So, not only can truth be correlated

¹ *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

with the findings of scientific research, but the experience of truth in an existential and cultural sense is highly important.

Much attention in Caputo's book is devoted to the figure of Jacques Derrida, whose biography so closely resembles that of the founder, St. Augustine. His work largely took place against the backdrop of the greatest of the Church Fathers, including the heretical desire to formulate a "religion without religion." Both were born in North Africa and later ended up in Europe. "Never before in the history of philosophy has a philosopher traveled more than Derrida, or done more work on the road, in hotels, aboard planes, encircling the globe many times over. He said he always felt welcome 'elsewhere'; that he was, as he put it, 'not identical with himself.'"¹ We can see that the figure of Derrida serves as the best example for both John Caputo's book and postmodernism as a style of philosophizing.

This style remains in confrontation to the ideas of the Enlightenment and Pure Reason. In order to distinguish between modernist, that is, to distinguish from the modern, and post-modern discourses that converge on close attention to the original style, we need to pay attention to the concept of repetition, that Caputo refers to in his explanation of Martin Heidegger: "Repeating the possible rather than actual."² Producing interpretations and meanings, postmodernism appeals to different languages, tastes and contexts, which enable distinction through a mutation of established meaning. For Derrida, this method of understanding opened up possibilities for finding evidence in language and history that was not really present—but might have been.

Modernist thinking makes Caputo's essay an embodiment of his unique style, using, as he does, an archetypal metaphor that is key to understanding the specific nature of humans. Caputo sees Bernstein's *West Side Story* as a repetition of Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, demonstrating the immutability of metaphor, which facilitates the telling of an ordinary human story and enables both the existence and the discovery of the truth. In this way, repetition becomes phenomenological in nature, without equating plurality and relativity.

¹ *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 72.

² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

A Postmodernist would have paid attention to the multiplicity of context—the reality of time and the names and character of the protagonists—, each time placing the author—who may conceptually play no role, only wanting to rid himself of the claims of previously expressed opinions, rather than creating new precedents—and reader in opposing positions of understanding.

The Modernist essayist might have insisted on the archetypal nature of the human love story that characterizes human relations in different historical periods and national flavors. Basing ourselves on John Caputo, who likes to compare the figures of Augustine and Derrida, we can affirm that they are both united by a unique style of thinking and writing. From this point of view, they emerge as essayists. The difference between the two philosophers is rooted in respect for the multiplicity of interpretations.

The author devotes considerable ink to criticism of the Enlightenment, which in history mediates between the religious understanding of truth and the post-modern situation. Copernicus, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and even the Romantic poets showed “how Reason ended up looking foolish.”¹ For Caputo, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche act as “post-modern prophets.”² “By the end of the 19th century, we were left with a choice between the madness to which Pure Reason had led and a salutary madness which had reacted against it.”³ Both philosophers, maintaining Christian positions or denying them, establish a place for humans and culture in the search for, experience and realization of truth.

Caputo relates truth in a post-modern situation primarily to the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger, the “language games” introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the idea of “paradigm shifts” developed by Thomas Kuhn. In the search for truth, they put forward phenomenological, linguistic and socio-cultural factors. Caputo emphasizes that the post-modern reality of truth does not reside somewhere in a place outside of us. Similarly, it does not belong to only one specific context or a particular thinker.

¹ *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 115.

² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

The author actualizes the ancient concept of love of truth in the post-modern age. “When I speak of the love of truth, the Eros or desire of truth, I am saying this is something we are, not something we decide to do. I am saying that the moment someone says this is the truth, this is democracy or science, sexuality or ethics—the one true interpretation—, then the flow of truth is cut off, the borders are closed, the event is prevented, the life of interpretation is crushed, the future is shut down and replaced by anxiety about the future. The police of truth have arrived.”¹ The global world today is characterized by a new quality of intertextuality, the interconnectedness of everyone with everyone else. We cannot ignore what differs from our point of view and what is associated with cultural contexts unfamiliar to us: those who lived in remote epochs, who live on another continent or in another country, or who otherwise belong to a different social group in society.

According to Caputo, we are moving towards post-humanism, which approaches after post-modernity, when we go beyond the global world. “The horizons of what we mean by earth and sun, space and time, by matter and even human life itself have begun to undergo a transformation whose measure we have not yet taken.”² He even states that, in the present age of new information technologies, amidst the general picture of the world that has emerged through revolutionary scientific discovery, “more and more it looks like even we are information, which is why the present age does not shirk from calling itself ‘post-human.’”³ The permanent place of residence becomes an illusion. We no longer stop or enjoy a rest from the voyage. We cannot even stand firmly on the ground. Our point of contact is not good old terra firma, but Spaceship Earth.

Because of the extent of ignorance and uncertainty associated with understanding the “info-techno-science will,” John Caputo appeals to faith and religion: “I do not mean a confessional faith that is supposed to save us, but a more radical faith that puts us at risk.”⁴ He calls for reading the most important philosophical texts in the terms and concepts of the

¹ *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

new age, and to accept the post-human will, not as the destruction of humanity, but as its re-creation and universal re-contextualization.

“Truth to tell, we do not know who we are—and that is who we are.”¹ Caputo notes, “the motto of my hermeneutics is that we get the best results by facing up to the worst.”² In this existential conundrum, his mind turns to the most lofty. He states that we perhaps may not need God to receive grace, but need grace itself to feel the presence of God—regardless of what we mean by the word “God” in our religions. The concept of grace appears more important to Caputo—a word from a new dictionary—and so allows us to look for the definition of the concept of what happens around us in a qualitatively new reality.

Finally, Caputo returns to the figures of St. Augustine and Derrida. They embody for him a certain metaphor of understanding. “It should be clear by now, that when I speak of a certain odd and irregular ‘religion’ or of ‘loving truth,’ I am not being comforting or sentimental; I am talking about negotiating an abyss.”³ Neither Augustine nor Derrida was aware of what truth they loved and sought at the time that they loved and sought their own God. Truth is not given from the beginning, it is found in the process of searching. The truth of their difference lies in this not knowing, which drives the thinkers forward to further thinking and understanding.

In his conclusion, John Caputo comes closest to the position of Friedrich Schleiermacher on the universal appeal of hermeneutics. The key value in any field of human endeavor is to overcome misunderstanding as such, and this must be accomplished through the efforts of the interpreter. Similarly, according to Heidegger, the human lives to understand. According to Caputo, all of us, like Augustine and Derrida, regardless of our individual preferences, can find common faith for the journey in this complex, changing world through understanding and maintaining the classical horizon of the “love of truth.” Perhaps this is the true independence of humans from any velocity, distance and circumstance that we might face.

¹ *Truth: Philosophy in Transit*, Penguin Press, 2013, p. 258.

² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

Kyiv-Mohyla Academy as a Medium for Free Speech¹

This article considers freedom of speech in Ukraine in light of the overall context, local political culture, key challenges and trends in the media, and the professionalism of Ukrainian journalists. Dr. Kvit makes the claim that, because the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy effectively functions as an independent public platform, it plays a role in mass communications in Ukraine today.

First, a few words about Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (KMA). Our university was founded in 1615 and is the oldest university in Ukraine, the oldest in the former Russian Empire, the oldest in Eastern Europe, and the oldest among the South Slavic peoples. Many prominent intellectuals, philosophers, writers, political leaders, scientists, and artists have graduated from Kyiv-Mohyla.

The Russian tsarist and later soviet governments looked askance at this center of liberal thought. By 1918, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy premises were being used as the headquarters of the Dnipro Military Flotilla, and later the Naval Political School was housed there, although Kyiv is hundreds of kilometers from the nearest sea. When the Soviet Union went into collapse in 1991, Viacheslav Briukhovetskiy, now the Honorary President of KMA, reopened and revived Kyiv-Mohyla Academy as a modern university, fully integrated into the Western system of higher education. This is the place where all innovations introduced into Ukrainian education have been launched and tested.

But before discussing the role of KMA in the context of freedom of speech, freedom of speech itself needs to be discussed.

The political implications of freedom of speech in Ukraine

There are two ways to look at freedom of speech in today's Ukraine. The first is much easier than the second. To start with, we can just go through the list of various abridgments, violations and bans in Ukraine currently.

¹ The original article was based on a speech at the University of Adelaide, Australia, May 4, 2012.

The alternative, more difficult approach is also more academic and therefore more desirable for this writer.

I have already tried to characterize the media environment in Ukraine today elsewhere.¹ Freedom of speech does not exist by itself, nor can it be exported or brought in from the outside. It can arise only in those states where the citizens want it. Ukrainians have shown themselves to be a nation that has an innate need for freedom of speech. With this in mind, let's analysis the state of freedom of speech in Ukraine in 2012.

Freedom of speech clearly has political implications. This is what Ukrainian society worries about most of all. We still do not know for sure who was the assassin's paymaster in the case of Georgiy Gongadze and the journalist community considers the case open. The different ways of preventing journalists from performing their professional duties include concealing information, publishing political advertisement without acknowledgement, and putting pressure on newspaper, television and radio journalists—and editors, which can come from the government, owners, and managers. Even a hint of pressure can lead to self-censorship.

These days, it's impossible to hide information about such cases, but different instances of political persecution more or less affect the exercise of freedom of speech. Sometimes journalists protest and ordinary Ukrainians support them. For example, journalists at UNIAN, a news agency, *Gazeta Po-Kyivsky*, a Kyiv tabloid, and the *Kyiv Post* at various times ran protest campaigns. The struggle for unbiased news, especially TV, continues both at the professional level and in public discourse.

In Ukraine, the government cannot possibly develop and implement a broad-ranging strategy of pressure on the media, as has been done in neighboring Russia. Some of the reasons for this include, firstly, that Ukrainian society does not accept authoritarianism; secondly, state media does not have as significant a presence and thus influence on the broader public as in Russia; thirdly, influential national and local media have a large variety of owners; fourthly, journalists and media specialists

¹ Kvit, Serhiy, "Mass Communications in an Independent Ukraine, in the Context of Normative Theories and as Evidence of Modernization Theory," 2010. Accessed: http://kvit.ukma.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Mass-Communications-of-an-Independent-Ukraine-in-the-Context-of-Normative-Theories-and-as-an-Evidence-of-Modernization-Theory_2010/pdf. – Title from the screen.

work together to defend their rights and professional values; and finally, the government is not prepared to discard democratic rhetoric completely, so, it feels pressure to maintain dialog with society.¹ In short, Ukraine illustrates an important general rule: a government can take as much power as society allows it.

New ways to promote or curtail freedom of speech

Ukraine does, however, have official agencies that perform the function of censorship. The National Expert Committee for the Protection of Public Morality is a government institution that does not operate on the principles of self-regulation. Nor are its decisions based on any relevant sociological or media research. So, the Committee has taken on the functions of a Church, which normally addresses moral issues in western societies. But in reality, this Committee is nothing more than a weird (post-) soviet anachronism. In the post-totalitarian conditions of today's Ukraine, it constitutes a menace to the very concept of freedom of speech.

Today, a range of new technologies can be used to curtail speech freedoms and to misinform very broad audiences. After the Orange Revolution—which also encompassed a journalists' revolution—, together with positive changes in this area, there appeared fundamentally new technologies for “ultimate openness as a kind of total closeness.” This phenomenon may be seen in many talk shows broadcasting endless and fruitless discussions on seemingly important social issues, often run by vulgar hosts. Even the behavior of participating politicians often leads to a result that is contrary to expectations: instead of getting clearer, problems are obfuscated in personal conflicts and even spitting. After the Orange Revolution, many critical national and social projects failed to materialize, and the most important of these, in my opinion, was establishing a public broadcasting service.²

¹ This may at least partly be explained by the fact that the Ukrainian government does not have extra money from oil and gas that can be spent on stimulating the domestic economy and constructing an authoritarian polity.

² Kvit Serhiy, “Public Broadcasting Service: A German-Ukrainian exchange of opinions.” Accessed: http://kvit.ukma.kiev.ua/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Ghost-of-Public-Broadcasting-Service-in-Ukraine_2010.pdf. Title from the screen.

Some questions for the journalist community itself continue to be important to understand the state of freedom of speech in today's Ukraine, including: What percentage of journalists are prepared to receive bribes and live according to double standards, and, conversely, what does freedom of speech mean to them? How familiar are these journalists with what are supposed to be their professional values? How many of them are involved in public, professional and trade union movements aimed at defending their professional reputation? These same questions can also be addressed to sociologists.

Practice in the two decades since 1991 has shown that the public activity of journalists directly depends on the prevailing social mood. In other words, journalists influence their audience, but the audience influences them even more. For today, we can state that freedom of speech, free media and free journalists are a reality in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the questions and threats keep growing.

In terms of the development of new information technologies and media convergence, Ukraine has the fastest-growing rate of internet penetration in Europe, and is 9th in the ranking of overall internet use: 16,900,000, or 40% of adults are regular users of the internet.¹ The role of new media and associated phenomena such as citizen journalism are becoming more and more important in Ukraine, and have resulted in greater accessibility to alternative sources of information and the engagement of the broader public in the production of media content. New technologies are furthering the development of freedom of speech. The audience for video clips on the internet is often broader than the regular audience for television news.

KMA as free speech platform

Now we can talk about the role of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in the struggle for freedom of speech in Ukraine. KMA has a unique School of Journalism,² oriented in its work on western standards and best practice. The School offers a 2-year Master's Program, a PhD in Mass

¹ Plus One DA. Accessed: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Gcgdr4K7gb4. – Title from the screen.

² Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism. Accessed: <http://en.j-school.kiev.ua/about/>.

Communications, the Digital Future of Journalism program for teaching new media to working journalists, and Digital Media for Universities, a new media program for teachers of journalism. It uses licensed software and offers TV and radio studios, professional equipment, and a Media Reform Center. It would be fair to say that the Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism is having a considerably impact on the development of professional standards and new forms of education for journalists in Ukraine. In addition to Ukrainian professors, experts from Great Britain, the US, France, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands are contributing to the development of the Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism.

With respect to civil society activities aimed at expanding freedom of speech in Ukraine, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has played a significant and generalist role by providing a liberal tribune for independent thought. Civic movements including Stop Tsenzura¹ and Chesno² were established at KMA; indeed, our university was their co-founder. Earlier, the work of the Media Reform Center³ before, during and after the Orange Revolution gave rise to a special term, media reform, in Ukraine. If someone is looking for a liberal tribune, KMA is the first place to apply to. Every event held within our walls has become an immediate newsmaker. According to our monitoring, KMA was mentioned in different Ukrainian media more than 17 times a day during the previous university year. From this point of view, in fact Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is an important Ukrainian mass medium.

Historical memory is closely related to freedom of speech in Ukraine. This fact reflects the new political reality in our country since the 2010 Presidential election, as was the case during the *perestroika* period. Historical issues often go far beyond the framework of academic research. Today, the Minister of Education and Science, Dmytro Tabachnyk, can publicly deny the existence of a proper Ukrainian nation; he can deny the existence of a separate Ukrainian language, and a historical memory.

¹ Stop Censorship. Accessed: <http://stopcensorship.wordpress.com/>.

² Chesno [Honestly]. Accessed: <http://chesno.org/>.

³ Media Reform Center. Accessed: <http://www.mediareform.com.ua/>.

In one effort—among many—to respond to this high-ranked political nonsense, last year KMA published a book entitled “The Time of the Cheap Clown.”¹ “Cheap clown” is what one well-known Ukrainian politician called the current Minister of Education and Science. KMA also publicly protested against Tabachnyk’s appointment to this position.² The Academy participates in ongoing debate both around his person and the changes that he proposes, including providing a public platform regarding new Law on Higher Education over last two years, defending the public interest of higher education, and asserting our rights in the country’s courts.

The national liberation struggle and a nation state for the Ukrainian people are now almost officially forbidden in Ukraine. Ruslan Zabiliy, a historian from Lviv, was even arrested for his professional activities, but released soon after mass protests by civil society that including historians, writers, journalists, and various civic organizations. Interestingly, he refused the offer to run for the Verkhovna Rada. Another historian, Volodymyr Viatrovych, who was director of the Archives of the Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU) until 2010 and had legally declassified documents related to the soviet secret service, was fired. Now he heads the KMA Center for Researching the History of Ukraine’s State Development.

Research and debate into the Holodomor are also considered controversial because they challenge the official position of Ukrainian powers-that-be to deny the genocidal nature of the Great Famine known as the Holodomor of 1932–1933. In these areas, KMA has continued with its own research, publishing and media policies. For example, in October 2010, the well-known American historian Norman Naimark presented his new book, “Stalin’s Genocides.”³ Kyiv-Mohyla Academy obtained the right to translated it into Ukrainian and publish it. In the spring of 2011, the Ukrainian edition of “Stalin’s Genocides” was pre-

¹ “The time of the Cheap Clown,” *Education in Ukraine: The challenge of pseudo-reforms*, KMA, V. Panchenko, editor, Kyiv: Agraf Media Group, 2011, 99 pp.

² KMA President’s Appeal. Accessed: <http://kvit.ukma.kiev.ua/2011/04/naukma-president%E2%80%99s-appeal/>.

³ Princeton University Press.

sented in Kyiv by the author, who also participated in several meetings, lectured in public and held press conferences. These events were highlighted in the domestic press and they provoked discussions at the professional and political levels.

The cradle of creative dissent

What is the logic of a state refusing its own historical memory? Losing historical memory is the most painful foe of any European country. Nevertheless, the nominal rhetoric grounding every important state decision continues to be pro-European. Here we are dealing with the phenomenon of a “sovok” or *homo sovieticus*, someone without a homeland who, as part of the Ukrainian political elite, must use rhetoric that proclaims his aim to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, espouse European values, and adhere certainly to EU economic standards—if not its political standards—, in order to be understandable to his electorate.

In the midst of this, the attempts of some politicians to build their pro-Russian reputation look even weirder, speculating on a “common” history lasting for several hundreds of years and soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War—not World War II—, and emphasizing the common history of Ukraine and Russia within the USSR. In fact, this rhetoric is connected to a naïve hope of someday gaining access to cheap Russian gas. Lately, these illusions have started to dissipate, and rhetoric about Russia has fairly quickly shifted from one “brotherhood” to unconcealed hostility.

The situation in Ukraine today is somewhat dangerous. For the first time since 1991, the humanities have been given up to those political forces that see their aim as a straggle against Ukrainian independence. This explains common, positive references by such politicians to the authoritarian/totalitarian “Russian model” of government and the lingering soviet style of thinking of many Ukrainian public figures. That is why the concepts like freedom of speech and an independent media irritate such politicians so much. Thus, freedom of speech is becoming a major cause in the unfinished battle for independent statehood in Ukraine.

Still, the situation in Ukraine remains very fluid. Ukrainians feel themselves Europeans in the meaning formulated by Denis de Rougemont, who called Europe “the cradle of creative dissent.”¹ And this spurs our hope and our self-confidence.

Mass Communications in Independent Ukraine in the Context of Normative Theories and as Evidence of Modernization Theory²

Introduction

At one conference organized jointly by the Institute for Broadcasting Economics and the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv, I discussed the history of the movement to establish public broadcasting in Ukraine. Today, I'd like to describe the day-to-day realities of mass communications in Ukraine and the circumstances under which we want to implement this ambitious project.

Investigative mass communications in post-soviet, post-totalitarian and post-colonial Ukraine is of special interest, as such communication is aimed at developing a proper understanding of the global world's dynamics. On one hand, the practical importance of such an investigation considerably differs from mass communications studies in the emerging states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. From there we gained more than enough proof of the total failure of the modernization theory as a component of the strategies of western cultural, economic and media imperialism. On the other, we need to separate Ukrainian media studies from Russian or post-soviet studies, which disappoint researchers, media experts, politicians and journalists alike, and make them recon-

¹ de Rougemont, Denis, *Lettre ouverte aux Européens*, Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1970, p. 213.

² The original article was based on a speech by Serhiy Kvit at the “Public Media: A Ukrainian-German exchange of ideas” conference organized by the Institute for Broadcasting Economics at the University of Cologne, supported by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) and Auswärtiges Amt, held on October 20, 2010, in Cologne.

sider current normative theories, launched in the well-known work by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, "Four Theories of the Press."¹

For the changes in Ukraine's media space that have been in progress since the end of the 1980s, an umbrella term has been coined, "media reforms." Unlike reforms in other areas, such as economics, science, education and public health, these reforms seem to be more systematic and consistent. The term "media reforms" has been used by the Media Reform Center² under the School of Journalism³ of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy⁴ since 2002. The Center was the first to start theoretically generalizing the processes in Ukraine's mass communications, and after the Orange Revolution, the first systematic research in such media reforms was pursued here.⁵ In 2004, the journalists' revolution was part and a key achievement of the Orange Revolution. Ukrainian media reforms have made it possible to take a fresh look at the logic of the development of the whole post-soviet area.

First, let's look at Ukraine's mass communications in the context of specific aspects of critical theory and modernization theory. After that comes the necessity to develop and adjust regular theories, taking into account the particular features of post-soviet states. Finally, Ukrainian realities can be put into the context of global regularities in the development of mass media and national media systems.

Modernization Theory

In terms of the main theories of mass communications in emerging states, Singhal and Sthapitanonda discuss three development paradigms:

¹ Siebert, F., Peterson, T., and Schramm, W., *Four Theories of the Press: The authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do*, 1956, Urbana.

² The Media Reform Center at <http://www.mediareform.com.ua/>.

³ Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism at <http://en.j-school.kiev.ua/about/>.

⁴ The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy at http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/eng_site/index.php.

⁵ Pavlenko, R. and Klymenko, I., "Are the Changes in Ukraine's Mass Media Induced by the Orange Revolution Really Irreversible?" in *Magisterium*, The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2006, Vol. 22, pp. 81–94. <http://www.mediareform.com.ua/article.php?articleID=423>.

dominant, dependency and alternative.¹ The first reflects the classical idea of modernization, or westernization, according to which these countries need to join the world dominant trend of the economical development. Media here take the role of an agent of social changes. The dependency paradigm is antithetic to the modernization perspective, being more neo-colonialist. It is based on the traditions of the Frankfurt school and encourages the countries resisting more developed “aggressors” to close the ranks. The alternative paradigm also appears as antithetic to the dominant paradigm, demonstrating another, “pluralistic” prospect. It emphasizes that every region, society or social group must find its own way of evolution. First of all, such ideological missions are being actualized, as in the assertion of civil rights and the anti-war movement, environmental and feminist movements in industrial countries, liberal and national movements in communist and emerging states. The requirements of mass communications include diversity, deinstitutionalization and locality.

Needless to say, all three paradigms in some measure complement each other and, at the same time—according to Singhal and Sthapitanonda—, utopianism is their common downfall, as long as there is no established definition for the term “development” and proper allowance is not made for human and cultural factors. In short, there is no standard model that is acceptable to everyone. Moreover, the phenomenon of globalization needs to be taken into account. The mention of human and cultural factors both negates and confirms the theory of modernization, since we can suppose that there are post-colonial countries for which modernization, or westernization, would be advantageous. In this context, Curran notes, “Nations have different languages, political systems, power structures, cultural traditions, economies, international links, and histories. These find continuing expression in the media of different nation states.”² Regardless of the fact that, in the age of globalization, the age of nation-states seems to be fading into the past, we cannot claim that a universal media system is arising at the same time. Conversely, the

¹ Singhal, A. and Sthapitanonda, P., “The Role of Communication in Development: Critique of dominant, dependency and alternative paradigms” in *The Journal of Development Communications*, 1996, 7 (1), pp. 10–25.

² Curran, J., *Media and Power*, London and New York 2002, p. 183.

specifics of national media systems keep depending directly on the needs and requirements of the societies in which those systems operate.

Critical theory and its variations have a long tradition of denying the modernization theory. On account of that, in formulating her theory of cultural materialism, Mousseau writes that she proceeded from the assumption that social life was a response to the real-world problems of existence. "Cultural materialism highlights three layers in all social systems: the infrastructure, the structure and the superstructure. The infrastructure is the base layer: the material conditions of human existence. How do people relate to their environment? How do humans produce and consume? The structure refers to a society's social and political institutions. What sort of familiar and non-familiar associations, organizations, and institutions are found in the society? The final layer, the superstructure, is a society's ideologies, paradigms, and values."¹ So, the theory of cultural materialism negates the modernization theory.

If the modernization theory postulates that political development and globalization are the direct results of the expansion of Western culture and education, the theory of cultural materialism insists that the cause of these effects is infrastructure, but not superstructure. Mousseau focuses on the principal difference between national and political culture: "...if we start with the superstructure, then it is difficult to determine what aspects of the 'model' culture a developing country should import. The shaving of the beard, the wearing of the Western hat, and, as missionaries once thought, "the singing of Western hymns" will not change political culture."² That is why the particular features of political, not national, culture should be considered first of all. "The market civilization of the present age originated in Western Europe by chance; it might just as easily have originated in twelfth-century Mali. But because it began in Europe, most everyone today confuses liberal political culture with 'Western' indigenous culture."³ Ultimately, these statements are not really obvious, and we can question them.

¹ Mousseau, M., "Globalization, markets and democracy. An anthropological lineage," in Mehdi Mozaffari (ed.), *Globalization and Civilizations*, London and New York 2002, p. 101.

² Ibid., p. 119.

³ Ibid., p. 120.

Freedom of Speech in Post-Colonial Ukraine

For that purpose, we need to turn to Ukraine's experience. This is a post-colonial and post-totalitarian country that has spent hundreds of years struggling for independence. In the 20th century alone, Ukraine's independence was proclaimed, often in the midst of bloody wars, four times: in 1917 in Kyiv, in 1939 in Khust, in 1941 in Lviv, and in 1991 in Kyiv. Moreover, tens of millions of Ukrainians were killed during two world wars, stalinist terror and the Holodomor, a genocidal famine.

Yet the rising of independent Ukrainian out of the ashes of the Soviet Union, much like the earlier emergence of new states in colonial African, took the whole world by surprise. But because of the European roots of Ukrainian culture, the educational level of the country's citizens and Ukraine's traditional political culture, Ukraine cannot be relegated to the group of developing states. Purely economic indices can be overlooked, as modernization theory appeals first of all to cultural, social and political standards.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 also demonstrated the Euro-centrism of Ukraine's mass communications. It became obvious that Ukrainians have a fundamental preference for freedom of speech. And yet, its journalists can hardly be called the most progressive and change-oriented element in Ukrainian society. Indeed, the journalists' revolution was not a forerunner, but a consequence of the Orange Revolution, as freedom of speech was one of the main demands of the Ukrainian people.

"One of the most remarkable and momentous results of the Orange Revolution was the journalists' revolution, when reporters from leading TV channels and print media refused en masse to follow the *temnyky* or covert instructions, to distort information, or to manipulate public awareness, practices that were extensively applied during the 2004 presidential campaign. The image of the main domestic TV channels, radio programs and press was transformed nearly overnight,"¹ according to the Media Reform Center.

We have to keep in mind that the progress of mass communications, but above all the principle of freedom of speech and the concept of public interest, depend directly on what a society needs. If a nation

¹ Pavlenko, R. and Klymenko, I., "Are the Changes in Ukraine's Mass Media Induced by the Orange Revolution Really Irreversible?" in *Magisterium*, The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2006, Vol. 22, p. 81.

wants to have democratic rule and free speech, it will have them. But if such things are not on the nation's list of priorities, it is impossible to explain their benefits from outside. And if someone does try to do this, the discussion takes on a "you don't know what you really need" tone that comes across as obtrusive, condescending and even imperialist.

Most of the disappointment among western political and media specialists about the democratization of domestic media is connected with Russia and China. We know about the conflict between the Google Corporation and the Chinese government over political censorship. The truth is that censorship has broad-based support in China and cannot be challenged from inside. As for Russia, freedom of speech became the main reason why relations with Ukraine chilled so deeply after the Orange Revolution. Vladimir Putin began to describe the most dangerous influence on his country as "Ukrainization," meaning democratization and freedom of speech. Putin is convinced that this would inevitably lead to the downfall of those in power in Russia.¹ Writing about the Orange Revolution, Ash and Snyder also noted that it represented a menace to modern Russia. The authors mentioned a joke that was popular in Russia at the end of 2004: "Leonid Kuchma wrote a book called *Ukraine is not Russia*. Now Vladimir Vladimirovich is writing a book called *Russia is not Ukraine*."²

In response to Putin's continuous statements that the West would "never bring Russia to its knees,"—in the sense of modernization theory and the standards of western democracy, the Czech journalist Martin Putna published an article called, "Russia, down on your knees!" in which he says that Russia itself must drop to its knees for all the wrongs it did to different peoples in the 20th century. Specifically, Russia should apologize to Ukrainians for the Holodomor that took as many as 10 million lives, to the Poles for the soviet occupation and massacre at Katyn, to Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians for mass deportations, to Hungarians for the invasion of 1956, to Czechs and Slovaks for 1968,

¹ "Российские эксперты прокомментировали высказывание Путина об украинизации" ["Russian experts comment on Putin's statement about Ukrainianization"] in Корреспондент (Kyiv), January 25, 2010. <http://korrespondent.net/russia/1039684>.

² Ash, Timothy Garton and Snyder, Timothy, "The Orange Revolution" in *The New York Review of Books*, April 28, 2005.

to Afghans for the invasion of 1980, to Chechens for the two terrible wars in the 1990s. Putna also calls on Russian powers-that-be to drop to their knees before their own citizens for all the wrongs done to them after the Bolshevik putsch in 1917, including corruption and the degradation of the individual, and for its inability to ensure a dignified and free life for the Russian people.¹

Yet, the situation cannot be simplified to such an extent, accusing Russia's leadership of evil intent against its people. Putin's and Medvedev's political success, with trust levels normally above 60%, is directly related to their efforts to centralize government and curtail civil liberties—freedom of speech first among these. For the vast majority of Russian people, a powerful state and imperial greatness are actually more important. Thus, the political tack of the Putin-Medvedev tandem needs to be considered, not just as a series of manipulations of awareness in Russian society, but also as a reflection of the desire of their electorate to see empire restored, no matter what it is called—Russian or soviet. Under these circumstances, freedom of speech is seen as an evil, threatening the dream of empire. According to Russian chauvinist mythology, such a restoration is impossible without Ukraine, as long as Kyiv, “the mother of Russian cities,” is on Ukrainian territory. That is why the main thrust of Russia's political, propaganda, and economic aggression is directed against Ukraine.

Normative Theories of the Press

Now we can reconsider normative theories about the press and possibly elaborate on them. In their canonic work, “Four Theories of the Press,” Siebert, Peterson and Schramm consider the authoritarian, libertarian, totalitarian and social responsibility models. There have already been attempts to explore this list, based on new developments in the world. For example, McQuail added the professional and alternative media models.² Siebert et al mention that “any theory of relationship of the mass media communication to the organized society of which it is a part is determined by certain basic philosophical assumptions (or con-

¹ Putna, M., “Rusko, na kolena!” in *Lidove noviny*, February 21, 2007.

² McQuail, D., *McQuail's Mass Communications Theory*, London 2010, p. 184.

clusions, if you wish) about the human and the state. For our purposes these areas of assumption can be identified as follows: (1) the nature of the human, (2) the nature of society and of the state, (3) the relation of the human to the state, and (4) the basic philosophical problem, the nature of knowledge and truth.”¹

Today, the new methodologies are emerging, leading to new models. For example, Ostini and Fung, noting the idealism and overestimation of the role of political economy in “Four Theories of the Press,” propose: “Use the model incorporating journalistic values and state systems... This new model incorporates the dimensions of individual journalistic autonomy and the structures of state policy. It thus increases understanding of press systems and the societies in which these systems exist.”² The authors consider the interaction of the authoritarian and democratic state systems with liberal or conservative–individual vs collective professionalization–models of journalists’ values and the practices that are common in a given country. They conclude that China’s media system can be defined as conservative authoritarian, Japan’s as conservative liberal, the US’s as liberal democratic, and Hong Kong’s as liberal authoritarian.

How then can we evaluate mass communications in modern-day Russia? In his study “Lessons from Russia. A Neo-Authoritarian Media System,” Becker writes: “In the Putin era, the Russian state has increasingly interfered with media autonomy,”³ so “the Russian press under Putin can best be understood as a neo-authoritarian media system... Perhaps the best example of neo-authoritarianism is in Zimbabwe.”⁴ New developments in Russia, indeed, suggest a return to traditional authoritarian approaches: “Contemporary Russia shares much with authoritarian regimes past and present,”⁵ so “the state remains the most important threat to the emergence of democratic

¹ Siebert et al., p. 10.

² Ostini, J. and Fung, A., “Beyond the Four Theories of the Press: a New Model of National Media Systems” in *Mass Communications & Society*, 2002, 5 (1), pp. 54–55.

³ Becker, J., “Lessons from Russia. A Neo-Authoritarian Media System” in *European Journal of Communication*, 2004, Vol. 19 (2), p. 158.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 149–150.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

media systems.”¹ Here we see an example when neither the state nor the society is interested in democratizing the public arena. Freedom of speech is not considered a value or a technological tool for improving living standards. Corruption, which belongs to the list of key typological characteristics of developing and post-soviet countries, seems to be more attractive, just because it is an administrative tool people have become used to.

The corruption is the #1 threat in the world today. After the Berlin Wall fell, globalization allowed the interpenetration of practices in the Western world, with its openness and liberal values, with states that were desperate to improve their socioeconomic status—mainly political elites seeking personal enrichment. Competition for attractive markets in Brazil, Russia, India and China, the BRIC group, inevitably led to the corruption of the Western business, who quickly adopted the precept, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.” The values of the public sphere also became more and more relative and situational, turning step-by-step into anachronisms. The globalization of corruption is all the more dangerous and damaging when freedom of speech is left out of the Western toolkit being borrowed by post-soviet and developing countries.

As a result, normative theories must cover new realities and not only include criteria from political economics in their typology, but also engage in more in-depth consideration of cultural priorities. And this returns us to modernization theory—only now, it is seen, not as a tool of neocolonialism, but as a key component in the superstructure for typing media systems. This typing should not be based on identifying the dominant ideology propagated by ruling elites, but on studying value priorities in certain cultures in considerable depth. In other words, the tools of freedom cannot be provided from the outside: they can only work where people have an inherent need for free media.

Nevertheless, freedom of speech can be threatened by external factors. For all the post-soviet countries, Russia is a negative center of gravity for the development of civil liberties. Conceptually, it is presented in this way: Russian “sovereign democracy” defends the values of the “Russian Civilization”—or so the claim is. Yet sovereign democracy is conso-

¹ Ibid., p. 158.

nant with strengthening authoritarianism with a tendency towards outright totalitarianism, including the suppression of opposition movements and the *de facto* restoration of the tsar—even if he's called a president. From the Kremlin ideologists' point of view, the concept of "Russian world" that extends beyond Russia is based on two main criteria: the presence of a Russian-speaking population and "natural" lack of will among this population to enjoy freedom of speech.

This concept is entirely grounded in xenophobia, as illustrated in an article by Andreyev called "The Russian Language as Shield and Sword." The author points at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy as a danger to the expansion of the Russian civilization to include Ukraine. The danger is that "teaching in the university is provided in Ukrainian and English. High-quality education in English makes it possible to omit referring to Russian cultural foundations, which removes the development of all the progressive disciplines from the stream of post-soviet science, and shifts it to the development of contemporary intellectual trends of the West... KMA faculty members openly espouse their 'democratic' orientation, which means, in Ukrainian terms, looking towards anti-Russian political forces."¹ By the way, a new political reality took shape after Viktor Yanukovich won his 2010 election bid, with the emergence of a free speech movement by journalists called "Stop Censorship," launched at KMA on May 21, 2010.

Conclusions

The post-Orange political situation is difficult, to say the least. On April 29, 2010, the OSCE expressed concern over freedom of speech in Ukraine in a special "Statement on mass media in Ukraine" It specifically mentioned the violence against and oppressions of journalists. In an article called "Doomsday for Freedom of Speech in Ukraine" written for *Gazeta Wyborcha*, the Polish daily, Andrzej M. Eliaz mentioned the attempts to close a number of television companies, leading to a dismal conclusion: "On the banks of the Dnipro, freedom of speech

¹ Andreyev, I., "Русская речь как щит и меч" ["The Russian language as shield and sword"] in Political News Agency, October 17, 2006. <http://www.apn.ru/publications/article10660.htm>.

will be limited to the internet, a few radio stations and a handful of newspapers. Ukraine is on a drift towards Belarus and Russia with their authoritarian leadership.”¹ That is why cheery declarations by Ukrainian officials about their readiness to set up a public broadcasting company are immediately received with incredulity in the professional media—all the more so that they then say that concept of public broadcasting needs to be “clarified” first, when the entire necessary conceptual and regulatory basis for public broadcasting has already been developed since the mid-1990s.

All this gives rise to a number of conclusions. First, the post-colonial, post-totalitarian and post-soviet status of Ukraine cannot be compared to developing countries. Ukraine’s key typological feature is the possibility of applying modernization theory. This accords with statements that Ukrainian society needs freedom of speech and a free press as values and tools for developing the public sphere.

Second, by dissolving the after-effects of the Cold War and the concepts inherent in a bipolar world, the globalization process leads us to reconsider current concepts about the press as well. This new reality makes us aware, not only of consistent patterns in political economics, the nature of the person and society, the structure of state politics, and common journalistic practices, but also of the priorities and values that are common to certain societies. These priorities and values are connected with both political and national culture. They need to be studied in depth, not only in developing countries and countries with transition economies, but also in wealthy, developed countries, as long as globalization defuses the West’s resentment over certain practices in the soviet bloc. What is happening now is no mere proselytizing of new members to the “Western club,” meaning professional standards and democratic values, but a comprehensive transfusion of cultures, causing some system changes in the West towards the dominating corrupt practices of the countries over whose markets Western countries now compete. The danger is, of course, that this process will also permeate into media and freedom of speech.

¹ Eliaz, A., “Śądny dzień wolności słowa na Ukrainie” [“Doomsday for Freedom of Speech in Ukraine”] in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, August 16, 2010.

Third, post-soviet studies need to be divided into the study of different countries whose societies have different needs, whether for democratic freedoms or authoritarianism. Or, put differently, those who are integrating into the world community, and those who are not, on principle. And so Russia's efforts to find a "special" way of development for "Russian civilization" and "sovereign democracy" merits careful, separate study—as does the fact that these euphemisms are a cover for plain old-fashioned aggression, xenophobia and corruption. The question is to what extent the situation is caused by the needs of Russian society, and to what extent it is the result of manipulations by its political leadership.

Finally, there must be no talk of something like "Russian sphere of interests in the post-soviet area," as long as that means the total abnegating of democracy and the restoration of the Russian empire, where most of the population is proud of the crimes committed by the tsarist and soviet regimes, instead of rejecting and repenting for them. Under such circumstances, a country like Ukraine, which is trying to develop a civilized public sphere, independent media and public broadcasting, meets powerful resistance from Russia's "sovereign democracy," with its hatred and even fear of freedom of speech and the free market of ideas as a threat to its authoritarian existence. Ukraine's independence can be strengthened if the ambitious projects presented here are carried out and Ukrainian society is consolidated around a "discourse of freedom."

Networked Communities: Strategies for Digital Collaboration¹

In *Networked Communities: Strategies for Digital Collaboration*, the authors² place a remarkable accent on the concept of a network society, which has become an object of intensive study everywhere in recent years. The authors view the network society from the perspective of those societies actively constructing such networks. Earlier authors, like

¹ Original review published in the *International Journal of Business Data Communications and Networking*, 5(4), 70–73, October-December 2009.

² Sylvie Albert, Don Flournoy and Rolland LeBrasseur, *Networked Communities: Strategies for Digital Collaboration*, 2009, 344 pp.

Manuel Castells,¹ used instead of the term “information society” or “informational society,” meaning by this that information is not just a thing of importance in our time, but rather that it means the ready access to information via telecommunication networks that gives local planners and entrepreneurs a special source of power. Networked communities are those with increased capability to create products and services that people need for a better quality of life.

Albert, Flournoy and LeBrasseur studied more than just the nature and impact of the global network; they also looked at enterprising communities that serve as hosts for the greatly expanded traffic flowing over this vast inter-network and the innovative uses to which the network is being put by local producers and non-local collaborators. Communities in Ukraine, in North America and everywhere else are all interested in knowing how these global networks can be used as tools for transformative change.

From a theoretical perspective, what we tend to first think about when we hear “network society” is the inevitable clash between the global and the local, which sometimes expresses itself as nationalism and sometimes as anti-globalism. In this book, a more positive technological position is proposed for resolving such conundrums: the public at large can now be encouraged, enabled and incorporated into a process of global development that works to the benefit of all. The internet is making it possible for people to meet their own objectives while joining with others in implementing programs of mutual interest—without depriving others in the process. In this context, the specter of network society need not be viewed solely in terms of who is directing and controlling the global network. Rather, the focus is on democratizing opportunities to enjoy the good life for all by actualizing common global potentiality: public networks that are accessible to common people.

This book reports on those strategies for effective digital collaboration that have enabled communities to produce and expand qualitatively new knowledge and innovative practices that are seen as transforming: linking schools to the internet, providing government information resources online, addressing the problems of the digital divide, developing

¹ Castells, Manuel, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Wiley Blackwell, 1996, 2 volumes.

a knowledge-based workforce, and so on. The authors focus on those conditions that, refreshed by technologies that foster creative expression and the application of citizen innovation and intelligence, allow forward-looking communities to gain traction serving the common good.

For a Ukrainian audience, this book is interesting, first of all, because of its numerous examples and specific tutorials that can help to make online collaboration more widespread and more professional. We do note that some internal contradiction appears here because, with new media based on the democratization of the internet and diminished provider controls over customers, de-professionalization has become a distinctive feature.

The phenomenon of citizen journalism is a good illustration. Now it seems that anyone who has been a consumer of news, music and video, can also become an independent producer or creator of all types of digital media content. What this book illustrates so well are the ways network society empowers individual members while providing the incentives and means for entire villages and towns, non-profit organizations and commercial businesses to establish interest-based online communities with common goals.

The authors have studied the multiple ways communities around the world are using the specific tools of digital communication to accelerate economic development, improve organizational performance, connect with their citizens, and improve the quality of local living. The authors suggest a “change framework” for more active and informed community development in which local businesses and institutions transform themselves by being better connected locally, regionally and globally. Such an approach is of interest to the people of Ukraine, where more than “20% of adults” of the population now uses the internet on a regular basis and the number of online enterprises keeps growing.

In Ukraine, as elsewhere, people are attracted to the web because they see that this is a new way to develop business, to get an education, to access government offices, to conduct library research, to promote tourism, and to get involved in a culture of digital use. For these reasons, community leaders are investing in broadband networks, looking to hire individuals trained in ICT, and investing in new internet applications and

software that better meet public needs and expectations. This book tells how community leaders and business managers alike have found more effective and successful ways to get their needs met in this new online world, where digital technologies and digital languages dominate.

I would like to point out that the internet played an extremely important role in Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004. Since the web was beyond the control of the government, new online media were able to provide Ukrainian society with far more honest and unbiased information. The internet also helped the protesters to attract a following and to organize and carry out their rallies. The Orange Revolution was, in some sense, a network revolution. Today, we need much more honest information about political events, effective communication among citizens in our society, and more productive and honest dialog between individuals, on one hand, and government institutions on the other. That is why this book should kindle great interest in Ukraine. In ways such as this, the technological capabilities of the worldwide web will further extend democracy and freedom of the press.

The true meaning of the internet is that the world is open for the first time, with the result that individuals and groups from any nation can exchange ideas and experience, can cooperate across national boundaries, and can more fairly compete. Although the concept of digital communication had not yet emerged in the 1970s when these ideas were being aired in the United Nations and in UNESCO, the authors remind us of those debates over a New World Information and Communication Order that offered great hope for a positive impact on global development, hastening and improving the exchange of modern technologies and information among all the societies without distinctions—rich or poor. These debates were held under the umbrella concept of Information Society and, later, the Network Society.

Albert, Flournoy and LeBrasseur refer to networked communities as the communities of the New World Information and Communication Order. What they write about is not just the realization of specific projects: this is a story about economic and social justice, and the exercise of basic human rights. These grand issues are now being addressed at the community level, where the culture of using network technologies and the democratization of these digital tools are expanding among

the general population. Building an infrastructure for broadband communications and assuring that there is an educated workforce should be among the priority interests of all governments—and Ukraine is no exception. In some sense, what we are talking about is the digital literacy needed in a modern society.

Whether they are called wired communities, smart communities or broadband communities, this book shows that in our digital epoch nobody with an internet connection lives beyond main-line development processes and that any community can join the networked society to enjoy a new age of prosperity. The size of these communities can be small or large and projects can be commercial or not. Whole towns, cities and even regions can turn into networked communities, regularly reporting on their achievements at the annual conferences of the Intelligent Community Forum (<http://www.intelligentcommunity.org>) held in New York. Although uniquely distinctive in each case, the activities of these communities are all aimed at expanding opportunities and increasing effectiveness in the places where people live. A real civil society can emerge when local communities mobilize to support each other, to mount opposition, or to collaborate with distant partners.

Networked Communities: Strategies for Digital Collaboration is more than a handbook on information technologies and citizen journalism. In Ukraine, a special program of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's: Mohyla School of Journalism, called the Digital Future of Journalism, is oriented on a similar set of tasks. But this program is only for journalists. It is for the next generation that will work with online technologies, content and business development in new media. Yet, we now understand that this group can, if it wishes, easily position itself as a networked community anywhere in the world, and contribute to forming new smart, useful societies that do not currently exist. In that aspect, this book could be very useful for university courses at any institution of higher education in Ukraine.

From a reader's perspective, this book is well composed in a clear style and easy-to-use format, in both its English original and the future Ukrainian version.

Науково-популярне видання

Serhiy Kvit

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Education in Ukraine**

(англійською мовою)

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This compendium of previously published articles, blogs, speeches, reviews, and essays of Serhiy Kvit is intended to inform a foreign audience about events and issues in Ukraine and related to Ukraine since 2008. Some of the blogs were published in University World News over 2012–2014. Other materials in this collection were published or presented as speeches to audiences in Australia, the US, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Finland, Poland, Belgium, and, of course, Ukraine.

The writing is divided into four sections: *Ideology, University World News, The Meaning of University, and Hermeneutics and Mass Communications*. The themes cover current developments, such as educational reform and the dramatic social changes of recent years, and more philosophical and global issues. As the oldest university in Ukraine and an institution that has led by example as both an agent and a catalyst for critical educational and social changes, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (1615) is the focus and even the locus of many of the issues and changes presented here.

Цей збірник раніше опублікованих статей, блогів, виступів, оглядів та есеїв Сергія Квіта призначений для інформування іноземної аудиторії про події і проблеми в Україні та пов'язані з Україною починаючи з 2008 року. Деякі матеріали були опубліковані на сайті University World News за 2012–2014 рр., інші свого часу були представлені як виступи і публікації в Австралії, США, Канаді, Великобританії, Німеччині, Фінляндії, Польщі, Бельгії та, звичайно, в Україні.

Книжка складається з чотирьох розділів: *Ідеологія, Світові університетські новини, Значення університету та Герменевтика і масові комунікації*. Збірник охоплює широке коло тем: від освітніх реформ і драматичних соціальних змін останніх років до більш філософських і глобальних проблем. Найстаріший вищий навчальний заклад України – Національний університет «Киево-Могилянська академія» (1615 р.) перебуває в центрі уваги багатьох публікацій, оскільки ця інституція виступає агентом і каталізатором найважливіших освітніх та соціальних змін, а також незалежною трибуною, де вони були вперше представлені.

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Dr. Serhiy Kvit is the Minister of Education and Science in Ukraine. A prominent commentator on educational issues, he has been rector of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy since 2007. From 2002–07, he was Dean of the Social Studies Faculty. He founded the Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism in 2001 and became president of the Media Reform Center, which was set up to foster open debate and promote more transparent media and government. He served as chair of the Consortium on University Autonomy over 2005–10. With a PhD from the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and a doctorate in philology, Dr. Kvit has published several books and numerous articles. He was a Fulbright scholar at Ohio University, a Kennan Institute scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, and a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) scholar at the University of Cologne. Serhiy Kvit was recognized by Kyiv Post as Best Ukraine's reformer in 2015.

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