Короткий опис(реферат):
The decision of the European Union (EU) to adopt and extend far-reaching sanctions against the Russian Federation came as surprise to many critics of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Especially in light of the history of
EU-Russian relations and the deep divisions between member states when it comes to
Russia-policy the Ukraine Crisis has become a turning point. This article tries to trace
the roots of the EU's response to the crisis by looking at the level of the member states.
In analysing three "most unlikely" cases (Germany, Italy, Austria) one-dimensional
IR explanations are rejected. One needs to look for an eclectic approach instead. I
argue here that Germany's surprising leadership role during the crisis can be
understood by personal, learning-based and normative factors. Italy and Austria did
not change national Russia-policy and their "critical consent" to EU-sanctions is
based on a yet firm but increasingly more fragile commitment to the European
project and order. Based on the findings the article concludes with a sceptical note on
both the sustainability of the EU's current Russia-policy and European foreign policy
development as such.
