Короткий опис(реферат):
A wide range of normative implications exists between corruption and the stability
of de-facto states. While some claim that corruption inherently disrupts institutional
development and stumps economic growth, others argue that corruption in some cases
acts as a stabilizing factor for authoritarian regimes. Regardless, corruption generally
plays a role in the political economy of any state. In de-facto states, corruption tends
to play an outsized role, either or equally impacting the exercise of political authority
or the allocation of public goods and services. This research aims to examine the case
study of the Luhansk and Donetsk "People’s Republics" and the relationship between
corruption and governance in these two de-facto regions to better understand how
corruption and stability are interrelated. Methodologically, I plan to use mostly political
economy methods, namely focusing on using Goodhand’s framework of analyzing
different economies during conflict. I will rely mostly on open-source information
for this preliminary research to determine what the governance structure is, namely
focusing on the DPR’s and the LPR’s respective governments.
