Короткий опис(реферат):
The aim of this paper is to explore the effects of corruption tolerance on corruption
levels. Strong claims are made in the literature to the effect that tolerance of corruption
is universally low. We show, however, that there are non-trivial variations in tolerance
of corruption, and that these are significantly related to commonly used indices of
corruption. This suggests that understanding which factors shape corruption tolerance
is important. Here, our concern is with the effects of elite structures on corruption.
We first ask if closeness to power affects corruption tolerance and if the general
population is less tolerant than elite groups. We then ask if different elite groups—
e. g., politicians and civil servants respectively—are likely to form different standards
regarding corruption. To hold certain external variables constant, the paper focuses
on two relatively homogeneous, low-corruption countries: Sweden and Iceland. Our
findings suggest that whereas little supports the closeness to power hypothesis—
the general population is not less tolerant of corruption than elites—there may be
important differences in how different elite groups within these countries view corrupt
activities. This has implications for how corruption can be contained.
