Передумови техногенної катастрофи на Чорнобильській атомній електростанції

Abstract

У статті висвітлено агентурно-оперативні та запобіжно-профілактичні заходи Комітету держбезпеки УРСР, спрямовані на контррозвідувальне забезпечення будівництва та експлуатації Чорнобильської АЕС упродовж 1970-х – першої половини 1980-х років.

The history of the construction of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant shows that the Soviet leaders attached great importance to the stability of their approved plans and very reluctantly resorted to the practices of adjusting and fitting their plans to the actual situations. So the very process of construction of one of the world’s most powerful stations near the city of Kyiv demonstrated a range of problems not only in the field of nuclear energy but also in the entire Soviet economy. Among these problems, one could mention low productivity, shortage of human and material resources, and an inefficient process control system. The addresses by the State Security Committee of the USSR on the “operational situation in Chornobyl” calling party officials “to apply measures” regarding those responsible for violations in the construction technology and fire safety met no or little adequate response on the part of the party officials of the highest level. The pursuit of record achievements led to many accidents and major equipment failures at the nuclear power plant in the early 1970s through the 1980s. Only in the years of 1983–1985, noncompliance to the rules of technological discipline and unprofessional actions of the technical personnel led to as many as nine accidents and 68 major equipment failures. Thus, structural and technological deficiencies in the design and construction of Soviet nuclear power plants, as well as weaknesses in staff training initially contributed to laying the foundation for the greatest environmental disaster of the twentieth century.