

THE GENOCIDE-HOLODOMOR OF 1932–1933, IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS AS THE GENOCIDE AGAINST UKRAINIANS

The problem of the Ukrainian population genocide in North Caucasus region is considered in the article as a crime against humanity [6], which constitutes a cruel but, at the same time, the most effective means of eliminating ethnic groups. Elimination or disorganization of such a group as the carriers of collective human rights is necessary for leveling the right to self-determination, and, therefore, to preserve the territorial integrity of the metropolis-empire. The main attention is paid to the Holodomor in the North Caucasus as a genocide of the Ukrainian national minority of Soviet Russia, the forced deportation of Ukrainians in the Kuban – as a crime against humanity, as well as accompanying illegal repression actions that carried the character of ethnocide and linguocide and caused the language and ethnic assimilation of Ukrainians. In the article for the first time within the framework of Ukrainian legal science (history of the state and the rights and protection of the national minorities' rights) the question of responsibility for committing crimes against humanity concerning the Ukrainian national minority of Russia is raised and possible forms and mechanisms of such responsibility are offered.

A well-known Russian explorer of the principle of self-determination O. Tarasov calls only four models of possible reaction of the metropolis (empire) to aspiration of enslaved ethnic groups to self-determination in the event of their international will to have their own statehood and (or) separate from the metropolis in case when it is clearly demonstrated at the international level [19]. The only legitimate reaction is the recognition of the right to freedom by ethnic group, for example nationalities of Austria-Hungary (Italians, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians). Other three ways to resolve the national issue mentioned by the author are illegal. However, if the assimilation of community or its deportation (eviction from historical places of residence) is in general a flagrant violation of individual and collective human rights, however, depending on the circumstances, they may either have signs of a crime against humanity or genocide, and do not have these signs, then the elimination and the disorganization of community as a plurality of people by genocide is unambiguous.

Such a liquidation of community is not necessarily accompanied by the complete destruction of all persons that belong to it. The Bolshevik regime had no intention (and could not have an intention for a number of reasons) physically destroy all Ukrainians in the Kuban – but it hung out and deported, by other words, removed the most active part of Ukrainians, that allowed to russify a rest of population extremely quickly. The disintegration and assimilation of the multimillion Ukrainian minority of the North Caucasus were necessary conditions for preservation of the Russia borders, disputed during the intensive national-cultural revival of Ukrainians in the North Caucasus.

A particular threat to the integrity of Russia were Ukrainians of the North Caucasus for two reasons: taking into account all the previous ethno-demographic history of the Kuban Ukrainian community and its socio-political activity, as well as taking into account the rapid processes of national-cultural revival of the North Caucasus Ukrainians, as in 1917, and in the future – under the influence of the coronation policy.

According to all statistics and researchers' assessments, Kuban region was predominantly Ukrainian in terms of population and language from the second half of the nineteenth century to the 30's of the twentieth century. In particular, according to information from the Caucasian calendar of 1886, among the inhabitants of Kuban region of 1882, Ukrainians were 503 235 people or 46.8%, while Russians – 41%, Highlanders – 9.73% [5, p. 192]. According to the first all-Russian census of 1897, persons with a native Ukrainian language comprised 47.36% in Kuban region, with a native Russian (Russian and Russified people) – 42.56% , and 10.08% in the other. [13, p. V, 60]. At that time, Russian imperial researchers point out that 859,122 people were considered to be Ukrainian, or 49.1%; as Russian only the 41.8% [14; 10, p. 569, 570].

The Kuban has shown political activity significantly higher than ordinary Russian provinces or regions. Already in the ultimatum to the Bolsheviks of December 4, 1917, the Central Rada actually recognized the right to self-determination for the Kuban [11, p. 43], which was implemented in the autumn of 1917 with creation of the Kuban People's Republic, proclaimed independent in January 1918. During the period of the liberation struggles in Kuban, which turned to the Kuban People's Republic (The Kuban Territory) in 1918–1920, three atamans, five heads of government were changed in power. The composition of government changed even more often – 9 times in total. These changes were the result of contradictions

between the Ukrainian-speaking Black Sea and Russian-speaking linear Cossacks in the Kuban. The first Cossacks, were economically and politically more active, stood on federalist (and often on pro-Ukrainian independent) positions [8, p. 7]. In order to humble Ukrainians, the Soviet authorities used the Holodomor as a method.

Numerous sources not only confirm the artificial nature of famine as a deliberately planned the Holodomor-genocide, but also testify to the anti-Ukrainian orientation of this unprecedented, yet punitive action. Thus, according to the research, conducted by D. Biliy, since all the repressive circumstances – the Holodomor, repressions, and deportations – touched primarily Ukrainian regions, where Ukrainians ranged from 30% (Tikhoretskiy district) to 87% (Temriutskiy), and in general in rural areas of Kuban region, which was the largest in Holodomor, Ukrainians accounted for 66.6%, and the percentage of Ukrainians among the victims reached about 70%. D. Bilyi, on the basis of his own calculations and with reference to the data of Hoover's archive materials at Stanford University of the United States, proclamate: in North Caucasus region from 1929 to 1933, during the Holodomor, deportations, punitive actions killed about 2 million 250 thousand man, calls the number of victims among Ukrainians in the region – 1 million 575 thousand people [1]. According to the research of S. Chorniy, about half of local Ukrainians died from the Holodomor in the Kuban [9, p. 326]. According to R. Medvedev, the Kuban population was deported from 16 villages, a total number was 200 thousand people, besides, M.V. Palibin notes that collective farmers – middle peasants and poor people were evicted. In view of this, it becomes clear that the influx of immigrants from the central regions of Russia to these territories was much larger than in Ukraine. In 1933, 329 echelons of the 21,856 Russian collective farms with a total number of 117,149 people were delivered to Ukraine, then more than 500 thousand immigrants from the central Russia came to the Kuban during 1931–1932, a significant part of them were the demobilized Red Army soldiers [15, p. 78]. According to the V. M. Rakachov data, by the middle of December 1933, 105 echelons in amount of 38,504 displaced persons from the Urals, from the central regions of Russia, from the southern Russian and Ukrainian regions came to the North-Western Caucasus (to the territory of the former Kuban region – primarily to the affected areas of the Black Sea and the northeastern Kuban). The responsible for resettlement persons acknowledged that over October–December 1933, more than a

thousand people fled from places of settlement [7]. It means that 37 thousand people remained in the region [16, p. 63].

The genocide was accompanied by the lingvocide: the curtailment of Ukrainization, the complete destruction of the system of Ukrainian-language education, the press, and a book publishing. The release of twenty Ukrainian newspapers and magazines was banned, radio broadcasting was stopped in Ukrainian, all Ukrainian schools and universities were closed, staff and students' departments of the pedagogical institute and the Ukrainian branch of the labor faculty were also repressed. In the spring and summer of 1933, the mass burning of Ukrainian-language literature was recorded on the margins of the village and city libraries of the Kuban [17, p. 214]. At the same time, the destruction of the Ukrainian toponymic – the renaming of the evicted villages – was proving: the Poltavske village became Chervonoarmiyske, Umanske became Leningradske [20]. For the Caucasian Ukrainians, the consequences of unprecedented for the twentieth century genocide, accompanied by the ethnocide and lingvocide became predictably catastrophic. In particular, the historian I.M. Skybitska, clearly summarizes: “In 1932, the “Ukrainization” was suddenly halted, with a change of rigid Russification. Stalin's policy surpassed ethno-cultural assimilation of royal power. As a result, the Ukrainian ethnic group has changed its ethnic identity into Russian” [18].

The perception of the surviving community or its remnants of the very fact and nature of the repressive actions towards itself, their proper political and legal assessment as a crime against humanity, as well as the adequate recognition and proclamation by such a community of the perpetrators of these actions is important not only for the actual establishment of the perpetrators and the degree of their guilt, but also to understand the post-genocidal nature of the social group: the level of preservation or loss of its features (and, consequently, the status) of the collective subject of the right to self-determination, as well as the right to adequate compensation for genocidal acts, even to restore the previous (pre-genocidal) position.

It should be emphasized, that the recognition and specific perception of the perpetrators of genocide are characteristic of all, without exception, its victims. We all know the position of the Armenians and Greeks towards Turkey, which does not require any unnecessary commentary. Similarly, for the Jews, the undisputed awareness of guilt of the German state apparatus in the commission of the Holocaust, as well as the involvement of (or at least criminal inaction) the entire German people.

The assimilated Ukrainian population of the Kuban, as well as the inhabitants of more conscious in the national sense Central Ukraine, fully acknowledges the Holodomor and very categorically defines its hidden causes and, in one way or another, those involved in the genocide, subjects, including the collective ones. Thus, according to many eyewitnesses, if the non-Ukrainian populations dominated in the Black Sea regional settlements of the Kuban western districts, the punishment of starvation would not be so terrible. It was also recognized that the Red Army troops closed access primarily to Ukrainian-speaking Cossack villages [12].

It is noteworthy that the planned nature of the Holodomor as a genocide, first of all, of the Ukrainian community of the Kuban, is recognized by representatives of the Russian people who witnessed those events themselves. Thus, according to the memoirs of A. Dolgaliyov's mother, out of population of 20,000 inhabitants of the Shkyrinske village in 1932–1933, six thousand ethnic Ukrainians (Cossacks) died of starvation, while ethnic Russians remained alive, because they received rations and some food [2] .

Soviet scientists, authorities, and artists for a long time have been concealing the Holodomor as a fact, wholly ignoring it with attention, now deny the genocide of Ukrainians by appealing to ... the Holodomor facts in the Kuban, Northern Caucasus, and Northern Slobozhanshchyna. Similarly, Russian state politicians deny the Holodomor as a genocide of Ukrainians, emphasizing its all-union character, while their most radical representatives generally refuse Ukrainians to recognize as individual people, proclaiming the Holodomor as an ideological basis for the creation of Ukrainian nation. This position is easy to explain in the context of responsibility for genocide: as long as there is an independent state Ukraine and an independent Ukrainian nation, as long as the world community maintains information about the autochthonous Ukrainian population, was living in the North Caucasus in the past, sufficiently organized to protect its rights and political demands – until the prospect of Russia's political responsibility for the Ukrainian in general and the Kuban and the whole North Caucasus will potentially be preserved.

Political responsibility in practice is realized by changing of state borders whose leadership has been found guilty of genocide or by using negative sanctions against social groups (ethnic minorities, irredentists' ethnic groups of people etc.) that supported the state leadership. Population exchange between the Ukrainian SSR and Poland aimed at ending armed confrontation and hadn't the

features of sanctions against one side of the conflict. In the contrary, the expulsion of up to 5 million Austrian Germans from the Czech Republic as well as the indigenous population from the German territories of Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia for further transmission the territories of Poland can only be very arbitrarily explained (but can not be justified) by the need to ensure social peace, the historical rights of Poland on these lands. Thus, such actions against Germany and German-speaking groups (in particular, the Austrians) may be legitimate only if it is recognized as an extraordinary political responsibility of ethnic Germans for crimes against humanity. In another case, it is evident of the brutal violation of the doctrinal principles of international law concerning the sovereignty, inviolability of the state territory and the realization of the right of nations of self-determination fixed at that time (1944–1946). Without the justification of the responsibility of Germany and the Germans, the unprecedented decisions of the Versailles, Yalta and Potsdam conferences automatically were illegal, and, according to the consequences (the decline of German culture, the many thousands of victims of deportation), this actions were criminal.

The experience of developing the state-territorial structure of postwar Iraq during the period of 2003–2008 is a precedent for restoring the legal status and the full extent of the rights of the community that has suffered from crimes against humanity (restoring the status quo). It is close to the relevant Ukrainian situation regarding the expression of will by the long-time assimilated population. In particular, to the final version of the new Iraqi constitution, approved by the referendum on 15th October, 2005, on demand of the victims of perennial repressions and ethnocide of the Kurdish community was added a special article №140. According to this article, the Iraqi executive power is obliged to take the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of Article №58 of the Transitional Administrative Law approved by the Council of Representatives of Iraq on 8th March, 2004. In particular, it was about measures of normalization the situation, the conducting a census of the population and a referendum about the granting the legal status (territorial independence) of the region, suffered from the crimes against humanity [22]. In addition, the requirements of the article are “unique”, because demographic and territorial manipulation that violated human rights, in particular, political rights and the collective rights of nationalities and ethnic minorities was legally recognized in the Article №58 at the highest levels of power in modern Iraq. For this reason, the legal requirements

stipulated in Article №58 and Article №140 of the Constitution envisaged measures for the rapid and uncompromising removal of offenses of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Thus, it was envisaged “to take measures to overcome the injustice caused by the activity of the previous regime regarding the demographic change of certain regions, including in the Kirkuk Province, deportation, expulsion of persons from their places of residence, forcing migration to and beyond the region, settlement of persons hostile to the region, as well as the deprivation of the work for the inhabitants and adjustment of their nationality” [21]. Consequently, the aftermath of the criminal actions of the Sunni Arab regime of Saddam Hussein against Kurds had all the features of a crime against humanity. It was recognized as the illegal actions and such that make impossible the objective results of the referendum. A completely analogous concept should be applied in the case of a referendum on the preservation of the USSR. It is a unique precedent that Ukrainians should use for overcoming the consequences of a violent change in the national composition of the North Caucasus, disruption and destruction of the Ukrainian community in the region as a result of the Holodomor-Genocide and deportation.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned precedents of responsibility and social situation at the time of solving such problems, it is impossible to consider the issue of Holodomor as inseparable from politics question. It would mean an artificial and unacceptable attempt to separate from the consequences of genocide and other crimes, from their impact on contemporary socio-political and international processes, as well as from public opinion in Ukraine, Russia, and the world in relation to the Holodomor, from contemporary Russian politics as a successor of the USSR, etc.

The experience of states, peoples and certain social groups testifies to their desire to obtain compensation, in particular at the state-political level, as well as the readiness of the world community to provide them with such reimbursement. The decisive role, in this case, is played by the factor of preservation of the community. It is clear that, at the international level, nobody will be able to provide for the restoration of a physically destroyed social group and to return the territories or material compensation to the assimilated population that has lost the traits of an ethnic group. It is apparent that can be no such political responsibility for China for the destruction of millions of its citizens or Cambodia for the criminal actions of the Pol Pot regime. We can only speak about the crime of

a regime against own people (with the punishment of persons) or one nation against one another.

Therefore, the representatives of the social-political “elite” of Russia disseminate the information about the genocide of the “Cossacks” and the destruction of the “Russian Vendée” in order to the final assimilation the population of the Kuban [3, p. 106]. They emphasize on the fact of the assimilation of Ukrainians in the Kuban as a subject of self-determination and to extrapolate this statement for the period of the colonization of the Kuban by removing from the research and journalistic (mostly, chauvinistic) works the mention about the Ukrainians. Soviet scholars, authorities hid the Holodomor as a fact and ignored its features. They deny the genocide of Ukrainians by appealing to ... the facts of the Holodomor in the Kuban, Northern Caucasus, and Northern Slobozhanshchyna!

At the same time, Russia's “scholars” categorically deny the Ukrainian character of the population of the western Kuban and the historical affiliation of the Black Sea Cossacks with the Ukrainian ethnic group. During more than 150 years, the Russian “researchers” don't recognize the fact that the population of Chernomoriya is the Ukrainian community. For them, that population was “an ethnographic, social, cultural and linguistic group with the identity of the Kuban Cossacks” [4]. This statement is fundamentally wrong. Accordingly, they don't mention about the ethnographic maps and statistical data of the linguistic composition of the population, about the crimes of the Holodomor and ethnocide, the curtailment of Ukrainization or the burning of Ukrainian-language books.

Similarly, Russian state politicians deny the Holodomor as the genocide of Ukrainians, emphasizing its all-union character. Their most radical representatives deny recognition of Ukrainians as a single nation, declaring the Holodomor an ideological basis for the creation of a Ukrainian nation. This position is easy to explain in the context of responsibility for genocide. The independent Ukrainian nation and the world community keep the memory of the autochthonous Ukrainian population of the North Caucasus, who could protect their rights and political demands. For this reason, the possibility of Russia's political responsibility for the genocide of the Ukrainian people in the Kuban and the North Caucasus is reminded as the responsibility of Turkey, Germany, and the Serbian states.

After an in-depth study, the author came to the following conclusions:

1. The well-stated and intensely advocated national desire to realize the right of self-determination can not be ignored. It can either be recognized as a metropolis or lose its relevance to the liquidation of its carrier, which can be achieved both by the physical extermination of people or the national minority and by their disorganization, assimilation as a collective entity of certain rights. The purpose of the USSR was to destroy, assimilate the Ukrainians of the Kuban as an organized national minority and a potential bearer of the right to self-determination.

2. Given the above statistics and estimates, the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in the Kuban and throughout the North Caucasus, despite numerous casualties among other peoples, is the genocide of the Ukrainian majority of the region, accompanied by of the Ukrainian ethnocide and the destruction of the Ukrainian language (the linguicide) and culture. That is why it should be considered inseparable from the Holodomor as genocide in Ukraine in 1932–1933, which necessitates the introduction of appropriate amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine”.

3. The surviving assimilated Ukrainian population of the Kuban retained a sense of isolation from the Russian state titular nation, which authorized genocide and ethnocide, as well as a clear awareness of the perpetrators of this crime.

4. The last circumstance points to the possibility of future responsibility of the Russian Federation, as a successor of the USSR and the RSFSR for the crime of genocide through its official recognition, as well as the implementation of active positive actions to eliminate the negative effects of genocide, the revival of the Ukrainian community in the Kuban and the North Caucasus and recognition, accorded to it, in the full extent of relevant collective human rights: the rights of national minorities and the indigenous people, including the right of self-determination.

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