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«The politics of history of the Law and Justice party in Poland and its influence on Polish-Ukrainian relations»

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052 Political Science

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1. INTRODUCTION

This introduction chapter first provides an overview of the work environment and describes the motivation for this thesis. It then formulates the research questions and hypotheses. This chapter also includes a literature review of the research topic and the methods that will be used. The chapter concludes with an overview of the structure of the thesis.

As Norman Davies mentioned: "History and politics have been inextricably linked since, or at least the second after, the world came into existence" (Davies 2007, p. 287). This concept is mainly found in the politics of history. It determines which events from earlier times should be remembered and which should be forgotten. Different political camps, of course, have other ideas about which historical figures and events deserve to be included in the treasury of national memory (Zaborski 2017, p. 116).

At the end of the twentieth century and even today, there is an intense instrumentalization of history worldwide, its practical use in domestic politics, ideological debates, and diplomatic conflicts. The political and ideological instrumentalization of history cannot be seen as a new phenomenon. It is one of the common ways of using and abusing the understanding of the past, constructing and reorganizing a relatively stable set of stereotypes about the community's past. Moreover, this instrumentalization of history can have a particular impact on the state's foreign policy, sometimes even setting a vector for development, which confirms Putin's instrumentalization of history and justification of foreign policy decisions with the help of historical myths.

In 2015, the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) took over government responsibility in Poland. A key element of PiS ideology is the politics of history or "polityka historyczna," the foundation of which is the idea of Poles as a nation of victims and heroes with an enormous positive contribution to history and European civilization (Balcer 2019, p. 2). As made explicit in the words of President Andrzej Duda upon entering force, PiS came to power with the intention both to 'bring necessary

corrections' to Poland's foreign policy¹ and to 'fight for historical truth in relations with neighbours' through an 'active politics of history'². For many years, the leading cause of tensions between Poland and Ukraine has been the problem of different interpretations of some historical issues. The PiS rise to power exacerbated the differences; at the same time, the democratization of Ukraine after the "Revolution of Dignity" (2014) and its struggle against Russian aggression took place, accompanied by the strengthening of Ukrainian national identity. As Poland is one of the most stable partners of Ukraine in its democratic development and in its fight against Russian aggression, it is worth reflecting on the impact of the politics of history on Polish-Ukrainian relations in 2015-2019.

The research subject is the politics of history of Poland's ruling Law and Justice party. **The research object** is the influence of the politics of history on Polish-Ukrainian relations.

This paper intends to describe the politics of history under PiS-government and to establish its possible impact on the bilateral relations of Poland and Ukraine. The **main research question** of the present study is: How does Poland's politics of history under the PiS government from 2015 to 2019 affect Polish-Ukrainian relations?

The research purpose is to consider the development of the politics of history in Poland under the PiS and the link of history with foreign policy on the example of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the framework of constructivism theory. **The following tasks** were set:

1. to single out constructivism as the basic theory of research, which allows smoothing the development of foreign policy through the prism of the politics of history.
2. to analyze the development of the Polish politics of history since 1989, and to establish the main features of the politics of history of the PiS.

¹<https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/andrzej-duda-o-polityce-zagranicznej-beda-glebokie-korekty-6027724287337089a> [Last access 02.07.2022].

² <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/oredzie-prezydenta-rp-andrzeja-dudy-przed-zgromadzeniem-narodowym,3213> [Last access 02.07.2022].

3. to establish the main priorities of Poland's foreign policy during the PiS rule, starting in 2015, and to recognize Ukraine's place in them.

4. describe the main decisions in the field of the politics of history of Poland concerning Ukraine and analyze their possible impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations.

There were identified two research hypotheses:

Research Hypothesis 1: The politics of history can influence the country's foreign policy course.

Research Hypothesis 1: The Polish politics of history in 2015-2019 led to the deterioration of relations between Poland and Ukraine.

The number of works in German or Polish dealing with “polityka historyczna” or “Geschichtspolitik” of Poland is very high and hard to survey. One of the reasons for the increased interest in Polish politics of history can be found in 2005. The then victorious brothers Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski - the first won the parliamentary elections with the PiS, the second the presidential elections - emphasized that a new development of the politics of history can build a better Poland. This went so far that the topic of the politics of history in Poland has developed into one of the three most important focal points of Polish historical studies in recent years (Leschnik 2018, p. 33). The focus of most works is on the features of the politics of history in Poland and “polityka historyczna” pursued by PiS (Ruchniewicz 2007, Wolff-Powęska 2007, Smolar 2008, Władyka 2019, Balcar 2019, Seydholdt 2020), in particular with an emphasis on culture (Kaluza 2019, Ciobanu 2017). Among them, there are some related to the comparison of Polish-Ukrainian politics of history, but it is primarily about different representations of the same historical events during World War II (Bonusiak 2015, Lewis 2016, Kordas 2017). In addition to researches on Polish politics of history, works that demonstrate the influence of historical discourse on foreign policy in Poland are also important in the context of our topic. Thus, one of the most significant works in this regard is an article co-authored by David Cadier and Kacper Szulecki, in which they demonstrate the connection between populism, historical discourse, and foreign policy using the example of the Law and Justice Party (Cadier/Szulecki 2020). Another such work is Bachmann's work, in which the main focus is the influence of Poland's “polityka historyczna” on bilateral relations with Germany, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Israel

(Bachmann 2018). Generally, it is observed a lack of the works dealing with the influence of the politics of history on contemporary Polish-Ukrainian relations (Iwaniuk 2017, Losovyj 2018). The possible effect of Poland's history politics on the image of Ukraine and Ukrainians for the Polish population is not taken into account.

The paper is based on the analysis of the following data:

1. First phase: documents.

I. Electoral programs and programmatic documents of the Law and Justice Party.

II. Legislative Acts on the Polish politics of history.

III. Statements by high-ranking Polish and Ukrainian officials, interviews in print media.

The evaluation and analysis of all data is based on a qualitative summary content analysis according to Philipp Mayring (2008).

2. Second phase: Analysis of the media. Through the method of framing analysis based on content analysis to examine the content of the selected articles. In particular, the presentation in the Polish media of the most important events connected with the Polish politics of history and with the possible impact on bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations was chosen. Research of publications of the different Polish editors– KrytykaPolityczna.pl, the liberal edition, wPolityce.pl, the conservative one, Gazeta Wyborcza, the mainstream Polish media, - became the empirical basis of this part of study (Danylenko, Nesteriak, Grynychuk 2020: 335). As Gazeta Wyborcza KrytykaPolityczna.pl and wPolityce.pl clearly represent the main political vectors available in the country, messages are rather clear and in accordance with the direction of their affiliation in contrast to right-wing editions such as kresy.pl. or Russian propaganda pl.sputniknews. Various publications of the following issues were selected from Ukrainian media: pravda.com.ua, ukrinform.ua, radiosvoboda.org, hromadske.ua on the basis of a study of Ukrainian mass media by the Institute of Mass Information³.

³ <https://texty.org.ua/d/2018/media-ranking/> [Last access 02.07.2022].

Before going into detail, the following paragraphs give a short overview of this thesis and its structure:

1. Introduction gives a piece of brief information about the research design of the paper.
2. Chapter 2 describes the foundations needed for understanding the content of this thesis. This includes the explanation of the basic definition of the paper “politics of history” and “polityka historyczna”; it also describes approaches to the instrumentalization of history, and also reveals the importance of constructivist theory in the context of our study.
3. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the development of the politics of history in Poland since 1989, and also focuses on the main features of the “polityka historyczna” under PiS.
4. Chapter 4 draws attention to the second component of our paper - foreign policy. Therefore, it describes the main priorities of Poland's foreign policy since 2015, as well as Ukraine's place in the foreign policy agenda of the PiS in the period from 2015 to 2019.
5. Chapter 5 describes the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the context of the “polityka historyczna”.
6. Conclusions.
7. Bibliography.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Terms like "politics of history," "politics of remembrance," "politics of memory" or "polityka historyczna" are used in science in flexible terms that either cover very different facets of the relationship between history or memory and politics or can be interchangeable. The following chapter will focus on the theoretical underpinnings of the concept "polityka historyczna" and its translation into English as "politics of history" to find a definition to use as a guide for this study. We will also clarify why this term was chosen as a fundamental concept of the paper. In addition, the theoretical substantiation of the use of the politics of history for political purposes is considered. Finally, we deal in this chapter with constructivism as this thesis's basic theory; within this theory's framework, we try to establish a link between politics of history and foreign policy.

2.1. Politics of history between politics and science: conceptual history

Regarding the research topic, it is worthwhile to consider German terms because the relation between history, memory, and remembrance with politics has been studied extensively in the German-speaking area. Moreover, related terms in Eastern Europe also have German origins. Generally, it can be spoken of a group of terms that include such terms as "Erinnerungspolitik" (literally: "politics of remembrance"), "Gedächtnispolitik" (literally: "politics of memory"), "Geschichtspolitik" (literally: "politics of history") and "Vergangenheitspolitik" (literally: "politics of the past"). Due to this diversity of terminology, the following part will explain why the English term "politics of history" is used in this study.

The terms "remembrance" and "memory" are first translated in Polish with the word "pamięć". For this reason, in Poland more and more authors use expressions like "pamięć historyczna" (historical memory), "pamięć zbiorowa" (collective memory). The term "kultura przeszłości" (culture of the past) is virtually non-existing in Poland. In contrast, the expressions "polityka wobec przeszłości" (politics of the past) and "polityka pamięci" (politics of remembrance, politics of memory) do appear in public discussion, compared to the term "polityka historyczna" less often and how part of the last one is used. At the same time, the great importance of the term "pamięć" in connection with

the goals of the investigation is already proven by the influential historical-political actors in Poland "Instytut Pamięci Narodowej" (Institute for National Memory).

Foremost, before using on a par the term "politics of memory" with "politics of history", it will be given an account of three different approaches, according to Kasianov, to the nature of the relationship between history and memory (Kasianov 2016: 119):

1. History and memory are opposed, even considered incompatible phenomena.
2. History and memory are identified what is more inherent in socio-political, journalistic, ideological discourses.
3. History and memory are interpreted as forms of understanding, interpretation, and representation of the past, which are in the process of constant interaction, and complementarity.

P. Nora formulated the idea of division and opposition of history and memory, which is characterized by its radicalism (Nora 1989: 8):

"Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodical revived. On the other hand, history is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history represents the past."

There is a distinction in this paper between memory and history, which means that the two terms "politics of history" and "politics of memory" are not interchangeable. Nevertheless, we do not share the point that both terms are opposed and do not deny the importance of memory for history. It means that the paper is based on Megill's point of view that firstly, without memory, the sense of time is inconceivable; secondly, history refers to facts that would be impossible without memory. Speaking of the need to distinguish between history and memory, A. Megill makes one more important remark of practical value. Memory is often a territory of conflict, so-called "memory wars" that are also a part of the "politics of history." The current day's problems actualize most conflicts about a past, and the competing parties' memories will always contradict each other. These arguments of A. Megill help understand the role of the "politics of history." They can be described as either a conscious mixing of history and memory or an attempt to separate history from memory (Kasianov 2016: 120).

As follows from the above, the key term for this paper was chosen "politics of history" (German: "Geschichtspolitik", Polish: "Polityka historyczna") despite its slight

popularity in English-language literature in comparison to "politics of memory," "politics of the past" or "politics of remembrance." First, "politics of history" is one of the best-known and most frequently used in German and Polish discourse, not only in science but also in public. According to the fact that this concept was found in Germany and as follows, most literature on this topic is also in German language; it was also transferred then to Poland and literally translated from German into Polish "*polityka historyczna*", it seems logical to consider the direct translation of the German and Polish terms into English, given the specifics of the paper.

The term "*Geschichtspolitik*," formed in the West German "historians' dispute" in the second half of the 1980s, has been adopted in other languages (Troebst 2014: 3). It was used pejoratively in the debates of the 1980s criticizing the opponent's historical arguments as manipulation and historical falsification. Although it does not mean that the term "*Geschichtspolitik*" has not existed before "historians' dispute." Harold Schmid assigned it to the ideologically right-wing journalism of the first third of the 20th century. So it can not be said that the term is first appeared in 1986 (Becker/Hill 2017: 26). However, there is no doubt that the issue of the "politics of history" has received considerable attention in the last 15 years of the twentieth century.

At first, "politics of history" was used polemically to criticize conservative positions accused of using and misusing history for political purposes. The term should have a political character of dealing with history (Zielenisky 2017: 10). There is a unity among scholars in the interpretation of politics of history, it describes "die bewusste Förderung der Erinnerung an bestimmte historische Ereignisse, Prozesse oder Personen in politischer Absicht und zu politischen Zwecken"⁴ (Leschnik 2018: 27; quoted from Bouvier/Schneider). On the one hand, the "politics of history" legitimizes this promotion of memory by participating in the discourse on the past. On the other hand, it can be used as a political tool for achieving political purposes.

In search of an answer to the question of what is politics of history, we turn first to the definition that was proposed by Edgar Wolfrum in his dissertation (Wolfrum 1999: 25:

"Geschichtspolitik ist ein Handlungs- und Politikfeld, auf dem verschiedene Akteure Geschichte mit ihren spezifischen Interessen befrachten und politisch zu nutzen suchen. Sie zielt auf die

⁴ Engl: „the conscious promotion of the memory of certain historical events, processes or persons with political intent and for political purposes“

Öffentlichkeit und trachtet nach legitimierenden, mobilisierenden, politisierenden, skandalisierenden, diffamierenden u. a. Wirkungen in der politischen Auseinandersetzung⁵”.

The use of this term, however, has a certain drawback in that it is explicitly elite-centred, and the elite is seen as the sole actor using the politics of history to create traditions, shape memories, and construct identities. Another definition that can be considered, was suggested by Harald Schmidt. His main idea was that the politics of history includes discourses and actions with which the interpretation of history as a current public representation of a collectively relevant past is pursued for political purposes (Troebst 2014: 5).

The group of the most important actors of politics of history includes politician, media, journalists as well as historians and other scientists. In addition, other organizations and institutions are also engaged in the process (Leschnik 2018: 28). The scientist Koselleck distinguishes between (national) state actors such as presidential administrations, governments, ministries, authorities, local authorities, municipalities, educational institutions, etc., and non-state actors such as political parties, media, companies, trade unions, churches, cultural and scientific institutions, museums, memorials, writers, intellectuals, etc. Civil society actors are also involved, such as victims' groups, reappraisal initiatives or history associations (Troebst 2014: 9). One of the basic tenets of the concept of politics of history assumes that each type of political action, regardless of which actor this action is planned by, is based on specific historical images (Leschnik 2018: 28).

Politics of history is cross-cutting issue that is relevant in all sub-areas of political science. There is no need to try to examine the politics of history of a certain sub-discipline of political science such as comparative politics, international relations or political theory (Becker/Hill 2017: 44).

As it was already mentioned, it is terminologically, "*polityka historyczna*" was transferred over the past decade as content in the Polish political and scientific language. This transfer to Poland took part in 2005 because of political change. Before

⁵Engl: „Politics of history is a field of action and politics in which various actors burden history with their specific interests and try to use it politically. It is aimed at the public and strives for legitimizing, mobilizing, politicizing, scandalizing, defamatory, etc. Effects in the political debate“

coming in power, the national conservative group discovered the term – which a wide variety of facets had meanwhile enriched – and made it usable. With this translation, however, the term "polityka historyczna" underwent a change in meaning, which can be described on the one hand as an extension and on the other hand as a restriction. It was also closely linked to the current political purposes in Poland. The specific coinage of the term *polityka historyczna* in Poland is owed to the fact that it was "imported" and adapted for political purposes by a national-conservative group.

So on the one hand, we are dealing with "politics of history" as a term taken up by the German-speaking sciences and defined in more or less detail. On the other hand, although the term "polityka historyczna" is a translation of the German term, it has change in meaning (Zielenisky 2017: 12).

The term "*polityka historyczna*" is often used in Poland with reference to Norbert Frei. In his book, Frei analyzes how political elites, media and historians in post-war Germany interpreted and reinterpreted the Nazi past and used it as an argument for or against political decisions. Over time, Poland's term "*polityka historyczna*" has assumed a normative meaning. Frei asked how politics was made with the help of interpretations of history, while his Polish epigones set out catalogs of demands as to which interpretations of the past politics should support or oppose, which view of the past is acceptable to the government and which is reprehensible. Politics of history in Poland has two goals: firstly, it should create identity internally, i.e., promote a specific understanding of what is Polish and what distinguishes the national community, and secondly, it should raise Poland's prestige abroad (Bachmann 2018: 414).

Marek Cichocki formulated his definition of the term "polityka historyczna" and mentioned that politics of history is practiced in different countries and in quite different ways. In the Polish context, the concept of "polityka historyczna" is probably the result of the search for a name for a phenomenon that can currently be observed, which as such is more important than its name. He described "polityka historyczna" as the intensification of public discourse about the past at home and abroad through various types of its institutionalization both at the level of central state institutions and municipal and regional institutions (Andrychowicz-Skrzeba: 62).

The context in which the term came about in Poland, namely the specification of a reflected, national-conservative ideology in a political program, led to that *polityka*

historyczna can and often does mean both: a specific political program on the one hand (namely that of the PiS party) and on the other hand an abstract term to describe reality. Therefore, "polityka historyczna" will mean the political project of PiS in the practical part of this paper and can be used in parallel with English term "politics of history".

However, a parallel transfer of terms from Germany to the west occurred only to a limited extent: French does use the terms "*politique publique de l'histoire*" and "*politique publique de la mémoire*", but they only refer to state measures. More comprehensive are the terms "*politique du passé*" and "*politique mémorielle*," which are used as politically correct handling of the colonial past, the slave trade, and the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire (Troebst 2014: 3).

The situation is different in the Anglo-Saxon language area, where the term "politics of history" is used much more often, but at the same time in parallel with such terms as "historical politics", "historical policy", "history politics", "politics of memory", "memory politics" and "politics of the past". The term itself was coined by Howard Zinn in 1970, a historian of the US civil rights and peace movements. However, the focus was rather on the political mobilization of historians than on political usage of references to the past (Troebst 2014: 4). It is worth mentioning that the term "Erinnerungspolitik" (literally: "politics of remembrance") can also be found in German literature. Thus, there is a need to consider the interaction of such terms as history, memory, and remembrance, given the number of existing terms and different or similar interpretations.

2.2. History, memory, and remembrance as a political tool

Historians and politicians constantly engage in historical reconstruction, trying to define or redefine national identity. This process could be observed in Germany after World War II, in Spain after the end of the Franco regime, and now in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War. Although such processes are necessary, there is a question of balancing them by combining positive and negative aspects of past experiences (Wiersma 2009: 20).

As a researcher, Hann mentioned that: politics of history is neither bad nor good, neither harmful nor useful, it is just there ignoring the goals it pursues (Leschnik 2018, p. 28). It can be used in domestic politics and foreign politics. It is also not possible to distinguish between "Geschichtsinnenpolitik" (historical domestic politics) and "Geschichtsaußenpolitik" (historical foreign politics) since both types of politics are always mixed up and also influence one another. In the case of "Geschichtsinnenpolitik", for example, aspects are in the foreground, such as building the new museum with a clear state-forward historical conception. In the case of Poland, historical debates in parliament are also part of it. Politics of history in domestic politics is also expressed in promoting a specific social image, while the others are ignored or banned. As it was mentioned, the second category of politics of history is "Geschichtsaußenpolitik". This is more often used as a simple tool of diplomacy, especially in East Europe. It becomes a 'soft power', a successful weapon; it can also play the role of an instance of responsibility and condemnation. That is why all authors do not approve of cross-border politics of history, as it can lead to an unfriendly act towards a neighboring country (Leschnik 2018: 28-30). However, historical-political decisions can not only lead to disputes but also lead to a diplomatic rapprochement between two states.

Given that memory and history are considered as complementary elements in this research, it is worth unraveling how memory can be used in the context of history, as the memory dimension is an indispensable part of analyzing political systems and political action. It is about the political meaning of memory and the possibility of instrumentalizing memories of past events for political purposes. Memory does not depict the past like a copy but always constructs it anew. From the political science perspective, this thesis is only continued insofar as it directs its attention to memory as a tool in serving certain political interests and actors. In all forms of politics of history, the legitimacy of political orders and actions should be established or consolidated. Reference to the past is a valuable resource for gaining and maintaining credibility and support (König 2008: 28). There are three levels at which memory is used as a resource for political purposes (Kohlstruck 2004: 173):

1. For the construction of political orders. In that case, the reference to a common past is of great importance - regardless of whether this is evaluated positively or negatively. Collective identity can be also thereby created and strengthened.

2. Memory is one of the policy areas in which actors compete, and political actors compete for social or political power. Above all, at this level of memory politics, it is a question of legitimizing political actors in internal or external conflicts and of maintaining political dominance.

3. Memory politics plays a significant role in upheavals and new political beginnings, i.e., after regime or system change, because the new political order has the task of legitimizing itself, of distinguishing itself from the respective predecessor regime. After political upheavals, questions of guilt and responsibility are always associated with memory, both in a legal and criminal as well as in a political or moral sense (König 2008: 34).

Generally, reference to the past takes place in society because one does not want to deviate from a historical line or tries to escape its influence. In the first case, it is a matter of anchoring the present in certain past traditions, and it is clear that this kind of historical reference is beneficial. The collectives behave in the same way as individuals: one prefers to remember the events in the past with which one is satisfied and of which one is proud, i.e., to those phases in which the feeling of self-worth is not called into question but stabilized. This means that collectives manipulate memory and bring past and present closer together. If the goal is to escape the power of the past, one can do so by remembering or forgetting. A particular case of the manipulative handling of history is that there are bans on remembering. One tries to remove, ban, and remember (König 2008: 33).

One of the main tasks of the politics of history is to shape and maintain the identity of certain social groups and the state as a whole. One of the mechanisms supporting such identity is the mechanism of the formation of historical consciousness and historical myths. When political elites manipulate historical memory, history becomes a platform for a "memory war" and a tool for achieving various goals in domestic and foreign policy (Polegkyi 2015: 178). Researcher Pomian identifies at least three dimensions of memory wars: cognitive, emotional, and existential one. The

cognitive dimension belongs to historians, who have the tools to determine what happened in the past with reasonable certainty. However, the emotional and existential dimensions of the wars of memory lie outside the realm of historians. They belong in the hands of writers and educators in the broadest sense of the word, among whom politicians play a prominent role. It is idle to say that their intervention in the memory wars aims either to pacify them or, on the contrary, to aggravate them, to transform a verbal controversy into a real confrontation (Pomian 2009: 82).

Another view can be presented, considering the historical past as a resource. In this case, the politics of history functions as an instrument to control access to such symbolic resources and obtain a political benefit using images of the past. Thus, we can define the politics of history as a conscious effort by the political elite to shape an image of the past that suits them to achieve specific political goals. It is a conscious effort by the state to create a historical consciousness of society that is consistent with its missions and to ensure control over the creation and flow of historical knowledge abroad. The politics of history is about the reproduction of political domination. Hegemony in producing and disseminating certain historical accounts forces society to consume the narrative proposed by the ruling elite. In this sense, the historical past can be viewed in Bourdieu's chosen categories of "symbolic power" and "symbolic struggle," representing one of the most important aspects of political struggle (Polegkyi 2015: 177).

Polish historian Andrzej Friszke mentioned the dual use of history: "By its very nature, history, especially recent history, is a very particular branch of learning. It exists in an uneasy relationship with the memories of those involved in the events. It can play an important role in either legitimizing or challenging a current state, regime, and ruling class" (Wiersma 2009: 17; quoted from Friszke). Creating a national identity based on a shared collective narrative is an essential means of legitimizing power, linking the existing political system to the myths of the historical past. Due to the absence of a clear ideology and vision of the future for the political class, the past is used as a source of legitimacy. The past, absorbed and interpreted in a certain way, enables the political elite to justify its claim to power, for example, through legitimation mechanisms such as elections and through symbolic reference to the right of inheritance rooted in tradition

and history. This kind of politics instrumentalizes historical knowledge-its use as an argument in domestic political struggle and foreign policy. For politicians and the public, historical reconstruction was no longer about 'how it was', but about the instrumental use of the past to make moral claims and prompt political actions (Müller 2002: 13–19).

As we can see, political ideologies often turn to history to justify the new political government's actions and legalize the political regime. It acts here as a method and content of ideological influence on public consciousness. They argue that historical events, facts, and processes divide history into segments in which there is a difference between "before" and "after". Thus, there is an assessment of the past, its comparison with the present, and the formation of a certain vision of the future. History is seen as a cumulative, generalized process that interprets events selectively, drawing attention to some parts of our experience, ignoring others, and creating causal relationships (Karapuz 2019: 248).

Furthermore, Karapuz points out the instrumentalization of history in forming the enemy image. By comparing historical events in different periods, an understanding of modernity emerges as a consequence of historical events. Therefore, it is essential to form the enemy image based on the events in the past and compare it with the present. Thus, historical facts used for political purposes change with the change of regime and political power. Accordingly, forming a typical image of the enemy (highlighting certain acts of violence, negative portrayal of politics, and certain persons of historical events) helps to create negative attitudes and behaviors towards it (Karapuz 2019: 247).

From a historical-philosophical point of view, Emil Angehrn denies the view that today's democracies have to construct a shared historical experience in order to create a national identity and legitimize a political regime. Modern Western states do not need recourse to a foundational history to ensure their survival or justify their legitimacy. The past plays no role here, since universalistic values and democratic processes define our societies. Instead, as individuals, we must reflect on the past to affirm our individuality and wholeness, which helps make the knowledge of our transience bearable. At the macro level, however, collective memory and, as a result, politics of history are irrelevant (Heinrich 2009: 79). It can be seen that society does not need history per se to ensure that its members can live together. On the societal level, we are dealing with

conflicts of interest over the distribution of resources, regardless of history. Their solution requires legitimacy because such conflicts can rarely be settled to everyone's satisfaction. Historical analogies lend themselves to this purpose. The past is then presented as something to teach us about the present and the future (Heinrich 2009: 90).

It is not so easy to distinguish the instrumental use of historiography from its free unfolding. This applies especially for contemporary history, where the relationship between the experience of the past and the shaping of the future is closely linked to the role of identity, the self-image of modern society. As a result, its efforts to legitimize the political regime through the politics of history (Sabrow 2013: 3). Sabrow also described methods that allow history to be used as a political tool (Sabrow 2013: 5-6):

1. Manipulation and falsification. Finally, distortion of historical truth through falsification of its sources and facts can be cited as an apparent characteristic of historical instrumentalization.
2. Influence and coercion. In addition to the distinction between original and forgery, the contrast between coercion and freedom provides a helpful orientation for making history understandable as an instrument. Foremost among these is the suppression or distortion of historical knowledge in the public sphere and in scholarship itself. The continued denial or marginalization of the Armenian genocide in Turkey during World War I is a prominent example of this.
3. Voluntary self-instrumentalization. It is not always just violating professional autonomy through non-academic intervention; sometimes, history turns itself into an instrument of political intentions.

In the absence of democratic development and signs of power monopolization, exclusive possession of memory and history can also be observed. Another definition of this process, "monolitische Geschichtspolitik" was given by Peter Oliver Loew (Loew 2008: 99). Thus, any interpretation of history that differs from the official position will be positioned as hostile. Thus, the state's politics of history is to promote the silence of certain events, or, conversely, to glorify others.

There are several models of politics of history given by Smolar (Smolar 2008: 53-54) which can be used by a state:

1. "Politics of submission". It attempts to promote values and impose its own vision of history being in power. This goal can only be reached under dictatorships, due to the lack of freedom of speech, pluralism, and complete control of the media by the ruling party in the state.
2. "Politics of the Cold Civil War". Behind this model there is a desire to give society a certain vision of the past, but the regime is facing limitations of its possibilities. The abandonment of a frontal attack goes along with the constant attempt to influence information and reform the education sphere.
3. "Politics of limited democratic consensus". It can be seen as a kind of asymmetrical integration: Although there is a basic consensus on specific values such as freedom, independence, democracy, human rights, or the rule of law, at the same time, there is a recognition of differentiation due to biographies, social positions, ideology or ethnic origin.
4. "Politics of differentiation and peaceful coexistence". This model is based on recognizing various coexisting values, notions of patriotism, interpretations of historical facts, and competing memories. The cohesion of the colorful community is not sought in collective memory, a dominant religion, or national myths, but in official rules of living together, in the feeling of belonging to a concrete political community of equal citizens.

Summing up, it can be mentioned that history's state politics shapes the context of past events and how people will build their present. An effective politics of history helps to strengthen national consciousness and self-identity. However, politics of history can also be used to legitimize the political regime, justify the conduct of a particular foreign policy, or for political struggle. Means of instrumentalizing history include manipulating or falsifying facts, forcing certain events to be discussed or silenced, and voluntary self-instrumentalization. They can be used all together or separately.

2.3.Constructivism

Foreign policy analyses have focused mainly on state interests, elite preference formation, decision-making process, or domestic political alliances. Constructivism, the most recent theoretical development in International relations theory, has begun to

address this omission of identity within foreign policy analysis (Becker 2013: 59). That is why, in this research, a constructivist approach is adopted.

Constructivist approaches emerged as a response to the conventional orthodoxy of realistic and liberalist theories that only argue with supposedly objective factors such as power and interests. For most realists, state action is led either by the system's structure or by opportunities to change the system. Any individual state's interest depends on its capabilities and, at the same time, the capabilities of its potential rivals. Constructivists reject the simple construction of state interest in the realism paradigm. They argue that interests and strategic and meaningful international interactions are fundamental to state identity. Hopf mentioned that through the lens of identity, durable expectations about the state behavior ensure predictable patterns (Becker 2013: 60). It is assumed that both the nature of the world (ontology) and knowledge about the nature of the world (epistemology) are socially constructed. They are only generated through the action and interaction of the relevant actors. (Friedrich/ Költzow/Tilly 2011: 33).

The constructivist paradigm is based on the following two statements (Shynkaruk 2009: quoted from Wendt):

1. International politics is constructed primarily on social rather than material reasons;
2. Individuality (identity) of international actors and their interests are not given by nature "constants", they can be formed in the social environment.

In particular, Wendt emphasizes that in the process of "socialization" common knowledge is acquired by international actors and influences the formation of their identities and interests. During the interaction, international actors produce common knowledge, norms, rules, and values that form common expectations about each other's behavior and structure the international system. Influenced by the international environment and the experience gained in the process, interactions with this environment arise new intersubjective meanings and knowledge, integrating into the dominant international "Culture" (knowledge that is socially divided at the level of the international community). As they recur, they become entrenched and lead to changes at the system level, ie, the transformation of this "culture". In turn, this affects the identity of international actors and the practice of their interaction. Moreover,

international anarchy, according to A. Wendt, is not an existing objective reality but only that in which the content is invested by the states (Shynkaruk 2009).

Another key author, John Hobson, points out the four basic principles of constructivism (Langenbacher 2010: 22, quoted from Hobson):

1. The primacy of ideational factors;
2. Agents are derived from identity constructions that is built through social interaction
3. Moral norms and communicative action defines 'appropriate' behavior
4. The importance of dynamic historical change.

A basic assumption of the constructivism of international relations is that the foreign policy actions of states can be traced back to their national identity. As Wendt writes, identities are the basis of interests. Meanwhile, Cynthia Weber states that 'what states do depends on what states' identities and interests are, and identities and interests change (Becker 2013: 59). This national identity is not given exogenously but is flexible and changes over time through interaction with other states (Friedrich/ Költzow/ Tilly 2011: 33). On the one hand, this means that changing realities between states can require new ideas about other nations. On the other hand, this is far more important: new socially constructed ideas can produce new international realities with new interactions.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and ideological universalism, and the emergence of new states led to increased national particularisms to radically rethink the research agenda that was popular before. This process promoted the constructivist theory of international relations as an alternative to the "rational" model of foreign policy and with it the "constructive" and socializing effect of cultural factors in the broader sense of the word - such as national identities, norms, and institutions, etc. - on the foreign and security policy in the foreground. After the end of the Cold War, it was no longer the ideological factors that had an impact on national security policy but rather the culture in the broader sense, i.e., the socializing of international institutions and norms as well as national identities. Accordingly, the interests of national security policy are shaped in many respects by those actors who provide fundamental answers to cultural questions (László 2004: 6).

While realism takes the interests of states as given and ignores the role of identity, constructivists assert that both interests and identities are constantly changing. Constructivists emphasize that states do not know their interests a priori; rather, these are determined by normatively formed identities. Rationalist explanations are therefore insufficient to explain the relationship between the nation-building process and foreign policy. National identities are viewed as constructs that can not only regulate the behavior of the states but also determine foreign policy.

According to the constructivist view, national identities can be used to explain a state's foreign policy and illuminate the constitution of its goals, tendencies, and instruments.

In constructivism, the interests of states are primarily understood to mean immaterial factors such as recognition and status. States are fundamentally concerned about their reputation and strive to be recognized in the international community of states. States, therefore, follow internationally set norms that they consider legitimate. Their actions are based on intersubjectively shared, value-based norms and what is understood as "appropriate behavior." Norms identify specific goals as legitimate and constitute motives that states should strive for. State decisions are made according to norms and rules against the background of subjective factors, historical-cultural experiences, and institutional integration (Friedrich/Költzow/Tilly 2011: 34).

Memory allows validation of the existence of a self-individual and collective. It means that identities have a united vision of time in which past, present, and future are not only fully integrated but also linked. Jenny Edkins writes that 'memory and the form of temporality that it generally instantiates and supports is central to the production and reproduction of the forms of political authority (Langenbacher 2010: 26). That is why traumatic memories play such an essential role in many societies. The constructivist message is that such memories and identities can not be given; actors contest them. Identities, like any other cultural phenomena, are constantly changing and must be produced or reproduced continually. When states experience trauma, it tends to cast a longer and more indelible shadow over the creation of memory and identity. Traumas often provide fertile ground for the instrumentalist manipulation of memory to serve a specific foreign policy purpose (Becker 2013: 58).

3. POLITICS OF HISTORY IN POLAND: DEVELOPMENT AND BASIC PRINCIPLES

The third chapter will examine the dynamic changes and main stages of the development of history policy in Poland since the end of communist rule in 1989. The second part of the chapter will focus on the basic principles of the politics of history under the ruling party PiS in Poland.

The topic of the politics of history raises several questions. Firstly, how the politics of history evolved and what influenced its development. Secondly, what are the tasks of the state, and where is the boundary between patriotic or historical education on the one hand and indoctrination according to the ideas of the ruling party on the other hand. Thirdly, how politics of history is implemented in one's society and international opinion. Fourthly, what is the goal of history politics, i.e., what image of Polish history to teach and what model of patriotism to propagate? (Ruchniewicz 2007: 2)

3.1. Relevance of the politics of history in Central and Eastern Europe

The post-Cold War period has seen the so-called "return of history" in West research. However, as Mark Mazower has pointed out, 'history had never left Europe nor returned to it'. Instead, policy-makers searched in the 'grabbag of history' for viable historical analogies and political orientation (Müller 2002: 7). However, it was in post-communist countries that time as history, memory, and remembrance began to play an important role, and the politics of history has become a battleground of competing for historical narratives and political struggle. As a result, history became in this region an instrument to achieve political goals and, at the same time affected foreign policy.

There were several reasons why the politics of history in the countries of Central and East Europa has played a significant role. Firstly, as in the West, the period during and after the Second World War has been 'unfrozen' given the international situation and the relatively short time lag from the most controversial events. At the same time, the period under communism can be considered as forgetting the history and memory

of nations and creating a modern one. As Müller argues, in a region whose recent past offers no explicit social or political descriptors, it is tempting to erase from the public record any reference to the communist era and in its place, an older past substituted as a source of identity and reference (Müller 2002: 9).

Secondly, in a situation where a state creates or transforms a political and national identity, the historical past and the mythology built on its basis play a unique role in this process. Exempted from censorship, societies conducted a historical revision (Wolff-Powęska 2007: 4).

There has been a process of a "nachholende" (catching-up) nation-building, for which collective memory has been mobilized. Pierre Nora believes that the end of the twentieth century can be described as "the era of the global triumph of memory" when questions about the historical heritage and the reception of the past became important for different countries, societies, and communities. According to Beata Ociepka, historical issues are of great importance for post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and therefore also Poland, which results from the importance of the past for their political culture, including the culture of foreign policy" (Polegkyi 2015: 177).

Finally, most countries in the region have a shared history, but at the same time, events that especially happened during the last century are not so clear in assessment. For states that have lost their dependence and embarked on the path of independence politics, they needed to shape their foreign policy with good neighborly relations. In order to build relations with neighbors, historical disputes and issues must also be resolved.

Even if a distinction is often made between cultures of remembrance that stylize the nation as a winner or a victim, official remembrance still shapes all elements of resistance and defeat. On the one hand, the politics of history in Russia primarily emphasizes the victory in the "Great Patriotic War" but focuses on the fact that the Soviet Union fell victim to the German attack and was initially left alone by its later allies. Poland and Lithuania see themselves primarily as victims of totalitarian dictatorships (Nikžentaitis 2010: 106).

3.2. Development of the politics of history in Poland after 1989

3.2.1 1989 – 1998

According to Borodziej, Poland's history policy after 1989 can be divided into different phases (Borodziej 2011: 269). After the collapse of the USSR, Poland's history policy changed drastically from 1990 in the Third Republic. After the era of a one-dimensional, the ideologically camouflaged politics of history in the Polish People's Republic (PRL), the democratic turnaround in East-Central Europe was promoted through pluralization. As a result, many historical images came to light in society. At the same time, the need for new founding myths grew, and the community, free from censorship, revised the previously mandatory historiography.

In general, the communist history after 1989 was considered wrong, and everything propagated as mistaken in the USSR was now correct and vice versa. Accordingly, communist holidays, hero names, and rituals were rejected (Seydholdt 2020). The "thick line" (*gruba kreska*) postulated by the first democratic Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his government exposé on August 24, 1989, was intended to separate the new Poland from the old, communist Poland to prevent the recurrence of the crimes of the Ancien Régime (Garsztecki 2021: 2)

However, it was not until the end of the 1990s that a law of April 1997 made informal cooperation with the secret services of the People's Republic of Poland between 1944 and 1990 compulsory for applicants for public office to disclose.

The center problems in the 1990s included two areas: the first was related to relations with other nations, with Poland's neighbors, or with fellow citizens of different nationalities. The most lively during the first phase were the disputes about Polish-German relations, especially about the resettlement of Germans after the war, and those that continued in several sequels discussion on Polish-Jewish relations. Thirdly, the debates on Polish-Ukrainian relations must be mentioned. In all these disputes, Poland and the Poles got a new role, namely not the traditional one of the victims but also that of causing the suffering of others (Ruchniewicz 2007: 5).

As was already mentioned, the new politics of history became a valuable tool in dealing with Poland's new neighbors: As early as August 1989, the Sejm described the use of the Warsaw Pact states in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as illegal, and in addition to this, in 1990, the Senate regretted the forced resettlement of Polish-Ukrainians in 1947. Guilt from the past in German-Polish relations was the subject of a lively debate within Poland. The state did not participate in it, but the media gave it a lot of space and attention. In Polish-Russian relations, the legacy seemed to have been eliminated: the most important documents on the Katyn case were sent by the Russian President as early as autumn of 1992. As a result, the III. Republic transformed the mass graves in Russia and Ukraine into impressive memorial sites (Borodziej 2011: 270).

The second area of particular attention was the discussions on the nature of Polish communism and the relations between those in power and the society they governed. It is about the texts by Jan Józef Lipski on the subject of patriotism and his assessment of the so-called lesser evil in history ("Two Fatherlands - Two Patriotisms") and by Jan Błoński the attitude of the Poles towards the annihilation of the Jews ("The poor Poles look at the ghetto"). The statements about the necessity of respect were important for Lipski towards other nations and the acknowledgment that some Poles' actions caused the Germans suffering even if it had not been possible to avoid them (post-war resettlement). Błoński, for his part, dared to break a taboo topic – indifference against the murder of the Jewish nation, which is demonstrated by sections of Polish society (Ruchniewicz 2007: 5).

After 1989, it was mainly conservative and conservative-liberal governments that pursued the politics of history understood in this way, while left-wing governments were very cautious. As its presidential candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski put it back in 1995, Poland's post-communist left had decided "for the future". He wanted that at the time as a rejection of any reference to history in the political arena. This only worked in some measure because often enough left-wing governments were put under pressure by the opposition through historical-political campaigns, or they had to respond to initiatives from abroad and take a stand in historical-political debates. Even if they did so only for domestic political reasons would have liked to avoid it (Bachmann 2018: 414). That is why a Joint Statement was signed on May 21, 1997 of the Presidents of Ukraine and the

Republic of Poland "To the understanding and unity. " The document emphasized the vast baggage of common historical experience - the war in the XVII and XVIII centuries, anti-Ukrainian actions Polish authorities in the 20s and 30s of the twentieth century, persecution Polish population in Soviet Ukraine in Stalin's time, and also the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in 1943–1944 and the action "Vistla". The statement's content was the result of compromise agreements that lasted until the last minute. At the time, it seemed that the issue with Ukraine had been resolved, but future governments would return to it, exacerbating relations with Ukraine.

Debates on historical topics began in the Sejm of the 3rd convocation (1997-2001), the majority of which was won by political forces that continued the traditions of Solidarity ("The Electoral Action "Solidarity" and "Unia of Freedom"), left-wing government. The most heated debate flared up around the law on creating the Institute of National Remembrance (INP), which President A. Kwasniewski even vetoed it, subsequently overridden by the Senate (Sawicki 2009: 185).

Thus, the main components of the Polish politics of history in the first stage can be considered primarily as the rejection of the communist version of history, as well as discussions and attempts to address the rather acute issues of World War II or postwar, the forced resettlement of Germans or mass killings of Polish citizens in other countries, which significantly contributed to the improvement of Poland's relations with its neighbors, primarily with Germany and Ukraine but also Russia. In addition, there was a review of the role of Poles, particularly during the Warsaw Ghetto, i.e. a transformation from the idea of only victims to possible perpetrators. Each of these debates did not come about by accident. In addition to the policy of eliminating the "blank spots" in one's own history, the desire for a fresh start in relations with neighbors played an important role. At that time, Poland signed the treaties on good neighborliness, which contained a requirement to deal courageously and impartially with the burdensome issues of the common past in order to contribute to peaceful coexistence. The atmosphere for such actions was favorable in Poland at that time. The anti-communist oppositionists now in power accepted a critical approach to the Polish nation's past as a prerequisite for regulating future relations with its neighbors (critical patriotism by Jan Józef Lipski) (Ruchniewicz 2019). However, the state's role in regulating history policy

was relatively insignificant, and it was instead the core of discussions among scholars or in the media.

3.1.2. 1999 – 2004

The debate on Polish-Jewish relations was, it seems, a turning point in the further perception of history and its public role in Poland. The previous discussion experienced a clear break. In addition to the critical attitude (critical patriotism), affirmation (affirmative/uncritical patriotism) now increasingly appeared. Over time, this affirmative attitude of showing only the glorious events of national history, underestimating or omitting their downsides, became more widespread. It was initially represented by publicists and a small number of historians from the conservative camp. However, it did not take long for the effects of this change in trend to start to kick in. (Ruchniewicz 2019). Already in the early 2000s, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to fight against the appearance of incorrect terms such as "Polish concentration camps" or "Polish extermination camps." They were soon referred to as false memory codes and publicly criticized. This happened with great success. Persons or editorial offices of the newspapers in which the incorrect information was published corrected the incorrect wording after objections from the Polish diplomatic services or the Polish community abroad.

In the second phase of Polish history policy after 1989, the Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN) was established in 1999. The IPN integrated the "Main Commission for the Investigation of German (from 1949 National Socialist) Crimes in Poland" (Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich Hitlerowskich w Polsce), which had existed since 1945, but now also focused on communist crimes. Generally, the IPN was entrusted with public prosecution tasks to solve communist and national socialist crimes between 1939 and 1990. It should be noted that the establishment of such an institution in Poland was the fastest in comparison with other Central European countries, which also underwent regime change, in particular, the Nation's Memory Institute (Ústav pamäti národa, ÚPN) in Slovakia was established in 2002 and the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, ÚSTR) in the Czech Republic only in 2007 (Lau 2020: 293). This IPN,

with its significant budget, has allowed history policy to become an essential tool in society. It also makes it possible to use history as an instrument of political struggle. The INP became one of modern Poland's most notable and influential state institutions.

3.2.3. 2005 – 2007

The third phase of the politics of history began in 2005 with the coming government party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) and ended in 2007 with a change of government. The PiS party succeeded also in the 2005 presidential election and provided the new president, Lech Kaczyński.

The issue of the politics of history played a significant role in PiS's 2005 election manifesto, "The Fourth Republic: Justice for Everyone". Generally, the manifesto pointed out that Poland's most damaging developments after 1989 were caused by a crisis of patriotism and ignoring the politics of history. This policy was aimed at both domestic and international audiences. The manifesto emphasizes on education and promotion of a national culture which can be a key of a future Poland's development.⁶

Będziemy prowadzić przemyślaną, skuteczną politykę historyczną zarówno wewnętrzną, jak i zewnętrzną. Wewnętrzna polityka historyczna zakłada stałą troskę o jakość edukacji historycznej w szkołach i mediach, a także nieustanne podejmowanie wysiłków, by nie tylko upamiętnić dzieje naszego państwa i narodu, ale także podtrzymywać ich żywą obecność w świadomości obywateli.⁷

During the first period of government of the PiS party, there were disturbing signals. Some attempts to use history for current political purposes came to light and only dealt with selected aspects of history. The history of politics project aimed to provide support for institutions that dealt with the issues of popularization of history or were involved in researching material evidence of the past. These activities included the opening of new museums, for example. The Museum of Freedom, would focus in the polish struggle for liberation. The international side of this project would pay attention to the new vision of Polish history that challenging with historical revisionism, which

⁶ <http://www.wybory2005.pis.org.pl/program.php> [Last access 02.07.2022].

⁷ Engl: "We will pursue a well-thought-out, effective internal and external the politics of history. The internal history politics assumes constant care for the quality of historical education in schools and the media and continuous efforts not only to commemorate the history of our state and nation but also to maintain their vivid presence in the minds of citizens"

provided for a rethinking of responsibility for crimes in the 20th century, another aim of this project would secure recognition for the Polish struggle against two totalitarian regimes and contribution to European civilization. The new Poland's status abroad would focus on the image as a proud and historic nation. Jarosław Kaczyński mentioned in the introduction to the election manifesto: "we want Poland to become, in a way that no one can challenge, one of the most important countries of our continent. We ought to want to be a great nation" (Ochman 2013: 22).

Poland's image was represented during this time as a victim and, as noted, played a unique role in the struggle against two totalitarian regimes. In June 2007, appealing to this thesis, the Prime Minister of the PiS demanded that Poland should be given more voting power within the EU because of its victims in the Second World War: "We are currently only demanding that we be given back what was taken from us. If Poland had not experienced the period from 1939 to 1945, it would be a country with 66 million inhabitants today" (Borodziej 2011, p. 271).

The Warsaw Uprising Museum, the largest project of that time, showed only the - undisputed - heroism of the fighters. However, the reflection on the effects of the uprising and the controversy surrounding it, which for decades was not only the preserve of historians, was completely ignored. There were no search answers to questions about the meaning of the uprising and its consequences, such as the thousands of victims and the destruction of the Polish capital, Warsaw (Ruchniewicz 2019).

The school curricula have now been partially changed, and the research profile of the Institute for National Remembrance also changed. In the case of Polish-Jewish relations, research on the rescue of Jews by Poland during World War II and the attitude of the Jewish population after the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939 were in the foreground from now on. The Jedwabne debate had undermined the image of Poles as innocent victims and martyrs (Ochman 2013: 22).

During this time, the PiS was pursuing an approach of demarcation from Western Europe and strengthening national identity. This distinction from the others created a precise distance to the principles and goals of the history policy of the III. Republic. The politics of history during the third phase was criticized for a Warsaw-centred and ethnic-

focused vision of Polish history. The role of civil society in encouraging historical discussions and future patriotism was weakened by the PiS politics of history, as interactions between the nation-state and its civil society receded into the background. The historical narratives were mostly done through the agencies of the nation-state.

3.2.4. 2008 – 2014

The Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform), which has been in power since autumn 2007, has dispensed with history as an argument in domestic and foreign policy, even though both its former leaders, Donald Tusk and Bronisław Komorowski, are historians. In 2004 Poland became a member of the EU. The main focus was relations with the EU and Poland's economic development after the financial crises, which could correspond to the EU; there was no battle for the historical truth.

According to the ideas of the PO, national identity was to be ensured mainly through the achievement of primary foreign policy goals. Ensuring security and favorable economic development conditions helped strengthen Poland's international position. This is how the Polish people can consolidate because, in this way, the Poles will be given a reason to be proud of the country. The image of a successful Poland makes one want to identify with Polish culture and history. Poland makes a significant contribution to European civilization by combining national interests with the interests of the EU (Olszewski 2013: 84). In 2007, Prime Minister D. Tusk said⁸:

“Będziemy chcieli przy pomocy polityki historycznej wzmocnić wizerunek Polski jako kraju, który w swojej historii zawsze miłował wolność i który wiedział, kiedy miał tę szansę, jak mądrze ją wykorzystać. W ostatecznym rachunku to właśnie taka polityka historyczna może być i będzie zasadniczym elementem oddziaływania Polski wobec naszych sąsiadów, także spoza Unii Europejskiej.

Chciałbym tutaj na marginesie powiedzieć jeszcze jedno zdanie właśnie o polityce historycznej, o tzw. polityce historycznej i o znaczeniu prawdy historycznej w naszych relacjach międzynarodowych, ale także tutaj, krajowych. Żaden rząd w Polsce nie powinien polityki historycznej, prawdy historycznej szukać, a później używać przeciwko komuś. Polityka historyczna ma służyć dziedzictwu i pamięci, a nie walce politycznej.”⁹

⁸ <https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Expose-Donalda-Tuska-z-23-11-2007-7329167.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

⁹ Engl: “We would like to strengthen the image of Poland with the help of the politics of history as a country that has always loved freedom in its history and that knew when such a chance presented itself, to use it wisely. Ultimately, it is precisely such the politics of history that can be will be the main element of Poland's influence on our neighbors, as well as members of the European Union... I would like to say one more sentence here about the politics of history, about the so-called the politics of history, and the importance of historical truth in our international relations, but also here, domestic. No government in

Thus, the issue of the politics of history receded into the background, and it was not given much attention during this period. A foreign policy course of good neighborliness and integration into the EU is at odds with the use of history in domestic politics.

3.2.5. 2015 – 2019

The last phase is characterized by the coming to power of conservative right-wing forces again. After a decisive electoral victory in October 2015 by the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS), the politics of memory became a policy priority in Poland. It is not surprising that the PiS uses the politics of history as one of the most essential areas of its political course, given the opinion poll in Poland on the attitude to history. The surveys by the opinion research institute OBOP¹⁰ from the years 1996 and 2005 show that 64 percent of the population are interested in history to varying degrees, while data from the state opinion research institute CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej - Center for Researching Public Opinion) from 2016 even give 74 percent (Garsztecki 2021: 3).

Thus, history politics becomes an important element not only in domestic policy but also shapes Poland's foreign policy, which significantly impacts relations with neighbors, including Ukraine. The PiS government has broken with the tradition of balancing foreign policy goals and inward-looking the politics of history.

A more detailed overview of the politics of history of PiS is performed in the next section.

3.3. "Polityka historyczna" as part of the political program of PiS

From a political and ideological point of view, PiS can be described as a conservative, nationalist and populist party (Szczerbiak 2017; Folvarcny/ Kopeček 2020). Conservatism and, mainly, nationalism indeed constitute essential foundations in the

Poland should seek the politics of history, and historical truth, and then use it against anyone. The politics of history is to serve heritage and memory, not a political struggle"

¹⁰ Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej - Center for Researching Public Opinion, today part of the opinion research institute Kantar Polska S.A.

party's attitudes and approach towards historical memory (Cadier/ Szulecki 2020: 991). That is why history policy is a key element of the PiS ideology that has remained unchanged since his first stay in power from 2005 to 2007. The foundation of the history policy of the PiS is the idea of Poland as a nation of victims and heroes (martyrdom and heroism) with an enormous positive contribution to European history and civilization (Balcer 2019: 2).

In the structure of the political landscape after the parliamentary election in October 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński's party facilitated the implementation of its policies immensely. With their absolute majority in Sejm, the PiS could change the direction of future development, redesign institutions according to their ideas, pass new laws and influence the public media. All this enabled the PiS to pursue a highly coherent and coordinated "polityka historyczna" (Andrychowicz-Skrzeba 2017: 65).

The PiS's basic ideas remained the same before the parliamentary elections 2015 in Poland, while the question about history policy was even sharper, as opponents ignored it and the PiS saw it as a threat to Poland and its image abroad. Historical issues were also discussed at the PiS "Myśląc Polska"¹¹ conference before the elections in 2015, where key theses of the election program were discussed. Historian Magdalena Gawin traced the central thesis of the PiS in this regard, that Poland's disregard for the politics of history during last years leads to Poland's coverage in academia and abroad in a negative light, which is unacceptable, given Poland's contribution to European civilization, freedom and "historical truth":

"Podczas gdy zakneblowana cenzurą, zastraszona i upokorzona Polska milczała, w Europie kształtowała się nowa powojenna narracja. Funkcjonowanie we współczesnym obiegu europejskim terminu: „polskie obozy koncentracyjne”, mylenie sprawców i ofiar jest tego najlepszym dowodem. Nie pytamy zatem: czy państwo polskie powinno prowadzić politykę historyczną, ale jak ją prowadzić, aby była skuteczna.”¹²

The politician Jarosław Sellin in his speech at the same conference, pointed out the spread of anti-patriotic revisionism, which should be stopped by a systematic history

¹¹ <https://pis.org.pl/dokumenty> [Last access 01.07.2022].

¹² Engl: "While Poland, gagged by censorship, intimidated and humiliated, remained silent, a new post-war narrative was taking shape in Europe. The term "Polish concentration camps" in the contemporary European circulation, confusing the perpetrators and victims, is the best proof of this. Therefore, we shouldn't ask: whether the Polish state should pursue a the politics of history, but how to pursue it to make it effective"

policy that PiS is ready to provide. This policy should maintain pride in Polish past and achievements to build a national and social bond and promote the Polish point of view on assessing the past in dialogue with other nations.

The party program of PiS was presented in 2014 and the results of the program convention held a year later form the basis for action after the last parliamentary elections. The reconstruction of the presented ideas helps us recognize what intentions in the area of "polityka historyczna" have been pursued by the political camp that has been in power since 2015. Analyzing the election program of PiS, it can be seen that history policy is an essential element of it and, in general, one of the critical elements of the narrative. It also builds ties between supporters of Jarosław Kaczyński's party, as they often gather at historical and patriotic events. The program also included allegations directed mainly at the Civic Platform because of history policy. Donald Tusk has been accused of conducting an ineffective foreign policy towards Germany and not reacting to the correction of German history policy, which questions the historical truth and moral sense of World War II. Sharp criticism was also directed at the authors of the limitations in teaching history in high school. That is why, PiS promises that after coming to power, it will restore the entire teaching of history and other subjects in secondary schools. In addition to this, history should also be promoted through proposals from the Institute of National Remembrance, which will receive more funding and more opportunities in history policy-making, as the institute should take on the responsibilities of the Council for the Protection of the Memory of War and Martyrdom and the Office for Veterans and Victims of Oppression (Rady Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa oraz Urzędu do Spraw Kombatantów i Osób Represjonowanych).¹³

In contrast to earlier legislature periods, the government systematically attempts to completely reorganize the state and its institutions according to their ideas. History was assigned an important role here; it should be a fundamental element of Poland's national identity. History thus became a tool for Poles to take pride in their nation's achievements. At the same time, today's rulers are trying to give the impression of continuing Poland's successful history, of being heirs to this - selectively told – past (Ruchniewicz 2019). The politics of history for PiS was an integral part of the great

¹³ <https://pis.org.pl/dokumenty> [Last access 01.05.2022].

project that first served in the power struggle during opposition time and after 2015 to maintain and consolidate that power. In her first government statement, Prime Minister Beata Szydło noted that her policy would promote the strengthening of patriotic attitudes. With the support of public funds, works are to be created that tell Poland and the world about Polish outstanding compatriots and heroes. It is vital to building the ethos of Polish heroes (Szydło 2015: 11).

In addition to this, in his response to the government statement, PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński outlined the relevant plans of his party. He saw one of the main challenges in the "renewal and consolidation of the national community." First of all, he emphasized protection from defamation of Poles from anti-polonism, which could doubt the legitimacy of the existence of the Polish state. It is also unacceptable that the Polish state does not react to what was happening globally. Poland, the nation that took up arms first and rose in hand to fight Nazi Germany is now treated as essentially an ally of Hitler, treated as partly responsible for the crimes of Nazi Germany. Poland was dealing with the situation of internalizing responsibility for the Holocaust with particular reference to Poles. There was a need to be very resolute in opposing this." (Kaczyński 2015:13)

The issue of the politics of history rose further when at the end of 2015, it was announced that the work on the development of "Strategy of Polish Politics of History ("Strategia Polskiej Polityki Historycznej") had been started. President Andrzej Duda announced that "prowadzenie polityki historycznej to jedno z najważniejszych działań prezydenta."¹⁴¹⁵

The PiS can rely on a social movement that is conservative values and generally sees Poland as an ethnonational community. The origins of this milieu are virtually unexplored, and it arose long before the first PiS-led government in 2005. The term "movement" should not be understood as if the individual groups were a homogeneous, coordinated phenomenon because this movement consists of independent initiatives, and there is no organization that unites or controls them. These organizations, guided

¹⁴ <https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/musimy-ksztaltowac-postawy-obywatelskie-i-patriotyczne,62> [Last access 02.07.2022].

¹⁵ Engl: "...conducting history policy is one of the most important activities of the president"

by amateur historians with more or less expert comments, discover local history, play in costumes on anniversaries, and recreate fights and battles from different epochs with modern weapons. One of these movements became known to the general public in the summer of 2013 as an initiative in Radymno in south-eastern Poland, an attack by Ukrainian partisans on a reenacted Polish settlement from 1943 and set up wooden stalls, especially for this purpose burned down (Portnov 2016). Liberal and left-wing media criticized the performance as nationalistic and anti-Ukrainian (Bachmann 2018: 418).

Thus, the politics of history under PiS has its idea and interest, which is, of course, thoroughly political. It also has instruments at its disposal, for example, at the disposal of the Minister of Culture and Heritage. The minister dissolves and establishes museums, resigns and appoints, establishes and takes over, censors, and receives subsidies. It also has the Institute of National Remembrance, which is controlled by the government and has a significant budget (Władyka 2019).

The PiS government in the frame of the politics of history in foreign policy, continued to push the initiative, mainly to fight against the misleading phrase "Polish concentration camps/ death camp" (instead of the correct designation "German" or "NS concentration camps [on Polish territory]"). It was seen as an acute problem in Poland because of the number of times this phrase was used. According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years between 2011 and 2014, 300 cases were registered. In 2015 there were almost twice as many, and in the first half of 2016, there were 115 cases. Criticism of the use of incriminated wording affects media titles all over the world, including daily newspapers and magazines such as the German "Tageszeitung", the "Süddeutsche Zeitung", the "Spiegel", the American "New York Times" and many others (Andrychowicz-Skrzeba 2017: 66).

In its program, the PiS explains 'polityka historyczna' as an essential element of their foreign policy. It states, "this aspect was most notoriously neglected or even loudly denied in the Third Republic. This is one of the most important tools in the positive presence of Poland in the minds of countries and societies of the world" (Zaborski 2017: 130). Based on this idea, other concrete activities of the PiS government in politics of history include the reorientation of institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs or Ministry of Culture, whose statutory aim was to impart knowledge about Poles abroad. In many Polish institutes abroad, including in Berlin, the previous management staff was replaced. According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish institutes should no longer primarily promote Polish culture abroad but rather concentrate on the needs of Poles abroad and historical diplomatic issues (Andrychowicz-Skrzeba 2017: 67).

In that way, it can be seen that PiS was trying to characterize Poland by the heroization of memory and the perception of Polish history as the history of a sacrificial nation. Representing Poland as a "victim" is one of the elements of implementing "polityka historyczna". Own story about history has probably become the essential ideological motive of PiS; it strengthens the legitimacy to rule, the process of elite replacement, and lectures on what is right and good and what is not the spiritual endowment of the nation. In 2017, historian Norman Davies mentioned that "PiS wants to politicize history to a degree unseen in the last 25 years," and he does expect that a vital element of political bias will occur because of changes made under PiS (Ciobanu 2020).

3.4. The Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej) and other actors of the politics of history in Poland

In its inward orientation toward the Poles, the PiS pursues grand and sometimes profound plans. The historical-political ideas under PiS are based on the belief that a nation owes its existence to its collective sense of identity as citizens and the memory of key historical events. An important step towards a more straightforward implementation of this Premise derived history politics formed the reform of the Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN), which until then had mainly done research work. Now it's for that, among other things responsible, "in Poland and abroad positions and opinions to spread historical events important for the Polish people", "in the context of patriotic education the history of Poland known to the time after the partitions and the last decades make" and "the dissemination of information and publications to counteract in Poland and abroad, the content of which is incorrect are or the Republic of Poland or the Polish people in a bad shine light or defame" (Andrychowicz-Skrzeba 2017: 67).

The mission and principles of the Institute, which are listed on the official website¹⁶:

“The mission of the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu – the IPN) is to research and popularize the modern history of Poland and to investigate crimes committed from 8 November 1917, throughout the Second World War and the communist period, to 31 July 1990.

The principles defining the work of the Institute of National Remembrance are:

- the preservation of the memory of the immense number of victims, losses and damages suffered by the Polish people during the Second World War and after its end;
- the patriotic traditions of the Polish people's struggle against the occupiers, the Nazis and the Communists;
- the commitment to prosecute crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes,
- the actions of Polish citizens in support of the independence of the Polish state and in defense of freedom and human dignity,
- the obligation of the State to compensate all injured parties of a State which has violated human rights; as an expression of the conviction that no unlawful action of the State against its citizens can be classified or forgotten.

The activities of the Institute on the site are described as "uncovering the truth about the most difficult but also the most triumphant moments in the history of Poland and the Polish Nation" by publishing books and works, organizing exhibitions and conferences concerning various, sometimes previously undiscussed, issues. Furthermore, the Institute of National Remembrance is engaged in popularizing recent history among the youngest generation, including rallies and competitions and reaching out to them through the Internet and social media.

The Institute is headed by the President appointed by the Polish Parliament and has a reasonably extensive structure; it consists of:

1. The IPN Archive— extensive archives of the 20th-century history of Poland,

¹⁶ <https://ipn.gov.pl/en/> [Last access 02.07.2022].

2. The Chief Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation – a commission with a main to prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed during both the German and communist totalitarian regimes,
3. The National Education Office – an educational center,
4. The Historical Research Office – an academic research center on historical topics,
5. The Office of Search and Identification – a team, searching for burial places of victims of totalitarian regimes and ethnic cleansing from 1917–to 1989,
6. The Vetting Office – occupied with the lustration process.
7. The Office for Commemorating the Struggle and Martyrdom – commemorating important Polish historical events, places, and figures.
8. A publishing house – a publisher of historical books, educational materials, historical journals, and more.

In addition, the Polish Institute of Memory represents a significant and extensive network, as the institute has a representative office in several cities. While The IPN's headquarters are located in Warsaw, another eleven branch offices were also established in Białystok, Gdańsk, Katowice, Cracow, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wrocław. There are also 7 subbranches located in Bydgoszcz, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Kielce, Koszalin, Olsztyn, Opole and Radom.

Before we begin with a more detailed account of the IPN work, Antoni Stammek, who has held managerial positions at the Institute for several years, will be considered. "Institute of contempt, lies, thrashing, slander, hideousness, nefariousness and so forth. These are just a few of the nicknames given to the institution where I was allowed to do my work for the past decade. Probably no other institution in the Third Republic aroused so many negative emotions, and most likely no other institution was temporally considered the most successful of the Third Republic" (Leschnik 2018: 431; quoted from Dudek). Apart from Dudek's memoir, there is no Polish-language monograph dealing with the history of the IPN. The critics include left-liberal public with the newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*, some Polish journalists or some historians who, as holders of secure posts, can afford to criticize the IPN. This is related to the fact that the IPN is a financially strong employer that is networked with politics (Leschnik 2018: 431).

The initially very close proximity to and dependence on politics was already evident when the first chairman was appointed since Leon Kieres was only able to take over the

management of the IPN after a lengthy political skirmish (Leschnik 2018: 433). It has to be justified because of the power play between different parties. The construct by which the first public prosecutors began their service in the Institute was also criticized. In 2001 there were already 79 prosecutors, which are otherwise equal to other public prosecutors so they are authorized to issue instructions to the Polish police, for example (Leschnik 2018: 434).

Since its foundation, the IPN has been involved in the screening (*lustracja*) of the high level of bureaucracy and the actors in public life to find possible cooperation with the communist political police. Since the law amendment in 2007, the public prosecutor's branch of the Institute has taken over the investigation and indictment in these cases. During the term of office of the first chairman of the Institut, the lawyer Leon Kieres (2000-2005), the IPN pursued more or less successfully, first of all, because of the investigation into the 1941 murder of the Jews in Jedwabne (Borodziej 2011: 271). For this reason, the Institute was perceived by the Polish public as a credible actor in public discourse and was even counted among the most trustworthy state institutions by the Poles (Leschnik 2018: 435). In the years between 2005 and 2013 surveys were carried out by the survey institute CBOS, the aim of which was how people evaluate the work of the Institute. Up to 45 respondents assessed the Institute's work positively, about 30 percent had no opinion about it, and about 20 percent of Poles assessed the work negatively. It is noteworthy that most young people who are still in education and attend church regularly rated the work of the Institute as positive (Leschnik 2018: 435). During the term of the second president Janusz Kurtyka from December 2005 until he died in the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash near Smolensk, the IPN developed into a state actor who intervened openly in domestic political disputes: numerous complaints against opponents of the right-wing coalition that governed from 2005 to 2007, as well as members of parliament and constitutional judges, were flanked by the press close to the coalition, which was consistently based on material from the IPN (Borodziej 2011: 272).

The considerable discussion and concern in Poland, Israel, the USA, and Ukraine around the IPN were caused by the amendment to the IPN law (Lesser 2018). There were fears that an attempt might be made to restrict critical research into the Holocaust in this way or operation Wisla. On January 26, 2018, the Polish parliament, the Sejm, on

the PiS party's initiative, amended the Institute of National Remembrance law. The new version of the law introduced the possibility of imprisonment for those who blamed the Polish nation and the Polish state for crimes committed by Nazi Germany on Polish territory. It was proclaimed in the text of the amendment that anyone who publicly and contrary to the facts, accuses the Polish nation or the Polish state of responsibility or joint responsibility for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich or other crimes that constitute crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes or otherwise bears responsibility grossly mitigate the actual perpetrators of these crimes, punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years (Bucholc/ Komornik 2019).

The reason for the change in the law was repeated reports in foreign media that spoke of "Polish concentration camps" or "Polish extermination camps" in a semantically misleading and historically clearly wrong way. Incidentally, this was not a new problem, as was already mentioned that this discussion began at the early 2000s, forced by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Israel, the US, and Ukraine quickly joined in the Polish criticism. As PiS politicians emphasized, "scientific and artistic activity" should not be affected by the change in the law (i.e. it should not be a crime in the sense of the law). However, the information campaign organized by the government has not dispelled these doubts and allegations. The compromise was achieved when the Polish government was finally forced to give in; a foreign policy embarrassment. On June 27, 2018, the Sejm adopted another amendment deleting the provision on criminal sanctions, including imprisonment (Ruchniewicz 2019).

The number of employees has increased from 444 in 2000 to 2,070 in 2010 (Leschnik 2018: 432). This indicates the growing importance of the Institute, as well as increased funding. At around 90 million EUR¹⁷, the budget of the IPN corresponds to a good third of the budget of the largest Polish university with its 60,000 students and thousands of employees; logically, the University of Warsaw, with its dozens of courses and research institutions, devotes an estimated few per thousand of its budget to contemporary history. In other words, the IPN is also a financial powerhouse in the

¹⁷ <https://dzieje.pl/dziedzictwo-kulturowe/w-2020-r-wydatki-ipn-wyniosly-ponad-393-mln-zl> [Last access 02.07.2022].

Polish academic landscape. Thus, it shapes not only the images of the past, but also the idea of what historical science actually means.

The budget of the IPN (PLN 213.43 million) in 2010 was higher than, for example, the budget of the Presidential Chancellery (PLN 158.5 million) or the Senate Chancellery (PLN 162 million) and significantly higher than the state expenditure on libraries (PLN 81.8 million) or archives (PLN 106.8 million). For the large amount of money that the IPN receives, there are countless ways to spend it, so it is simply impossible to even begin to list all the publications, exhibitions, national and international conferences, competitions, educational programs, public campaigns, etc. through which the Institute in distinguished in the years concerned (Leschnik 2018: 433).

Another important historical-political player was the Council for Preserving the Memory of Struggle and Martyrdom (Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa, ROPWiM), which was responsible for maintaining national memorials and military cemeteries, organizing commemorative events, publications and exhibitions commemorating the freedom struggle and the victim was responsible. In 2016 the council was dissolved by the government of Beata Szydło, and its documentation was taken over by the IPN¹⁸.

The Warsaw Uprising Museum (Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego) is a prominent historical and political actor, which opened in 2004 and has since become very popular. The museum is considered a symbol of PiS's history policy, so it logically reinterprets the uprising as a moral victory for the Poles. In contrast to the Polocentist and heroized concept of the Warsaw museum, the Gdańsk museum should be an institution that shows events of the Second World War from both perspectives: Polish and transnational (Leschnik 2018: 440).

In the case of Poland, another important role is played by veterans' associations that also have political influence because they even took part in drafting laws. These associations have two signs in Polen: 1. nobody knows their number; 2. They fought among themselves (Leschnik 2018: 442). Other historical-political actors in Poland include the National Cultural Center, which aims to uphold national and state tradition,

¹⁸ <https://www.wnp.pl/parlamentarny/wydarzenia/wchodza-w-zycie-przepisy-noweli-ustawy-o-ipn-dot-likwidacji-ropwim,12496.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

and two think tanks. It is about the Stefan Batory Foundation (Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego) established by American financier and philanthropist George Soros.

On the other hand the Educational and Scientific Society The Center for Political Thought (Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej). Both think tanks carry out educational and scientific activities in political thought, history, and international relations. It is also a place of public debate on Polish politics, contemporary ideological disputes, and international politics.

4. POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PiS

4.1. Foreign Policy Dimension of PiS

Since the end of communism, the continuous integration of Poland into "the West" has been considered the primary goal of Polish foreign and security policy. This approach resulted in the accession to NATO, the EU, and generally good relations with western partners. It was further solidified in a non-partisan consensus in the years that followed. Generally, Gadier (Cadier 2021: 709) pointed out the three basic principles of Polish foreign policy before 2015: 1) strengthening relations with the USA and NATO's security mechanisms what is connecting with the second point; 2) deterrence of Russian influence; 3) support to Poland's European integration.

Until 2015 the foreign policy of Poland can be described as consistent. The first phase focused on joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU¹⁹. Once these goals were achieved, it focused on strengthening Poland's position within these organizations, primarily by maintaining close relations with the United States and Germany. Poland's Ostpolitik was equally consistent, involving continuous efforts to bring Ukraine and other countries (such as Georgien) in the region closer to Western institutions. It is worth mentioning that Ostpolitik was done primarily through the institutional channels of the EU. Polish foreign policy has always placed the EU and NATO first, reflecting the country's desire to be fully integrated into Western civilization and to weaken Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Zwolski 2017: 171).

Since taking office in 2015, the government led by the PiS has changed the primary strategy of Polish foreign policy. Moreover, foreign policy has become a function of Polish domestic policy (Gregorz 2021: 1). In a departure from Poland's traditional pro-EU orientation, the new government has set out to "correct" Polish foreign policy. When President Duda announced his foreign policy goals in an interview on August 5, 2015, he noticed that he was not advocating revolutionary changes in foreign policy.

Instead, he spoke of necessary, "sometimes profound" corrections²⁰. Although the directions of the aforementioned foreign policy have been unchanged, the "balance,

¹⁹ Since 1999 Poland is a full member of NATO; in 2004 Poland joined the EU.

²⁰ <http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/duda-nie-jestem-za-rewolucja-w-polityce-zagranicznej-ale-beda-korekty> [Last access 02.07.2022].

emphasis and relationship between these tenets have been reconfigured," as Kerry Longhurst mentioned (Cadier 2021: 709).

Based on the summarizing of the "Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021"²¹ made by Chekalenko (Chekalenko 2017: 66), the following main priorities can be confirmed:

- Strong Poland in a strong political union: building a competitive, solidary, open, and secure European Union, in which all countries are jointly responsible for the future of European integration, in cooperation with respect for Polish interests by other participants; constructive participation in the EU decision-making process for Poland's success both on the European and world stage.
- Poland as a reliable ally in the stable Euro-Atlantic dimension: developing its capacity to contain and maintain confidence in NATO as a defense alliance; working closely with Ukraine and other countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus; combating terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Poland is open to various forms of regional cooperation: cooperation with the West in the field of security and a strong economy; openness and solidarity with the East; use of templates from the North in terms of the quality of life of citizens; partnership with the South in terms of common goals; strengthening cooperation between the Visegrad countries.
- Promotion of democracy and human rights: supporting measures to promote human rights, the rule of law, and democracy to prevent conflicts and secure what can positively affect Poland's security and the stability of its neighbors and cooperation partners.
- Promotion of Poland abroad: developing a promotional campaign to strengthen Poland's position in Europe and the world, as well as Poland itself; "paying special attention to the needs of Poles in the East"; organization of a new quality in relations with Polish diaspora in order to use its potential for creating a positive image of Poland and promotion of Polish identity.
- Effective diplomacy: continuing the modernization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thus, based on the strategy, it can be seen that PiS continues to give the highest priority to security, leading to increased cooperation with the United States and NATO. Another way to stabilize the border is to support neighboring countries' democratic and sustainable development. At the same time, in the context of the EU, it is pointed out

²¹ <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/what-we-do> [Last access 02.07.2022].

that the decisions taken must be in Poland's interest, which is connected with deteriorating relations with the EU. There is also an emphasis on Poland's regional importance and the promotion of its status as a leading power in the region. Last but not least, PiS attaches great importance to its image abroad and promoting the Polish identity, which will be possible thanks to a new impetus for developing effective diplomacy. In other words, unlike in previous years, cooperation with the EU is not being prioritized; instead, attention is being paid to Poland's status as a leading regional power that will promote Polish identity and the ideas of democracy.

Under the PiS government, Poland's relations with EU institutions are in deep crisis. However, the problems arose earlier. Looking at the past quarter century, one can see a paradigm shift in Poland's relations with the EU that has moved the country away from the mainstream of European integration, from the pro-integration determination at the time of EU accession, to the stagnation of integration that lasted until the end of the PO-PSL government²², to the regression of integration that began when PiS came to power in 2015 (Gromadzki 2018: 1). It is connected with Polish judicial reforms and the media law; that is why the EU spoke about "illiberal democracy" ²³.

The challenges for Europe and thus for German-Polish relations were in 2015 significant: the crisis in the eurozone, the migration crises, and Putin's imperial policies towards Ukraine. These are not German-Polish factors but developments that weekend cooperation between the states through different perceptions and political actions (Kerski 2016). Polish criticism focused on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Germany and Russia, which contradicts Polish interests. This historical-political component was reflected in the recurring demands for reparations and the insinuation that Germany was trying to downplay its guilt in World War II using the mentioned terms in the third chapter as "Polish concentration camps" and others (Gregorz 2021: 1). Influential party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski claimed in 2016 that "Germany owes Poland huge sums of money." However, in 1953 Poland refused to follow the position of Western allies in relinquishing any claim to money reparations from Germany (Buras 2017).

²² Polish government coalition of the Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, PO) and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (The Polish People's Party, PSL) between 2011-2015 in power

²³ <https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-poland-solidifies-its-illiberal-politics/a-50860220> [Last access 02.07.2022].

A regular part of Polish foreign policy strategy is insistent on active participation and involvement of the USA and NATO in European security (Zwolski 2017: 172). Under the Trump administration, these relations seem to be deepening. Poland was one of the first countries Trump visited after taking office, and President Duda has also been a guest at the White House on several occasions (Gregosz 2021: 3). Security remains the essential life interest. It can be understood as state sovereignty or territorial integrity, but in the case of Poland, it is still about minimizing threats to the state (Starzyk/Tomaszewska 2017: 20). As a result, confidence in the USA as a security guarantor unites the otherwise fragmented Polish party landscape.

Under the ruling of PiS, Poland can not be seen as an engine of European integration as PiS emphasized the primacy of national communities over the transnational EU. Instead, the new government aimed to revive an inter-war tradition of focusing on alliances in CEE under the Polish leadership as the largest country of this region. The aim of changing the narrative is a claim that Poland has to protect its own sovereignty and national interest against Brussels, Berlin, and Russia; Poland is considered the defender of Christian liberal values because of migration crises in EU and as a victim of German economic domination and Russian security threat (Zwolski 2017 :167).

Geographical position, which dooms Poland to a dangerous neighborhood and the torments of regional and civilizational self-determination, but leaves room for opportunities to strengthen Poland's international position especially in the context of the eastern flank of the EU and NATO, as well as the role of regional leader in Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish foreign policy strategy for 2017-2021 mentions the following²⁴:

“Poland lies at a key junction in Europe, at the intersection of two geopolitical tectonic plates: Western Europe, institutionally embodied in NATO and the European Union, and Eastern Europe, largely dominated by Russia. The country also functions as a keystone on the North-South axis – between the wider Baltic Sea region and Central Europe, and beyond: the Balkan states and the Adriatic and Black Sea areas. Its geographical location poses many challenges, but also offers unique opportunities to strengthen Poland’s international position.”

²⁴ <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/what-we-do> [Last access 02.07.2022].

It is often stated that the foreign policy of Kaczyński and Duda follows the Polish tradition of the interwar period. The binary worldview of PiS nationalism is primarily derived from Dmowski: the Poles as heroes/victims, their enemies/traitors. This binary worldview of Dmowski characterizes the government's foreign policy rhetoric. What was the case in the interwar period, namely Poland's position between two hostile blocs (Soviet Union and Germany), is spun out as an emotional message and national myth (Doering 2018). The concept of the Intermarium, which also dates back to the interwar period, also gained popularity during the PiS rule. This refers to the plan for Poland to lead a unified bloc of countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea to create an effective counterweight to Germany and Soviet Russia. The plan never materialized but remained attractive to conservative and anti-EU political circles in Poland, which have been controlling the country's foreign policy since 2015. Even before he was sworn in as president, Andrzej Duda announced that he favored increased cooperation in CEE, "from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea." As a result, the intermarium concept was replaced in public discourse by the idea of regional cooperation under the name "Three Seas" (Zwolski 2017 :174).

The Three Seas Initiative brings together Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, started in 2016 to create a dialogue for overcoming regional issues. The motivation was that, unlike Western Europe, these countries are somewhat separate from each other in terms of infrastructure. One of the engines of this initiative was the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, as indicated in particular on the website²⁵:

"Attention was drawn to Europe's disparity in development in 2014 by a US think tank, the Atlantic Council, in a report entitled 'Completing Europe'. This inspired the then heads of state of two countries – President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović of Croatia and President Andrzej Duda of Poland – to launch an initiative, which has gone on to attract more and more senior figures and leading players from the worlds of business and politics."

Based on the Polish foreign policy strategy, Eastern Europe will continue to pose some of the most significant challenges to Poland's foreign policy in the years to come. The region has witnessed a steady downward trend in stability and predictability, both foreign and domestic. As the largest country in terms of population and economy,

²⁵ <https://3seas.eu/about/threeseasstory> [Last access 02.07.2022].

Warsaw derives a claim to leadership from this and sees itself as a central point of reference in CEE for the transatlantic alliance (Gregorz 2021: 4). President Duda often recalls that he draws inspiration for his foreign policy from Lech Kaczyński, Poland's Poland's president from 2005 to 2010, who died in a plane crash in Smolensk. Lech Kaczyński shared his brother's distrust of the EU and Germany. He became notorious in the EU primarily for delaying the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, Lech Kaczyński was very active in the CEE region. First, he made concerted efforts to reduce Poland's Poland's dependence on Russian energy sources primarily through regional energy summits. Second, along with other regional leaders, he intervened in the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. He stood out from most EU states as a staunch and uncompromising critic of Russian aggression by traveling to Tbilisi to support Georgia (Zwolski 2017: 173).

Contrary to the assertion of the importance of supporting good relations with neighboring states, there were some obstacles. For example, Poland shared a common strategic interest with Ukraine, especially regarding its attitude towards Russia. At the same time, there are historical clashes related to the events during the Second World War. Poland also shares security policy commonalities with the Baltic states, as the eastern part of NATO feels most threatened by Russia (Gregorz 2021: 4).

In addition to mentioned initiatives in CEE and bilateral relations between states, there is another form of cooperation in the region, namely the Visegrád Group (V4), which unites Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The goal of the V4 is to coordinate and establish good neighborly relations jointly. The V4 gained Europe-wide attention in the wake of the migration crisis in 2015 when concerted action against an EU-wide distribution of refugees began to emerge. Contrary to the same reaction during migration crises, the group is far from being a homogeneous community of interests.

Thus, we can sort out the three general development directions of Polish foreign policy under PiS: 1. The strengthening of security cooperation with the EU and NATO, in the face of Putin's Putin's expansionist policy. 2. The deteriorating relations between Poland and the EU, especially with its western neighbor Germany. 3. The intention to consolidate Poland's status as a regional leader is related to Poland's Poland's active

position in the Visegrad Group, the Three Seas Initiative, and bilateral relations with countries in the region.

4.2. Ukraine's place in Poland's foreign policy strategy

Since the declaration of Ukraine's independence, the relations between Warsaw and Kyiv have traditionally been important for Poland's international position, especially in the security dimension. Polish foreign policy elites see an independent and Western-oriented Ukraine as a necessary geopolitical buffer against Russia's power in the region and vital for Poland's own security (Zwolski 2018: 180–181). This view has made Warsaw one of the strongest advocates of Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU.

After 1991, two opposing social trends determined Polish relations with Ukraine (Bachmann 2018: 420). On the one hand, there was a broad consensus among the political elites of all ideological shades that Ukraine's independence should be supported to prevent a re-extension of Russia's sphere of influence to Poland's eastern border. It is often associated with Jerzy Giedroyc, the founder and editor of the Parisian émigré magazine *Kultura*. He advocated recognition of post-war borders, reconciliation with Ukrainian émigrés, and post-1991 good relations with independent Ukraine. Alongside this security-motivated position, which determined the Ukraine policy of all Polish governments after 1989, there was always a counter-current of Poles expelled from the former eastern territories, or their descendants, who opposed any rapprochement with Ukraine (Bachmann 2018: 421).

When the PiS party came to power in 2015, the Polish government's attitude toward Ukraine changed rapidly. Poland's Ukraine policy was shaped by the radical right's nostalgia for Polish domination of the CEE region in the interwar period. These ideas are used not only by radical right groups, but also by the PiS leadership. According to former PiS politician Paweł Kowal, the party has always been divided into two factions, with the majority favoring the nationalist tradition... Nevertheless, Jarosław Kaczyński, who still adheres to the Giedroyc doctrine²⁶ and the *Solidarność* policy, has the final say (Iwaniuk 2017).

²⁶ The Giedroyc doctrine that was developed in the 1970s can be seen as a guiding principle for Warsaw's relations with its eastern neighbors. Poland was presented as a supporter for independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania from Russia.

After coming to the power of PiS, Ukraine's place in Polish foreign policy was systematically weakened. Thus, in 2015, there was a shortage of PiS personnel who could be responsible for working with Ukraine. Polish experts also explain that the Ukrainian portfolio is less prestigious than other foreign areas, including cooperation with the United States. Moreover, in general, foreign policy was much inferior to domestic policy in terms of PiS. At the same time, due to ideological confrontation, PiS did not apply for personnel support to the Civic Platform, which has a significant pool of experts on Ukrainian issues. Politicians such as Radosław Sikorski or Bronisław Komorowski, who would like to make Ukraine's support part of their political image, have also receded into the background (Zarembko 2016).

Poland's role in stabilizing the region must be perceived through the fundamental fact summarized in President Petro Poroshenko's rejection of President Andrzej Duda's initiative to expand the Normandy format in the summer of 2015. Kyiv recognized Warsaw as a strategic partner but preferred to resolve the main issues in a smaller group with the participation of Germany and France, but without Poland. Another factor was Poland's weakening position in the EU (Mróz 2019, p. 28). Although Poland was one of Ukraine's most consistent allies after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it supported sanctions against Russia and condemned its actions against Ukraine. Poland also advocated a democratic change in Ukraine and supported a visa-free regime for Ukraine. Through these and other demonstrations of support for Ukraine, the European Council on Foreign Relations confidently ranked Poland among the EU's "leaders" in supporting Ukraine, after Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden (Zarembko 2016). During and after the Maidan, Polish diplomacy played a particularly active role in consolidating EU and Visegrad Group support for Ukraine in their joint statements condemning Russia's misbehavior.

In addition to political support, Poland has provided \$100 million in loans to Ukraine through 2016²⁷, making it the second-largest bilateral European lender after Germany. Poland's Official Development Assistance (Oficjalna Pomoc Rozwojowa) provided Ukraine more than \$12 million from 2014-2016. Poland has also opened its market to Ukrainian seasonal workers. Their number exceeded 410 thousand people in the first half of 2015. Poland has participated in all multilateral military exercises with Ukraine

²⁷ https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/616_196 [Last access 02.07.2022].

and supplied Ukraine with non-lethal weapons under the NATO program. While many international investors avoid Ukraine, Polish investments increased in 2015; Poland accounts for 5.5% of all foreign direct investment in Ukraine (Gressel 2016).

In order to win on the foreign policy historical front (by exerting influence on the patriotic electorate and winning the support of nationalist organizations), Polish conservative politicians tried to arouse the conservative-nationalist and Catholic-traditionalist feelings of the Polish community (Lozovyy 2018, p. 149). This gave the impetus to forming "polityka historyczna," which became an essential element of domestic and international relations, particularly Polish-Ukrainian relations.

4.3. Correlation of the Foreign policy and “polityka historyczna” under PiS

Since 2015, there has been no balance between "polityka historyczna" and foreign policy goals. This is partly because the PiS program contains many concrete and consistently implemented domestic policy goals but is very vague on foreign policy. Thus, previous governments pay much less attention to foreign policy issues. The other reason can be that all foreign policy decision-makers and high-ranking diplomats who were involved in implementing the foreign policy ideas of previous governments and presidents have since been dismissed or resigned (Bachmann 2018: 415). Thus, experienced people in this field were excluded from further work, and searching for new qualifications also took time and effort.

In addition, Andrzej Duda was elected president for the first time in 2015, a politician with neither foreign policy experience nor backing in his party and few foreign policy ambitions. Its stated goal is to give Polish society a stronger sense of belonging and shape it into a community that is as free of conflict as possible. This is in line with the policies of the government of Beata Szydło and her successor Mateusz Morawiecki (Bachmann 2018: 415). Another face of Poland under PiS is its leader Jarosław Kaczyński who is the decision-making center of the party, the government, and PiS factions in the Sejm and the Senate. He is also known for his disinterest in foreign policy. He speaks no foreign language, rarely travels abroad, and largely refuses to receive foreign diplomats. Exceptions include Kaczyński's meetings with the U.S. ambassador during Obama's presidency, which were described by as "extremely unpleasant" because of U.S. criticism

of the "reform" of the Constitutional Court; a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel; and Kaczyński's meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (Bachmann 2018: 416).

It means that the main leaders of PiS did not have much interest in foreign policy and focused on domestic policy goals. The lack of central coordination of foreign policy, usually the prime minister's job, means that foreign policy is subordinate to the primacy of domestic policy.

As we have already understood, in contrast to the politics of history of previous conservative governments, such as in the early 1990s and after 1997, PiS "polityka historyczna" is primarily focused on achieving domestic political goals. The aim is no longer to present a positive image of Poland to the public in neighboring countries and among Poland's allies as mentioned in Polish foreign policy strategy, but to confront them with the new government's view of history. Every adverse reaction consolidates one's own following and pillories the opposition if it shows understanding for the reaction from abroad (Bachmann 2018: 415).

The application of narratives of national victimhood was used in post-2015-Poland by the government of conservative PiS as a vital part of the foreign policy discourse. As Cadier and Szulecki show (Cadier/ Szulecki 2020), Law and Justice leaders adopted historical narratives that tend to portray the Polish nation as outsiders or victims and castigate internal and external opponents as "elites". It helps the to reproduce the typical dichotomy for populist discourse. In that way, while Polish liberal politicians were antagonized as domestic elites, the EU-level elite aims to undermine Polish interests. The logic of populist discourse was also evident in Polish leaders' totalizing and moralizing historical narratives about victims, heroes, and perpetrators, especially during the Second World War. According to these narratives, Poland as a country of heroes and victims can not be associated with perpetrators. This was the logic behind the so-called Holocaust Law, introduced by the Law and Justice government to criminalize claims of Poland's complicity in the Holocaust or other Nazi crimes. As we have already discussed, it caused a considerable discussion in Israel, the USA, and Ukraine. It shows how populist politics of history tend to spill over into the international arena and fuel conflict (Klymenko/Siddi 2020: 949).

Analyzing the foreign policy in Poland, it can be stated that PiS in the field of foreign policy, declares decisively actions aimed at all those who insult the good name of Poland and Poles through lies and stereotypical slander. PiS wants active and decisive action in the international arena and in the field of history and to promote such values as freedom, justice, solidarity, and truth. It also announces the rapid institutionalization of "polityka historyczna" in its international aspect. Andrzej Duda announced after coming in power that he would set up an office in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland that would act in defending Poland's good name on the international arena.

Further evidence of the importance of historical issues in foreign policy is the proclamation of 2016 as the "Year of Polish Historical Diplomacy." The aim was to testify to the great importance of historical themes in foreign policy. Under the auspices of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Council for Historical Diplomacy was established to develop recommendations and proposals for Polish diplomatic missions and disseminate knowledge about Polish history abroad (Lozovyi 2018: 3).

In summary, PiS gives priority to domestic policy goals. Foreign policy priorities are limited to strengthening security cooperation with NATO and the United States, ambitions to assume Poland's regional leadership role, pursuing EU policies solely in Poland's national interest, and promoting Polish identity abroad and a positive image for the country. At the same time, historical issues play an essential role in the foreign policy agenda and cause conflicts with some countries, especially Germany, Israel, and Ukraine.

5. UKRAINIAN-POLISH RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “POLITYKA HISTORYCZNA”

The last chapter of this paper will consider specific decisions in the field of “polityka historyczna” and the reaction of the Ukrainian side, and the possible impact on the development of bilateral Ukrainian-Polish relations. This chapter will also include a case study of the adopted Sejm resolution, which recognized the Volyn massacre as a ‘genocide’ and declared 11 July the National Day of Volyn Genocide Victims Remembrance. In addition, some results of public opinion polls related to the topic conducted by the CBOS will be analyzed.

The coming to power in Poland at the end of 2015 of the Law and Justice Party, for which “polityka historyczna” has become one of the priorities and The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory policy, caused a significant aggravation of the existing conflict of historical memory. This, in turn, has left its mark on the atmosphere in bilateral relations. Although Polish-Ukrainian discussions on complex history began in the 90s, after 2014-2015 began to become more complicated (Konończuk 2018: 5). The historical issue is the most severe obstacle to developing friendly bilateral relations. Historical disputes concerned an assessment of the events during the Second World War between Poles and Ukrainians in Volhynia and Galicia.

At the meeting on the discussion of the Strategii Polskiej Polityki Historycznej, Andrzej Grajewski noted the importance of finding a joint dialogue in the discussion of the politics of history with Ukrainian historians²⁸[1]. This is because Ukraine is a victim of Russian historical propaganda, which exacerbates the conflict in Ukraine; at the same time, in Poland, some ideas of this propaganda are also gaining importance. Despite the stated desire, the statement also noted the complexity of this dialogue with Ukraine:

“Jestem głęboko przekonany o tym, że jedną z najistotniejszych kwestii stojących przed polską polityką historyczną jest problem zbudowania sensownych relacji z historykami ukraińskimi. Ukraina jest w tej chwili krajem poddawany największej propagandowej obróbce w rosyjskiej wojnie historycznej. Rosji udało się już „nakleić” na niepodległościowy bunt Kijowa nalepkę faszyzmu i banderowszczyzny. I część tych haseł spotyka się z pozytywnym oddźwiękiem również w Polsce. Dlatego jeżeli nie uda nam się zbudować wspólnej narracji historycznej – co nie będzie proste, jeżeli chodzi o Ukrainę – to będziemy mieli ogromny problem, także polityczny.”²⁹

²⁸https://www.prezydent.pl/storage/file/core_files/2021/8/5/e283c89495b5691530c7545261aab539/zapis_spotkania_dot_strategii_polskiej_polityki_historycznej.pdf [Last access 02.07.2022].

²⁹ Engl: “I am deeply convinced that one of the most important issues facing the history of politics in Poland is the problem of building meaningful relations with Ukrainian historians. Ukraine is currently the

From the Polish point of view, covered by Wojciech Kononchuk, head of the Ukrainian department at the Center of Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw, was negatively assessed when the Verkhovna Rada decided to recognize the UPA as fighters for Ukraine's independence. This happened a few hours after the pro-Ukrainian speech in the Ukrainian parliament by Polish President Bronisław Komorowski, which Warsaw recognized as deliberate anti-Polish action. The thesis about Komorowski's speech, when they voted for those laws at the same time, was on the front pages of Polish newspapers as proof of demonstrated contempt for Poland³⁰³¹. In April 2017, the Ukrainian side suspended the issuance of permits for Polish search and exhumation works in Ukraine. This ban applied both to the victims of the Volyn crime and to the entire territory of Ukraine, including the victims of the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920. Kyiv's decision was a response to dismantling the UPA monument in the village of Hruszowice in April 2017³², which resulted from an administrative decision by the local commune. In 2014-2017, there were acts of vandalism in Poland against a dozen monuments and graves of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At the same time, several Polish cemeteries and memorials in Ukraine were damaged (Kononchuk 2018, p. 5).

Thus, it can be noted that it is necessary to exclude the thesis that only "polityka historyczna" has caused the deterioration of relations. With the emergence of identity- and memory-based politics in Warsaw and Kyiv, the shadow of the past has begun to undermine the relationships between the two neighbors. The resulting escalation in memory conflict between the two governments sharply contrast with the relatively positive social relations between the two countries. This positive image is illustrated by the massive recent influx of Ukrainian labor migrants have been well integrated in Poland and Poland's massive support of Ukraine in its struggle with Russia. Analyzing the politics of history in Poland and its impact on Polish-Ukrainian bilateral relations, it

country subjected to the greatest propaganda processing in the Russian historical war. Russia has already managed to 'stick' a sticker of fascism and Banderites on Ukraine. And some of these slogans have a positive response also in Poland. Therefore, if we fail to build a common historical narrative - which will not be easy when it comes to Ukraine - then we will have a huge problem, also a political one"

³⁰ <https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/ukraina-honory-dla-upa-podczas-wizyty-komorowskiego-w-kijowie/49fjsq> [Last access 02.07.2022].

³¹ <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/487556,ukraina-wizyta-prezydenta-komorowskiego-i-honory-dla-upa.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

³² https://lb.ua/news/2017/04/27/364995_polshe_razobrali_pamyatnik_voinam.html [Last access 02.07.2022].


would be mistaken to ignore changes in Ukraine in the politics of history altogether. Thus, in 2014-2019, the politics of history in Ukraine became an essential field for the political elite, within which active activities for strengthening the national narrative unfolded. The leading actor in this field was the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, headed by historian Volodymyr Vyatrovych. The main basis for intensifying the "struggles for the past" was the aggression of the Russian Federation and the conflict in Donbass (Kharchenko 2020: 9). From the point of view of historians and the ruling establishment, their activity was to consolidate Ukrainian society. Thus, although the purpose of the paper is not to analyze the Ukrainian politics of history, it can be argued that in this atmosphere where indeed, on both sides of the border, a nationalist perception dominated, the dynamics of radicalization crippled political dialogue (Cadier/Szulecki 2018: 1004). In addition, research data on the possibility of reconciliation between Ukrainians and Poles should also be considered.

In addition, research data on the possibility of reconciliation between Ukrainians and Poles should also be taken into account. In a 2009 survey commissioned by the Gdansk World War II Museum, Poles were asked if their family had contacts with other nations during World War II and what kind of contacts they had. Contacts with Ukrainians were remembered in the families of 14.7 percent of Poles, and in 63.8 percent of all cases, these memories were negative. The last number is astonishing since comparatively only 62.6 percent of all contacts with Germans and only 57 percent of all contacts with Russians were remembered negatively (for the results of this survey, see Leschnik 2018: 144), even though Poland was attacked and divided by the German Reich and the USSR. Besides, in 2007 while 52.2 percent of Poles considered the former Eastern Borderlands with Vilnius and Lviv to be still Polish lands - according to Pentor's research commissioned by "Wprost"³³ [4], 57.9 percent regret that Vilnius and Lviv no longer belong to Poland. Nevertheless, in the conclusions of the survey Dr. Antoni Dudek, a historian from the Institute of National Remembrance, mentioned:

³³ <https://www.wprost.pl/tylko-u-nas/102358/Polacy-nie-pogodzili-sie-z-utrata-Wilna-i-Lwowa.html> [Last access 02.07.2022]

“Tęsknota za Kresami Wschodnimi jest bowiem częścią naszej tożsamości narodowej i nie powinna być interpretowana, zwłaszcza przez naszych wschodnich sąsiadów, jako wyraz dążeń połowy Polaków do zmiany granic w Europie³⁴”.

Figure 1. The results of the CBOS surveys of 1997³⁵, 2013³⁶, 2018³⁷



Let us look at the population's views. We can see, in particular, that during the so-called "reconciliation" of Poles and Ukrainians in the late 1990s, which consisted in signing joint declarations, this process was not popular among many Poles. In 1999, almost 40 percent of Poles believed that Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation was impossible. Although this percentage dropped significantly in 2013 to 17 percent, it rose again to 20 percent in 2018, which can be explained by the rised historical conflicts between the two countries during this time (see Figure 1). Over the past 14 years, historical issues have become far less crucial to developing relations between the two countries. At the same time, however, after the electoral victory of PiS, there has been a slight increase

³⁴ Engl: "The longing for the Eastern Borderlands is part of our national identity and should not be interpreted, especially by our eastern neighbors, as an expression of the aspirations of half of Poles to change borders in Europe"

³⁵ CBOS (BS/100/99), Polacy o mozliwosci pojednania, p.3.

https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/1999/K_100_99.PDF [Last access 02.07.2022].

³⁶ CBOS (BS/101/2013), POJEDNANIE POLSKO-UKRAIŃSKIE, p.2.

https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_101_13.PDF [Last access 02.07.2022].

³⁷ CBOS KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ Nr 84/2018, Wołyń 1943 – pamięć przywracana, p. 3.

https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2018/K_084_18.PDF [Last access 02.07.2022].

in the number of those who see no possibility of reconciliation between the two countries.

Thus, for many Poles, historical issues hindered the reconciliation of Ukraine and Poland long before the PiS came to power in 2005, and even more so with the beginning of the development of the new "polityka historyczna" in 2015. However, it is impossible to exclude the fact that the "polityka historyczna" did not influence bilateral relations. In particular, in this paper, we will conduct a detailed case study of the resolution of the 22 July 2016 of the Polish Sejm declaring 11 July a National Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Genocide of the Citizens of the Polish Republic committed by Ukrainian Nationalists and formally called the massacres a genocide³⁸. We will have a look at what preceded the signing of this resolution itself in the wording that followed the reaction of the Ukrainian side, and how it affected the relations between Poland and Ukraine

In 2013, the Sejm debated the Volhynia massacres and the introduction of a national day of remembrance for the first time. The PiS, then in the opposition, called for the massacres to be described as "genocide" in the Sejm resolution. The Civic Platform and the Peasant Party, trying not to let this debate become a foreign policy burden for the dialogue with Ukraine, presented a draft that spoke of "ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide" (Bachmann 2018: 423). The chairman of the Polish Senate Bogdan Borusiewicz stressed at the time that "we are not talking about the responsibility of Ukrainians or the Ukrainian state, but about the responsibility of the OUN and the UPA." In 2016, even some conservative essayists expressed concern about the potential impact of the Sejm resolution, and pointed out that Poland should avoid a paternalistic attitude toward Ukraine, because it can have origins in Putin's "interest in Poland's entanglement with Ukraine". Furthermore, Poland did not have to allow "tragedies of the past to determine today's policy" (Portnov 2016).

The Polish authorities claimed that Volyn events were of great concern to society and interpreted the memory of the Volyn tragedy as a constant factor in the "Polish historical consciousness". Although in 2013, a sociological study by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion determined that 47% of Poles did not know who was to blame for the Volyn tragedy and its victims. But later, through the efforts of politicians and the

³⁸<https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20160000726/O/M20160726.pdf> [Last access 02.07.2022].

media, the problem was inflated in the eyes of voters to such an extent that it seemed "it was a Polish Holocaust" (Lozovyy 2018: 149).

After winning the 2015 elections, the PiS presented a new resolution calling the massacres in Volhynia "genocide". The party did not give up on this plan when Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko visited Poland. In early July 2016, he knelt in a gesture of apology in front of a monument in Warsaw Żoliborz district to the Volhynia massacres victims³⁹. Two weeks later, both houses of the Polish Parliament passed the Genocide Resolution (Bachmann 2018: 423). However, this was hardly unexpected, given that the previous PiS resolution was not voted on, appealing for its soft wording. The PiS senator and well-known Polish historian Jan Żaryn mentioned that "Ukrainians can not become a full-fledged nation without realizing that the Volyn tragedy was a genocide of the Polish people". This opinion was expressed by the historian, who became a senator from the PiS party, in an interview with the Polish newspaper *Prawo*⁴⁰.

Under Waszczykowski, foreign minister in the Szydło and Morawiecki cabinets, a lack of foreign policy experts meant that the foreign minister forwarded the pressure from party-affiliated veterans and victims' associations unfiltered to the Ukrainian government. This is what happened in June 2016, when Waszczykowski announced in an interview for a pro-government internet portal that "Ukraine will not join Bandera in the EU coming", as if Ukrainian authorities continued to erect Bandera monuments and name streets after the nationalist leader, Poland would veto any accession negotiations. He compared this to Greece's behavior towards Macedonia's EU membership (Bachmann 2018: 425)

After this interview, the Polish ambassador in Kyiv was summoned to the foreign ministry there.

It should also be understood that since 2013, with the assistance of PiS, Kress organizations have gained considerable importance. In addition, the right-wing populist Kukiz'15 movement, which is even more radical than the PiS in its views, has gained considerable weight in Polish politics. Thanks to their influence and pressure, they managed to include in the resolution provisions that correspond precisely to their view of the tragic events in Volyn. Kress organizations relied heavily on members of the

³⁹ https://lb.ua/news/2016/07/08/339788_poroshenko_vozlozhil_tsveti.html [Last access 02.07.2022].

⁴⁰ <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2015/10/28/7040008/> [Last access 02.07.2022].

opposition right-wing conservative Kukiz'15, who insisted even before the final vote that the wording was too lenient. Two points were essential to the Kress organizations: the word "genocide" should be in the text and the national commemoration day should be July 11. During the discussion, PiS offered alternative dates: September 17 (the beginning of Soviet aggression against Poland) or August 11 (the beginning of the ethnic cleansing of Poles at the USSR on the orders of People's Commissar Mykola Yezhov). However, the leaders of the Kres organizations insisted on July 11, stressing that the Ukrainian nationalists were responsible for the crimes and that the climax of the crimes in Volhynia had taken place that day. In the run-up to the vote, liberal forces wanted to make several amendments to weaken the text of the resolution. In particular, it was suggested that this day should not be called a genocide but rather a "Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Volyn Massacre." However, this amendment was rejected. At the same time, a few minutes before the vote, the "fratricidal war" amendment was actually changed and the word "fratricidal war" was deleted. It was to erase the sign of equality between victims and perpetrators and not equate the parties' responsibility for the crime (Banakhevyh 2016). Even in the Sejm itself, the adoption of this resolution was accompanied by a rather heated debate. Civic Platform in particular, advocated softer wording in order not to worsen relations with the neighboring Ukraine. Nevertheless, given the position of PiS and Kukiz'15, which had more than 270 seats in parliament in 2016, the decision was taken without any hint of softening the wording. The resolution of the Sejm, which was supported by an absolute majority of deputies, was perceived as a pro-Polish and patriotic document in Poland.

The adoption of this resolution took place although in the early 2000s the conflict over the Volyn tragedy was practically resolved. The presidents of the two countries honored the memory of the victims of the tragic events of the past during jointly organized ceremonies. They called on the people to "forgive and apologize." However, this indicates not only that the new politics of history of PiS differed significantly from the previous one but also dictated new priorities and accents. It also showed that the problem was not solved in the 90s, and gestures at the high political level did not find a response in the population.

The decision of the Sejm was received with misunderstanding in Ukraine. In addition, many pointed out that such a decision by the Seimas is unacceptable in the face of

Russian aggression against Ukraine, as it gives Russia grounds to discredit Ukrainians and further spread its historical myths based on the decision of the country's parliament, one of Ukraine's main allies. Polish journalist Bronisław Wildstein also noted that there is nothing better for the Moscow Empire than the enmity between Poland and Ukraine, the enmity to which the Kremlin successfully aspired (Wildstein 2016).

But there is a question if we can say that resolution was “antiukrainian” as this resolution did not address the judgments of “Ukrainians” as such, the resolution included such phrases as “Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wyraża szacunek i wdzięczność Ukraińcom, którzy narażając własne życie, ratowali Polaków” and “Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wyraża solidarność z Ukrainą walczącą z zewnętrzną agresją o zachowanie integralności terytorialnej” (Popowych 2016). It means that Polish deputies directly expressed solidarity with Ukraine, which is fighting against Russian aggression, and also thanked Ukrainians who saved their Polish neighbors during the events of 1943-44.

The statements of high-ranking officials did not take long, so most of them immediately assessed the adopted resolution on their social networks. President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko mentioned on the same day (Poroshenko 2016):

“Шкодую щодо рішення польського Сейму. Знаю, багато хто захоче використати його для політичних спекуляцій. Однак, маємо повернутися до заповіді Івана Павла II – пробачаємо і просимо пробачення. Лише спільними кроками можемо прийти до християнського примирення і єднання. Лише разом зможемо з’ясувати всі факти трагічних сторінок спільної історії. І вірю, що ми продовжимо рухатися саме цим шляхом.”⁴¹

Commenting on the adopted resolution of the Polish Sejm on recognizing the Volyn tragedy as genocide, Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland Andriy Deshchytsia (Deshchytsia 2016) noted that Polish deputies had chosen a political assessment of the tragic events of 1943-1945, and not professional international or at least Ukrainian-Polish expert research and relevant legal conclusions of what happened. The Chairman of the Institute of National Memory, Volodymyr Viatrovych (Viatrovych 2016), in turn,

⁴¹ Engl: “I regret the decision of the Polish Sejm. I know many will want to use it for political speculation. However, we must return to the commandment of John Paul II - we forgive and apologize. Only by joint steps can we come to Christian reconciliation and unity. Only together can we find out all the facts of the tragic pages of our common history. And I believe that we will continue to move this way”

called the decision of the Seimas a "historical misunderstanding" and that "it has nothing to do with honoring the memory of the dead, but is only an instrumentalization of the past conflict" to receive political dividends today. Vyatrovych believes that the decision of the Sejm, to a large extent, cancels the achievements of the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue so far.

The Ukrainian parliament expressed⁴² also concern over the resolution of the Polish Sejm, condemning the unilateral actions of Polish colleagues. It called for an end to the politicization of historical issues and a focus on constructive relations between Ukraine and Poland. It was also emphasized that the return to the painful issues of Ukrainian-Polish relations occurred during the war with Russia.

Possible warming in this matter may be the statement of the two parliaments in October 2016, "The Declaration of Memory and Solidarity", which included respect for all the victims of the violent clashes of the twentieth century and condemnation of the external aggressors of both countries, especially, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Portnov 2016). During a visit to Ukraine in July 2018, the President of Poland called the Volyn tragedy "genocide" and that the ethnic cleansing of Poles was historical truth. At the same time, Duda called for "building friendship between our peoples." (Kancelaria Prezydenta 2018). That is, in this way, it can be seen that the official Polish position did not deviate from the wording of the genocide, given the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian side. But at the same time, this historical issue does not prevent from building friendly relations between Poland and Ukraine today.

As for other events connecting with the ""polityka historyczna"" that also had an impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations, it is worth noting in particular the dismantling of the monument to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in southeastern Poland. It was the reason for the banning of Polish exhumations and commemorations in Volhynia and the work of the Polish IPN on Ukrainian territory until the monument is rebuilt. When Polish Culture Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Piotr Gliński visited Kyiv in October 2016, he was unable to resolve these issues, while the IPN's deputy director stressed that there would be ""no approval"" for attempts to build "triumphal arches" for the UPA in Poland (Cadier/Szulecki 2020: 1004). It should be noted that Polish

⁴² <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1507-19#n8> [Last access 02.07.2022].

Ambassador Jan Peklo noted in 2018⁴³ that the Ukrainian monument to UPA soldiers in the village of Hrushovychi near Przemyśl will be restored if burials are found there, and also suggested joint exhumation works in Hrushovychi, where local authorities dismantled an illegal monument to the UPA. And in September 2019, Ukraine's Ukraine's permit for search and exhumation work on its territory was renewed⁴⁴.

A shift away from the pro-Ukrainian course of previous governments and the strengthening of anti-Western, implicitly pro-Russian groups in PiS culminated in the second half of 2017 in the amendment of the IPN law, which became known and infamous in the international media as the "Polish Holocaust Law." (Bachmann 2018: 430). Although it was directed initially only against Germany; the new law also criminalized denial of crimes committed by "Ukrainian nationalists." Ukrainian scholars and journalists working on the issue in Ukraine could be prosecuted in Poland. This initiative also means that denial of Polish crimes against Ukrainians in the interwar or postwar period goes unpunished. However, conversely, denying Ukrainian crimes against Poles can be punished by up to three years in prison (Cadier/Szulecki 2020: 1006). The head of the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance, Volodymyr Vjatrovych, found the equating of "Ukrainian nationalism" with the great totalitarianism of the 20th century and its crimes "ahistorical", because they fought also against the totalitarian regimes (Bachmann 2018: 430).

Ukrainian diplomats and politicians had tried to get President Duda to veto it. However, during that time he and the government mainly were concerned with the reactions from Israel and the US. Paradoxically, the law, originally intended as an antidote to alleged German historical revisionism, did not lead to any diplomatic entanglements with Germany (Bachmann 2018: 431). In Ukraine, the adoption of the law met with considerable resistance. After the President signed the law, Ukraine's Ukraine's Ambassador to Poland said he feared for the safety of his compatriots in Poland amid growing hostility towards Ukraine (Deshchytsya 2018). The Ukrainian parliament protested against the IPN law in a resolution⁴⁵. Foreign Minister

⁴³ <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-presshall/2441481-an-peklo-pro-polskoukrainski-vidnosini-u-politichnij-ekonomicnij-i-gumanitarnij-sferah.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

⁴⁴ <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ukrajina-polshcha-exgumatsija/30187526.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

⁴⁵ <https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/154314.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

Pavlo Klimkin said the law is unfair to Ukrainians and was only intended to "create myths"⁴⁶. Finally, in 2019 it was declared unconstitutional and void by Poland's Constitutional Tribunal and blocked by the President.

If we analyze the assessment of Poles in Polish-Ukrainian relations between 2013 and 2018 (Table 2), it can be noted that decisions in "polityka historyczna" have caused a slight deterioration, because in 2018 13% of respondents said that relations are bad, while in 2014 it was only 7 percent. But at the same time, even in 2018, the share of those who evaluate positively or normally is much higher than in 2013. From this point of view, we can conclude that for most Poles the priority criterion is the pro-European vector of Ukrainian politics and the improvement of economic ties with Ukraine, rather than historical battles.

Table 2 CBOS research on Wołyn 1943⁴⁷

How do you evaluate the current Polish-Ukrainian relations?	2013	2014	2016	2018
<i>Good</i>	21	37	29	29
<i>Neither good nor bad</i>	39	43	48	44
<i>Bad</i>	16	7	8	13
<i>Hard to answer</i>	24	13	14	14

Summing up, while Poland's economic and security relations with Ukraine remain relatively smooth, the contention around historical matters has undermined the broader political climate between 2014-2018, that caused disorganization in Polish-Ukrainian relations. However, at the same time, it is hardly possible to talk about the deterioration of relations, because controversial issues either found a solution (as was the case with the TIN law or the ban on exhumation works), or radicalism was limited to the statements of only certain officials.

⁴⁶ <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/klimkin-polshcha-zakon-nespravedlyvyj/29632177.html> [Last access 02.07.2022].

⁴⁷ CBOS KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ Nr 84/2018, Wołyn 1943 – pamięć przywracana, p. 2. https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2018/K_084_18.PDF [Last access 02.07.2022].

6. CONCLUSIONS

At the end of the 20th century, due to the end of the Cold War and the departure from the unified socialist vision of the past, the new politics of history became necessary for forming new states in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, in particular, the politics of history can be drawn on achieving internal political goals because it contributes to consolidation, mobilization, and creation of collective memory. In addition, it can also be used to legitimize the regime or fight against political opponents.

However, even today, in contrast to Western European states, the politics of history affects domestic political development in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, it fulfills domestic political goals and influences the course of foreign policy. After all, if the politics of history goes beyond the state's borders, then we are faced with cross-border politics of history. Under such circumstances, the politics of history becomes a 'soft power', a successful weapon; it can also play the role of an instance of responsibility and condemnation, and it can lead to an unfriendly act towards a neighboring country. This approach can be considered within the framework of constructivism as a theory of international relations. A basic assumption of the constructivism of international relations is that the foreign policy actions of states can be based on flexible national identities that can change over time. In particular, the politics of history can influence the formation and change of national identities. Thus, following changes can also have a direct impact on the foreign policy of the state.

In Poland, the politics of history after the right-wing political forces came to power in 2005 moved in the direction of restoring and reformulating standard historical events of the 20th century and adjusting them to new geopolitical conditions and new challenges to Polish identity. Even though the politics of history did not play a significant role for the Civic Platform during 2007-2015, conservative forces in Poland continued to maintain their weight, emphasizing the need for the new politics of history considering the threat to the Polish image abroad. It led to the fact that after PiS came to power, 'polityka historyczna' in Poland in 2015-2019 turned into an essential field for the political elite, within which active activities were launched to strengthen a new historical narrative. The main idea of this narrative was based on Poland's contribution to history

and Western civilization, given its opposition to totalitarian regimes. As a result, Poland and the Poles appear as heroes and victims, not as criminals.

In this way, 'polityka historyczna' became a political tool in the hands of the ruling PiS party, which was used to solve internal political issues. However, considering its comprehensiveness and predominance of domestic political goals with foreign policy by the PiS, the Polish politics of history in 2015-2019 is characterized by the cross-border effect. As a result, it led to an impact on relations with neighbors, in particular Ukraine.

Since the declaration of Ukraine's independence, the relations between Warsaw and Kyiv have traditionally been important for Poland's international position, especially in the security dimension. For Poland, an independent and Western-oriented Ukraine was a necessary geopolitical buffer against Russia's power in the region and vital for Poland's security. It was one of the main reasons Warsaw is one of the strongest advocates of Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU. However, after coming to the power of PiS, Ukraine's place in Polish foreign policy was systematically weakened. Poland's Ukraine policy was shaped by the radical right's nostalgia for Polish domination of the CEE region in the interwar period.

Although Polish-Ukrainian discussions on complex history began in the 90s after 2014-2015 began to become more complicated. The historical issue was the most severe obstacle to developing friendly bilateral relations during this time. Historical disputes concerned an assessment of the events during the Second World War between Poles and Ukrainians in Volhynia and Galicia. It is also necessary to understand that in Ukraine, after the 'Revolution of dignity' and the Russian armed aggression, activities to strengthen the national narrative also took place. The leading actor in this field was the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, headed by historian Volodymyr Vyatrovych. That is, activation of 'memory wars' took place on both sides, and it was not a one-sided process from the Polish side. Thus, the paper focused on the consideration of two cases, 1. The resolution of the Polish Sejm declared 11 July a National Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Genocide of the Citizens of the Polish Republic committed by Ukrainian Nationalists and formally called the massacres a genocide; 2. The IPN law criminalized the denial of crimes committed by "Ukrainian nationalists."

If the IPN law, after a series of indignant statements from both the Ukrainian side and discontent inside Poland and abroad, in particular in Germany, Israel and the USA, in 2019 the president vetoed it. The resolution on genocide remained, despite the statements of Ukrainian high-ranking officials about the inadmissibility of such a decision in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, this may rather be a confirmation of the priority of internal political goals because discussions in the Diet on this issue have been ongoing since 2013, when PiS was in the opposition and accused the coalition of soft wording. It can hardly be considered that this led to the deterioration of relations with Ukraine, as evidenced by Duda's visits to Ukraine and statements of support, as well as a number of other compromise decisions made in the politics of history and in particular, polls of Poles regarding their assessment of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Despite of that, the European Council on Foreign Relations confidently ranked Poland among the EU's "leaders" in supporting Ukraine, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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