

Таким чином, можемо стверджувати, що фейки, фейкові новини, дезінформація стало глобальним явищем, яке негативно впливає на свідомість людей, свободу самовираження, права людей, право на інформацію, врешті, на приватність. Повинно бути усвідомлення керівництвом держави проблеми дезінформації і рішуче бажання з нею боротися. Основними напрямками державної протидії інформаційним впливам повинно стати: удосконалення законодавства; розслідування та дослідження фейків; навчання людей критично мислити; розпізнавати фейки, дезінформацію. Протистояти інформаційним впливам також повинна якісна громадянська освіта.

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Herold Jakub, Kazimierz Wielki University

The year 2019 as the challenge for domestic observers monitoring the election process in Ukraine and Belarus

In 2019, early parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine and Belarus. The elections were a peculiar test for independent civil society organizations monitoring electoral processes in these countries. In spite of territorial and cultural proximity and being

included in the Soviet Union for many years, the conditions of the functioning of these institutions in both countries differ significantly. This is a reflection of the situation prevailing in civil societies.

Ukraine and Belarus are members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which follows election standards mainly from the arrangements contained in the Copenhagen Document adopted in 1990. The act clearly indicates to a civil observer as one of the essential subjects of electoral law [1].

The provision about the institution of an election observer who monitors the election process on behalf of a social organization was first included in the Ukrainian electoral law - Law of the Election of People's Deputies - in 2006. Previously, in order to observe the election process, representatives of various organizations and informal groups, e.g. Студентська хвиля (Studentska Khvylya), Знаю (Znayu), Civil Network PORА, Committee of voters of Ukraine (CVU) were expected to have media accreditation granted by e.g. newspaper Точка Зору (Tochka Zoru) [2]. It is worth noting that historically the first domestic observation mission was the Filipino NAMFREL mission in 1984. At that time, the Congressional elections were monitored by 200,000 observers.

In Ukraine, between 2006 and 2019, the number of organizations accredited to the Central Election Commission to observe parliamentary elections increased tenfold from 16 to 163, although many of them ultimately did not delegate observers [3]. The number of observers also increased from 5 to 28 thousand, respectively, even though a downward trend has been visible in recent years. The record year was 2012, when the elections were monitored by over 40,000 civil society observers.

The list of the Central Election Commission of Belarus included 28 entities authorized to monitor parliamentary elections, which were represented by trade unions, political parties, organized groups of citizens and non-governmental organizations. Almost 31,000 people obtained election observer mandates as representatives of social society organizations. This is a significant quantitative increase compared to the previous ones, as in 2016 there were 26 thousand of them, and in 2012 - 22 thousand. They included Belarusian Republican Youth Union, Republican Public Belaya Rus, Belarusian Women's Union, which are assessed as pro-regime. According to experts, the only independent non-party organization was Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, represented by 151 observers. The organization unites activists from the Belarusian Helsinki Comitee and the Human Rights Center Viasna, who frequently face obstacles such as not being admitted to polling stations, preventing observation or pressure from central and local authorities [4]. It should be emphasized here that in 2019 almost 28,000 domestic observers were registered in Ukraine, which is more than four times populous.

Ukrainian independent civil organizations which can monitor the elections operate under completely different conditions than their Belarusian comrades. The most prestigious ones, such as OPORA or CVU, are respected by Ukrainians. They have foreign donors and partners from Western Europe and America, they work closely with the Central Election

Commission of Ukraine and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (*IFES*). They practically have the status of institutes, and their activities are an impulse for changes in the electoral law of Ukraine. Their work is best illustrated by reports of several dozen pages, which describe each element of the election process in great detail. In addition, they developed a methodology for election monitoring and provide observer training. Unfortunately, the vast majority of Ukrainian election monitoring organizations do not summarize their activities in the form of a report, do not train observers and often have political affiliation, which contradicts the idea of independent social observation.

How to recognize a fake - an organization whose observers monitor the elections:

- is formed very shortly before an election
- its members are affiliated to one political party
- does not prepare or publish reports on its activities
- has no methodology and does not train members
- does not recruit members in a transparent manner
- does not disclose the funding of the organization
- the postal address is shared by several organizations, and sometimes also by political parties.

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