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How is it possible to overcome relativism? Some models for answers in transcendental tradition.

In the article the author gives consideration of two models from the experience of overcoming relativism as a worldview by transcendental philosophy, the experience of which is especially distinctive in criticism of culture - relativism. The first model, "postantinomical systematicness" is built by I.Kant on the notion structural features of experience types (cognition, judgment ability, morality and norms). Intellectual discipline corresponding to the structure of each experience types served here as an antithesis to relativism. After the solution of antinomies, human intellectual discipline has become an even more methodical, co-ordinated and sensible general strategy of human existence in the world. The second model of "communicative guarantees" shows how K.- O. Apel's arguments for transcendental pragmatics are transformed into the criticism of deformed or reduced forms of rationality dictated under the modern conditions.

1 Appeal to transcendental

One can consider relativism as the direct result of deeply rooted in European culture and philosophy mistrust towards the idea of harmony between different types of human experience. Kant's transcendental project of bringing into agreement three types of experience: scientific cognition, judgment ability and ethical practice -
was given so wide and intensive critical reinterpretation that the very results of such criticism have become the object of philosophical metaanalysis being typified enough. For example, as long as metaphilosophical analysis remains within the limits of Husserl's substantiation of the possibility that "vital world" intersubjectivity can transform into a kind of new logic, to which in its turn a new basis of ethical experience corresponds ("responsibility for" instead of formal duty), as long we virtually subscribe to the opinion that however Kant's project was strongly idealized, it remains essentially true and therefore is to reformed. What often takes place?

The process of perfection of rational reconstructions of theoretical knowledge progress which goes by the slogan of reflection of real history of cognition is tightly connected with the ideology of contextualism. The epistemological scheme of contextualism is an imaginary space of theoretical knowledge which, changing, begins to be open towards the influence of ideals and values of cognition and culture. Their main importance is usually taken into account by the methodological explanation of the situation of theoretical choice and the preference of alternative hypothesis or it can be considered as heuristics in the science mode of thinking. In this situation, contextualism unnoticeably uses the idea of creative conformity of context elements and theoretical hypothesis. This non-direct conformity between the conceptual contents of theoretical knowledge and the contextual norms can be sometimes described as the historical type of rationality or historical "a priori", of which a well-known variant is the scheme of paradigm and their geshtalt-switching by T.Kuhn.

The ideology of contextualism was present in the concept of "inner" and "outer" history of I. Lakatos, it is not also far from the spirit of Feyerabend's criticism of the incompleteness of logical and semantic reconstructions of theoretical novation because of the exclusion of the great number of real historical causes of theoretical synthesis in favor of their idealized scheme.

The attempts to explain theoretical innovations at the expense of increasing the share of contextual mediators of non-local type (time spirit,
worldviews values and ideas of cognition, style of thinking), came to the point when the methodological image of a theory diminished to the models of "pure theories of nature" (to the contents of main ideas and principles), eliminating all other levels of theoretical knowledge. The construction of methodological theoretical image could always become the cause of revival of fundamentalism, which renovate an extremely deductive look at the theory. But it was not the only danger.

Another danger of contextual scheme of scientific cognition is cultural relativism. For example, in the explanation of theoretical innovation process according to the scheme of rational choice of the hypothesis or alternative theories by the subject, there is always an open question about the completeness of grounds of critical choice, that disintegrates to levels (methodological, cultural, social-psychological, institutional) and the number of these grounds can be increased up to the degree beyond which it is quite difficult to keep the principle of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific types of rationality.

That is why, for the methodology is so important, the problem of contextualization within the permissive borders where one can observe the rule of immanent and relevant influence of cultural environments on theoretical synthesis in the whole structural volume of theoretical knowledge. When the limits of contextualization are passed, i.e. when the truth of a statement turns out to be non-symmetrical to different cultures, then, as H. Putnam observed, the basis of reason, its transcendental status to its any immanent inclusions is lost [1].

Actually, the subject of scientific cognition always keeps the balance between transcendental and immanent position because the reason is immanent (it is always included in concrete language games and institutions) and transcendent (it keeps regulative character of ideas for the criticism of all kinds of activity and institutions).

But namely this ability of reason - to criticize from time to time all "immanent context" - is being considered as the main obstacle to strengthening the subtle forms of cultural relativism.
But is the criticism from the position of reason an effective way to control the attachment to the stereotypes and the standards of culture and institutions, including scientific ones? How is the critical distance as regards to non dominated and effective forms of scientific rationality possible without appeal to the anonymous and endlessly reflecting subject? And the science does not even know about this subject?! And even if the possibility of such radical criticism of reason is also an idealization, all the same there appears a problem of causes for confidence in the model of regulative meaning of transcendental philosophy. Does not the confidence exist because of the fact, that transcendental philosophy had long ago proposed quite a serious solution to the problem of cognition contextualization within acceptable limits?

2 Postantinomical as systematical

Kantian transcendental model of unification of three types of experience, cognition, judgment ability and morality, proposed to understand this possibility within the limits of reason.

One of reason's tasks is to keep each of the types within its own limits. Necessity of such keeping is explained by a naturally appeared striving to conceive natural phenomena and to judge the world to be beautiful, lofty and self-expedient or to imagine oneself in the other people's world as if man, due to certain concepts, could own the world as conditioned by something unconditional in itself.

Such natural intellectual and practical claim of man for thinking, judging and acting on basis of the absolutely unconditional, remaining at the same time a finite being-subject, is fixed by reason in antinomies to. correspondingly, each type of experience.

On the one hand, all historically significant argument for man's mental, practical and subjective reflective conception of phenomena from unconditional fundamentals are finally totaled in antinomies. On the other hand, such historical resume exposes itself as equally verifiable and mutually exclusive parts of antinomy - thesis and antithesis. Antinomies, thought as resume, push us to relativism and skepticism.
But both skepticism and relativism can penetrate into us even deeper. For example, when we realize the logical equality of arguments for the thesis that the world is simple by its nature or for the thesis that there is nothing simple in the world. Then this gives birth not only to distrust to the logic and consistency of reason [2.1]. This also give birth to the feeling of loss of criterion for selection of relevant arguments from the other types of experience either for the thesis or for antithesis of antinomy. As a result, in argumentation there accumulates the portion of extrapolations, analogies and figurative comparisons, due to which the meaning and extent of concepts they have in corresponding type of experience are deformed. For example, reinforcing the thesis of the world's simplicity at the expense of concept of judgment of nature on the basis of concept of the beautiful, we, according to Kant, are fully ignoring the structure of reflective ability of judgment. In the structure of the latter, judgment of the beautiful is only an initial stage of wakening the feeling of pleasure on the basis of contemplation of the outer forms of an object or the geometrical forms which combine the outer and inner forms. In the last case, "... das Wohlgefallen zuht nicht unmittelbar auf dem Anblicke der Gestalt, sonder der Brauchbarkeit derselben zu allerlei möglicher Absicht" [2.2].

Such concept of the beautiful lacks understanding of the subjective nature of aesthetic judgment, because an aesthetic judgment gets its meaning from the inner, uninterested play of imagination forms, which later, through the stage of developed taste, can be entrusted and transferred to other people, expecting from them the total recognition of relatively private judgment of a particular person.

Transfer of such basically incompleted concept of the beautiful as an argument for the thesis of the world's structure simplicity destroys the structure, within which the meanings of aesthetic judgment are formed. However, the transfer itself is the result of contextualization with help of undeveloped taste. Such variants of unproductive contextualization appear due to underestimation of the structure of different types of judgment, i.e. because of insufficient analyzation of their type and its subsequent adoption by man. It is possible to say that, for Kant, a right borrowing from another type of experience (acceptable contextualization) at preantinomical stage consist of understanding for oneself the structure of
capacity of a particular type. The structure of a particular type capacity is studied by the corresponding analyzation.

According to this approach, it is possible to think that the number of judgments of each experience type is determined by intellectual "discipline" of cognitive capacities that is the subject adheres to (discipline of cognition, satisfaction and nonsatisfaction, and ability to desire). This discipline is the demand for adhering, within the judgments of a particular type of experience, to the mind's structures combinations characteristic of it (the outer and inner feeling, intuition and reason, conception and imagination, determinative or critical reflection).

Strictly determined thesis "person relation to proposition" creates a hierarchy of corresponding judgment subtypes which are consecutively connected among each other through the relation between the basis and the conditioned. Such a view on judgments and foundations of their typology, as R. Rorty aptly observed, made Kant describe the synthesis of experience in judgments of a particular type at the expense of "causal metaphors": "constitution", making", 'shaping", "synthesizing" and the like [3]. So judgments of different experience type are put in accordance with synthesis of experience and particular intellectual discipline conditioned by specific structure of each type of experience. This way, for example, judgment of taste at the stage of the lofty, unlike judgment of the beautiful gives us a new level of imagination - communication with intellect, although without increase in degree of our mastering of the conception. In judgments of the lofty, imagination is stricter and it has its rhythm, which creates disposition of the soul, and which is awakened by the inner feeling of power and force of the phenomena, independently of what it represents for us - order or chaos [2,3].

Solution of antinomies becomes then a significant step towards preventing such phenomenon as unproductive "contextualization". To the question of how antinomies are sold, we are given the following variant of answer: consider the thesis of unconditional completeness of all experience conditions as the prototype of pure reason's fundamentals through which it regulates the completeness of reason experience more effectively (without antinomies) [2,4]. And the fundamentals of reason themselves can be defined
by the ideals and principles in which the maximally possible systematic and integrity of the world is mentally traced.

Gradual adoption of regulative meaning of the reason's ideals in the intellectual discipline of man is being gradually consolidated by a system of maxims.

The possibilities of the maxims' existence were already present in the very structure of each type of experience, but they were closed before solution of antinomies. For science, it is the maxim of maximal expansion of a regressive number of phenomena to infinity; in the sphere of taste judgments, it is a number of rules which are similar to the rules of everyday behavior - such as striving to have ones own judgment of all as well as considering the judgments of others, but remaining at the same time consistent. In the sphere of teleological judgments it is necessary to put in the foreground the rule of subordinate position of mechanical causality relatively to teleological one [2.5]. This way of the image is formed of effective multilevel intellectual strategy inside each of types of experience, which includes criticism of relativism and skepticism in each of them.

But post-antinomical experience of criticism of relativism is represented then not as understandable and effective method but as a certain general strategic perspective for all types of experience, whose outlines are clear enough, presupposing, however, a considerable amount of time for their realization. Solving antinomies with help of the idea of the most complete and maximally possible unity of diversity as the main ideal of the mind makes this idea not only an effective means for controlling reason. Intellect not only gives help to reason prompting the very scheme of "potential regress" for investigating the causal line of phenomena which will not be fraught with appearance of antinomies. It strengthens our opinion that the further progress in cognition of nature begins to depend on the concepts which speak of nature with no leaning on perceiving. The same can be observed after solution of antinomies in other types of experience as well. "Schwerlich wird in späteres Zeitalter jene Muster entbehrlich machen: weil es der Natur immer weniger nahe sein wird..." [2.6]. The joint move of the three types of experience to extrasensual bases of development of all experience as a whole after overcoming of antinomies is seen as the quite
sensible perspective. The stress on experience of reason over the world's sensual systematization as well as over nature without sensual definitions as a source of effective strategies of evading antinomies comply with Copernican style of predetermination of nature laws by reason. Regulative scheme of the intellect's help to evade antinomies helps reason (logic) to evade contradictions and preset physical laws in mathematical formulation. It is no coincidence that, after solution of antinomies, the whole scheme of structure of cognitive capacities can be seen then as description the further postantinomical development of science tightly connected with a particular scheme of their mathematization.

The future development of judgments of the beautiful as well as of judgments of taste and teleological judgments and capacity for pleasure and displeasure in general is seen as much serious after solution of antinomies. Connected together, all the three subtypes of judgments based on pretersensual "sensus communis" is seen in future as art of communication between differently educated people with desirable preservation of the balance between feelings which express itself in formation of such, for example, "strange" feelings as "exquisite simplicity" [2.7].

After solution of antinomies intellectual behavior of subject inside the structured experience not only can be more methodical and contextually independent, but this behavior is assigned a new supreme task to concentrate its efforts on harmonizing all types of experience and maintaining the harmony.

3 "Communicative guarantees" of transcendent pragmatics

From the very beginning it is necessary to say that the model of "communicative guarantees" should be understood as a certain generalization of the schemes of explanation of communicative guarantees for the existence of successive critical rationality in competent self-reflection which in transcendent pragmatics were proposed by K-O.Apel. In his opinion, the supposed rationality should guarantee not only resistance to evidently inconsistent forms of rationality (ideology, pseudoreligious and dogmatic views), but also critical estimation of limits of different types of explanation: causal nomological one, hermeneutic one
and the explanations of social and historic sciences on the basis of critical reconstructions [4.1].

Genealogy of such model formulation can be described as a series of successive critical methodological specification of understanding the problem of intersubjectivity in epistemological tradition.

From the very beginning, the model of so called "communicative guarantees" is formed at the expense of search for the possibility to get a satisfactory formulation of leaning of theoretical knowledge on "evidences". Such a formulation should immediately rule out any variants of presence of evidence in theoretical knowledge through the evidences of individual self-reflection, categorical intuitions and perceptive evidence.

If we remember that the system of knowledge dictums for transcendental philosophy is, first of all, "relations person to propositions", then it is natural that the area of localization of "evidences" should lie in the sphere of relations of subject to propositions. Therefore, C. S. Peirce's idea that pragmatics studies the phenomenon of symbol interpretation by a community of interpreters [5.1] is very important for transcendental pragmatics. Substitution of "community of interpreters" for "subject" in relation of subject to propositions allows to move gradually the meaning of evidence conception to the consensus worked out by the community of researchers [5.2].

Consensus is a quite stable form of manifestation of intersubjectivity by evidence which is worked out in communication. This, however, does not mean a decrease in its critical potential. If we think this decrease possible, then it is possible to return to diminishing the role of pragmatic contexts in cognition according to the known tradition of separating the contexts of discovery and basing, where criticism is justified only as a means of formulation of final decisions. Such understanding is not acceptable for transcendental pragmatics.

The shift from understanding of nonsituational nature of correlation between criticism and evidence on the basis of ideal of infinite community of researchers is an important step in transcendental pragmatics.
Singling out the discussion and its subsequent generalization to the model of social interaction and institutions which are capable to support or, vice versa, to stop discussions become the maximum level of generalization of concept of discussion in a community of interpreters, but beyond the borders of propositional language of scientific systems of knowledge. Such discussions already exist in quasi-languages [5.3].

If transcendental pragmatic follows the tradition of transcendental philosophy, then explanation of the meaning of language games existence beyond the border of scientific systems of knowledge will use relation between the basis and the conditioned. The relation between the basis and the conditioned will then describe either the act of knowledge synthesis, or raising for the conditioned the possibilities without which it cannot consolidate itself in existence and constitute itself. That is the way it happens. For example, the concept of causality gradually becomes the evidence of intellect and it is considered as an integral property of objects of which questions can be asked and answers can be received. But this can be done only after certain processes snap into action, the processes which are superimposed on each other (the man's corporeal and purposeful intrusion into nature, interfering in the very question of phenomena existence, the freedom in manipulation of objects, the control over artificially evoked existence of objects, mastering if-then technology) [4.2]. In all these historical events the same cognitive interest varies - the interest in predicting and controlling behavior of objects [4.3]. Correspondingly, in other interests - that of communicative understanding, emancipatory interest - there act other specific events which, however, act according to the same scheme of consolidating, for sciences, their specific object relatively to which the pragmatics of even more special level is possible.

Knowledge of genetic code of events which created the corresponding type of cognitive interest turns out to be very important. With the help of this knowledge, absolutization by any type of explanation of its meaning such as, for example, causal - nomological one takes place because of distorting its own bases through putting the events which have led to its consolidation beyond the brackets of its own cognitive interest.
But will the proposed variant of guarantees of providing man with critical self-reflection and critical competence be proportionate and formally acceptable to man, as was always required by transcendental tradition?

References


[2.1] KRU – S. 300
[2.2] KU – S. 241-242
[2.3] Ibid. – S. 244-246
[2.4] KRU – S. 348-352
[2.5] Ibid. – S. 388-389
[2.6] Ibid. – S. 356
[2.7] KU – S. 293-296


[5.2] Ibid. – P. 258.
[5.3] Ibid. – P. 259.


[4.3] Ibid. – P. 216-220.