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**DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY  
OF DEVELOPMENT: CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE  
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIOLOGY  
OF DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION**

*Post-Leninist societies in general and Ukraine in particular are facing a challenge of reformulating their respective ideologies of development in terms of liberal democracy and capitalism. The article provides a sociological analysis of the dynamic of the ideology of development in Ukraine as it is viewed by major social /political forces and its impact on a vision of Ukrainian developmental project. The mode of interaction among ideal-typically defined approaches to the ideology of development is conceptualized as a conflicting and mutually exclusive one. This has resulted in the formation of partisan and partial ideologies of development incapable of incorporating relevant insights suggested by other approaches. The novelty of the article is in its analysis of the ideology of development in terms of the equity, efficiency and participation. It is argued that the project of development under current circumstances cannot be reduced to economic growth and should be accompanied by institution building in the realm of political and civil societies as well as social welfare. The emergence successful implementation of the ideology of development in the post-Leninist Ukraine depends on its major political actors' ability to promote - instead of circumscribing - the creative potential of democracy.*

Postmodernist thinking alleges that it has driven a final nail in the coffin of the concept of ideology viewed as essentially modern society project. By the same token, the concept of modernity is rendered obsolete theoretically and useless practically. The extinction of Leninism both as a way of life and ideology seemed to confirm these conclusions. Yet, despite repeatedly being buried, modernity, development, and ideology as social phenomena are alive and kicking. These issues go beyond mere academic debates since Ukraine's future is currently in making and the question whether Ukraine will become Eastern European counterpart of South Korea, for example, which has managed to deliver on its promises and attained the status of Asia's economic giant (for an insightful discussion see [1]), or it will follow the path of Brazil, the country blessed with natural resources, but suffering from staggering underdevelopment (for classical statement and its renewal see [2]). Postmodernist concern with posteconomic, nonmaterial values as a new orientation of social action as well as endless debates on discourse and identity

are far removed from most societies - including post-Leninist Ukraine - mundane problems.

The postmodernist thinking in sociological theory best represented, perhaps, by Zygmunt Bauman, has found its match in postdevelopment paradigm (I have analyzed this approach in [3]). The latter «proposes to speak of development as a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action, by analyzing the characteristics and interrelations of the three axes that define it: the forms of knowledge that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is elaborated in to objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those through which people come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped. The ensemble of forms found along these axes constitutes development as a discursive formation, giving rise to an efficient apparatus that systematically relates forms of knowledge and techniques of power» [4]. Scholars associated with the postdevelopment school view the development

exclusively in negative terms as the West encroachment on tranquil and harmonic eco-social order of premodern communities. I consider a postdevelopment approach as rather a failed attempt to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the underdevelopment of the third world is an outcome of the project of modernity. In my view, the vast majority of the countries in a contemporary world are badly in need of access to modernity and are unlikely to be suffering from its abundance.

I myself side with Clifford Geertz, whose interpretation of ideology rejects the reduction of this phenomenon to a mere cunning and the Machiavellian straggle for power. Ideologies can also play a critically important role in «identifying (or obscuring) social categories, stabilizing (or upsetting) social expectations, maintaining (or undermining) social norms, strengthening (or weakening) social consensus, relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions. Reducing ideology to a weapon of in *guerre de plume* gives to its analysis a warming air of militancy, but it also means reducing the intellectual compass with which such analysis may be conducted to the constricted realism of tactics and strategy» [5]. Therefore, the development of ideology promoting what Alexander Gerschenkron termed as «new deal in emotions», and thus promulgating the commitment to new values and mode of social action is a critical requisite of the development itself.

The argument presented in this article runs counter popular underestimation of the role of culture and ideology in the formation of a given country politics and policy. I also reject an equally dangerous temptation to replace purely instrumental theorizing with an idealistic one - Jeffrey Alexander's failure at the synthesis is an outcome of the predominance of the latter tendency in his theory-building. Therefore, ideology cannot be reduced to a mere cultural phenomenon either, and Weberian concern with domination, conflict, inequality and state should not drop out of our conceptual picture.

The development of the ideology of development in Ukraine has been arrested so far. The article *seeks* to analyze the link between major social / political forces in Ukraine and their discourses of the development. / *define the development as a given society's drive to upgrade its technological infrastructure, economic, political, and state institutions as well as to combine equity, efficiency, and participation. I distinguish development and modernization. While the former is instigated by the «developmental state» [6] and is usually a response*

*to external challenges and, thus is a transformation as imitation and emulation - adjusting to and reshaping the local cultural patterns - the latter is a process of coming into being of the modern society launched by endogenous activist world view. Thus, development can and should be promoted, the modernization is rather self-regulatory, autonomous process. The development takes place on the level of the change of structures (economical and political, thus leading to the transformation of the social structure), while modernization is rather a (by)product - often unintended - of the features intrinsically inherent to the cultural patterns (e. g., Weber's ascetic Protestantism). Therefore, developed does not always mean modern (e. g., Nazi Germany, Soviet Union under Stalin), while modernity has closer elective affinity with the development. The «original» Weberian modernity «developed in Europe and combined several closely connected dimensions. In structural terms, these included differentiation, urbanization, industrialization, and communication...; in institutional terms, they included the nation-state and the rational capitalist economy; in cultural terms, they allowed for the construction of new collective identities bound up with the nation-state but embedded in a cultural program that entailed different modes of structuring the major arenas of social life» [7]. In more general terms of Parsonian sociological tradition - enriched by the synthesis with Marxist-oriented historical sociology - non-Western modernity can be conceived of as «a type of social organization which, from a social-integration point of view, is characterized by an unprecedented level of social mobilization / incorporation into the centre; and, from the point of view of system integration, by an equally unprecedented level of institutional differentiation» [8]. The processes of the development and modernization are tensely intertwined and may be reinforcing each other.*

Politics is a vision thing, US President George Bush once remarked. But visions can not be built on the intuition alone: they require more solid scientifically valid basis (e.g., thoroughly examined concepts), especially in the controversial realm of societal development. Picking up ideas which were or are in vogue in the West, Ukrainian politicians tend to devoid them of their meaning, rendering them useless as analytical tools and policy goals. Another side of the same coin is that being unfamiliar with well established concepts, Ukrainian policy-makers have to reinvent the wheel time and again. For example, we can trace in major policy

speeches delivered by the President of Ukraine the intuitively grasped understanding of the importance of the state in fostering the development in the post-Soviet context and the irrelevance of the neo-classical minimalist doctrine of the state. At the same time, the elaborated conceptual vocabulary of the developmental state is not being employed, although its usage could assist in formulating feasible goals of public policy whose implementation could bring tangible benefits to the public at large.

The *novelty* of my approach lies in an assertion of the importance of the developmental nation-state building, while appreciating the role of world-systemic forces. My position, therefore, goes beyond limits of developmental state paradigm and world(-) system(s) theories, providing for a synthetic combination of relevant assumptions and findings of both schools of thought. Andre Gunder Frank has made a penetrating and thought-provoking observation that «real world system development has never been guided by or responsive to any global and also not to much local "development" thinking or policy. In this world-economy, sectors, regions, and peoples temporary and cyclically assume leading and hegemonic central (core) positions of social and technological "development". Then they have to cede their pride to new ones who replace them. ...At the sub-system level of countries, regions or sectors, all "development" has occurred through and thanks to their (temporarily) more privileged position in the "international division of labor and power"» [9]. I offer a qualified support for this statement while complementing it by the two theses: a) national autonomous development does occur under favorable international conditions and conducive domestic situation (combination of good values and good policies, as US President Bill Clinton once put it). Both Japanese miracle and the rise of Asian Tigers can only be partially explained by actions of the USA bent on containment policy and thus interested in the reconstruction of countries in question as their powerful allies in a clash with Leninism; and b) it can and ought to be promoted by the state with a democratic agenda. This statement goes against much of the sociological theorizing on the development, which tends to assert that a repressive character of the rule is almost an indispensable trait of the developmental state. I also emphasize the critical role of culture in societal development and modernization. For example, in 1970s the average annual workload in Germany was 1860 hours, while South Koreans worked 2800 hours. The latter worked longer hours

even in comparison with their counterparts from developing countries. There are two possible explanations of this dramatic difference between developed and developing nations. One hypothesis emphasizes superexploitation of the workers in the periphery. An alternative insight - which I personally share — points out to the culturally determined predisposition to intensive work. It should be borne in mind that the latter explanation does not rule out the reality of exploitation.

All this said, underlines the importance of a link between the development and its ideological underpinnings. We have also witnessed a world-wide resurgence of ideologies, especially of a radical, militant bent (e.g., the religious fundamentalism, interpreted as a political principle being a most often cited example). Thus, Ukraine needs a secular ideology of development capable of realistically identifying nation's place in the world and outlining the desirable effects of the post-Leninist societal transformation. I deliberately avoid using the language of «goals» for the latter is intimately connected with excessively rationalist world-view inherited from the Enlightenment and Marxism. Contemporary version of such style of thinking is a transitology with its naive belief in feasibility of goals of societal development once they have been properly identified. Therefore, instead of being concerned with transforming an old social order and creating new one, transitology was confidently preaching about a smooth passage from one stage of societal development to another, a higher one. Being inspired by Fukuyama's optimistic liberalism which was bordering on militancy, transitology also sub-consciously invoked old-fashion explanatory schemes of classical modernization theory with its vision of an irreversible, progressive, linear, evolutionary road to the institutions of liberal-democratic capitalism (for the explication of theoretical and ideological assumptions of classical modernization paradigm see my article [10]). An escape from Leninism and coping with post-Leninism proved a far more difficult task for Ukraine than originally expected. It was also discovered that peculiar modes of extrication from Leninism, chosen by different countries, depended dramatically on how long they had experienced Leninist rule and to what degree their regimes had been committed to a revolutionary breakthrough and system building. Thus, it is not surprising that the transition of Ukrainian society to a realm of market, democracy and civil society by leaps and bounds has not occurred. Ukrainian way has been a zigzagged path - neither East European nations' revolution nor China's grad-

ual reform - reminiscent of Vladimir Lenin's phrase: «one step forward, two steps backward». It is crucial to charter a developmental course for the nation and provide a motivation for perusing it. Thus, the ideology of development, providing a vision of the future and both instigating and motivating «new deal in emotions», is needed. At the same time the existence of the ideology of development alone cannot guarantee the country's success on the road of the development - it is only one of its requisites - and should be complemented by the developmental project. The developmental project is understood here as a set of policies designed to implement a vision provided by the ideology of development. The combination of these two factors is instrumental in identifying desirable direction of social change and realistic policies required to follow the chosen path (hopefully more feasible than «shining path» to «feasible socialism» used to be).

Let us look closely at the genealogy of ideas of development in the discourse of major Ukrainian social/political forces. It should be noted that none of them has exhibited a commitment, let alone ability to elaborate ideology of development with a mobilizing potential and buttress it with collective action and/or policies. This weakness of collective political actors is structurally embedded in Ukrainian society. Therefore, I am in favor of going beyond the analysis of the state actions/policies and their impact on the development; this type of the discourse - paradigm embodiment of which is a state-centered approach - naturally tends to be elitist and has to be complemented with bringing society back in a sociological analysis of the development.

It is useful to construct the ideal types of the three most influential political actors in Ukraine: this will allow us to elaborate ideal types of their respective visions of the development within their broader world views. These are ideal types of the left (represented here for the sake of simplicity and analytical clarity, by the Communist Party of Ukraine); the right (the center of influence in that community of discourse has shifted from the Rukli, founded by late Viacheslav Chornovil, to Victor Yushchenko's umbrella organization Our Ukraine), also often conceived of as national democrats; and so-called center (represented by different political forces lacking a distinct ideological identity and united by their links to ruling political establishment, on the one hand, and political capitalists, on the other). It should be borne in mind that in reality the boundaries among these political actors are fuzzy, and their choices are of-

ten determined by short-term considerations of micro-rationality and tactical gain; yet, it does not render this typology useless since, according to Weber's formula, it is necessary to take into account the interplay of interests and ideas to reconstruct motives of the social actors.

The political actors identified above tend to have an elective affinity with the following social groups (what follows is also an ideal-typical discussion): Given that property relations in Ukraine remain fuzzy, and rule of law is still a distant ideal, entrepreneurial activity is heavily dependent on business of private favors rendered by state managers. This makes political and economic forms of capital (to employ Pierre Bourdieu's terms) - appropriated mostly by state managers and the nascent class of political capitalists respectively - easily interchangeable. These two *social* subcategories form the major fractions of the ruling establishment with the state managers performing the function of the intermediary between local and global capital. Given the precariousness of the position of this group in a society - population at large is distrustful towards the state and its managers and suspicious of entrepreneurs - the vague mixture of moderate centrist sounding ideas was chosen as its ideological wrap. Such ideological arbitrariness - somewhat akin to the «end of ideology» principle - turns out to be an asset in a volatile conditions of the societal transformation, allowing its bearers to borrow opportunistically the elements of ideological visions of the development championed by their opponents on the left and on the right.

The social basis of the Ukrainian right is an imaginary middle class which tends to share the values of its Western counterpart, but lacks economic resources and social status of the latter. The Ukrainian left is supported by those who have been excluded by from the benefits of marketization of the society and thus are likely to occupy a position on the fringes of the society. None of the political actors identified above has shown the ability to elaborate the ideology of development with a nation-wide appeal and mobilization potential. The most influential political players have tended to waste their resources on turf wars with their opponents and have failed to identify society's urgent agenda, while the society has been undergoing fragmentation and opted for the withdrawal from public life.

For example, the resurrection of the communist party (after a two-year ban, a «new» communist party was registered in 1993) did not happen along

reformist, «social democratic» lines, it reproduced even more rigid ideological outlook than before, instead. By advocating the restoration of the Soviet Union and thus challenging the legitimacy of the Ukrainian statehood, communists ruled out the chance of less antagonistic mode of interaction with the other two major camps: diverse forces falling under broadly defined rubric of national democrats who were championing the cause of Ukraine's independence (the right), and former Leninist regime's officials (both affiliated with the party and the state) who aligned themselves with pro-independence forces and managed to capture the state power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of Leninism as its *raison d'être* (the center). While national democrats - whose paradigm embodiment was Rukh under Viacheslav Chronovil - were primarily motivated by ideas and ideal interests, to revoke Max Weber's scheme again, the post-Leninist political establishment saw an independence as a chance to ensure its own autonomy as state-builders while forging beneficial ties with nascent capitalist class (also made up predominantly of former regime's proxies) and, therefore, were predominantly guided by material interests.

At the same time, political actors in general and elected state managers in particular have been under the combinations of pressures - mild domestic ones, coupled with more vigorous persuasion on the part of Western powers - to act within the framework of (formally) democratic political society. That meant periodically held elections, a participation in which, in turn, required an ideological wrap. We may identify *two political* sub-categories within a ruling block - to use Antonio Gramsci's term - whose emergence was determined by the necessity to compete both for the office of the head of state (who, in Ukraine, is effectively a chief executive) and unicameral legislature. Comparative-historical evidence of the modernization processes in so-called «new states», which emerged after the collapse of European powers' colonial empires, suggests that the best platform for capturing the presidential office is a mildly nationalist ideology - compatible with centrism discussed above - within framework of which the president is portrayed as a bipartisan umpire of a nation, based on an organic solidarity. Being above the political fray meant that the holder of the office of the president could not identify him/herself with more specific ideologies and their supporters: only the whole nation was perceived as an appropriate reference point and a

source of legitimacy for the institute of the president. This explains why successful campaigning for the office of the president in Ukraine did not require a party affiliation (unlike established practices in countries with presidential regimes, like France and USA). It remains to be seen if current arrangement can be replaced by new rules requiring more articulate political formula.

A different configuration has formed at the level of the competition for the legislature. Although electoral competition under first-past-the-post system, which was initially in use in Ukraine, did not appear conducive to the development of parties with distinct *Weltanschauung*, identity, and political ideologies, its transformation into a mixed arraignment combining the elements of proportional and majoritarian ones did provide a boost for a party-building and thus ideological self-identification. At the same time, Ukrainian parties, established by those affiliated with a ruling power block have tended to reproduce organizational structure similar to that of their predecessor - Leninist party (it should be noted it is rather a structural similarity, not substantive one). The political actors' ideological identities - in a new situation of a society commercialization - have often been dealt with in a manner resembling a treatment of trade marks/brand names by their owners. Although acting in a competitive environment, these political organizations have tended to employ party-building strategies modeled on a Soviet example, thus emphasizing core membership and devoting significant resources to the creation of umbrella associations with no clear action plan and rationale behind their existence. Data from other countries struggling for democratization suggests that a successful party as well as ideology development are more likely to happen if the format of social movements is being sought. The latter does not require an elaborate managerial structure and stable membership, since they focus on issues going beyond sectional divisions of the society.

These developments resulted in a striking discrepancy between parties' declared ideological goals and actual policy as well as their social composition. While being an effective tool for providing votes via clientelistic arraignments in first-past-the-post constituency, the treatment of ideology as a mere technicality backfired during last the parliamentary elections in May 2002 under proportional system in particular. Political forces with more distinctive ideological features seized their chance to capitalize on their competitive edge.

Under the regime of established elites - they are defined by Ralf Dahrendorf as political forces, viewing their opponents as legitimate players with a stake in a system - social (political) ideological camps outlined above could perform constructive functions and eventually contribute to the elaboration of the ideology of development appealing to the articulated public and acceptable to the majority. Communists could focus on the criticism of deteriorating socio-economic living conditions, spreading the language of equity, solidarity of the labor and welfare; national democrats could undertake an endeavor of laying foundations of the project of political-cultural identity, thus contributing to the emergence of public sphere and, eventually, civil society; and ruling power brokers could concentrate on democratic re-building of the state and transformation of the economy along competitive lines. This potentiality failed to materialize. Each side of this triangle was blinded by its ideological tenets coupled with material interests. This, in turn, resulted in mutually exclusive ideological rivalries (it did not preclude the possibility of situational alliances, though, but they were not instrumental for overcoming fundamental ideological differences). Thus, even correct diagnoses and proposals from opposite camp were falling on death ears. For instance, communists adequately described the ills of the Ukrainian society. Their diagnosis of its causes was less convincing and credible, for it was heavily borrowing from the rigid vocabulary of «scientific communism» of the Soviet era. Communists also denied the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state altogether - which they wrongly treated as a bourgeois one, overlooking a critical difference between bourgeois circles as they developed in the West and domestic political capitalists. But their strong stance in favor of the restoration of the Soviet Union and overzealous preaching about the benefits of the union with Russia could be viewed as a promotion of the foreign influence in Ukraine.

Ideologues of national democrats failed to come up with an elaborate version of their vision. What they had to offer was rather a strange mix of rhetoric looking backwards into a common painful past and promising national revival in future. Their vision of nation's institutional development did not go beyond borrowing free market jargon of neo-liberal orthodoxy.

All three camps had certain elements of the true picture - understood here as an ideology of development based on the utilization of the experience of countries in similar conditions and adjusted to

Ukrainian society needs - but failed to combine it into a synthetic vision and a common blueprint for action. The communists calls for social justice and condemnation of the realities of primitive accumulation as well as reproduction of Ukraine's dependence on external center of power was met with skepticism not because of their conclusions, but due to the unacceptability of assumptions and prescriptions (e.g., the restoration of the USSR, Soviet structure of power, and planned economy). The ruling power block has monopolized the job of state-rebuilding, but in doing so, it but failed to act in a manner responsive to broader societal interests. National democrats opted for promotion of a contradictory scheme: support for radical reforms inspired by simplistic interpretation of liberal tradition and unflinching impersonal forces of international capital and preservation of national culture. The latter task is being quite unrealistic under the conditions of «globalization». Being mutually exclusive and particularistic in their character, all three approaches to country's societal development failed to win minds and hearts of the majority of population.

The ruling power block could hardly encourage cooperation among political actors transcending ideological boundaries for its politics has been bearing striking resemblance to Charles Tilly's notion of «state-building and war-making as an organized crime», to employ the title of his brilliant essay. Yet, purely utilitarian interpretation of these events seem to be neither adequate nor sufficient. Michael Burawoy has called for the antecedent conditions to be included into conceptualization of the post-Leninist transformation. Given the success of the Soviet Leninist regime in destroying autonomous institutions of the society and alienating population from public life, it would be unrealistic to hope for the Ukrainian counterparts of Vaclav Havel to emerge from the civic scratch left after the downfall of the regime. The only avenue leading to the political advancement under the Soviet Leninist regime was undergoing political socialization within the party itself or party sponsored / controlled institutions (e.g., *komsomol*, trade unions, state apparatus). The decadent late party cadre morale caused by antagonistic clash of charismatic, rational, and traditional elements within the regime itself could hardly be an environment conducive to forging politicians capable exercising an ethics of responsibility based on convictions. This Leninist legacy is an important factor shaping current state managers outlook and hampering the

elaboration of responsible ideology of development that would become a basis for policy-making.

The resumption of an economic growth in Ukraine seemed to change the situation significantly. The growth provided a rationale for the power block who could legitimize its grip on power not only by references to law and order (whose stability have been questionable to many), but also citing the nation's impressive economic performance. At the same time, it is doubtful that the growth has been beneficial to many. Again, comparative-historical evidence shows convincingly that the growth alone cannot solve social problems unless it takes place in a framework of competitive political society based on *participation and deliberation* and welfare state. Brazil can serve as a useful point of comparison in this respect. This country's growth rates in 1968-1974 averaged at 10 percent, and that led many scholars to believe that they were witnessing an economic miracle based on Brazilian model. Yet, the growth launched under export promotion policies was heavily dependent on external demand. Once the world crisis hit the core of the capitalist world-system in 1974, the Brazilian miracle was brought to an abrupt end. It is also worth mentioning that a spectacular economic growth in Brazil was happening against the backdrop of severe political repressions and deteriorating living conditions of popular classes. (For more details see penetrating analysis provided by A. G. Frank [11].) Revoking - probably sub-consciously - the experience of Asian Tigers whose authoritarian rule and repression against political opponents and labor were forgiven in a light of their economic performance - and trying to make growth rates the source of its legitimacy, Ukrainian ruling establishment has failed to note a critical difference in international and domestic situation between Ukraine and Asian Tigers. The open breach of human rights and democracy by the latter could be tolerated in a world divided in two political camps - liberal and Leninist ones - which were competing for the loyalty of developing nations and thus put a premium on their allies domestic stability achieved at any cost. Ukraine, being a geographical center of Europe, cannot afford the luxury of ignoring signals coming from major centers of the Western powers (tough attitude of the West towards domestic political scandals that were rocking Ukraine recently is a case in point). Thus, Ukrainian leaders have been motivated to keep up democratic appearances. But soon it may not be enough for both domestic and external reasons, and

politics in Ukraine will have to switch its operational mode from conflicting and alienating to conciliatory/inclusive one. Some of the authoritarian politically but successful economically East Asian countries have already made an effort to inculcate democratic institutions and procedures. Developmental authoritarianism fad, which sought its legitimacy from the rate of capital accumulation, seems to be over, particularly in the part of the world where Ukraine is located.

It is important to realize that Ukrainian post-Leninist political capitalists' pattern of action differs dramatically from that of industrial capitalists of the West during «great transformation». If the latter were primarily concerned with the *production* and thus *creation* of the wealth via the *exploitation* of the working classes, the former are chiefly operating in a sphere of the *exchange*, where the most effective mechanism of accumulation is a *redistribution* of already existing wealth via a *loot*. The favorite strategies of the post-Leninist accumulation have been as follows: tax evasion, with state managers selectively turning blind eye to it; capital drain; money laundering; export of raw materials and semi-finished goods produced by public enterprises - who thus bear the costs of production - at artificially depreciated prices with subsequent siphoning profits overseas; receiving unjustified subsidies from the government (this is by no means an exhaustive list). Giovanni Arrighi [12] has advanced a powerful argument, challenging the presumptions of the Weberian tradition which underlines the uniqueness of Western capitalism, reasoning that both Western (British) and Eastern (Chinese) capitalists in 19<sup>th</sup> century were structurally similar with family-oriented enterprises as a dominant mode of economic activity. Although contesting Arrighi's argument goes beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that Weber's thesis deals with the *initial* stages of capitalist development which was a byproduct of a religiously inspired new way of life, while Arrighi is discussing well established and highly institutionalized capitalism.

The development is a complex concept implying a multidimensional societal change, affecting - ideally in a positive manner - not only the political-economic establishment, but the society at large and occurring in a democratic political society, thus avoiding rigidity of authoritarian developmental state and enabling developmental state compatible with participatory environment. Given that three main strands of political thinking/actions in Ukraine

have been developing along independent trajectories, every force has tended to emphasize only separate elements of the ideology of development. Members of Ukrainian ruling power block, for example, have exhibited illegitimate obsession with growth rates alone. The economic growth itself cannot ensure an equity and a participation. Astonishingly, but everybody seems to have been mesmerized by Ukraine's growth pace. Nobody has ever used, to my mind at least, such terms as overheating and bubble economy. It is almost a rule that bubble economies bust with devastating implications for the society. Such *problematique* is being addressed only rhetorically - but not politically and ideologically - precisely because Ukrainian policymakers are lacking the ideology of development.

By breaking down the ideology of development into three major components: equity, efficiency and participation, we can evaluate every ideal-typically identified political actor against these criteria. It turns out that the left has been focusing on the equity, while ignoring efficiency and participation, the center has been advocating a precarious notion of efficiency while paying only a lip service to the participation and the equity, and the right has been advocating participation and efficiency, treating an equity as a residual category. The ruling power block moderate centrist language appears to be a self-interested hypocrisy in a light of a its real policy agenda and practices of political capitalists tolerated/encouraged by the state. The ruling block's lack of credible ideological convictions has been compensated by what Gramsci called «volunteer actions» (it is rather an idiosyncratic usage of a term by Gramsci who meant voluntarism). An Italian thinker exhibited skepticism towards a potential of that mode of action and its implications for the society at large: «The assertion that modern Italy was characterized by volunteer action is correct... but it must be stressed that this volunteer action, despite its undeniable historical merit, has been a surrogate for popular intervention, and in this sense is a solution of compromise with the passivity of the masses of the nation. Volunteer action and passivity go together more than is thought. The solution of involving volunteer action is a solution of *authority from the top down, formally legitimized by consent, it is claimed, of the «best» elements* (italics is mine.- P. K.). But to construct a lasting history the «best elements» are not enough; the vaster and more numerous national-popular energies are needed» [13].

For those concerned with economic progress

the form of government and welfare don't matter much. Yet, contrary to Thomas Hobbes, I reckon that the form of government does make a difference as far as conditions of liberty and, therefore, participation are concerned (Hobbes made a famous argument that «there is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth, than in Constantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchial or Popular, the Freedom is still the same» [14]), and, unlike Milton Freedman, I am of opinion that freedom does not follow from free market capitalism automatically. The political dynamics is crucial for the implementation of the ideology of development, yet power should be understood in terms of Talcott Parsons' concept with its stress on broader society's consent to political system's goals and societal support that ensures the legitimacy of the political decision to mobilize resources. Clifford Geertz's interpretation of Parsons' ideas is particularly instructive and relevant to the case of Ukraine: «The growth of a modern state within a traditional social context represents... not merely the shifting or transfer of a fixed quantity of power between groups in such a manner that aggregatively the gains of certain groups or individuals match the losses of others, but rather the *creation* (italics is mine.- P. K.) of a new and more efficient machine for the production of power itself, and thus, an increase in the general political capacity of the society. This is much more genuinely «revolutionary» phenomenon than the mere redistribution, however radical, of power within given system» [15]. Instead of power production Ukrainian ruling political establishment has been engaged from the onset of country's independence into *power distribution* (not unlike its symbiotic partner - the class of political capitalist who have been primarily concerned with *wealth distribution*).

Let us draw now some *conclusions* about the role of the ideology of development. *It has been shown that the idea of the synthesis proves its relevance and adequacy in both development theory-building and policy formulation.* I have demonstrated that the emergence of the ideology of development and its translation into the reality of developmental policies instigating economic growth, social justice and citizens' participation *may* be facilitated by existing of conducive culture [16]. The presence of such an «inner-world»-activity culture is doubtful in contemporary Ukraine (the

dominate worldview seems to be encouraging the adjustment to the world instead of transforming it). The ethic of responsibility compatible with the rational bureaucracy ethos has not evolved in Ukraine (for the elaboration of both points see [17]). These factors hamper the emergence of the state institutions able to foster policies conducive to the development and institution-building while identifying its niche within the world-system. *The variables listed above may be combined in a theoretical triangle whose angles are as follows: culture, developmental state and world-system.* The boundaries among levels of the world-system tend to become more flexible in a time of global turmoil. Leninist extinction and events of September 11, 2001 in the USA, to name just a few recent developments, highlight that the world-system is far from being stable. This may offer Ukraine a chance to integrate itself into the world-system as its important element, rejuvenate democracy and post a good economic performance coupled with the promotion of equity at home. Whether this chance will be seized depends on several conditions. It is of critical importance

that decision-making is taking place in a manner compatible with Parsons' model of power described above. Achieving this task requires more consensual political action on the part of major political forces, however none of them has exhibited the willingness to make concessions to their opponents so far. The ability of state managers and politicians to learn from both successes and failures of countries which began their journey on a road to development earlier is also crucial, but Ukrainian leaders seem to be bent on confirming the conventional wisdom that «history teaches nothing». Without meeting these requirements, the chances of the emergence of a synthetic ideology of development accompanied by developmental project and compatible with the vision of modernity in its ideal-typical Western embodiment remain rather slim.

Ukraine has succeeded in becoming a paper tiger for the time being. To attain a status achieved previously by the country of a rising sun and East Asian tigers and combine it with a flavor of Western democracy Ukraine needs to become the country of a rising ideology of development.

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## **РОЗВИТОК ІДЕОЛОГІЇ ТА ІДЕОЛОГІЯ РОЗВИТКУ: СУЧАСНА УКРАЇНА З ПОГЛЯДУ СОЦІОЛОГІЇ РОЗВИТКУ І МОДЕРНІЗАЦІЇ**

*Постленінські суспільства в цілому і Україна зокрема стоять перед викликом переформування своїх проєктів розвитку у термінах ліберальної демократії та капіталізму. Стаття пропонує соціологічний аналіз динаміки ідеології розвитку в Україні з погляду на неї основних соціальних / політичних сил та впливу останньої на формування бачення українського проєкту розвитку. Спосіб взаємодії між: ідеально-типово концептуалізованими основними підходами до ідеології розвитку визначається як конфліктний і такий, що виключає інкорпорацію інших альтернатив. Така ситуація мала своїм наслідком формування партійна обмежених та часткових ідеологій розвитку, які виявились неспроможними до синтезу релевантних відкриттів, що пропонуються іншими підходами. Новизна статті полягає в аналізі ідеології розвитку у термінах рівних можливостей, ефективності та участі. Доводиться, що проєкт розвитку в сучасних умовах не може редукуватись лише до економічного зростання та має супроводжуватись розбудовою інституцій у сфері політичного і громадянського суспільств, а також суспільного добробуту. Успіх постленінського проєкту розвитку в Україні залежить від здатності вітчизняного істеблішменту до захоочення - а не обмеження - творчого потенціалу демократії.*