Norms of credibility track power. At the dinner table, our conversation about politics was also guided by subtle (and not-so-subtle) power relations. Gender, professional status, argumentation skill, comfort with adversarial methods.

In addition, the libertarian was able to deny the credibility of any source of justification that she encountered. Why? Because any knowledge—first- or second-hand—of what it was like to need public assistance would have been clouded by being a recipient of financial aid. And those recipients could be dismissed in two ways. First, they just have a greedy interest in receiving money they do not "earn." And second, their station—as poor, as needy-lowers their epistemic status. Their testimony is not as trustworthy as a college professor's testimony about how the political landscape looks from her perspective.

Is "credibility overspill" also a barrier to learning new things? If you're in a position of privilege, you can afford to not notice certain things about what everyday life is like for the less privileged.

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**PROBLEMATIVISTIC, PRAGMATIC AND TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACHES TO EXPERIENCE**

1. Philosophy appears at the moment when thought starts reflect on itself. This definition of philosophy is certainly incomplete and does not pretend to be final. However, it has an advantage that it does not create a ground for interpreting philosophy neither in historical, not in logical way. The moment it mentions at the same time is both historically-temporal and transcendentally-logical situation, main feature of which is its astonishment of the fact of its presence. While thinking of and reflecting on itself, the thought comes across question of its own experience. This question about experience is an inseparable problem of each self-conscious philosophy. At first glance, this question is a question about itself as of something, namely about its givenness and a mode of its givenness. But as soon as the questions are asked the thought does not dwell on it and progresses further. Thought goes on asking about conditions that let us formulate obtained experience in notions. The interval that rests between these two questions is the interval between scientific theory of experience and philosophical theory of experience. The first is mainly interested in certain experience(s) that relates to certain separate science. The second approach needs to take into account two layers of the problem: 1) preconditions of possibility to experience something (including experience of experience); and 2) aim, structure, methodological ground and framework of philosophical theory of experience. Which does actually mean that in philosophy we have theory of experience and meta-theory.
2. Accordingly, philosophical theory and meta-theory of experience should be viewed not only in their relation to scientific theory of experience, but also as integral part of house of philosophy. This means that philosophy should endeavor to be meta-theory of experience, i.e. to study conditions of possibility to conceptualize and analyze experience. It also means that meta-theory needs to have a clear connection with and separation from other philosophical disciplines, i.e. epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and esthetics.

In this report I'd like to discuss two interconnected issues: what are the limits and bounds of meta-theory of experience, and what categories should it use to consistent with its aim.

3. Philosophical theory of experience has a task of understanding experience of objects described/fixated in clear terms. But as soon as in history of philosophy we find more than one theory of experience — the ones that were formulated within different philosophical approaches — it becomes evident that philosophy needs to have a meta-theory of experience to include all these approaches into it without loosing its general sense. Within frames of the latter a set of criteria should be developed to provide possibility of assessing significance, consecution and consistency of competing theories of experience. These criteria could be developed only if they ground on analysis of these theories' preconditions, their basic concepts and assumptions, their cohesiveness and ability to bring to better results than other alternative theories. This kind of reflection on theories of experience is the meta-theory of experience.

4. In his fundamental book dedicated to philosophical reflections on experience, Wolfgang Roed, an outstanding Austrian philosopher and historian of philosophy, provides necessary arguments to lor the admission that real meta-theory of experience is the 'transcendental philosophy'. Professor Roed states that by means of transcendental philosophy Kant expressed an idea of sameness of theoretical philosophy and theory of experience. 'Transcendental philosophy... takes theory of experience as its own topic. It reflects on theories of experience, explicates and highlights nature of their concepts, as well as discusses limits and modes of their significance.'

5. At first, this statement was not that evident to me since the very term of 'transcendental philosophy' has undergone through many interpretations, so that identification of it with meta-theory does not add any clearness to the case. But if we take the primary understanding of transcendental philosophy as philosophy that investigates conditions of possibility of knowledge, then interpretation of professor Roed is acceptable. At the same time due to this interpretation the transcendental philosophy has got an unexpected connectedness with history of philosophy: fore in this case it will need to devote itself to historical analysis of philosophical approaches to experience from the antique times on.
6. The unexpectedness of this connection bases on a usual assumption that theoretical philosophy does not deal with historical issues. How important could be history in form of used-to-be-respected theories of experience for meta-theory of experience? Will this meta-theory be conditioned by history?

7. There is an understanding shared by many that philosophical theories of experience implicate results and assumptions of the philosophical reflection of their age. An example of this presupposition we may find in lectures of John Dewey that were published as a book with title 'Reconstruction of Philosophy'. Here, Dewey insists that concept of experience is a philosophical construct that resembles expectations of philosophers. 'Old notion of experience was itself a product of experience — the only type of experience that was available at the moment for people. Now another concept of experience is possible since the quality of experience in which it can be experienced has gone through a number of considerable social and intellectual changes compared to experience of older times. Notion of experience that Plato and Aristotle had is the notion of experience that the Greeks really had.' Dewey insists on dependence of notion of experience on orientation of philosopher or on historical context he lived in. This is actually why Plato and Aristotle were right when they did not recognize role of experience in defining universalities and method of finding them. This way the meaning of experience was reduced to concreteness and limitedness.

However, later on in the New Age philosophy have got a new, an emancipative task: a task to ruin 'huge lifeless burden' of tradition that was dominating over the mankind. Having this in mind, philosophy had another role for experience. It was now a criterion to measure lifeless ideas and prejudices. If tradition is overcome, as the champions of Enlightenment thought, social structures and science would progress fast.

Another shift happened in philosophy in late XIX century, when philosophy has been developing a new theory of experience. Progress of biology and psychology has considerably changed an understanding of processes of experience. It could be used, as Dewey thought, 'to propose methods and aims for development of new and better experience'. De facto, Dewey assumes that contemporary (for him) concept of experience is a tool to take over the human environment and to re-orient human behavior. His formula is as the following: to profoundly change human behavior one should change conditions. In this way 'experience becomes self-regulating'. One of results of this shift is a new correlation of empirical and over-empirical spheres: we may now talk of 'experimental intellect' that is the source of empirical propositions 'that could be applied in a constructive form for new tasks'.

8. It is worthwhile to note that Dewey insists on a Hegel-like thesis that change of understanding of experience means the change for experience itself. The shift in our understanding of experience results with change in 'real nature of experience, in its content
and methods, as well as in the way it is really experienced'. When Dewey says about 'real', he means that it is defined by the pragmatic dimension of knowledge. This is why, for example, if Kant’s notion of experience required subjection to principles and prescriptions of reason, the situation in XX century is quite different: reason is now much more dependent of experience that results with changes in social life/social structures.

9. The pragmatic approach in defining content of notions dictates certain logic of those ties and relations that unite this content with its pre-condition embodied in community of interprets. But these ties and relations cannot be of historical nature as it is stated by Dewey, as well as by C.S. Pierce in his theory of melonisation. My opinion is that 'historization' of pragmatic dimension deletes validity and significance of philosophical and scientific notions: it would necessarily mean that whatever truth is stated now it could become false in future. Historization of pragmatic dimension of sense devalues its validity. It is a week argument for philosophy that decision on validity of a sense should be postponed for indefinite future.

10. The problem that creates pragmatism based on melonization can be solved by transcendental pragmatism founded by Karl-Otto Apel. Transcendental pragmatism comes back to basic interpretation of meaning and experience: something is as something. This 'as' is the moment of mediation. This mediation is done through three dimensions: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic ones. The latter dimension deals with issues of what are conditions of our understanding of a meaning and reaching agreement on its interpretation. We cannot deny that ideal communicative community is the single most important condition of understanding on that level, while real historical community of interprets is only a derivative of it. If agree with this, we have now a formula to understand the structures of communication not only between and/or among subjects, but also among different communities and different epochs. This also structures the way history conditions and limits a meaning.

11. If we look back at our main question — if meta-theory of experience as transcendental philosophy is conditioned by history — the answer is as the following: yes, history conditions the meta-theory of experience. But this conditionality is limited and should be regarded by philosopher as an issue to be always considered in any analysis of experience and its theories. At the same time there is an over-historical pragmatic dimension that should primarily be the sphere of philosopher's work. Taking into account what was just explained, we can also answer the question of how should meta-theory of experience be formed so that it can work with philosophical notion of experience which has so many different interpretations in different theories and in different contexts? The only acceptable answer I have is that we need to work with those challenges that existing theories of experience face, as well as with those that could appear in possible theories of experience.
12. It seems to me that professor Roed comes to the same answer, although in a different way. He assumes that any positive statement of experience in philosophy reduces it till the level of theory of experience. Meta-level philosophy may keep only if it works with problems or problematic notions that we find due to comparison of different theories of experience. Meta-theory should refrain of positive statements on experience. Wolfgang Roed states that transcendental philosophy as an only possible consistent meta-theory of experience 'has a task to reflect on those assumptions that define experience of objects as possible, as well as define character of validity of these assumptions'[11]. This way meta-theory of experience does not support any theory as a true one. Meta-theory of experience considers theory of experience as its problem and thus it is based on problemativistic approach. Thus, professor Roed names his approach problemativism [12].

13. Even though there are two ways to come to the same conclusion, meta-theory of experience could be grounded only on basis of refrain of any kind of theory of experience. But as soon as we agree on this conclusion, its relation to problemativism provokes another complication: refusal of positive statement hinders potency of thinking on experience and even may lead to interruption of it. How fruitful can be problemativism? What heuristic consequences could it have?

Wolfgang Roed was seemingly aware of this problem. He himself called this as 'heuristic vagueness' of problemativistic meta-theory of experience. He proposed to resolve this complication by repudiation of those propositions that include predicates of existence of subject and of an object. Professor Roed adheres to the strategy of abstinence of existence' predication until the need arises: a need to ground experience at least on a specter of existing thing. Otherwise the both — heuristic and scientific — constituents of experience could be lost. As a compromise with this need he mentions 'residuum' in experience. This vestige in experience reflects Kant's notion of multitude and Husserl's 'Residuum', which means that even in problemativistic approach a particle of theory of experience is still alive. Id est, the meta-theory of experience looses its purity and consistency.

14. My opinion is that the challenge of the heuristic vagueness could be addressed in a different way. The repudiation of those propositions that include predicates of existence of subject (or I, self etc.) and of an object (thing, state of affairs etc.) does not equate to repudiation of neither self, nor thing. Furthermore, repudiation of propositions that include predicates of existence should become objects of investigation within the framework of meta-theory of experience. The heuristic justification of the problemativistic approaches based on fact that use of problematized notions gives an access to deep structures of experience without need to rely solely on empirical acts in cognition of experience. These thoughts will have a better proof only after a try to explicate meta-theory of experience founded on use of possibilities that provide problemativism with corrections brought by transcendental pragmatism.