DOCTORAL THESIS

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA DISCOURSE

by Anastasia Bezverkha

Supervisors:

Dr. Volodymyr Kulyk, Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine;
Prof. Marta Dyczok, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS OF STUDY

1.1 Theoretical framework of study
   1.1.1. Discourse and discourse analysis
   1.1.2. Discourse and identity
   1.1.3. Ethnic and national identity
   1.1.4. Ethnicity, racism and hate speech
   1.1.5. Ideology, common sense and power relations
   1.1.6. Media discourse
   1.1.7. Media and memory

1.2. Methodological framework of study
   1.2.1. Methods of data collection
      1.2.1.1 Principles of the media texts selection
      1.2.1.2. Expert interviews
   1.2.2. Methods of data analysis
      1.2.2.1. Critical discourse analysis
      1.2.2.2. Framing and agenda-setting analysis
      1.2.2.3. Narrative analysis
   1.2.3. Research structure
      1.2.3.1. Research stages and sampling
      1.2.3.2. Limitations of study

1.3. Conclusions

CHAPTER 2. SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF STUDY

2.1. Key characteristics of the Ukrainian media landscape
   2.1.1. Ukrainian media ownership structure
   2.1.2. General features of the Ukrainian media discourse

2.2 Crimean media landscape
   2.2.1 Crimean mainstream media
   2.2.2 Crimean Tatar national media

2.3. Overview of the current studies on the Crimean Tatars
CHAPTER 3. PATTERNS OF MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA (2010-2012)

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Patterns of representation of the Crimean Tatars in the media discourse
   3.2.1. Genres
   3.2.2. Topics (themes)
   3.2.3 Representations of social actors
      3.2.3.1. Wording
      3.2.3.2. Agency of social actors
      3.2.3.3. Personal representations
      3.2.3.4. Representation of the Milli Mejlis
   3.2.4. Crimean Tatars in the mediatized political discourse
      3.2.4.1. Crimean Tatar’s problem
      3.2.4.2. Crimean Tatars – 'the unsatisfied'
   3.2.5. Discourse of threat
   3.2.6. 'Land seizures' VS 'glades of protest'
   3.2.7. Strategies of exclusion and inclusion

3.3. Conclusions


4.1. Why deportation?
4.2. Dominant and alternative historical narratives in Ukraine
4.3. Narratives of deportation: representation by the national, regional and Crimean Tatar national media
   4.3.1. National media on deportation
      4.3.1.1. Sample of media texts
      4.3.1.2. Media representations of deportation
         4.3.1.2.1 Wording
         4.3.1.2.2. Genres
      4.3.1.2.3. Subjects and sources of reference
         4.3.1.2.4. Mediatized political discourse on deportation
      4.3.1.3. Conclusions
   4.3.2. Narratives of deportation represented in the Crimean mainstream media
      4.3.2.1. Sample of media texts
4.3.2.2. Media representations of deportation

4.3.2.2.1. Dominant historical meta-narratives: Crimean Tatars in the Crimean politics of memory
4.3.2.2.2. Narratives of commemoration of the Crimean Tatars' deportation
3.2.2.3. Mediatized political discourse on deportation

4.3.2.3 Conclusions

4.3.3. Alternative media discourse: deportation through the lens of the Crimean Tatar ethnic media

4.3.3.1. Sample of media texts
4.3.3.2. Media representations of deportation

4.3.3.2.1. Representation of commemoration practices of the Crimean Tatars deportation
4.3.3.2.2. Political discourse: between memory and politics
4.3.3.2.3. Historical narratives
4.3.3.2.4. Personal memories and recollections of deportation
4.3.3.2.5. Narratives of collaboration - “lieux d’oubli”

4.3.3.3. Conclusions

4.4. Conclusions

CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
APPENDIX 1. List of interviews
INTRODUCTION

Crimea is a unique, ethnically diverse region and the only region in Ukraine where the Crimean Tatars, mostly practising Islam, live within compact vicinity among the Slavic majority, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. The Crimean Tatars is an ethnic group which was forcibly removed from Crimea in 1944 by Stalin's totalitarian regime. Since the late 1980s, the Crimean Tatars and other forcibly displaced ethnic groups started to return en masse to their native lands after more than 50 years in exile. According to the official Soviet propaganda, the Crimean Tatars were deported in May 1944 after being accused by Stalin’s regime of ‘collaboration with the Nazis and treachery of the Soviet people’. As a result of inhumane conditions of the forced relocation of around 180 000 Tatars (including children, women and elderly people) to Central Asia in livestock train carriages, hunger and diseases during the appalling journey and soon after the arrival, the Crimean Tatars lost from 15% to 46% of the group’s members (Paliy 2012). The survivors lost their property, their land, they were deprived of their political and cultural rights – the group was forcibly kept out of Crimea up until November 1989.

An active political struggle of the Crimean Tatar national movement in many ways informed the processes of self-identification of the group and shaped its relations with other ethnic groups in Crimea and with the Ukrainian authorities. Despite the long-term state policy targeted at the economic and cultural re-integration of the returning population, various conflicts as well as a significant level of xenophobia have been dominating the public discourse with regard the Crimean Tatars in Crimea for decades.

Officially, interethnic relations in Ukraine are managed by the national and Crimean governments, by the regional bodies of state power as well as by elected local self-governments, which elaborate state policy programs and implement the central government’s decisions addressing various social, political and cultural aspects of the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. However, as Van Dijk and other scholars have pointed out, the political decision-making process in general, and in the sphere of interethnic relations in particular, is not autonomous. It is a discursive process of communication of various interests which are represented in society and is influenced by public opinion (Van Dijk 1995).

Thus, sharing Van Dijk’s opinion about the discursive character of public policy and decision-making, I assume that public opinion and media representation of the relevant issues of interethnic relations directly impact the state policy. Moreover, accepting this assumption means that the sphere of politics and public policy, being influenced and shaped by the media, can be described and analyzed by means of terms and methodology of discourse analysis.

This study is grounded in the social constructivist ontological paradigm. It shares the general notion that the meanings are socially constructed by
individuals and groups during their social interaction (Crotty 1998: 43). Following the general conceptual framework of discourse analysis – the key theoretical and methodological framework of this study – I share the central statement of discourse theory about the mutual interplay between the social reality and discourse. Moreover, social identity is constructed and constantly (re)negotiated in discursive interactions, and therefore, is perceived as flexible and contingent. Discourse theory also aims to explore ideologies as they shape the meanings within discourse, legitimize existing social relations and institutions and, furthermore, construct and reproduce social identities.

The aim of the present study is to explore the patterns of the media coverage of a variety of issues related to the Crimean Tatars from political, social and cultural spheres, media coverage of events involving their political struggle for the status and rights, media materials about culture, tradition and history of the Crimean Tatars, discussion of acute socio-economic issues related to the process of repatriation of the Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea from exile as well as other relevant issues.

The focus on the media representation of a broad spectrum of themes and subject-matters involving Crimean Tatars is grounded in the assumption that the general image of the group is constructed by the media systematically over the long period of time (Fairclough 1989) and therefore, needs to be studied in its full, multi-layered complexity. This research aims to discuss the ways in which media builds an image of the collective and general attitudes towards it, as well as exploring mechanisms which shape public perceptions of the Crimean Tatars among the Slavic majority of the Crimean peninsula and whole Ukrainian society.

The main part of the study covers the period of time between 2010 and 2012, during the time of presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, and examines a sample of media texts from Ukrainian mainstream media outlets as well as Crimean mainstream media. Additionally, for the study of the mediatized narratives of deportation, the timeframe for analysis has been expanded to include a sample of media texts from the month of May of each year from 2007 to 2012. A longer timeframe for analysis allows tracing chronological changes in media representation of the memory of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation, given the changes in the political context with the change of the ruling political elites in 2010.

The research is aimed at studying the collective and individual representations of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine’s media discourse, defining the key discursive strategies utilized by the media to construct popular beliefs about the group, and exploring the ways in which media discourse shapes the identities and power relations between the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups of Ukraine and, more specifically, Crimea. Among other objectives, I seek to explore the patterns of media representation of the collective memory of deportation of the Crimean Tatars of 1944, deriving from the assumption that the memory of deportation is a
crucial focal point for the construction of ethno-national identity of the Crimean Tatar people. In this regard, I am interested in structural and content differences of the media representations of deportation of the mainstream and Crimean Tatar ethnic media.

In order to address the main research objectives of the study, the following research questions have been formulated:

1. How are the Crimean Tatars represented in the Ukrainian media discourse?
2. How do the broader socio-political context and the level of development of the media landscape affect the representation of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian, and more specifically, Crimean media?
3. Which dominant images and characteristic features shape this representation at both national and Crimean levels?
4. How does the mediatized memory of deportation of the Crimean Tatars inform the process of construction of collective identity of this ethnic group?

As far as the importance and academic novelty of the proposed study is concerned, the following remarks need to be made. Present Ukrainian studies dealing with issues related to the Crimean Tatars mostly focus on history of the deportation and return of the Crimean Tatars in a broader context of the Soviet repressions, analyse the national and international legislation on the status of indigenous populations and their rights, or discuss political implications of granting rights and economic privileges to the populations that were forcibly displaced and then returned to their ancestral land.

Ukrainian and Western academics have been exploring various political, historical and cultural aspects of life of ethnic groups in Ukraine, using theories of nationalism, ethnopolitics and multiculturalism. Phenomena of xenophobia and interethnic conflicts in Crimea have received considerable attention in social studies; however, their methodological tools are often limited to content analysis and they rarely deal with ideological frameworks and their impact on the media content. At the same time, recent studies on religious and cultural identities of the ethnic groups of Crimea provide insightful findings, but these studies normally do not include analysis of the media as a powerful social institution which informs the process of the construction of identities.

The present study makes a contribution to the existing body of knowledge by employing a multidisciplinary approach of critical discourse analysis to the Ukrainian social-political context. An in-depth analysis of popular images and attitudes produced and maintained by the media helps to shed light on the patterns of identity construction and power dynamics in the media discourse on the Crimean Tatars from a novel perspective. One of the main findings of this study points to the fact that political and social discrimination of the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic minority in Ukraine's media discourse has been realized.
mainly by subtle, indirect means. Additionally, the focus on the analysis of the mediatized politics of memory in contemporary Ukraine revealed contestation of the dominant versions of memory by the Crimean Tatars ethnic media. The representation of the Crimean Tatars by the national and Crimean media has previously received very little academic attention. Discourse analysis, which is relatively rarely used by the Ukrainian social scholars, allows taking a detailed and comprehensive account of the current role and place of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukrainian society.
CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

This chapter outlines specific theoretical and methodological grounds of the research, defines key terms and concepts utilized for analysis. Additionally, the sample of the media texts compiled for research will be presented and explained in detail, and the limitations of study will be pointed out.

1.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section will comprise six subsections, each focusing on theoretical concepts essential for carrying out of the proposed study. Firstly, I will explore the main concepts of discourse analysis and discourse theory, provide definitions of key terms, such as discourse and social identity, ideology, power relations, and present main approaches to their analysis. Then I will make an overview of studies pertaining to the broader field of racism, hate speech and ethnic minorities’ discrimination. The next section will provide explanation of key terms and methodological approaches of media studies and narrative analysis, which will be used in my research, and indicate major points of intersection between the media and memory studies with regard to the media representations of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, which will be presented in chapter 4 of this study.

1.1.1. DISCOURSE AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse analysis is a theoretical and methodological framework, widely used to study political conflicts, national identities, issues of racism and discrimination of marginal social groups, media and construction of public opinion in modern societies. Here I will discuss some basic characteristics of discourse analysis, providing a classification of sub-disciplines within the field.

The word discourse is used in a variety of contexts. In the academic sphere, the term is utilized to explain theoretic concepts of linguistics, literature, political science and philosophy. Therefore, each discipline has developed its own definition of discourse. In this study, I will focus on a particular set of definitions of discourse, pointing out approaches which could be united by considering discourse to be their central and basic conceptual point of departure. All definitions of discourse within the given scientific field could be divided into two major groups: definitions which refer to the linguistic nature of discourse and ones pointing out social interaction as a basic feature of discourse.

As Jan Blommaert points out, there is a long tradition of referring to discourse in linguistic terms, either as ‘text’ or as ‘language-in-use’ – linguistic structures used by people (2005: 2).

One of the representatives of the linguistic school, Zelling Harris defines
discourse simply as sequences of utterances (Howarth 2000: 7), pointing out the primary importance of linguistic structures, such as words, sentences, utterances and texts, as main objects of analysis. Underlining the complexity of discourse and understanding it broader than just text, Blommaert views discourse as complex combinations of texts, visual images and audio, which are treated ‘as contextualized activities rather than as simple objects’ (2005: 3).

Post-modernist intellectual Michel Foucault, who is considered the ‘forefather’ of the modern discourse theory, provides no clear definition of discourse. However, he draws links between basic terms is which discourse should be understood and analysed. Foucault suggests investigating the operation of discourse in specific time and situation, thus the methodology he offers is essentially historical (MacDonald 2003:16). He defines discourse as an autonomous system of statements structured by historically specific formation rules, with a particular system of knowledge/power relations (Howarth, 2000: 77).

Myra MacDonald integrates discourse as a ‘system of communicative practices’ to a wider set of social and cultural practices which construct specific frameworks of thinking (2003: 10), thus pinpointing the cognitive function of discourse.

In addition to the cognitive function, discourse is also closely interwoven with social structures of society. In the process of interaction between discourse and social practices, social continuity and change is achieved. Therefore, control over discourse and its structures (or orders) allows power holders to preserve their dominant position and can become a space for contestation of the existing power relations (Fairclough 1989: 37).

Deriving from the dialectical relations between discourse and society (meaning its non-linguistic parts), Norman Fairclough developed a two-facet definition of discourse, which comprises the social process of the production of text as well as the social process of its interpretation, where text is both a major product of discourse and resource for its interpretation (1989: 23-24). Given that the processes of discourse production and interpretation are socially determined, the author argues that discourse also contains context – the social conditions of production and interpretation.

Fairclough and van Dijk are researchers who focus heavily on the ideological impact of discourse and on the process of negotiation of social identities in discourse. Ideology, Fairclough (1989) states, can directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations by sustaining the social practices of domination. Van Dijk also argues that a crucial role of ideology is “to sustain, legitimize and manage group conflicts” (1998: 24).

In addition, Fairclough describes discourse as “a way to represent aspects of the world – processes, relations and structure or mental world… thoughts, feelings and beliefs” (2003: 124). This means that discourse also informs the shape and
essence of social identities, as well as meanings of events and collective beliefs about society and its institutions.

David Howarth provides a more detailed definition of the term. He sees discourse as a concrete system of social relations and practices that are initially political, as its construction involves the construction of antagonisms, execution of power and drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (2000: 9). Thus, Howarth steps away from the linguistic approach to discourse by emphasizing the social nature of the phenomenon and pointing out a number of key processes within discourse such as an antagonism of political forces and the construction of social identities.

Although these definitions form only a minor part of possible explanations of the term, they allow describing its essence and pointing out fundamental theoretical conditions for the use of this term in the empirical part of the present research.

Summarizing the definitions provided, I can now point out main characteristics of discourse:

1. Discourse is social in its nature.
2. Discourse refers to a set of linguistic structures within a particular social and cultural context.
3. Meanings are produced, modified and re-negotiated during social interaction within discourse.
4. Discourse is contingent, contextual and historical.
5. During discursive interaction, identities and subject positions are being constructed, modified and contested.
6. Discourses are ideological, and through construction of certain meanings and conventions they impose certain worldviews.
7. In each discourse, particular relations of power are enacted.

Various schools of discourse theory emerged as cross-disciplinary approaches that integrate linguistics and hermeneutics with social and political science. Broadly speaking, discourse theories focus on the interpretation of events and practices by analysing the ways in which political forces and social actors ideologically construct meanings within certain discourses.

Jacob Torfing distinguishes three schools of discourse theory (Howarth and Torfing 2005):

1. Sociolinguistics which unites linguistic approaches to analysis of spoken and written texts. Sociolinguistics does not link discourse analysis with the analysis of power struggle and political antagonism within discourse, limiting itself to the use of language in social interaction.

The sub-disciplines which Torfing subsumes under this approach are as follows: content analysis, conversation analysis, discursive psychology inspired by
speech act theory (Searle) within analytical philosophy (Austin), critical linguistics (Fowler), which studies how ideologically presented types of reality are produced through the choice of linguistic expressions and style.

2. Post-structuralist approach is represented by a theory of discourse developed by Laclau and Mouffe. Torfing points out that the notion of discourse in this approach covers all social phenomena, following the argument put forward by Jacques Derrida that ‘there is nothing outside text’ (Howarth and Torfing 2005: 323).

Theory of discourse by Laclau and Mouffe is synthesised from post-Marxist, post-structuralist and postmodern traditions of thought. This theoretical approach provides analysis and interpretation of the social relations under the conditions of discursive construction of meaning, investigation of dominant ideologies and legitimization of existing social relations and institutions and, furthermore, construction and reproduction of social identities.

3. Critical discourse analysis (CDA). The followers of this approach view discourse as a wider set of social practices not reduced to written and spoken language. CDA is represented by scholars such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun Van Dijk and is greatly inspired by Foucault.

CDA refers to discourse as a set of varied linguistically mediated social practices used by social actors to create and interpret meanings. Analysts, who work within the CDA methodological dimension, focus on the links between discourse and power. Michel Foucault, in turn, developed a discursive understanding of power, viewed not merely as dominance or capacity to act, but rather as the ability of discourse to regulate actions by means of shaping identities, capacities and relations of subordination of the social actors (Howarth and Torfing 2005: 24).

Summing up, it is worth pointing out a number of basic statements shared by all of the above-mentioned theories of discourse. Firstly, it is common for the three approaches to move away from the realist tradition of perceiving the truth. According to the discursive tradition, truth is not a feature of existing reality but a feature of language, i.e. it is always local and flexible, connected with a discursive regime that determines what is true or false. Secondly, they share a relationalist perspective of identity, moving away from the understanding of identity as a stable and pre-given essence (Torfing 1999). Identification of subjects, as well as construction of meanings, change historically and are renegotiated in every social interaction or conversation.

Among all the theories of discourse discussed in this section, critical discourse analysis is the primary theoretical and methodological approach used in the present study.

While the theories of discourse are problem-driven and focused on interpretation and solution of deep social problems, discourse analysis is more method-driven.
Jan Blommaert points out key principles of the critical analysis of language (2005: 14) which form the basis of understanding of general methodological implications of discourse analysis. The critical study of language focuses not only on the ways in which language is used in society, but also investigates what language use means to its users. It also studies how language operates in different environments and social and historical contexts.

Taylor (2001) argues that discourse analysis draws attention to the study of patterns of language to show how they constitute aspects of social life. This approach also focuses on the social nature and historical origins of the social reality which is taken for granted. A basic assumption is that language enables and constraints speakers’ expressions but also their actions. Thus, critical discourse analysis by Fairclough, Wodak and others could be associated with the theoretical approaches focusing on the study of conditions and consequences of social interactions, particularly on power relations, dominance and inequality.

Key conceptual foundations of this methodology will be presented further in this chapter.

1.1.2. DISCOURSE AND IDENTITY

The concept of social identity is one of the central for this research and, therefore, needs to be discussed in more detail.

The term identity has been brought into social sciences in the 1960s. The research on identity has become very important for social linguistics, discourse analysis, cultural anthropology etc. The ontology of the term identity can be roughly divided into two major areas: an approach which sees identity as a stable given set of characteristics (like social background, race, native language) and one which underlines changeable nature of identity under certain cultural or historical conditions. Modern social theory has mostly moved away from the essentialist approach to identity as a stable fixed feature, which remains the same and preserves distinctive features of an individual or a group.

The idea of differences between the 'self' and 'other' lies in the core of individual and group self-identification. A person constructs her personality in opposition to the features that others have (Potter 1996).

Jan Blommaert points out two layers of social self-identification. First, which he calls 'inhabited', is related to an identity that a person chooses or attributes by herself; the second – 'ascribed' – is a certain set of features ascribed to a person or a group by others, which in turn shapes the person’s beliefs about self and others (2005: 205).

There are various views of the nature of this notion. Often, identity is seen in psychological terms as “sameness”. The definition of collective identity is also often based on psychological grounds, as a feeling of belonging to a certain group. As Yavorska argues, this often results in the extrapolation of individual
psychological characteristics (such as feelings and attitudes) on the group, concluding in the “we-feeling” as a feeling of a separate group organism, “personification of the group” (Bohomolov et al. 2005: 83). The results of this process are clearly reflected in discourse (in utterances like The Crimean Tatars believe that..., The Russians are offended by .....) and should be taken into account during research while considering the subject of analysis of the group vs. individual identity.

Yavorska distinguishes between “natural” and “conventional” definitions of identity. She argues that the “natural” paradigm of identity relies on the “homogeneous and monolith cultural tradition” as the key instrument of identity’s reproduction, while the second paradigm coins the identities change and reproduction with the heterogeneous discursive practices, where tradition is only one out of many (Bohomolov et al. 2005: 95, 96).

Jimenez, Gorniak et al. (2004) propose a similar model of group identities division: the cultural model based on stable cultural traits, common history, ethnic sameness, and the civic model grounded in conventions about the norms of social co-existence.

Turning to the present study, the use of the mentioned models will allow tracing the combination or layers of attitudes which lie in the core of the group identity of the Crimean Tatars, interplay between the rational, conventional reasons and the cultural and religious factors which together form a certain blend or a hierarchy of identities which tend to change and rearrange according to the social conditions.

The definition of the term identity provided by Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall – “identity is a social positioning of self and other (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 586) - is too broad and cannot be used to conceptualize the term in the constructive way. However, it is worth mentioning that the authors tend to share a “soft” definition of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), as “a relational and social cultural phenomenon that emerges and circulates in local discourse contexts of interaction” and underline its key feature as “being a product of social linguistic negotiation” rather than a fixed social category (Bucholtz and Hall 2005). Jan Blommaert also shares this opinion stating that people “don’t have an identity, identities are constructed in social practices” (2005: 205).

Brubaker and Cooper have put forward another division between the approaches to identity definition, they speak about the scope of definitions of identity, ranging from “hard” - “essentialist” to “soft”- “constructivist”. The authors take a critical stance with regard to this theoretical division, arguing that the “hard” definition, taken as an analytical category, fails to embrace the contemporary changeable nature of social reality. At the same time, the “soft”, constructivist definition gives no room for analysis, “for it is not clear, why what is characterized as multiple, fragmented and fluid should be conceptualized as 'identity' at all” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 6).
Moreover, Brubaker and Cooper speak about an “identity crisis” in modern social sciences, meaning “overproduction and consequent devaluation of meaning” of this term (2000: 3).

Brubaker and Cooper provide a number of uses of the term identity. Here I name only the ones most relevant to the specifics of my research:

1. Identity is understood as a collective feature of sameness of the members of a group. Here the belonging to the group may be approached as an objective (sameness grounded in certain common attributes) or subjective (felt, imagined or self-identified unity) characteristic (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 7). This concept implies the existence of clear boundaries between “us” and “them”, underlines the homogeneity of the group.

2. This understanding is common for the studies on race, gender, ethnicity and social movements. It is important to mention that in this approach, the “hard” definitions of identity prevail, as this approach emphasizes the abiding sameness between persons and over time (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:10).

3. Identity is seen as a product of changeable and competing discourses, the term “highlights the unstable, multiple and fragmented nature of contemporary self” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 8). This tradition is rooted in post-modern and post-structuralist social theory.

4. This understanding is criticized by Brubaker as the one which loses its theoretical rationale, when becoming “too soft” to have any stable attributes at all.

I suggest to move away from such extremes and to take into consideration both approaches, critically utilizing them in my study. Sharing the constructive paradigm, I state that collective identity still implies a certain set of social attributes individuals and members of the group share, however, the process of self-attribution to a certain group is executed discursively, confirming or renegotiating the existing set of attributes under the current dominant ideological framework.

Teun van Dijk stated that “discourse forms the group” (1998: 125) meaning that collective identities are constructed in discursive acts. Individuals engaged in the social interaction bear not only their personal features but also subject positions attributed to them as members of certain groups. Thus, each individual discursive interaction is also a group interaction and adds to sustaining or reshaping the relations between the groups. However, Volodymyr Kulyk (2010) points out that a single discursive act does not fix the manifested identification, only the systematic repetition of the manifested discursive role assigns this type of behaviour to a certain individual or group, moulding the identity as a more or less stable characteristic.

Political discourse is one of the most powerful discourses which influence the construction and maintenance of the group identity. Firstly, it is directly related
to the patterns of distribution of power relations, imposing dominating ideological frameworks and norms. Secondly, the political sphere relates to other social spheres, like culture, history, religion, economy etc. and utilizes issues from these spheres for political purposes. Social and ethnic groups strive for political consideration and take part in public discussion contesting the existing relations of dominance or trying to preserve the status quo, if they are the ones, which are in power. The character of group identities is greatly informed by this political antagonism.

One of the fundamental instruments of the constitution of social identities is othering. The “we” identity is created and sustained in opposition to the “they” identity. For this reason, the strategies of exclusion and inclusion are often interconnected with each other, as relations of commonality or solidarity with one group are often built on the opposition to the other. In addition, the identities of “self” and “other” are not fixed, they are contingent and reflexive and renegotiated constantly in the discourse.

Discourses of otherness are articulated, according to Stephen Riggins, both by majority and minority groups. As Riggins argues, in order to develop a personal or group self-identity, a personality or a group has to generate discourses of both similarity and difference with other-identities, must reject and embrace certain identities (1997: 4). However, members of dominant groups have more resources to express their identities, while public expressions of minority group identities are often marginalized or silenced. The discourses of othering constructed and maintained by the groups can refer to a number of constitutive features, like judgments of value (whether the group is good or bad), level of social distance (are they different from us) or knowledge about a minority group's history or culture (Riggins 1997: 5).

One of the most widely used discursive strategies of othering is positive self-presentation vs. negative other-presentation. As van Dijk (1997: 36) argues, in public discourses the majority groups are often presented as tolerant and hospitable, while the minorities are often present in negative light, as deviant or even illegal. The author argues that this strategy came to serve as a subtle form of ethnic or racial discrimination in societies, where overt racism has been banned.

Further in this study I will explore in more detail patterns of construction of discourses of othering in the Ukrainian media.

1.1.3. ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Study of the relations between the Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatars as national minority group living on the territory of Ukraine requires an exploration of such concepts as ethnicity and ethnopolitics.

Ethnic and national identities are subcategories of group or collective identity.
Anthony Smith, who is believed to be one of the founding fathers of the concept “national identity”, distinguishes a great number of various collective identities: gender identity, regional, social, religious, class identities etc.

As Vernon Van Dyke argues, the classic liberal concept of political relations between an individual and the state is limited by the existence of ethnic communities, which often demand a specific legal status and a set of rights not as individuals, but as a collective. By ethnic group Van Dyke means “a group of people, who think of themselves as collectively possessing a separate identity based on shared cultural characteristics” (1995: 32). This definition, he claims, has strong political implications. One of the profound legal rights of the peoples is the right to self-determination – the right of every people “to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live” (Woodrow Wilson, cited in Van Dyke 1995: 43).

Being a social construct, ethnicity implies a number of criteria of ethnic identification, which could vary in degree and importance and change over time. Among the most important of them are shared language, religion, physiological distinction, common historical heritage and modes of living as well as region or land of origin. The key criterion for ethnic group identification is a process of self-conscious acknowledgment of belonging to a certain ethnic group - the ethnic group is socially constructed by its members as well as by non-members, who view others as belonging to that group. As the social construction doesn’t happen in isolation, the determination of boundaries with the other groups is what maintains the process (Gilbert 2000: 22).

The dispute about the nature of ethnicity has been happening for decades between the primordial and instrumental traditions in social sciences. In short, primordialists or essentialists believe that ethnicity is “a fundamental, primordial aspect of human existence and is essentially unchangeable” (Jenkins, cited in Gilbert 2000: 24). The instrumentalists in turn, stress not only the conscious or unconscious process of self-identification of a group as a key feature of ethnicity, they also speak about common interests and purposes which drive such a unity, be it a political recognition or common culture (Gilbert 2000: 26).

The theory of the ethnic identity developed by Anthony Smith is mostly grounded in the essentialist implications of a certain set of fixed characteristics inherent to an individual or group. Smith stresses the shared collective feeling of the “centrality, superiority and rightness” of the features shared by their ethnic community in relation to others outside (Smith 1992: 50).

Volkan Vamik derives the emergence of ethnic groups from a process which involves “historical continuity, geographical realities, myth of the common beginning” (1998: 22). Common language, culture, territory and history and traditions are major uniting factors of ethnicity. Membership in the ethnic group is based on kinship: real or imagined. Donald Horowitz, in turn, proposes to refer to ethnic identity as “one of the many ways in which people categorize
themselves”, stressing the social constructivist nature of emergence of any collective identity (1985: 55).

Rogers Brubaker criticizes such “groupism” as an approach to the study of ethnicity. By groupism he means a tendency in social theory to “take discrete, internally homogenous and externally bounded groups as key constituents of social life and fundamental units of social analysis” (2004: 8). As the author claims, the principle of groupism is rooted in the fundamental categories of the ethnopolitical practices -national state policies towards ethnic minorities, migrants- and concepts of nation-states, however, it shouldn't be taken for granted as a commonsensical principle in the social analysis of these phenomena.

Brubaker proposes to conceptualize ethnicity, nationhood or race primarily in processual terms, to perceive these concepts as “practices, situational actions, cognitive schemes, discursive frames, institutional forms etc.” (2004: 11).

The political struggle for power between ethnic groups also serves as an important factor for collective identity, providing people with a sense of belonging to and identifying with a certain ethnic group. Because ethnic group identity, as Rothschild puts it, “is the only social entity left, which accepts people, for who they are and not for what they do” (1981: 6). Despite the fact that other non-ethnic affiliations and fragmentations are also at the table, the ethnic dimension is becoming increasingly salient in the political sphere.

**National identity**

Concepts of “nation” and “nationalism” can be characterized by a high level of ambivalence and great differences in definition. The best-known distinction is between ethnic and civic, or cultural and political forms of nationalism. It was suggested by Anthony Smith.

Smith provides a clear distinction between ethnic/cultural and national identities, calling ethnic communities passive, based on common culture and tradition. National unity, according to his theory, envisages a certain sense of political self-identification, statehood and national institutions. Citizenship remains a key formal characteristic feature of national identity, which an individual can demonstrate to other “to support a national identity claim” (Bond 2006: 611).

Bond names three prominent markers of national identity: residence, birth and ancestry (2006: 611). In this regard, Smith speaks about inclusive (civic) and exclusive (ethnic) concepts of national identity. The former concept emphasizes the idea of becoming a member of a “territorial community”, based on birth and residence, while the former stresses on the process of belonging to a group based on common descent (Smith 1991: 11).

Alternatively to politically-dominated theories, Ola Hnatiuk in her study of Ukrainian identity (2005) provides her own definition of national identity.
Sharing Anderson’s concept of nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson 2001), she relates nation with culture, placing the feeling of cultural attachment into the core of national identity.

In general, Hnatiuk's approach to national identity seems relevant to this study as it utilizes a discursive perspective on the patterns of construction of national identity. Her vision of culture is inspired by Stuart Hall’s definition of culture as discourse – a space for construction of meanings that define the nation (Hnatiuk 2005: 43). Hnatiuk also builds on Hall’s idea that national cultures construct collective identities, formulating the sense of a particular nation, with which members can associate themselves. She also suggests adding the concepts of collective memory and “othering” to the definition of national culture. She underlines two basic functions of identity – to satisfy the feeling of “belonging” to a certain cultural community and the feeling of “otherness” with regards to other cultures (2005: 51).

Similarly, Wodak et al. argue that national identity is a product of discourse. National identity is shaped by political, media, everyday and other types of social practices performed by individual members. Discursive practice is a type of social practice, which plays a role in the expression and sustaining of national identity by sharing narratives of national culture and feelings of sameness and belonging, etc. (1999: 29).

According to this social constructivist approach, cultural tradition is not something stable. Grounded in collective memory, tradition is perceived as a set of social practices, historical and cultural codes, which play a significant role for the national self-identification in the certain period of time. Hnatiuk calls a fixed tradition a tool of political consolidation of the national group in order to impose certain ideological framework. This is achieved by placing certain historical events in the limelight and downplaying or silencing others (Hnatiuk 2005).

According to Smith (1994), national identities in their political sense could be, in turn, divided into nation-states (the state is built upon the values of the titular nation) and the territorial or civic forms of the statehood, where all people living on the territory of the state, regardless of their ethnic origin, and share common social space. Smith provides the following definition of nation: “Nation is the self-perceived community of people, whose members share common myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions; they create and share a common culture and norms” (1994: 40). This definition implies the concept of “self-perception, self-identification”, which means that belonging to a nation is not only a belonging to a certain ethnic group, but rather a wish of a group of people to image themselves as a community.

Michael Keating defines civic nationalism (as opposed to ethnic one, based on common traditions and history) as a more rational choice of individuals residing on a common territory and guided by common interests but not necessarily common ethnic origin (cited in Brubaker 2004: 138).
Rogers Brubaker, however, criticizes this juxtaposition, stressing that both ethnic and civic nationalisms are extremely ambiguous concepts, and pointing to an uncertain place of culture in this civic-ethnic scheme (2004: 139). Issues of language and collective memory, for instance, are highly politicized in many societies, making the fine distinction highly problematic. Ethnicity in modern multiethnic states is often one of the important factors of state politics as well as societal values and public debates. The marker of ethnicity has become dominant in the modern political space, where ethnic values are often used to achieve specific political or economic interests or to (de)legitimize regimes and governments. As Rothschild argues, in the process of politicization of ethnicity the unique cultural heritage of an ethnic group is actively “ideologized, modified and even virtually re-created” (1981: 3). Ethnic markers could be used not only to conceptualize struggle between the dominant or titular and minority groups, but could also serve as factors of the effective democratic state policies. For instance, Rothschild mentions state benefit and social program distribution policies based on the ethnic not class division or formation of the ethnicity-based political movements and parties, which unite and articulate the needs and interests of certain national groups (1981: 224). In many cases, the author argues, the social category of class could be too broad and too general in their expectations, while dealing with ethnic groups could be more efficient and functional for the state governments, creating thus new opportunities for managing interethnic tensions in multiethnic societies. In general conventional pattern of relations between the state and the ethnic groups is marked by the striving to achieve, or at least demonstrate it rhetorically, political and cultural integration as part of the process of political “nation building” (Rothschild 1981:228).

These integrationist intentions are, however, only likely to be successful in situations, when the central political elites are capable of using the factor of multi-ethnicity as an asset of state politics and to provide respective policies to the resisting ethnic groups (Rothschild 1981: 231).

In situations when the state fails to conduct efficient distributive policies, the regionally concentrated or autochthonous ethnic groups (like Crimean Tatars in our case) have additional options to voice their discontent in state inefficiency and challenge the current boundaries of the state, demanding their own alternative state institutions.

An important issue pertaining to claims of the Crimean Tatars for the status of an indigenous group of Crimea, is an ethnopolitical concept of indigenous people and the rights which derive from this status. The principle of “native peoples”, as Gilbert points out, presupposes that “the rights of the indigenous people stem directly from the fact of residence and this fact itself creates a presumption of rightful occupation of a certain territory and right to own it” (Gilbert 2000:161). Johnston (1995) argues that native peoples view their relations with the land as central to their collective identity, the land is inherently
linked to their culture and worldview. As history shows, the displacement of these communities from their land often leads to group’s marginalization and disintegration. That’s why the legal practices with regards to the indigenous populations have to ensure the right to the continued land possession. She claims that land as a collective value for the indigenous people cannot be reduced to market relations only. “Money cannot replace a way of life, which is intimately connected with the land” (Johnston 1995: 197).

Discussions about the ethnic and national dimension of collective identity primarily define nations and ethnic groups as substantial entities constructed on common values and ideology, as collectives through which political struggle between dominant and subordinate groups manifests itself in modern societies. The social constructivist approach to the definition of these concepts stresses the contingent and flexible character of this power struggle, institutionalized in certain social practices and represented in discourse.

Various models of interethnic relations within multiethnic states provide room to discuss the nature of ethnicity as such as well as relations between ethnic groups in practical categories, which inevitably deal with the relations of unequal power distribution, ideology and common sense.

For this study, I am particularly interested in the ways ethnic and national differences are articulated and reflected in discourse, rather than in theoretical differences between cultural and civic forms of national identities. The meanings of these terms may vary across the types of discourses imposed by certain ideological frameworks dominant in the particular historical and cultural settings and, therefore, should be taken into consideration during the analysis of the media discourse.

1.1.4. ETHNICITY, RACISM AND HATE SPEECH

Ethnic and cultural diversity is a worldwide phenomenon, enacted in discourse and communication. Members of ethnic groups often refer to each other and to member of other groups in terms of cultural differences, ethnic and racial divides. However, as Van Dijk, Ting-Toomey, Smitherman and Troutman argue, differences between groups are framed in accordance with the existing unequal power relations and resources which different groups have. They claim that these differences are used “as a legitimation to dominate or to marginalize other groups” (van Dijk et al. 1997: 145). Moreover, scholars claim that the concept of “race”, widely used in public discourse in many contexts, is not a biological, but a completely socially-constructed term (Shnirelman 2005) deeply rooted in a commonsensical perception of differences in skin colour, which causes unequal social position of people of different appearances in society. Similarly, authors propose to use the terms (ethnic or racial) “minority” and “majority” not as a numerical characteristic of a group, but as a reflection of dominance and unequal access to social and political resources (van Dijk et al 1997: 146).
Therefore, Van Dijk et al. define “racism” as a complex system of ethnic and 'racial' domination, which may come in more blatant or subtle forms. It also involves a set of discriminatory practices, including discursive ones, as well as a set of attitudes and ideologies supporting these practices (1997: 165).

These attitudes and beliefs, most importantly, provide “tacit legitimation of the power exercised by the dominant group” (van Dijk 1989: 202). More specifically, it may also take such forms of discrimination as ethnocentrism, xenophobia or anti-Semitism, but all of them result in social and political domination of ones group over another, unequal access to material goods, representation in media and political spheres.

Where cultural and ethnic differences incorporated into the media, the tendency is to offer an impersonal, passive view, with minorities given an active voice only in the context of violence, comic relief or stereotypes (Jakubowicz 1994: 185)

Most importantly, discourse plays an equally crucial role in the reproduction of and resistance to this system. Obviously, minority groups do not enjoy the same level of access to the mainstream media and other forms of public discourse as does the majority. However, the authors state, they can create their own forms of public expression as well as media platforms such as online and social media outlets, books etc. to counteract the dominant ideological frameworks promoted by the power-holding elites.

In the modern era of “political correctness”, racism, however, did not disappear. Discourses of racism, chauvinism are still present and sometimes bubble to the surface or appear in sanitized forms (Hall 1997). There are number of techniques developed by media experts to monitor the use of derogatory rhetoric and hate speech in public discourses, including the media. It is worth noting that there is no single definition of hate speech, as it comes in the multiplicity of forms. Hate speech in its most broad definition is any type of expression that denies the principle of equality for every individual. Hate speech describes and defines a hierarchy between various groups of people and evaluates the individual features of people based on their belonging to certain groups (Fedorovych et al. 2011).

Ann Veber uses the following definition of hate speech recommended by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers. In this broad definition hate speech means all forms of expression with spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms hatred based on intolerance... including discrimination and hostility against minorities and migrants, people of immigrant origin” (2009: 3). These expressions can be directed against an individual, as well as against a group of people. This definition utilized by the Council of Europe is quite general and doesn't provide a comprehensive set of criteria of public expressions, which fall under this definition.

However, with regard to the media sphere such criteria have been developed. For instance, a Russian information-analytical centre called “SOVA” which
specializes in the monitoring of hate speech aimed at migrants, ethnic and religious minorities in the Russian media, offers the following methodological approach to monitoring of hate speech in the media texts. Even though their methodology is targeted at pointing out, among other features, derogatory wording, basic structure and tone of the text, the authors argue that their method enables only general conclusions about the level of hate speech in the media during a certain period. They distinguish between three types of hate speech – tough, medium and soft – and additionally divide all cases into 17 types of hate speech in the media (Kozhevnikova 2007: 12-14). For instance, open calls for violence and discrimination against an ethnic or religious group, according to this method, are attributed to the tough type of hate speech; justification of the historical cases of violence and discrimination against a minority group to the medium type; and the creation of a negative image of a minority group or the use of offensive and derogatory comments about a minority group or statements about a group's cultural or political inferiority are considered soft cases of hate speech. As the authors state, both groups and individuals can be objects of hate speech. Obviously, this method allows tracing and coding only explicit forms of hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric in the media.

In their hate speech monitoring report, Fedorovych et al. argue that hate speech could take direct and indirect forms. In direct or open hate speech, the objects of hate are named, while indirect forms tend to discuss the division of people into groups and speak about superiority of some groups over others. In other cases, indirect forms of hate speech may point to invincible differences among the groups because of their historical or cultural background. Frequently, as authors argue, indirect forms of hate speech are rooted in journalistic practices, when negative images of the groups appear in the media texts unintentionally or due to the lack of critical awareness of their own prejudices and words their use to describe the events (Fedorovych et al. 2011: 21).

1.1.5. IDEOLOGY, COMMON SENSE AND POWER RELATIONS

I will now discuss another set of fundamental concepts within the discourse theory. These are the notions of ideology, power and common sense.

In this study, I will use the post-structuralist definitions of power. The notion of common sense is closely connected to the nature of power and often used by the power-holders to control those less-powerful subjects. As Barry Hindes argues, the post-modern understanding of power involves not only patterns of coercion but also consent. The author states: “power is involving not only the capacity but the right to act, capacity and rights are seen to rest on the consent of those over whom the power is exercised (Hindes 1996: 1). As Herbert Markuse argues in this regard, propaganda through the media has turned liberties of modern societies into a “power instrument of domination” (Markuse 1968: 21), preventing individuals from recognising their real interests (Lukes 2005).
Theoretical basis of concept of power has been also laid by Michel Foucault. Both critical discourse analysis and post-structuralist schools apply Foucauldian implications on ideology and power. Foucault states that power does not operate by repression alone and that knowledge is one of the most powerful instruments of power (Macdonald 2003: 33). He sees knowledge not as an object, but as a process continually evolving through the practice of discourse. The access to knowledge informs social identities and shapes specific relations of dominance within discourse. As identities are constructed through power, people are placed into specific relations of control and dependence (e.g. doctor and patient, teacher and students), of institutionalized set of discursive strategies and practices that shape these relations. Thus, dominance in discourse is an immanent effect of power (Fairclough 2001b). Foucault underlines both productive and repressive aspects of power. According to him, power works through normalising regulation – self-correction in the face of discursively constructed truths; and through disciplinary techniques – institutional regulations and punishment (Foucault 1995).

Further, it should be stressed that discourse theory steps away from classical Marxist definition of ideology as “false consciousness”, the integrated and coherent set of ideas that serve to represent the domination of the ruling social groups as natural and inevitable. In discourse theory, ideology can be broadly defined as a set of ideas that represent a certain vision of the world, a way of understanding social relations and defining social realities. But ideologies are not fixed or static; they are constantly in the process or change and antagonism.

Discourse theory implies that ideology is driven by will to power and aims to establish a particular way of thinking by imposing particular meanings. Richardson aptly formulated the relations between ideology and power as “meanings that contribute to (re)production of unequal power relations” (2007: 240).

Noteworthy, as Myra MacDonald (2003) pinpoints, if a certain ideology achieves dominance within a specific cultural context, it is no longer referred to as “ideology”, but will turn to “common sense” or self-evident truth. Thus, the goal of ideology is to gain implicit consent. Norman Fairclough states that ideologies are embedded in discourse features, which are accepted as common sense (1989: 77).

Common sense is one of the central concepts of discourse theory. Kulyk (2011) refers to Shultz's definition of common sense as a set of implicit assumptions and expectations about the nature of the world and the role of an individual in it. These assumptions are reproduced in social interactions along the lines of unproblematic compliance with the socially accepted norms and patterns of behaviour.

In addition, common sense, as Fairclough argues, is an important cognitive instrument, by means of which a text is interpreted by its audience. Common
sense assumptions and expectations about the text work as a type of connection between parts of text as well as between different texts, informing their coherence (1989: 78). The process of gap-filling in this case is based on implicit assumptions about the meanings coded in the text and allows a person to decipher these meanings linking the sequence of sentences into a logical frame according to interpreter’s cultural and social background (Fairclough 1989: 81). The gaps left in the discourse for the audience to fill out according to their commonsensical beliefs can also help the interpreter to understand which ideological assumptions are presupposed to be commonly shared (Kulyk 2006: 283). In this regard, Stuart Hall pointed out the following: “You cannot learn through common sense how things are, you can only discover where they fit into existing scheme of things” (1997: 325).

Furthermore, the media discourse, Richardson states, mediates the relations between the dominant ideology and the public by the character of its news content. This dominance is executed by means of naturalization process, when a set of common sense implications shared by the journalists is imposed on the media audiences (2007: 36). However, Fairclough notes that relations between the ideological nature of common sense and power relations can vary in different discourses. The system of group dominance within a particular society and discourse is a contingent and fragile state of affairs, because the utter ideological control over the meanings is undermined by constant ideological struggle (1989: 88-90), which causes a certain degree of ideological diversity. He argues that “existing language practices are reflecting the victories and defeats of the past struggles”, leading to normalization of certain dominated discourse practices to the extent that they become considered one of the legitimate possible options of expression together with a dominant one. In turn, “ideologies become common sense, when discourses which embody them become naturalized” (1989: 92).

Taking into account constant struggle between various ideologies in society, common sense often does not provide only one possible norm of an object or its meaning. It is rather a process which involved normalization of a certain range of possible options, which are considered normal' under the given ideological frame. In this regard, media discourse is an important milieu of (re)production of 'what is normal', as well as it takes part in construction of the limits of 'normality' by shaping the meaning of 'abnormal', 'unacceptable' or 'problematic' (Kulyk 2006). Processes of agenda setting, often dominated by the ruling elites, shape the audience’s assumptions about what can be taken for granted, what is just common sense.

1.1.6. MEDIA DISCOURSE

Mass media communication has a set of specific features, which differs it from other types of communication. Firstly, the time and place of media production is different from the time and place of its consumption. Therefore, the process of
encoding and decoding of the media message goes through a chain of communicative acts, which include encoding of the media text by producers, within certain knowledge framework, relations and technical means of production. Similarly, the process of text decoding carried out by media consumers also takes place within a cultural context and knowledge framework shared by the media audience (Hall 1993: 94). The transmitting process also may involve a certain level of distortion, and a lack of accordance between the codes may be a result of structural and relational differences in the positions of producers and consumers. However, Hall (1993) argues, most of the perception codes are naturalized by the consumers at an early age, which turns the process of codes consumption into a natural habit, facilitating the ideological impact of the media production codes on the mass audiences. Each ideology, according to van Dijk, needs “production and reproduction through text and talk, which is – in our modern times – largely generated and mediated through the mass media” (1993: 28).

One of the most important features of media discourse, and more specifically the news discourse, is that it does not only describe events, but also actively constructs them. As van Dijk argues, there are many factors influencing this process: production routines, values behind them, corporate interests infiltrated into the news by the media owners, professional ideologies and standards, media formats and genres. These and many other features influence the way media report the social reality.

Richardson points out that mediatized discourses are institutionally based, as they are produced and disseminated by media institutions according to their established practices and therefore reflect their values. As Richardson argues, media discourse is a specific type of discourse which should be considered in terms of functions it fulfils, production techniques it employs, relations with other social agencies and institutional settings within which it is taking place (2007: 76). One of the most important features, according to van Dijk, is what he calls “symbolic power” of the media (1989: 203) to produce the dominant ideological frameworks and thus legitimize the power-holding elites, manufacturing a social consensus. However, it is important to draw the line between political discourse per se and the political discourse as reported in the media. Kateryna Serazhym defines political discourse as a separate linguistic milieu, consisting of the corpus of discursive practices, servicing the needs of the respective practices of politics. She argues that one of the key features of political discourse is its declarative nature, meaning that the genres like declarations, persuasive and position statements dominate within this type of discourse and are always overtly ideological. But it is crucial to take into consideration that even the positions of what she calls “critical opposition” are not necessarily reported critically by the media, but frequently are simply replicated without any questioning or challenging (Serazhym 2000). To refer to such non-reflective and non-critical stance of the media with regard to the reporting of the political discourse, Kulyk uses the term “the frame of the
appropriate functioning of the authorities”, meaning that when a media outlet informs about an event without providing its own definition thereof, it adds to the reproduction of the ideological positions and agenda promoted by the political subjects (2010: 258). He argues this discursive strategy is used predominantly to frame the events or statements related to the incumbent authorities.

Van Dijk argues that journalists and mainstream media demonstrate great orientation towards the meanings and definitions of the social reality (including the definition of the relations with ethnic minorities within the society) as provided by the dominant elites and their institutions. Minorities traditionally have less access to media discourse and if they do, are often left with no voice, as they are reported about in terms imposed by the power-holding majority (1989: 204-205). Given the mass character of the media audiences, predominantly one-sided nature of mass media communication and the strength of the media influence on popular beliefs, there is a constant interest to control its messages and content and to limit access to media channels. Even in cases when media formats provide room to the voices of 'ordinary' people and minority representatives, there is still a high level of professional and institutional control over the actual media output (Fairclough 1995: 40).

In democratic societies, the media sphere should play the role of a public arena for the representation and discussion of various social interests and positions. However, modern ownership schemes and profit-orientated models of media production have changed the nature and functions of the modern media discourse. Due to their great ideological and persuasive power over mass audiences, media often become subjects of political and corporate-backed manipulation in a broad sense. By manipulation Denis McQuail means the systematic favouring of one position over another in the process of news reporting. In his theory of the media bias, McQuail defines bias as “a consistent tendency to depart from the straight path of objective truth” (1992: 191). The author distinguishes between open and hidden, intended and unintended types of news bias. Ideological bias, according to McQuail, pertains to features of hidden and unintended bias, when journalists’ naturalized beliefs and assumptions shape the reporting in a biased way. However, as Shoemaker and Reese rightly point out, the measurement of bias is quite problematic, as there are no suitable references, with which media content can be reliable compared, as there are no ideal standards of news objectivity (1996: 41). Journalists are key gatekeepers in the process of news gathering and prioritizing, based predominantly on the set of assumptions about newsworthiness and supposed audience’s interests. Nevertheless, being a highly contested milieu, authors state that certain balance in media reporting is possible, providing comparable media space to different social actors and their positions in terms of number of news pieces, their lengths, soundbites and quotations, etc.
1.1.7. MEDIA AND MEMORY

In this section I will focus on a number of theoretical concepts, such as history, memory, narrative, commemoration and the relations between media and memory, which are central for the study of historical narratives represented in the Ukrainian media discourse.

**History and memory**

Memory is one of the central concepts in the study of the media representation of the historical narratives of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation of 1944.

I share a social-constructivist approach to the concept of memory, which states that each society constructs its recollections of the past and historical sentiments in the course of social interaction, which Maurice Halbwachs calls the process of “making of memory” (cited in Uehling 2004: 11). The construction of memory includes not only a certain set of historical events and characters to remember, but also a scope of meanings and values according to which these events are defined. The collective memory is defined as structured experiences of the past shared with other members of the group, the shared ideas of the past (Wingfield 2000).

The founder of the term “collective memory” Maurice Halbwachs argued that social groups construct their image of the world by constantly sharing and reshaping versions of their past (Neigel et al. 2011: 3). This process is crucial for the construction of collective identities and often means that different groups share different memories of the past or different interpretations of it. I share the basic assumption that every social group develops its own “collective memory” of the past in order to preserve its self-image, emphasize the uniqueness of its past and – more importantly – of its future compared to other groups. The memory of the past cannot be separated from the present, where groups constantly share or re-shape the events of the past to serve their current political and ideological needs (Uehling 2004: 12). Being a social and cultural phenomenon, collective memory is accumulated on various levels. Another notable scholar in the field of memory studies, Jan Assman distinguishes between two forms of memory – everyday “communication memory” and “cultural memory”. While everyday memory is a collection of memories and stories greatly influenced by people who experienced them, cultural memory is an officially sanctioned heritage of a society, which consists of the artefacts of culture. The crystallization of collectively shared popular meanings and knowledge of the past is a prerequisite for their transmission into the culturally institutionalized heritage, the cultural memory of society (Assman 1995: 130).

Sasha Torres uses term “national memory” to refer to the “the institutionally procedured and mass-circulated refuguration of the nation’s public past” as opposed to “popular memory”, recollections of the past produced and circulated by individuals, “the place where public and private pasts meet” (1995:150). Wingfield underlines the crucial role of power relations in the process of
construction of the national memory. She speaks of the processes of socially organized forgetting (which may include exclusion and suppression) and remembering (which in the other hand means deliberate emphasis and popularization of certain details or elements) imposed by the elites (2000: 246).

**Commemoration**

The term “collective memory” implies not only certain patterns of remembering the past by a social group, but also various practices of its commemoration. The politics of memory established and maintained by the social institutions of power has two major goals – the legitimization of the current political domination and the construction of national identity.

Practices of commemoration include various forms of public rituals and ceremonies, public speeches and texts (poems, anthems, books, media texts), visuals and images, naming practices as well as various cultural objects like monuments, commemoration sites etc. Besides of the officially authorized and sustained commemoration practices, Vinitzky-Seroussi argues, commemoration also manifests itself in the informal, often unintentional forms of everyday “banal commemoration” (2011: 52).

The officially established commemoration ceremonies, appropriated by the local and national authorities, aimed at recalling and preserving “versions of historical events”, make up an integral part of the politics of memory (Wingfield, 2000: 249). The national memory is shaped by the political elite by means of narratives of the past intended to legitimize the nation state. Nancy Wingfield calls this process creating the memory of “acceptable past” (2000: 246).

**Media and memory**

Many scholars have emphasized a decisive role of the mass media in shaping the collective recollections of the past (e.g. Huyssen, 2000; Theobald 2004). Neigel et al. state that public articulation and discussion of the interpretations of the past is “an inherently mediated phenomenon” (2011: 3). According to Klinger-Vilenchik, collective memory works as a source through which the current social agenda is discussed and addressed by the media (2011: 229). Journalists use past events to draw parallels with the current affairs, to cover anniversaries of the past events and to apply historical contexts in the commentaries. Thus, they create a certain memory agenda in the media.

Generally speaking, the analysis of historical narratives is no longer possible without taking into consideration the representation of history in the media discourse. John Theobald argues that the modern age media discourse “has moved from footnotes to the central object of analysis” (2004: 1). He proposes to use the term “newstoriography” as a contemporary form of “historiography” to unmask the interrelations between “mediatized” popular history and journalism. He argues quite critically that “the present history provided to the audiences has been filtered through for the public and often contains (deliberately or accidentally) elements of distortion or lies” (2004: 6). Looking
at the role of the media in constructing of national memory, Sasha Torres argues that the commercial and profit-oriented model, which lies in the basis of the contemporary media systems, builds up constrains in historical thinking and “promotes the annihilation of memory”, when personal memories and emotions are used as substitutes for historical narratives and political analysis ” (1995: 149). Both researchers speak about the hegemonic historical narrative, which mass media serve, construct and help to uphold and which provides the commonsensical ideological constructs, “the “lessons of history”, which justify future actions and policies often based on misinterpretations or even deliberate misappropriations” (Theobald 2004: 6).

In spite of the prominent role of the elites controlling the mainstream media discourse in the process of selection and framing of the past and present events, it is worth mentioning counter-discourses that limit the power and influence of the dominant discourse and provide space for counter-arguments and challenge the majority-accepted, seemingly commonsensical perception of history and therefore its implications for the present and future. The national Crimean Tatar media discourse on the deportation and an alternative narrative of this historical event it constructs and promotes for their audiences serves an example of such counter-hegemonic discourse and will be analysed further in this study.

Taking on board the fundamental “mediated” nature of the collective memory, I argue that it makes sense to study the collective memories of deportation and their impact on the construction of the Crimean Tatars national identity through the analysis of the media representations of this historical event.

Neigel et al. (2011: 4-5) point out a number of characteristic features of collective memory, which is worth summarizing for the present research:

1. Collective memory is a social-political construct, a version of the shared past, which has been selected by the given community to remember.

2. Construction of the collective memory is an ongoing and continuous process and is characterized by the constant movement from the past to the present and from the present to the past – the interpretation of the past defines today's decisions and the current context guides our reading of the past.

3. Collective memory is functional – it serves various purposes, defining the features of the groups and its internal and external social structure. Particular versions of the collective recollections serve to explain or justify past or present-day decisions, claim rights or status.

4. Collective memory is narrational – it is structured within the given cultural frames. Authors also argue that the narrative structure of memories allows inserting stories with lessons and morals for the present and future generations.
1.2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The methods used in the current study can be divided into two large groups: methods of data collection and methods of data analysis. Section on the methods of data collection includes a brief description of expert interviews gathered for this research.

Section on the methods of data analysis primarily discusses critical discourse analysis, a major methodological approach used in the present research. Additionally, I will briefly discuss content analysis and frame analysis, as well as some elements of narrative analysis, which will be used to approach mediatized personal stories and recollections of the Crimean Tatar deportation survivors.

1.2.1. Methods of data collection

1.2.1.1. Principles of the media texts selection

The selection of the texts for detailed analysis is the main method of data collection in this study. The corpus of the media texts chosen from Ukrainian newspapers and online media outlets is the primary data of the study which is used to examine the presentations of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian media discourse. The primary unit of analysis is a single media text – a piece of news, an analysis, an interview or a feature story.

The process of the media text selection has been guided by a number of criteria. First of all, as Krippendorff argues, the selected body of texts for analysis has to be manageable and representative (1980: 111).

The first stage of selection process includes the selection of sources - the list of media outlets, which match the selection criteria and reflect the research questions. The process of sampling includes decisions about relevant and irrelevant texts, which should be made by a researcher in accordance with the research questions or hypothesis. Sampling techniques, according to Krippendorff (1980), may include random sampling, stratified random sampling or systematic sampling. In each of the sampling techniques chosen for the analysis, the principles of validity, reliability and objectivity must be followed.

In the current study the sources are divided into two main groups: national media outlets and Crimean regional media outlets. Further, within this large group, the sampling procedures need to be employed. In order to conduct sampling of the media texts, that contain references to the Crimean Tatars, cluster sampling is the most appropriate technique. Krippendorff argues, that cluster sampling is most applicable to the situations when the researcher can not enumerate all the units for analysis, but rather aims to explore certain issue (1980: 117). Within the cluster of texts selected, the researcher then codes and analyses systematically all the units, that are relevant to the research question and fit the designated timeframe. However, because the body of the media texts on the Crimean Tatars may be too large to analyse, the list of the media outlets,
selected for the detailed analysis was limited according to the principle of representative stratification. In the choice of the specific media outlets I have followed the principles of diversity of types of media (daily, weekly), language preferences (Russian or Ukrainian) and variety of audience orientations of the media outlets (pro-Ukrainian audience or bearers of pro-Russian sentiments). All the chosen media outlets enjoy leading positions on the Ukrainian media market and, therefore, their media content is being consumed by large audiences across Ukraine.

1.2.1.2. Expert interviews

Expert interviews are a specific type of interviews, used in social research to explore a specific field or an issue. This method is used when the search aims at a specific type of information, which could be obtained from people, who have a certain type of expertise in the field and can provide an informed and well-grounded answers in a required form. Expert interviews, according to Kryzhanovskiy, are used to explore an underdeveloped or understudied field or in order to conduct an evaluation or general diagnostics of an issue (1992: 3).

An expert, in this method, is a person possessing certain field-specific knowledge and having strong analytical skills. As Dorussen et al. state, experts are “a valuable source of the ‘inside’ information about the policymaking” (2005: 317) and can shed light to the internal logic of the processes.

Kryzhanovskiy speaks about two strategies of expert selection process: objective (based on the sphere of expertise, motivation and experience in the field) and subjective (based on face-value validity, mutual expert evaluation and recommendations). Depending on the researcher's resources and research goals, expert interviews can be conducted in different formats – personal oral interviews, written questionnaires or expert group meetings. Interviews can be conducted once or scheduled in a number of stages, repeated over a certain period of time. Quite often expert interviews are used to evaluate or analyse characteristic features of certain phenomena, provide classification or ranging of the research subjects according to the provided scale or indicators (Kryzhanovskiy 1992: 9).

On the other hand, Dorussen et al. evaluate the validity of expert interviews in social sciences and make a number of important remarks. Obviously, the reliability of the research findings gathered by means of expert interviews depends on the quality of expertise involved in the study. The authors raise the question about the inter-expert reliability of the data obtained from expert interviews. They argue that reliability of data sets limits to the validity of the research outcomes based on it (2005: 318). In order to ensure a higher probability of an agreement on the most important issues, it makes sense to increase the number of experts in the sample, taking into account their various levels of competence. In addition, their study demonstrates that experts are more likely to provide valid data and demonstrate a higher level of agreement with
regard to the salient issues. By salient issues, the researchers mean the list of the most important issues or factors, which can describe the analysed problem, as identified by the experts themselves (Dorussen et al. 2005: 330). In order to identify the list of salient issues, the open-ended questions should be included into the questionnaires or interview questions.

1.2.2. Methods of data analysis

1.2.2.1 Critical discourse analysis

As I mentioned earlier, critical discourse analysis is a major methodological framework used in this study. The coding and interpretation of media materials related to the Crimean Tatars will be conducted according to the principles of Critical discourse analysis (CDA) developed by Norman Fairclough, Teun Van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, John Richardson and other scholars, who have established the institutionally developed critical approach to discourse firmly connected with social interactions.

Critical discourse analysis presents linguistic conventions as a result of social relations, in particular relations of power and social antagonism within discourse (Fairclough 2001b).

The term ‘critical’ stands as the main goal of the CDA is not only to describe and interpret the use of language under various social conditions, but to expose and criticise the existing vices of society, its inequality and discrimination expressed through discourse. It is critical in the sense that the researchers are committed to progressive social change, have the ‘emancipatory knowledge interest’ (Fairclough 2001b: 230). Norman Fairclough argues that the main objective of CDA is to expose the ‘non-obvious ways in which language is involved in social relations of power and domination, and in ideology’ (2001b: 229). CDA also seeks to investigate linguistic and semiotic aspects of social and personal identities.

Critical discourse analysis focuses on the semiotic structure of text, productive work which texts perform with regard to social interactions, and the ongoing relationships between texts and these interactions (Fairclough 2001a). On the structural level, the analytical model of CDA involves functional linguistics, or being 'functional', in terms of Fairclough, as it “sees and analyses a language as shaped (even in its grammar) by the social functions it has come to serve” (2001a: 126).

Fairclough states that practices of discourse are ideological and used for naturalization of systematically constructed meanings, that is, for the construction of common sense. Social and ethnic groups produce their discourses to maintain hegemonic power or to create counter-hegemony in society.

Turning to methodological framework of CDA, Fairclough identifies two levels of analysis within CDA:
1. Analysis of the discursive aspects of social interaction.

2. Actual analysis of texts.

I shall look at these two levels in more detail.

Analysis of the discursive aspects of social interaction is based on the revealing and discussion of the ways in which one group dominates over another and discursive means that are used to keep up their hegemony. Antonio Gramsci (1971) defines hegemony as ‘the success of the dominant classes in presenting their definition of reality, their view of the world’, and stresses the exercise of power through achieving consent, not mere coercion. The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. When the discourse of domination of one social group comes to be seen as the only possible way to perceive the world, it means it has been accepted by other groups as 'common sense'.

Based on the notion of hegemony, Fairclough points out a number of key terms within discourse theory. He argues that social life consists of networks of social practices which, in turn, are anchored with corresponding discursive practices, which discourse analysis seeks to explore and explain. Thus the construction of meaning is an inherent part of every social practice. Networks of social practices, constituted in a particular way, make up the social order. Semiotic part of such order is referred to as the order of discourse. Fairclough (1995) defines the order of discourse as the social ordering of relations among various discourse and genres in which meanings are constructed. As Fairclough points out, media is an external mediator between public and private orders of discourse, and, at the same time, takes part in constant reshaping of the relationships between these social practices (1995: 63). Another term adjacent to the order of discourse is the type of discourse, which, according to Fairclough, stands for a relatively stabilized set of genres and discourses within a specific order of discourse.

Discourses are ordered under the principle of dominance defining which ways of making meaning will become mainstream and which will be marginalized. In order to legitimize and sustain the domination of a certain discourse over another, dominant discourses aim to reach the level of common sense – naturalize its particular way of creation of meanings.

However, these relations are not fixed or stable, as the hegemony of a particular discourse is being constantly contested in hegemonic struggle. One of the important objectives of CDA is to investigate how existing social divisions may facilitate strategies of domination with the help of dominant discourses. In this regard, Fairclough introduces the notion of ideology as a powerful mechanism of sustaining the relations of domination between various social actors in society.

Text is also seen as ‘part of the process of producing social life’ (Fairclough 2001b: 240). It should be noted that Fairclough uses the term text in a very
broad way. He refers to written texts (articles, interviews), audio–visual materials (radio, television programs) as well as to actual conversations as to texts suitable for the analysis of social interaction. As written texts or television programs are oriented on the specific audience and certain response, therefore, they can be considered interactive.

The aims of interactive analysis are to study the internal linguistic and semiotic structure of the text and to trace how the mentioned characteristics of the text are connected to actual social interaction, how the inter-discursive work of text is reflected in the linguistic and semiotic figures in the text (Fairclough 2001a).

Methodologically, interaction analysis looks at texts in two major dimensions: choices made among possible alternatives and cohesion of the texts and its parts. Choices made by the speakers are limited by the orders of discourse, certain genres, conventions or linguistic structures available. As for cohesion, different elements of the text can be combined in particular chains and sequences, which locally reproduce existing or make up novel representations of the world, social relations, identities etc.

Jan Blommaert defines the key object of discourse analysis as voice – the way in which people use language in the interaction to express their thoughts, using discursive means at their disposal within a particular context under given conditions of use. Blommaert argues that the notion of voice is influenced by linguistic inequality. Thus the subject of investigation of CDA is expressions of voice under limitations imposed by the current socio-cultural and linguistic norms and exercise of power (2005: 5). Another concept used as a tool for analysis in this regard is agency of social actors. Specifically for media discourse analysis, agency serves as an important marker of representation of the power inequality in discourse.

Agency of social actors presented in the media discourse points to their role in the described processes, which can be active or passive. It also represents the dominant group’s perspective reported by journalists, active agency granted to the minority groups often means placing responsibility for the described negative actions (such as street fights or crime) on them. Alternatively, passive agency used in news texts and headlines mitigate their active role in politics and decision-making (van Dijk et al. 1997: 166). Linguistically, the agency of social actors in discourse is realized by means of passive or active voice or by the use of verbs, which refer to various types of actions: passive - like “rely”, “ask” and active - “demand” or “initiate”. Van Dijk also points out that in media discourse authorities primarily hold active agency, presented as “solving problems” and “controlling”, while the minority groups are often portrayed as passive recipients of support and causing problems (1989: 213).

Wodak et al. (2009) indicate the key tasks of the critical discourse analysis as follows: to identify constructive, justifying strategies which are primarily determined by the dominating power distribution patterns; to point out key
counter-strategies of dismantlement and transformation; to explore the relations between linguistic forms and structures and discursive practices which define them; to explore the relations between discursive actions and existing social structures, political institutions etc.

CDA shares the idea that discourse as social practice reflects cultural differences in the process of intergroup and intragroup communication (Van Dijk et al 1997: 147). It aims to explore these differences in various contextual matters such as norms and values shared by the groups taking part in such communication and to study ideologies and power relations as they shape collective and individual identities of the group members. The analysis of these differences may include linguistic (grammatical) and conversational structures, rhetoric and narratives, argumentation schemata, themes and genres and other properties of text and talk.

Another important task of CDA is the exploration of social and political context of these interactions as well as the analysis of social institutions that promote or oppose the dominant ideological implications of interethnic and intercultural differences within a society. In this regard, authors distinguish between the dominant (state, governing bodies, churches or schools) and the oppositional institutions (these could be universities, media outlets, non-government organizations etc.) (van Dijk et al. 1997: 148).

The discourse historical approach to the discourse analysis, which was developed by the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis headed by Ruth Wodak, takes into account the historical dimension of discursive acts, “embedding discursive events into historical background” as well as tracing diachronic changes which specific types of discourse undergo during a specific period of time. Rooted in the assumption that discursive acts are closely connected with social institutions and social context which shape and affect them, this approach perceives discourse as a form of social practice (Wodak et al. 1999: 8). In this regard, the discourse historical approach also features a broader analysis of the discourse of a certain historical period (i.e. four years of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych) and in-depth study of the historical and political context in a close relation with discourse, its patterns of distribution of power relations etc. Wodak et al. (2009) point out the importance of study of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of discourse. Synchronic analysis means analysis of various sources reporting the same events (for instance, a comparison of representation of a certain event by the media outlets of various ideological orientations). Diachronic analysis investigates the development of a pattern or a discursive practice over time.

Among additional methods of textual analysis in this study, I will use elements of framing analysis and narrative analysis. I will now present the conceptual frameworks of the mentioned methods.

1.2.2.2. Framing and agenda-setting analysis
The object of my analysis lies within the domain of media discourse, a specific type of discourse possessing specific features. Therefore, the combination of methodological approaches of discourse analysis and media studies is appropriate to investigate the impact of the media on the social reality.

Paul Jalbert makes an important remark that media analysis is not aimed at uncovering which meanings particular audiences perceive, but to study the meanings which could be achieved by virtue of the text organization, and to make arguments about kinds of understanding derived from a specific media text (Jalbert 1999, 32).

Issues of identity construction in/by the media also may be approached using the methodological tools of the media studies. In particular, I will focus on two central concepts of the theory of media effects – agenda-setting and framing. These two concepts describe the interplay between the media content and the social beliefs and opinions of their audience.

**Agenda setting**

One of the central terms of the media studies – the agenda setting function of the media should be characterized here as it will be used to conceptualize the construction of identity in the media. McCombs generally calls agenda setting a process of selection and presentation of events and issues by the media to the public.

Protess and McCombs (1991) define agenda-setting analysis as the study of groups of texts, which influence the audience cumulatively. The analysis is targeted on the procedures of prioritization of certain topics and themes in the news programs. The editors and journalists not only report the news, they focus audience’s attention on what they believe is the most important events of the day, creating a set of issues for the public discussion. McCombs emphasizes a link between the media agenda and public agenda – he states that the public uses the news in the order of importance imposed by the media to organize its own lists of important issues to discuss (McCombs 2004, 2). In other words, the media set the public agenda. Thus, we can talk about the agenda-setting function of the media as one of the manifestations of power relations, which impose a set of priority issues for public discussion. Van Dijk et al argue in this regard that “prevailing topics in the media influence the agenda, that is, what public thinks and talks about” (van Dijk et al 1997, 168).

It is important also to mention, however, that the audience, while influenced by the media content, is not a passive recipient of the news. McCombs emphasizes the central role of the media in placing events and issues in the limelight of the public discussion. On the other hand, the concept of selective perception emphasizes a selective and critical approach to consumption of the news content by the representatives of the media audience (McCombs 2004, 6). McCombs shares an argument that individuals perceive information according to their internal attitudes and tend to avoid content that doesn’t correspond to their
preferences. According to this theory, journalists often formulate the media content, taking into consideration opinions of their audience. Thus, I prefer to share the vision of the mutual interplay between news and audience’s reaction, and view the one-sided paradigm of the media effects critically.

McCombs sees the roots of the agenda-setting function in storytelling, “linking journalism and its tradition of storytelling to the arena of public opinion” (McCombs 2004, 14). This connotation with storytelling is important to mention as it gives us links with the notion of a narrative, which will be briefly characterized later.

**Framing**

Framing analysis has developed within the broader social constructivist paradigm in the media studies and has become one of the most commonly used research approach in media and communication studies (van Gorp 2007). This methodological paradigm focuses on the cognitive effects of the mass media and its role in the construction of the social reality. McQuail argues that the mass media have a strong impact on reality by “framing images in the predictable and patterned way” (McQuail, 1994: 331).

Scheufele characterises frames within the theory of media affects, as “preexisting meaning structures and schemas”, frames or reference that readers and viewers use to interpret and discuss public events (Scheufele 1999, 105). This definition is quite similar to Fairclough's (1992) definition of the discursive practice, which includes not only a certain type of text and its organization, but also the processes of text production, distributing and consuming by the audience. Therefore, these concepts will be used as synonyms in the current study.

The framing school of media analysis focuses on the ways in which events and their contexts are represented in the media (Entman 1993). The theory of media frames is used to address the patterns of construction of identities by the media. In this regard, Van Gorp points out that frames usually conceived as rather subtle changes in wording, accompanied by great differences in meaning (van Gorp 2007).

According to Entman (1993) the process of framing is closely related to procedures of “selection and salience” (Entman 1993, 52), selecting certain aspects of reality and making them more salient in the media text.

Analysis of frames, explicitly or implicitly present in the text, allows to judge both about intentions of a writer as well as to trace possible effects the text has had on an audience. As van Gorp puts it, the shared repertoire of frames in culture provides a link between the news production and news consumption (van Gorp 2007, 61). Sharing the culture-bound approach to framing, van Gorp underlines that the core of framing lies in the process of social interaction of the media makers, their sources, media receivers with media content and with each other. Framing as a multi-layered interplay occurs at the textual level (media
frames), cognitive level (frames shared by the media makers and their audiences), extramedial level (frames of the actors, like spin doctors, advertisers or interest groups, influencing the media sphere, whom van Gorp calls “frame sponsors”) and finally, the meta-frames available in the shared culture (van Gorp 2007, 64).

Framing analysis is widely used in media studies to address the ways in which media discourse impacts the audience’s beliefs and attitudes. For instance, studies of the media representation of ethnic minorities prove that certain topics are permanently framed in a certain way. According to the findings of van Dijk et al, European media rarely frame the topic of immigration in neutral terms, but rather as “a problem” or “a fraud”, while religious differences, such as Islam, tend to be represented as deviance (van Dijk et al 1997: 168).

During the interaction between the mass media and their recipients, meanings of reality are constructed and contested. In this regard Scheufele (1999) calls for a specific attention to the interplay between the individual frames that people have and the frames imposed by the media. He argues these two levels of frames provide meanings, which often contest each other (Scheufele 1999: 106).

According to Scheufele, media frames also serve as an organizational routines for journalists allowing them to classify and identity information in the process of production of news and to package it according to their understanding of the audience’s needs. In other words, journalists use certain linguistic structures (such as wording, placement and repetition) to promote definitions, points of view and cause-effect relations of an event, producing or re-producing certain identities and characteristics attributed to them.

1.2.2.3. Narrative analysis

Narrative is another concept that needs to be discussed in detail in this chapter, together with methodological approaches to its analysis. Nick Lacey defines narrative as “a story, a logically connected sequence of events, developing chronologically” (Lacey 2000: 13). This logical nature of a narrative is underlined in the definition of Chris Newbold: “narrative implies relationships of cause and effect, which create a sequence of events” (Newbold 1998: 142).

The concept of narrative is crucial in approaching the issues of identity construction. Ulrike Meinhof provides the following definition of narrative: “Narrative is a process of understanding occurrences, experiences and social relationships by way of storying them, which includes selectivity, evaluation and the creation of links” (Meinhof 2002: 10-11). Meinhof sees narration as a basic process of identity, as it is closely related with self-understanding, attachment and belonging to a certain group.

Ruth Wodak (Wodak et al. 2009) also provides her vision of the national identity as a product of the discourse. She shares Stuart Hall’s definition of identity
through narratives. According to him, the national identity is constructed by the narratives of the national culture (cited in Wodak et al. 2009). Stuart Hall speaks about the following discursive strategies in the national culture narrations (Wodak et al. 2009: 23-25):

1. Narratives of the nation’s everyday life (everyday news, stories of “national destiny”, nation’s achievements etc),
2. Emphasis on origin, continuity and tradition of the nation,
3. Invention of traditions, symbols and rituals, common myths,
4. Portraits of original people, who possess characteristics of the national character, personal stories of the “true” members of the group.

The media play one of the leading roles, not only in channelling the existing narratives of a certain group, but also in shaping them. By actualizing some stories and silencing other ones, the media can create their own narratives, which, in turn, change the existing identities. For this reason, I plan to use the concept of narrative in my research and, by reconstructing the media narratives related to the Crimean Tatars, to track their relations with the exiting “popular” narratives. It is also possible to make assumptions about the interplay between the “popular” and “media” narratives and to speak about their impact on the construction of the collective identities.

Kulyk makes an important remark about the definition of the term “narrative”. While we define narrative as a story of the past with a certain structure, there are also meta-narratives, which can be defined as “a particular ideological patterns of making sense of the past events and relations between them” (Kulyk 2011: 291).

Despite the similarity of definition of a narrative, there are various approaches to its analysis.

Levi-Strauss examines binary oppositions in the narrative and their ideological impact, like frames good VS bad, us VS them, looking for identities and their relations. He argues that binary oppositions are often hierarchical and some of them are more dominant than others (Lacey 2000: 67). In this case, it makes sense to analyze the hierarchical structure of the dominant and counter narratives and compare their structure. At the same time, Sperry adds that the media tends to “dramatize” the events by bringing together the confronting sides or points of view (Sperry 1981: 304).

The historical and social context plays a crucial role in the analysis of narratives, because they have been produced by people, who had been both physically and psychologically displaced. In the further sections of this study, I will be examining the structure of the personal recollections of the deportation survivors, published by the media. The focus on displacement also allows exploring the relations of power and domination between both past and present political actors and to discuss the position of forcibly displaced ethnic groups and further marginalization by the dominant majorities, who control their right
to return. Dominant historical and modern public discourses often ignore, silence stories of the displaced minorities, who in turn use the narratives of displacement for resistance and maintaining their own national identity (De Fina and Baynham 2005).

Another important feature worth mentioning here is relations between narratives and institutional representations of the events. As we will see, personal narratives and official discourse constructs the described events differently, using different ideological frames, identities and agencies of the actors. For instance, personal recollections not only challenge the historical facts maintained by the official institutional discourse, but also tell their stories in high level of agency challenging the hegemonic power actors of the given historical period.

1.2.3. RESEARCH STRUCTURE

1.2.3.1. Research strategy and sampling

The following research structure was designed to reflect the multiplicity of approaches to study the representations of the Crimean Tatars in the media discourse. The study is developed to address the research objectives and comprises three stages: sample selection, contextualization and textual analysis. I will now discuss each stage in more detail.

It should be stated that at the stage of sample selection, each chapter of the dissertation uses its own data sample in accordance with the respective research questions.

The sample of the media texts selected for the chapter 3 comprises 700 relevant media materials for the period of 3 years from January 2010 to December 2012. The sample comprises 287 texts – from the all-Ukrainian media and 413 – from the Crimean mainstream media.

The sampling method employed for the data selection – systemic media monitoring using broad search by key words (for online archives of the media outlets, which have complete and working online archives) and page-by-page browsing (for the media outlets whose online archives are not complete or not working properly). The combination of these monitoring techniques ensures the high level of consistency of the gathered corpus of the media texts used for the research.

The criteria of the inclusion of media texts into the sample were the following:

1. The media texts that are fully or partly dedicated to the various issues of the Crimean Tatars’ political, social, cultural life, history and tradition.
2. The media texts that deal with the Crimean Tatar-related affairs among other issues of general importance mentioned in the text and contain direct references to the specific issues or names.
3. The media texts that contain relevant group or individual naming of the Crimean Tatar people and its representatives, provided in various contexts in the texts that are not necessarily dedicated to the Crimean Tatars’ themes.

The following list of the media outlets was chosen for the media monitoring. All-Ukrainian mainstream media outlets: daily newspapers “Ukraina Moloda” and “Segodnia”, weekly newspapers “Komentari” and “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia”, weekly magazines “Korrespondent” and “Focus”, and the top-rated online media “Ukrajinska Pravda”. Among the Crimean media outlets I choose three: “Krymskiye Izvestiya” and “Krymskiy Telegraph” daily newspapers and “1 Krymskaya” weekly. The combination of the different types of media outlets allows embracing greater variety of genres and subject-matters covered by various types of media outlets, which focus on various topic and package their information in various media formats.

Both popular dailies “Ukraina Moloda” and “Segodnia” feature the short genre of news and cover variety of issues from politics to lifestyle and culture, however, “Ukraina Moloda” is published only in Ukrainian and overtly demonstrates the pro-Ukrainian and pro-European ideological affiliations. On the contrary, “Segodnia” is published only in Russian and is oriented towards the Russian-speaking audiences, expressing pro-Russian sentiment and emphasizing historical and political ties with former Soviet republics.

Both weekly newspapers, chosen for textual analysis can be considered “intellectual media” or “broadsheets”, targeted on educated social classes, political and business elites. These media put a lot of emphasis on the analytical materials, expert opinions and forecasts in the spheres of politics and business. Both newspapers are published in both Russian and Ukrainian and maintain high quality extended web-versions of their media content, thereby attracting internet audiences. Ideologically, these media outlets maintain seemingly neutral ideological positions, stressing the balanced and objective character of their media content.

The inclusion of weekly magazines into the sample allowed embracing another set of media genres, such as reports, human stories, opinions etc. Both magazines “Korrespondent” and “Focus” during 2010-2012 were published in Russian and operated within the so-called “Newsweek” format, which means the main focus of the magazine is on politics, social and cultural events of the country and abroad.

Additionally, I added the top-rated internet media “Ukrainska Pravda” into the media sample. This leading online media outlet publishes both news materials (original and copied from other online media and information agencies) and original analytical articles, interviews and reports on the variety of political, social, economic and cultural spheres. Being an influential online media, its internet audience could be compared to the audiences of the popular paper-based
media outlets. “Ukrainska Pravda” made up 10.53% of the general coverage of the Ukrainian online population in December 2012.

As for the Crimean regional media, the similar principle of diversity was utilized: privately owned popular daily “Krymskiy Telegraph” publishes news on political and social life of Crimea and Ukraine in general, while “Krymskije Izvestiya”, an official medium of the Crimean Parliament, focuses primarily on the coverage of the current political decisions and events involving high Crimean state officials, and therefore, largely reflects state policies towards the variety of issues, including on the issues related to the Crimean Tatars during the analysed period of time. Crimean weekly “broadsheet” “1 Krymskaya”, similarly to the all-Ukrainian newspapers of the similar type, in 2010-2012 focused on the news and analytical materials and often provided critical reflections of the Crimean political life and, in addition, published materials on culture and traditions of the ethnic minorities of Crimea. All Crimean media outlets, chosen for the sample, are published in Russian.

The sample of the media texts selected for Chapter 4 of this study is based on the separate corpus of media texts, and is formed according to the different criteria. The sample of the media texts covers the period of 6 years from 2007 to 2012, focusing on the media texts published during the period of time directly related to the date when the Crimean Tatar people’s deportation is commemorated. For technological reasons the actual sampling period taken for analysis, is somewhat wider, and includes the media materials published between May 15 and 25 each year. This is done in order to include the materials published by the weekly media outlets that do not appear on the same day of the event. Additionally, some media outlets start publishing materials on the deportation a couple of days before the actual commemoration day, dedicating a series of stories to this topic.

For this sample of media texts the selection procedure was not limited to the specific list of the media outlets and covered all relevant media materials from the all-Ukrainian and Crimean media. The sampling was carried out with the help of the monitoring agency, which had access to the archives of the major Ukrainian media outlets, printed and electronic, as well as to paid subscriptions to the news feeds of the main national information agencies. Additionally, the consistency of the sample provided by the agency was double-checked manually by me by browsing the available online archives of the media outlets and, in some cases, by manual page-by-page monitoring of the paper versions of the newspapers.

As a result of the media monitoring, the sample for analysis in chapter 4 comprises 732 media texts: 184 from the national media, 167 media materials published during the given period in the Crimean mainstream media, and 381 – published in the Crimean Tatar ethnic media outlets. The monitoring includes

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1 According to the study by InMind. See more at [http://www.telekritika.ua/ratings/2013-01-24/78423](http://www.telekritika.ua/ratings/2013-01-24/78423)
national and regional Crimean daily and weekly newspapers, national and regional TV channels and information agencies. The language of all the media outlets is Ukrainian and Russian. The media outlets published in Crimean Tatar language were not included into the sample, due to lack of resources of ensuring of proper translation of these materials. The key criteria for including of the media texts into the study is mentioning of or direct references to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in various contexts.

Moving to the second stage of the research strategy, the contextualization, the following points should be made. Chapter two of the present study provides a detailed overview of the media sphere of Ukraine and Crimea in particular, in order to point out key features and characteristics of the political economy of the Ukrainian media market, its characteristics features and ideological affiliations. Additionally, the chapter seeks to discuss the production routines and conventions utilized by the media professionals to report the events related to the Crimean Tatars. In order to address these issues, I have used open sources of information about the structure of media ownership in Ukraine and its evolution, analytical materials about the state of freedom of speech in Ukraine during the analysed period as perceived by the leading Ukrainian media experts (like Ihor Kulyas, Otar Dovzhenko and Natalia Ryabinska) as well as findings received by interviewing the Crimean journalists and media experts. Additionally, the analysis of the ideological affiliations of the leading Ukrainian mainstream media holdings and media outlets were explored. The discussion of the contestation between broad ideological meta-narratives in Ukraine was also addressed in the chapter, allowing to fit media representations of the ethnic minority issues into the broader ideological frames of Ukrainian society and to explore the linguistic and institutional means of their realization.

It should be mentioned, that due to the scarcity of reliable academic and analytical sources about the characteristic features of the Crimean media sphere, I used semi-structured open-ended expert interviews with Crimean media experts as well as findings of the independent journalist investigations in order to gather the comprehensive set of data about media ownership schemes of the Crimean media outlets, their ideological affiliations and basic production patterns used by the Crimean journalists to report the topics related to the Crimean Tatars. In addition, the interviews with the Crimean journalists enriched the study with the detailed account of the journalist practices and routines of the media discourse production. Moreover, the interviews shed light on the phenomenon of the Crimean Tatar ethnic media, their features and institutionalized routines. The discussion of the characteristics of the Crimean Tatars ethnic media is primarily based on the interviews with journalists working for these media outlets as well as with the media experts of both Crimean Tatar and non-Crimean Tatar origin. In order to explore and properly contextualize the patterns of media representation of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean mainstream and ethnic media outlets, I have conducted 10 expert semi-structured interviews. For the list of interviewees please see appendix 1.
And finally, the third stage of analysis – the textual analysis is based on the following principles. Following the analytical guidelines by the critical discourse analysis, the present study employs the principle of triangulation, which means that the analysed phenomenon is approached from the variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives (Wodak et al 1999: 9). The representations of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian media discourse and patterns of discursive construction of their collective identity are approached from an interdisciplinary combination of political, linguistic and historical perspectives, using the variety of methods of data collection and analysis. This principle, according to Wodak et al, also envisages analysis of different sets of data: various media samples and interviews, which allows providing detailed and diverse picture of media representations as well as analysing the media texts within the broader socio-political and historical context. Additionally, the analysis of media discourse also envisages qualitative account of the analysed sample of the media texts. In the studies of ethnicity and interethnic relations this method is primarily used to enumerate the occurrences and topics, in which certain ethnic group appears in the news, or how often certain words and phrases are used in the media texts (van Dijk et al. 1997: 166). This allows tracing certain tendencies in patterns of representation of social phenomena in various types of public discourses.

The textual analysis within the framework of the present study will be carried out following the analytical logic presented by the critical discourse analysis methodology. The actual analysis of the media texts will be divided into analytical stages, moving from the broader analysis of texts as a whole and in relation to other texts (intertextuality) to the more micro level of analysis focusing on grammatical relations between parts of the texts, sentences and words.

The analysis will move along the following dimensions of analysis proposed by the discourse historical approach (Wodak et al. 1999: 33-35):

1. Content, which may include the thematic and narrative composition of the analysed discourse
2. Strategies employed by the key political and social subjects to fulfil their goals through discursive acts, level of intentions of social actors behind specific actions reflected in the discourse. The authors point out the following strategies realized at the macro-level:
   - Constructive discursive strategies aimed at establishing solidarity, maintaining or reproducing national identity
   - Strategies of transformation, targeted at changing the existing collective entities, persuading social actors
   - Destructive strategies, dismantling parts of existing unity models.
3. Lexical units and syntactic tools serving to construct unification, difference or continuity mentioned above. At this level, most importance features of analysis are as follows:
• Personal references, pronouns and quantifiers
• Spatial references, such as toponyms, adverbs of place (adverbs pointing to specific location or pointing to a certain direction)
• Temporal references reflected in temporal propositions, adverbs of time etc.

Additionally, other linguistic forms such as metaphors, allusions, linguistic hesitations, euphemisms will be analysed as means of the realization of specific discursive strategies.

Additionally, Mary Sykes identifies two basic levels of critical discourse analysis (1985: 88-97):

1. Syntactic analysis, which focuses on the main subjects of the texts, topics and genres, on the study of causality and on the linguistic peculiarities of particular representations of events and persons (addressing such matters as the use of transitive/intransitive verbs, passive/active forms, the framing of sentences etc.)
2. Semantic analysis, which pays attention to lexicalization, choice of words and terms, and their meaning in the particular context.

Fairclough also suggests analysing work of language in the texts at the following levels (2001b: 241):

1. Whole-text organization – narratives, structure of text or dialogue
2. Clauses combination – ways of linking clauses and sentences together
3. Clauses (sentences, utterances) – grammatical categories such as modality, passive/active voice, mood, transitivity
4. Words – vocabulary choice, semantic relations between words, use of metaphors etc.

Van Dijk proposes to analyse discourse on two major levels – macro and micro. The micro-level analysis involves linguistic features (wording, metaphors, comparisons), which could serve as signifiers and ideologically charged terms in the construction of groups identities, sentence structure (active/passive voice, silencing) and its implications for the construction of meanings and the role of actors of the text, and utterances – logical links and connectivity between parts of the texts.

At the macro-level, discourse analysis includes the study of context and intertextuality, strategies of group exclusion, like silencing, “othering”, “victimizing” or “marginalization”. It also includes the analysis of narratives, themes, and of the work of common sense and implicit ideological implications in the texts.

Given that the research questions imply the examination of the mediatized narrative of deportation, some ideas and principles of narrative analysis discussed above will be included into the broader analysis of the media discourse. A specific type of narrative I am dealing with in the course of this study is media representations of the personal memoires of deportation of the
Crimean Tatars – in other terms, it is a mediatized form of “narratives of dislocation”, as Anna de Fina and Mike Baynham (2005) put it. Social context described in these particular types of narratives is characterized by uncertainty, conflict and inequality, which in turn inform the structure of the discourse. The discourse of dislocation is also closely related to the notion of time and space – “it is a travel story” (De Fina, Baynham 2005:2). In the analysis of the narratives of deportation of the Crimean Tatars through the prism of the media discourse, I agree with the statement of Nick Lacey that news is structured as narratives (Lacey 2000: 41), because most of them fit into Todorov’s narrative structure and created around a conflict or a dispute, which lies in the core of the news. For this reason, Todorov’s five-stage narrative structure (cited in Lacey 2000: 21) will be applied to the media texts analysis. The stages of the narrative often include the following:

1. state of equilibrium at the beginning
2. disruption of an equilibrium by an action
3. recognition of the disruption
4. attempts to repair disruption
5. reinstatement of equilibrium.

Given the general multidisciplinary nature of the present research and the principle of combination of various methods, all of the mentioned analytical techniques provide valuable tools of approaching the corpus of media texts in the present study. Sharing theoretical grounds of critical discourse analysis, the above-mentioned analytical scheme follows the general logic of moving from the broader work of discursive strategies and themes to the detailed analysis of ideological implications realised through linguistic and syntactic means in the media texts seems a relevant analytical strategy for the further analysis.

1.2.3.2. Limitations of study

First of all, in should be stated that processes of media monitoring, selection, coding and further analysis and interpretation of media texts, involve close subjective involvement of the researcher. For instance, in cases of uncertainty, the decision about inclusion for a certain media text into the research sample or when dealing with attribution of the linguistic forms of the text to the analytical structures, is final decision is carried out based on the level of relevance and subjective experience of the researcher. Similarly, the deconstruction and further interpretation of the ideological frames employed in the media texts is possible, because the analyst belongs of the same historical and cultural context and inherently shares cultural meta-frames of the given society. Moreover, critical discourse analysis doesn't pretend to assign a neutral or objective stance to the analyst. On the contrary, the ultimate goal of critical analysis of discourse is to intervene into existing social and political practices, to expose inequalities, “to uncover manipulative manoeuvres in politics and the media” (Wodak et al 1999: 9). But, on the other hand, this subjective involvement of the researcher can be considered a limitation that can significantly distort research findings. This may
happen due to the incapability of the analyst to maintain a self-critical stance and to step away from one's own beliefs and commonsensical assumptions, which are often ideologically charged, and may create obstacles for the impartial analysis.

Besides, there are following limitations in the sample of media materials. The study predominantly does not work with the televised media content and even in the cases of incorporation of news pieces from the national and regional TV channels, I am only taking the text for the analysis, putting the images and video off the brackets. There are a number of reasons for that. First of all, access to the complete and systemic archives of the national and regional TV channels is quite limited and in some cases even impossible. This is particularly true for the Crimean TV channels, which often do not make archives at all, or due to frequent reselling or restructuring, these archives are incomplete or hardly accessible. Furthermore, the incorporation of the visuals into discourse analysis would require additional theoretical and methodological concepts, which would overcomplicate the research structure. However, analysis of the media visuals is considered a fruitful source of insights and could greatly add to deeper understanding of the patterns of construction of the ethnic group identities through the media. This type of research could be conducted in the future using a more narrow research sample.

The timeframe of three years chosen for the analysis in chapter 3 provides limited possibilities to conduct a chronological analysis of possible changes in discursive practices and representations of the Crimean Tatars in the media with the change of political elites, and does not allow tracing changes in the processes of discursive contestation between the dominant and alternative narratives or representation patterns etc.

Additionally, some gaps in the media sample occurred due to technical faults of online archives of certain national and Crimean media outlets, particularly in the period of 2006-2007 (corpus of media texts for the chapter 4). Some Crimean Tatar ethnic media outlets changed their ownership during the analysed period and, therefore, can no longer be considered belonging to the group of ethnic media, as the new owner changed the editorial team and the character of the media production. For instance, “Poluostrov” newspaper was bought by the Crimean politician Rustam Temirgaliev in the summer of 2012.

The conclusions based on the analysed corpora of the media texts can not be considered final and, therefore, are subjected to further discussions. The conclusions based on the information and opinions received by expert interviewing also should not be treated as objective and bias-free, they only point to the opinions of people, who have relevant experience and knowledge in the field, but could also be biased or voice politically or ideologically charged statements. However, the conclusions are based on the consolidation of all expert answers and their critical analysis. The relatively small number of the
interviewed experts and the semi-structured interview questionnaire and the use of open-ended questions, make the data gathered with the help of this method quite valuable for the research goals of the present study, but should not be considered representative.

Last but not least, it should be stated, that the events of the November 2013-February 2014 in Ukraine, known as the Revolution of Dignity or the protests at the EuroMaidan, and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014, have dramatically changed the political and social life of Ukraine and particularly Crimea. With the changes in the socio-political context, the dominant features of the media discourse about the Crimean Tatars have also changed. This happened in the period, when all field trip and actual media text analysis within the framework of this research were already completed. In addition, the period between 2013 and 2014 was not initially intended to be included into the analysis. For these reasons, the discussion of the features of the media landscape and the major conclusions about the patterns of media representation of the Crimean Tatars in this study were left intact. However, new political and social realities, reflected in the media discourse, open doors for further research, which could address the changes in media practices and discursive strategies utilized by the media to represent Crimean Tatars and other minority groups after the events of 2014.

1.3. CONCLUSIONS

Discourse analysis is an interpretive methodology, which embraces theoretical concepts of social constructivism (primarily the notion that the social reality is constructed and shared by individuals and groups in the process of social interaction). It provides tools to explore a particular practice of social interaction, namely a discourse.

Critical discourse analysis is widely used to study the patterns of the social construction of identities as well as of the discrimination and exclusion of the marginalized groups (both social and ethnic). In Ukraine this approach hasn’t been widely used so far and wasn’t applied to the study of the Crimean Tatars.

Discourse is a domain where meanings are constructed and reproduced and therefore shared or contested by the actors. Analysis of the media discourse allows the researcher to explore the means of creation of meanings as well as their ideological implications and the impact on the construction of social identities. According to Fairclough, the process of construction of identities in discourse is contingent and relational. Thus critical discourse analysis explores the relations between the ways of construction of identities and the dominant ideologies which define this construction within a particular discourse. Analysis of the process of “othering” – the discursive maintenance of the “us – them” (van Dijk 2005) dichotomy plays a crucial role in analysis of texts produced and
disseminated by the media.

In addition, according to the principles of critical discourse analysis, not only “othering”, but discrimination and exclusion are maintained through the media discourse.

As for racism and discrimination present in media discourse, it is also useful to recall Van Dijk’s discussion of ‘new’ or ‘symbolic’ racism—indirect discrimination in action and discourse, which has become institutionalized and is often manifested implicitly using various linguistic and discursive strategies, rather than expressing itself in overt forms of abuse (Van Dijk 1995).

Thus, discourse analysis provides means to study not only obvious mechanisms of constructing the group (in our case ethnic) identities, but also to expose implicit ways, in which certain groups’ identities are being constructed and presented by the media. As will be shown in the next chapters, most of the existing studies of ethnic minority groups’ media representation, currently conducted in Ukraine fail to look at the ideological utilization of common sense, silencing and other implicit forms of discursive discrimination, but rather tend to focus on overt and explicit forms of discrimination and hate speech utilized by the media with regard to ethnic minorities.
CHAPTER 2. SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF STUDY

2.1. Key characteristics of the Ukrainian media landscape

Since Ukraine became independent in 1991, the Ukrainian media sphere developed into a highly diversified and vivid milieu. However, the process of transition from the Soviet state-controlled to the more liberal pluralistic media model, based on professional standards of the independent journalism, hasn’t been smooth. Direct and indirect forms of state and corporate censorship as well as pressure and persecution of independent journalists haven’t been uncommon during the last 20 years. As Natalya Ryabinska states, the privatization of the media in the Post-Communist countries does not automatically mean their freedom from state control and the representation of the wide range of views and interests in society. As she states, “post-communist politicians often see the media as “theirs” and perceive media criticism as a threat” (Ryabinska 2011: 4); therefore, they have been using a variety of tools to establish control over the media market and its development perspectives.

2.1.1. Ukrainian media ownership structure

The structure of media ownership and the political affiliation of media outlets is one of the crucial points in understanding their ideological affiliations, orientation towards a specific audience, and their regional and language preferences. The profound choice between the orientation towards ideological or political necessity on one hand and the pursuit of business goals and profit-orientation- on the other, is an important factor, which informs the way each media outlet represents social reality to its audience. It should also be mentioned that the Ukrainian media market and particularly its ownership structure, which is quite dynamic and constantly changing and reshaping its structure, remains heavily understudied both by the scholarly and media professional communities (Ryabinska 2011).

Ryabinska provides a set of general characteristics of the post-communist media markets, which could be attributed to that of contemporary Ukraine during the analysed period of time. Among them, most importantly, are constant attempts by the state authorities to control and regulate the market, close links between media owners and political and business elites, a lack of transparency of the ownership of the media outlets. Despite a great number and variety of the media outlets on the market, they are mostly underdeveloped and underfunded, which undermines their credibility and profitability (Ryabinska 2011: 4-5).

Marta Dyczok pinpoints a number of trends, which shape the relationships between the political elites and the media in Ukraine. In Dyczok’s terms, the media landscape developed a hybrid system (Dyzok 2009: 21), where part of the media system was still owned by the state and the private ownership was closely related to the current political elites and groups of interest. The national
broadcasting companies were owned either by the state (Pershyi National’nyi TV channel and Ukrains’ke Radio) or privately owned by oligarchic groups, which used the TV and radio stations for sustaining their political domination. The political orientation of the owners of these media outlets allows drawing general conclusions about the character of editorial policies of these outlets, analyzing the extent to which these media can be considered objective, balanced and, most importantly, critical towards the activities of the authorities.

In this section, I am referring to open source information about the ownership of the Ukrainian media outlets. It should be stated that the structures of ownership of the Ukrainian media sphere lacks transparency, and therefore, information available in open sources may be inaccurate or incomplete, the direct ownership ties between a certain political figure and specific a media outlet may not be proven, however, the information available is sufficient to make general conclusions about the major tendencies and influences of the political and business groups on the media content during the period of 2010-2012.

I have divided the national media outlets into three groups according to their basic ownership structure:

1. Media outlets owned and controlled by the state.
2. Media outlets and media holdings owned by influential oligarchic groups, whose business assets are not primarily in media sphere.
3. Media outlets owned by individuals (independent publishers or editorial groups), whose major assets are in the media sphere.

State-owned media outlets in Ukraine include First National TV channel (UT-1) and National Radio Company of Ukraine (UR-1). Among the biggest national printed media there are “Holos Ukrajiny”– the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Parliament and “Uriadovy Kurier”, the official medium of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Additionally, in 2011 there were over 100 state-owned and around 800 municipal newspapers across the country (Ryabinska 2011: 6).

The state-owned media in Ukraine are characterized primarily by the loyalty to the authorities, and non-problematized news coverage. Genre-wise, these media outlets regularly publish official state documents adopted by the government and the parliament (laws and decrees), as well as official appeals of the top state officials on various occasions. Another important feature of these media outlets – is the way their issues are delivered to the readership. These printed editions are normally disseminated within the major state budget-funded institutions (like regional and local health and education departments, oblast state administrations etc) have subscriptions to these newspapers; many state-owned and municipal newspapers are the only media distributed in the rural areas. This means that the audiences of these newspapers are often formed not by personal choice of an outlet, but by the fact of belonging to a state-affiliated institution, or by a

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specific place of residence.

Other major national media outlets in Ukraine are either privately owned by the business groups of the most influential Ukrainian oligarchs or produced by independent publishers. The major national media outlets in Ukraine are divided between companies owned by Renat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Viktor Pinchuk, Serhiy Taruta, Petro Poroshenko and other Ukrainian billionaires. According to KAS media landscape report of 2010, this leads to the situation, when virtually no national social-political media outlets are independent and oriented solely towards their audiences’ interests (KAS Ukrainian media landscape 2010).

The media holding of Renat Akhmetov, the owner of the SKM group of companies, millionaire and member of the Party of Regions, the ruling party in 2010-2012, included, among other outlets, the top-rated national “Ukraina” TV channel and “Segodnia” daily newspaper. The latter is one of the most popular newspapers in Ukraine with the official circulation of 150 000 copies. Dutsk argues that “Segodnya” in 2010 was mostly loyal to the authorities, but could be very critical in its coverage of certain issues, and was taking part in the public contestation of the Ukrainian past and future. According to Dutsk, “Segodnia” criticized the Orange political camp, Ukraine’s Euroatlantic course and overtly confronted the memory of OUN-UPA (2010: 37).

Ihor Kolomoyskiy, another Ukrainian oligarch, owns a media holding which in 2010-2012 included “1+1” TV channel and “Komsomol'skaya Pravda v Ukraine”, as well as some other influential national media outlets. These media outlets generally took a non-critical stance towards the authorities in 2010-2012, as Dutsk argues.

“Inter”, the most popular Ukrainian TV channel, according to GFK ratings, in 2010-2012 belonged to the business group of Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy, person close to Viktor Yanukovych and his business partners. Therefore, this TV channel was actively utilized to provide support for the state policies and, therefore, often silenced news uncomfortable for the ruling political and business elites.

Media holding of Viktor Pinchuk, another Ukrainian oligarch and millionaire, comprised among other 3 big national TV channels: “STB”, “ICTV” and “Novyi Kanal” as well as a number of printed editions, like daily newspaper “Fakty i Kommentarii” and business weekly “Delo”, which were among the most popular print media in Ukraine.

Donetsk business group, headed by Serhiy Taruta and Vitaliy Haiduk, owned a media holding, which in 2010-2012 included business outlets “Ekonomicheskie Izvestiya” and “Kommentarii”. The latter, included into my research media sample, was focusing on a wide variety of social-political issues, such as politics, foreign news, business, religion, education etc. According to Dutsk, “Kommenmtarii” followed a quite balanced editorial policy which was rather
independent from the owners (2010: 38), before in December 2013 the newspaper was bought by the VETEK company owned by Sergei Kurchenko. The change of owner, changed its editorial policies dramatically, turned into a lap-dog of the Yanukovych's regime.

Daily newspaper “Ukraina moloda” shared a pro-European and pro-Ukrainian ideological position, allowed critique towards the ruling government, focused on covering events from cultural and social spheres, published materials on Ukrainian history etc. The newspaper officially belonged to Myhailo Doroshenko, its editor-in-chief. However, in 2010-2012 this newspaper was closely affiliated with (and allegedly sponsored by) “Nasha Ukraina”3 political party and ex-President Viktor Yushchenko. Magazine “Ukrainskyi Tyzhden’”, another media edition, that shared overtly Ukrainian nationalist ideological preferences and was overtly critical towards President Yanukovych and the “Party of regions”, revealed no official information about its ownership structure.

Another group of media outlets, included into the monitoring sample, can be generally characterized as independent and profit-oriented.

Ukraine’s leading social-political magazine “Korrespondent” in 2010-2012 belonged to the KP Media holding, owned by independent publisher Jed Sunden. The holding also included popular online news portal “Korrespondent.net”. The editorial policies of both media outlets can be characterized as independent, impartial and profit-oriented. The mentioned media outlets published journalists’ investigations about corruption schemes of the authorities, focusing as well on various political and social topics that could attract audiences' attention. Genre-wise, it should be mentioned that both the online and paper editions of “Korrespondent” published a lot of opinions, giving room for public discussion of acute issues.

Analytical weekly newspaper “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” with an official circulation of around 50 000 copies is an independent edition owned by the editor-in-chief Mostovyi family and is one of the oldest newspapers in Ukraine. This newspaper provides lengthy analytical and investigative materials, as well as opinion articles. In 2010-2012 “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” was overtly critical toward the ruling political elites and the ruling party, however, it provided balanced views on the current affairs and often took a critical stance towards the opposition at that time period.

The list of media outlets and their ownership structure provided is not complete and inaccurate for a number of reasons, which characterize the Ukrainian media landscape in general. Most importantly, the media ownership in Ukraine is not transparent. The structure of the media market in Ukraine was not stable, the media outlets are resold quite often. For many large business groups, the media are not a source of business profits, but primarily as a tool of for influencing

3“Our Ukraine” political party
public opinion and backing their own political as well as business interests (Dutsyk 2010; Ryabinska 2011). In 2010-2012 there were only a few media outlets which worked as business models, oriented solely towards profits from advertisement and, therefore, willing to increase the quality of their content to attract wider audiences.

“Ukrainska Pravda”, the online media outlet, during 2010-2012 belonged to the group of the so-called “opposition” media outlets. Sharing the certain set of ideological orientations, which included supporting the European integration strategy for Ukraine, being overtly pro-Ukrainian, and using predominantly Ukrainian language in broadcasting, this media outlets tended to provide critical and politically balanced media content to its audience. “Ukrainska Pravda” is owned by the editorial team.

Summing up, it should be pointed out that the general state of the Ukrainian media market, as characterised by Oxana Gaman-Golutvina’s rather critical vision of the media in the Post-Communist countries, “act like influencing actor, but not as a creator of politics”. “They are not masters of discourse” (2009: 240), the author claims, underpinning the high level of dependency of the editorial policies of the biggest media outlets on the owners’ political and business interests. Since the emergence of the privately owned national and regional media outlets, many of them were often created not for public information or profit-oriented purposes, but to maintain the political influence of their owners (Dyczok 2009). However, as Dyczok argues, the pool of independent media outlets in 2010-212 in Ukraine, even having smaller audiences compared to the leading national media, were, nevertheless, powerful instruments in circulation of the alternative societal attitudes and ideas. (2009). Various civil society and minority groups, she states, had possibility for promotion of their political and social agendas through alternative media channels and could create their own communication spaces “outside the official mediated political communication system” (Dyczok 2009:25).

2.1.2. General features of the Ukrainian media discourse

During the late 2000s, the phenomena of “temnyky” and “dzynsa” became an integral part of the Ukrainian media rhetoric informing the character of the national as well as regional media content. “Temnyky”, daily “recommendations” with the list of top news and suggestions about their coverage, imposed by the President’s Administration officials in 2001, were shaping the media content, and therefore, public agenda for years. Vakhtang Kipiani (2005) calls “temnyky” the “instructions of devastation of political enemies” as well as tools of destruction of the professional and personal reputations of the media professionals. In addition to direct orders from the state officials, Igor Kulyas names the so called “syndrome of the lazy newsroom”, when journalists report the statements of the authorities often provided by their press-services, not willing to seek for alternative opinions and facts to provide
the audience with a more critical and balanced story. Another important factor, the author mentions, is a commonsensical presupposition, shared by many journalists, according to which “all actions of the top state officials are to be (almost automatically) covered and reported in great detail, as they are considered “important”, regardless to their value for the country and society” (Kulyas 2009).

The Orange Revolution of 2004 significantly changed the course of the media as well as social-political development in Ukraine. In 2005 President Viktor Yushchenko eliminated the practices of straightforward state censorship, which boosted process of the media “marketization” (Ryabinska 2011). Media researchers Pavlenko and Klymenko argue that in 2004 alongside with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Journalists Revolution also took place. The authors define this phenomenon as a “distinctive process of deliverance in the journalist community caused by the changes in public consciousness and the protest rallies during the presidential campaign of 2004” (Pavlenko and Klymenko 2006). However, the researchers generally came to the conclusion that media freedoms achieved in 2004 needed to be secured by a set of systemic reforms and the introduction of mechanisms of public control over the media editorial policies and ownership structures. Failure to conduct these reforms, led to the establishment of the new forms of censorship. Soon after 2005, there was a shift from the direct government pressure on media to the fragmented influences on the media content, which happened primarily at the level of relations between media owners and editorial teams, Grynko (2010) argues.

The slang word “dzynsa” which stands for “paid media materials” was introduced into the Ukrainian public discourse back in 1996 and has become an integral part of the media routines for journalists in the capital and periphery media outlets. The term “dzynsa” usually concerns with the direct “cash for the news coverage” influences on journalists (Grynko 2010:87), but could also mean “pre-ordered” or “manipulated” character of news, initiated by the state authority officials, media owners, controlled by the authorities, media management, editors, not necessarily directly connected with “cash for the coverage” offers (Kulyas 2009).

The non-monetary forms of state censorship of the media content, established during the Leonid Kuchma presidency in 2001, flourished again in 2010, when Viktor Yanukovych took President’s office. When the new political elites came to power, the centralized system of media control was re-established, demanding from the media to cover the newly-declared state strategy of “Pokrashchennia” (“the Enhancement”) in positive terms, avoiding criticism. Journalists and editors at the private media started to face various forms of pressure from the station owners and state officials – a new wave of the freedom of speech infringement started in Ukraine (Ryabinska 2011). The projects of media monitoring conducted in 2010-2013 by the team of media experts from...
Telekrytyka⁴, named the “loyalty towards authorities” as a major form of violation of the balanced news reporting standard, particularly by the regional media outlets (Sokolenko 2013).

In 2010, a report of the Reporters Without Borders “Temptation to Control”, indicated an increase of various forms of media censorship in Ukraine. (Reporters Without Borders 2010). This tendency was also reflected in the Freedom House annual reports on the freedom of speech in Ukraine. By the level of civil liberties and freedoms in 2010 Freedom House called Ukraine “free”, but in 2011 and 2012, the country was moved to “partly free”, with the rating of general freedom dropped from 2.5 in 2010 to 3.5 in 2012⁵ (Freedom in the world 2010, 2011, 2012). Similarly, the Freedom House rating of Freedom of Press in Ukraine dropping from 53 in 2010 to 59 – in 2012⁶. (Freedom of the Press 2010, 2011, 2012).

Summing up the above-mentioned features of the Ukrainian media landscape during the period of 2010-2012, the following feature of the Ukrainian media system can be pointed out: the professional level of the media content was gradually decreasing, mostly due to a high level of dependency of the media outlets’ editorial policies on the political preferences of the owners of the particular media businesses (Khamchych 2013).

In addition, media expert Otar Dovzhenko (2012) speaks about the decline of critical discussion in the media as one of the fundamental social features in 2012. Dovzhenko stressed a lack of critical analytical approach to coverage of the activities of authorities, but at the same time pinpointed a huge gap between the media and public discourses on one hand and the political sphere on the other. The author illustrated this phenomenon with numerous situations, when even the most thoroughly investigated critical reports about of the government’s actions including direct accusations of corruption, reported by the leading media outlets, had no actual impact on the authorities’ practices and state officials. Additionally, Diana Dutsyk (2013) stated that such high a level of media conformism among the media owners and journalists can also be explained by the lack of demand for quality media product from the Ukrainian audience. The need for entertainment and scandal, the author believes, caused many journalists to break the ethical norms and to use offensive and obscene language in their reports and discussions. In this regard, Dutsyk believes, the existence of a target audience, capable not only to consume information, but to utilize it as a tool in its activities, the group, which can formulate a request for social change for the media outlets, could really make an impact on the development of the media system in Ukraine. Dovzhenko, as well as Dutsyk, however, were skeptical about the fact of its existence in the early 2012.

Speaking in more detail about the relations between the media content and the

⁴ See for instance monitoring results for October 2012 at http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/material/12714
⁵ 1 = best, 7 = worst level of freedom, according to the Freedom House rating.
⁶ 1 = best, 100 = worst level of freedom of press, according to the Freedom House rating.
way in which it reflects the social reality and the audiences' perceptions of this reality, it should be stated that the Ukrainian audiences' critical perception of the media content has always been widespread. However, according to the results of a survey, carried out by the “Democratic initiatives” foundation together with the Razumkov centre in 2013, the level of trust in the media significantly increased after 2007. In 2007, – 45,8% of respondents completely trusted the Ukrainian media, while around 40% – did not trust them completely. The tendency towards decreasing of level of distrust was demonstrated in 2012– when only 28% of respondents answered that they completely distrust the media in Ukraine, while 40% - trusted them. In May 2013, – 58,3% of respondents expressed complete trust in the media. The population of the Southern regions of Ukraine and Crimea demonstrated the least critical position towards the freedom of speech in the media. Only 22% of respondents from the South of Ukraine answered they generally do not agree Ukraine has freedom of speech and only 3% (compared to 9,8% in central regions) stated there is no freedom of speech at all.7

Social scholars conclude, that the media are an important social institutions involved in the construction and maintenance of social identities, both individual and collective, particularly they are engaged in the process of construction and maintenance of national identity. The production of socially accepted images of the past is also one the media’s key functions. The recent development of the electronic, print and online media outlets led to multiplication of representations of the past and present and to a great ideological diversity of media products available on the media market (Kulyk 2013). However, as Kulyk argues, such a rise of pluralism in public opinion and democratization of the media sphere led also to an increase of clashes between political forces, various ideologies and, therefore, between features, that define group identities, imposed by these ideologies Consequently, many scholars, who study Ukrainian media sphere, point out to a high level of contestation and conflict among various media outlets over the meanings of the past, present and future of the country. These differences manifest themselves through the multiplicity of the regional representation, overt or hidden political affiliations, language and naming conventions, historical and cultural preferences. Various types of media tend to reflect these differences in a different way.

As the majority of the national TV channels tend to enjoy greater popularity then printed press and embrace various audiences across the country, the television content is initially targeted at reconciling interests of the urban and rural population in all the regions and of all ethnic backgrounds and, therefore, is mostly ambiguous, culturally and ethnically (seemingly) neutral (Kulyk 2013).

As many authors argue, the circulation of the printed press has been decreasing in Ukraine (and worldwide) due to growing audiences of the online media

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7 Riven` dovir do ZMI zris – Iryna Bekeshkina, Telekrytyka, 2013-06-05, available online at http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/material/19066
outlets and a shift to the more rapid ways of information consumption, facilitated by the Internet. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian market of the printed press, both national and regional, remains diverse and vivid. The Institute of Media Law has identified the tendency for increasing of the number of the printed media outlets, with around 30 thousands registered in 2010 and more than 42 thousands – in 2012. As plural as printed media market in Ukraine is, newspapers provide more ideologically-targeted media product than electronic media outlets, meaning that “each individual newspaper embodies rather narrow range of ideological propositions” (Kulyk 2013: 72).

The choice of topics and genres used to report events obviously reflects a certain set of values and standards, which make impact on their audiences’ views and beliefs. As for the critical stance of the media or their watch-dog function, Kulyk argues that only a few media outlets – primarily quality elite-oriented editions – discuss the issues from various points of view, using overtly ideological genres, like opinion articles or broad analytical reviews. The majority of popular press – tabloids – mostly work in ideologically neutral genres like feature stories, reports and news, thus avoiding direct questioning or contesting of the actions and comments of the news subjects on a regular basis. They tend to “report” the story, rather than “analyze”, focusing on entertainment of their audiences. Media analyst Natalia Dan’kova concludes that genre-wise, television content has been evolving towards “easy” and “entertainment” genres like talk shows and reality shows. In an attempt to accommodate “infortainment” principle in the news programs, journalists are searching for sensational news, which results mostly in a decrease of news quality (Dan’kova 2011).

Speaking about ideologically-changed versus neutral and unbiased representation of events, Ukrainian media outlets can be broadly divided into three groups: ideologically-engaged Ukrainian-nationalist, ideologically-charged pro-Russian or pan-Slavic and (seemingly) ideologically neutral media outlets.

Many nationwide and regional newspapers share an overtly ideological stance, which have utilized and naturalized Ukrainian nationalist, pro-European ideological meta-narratives: these are newspapers “Gazeta Po-Ukrajins’ky”, “Den”, “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia”, magazines “Ukrainskyi Tyzhden” and “Krajina”. Among other topics, these media outlets focus on the reproduction of the Ukrainian nationalist historical narratives, cover more news from the (pro)Ukrainian cultural and social spheres, discuss issues of language use, engage more actively in practices of commemoration of the Ukrainian national memorial dates, like Holodomor commemoration, as opposed to the Soviet ones. Being owned or influenced by the opposition national-democratic political parties (like “Nasha Ukraina” or “Batkivshchyna”), these media tend to be very critical towards the then-ruling political parties – the Party of Regions and the Communist Party – and their “anti-Ukrainian” policies.

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8 See in more detail at [http://www.medialaw.kiev.ua/news/media/2063/](http://www.medialaw.kiev.ua/news/media/2063/)
9 “Our Ukraine”, “Fatherland” political parties
Another group of ideologically-charged media outlets, oriented towards the audiences with Pro-Russian, East Slavic and Soviet sentiments – editions like “Rabochaya Gazeta”, “Komsomol’skaya Pravda v Ukrainе”\(^\text{10}\), “2000” etc. – routinely report news from the post-Soviet countries, particularly Russia and Belarus, in a positive and detailed way, maintaining political and cultural ties with the “Slavic world”. These media outlets share the Soviet-moulded historical meta-narratives and place an emphasis on the commemoration of the Victory in the “Great Patriotic War” and stress common history of all post-Soviet Slavic peoples.

In addition to the mentioned features, both groups of the media constantly engage in various forms of subtle and overt contestation and delegitimizing of values and positions of their ideological opponents. The major discursive contestation, as Kulyk explains, often finds its realization in the strategy of construction of (ab)normality. Each of the ideological groups of the media use similar strategies of representation of what they believe is “normal” and lies within their ideological horizons. An issue or an event, is being normalized by the regular and unproblematised representation, frequently by means of laconic genre of news, which by itself creates an impression of objectivity, credibility, and, therefore, - normality (Kulyk 2010: 499). On the contrary, contested matters, are overtly problematized and questioned. Such type of representation can contain commentary and other more vivid and multi-layered genres (Kulyk 2010: 535).

In the imaginary centre of the ideological spectrum of the Ukrainian media market, there are media outlets that present themselves as ideologically neutral and profit-oriented business projects. The list of such media outlets in Ukraine during the analysed period of 2010-2012, may include business-political weekly broadsheet “Kommentari”, daily newspaper “Kommersant Ukrainа”, magazines “Focus” and “Korrespondent” and others. Obviously, these editions are only seemingly ideologically neutral and free of political bias. As Kulyk stresses, such disguised and non-reflective forms of events reporting, in addition to certain routinised criteria in topic selection and their interpretative frames, bear a set of values and narratives, which dominate in the society as a whole, or in a particular region, and are being normalized by the constant repetition and reproduction of these patterns over the long period of time (2013: 73).

In further chapters I will conduct an analysis of media texts from a selected list of media outlets, which belong to all three groups of the media outlets and will make conclusions about specific discursive strategies used to build the ideological frames of the media representations.

Moving further, from the national to the regional level, in the next section I will provide a brief overview of the regional media landscape of Crimea and will point out its major characteristic features during the period of 2010-2012.

\(^{10}\)“Working Newspaper”, “Komsomol Truth in Ukraine”
Among other issues, I will demonstrate how ethnic minority media outlets can efficiently channel alternative and counter-discourses as well as becoming instruments for the constructing and sustaining of the ethnic and regional collective identities.

2.2. CRIMEAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE

Moving the focus of analysis from the national to the Crimean level, it is important to take into account characteristic feature of media landscape of this region. The Crimean media landscape can be considered one of the most vivid and diverse in Ukraine (Baturin 2013). In her study of the Crimean media landscape, Dyczok argues that the media system of the peninsula, though quite diverse in numbers and formats, mostly served the information needs of the Russian-speaking majority, while the two big ethnic minorities - the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars – mostly remained underrepresented (Dyczok 2004). As Kulyk argues, regional (and local) media of the Crimean peninsula participate in the construction and maintenance of regional identity by reproducing dominating regional beliefs, ideological positions, collective memories, adding to the internal heterogeneousness of the Ukrainian public and media discourse (2013: 67).

Crimean media outlets can be grouped according to various features. Alim Aliev proposed to divide Crimean media sphere into four major groups, which include the all-Ukrainian media circulating in the region, the all-Crimean media outlets produced by local media houses, the pro-Russian media produced in Crimea and the Crimean Tatar ethnic media (Aliev 2011: 232). The reason why Aliev singled out the pool of “pro-Russian” media outlets that is a great deal of population of the Crimean peninsula shares pro-Russian sentiments, and often reproduces historical meta-narratives influenced by the Soviet ideological legacy. This is also true for certain newspapers, which overtly present themselves as “pro-Russian” to attract respective readership. For instance, “Krymskaya Pravda”11 posted a disclaimer on its web-site stating its political orientation towards unity with Russia and support of pro-Russian values such as the Russian language and Soviet history and against the 'Islamic threat' in Crimea12. However, my research has demonstrated that the key factors which influence the content of the Crimean media are local, at least during the period before the Russian annexation of the peninsula in the spring of 2014. Even in those cases when the Crimean media promote pro-Russian agenda, it rarely contradicts the ideological position of local elites and usually goes in tune with the political and business interests of Crimean domestic media owners.

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11 The Crimean Truth
12 “Krymskaya Pravda” – is not only a newspaper for the Russians, but for everyone, who feels he belongs to the Russian World (Russkiy Mir), it’s history and culture, who thinks and speaks Russian The newspaper will continue to fight with the forced ukrainization, with politics of limitation of use of Russian language, with the attempts to re-write the history, split up the Orthodox world, will fight with the forces, which try to play an “Islamic card” in Crimea, aiming to drag Ukraine into the American sphere of influence, to use an example of Georgia to turn it into a non-friendly state to Russia.” The full original in Russian is available online at http://www.kp.crimea.ua/about
Crimean political analyst Denis Baturin offered another delineation of the local media outlets in Crimea, dividing them into pro-governmental (or loyal to the current ruling elites) and independent media outlets. He additionally points out the Crimean Tatar ethnic media outlets as a special type of media outlets. In my study, I will use Baturin’s model to analyse Crimean media. It should be taken to consideration that each media outlet follows its own ideological frame and has its own political and ideological affiliations. However, as interviewed Crimean experts state that media outlets in Crimea are highly dependent on the goals and interests of their owners. These goals are largely limited to two business strategies: the media outlets are perceived either as business projects, aimed at profits from advertisement and sales or used mostly for ideological and political purposes by their owners. Crimean media experts, interviewed within the framework of this study, pointed out that the majority of the popular media outlets in Crimea follow the latter strategy of their content production.

Additionally, the Crimean media landscape has been extremely changeable and unstable. The media outlets in Crimea were mostly consolidated into local media holdings, owned by a single owner and normally consisted of the group of media outlets of different type: newspapers, radio stations, TV channels and internet media platforms. Serhiy Kostynskyi added in this regard that media outlets in Crimea were sold quite often and media landscape changed before every elections. During the period between 2010 and 2014, the majority of the influential media outlets were owned by local politicians and businesspeople affiliated with the then-ruling Party of Regions. However, Kostynskyi argued, that being expensive but unsustainable assets, media outlets were mostly used during election campaigns. He states: “Businessmen can’t spend money on the maintenance of media outlets forever. Majority of the media are not profitable, so they have to pay back by working during the elections as manufacturers of political 'dzynsa', while in the periods between the elections, they are becoming a burden for its owners and are being sold” (Kostynskyi 2013). Crimean journalist Valentyna Samar admitted that during the non-election period of 2010-2012 paid materials in the Crimean media were mostly of a business character, because “all major political players already have their own media assets and there is no need for them to pay to the other media for publications” (Samar 2013).

I will provide a short overview of the Crimean mainstream media outlets, which could be considered independent projects as well as the one’s which were loyal to the ruling government and their owners’ in 2010-2012, and briefly describe their ideological positions and ownership schemes. In the following subsection, I will explore the state and ownership of the group of the Crimean Tatar ethnic media.

2.2.1. Crimean mainstream media

Speaking more specifically about the so-called independent media of Crimea, it
should be stated that a group of media outlets that could be considered independent, was relatively small during the analysed timeframe. Media expert Lenur Yunusov argues that this group of media outlets was primarily interested in attracting broader audiences as well as in cooperation with the lively advertisement market, in order to make profit. In addition, these outlets cared about the quality of their content, seeking new attractive formats and genres in order to satisfy their audiences’ requests. These media outlets, as Yunusov (2012) argues, normally used neutral and (seemingly) objective tone of reporting and embraced a great variety of topics and issues, which could be of potential interest to the vast majority of Crimean population. Enjoying a great level of independence from owners in their choice of topics and framing of news, editorial teams of these media outlets could also allow critique towards the current authorities, publishing impartial investigations and analytical materials, embraced a greater variety of speakers and commentators. However, these media often “worked under vary complicated conditions”, under constant pressure and often experienced financial hardships due to poor development of the local advertisement market (Samar 2013; Kostynskyi 2013).

Among the key independent media in Crimea in 2010-2012, experts name first of all Crimean newspaper “Pervaya Krymskaya”, the largest Crimean weekly, which belonged to the all-Ukrainian media holding “Kartel”, co-owned by Russian businessman Leonid Fedun. Lenur Yunusov is convinced that even though the owners of the media holding were affiliated with the Russian company “Lukoil” and Party of regions, the famous Crimean journalist Liliya Budzhurova, who was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper until it changed the owner in May 2014, managed to secure an independent editorial policy of the weekly. After the change of owner\textsuperscript{13}, the editorial policy of “1 Krymskaya” became overtly pro-Russian.

Another newspaper that was positioning itself as impartial business project at the Crimean media market - is weekly “Sobytiya”. Lenur Yunusov, who worked there as a deputy editor-in-chief during 2010-2011, states that this edition went beyond covering 'traditional' topics of local newspapers and wanted to attract audience from all ethnic groups of Crimea. He argues that “truly business oriented media outlets work for all (groups – edit. A.B.). If you are profit-oriented, it is foolish to limit yourself to one specific audience. This affects media content in that these media try to avoid radical and sharply ideological statements, pay attention to covering life of all national communities instead of following the standard list of issues – the government, the Russian population…” (Yunusov 2012). In 2011 the newspaper was bought by a Crimean media holding owned by Andriy Senchenko, MP, member of the then opposition “Batkivshchyna” political party and became the “BYuT political party project”\textsuperscript{14}, as Yunusov called it, criticizing the ruling political authorities.

\textsuperscript{13} Izdatel’skaya gruppa “Kartel” menyaet sobstvennika UBs, 25. 03. 2014 http://hubs.com.ua/business/izdatelskaya-gruppa-kartel-menyaet-sobstvennika.html
\textsuperscript{14}BYuT – Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, which was formed on the basis of the “Batkivshchyna” political party.
and serving the political and business interest of the owner.

Among other independent media projects in Crimea Serhiy Kostynskyi (2013) names internet newspaper “Argumenty Nedeli-Krym”, funded by a local businessman, who was interested primarily in commercial benefits from the media ownership. In addition, there are number of outlets, belonging to the Crimean Tatar ethnic segment of the media market, which could be considered independent and profit-oriented. Among them, “QHA” and “Reanna” information agencies, as well as ATR media holding owned by the Crimean Tatar oligarch Lenur Islyamov.

Another larger group of the Crimean media outlets can be characterized as loyal to the ruling political and business elites of the ARC. The type of development strategy broadly used by the owners of these media, is utilization of a media outlet as a tool of political and business negotiations, as an instrument which does not seek to reflect audience’s request for information or entertainment, but serves as a space for the promotion of the owner’s political and ideological agenda. This group of media included in 2010-2012 both state- and private owned media outlets, controlled or owned by Crimean political figures or their affiliated partners.

Among the state-funded media in 2010-2012 were daily “Krymskaya Gazeta”, information agency “Krymskoye informatsionnoe agenstvo” and the official medium of the Crimean Parliament “Krymskiye Izvestiya” weekly. In the summer of 2013 “Krymskaya Gazeta” was bought by a local company linked to the Party of Regions and Serhiy Tykhyi, the former editor-in-chief of “Gazeta po-Kievski” was invited to lead the new media project. The content of these media was heavily influenced by the political agenda of the Crimean authorities and reflected ideological position of the Party of Regions, which in 2010-2012 fully controlled both the Crimean parliamentary majority and the Crimean government. The pro-governmental media outlets mostly covered current decisions and statement of authorities allowing little critique of or independent expert commentaries on these decisions.

Among the privately owned media, that could be considered loyal to the government and ruling party, was also the oldest and popular Crimean daily “Krymskaya Pravda”, owned by the Bakharev family – father and son – who were both members of the Crimean Parliament from the Communist Party and during 2010-2012 were holding senior positions in the Crimean government institutions Konstantin Bakharev was the head of the Parliamentary Committee on mass media in 2010-2012. “Krymskaya Pravda” had its own stable audience among the Russian speaking population of Crimea, who share post-Soviet and Slavic sentiments. This newspaper openly positioned itself as pro-Russian and for a long time published overtly anti-Tatar and anti-Mejlis articles, like the infamous article “Blown by the wind” by Svitlana Astakhova published in 2008, which contained uncovered hate speech against Crimean Tatars. However, according to media expert, this newspaper was slowly loosing its readership,
because the demand for this type of radical rhetoric within the Crimean society was decreasing. During the last five years, Sergiy Kostynskyi argues, the newspaper’s content was slowly drifting towards more neutral tone and becoming more inclusive with regards to the ethnic minorities of the peninsula. On the other hand, Mykola Semena, head of a team conducting hate speech monitoring in Crimea since 2010, pointed out that the phenomenon of hate speech still existed in the Crimean media in 2012.

According to findings of his project, in March 2011 the most notable types of hate speech in the Crimean media were the following: 31.37% of hate speech cases were accusations in extremism and 11.76% of cases – mentioning of the members of ethnic groups in a humiliating context. Among the objects of hate speech were the ethnic groups – the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainians.15 Semena also pointed out that most cases of hate speech had been found in “Krymskaya Pravda”, “Krymskoye Vremia” and “Krymskiy Telegraph”. He believed that these editions openly declared elements of hate speech to be part of the “editorial style”, that is, “using the terms that could be considered ethnically-offensive, editors of these editions claim they add to the literate eloquence of their articles”(Semena 2013). Speaking about “Krymskoye Vremya”, Semena pointed out that journalist Natalia Kiseliova, who had her own editorial column, every week in 2012 published articles openly aimed against the Ukrainians or the Crimean Tatars. Additionally, Semena admitted that some articles did not bear linguistic structures that could be considered hate speech, however, the general character of these articles, their tone of “scorn and hatred” made them overtly discriminative.

Another weekly newspaper, which according to Mykola Semena, often used hate speech is “Krymskiy Telegraph”. This newspaper was part of a media holding owned by businessman Aleksandr Melnik, who was affiliated with the Party of Regions. However, according to the Crimean Center for investigative journalism, the media assets were officially owned by off-shore companies, so the real owner of “Krymskiy Telegraph” remained unknown16. Media holding controlled by Melnik also included ITV Crimean broadcasting company, and a number of small media outlets published in some districts of Crimea. Speaking about the content of “Krymskiy Telegraph”, Mykola Semena admitted that this edition often followed the pro-Russian ideological position and regularly published articles, targeted at delegitimizing and diminishing political weight of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars and personally Mustafa Dzhemilev. Hate speech monitoring results also demonstrated regular cases of violation of journalist standards by this newspaper, including the use of overt forms of hate speech (Semena 2013).

Among other media holdings controlled or owned by the Crimean pro-

16 Khoziaeva krymskikh media: uslovnyj “mediaholding Melnika” bez Melnika,. Center for investigative journalism, 07.11.2013 http://investigator.org.ua/articles/106480/
governmental politicians and businessmen, one can also name a media holding owned by a Crimean businessman, member of the Party of Regions Frunze Mardoyan. Among other media outlets, it includes television channel TV FM. Before February 2013 TV FM, which until February 2013 was called TV 'Neapol' and belonged to Sergey Kunitsyn, member of the Ukrainian Parliament (since 2012) and former member of Crimean parliament in 2010-2012. Serhiy Kunitsyn, who also used to own FM radio station “Lider” and information agency “E-Krym”, sold his media assets in 2011-2012: E-Krym” – was bought by Rustam Temirgaliev and radio “Lider” – by the Crimean Tatar oligarch Lenur Islyamov, owner of ATR media holding17.

Another notable media owner in Crimea is Rustam Temirgaliev, Crimean oligarch and member of the Crimean Parliament, since 2013 – Vice-Prime Minister of ARC. According to Volodymyr Prytula (2012), Temirgaliev had strong political ties with the Russian political and business elites and for a long time was promoting pro-Russian political agenda through his own media assets, like Trans-M Radio and “E-Krym” information agency. In 2011 he also bought newspaper “Poluostrov”, which has been owned and published Vasbi Abduraimov, a leader of the Crimean Tatar political party 'Milli Firka'. Soon after Temirgaliev bought this newspaper, it stopped covering issues related to the Crimean Tatar community and since early 2013 was not published at all.

Another media holding belonging to the Crimean oppositional politician Andrey Senchenko and his business partners and MPs Ludmila Denisova and Sergey Velizhanskiy. These political figures represent “Batkivshchyna” political party and since 2010, when Viktor Yanukovych and his political party came to power, lost their political influence in Crimea. Senchenko’s major media assets - “Chernomorskaya” TV broadcasting company, newspaper “Sobytiya” and Ukrainian language magazine “Sotsial’na kraina”, as well as other businesses in Crimea, started to face pressure from the law-enforcement authorities18, and the amount of financial investment of the owners into these media outlets decreased.

Summing up, I can state that the Crimean media landscape in 2010-2012 was highly dependent on the political situation and generally reflected the ideological orientations of the dominant political elites; its media content and financial development were almost completely controlled by media owners – key political players of Crimea. As Valentyna Samar (2013) aptly pointed out in this regard, low professional standards and poor economic conditions made editorial teams highly dependent on paid materials or direct financial aid from the owners: “More or less independent media outlets make big financial profits during election campaigns when they are paid in 'black cash'. Thereby, during the period in between the elections the media are dying out or being sold, causing both reshuffling of the media ownership and shrinking of the editorial

17Khoziaeva krymskikh media: mediaholding krymskoho biznesmena i politika Frunze Mardoyana, Center for investigative journalism, 25.10.2013 http://investigator.org.ua/articles/104693/
18 Khoziaeva krymskikh media: uslovnyi holding Senchenko, Denisovoy i Velizhanskogo, Center for investigative journalism, 27.09.2013 http://investigator.org.ua/articles/101419/
teams to a few editors, who only produce news online”.

The ideological orientations were also dependent primarily on the current political and business agenda of the dominant political elite. For instance, Lenur Yunusov spoke about a change in the ideological orientation of the “Krymskaya Pravda” newspaper, which for decades had been a traditional medium of the “Russian Crimea” and taken an openly anti-Crimean Tatar stance. Yunusov also argued that ever since the owners had established strong political ties with the Party of Regions in 2010, “Krymskaya Pravda” became much more loyal towards the Crimean Tatars and started to avoid critical and overtly offensive statements regarding the Crimean Tatar community, because “it was no longer useful for the Party of Regions to hound the Crimean Tatars” (Yunusov 2012).

Similarly, Mykola Semena explains the sharp anti-Tatar rhetoric of “Krymskiy Telegraph” newspaper not solely referring to the ideological position of the owner, but the business interests of the latter, which often were at the odds with the local business interests of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar community.

Opinions of the interviewed media experts can also be confirmed by the results of a monitoring of the media standards in Ukraine which was conducted by Telekrytyka in 2010-2013. According to the results of the monitoring, the Crimean local broadcasters in 2012 were among the national leaders by placing paid materials. The monitoring also demonstrated that the political leaders of the ARC at that period – Anatoliy Mogiliov and Vladimir Konstantinov – were the state official most frequently appearing in the news. Moreover, the activities of the Crimean authorities were reported predominantly in a positive way, without voicing alternative or critical opinions of other speakers or groups. Based on the findings of the monitoring, Natalia Sokolenko argued that on the regional level the voices of the top state officials and owners of the respective media outlets dominated in the air, the tone of reporting was mostly loyal towards the current ruling government, “transmitting the state’s policies of “enhancement” without giving a voice to political opposition or experts.” (Sokolenko 2013).

As one can see, during the analysed timeframe, the immediate political and business interests of the owners and sponsors of the Crimean media outlets tended to prevail over purely ideological and externally inspired agenda and largely informed the character of the overall media content in Crimea. Poor financial conditions of the vast majority of the media outlets made them dependent on paid media materials and limited possibilities for independent and critical coverage of events. As Valentyna Samar (2013) concluded, the weak advertising market resulted in a lack of analytical and investigative journalism and limited possibilities for the journalists to work with primary sources of information and protect their rights by filing lawsuits. Because of these reasons,

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19 Sokolenko N. Yak dzynsuvaly regional’ni telekanaly v liutomу – travni 2012 // Telekrytyka, 04.07.2012, available online at http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/material/7908
current media outlets provided little room to satisfy the audiences’ possible demand for timely information and impartial analysis of the events. Therefore, she argued, the new sphere of digital activism and blogging was rapidly developing in Crimea, taking over these functions from the traditional media outlets.

In the next subsection I will provide an overview of the third group of the Crimean media – the Crimean Tatar ethnic media outlets, which were founded by Crimean Tatars and mostly covered political and social life of the Crimean Tatar community.

2.2.2. Crimean Tatar ethnic media

Crimean Tatar media is a unique type of media for Ukraine, as they are produced and disseminated only in Crimea by Crimean Tatars and primarily oriented on the Crimean Tatar audience. These media outlets reflect collective interests and values of this ethnic group. The need to establish Crimean Tatar national media outlets at the territory of Crimea emerged in the early 1990s, when an active phase of the return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea started. As Yablonovska (2008) argues, the primary goals of these media outlets were to help unite Crimean Tatars in Crimea, facilitate their integration into Ukrainian society and establish information and cultural dialogue with other ethnic groups of Ukraine. For this purposes in 1990 in Feodosia the magazine “Vatan” was launched in the Crimean Tatar and Russian languages.

The oldest Crimean Tatar newspaper, which was established in Crimea in 1989, – “Dostluk” (since 1992, “Qirim”), – was published as an add-on to “Krymskaya Pravda” newspaper. As Yablonovska argues, the state support of the publication of this newspaper meant first of all the legitimation of the Crimean Tatar community and its political agenda in Crimea, but, on the other hand, allowed certain forms of state control over the content. In 1990 an independent Crimean Tatar newspaper “Avdet” was founded by the leaders of the Crimean Tatar National movement. This newspaper was first published in Bakhchysaray by its first editor-in-chief Liliya Budzhurova and its primary goals were to coordinate the activities within the Crimean Tatar national movement and to provide objective information to the Crimean Tatar community. Unlike “Qirim”, “Avdet” was quite critical towards the Crimean authorities.

Crimean media experts mostly characterize the Crimean Tatar media as independent, as their agenda is significantly different from the Crimean mainstream media. The most notable and the most actively developing Crimean Tatar media holding is ATR, which includes ATR TV channel, Crimean Tatar TV channel for children “Lyale”, radio “Meidan” and online media “15 minut”. Privately owned by Crimean Tatar oligarch Lenur Islyamov, the holding was developing as a successful business project. In 2012 ATR TV channel obtained license for digital broadcasting and bought a place in the national package of
one of the leading satellite broadcasters, which allowed the channel to attract additional funds from the all-Ukrainian advertisement market (Prytula 2012). In addition, the channel launched the top-rated Crimean Russian language talk show “Gravitastiya”, which was going far beyond the Crimean Tatar related issues, invited public speakers from all political camps of Crimea, including the pro-Russian groups, and as a result, effectively attracted mainstream audiences (Yunusov 2012).

As for the political affiliations of the Crimean Tatar national media, for a long time they formed a “united front” on issues concerning the rights of the Crimean Tatars as a native group of Crimea, land distribution and the setting up relations with Ukrainian political elites (Yablonovska 2008: 259). However, as experts pointed out, this situation changed in the late 2000s. The fragmentation of the Crimean Tatar national movement and the emergence of a number of conflicting organizations within community led to the differentiation of ideological positions within the pool of the Crimean Tatar media. For instance, newspaper “Avdet” was always close to political course of the Milli Mejlis and its leader Mustafa Dzhemilev, while newspaper “Poluostrov” was owned by the leaders of the Crimean Tatar political party ‘Milli Firka’, which stood on the openly anti-Mejlis positions.

Speaking about the ideological orientations of the Crimean Tatar media, Najie Femi, editor-in-chief of the “Meidan” radio and anchor at ATR TV channel in 2010-2012, formulated it in the following way. Femi spoke about the tendency of increasing of the pro-Russian vector in the Crimean political sphere after Viktor Yanukovych had come to power in 2010, and argued that this shift affected the way Crimean authorities treated the independent Crimean Tatar media. According to her, the initial goal of the Crimean Tatar media was to promote the Crimean Tatar culture and to broadcast in the Crimean Tatar language. However, being financially independent, these media managed to strike a balance between developing and maintaining of their own editorial policies and creating room for an interethnic dialogue in Crimea. Femi also pointed out that the Crimean Tatar national media could not compete with the Russian language media of the peninsula for the general audience, so they had to focus on the social, cultural and education content for the Crimean Tatar population (Femi 2010). Following the cultural and religious profile of their target group, the Crimean Tatar national media, according to Femi, were quite rigid in selection of topics and manufactured their content with the Muslim audience’s cultural and social values in mind. At the same time, both ATR and radio “Meidan” oriented themselves mostly toward the younger audience, having to balance between the interests of youth and limitations of cultural traditions, thus producing, what Gemi calls “modern formats with ethnic flavour” (Femi 2013).

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In terms of the language of broadcasting, Russian heavily greatly dominates the Crimean media landscape. However, the correlation between the ethnic composition of the peninsula and the language configuration of the media market is far from proportional. According to the last census of 2001, 77% of Crimeans considered Russian their native language, 10% - Ukrainian and 11.4% - Crimean Tatar. But in 2000 in Crimea there were 412 officially registered Russian language media outlets, 15 – in ethnic minority languages including Crimean Tatar, and only 4 – in Ukrainian (Yablonskova 2008: 267). Language practices of the Crimean Tatar national media have been greatly influenced by the law on the regional languages that the Ukrainian Parliament adopted in August 2012. In 2010, ATR and “Meidan” broadcasted 50% of the airtime in Ukrainian, 30% - in Crimean Tatar and 20% - in Russian. After the law was adopted, the content has changed as there was no longer any required minimum of broadcasting in Ukrainian. In 2012 “Meidan” turned to 100% Crimean Tatar language content and ATR considerably decreased Ukrainian-language broadcasting, leaving only one daily Ukrainian language news cast, in order to expand Crimean Tatar and Russian-language broadcasting, as Nariman Dzhelyal (2013) stated.

At the same time the Crimean Tatar section at the state owned “Krym” TV and radio company broadcasted only for 2.5 hours a week in Crimean Tatar in late 2012.

Crimean Tatar national newspapers had different language practices: some of them were published only in Russian, others – only in Crimean Tatar. Weeklies “Avdet”, “Golos Kryma” and “Poluostrov” were published in Russian, while “Qirim” and “Yan-Dunya” relied on Crimean Tatar.

The Crimean Tatar internet media outlets were more flexible in terms of their language policies. Most popular Crimean Tatar online national projects in 2012 information agency QHA and part of the ART-Meidan media group, web site “15 minut”21 – had Russian language news feeds, however, QHA also had Turkish and English pages. An online page of the ATR TV channel published textual and video content in both Russian and Crimean Tatar languages.

Media expert Lenur Yunusov points out that media, broadcasting only in the Crimean Tatar language could not reach broad audiences and, therefore, constantly experienced financial hardships. The newspaper “Qirim”, which received funds from the state budget as a part of the state support of the culture of ethnic minorities, was on the verge of closure in 2012, due to unstable state funding and the inability to attract external funds from advertisement. Yunusov argues, that in the Crimean situation, outlets trying to accommodate only interests of their national audience are destined to die out sooner or later. He also pointed to the tendency for the national Crimean Tatar media during the 2010-

21 http://15minut.org/
2012 to go beyond their initial editorial goals and to seek new ways to attract broader audiences, to broaden the scope of their content. Introduction of Russian as the main language of broadcasting was one of the most widely used strategies, according to Yunusov. However, the expert mentioned, this often caused a critical feedback from the traditional Crimean Tatar readers, who wished to receive information in their native language and saw the media outlets primarily as a tool of the promotion of the national culture and language education for the younger generation of the Crimean Tatars.

As a concluding remark, I should state that in the period between 2010 and 2013 (up until spring 2014) the Crimean Tatar media were actively developing and searching for their niche at the Crimean media market, trying to balance between economic profitability and attracting broader audiences on one hand and preserving ethnic peculiarities and unique national mobilization and education functions on the other. Setting up high standards of journalism at the peninsula, the Crimean Tatar media influenced the development of the Crimean mainstream media landscape, stirring up competition and actively opposing attempts to use xenophobic rhetoric by Crimean mainstream journalists. In this regard, Yunusov spoke about an important process of “de-segregation” of the Crimean media space, ongoing during the period between 2010 and 2013, where media outlets slowly but surely were transforming their dominant frames of media coverage to accommodate the needs of all ethnic groups of the peninsula, using more inclusive verbal constructions, avoiding overtly insulting statements regarding any ethnic groups of Crimea. Stressing the neutral territorial identity of being primarily “Crimeans”, the media blurred or pushed on the margins the political and cultural differences between the Crimean ethnic minority groups, putting emphasis on the commonalities and shared regional problems, values, symbols and memories. Yunusov (2012) evaluated this process as a “healthy and positive tendency, which helps to eliminate interethnic tensions and xenophobia from public discourse”.

On the other hand, I argue that this process has its reverse side. Such a seemingly neutral frame may be caused (or even inspired) by the dominant political elite, which also controls the majority of the Crimean mainstream media, in order to maintain status quo and to impose their own meanings of the promoted shared identity. Stressing commonalities and encouraging the unified and mainstream representations of the present and the past, the empowered political elites, through their media “lap dogs”, use such constructed imaginary unity for their own good, either to promote the idea of dominance of the Russian culture at the peninsula, by promoting the idea of Russian language to be the only means of interethnic communication, or to stress the unified and government-backed version of the collective memory dominating the Crimean public discourse. In addition, erasing the ethnically-marked political agendas from the media discourse may cause public denial of the demands of the ethnic groups including the Crimean Tatars, which are striving for political recognition, proportional political representation and rehabilitation of their national versions
of painful collective memories, which running counter to the dominant one.

Thus, this process appears to be ambiguous and multi-faceted, informing complicated and contingent relations between the audiences, media professionals, media owners and political and business elites of Crimea. I will be discussing these arguments in more detail in further chapters of the study.

2.3. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STUDIES ON THE CRIMEAN TATARS

In this section I aim to discuss major approached to the analysis of the key pillars of the Crimean Tatar collective identity, through a critical overview of existing studies of political, historical, cultural and religious aspects of this identity. By this overview, I seek to answer the following questions:

1. What are the key features of the Crimean Tatars' collective identity and how do these features add to the construction of social boundaries between the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups in Ukraine and, particularly, in Crimea?

2. How do the existing studies about the Crimean Tatars approach the construction of the basic features of their collective identity?

3. In which forms did the Russian influence manifest itself in Crimea during the analysed period of 2010-2012?

There are number of studies, the overview of which can provide a detailed account of the key features of the Crimean Tatars collective identity. The membership in a group, according to Horowitz, can be informed by birth or by choice. He claims that ethnic ties are rather pre-given affiliations, which come with birth. However, there is always room for accepted forms of inclusion of the members of similar or neighbouring groups, a process which Horowitz calls “fictive kinship”. (1985: 61). Using this idea, one can explain the process of construction of the Crimean Tatars as a separate ethnic group in early XV century. In Horowitz's terms, the movement of 'ethnic assimilation' (1985:71) led to the creation of the Crimean Tatar people as a coherent group. Ethnic identity of the Crimean Tatars is multi-faceted and contains commonalities, as well as differences, with a number of broader identities, which in various forms influence its nature.

Firstly, the modern Crimean Tatars have inherited many features, common for all post-Soviet ethnic groups. This includes sentiments and cultural values as well as collective negative memories (like Stalin's repressions, stagnation period etc.), shared by the generations of people at the Post-Soviet space.

Being of Turkic origin, the Crimean Tatars have certain historical and cultural ties with Turkey. The large Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey has devoted itself in providing cultural and humanitarian support to the Crimean Tatar returnees in the early 1990s. The idea of imagined or virtual kinship with the Turkish people plays one of the leading roles for the Milli Mejlis of the Crimean...
Tatars. Based on these common grounds, political leadership of the Crimean Tatars carried out active communications and joint activities with the Turkish political elites. In this regard, Sasse speaks about certain fear of 'Turkish influence' or 'Islamic factor' remained present in the public discourse of Crimea in the late 2000s (Sasse 2007: 91).

Another important marker of the Crimean tatars' identity is religion. Islam, which was the state religion of the Crimean Khanate in the XV century, is still practiced by the majority of the Crimean Tatar population. Based on religious unity, Crimean tatars share cultural ties with the Muslim world and, among other features, also embrace the ideology, promoted in Crimea by the Islamic party “Khizb-ut-Tahrir”. This Islamic political party quite successfully worked in Crimea since the mid 2000s and united Crimean Tatars, who support the idea of restoration of the national religious statehood – the Crimean Khalifat (Prytula 2012).

Being an important factor of ethnic identity, Crimean Tatar language can not be considered the dominating criteria for group’s identification, Yunusov states. Having spend more then 60 years in exile in Central Asian countries, many Crimean Tatars, including the younger generation born and raised in Crimea, use Russian as an everyday language of communication both within Crimean Tatar community and with the representatives of the non-Tatar population of the peninsula. Despite the great efforts of the Crimean Tatar community to restore education in national language and to use Crimean Tatar language in the national Crimean Tatar broadcasting, Russian remains dominant language of the public sphere and media in Crimea (Yunusov 2012). This in great extent explains the situation, when Russian is considered more prestigious for the younger generation of the Crimean Tatars in their willingness for integration into the social life of the region, in their search for education and job opportunities.

All of the above-mentioned features draw social boundaries of the group and shape its relations with the out-groups. However, I can argue that a mix of various identities, that Crimean Tatars share, makes this group less closed and its social boundaries less firm. This allows speaking about relative inclusiveness of the group and the low level of conflict potential in relations with other groups.

On the other hand, Horowitz speaks about the tendency to enforce the boundaries between the groups and to emphasize cultural distinctions of the group in the situation of threat to the uniqueness and traditional ways of life for the members of the group. The cutting-edge historical moment, which deprived the group not only of its native land, but also its national self-determination was the forced deportation of 1944, which had clear ethnic-based grounds and held against this and another small ethnic groups of Crimea by Stalin's totalitarian regime. After the en masse return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea, the collective memory of deportation became a central and vital element of the group's ethnic

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self-determination. The collective trauma and the tragedy of deportation created powerful bonds that connect the group together and draw the boundary between the Crimean Tatars and the Russian population of Crimea. The memory of deportation could be considered the “selected trauma” of the Crimean Tatars, used for political purposes, primarily in the power struggle with the Crimean and all-Ukrainian state authorities.

Considering Crimea to be its native land, the Crimean Tatar people lays political and symbolic claims on this territory and strives for the status of indigenous population to the peninsula. The conflict with the Slavic population here derives from the fact that after the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944, the peninsula together with all the property there was re-settled by the people from various regions of the USSR. Over the years, the Russian-speaking majority established itself in Crimea, so when the USSR collapsed and the Crimean Tatars started to return to their homeland, the tensions over the land and houses, previously owned by the deportees and their families, turned into political struggle between the Slavic majority population (mostly ethnic Ukrainians and Russians) and the minority group (Crimean Tatars). According to Korostelina (2007), such mobilized form of collective identity, which is stimulated by an open confrontation with another group, contains a conflict potential in its very nature. In her study of the national identity formation among the ethnic minorities of Crimea, she approaches this social phenomenon from the perspective of social conflict. She argues that conflict arise when ethnic groups perceive that they are oppressed or victimized through a denial of recognition, security, equality and political participation (Korostelina 2004). Speaking about Crimea, the author argues, that the return and further resettlement of the Crimean Tatars in the early 1990s “changed the ethnic balance through inserting of the ethnically divergent group and resulted in land disputes and citizenship claims by the new arrivals” (Korostelina 2004: 215).

Among the key indicators of individual and collective readiness for conflict behaviour, Korostelina points out the following conflict indicators: ethnic group salience, level of ethnocentrism, economic deprivation and minority/majority position of the group. According to her findings, Crimean Tatars demonstrated a much higher level of ethnic group salience (around 80% of the research sample), while Russian population of the peninsular - only 10% (Korostelina 2004: 220). On the other hand, the Russians of Crimea, who share salient Russian ethnic identity and perceive their group from the majority perspective (see themselves as a more powerful and dominant group), demonstrated a higher level of ethnocentrism and readiness for conflict behaviour towards ethnic out-groups.

On the contrary, for the Crimean Tatars with a higher level of salience of national identity and loyalty towards the Ukrainian state, ethnocentrism doesn't lead to higher readiness for the conflict behaviour, but rather a higher level of tolerance towards other ethnic groups (Korostelina 2004: 225).

As Korostelina states, ethnic minorities often transform loyalty towards the national unity and the state, into a means of accomplishing their own political
goals and obtaining benefits. She argues that the adoption of national identity can only decrease the conflict behaviours, if the state can succeed in providing opportunities and protecting rights of ethnic group members. Therefore, failure or inefficiency of the Ukrainian state ethnopolitics in Crimea, exacerbated by an increase of Russian ethnocentrism led to political stalemate, when Russian political and cultural domination in Crimea created tensions around the Crimean Tatars' claims for indigenous status and economic compensation of their return from exile.

Theoretical model of Donald Horowitz is useful for explaining the stages of the Crimean Tatars' collective identity formation from sub-ethnic groups into one ethnopolitical entity as well as modern time transformations of the group's identity. Since Ukraine independence, Crimean Tatars position themselves as a native group, which has suffered from ethnic-based violence and still struggles for historical rehabilitation.

Jasques Lacan speaks about the fundamental principle of the construction of identity. He states that an individual obtains her 'self'-subjectivity, in opposition to or as a reflection of the 'other' (Lacan 1995:101). Following Lacan’s theory of identity construction, Olga Dukhnich argues that the contemporary Crimean-Tatars’ collective identity was formed primarily as an ethnopolitical construct, including certain stance on the issue of land, a view of ancestors and a vision of the future. She claims that such ethnically and culturally vivid identity has been developing in the cultural space of Crimea, where the “significant other” for the Slavic majority was absent for quite a long time. During Soviet times, the Russian and Ukrainian population, residing in Crimea, was sharing the only dominant collective pattern – the Soviet identity. This type of social categorization, as Dukhnich argues, was deprived of ethnic characteristics. She explains: “In the Soviet times ethnic markers for the people living in Crimea were not actualized at all. Most of them have been moved to this region. The overwhelming majority of these people didn’t preserve their cultural practices. The Soviet identity in Crimea was non-ethnic in its core – it was a local melting pot.” (Dukhnich 2013) Thus, the scholar claims, the Crimean Tatars, with their visible cultural and religious practices, became the “symbolic other” for the Slavic majority of Crimea, triggered a symmetrical strive for ethnic categorization among the Russian and Ukrainian population. However, both the Russian and Ukrainian ethnic projects were not well developed in Crimea, as the majority of the population was socialized into the Soviet values and didn’t live in Crimea for a long time. According to Dukhnich, such asymmetry in interethnic relations between the Slavic and the Crimean Tatar population bears a conflict potential. The lack of powerful ethnic self-identification factors raises a feeling of anxiety among the Slavic 'self'-group, as opposed to visibly different and culturally active 'other' - the Crimean Tatars. The 'other', which was imagined as a well-united, politically active group and, therefore, potentially threatening to 'us'. This idea could help explain the discourse of threat, widely used by the Crimean media to represent the political activities of the Crimean
In her recent study of collective identities of the three ethnic groups of Crimea (the Crimean Tatars, the Russians and the Ukrainians), Dukhnich speaks about the characteristic features of the Crimean Tatar identity in more detail. First of all, she argues that the collective identity of the Crimean Tatars is predominantly ethnic and closely connected with a territorial marker – the native land of the Crimean peninsula (2013: 70). The key constructing pillars of this identity are cultural traditions, religion and the traumatic past of the ethnic group – the collective memory of deportation, life in exile and the return are among the most notable its elements. Alongside with a strong ethnic bounds within the collective, as Dukhnich states, a civic national identity of being a Ukrainian citizen is prevalent among the younger generation of the Crimean Tatars and does not contradict such strong ethnic ties. On the contrary, Ukrainian national identity is often perceived as an active form of realization of political ambitions of the ethnic group, its collective strive for political and cultural recognition within the Ukrainian state.

Greta Uehling, in her study of the Crimean Tatars' identity “Beyond memory” (2004) comes to similar conclusions about the nature of the Crimean Tatars' ethnic identity. Based on in-depth interviews with representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, both ones who have lived through deportation and the younger generations, Uehling argues that, the social construction of identity is closely related to the collective memory and the narrative of the common history. Uehling utilizes the concept of collective memory to portray concrete narratives and actual feelings which link this people to the Crimean land. Here, she argues, the deportation as “a national trauma” and the notion of the “Father’s land”, which were preserved by the Crimean Tatars in exile and transferred to the younger generations, are the most powerful memories holding together the collective identity of this ethnic group (Uehling 2004: 47). The above discussed studies of identity utilize the interpretive framework while approaching the issues of deportation and the status of indigenous population of the Crimean Tatars. Both Dukhnich and Uehling connect the issues of status and rights of this group not to the existing legal framework, but to the self-perception of members of the group. In addition, Dukhnich broadens the picture of the collective identity features by mentioning that along with the 'traditional' characteristics of collective identity, younger generation of the Crimean Tatars express the need for the “new identity myth”, grounded in modern socio-political relations with the Ukrainian state and fostering the European image of the Crimean Tatars (Dukhnich 2013: 70).

Historical aspects of the collective identity of the Crimean Tatars, their deportation, the emergence of their national movement for political rehabilitation which started from the early 1960s, historical details of the return and resettlement in the independent state of Ukraine, are explored and studied by the Ukrainian academics in great detail. There are a number of profound
studies, which provide a historical as well as political analysis of the process of repatriation, consolidation of the Crimean Tatar political elites and their negotiations with the Ukrainian authorities about acute problems during the active phase of repatriation, claims for political representation of the Crimean Tatars in the local bodies of self-government and in the state institutions. (Tyshchenko and Pikhovshek 1999; Kotygorenko 2005; Belitser 2012, and others). In terms of analysis of xenophobia and interethnic relations in Crimea, there were number of analytical reports prepared by the leading human rights organization, which examined the use of hate speech in the public rhetoric in Crimea and analysed the Ukrainian state policy in this sphere (Kharkiv Human Rights group report 2009), or focused on the use of hate speech in the Ukrainian online sphere (“No borders” project cyberhate report 2011). Until the beginning of 2014, there were a number of civic initiatives that carried out regular monitoring of the content of the national and Crimean media outlets with regards to the use of hate speech and discriminatory language.

The outcomes of these monitoring initiatives revealed general tendencies about the types of hate speech and its objects, however, these monitoring projects focus predominantly on explicit and overt forms of hate speech, not looking at deeper layers and structural forms of discrimination in the media discourse, which I will talk about further in this study.

Many works of Ukrainian and Western academics have dealt specifically with the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944. One of the most notable works in this sphere is the study by Gulnara Bekirova “Krymsko-tatarskaya problema (1944-1991)” (2004), which provides a detailed historical review of the deportation and the development of the national movement of the Crimean Tatars in the 1980s. She refers to primary sources – documents from the Soviet achieves, previously kept secret from public, in order to reconstruct the events and provide new arguments for the current political debate about the causes and consequences of the deportation and, therefore, contributes to the public re-negotiation of the current status of the Crimean Tatars and their political demands channeled through media discourse.

The issues of the Crimean Tatars’ rights are often addressed from the political science perspective. In this regard, the core of the Ukrainian academic discussion lies in defining the legal status of the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic minority within the Ukrainian state as well as in analysing state polices in the sphere of reintegration of the returnees and political and economic obligations of the Ukrainian state towards the Crimean Tatars as forcibly removed population. Among other studies, Valentyna Subotenko (2004) provides an analysis of the Ukrainian and international norms of legislation utilized to justify the Crimean Tatars’ claim on the status as an indigenous population to the Crimea. Natalya Belitzer (2004) investigates the term “indigenous population” and provides the key identification criteria for the groups granted with this status. She analyses the Ukrainian legislature as well as the concept of state ethnopolitics and
compares them with existing international legal practices of the inclusion of these groups into society, opening possibilities for their cultural and political self-identification. Her recent work in this field deals with the question of territorial autonomies, as an internationally accepted instrument of granting rights to the ethnic minorities within the unitary states. Comparing the legal and institutional frameworks of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine and the Aland Islands Autonomy in Finland, Belitser (2014) argues that, unlike the Swedish-speaking autonomy in Finland, ARC is an example of the territorial “autonomy for no one”. The author believes, that the ARC was initially created to satisfy demands of the Russian-speaking majority of Crimea and, at the same time, “almost completely ignores well-grounded demands of the Crimean Tatars – the indigenous population to the region – and the Ukrainians – “a minority within minority” in Crimea”, and, therefore, bears a potential for interethnic conflicts in its very core (Belitser 2014: 45). For this reason, the author claims, the legal model of ARC can not be classified under the international principles of territorial autonomies, which are in principle used as a constitutional tool of “asymmetrical federalization” to satisfy the territorial, political and cultural needs of a certain ethnic group within a unitary state.

Gwendolyn Sasse looks at the Crimean issue through the lens of regionalism, calling Ukraine “a state of regions” (Sasse 2007:69) and stressing the differences in ethnic, linguistic, social economic spheres, cleavages in memories and political orientations. However, Sasse argues that regional diversity, which has been a key factor informing the character of the Ukrainian post-Soviet transition and nation-building processes, also bears a two-folded potential both being a constant threat of separatism within the country, but also ensuring its political stability(Sasse 2007: 70). In this regard, she argues that the very notion of the “region” in Ukrainian public discourse has become extremely politisized, as regions are generally perceived as “independent political actors, which would ultimately undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity” (Sasse 2007: 76). Obviously, in this regard ARC is seen as potentially the most separatist region of Ukraine. Returning back to Belitser's point about the nature of the Crimean autonomy and its failure to accommodate the political request for the Crimean Tatars self-determination, this politically active minority group initially opposed Crimean political autonomy and adopted the rhetoric of decentralization for their own different concept behind it – the idea of a national-territorial autonomy (Sasse 2007: 82)

In the meantime, Belitser's recent field study in Crimea has revealed an opinion, which dominates in both popular and expert circles of Crimea – the idea of “equal rights for all groups of Crimea”, which has been naturalized, according to Belitser, as a part of the Soviet legacy shared by the Crimean population (Belitser 2014: 47). The idea of “equality” is considered democratic and normal, while ideas of equity and models of positive discrimination of the minority groups are openly opposed. These conclusions confirm my own findings which I will present in the next chapters that this popular notion is inherently present in
the Crimean media discourse and affects public opinion on political demands of the Crimean Tatars.

Another notable Ukrainian scholar Volodymyr Yevtukh also deals with the issue of indigenous populations of Ukraine within the theoretical framework of ethnopolitics. He speaks about the state policy towards ethnic minorities in terms of equal access to resources, fulfilling of their cultural and educational needs secured by the Ukrainian state. However, he shares an ethno-cultural paradigm defined by Anthony Smith, where the titular nation dominates the other ethnic minorities within its nation-stat and the ethnic minorities, in turn, “receive equal treatment” (Yevtukh 2000). In this paradigm ethnicity is perceived as a fixed attribute and a basic factor in distribution of power within society. This study resonates with the ideological framework of the Ukrainian state's ethno-policy since Ukraine's independence (Yevtukh 2000: 200). Yevtukh briefly describes this concept, which was implemented in the Ukrainian Constitution, as follows: “Ukraine as a state entered the path to give the titular nation, the Ukrainians - which had no statehood before – a state and a proper position for its self-determination. Also such space has been created for all ethnic minorities residing in Ukraine” (cited in Yevtukh 2000:40). As for Crimea, according to Yevtukh, the multi-ethnic model was used. However, despite the announced universal principle of granting equal rights to all ethnic groups, in reality this model meant the distribution of political and cultural benefits not according to the ethnic principle, but according to the territorial one. It means that a group dominating in a certain region, gets the adequate political representation in state institutions, access to social infrastructure, education and other benefits.

This inequality grounded in the legal framework manifested itself in numerous conflicts between the Slavic majority and Crimean Tatars over economic resources (such as land plots or budget funds) and political representation, as well as resulted in a significant level of xenophobia (Kharkiv Human Right Group 2009). The mentioned features clearly prove that this model is far from being an efficient tool for national integration and stability in Crimea. The issue of Russian political influence in Crimea during the analysed period of 2010-2012 and, more broadly the issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and the role of Crimea in geopolitics of the Black Sea region, have been actively discussed by many scholars in the fields of IR and political science. In these studies the Crimean Tatars are referred to primarily as a factor of political instability in the Crimean peninsula. Issues related to their political and social status are closely bound to the general Ukrainian–Russian relations. However, as Sasse rightly pinpoints, the implied clear-cut dichotomy between the Russian and Ukrainian groups, often put forward by the scholars with regard to the 'Russian' factor in Ukrainian and Crimean politics, in reality is quite blurred (2007: 70-71). The historical mix of ethnic backgrounds and a large number of Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea make this distinction quite
problematic. Additionally, she argues that the juxtaposition of these two large ethnic groups often leaves aside relations with other groups of influence.

Crimea with its ethnic diversity and strategic geopolitical location is often looked at with regard to internal and external factors of instability. The key external factor is the Russian overt and covert political influence on Crimean domestic politics. Many experts state that external influence of Russian propaganda and Russian financial capital on Crimea's politics and its relations with the official Kyiv has been a significant factor ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Exploiting the Soviet sentiments of the Slavic majority of the Crimean population, pro-Russian non-government organizations and Crimean pro-Russian political parties, often directly sponsored by the Russian Federation state officials, have been systematically setting a pro-Russian agenda in the Crimean public and media discourses. LENUR YUNUSOV stated that in 2010-2012 Russia mainly used indirect financial influence on the Crimean information sphere by controlling content of the Crimean media outlets, like the one of the most popular Crimean FM radio broadcasters – Trans-M Radio, owned by AUSTAM TEMIRGALIEV, a member of the Crimean Parliament, representing the Party of Regions.

Merle Maigre (2008) examines the issues of Russian political, economic and cultural influence in Crimea and makes a number of important points. Maigre argues that the 'Moscow propaganda' campaigns (2008:8), the central external tool of Russian influence on the Crimean politics, were conducted predominantly in order to put pressure on the Ukrainian government on various matters.

On the other hand, the Crimean Tatars could be listed as one of the most important internal players ensuring political stability in Crimea. They are considered one of the most active and visible groups of interests within Crimean political sphere, which has its own distinct ideological and political position and specific religious affiliation. Therefore, the Crimean Tatar political leadership is perceived as capable of confronting the Russia-backed political agenda in Crimea and as a long-term strategic political ally of the central Ukrainian authorities in the region.

The pro-Russian actors, political parties and NGOs in Crimea, like “Russkoe edinstvo” and “Russkiy Bloc”, could also be named as important internal players, who in contrast, promote a pro-Russian agenda in Crimea and publicly oppose the demands of the Crimean Tatars. The pro-Russian organizations often become the opposing party in the political scandals and street clashes which involve the Crimean Tatars. Sasse points out that the rise of popularity of the pro-Russian movement in Crimea in 1994, which resulted in the election of the Crimean President Yuri Meshkov, however, did not succeed due to internal divisions and elite in-fight within the movement. In this regard she states: “The quick rise and fall of Meshkov's movement demonstrated how easily dormant ethnic sentiment can be mobilized in conditions of change and uncertainty, but
also how unsustainable it is in the presence of cross-cutting cleavages and the lack of political alternatives” (Sasse 2007: 88).

The level of political influence of the pro-Russian groups in Crimea during the period of 2010-2014 is quite questionable. Crimean media experts, whom I interviewed in 2012 and 2013, expressed doubts about the support of the pro-Russian groups by the Crimean Slavic majority. Olga Dukhnich stated that leaders of the pro-Russian organizations were politically weak and uninfluential during the mentioned period of time, “they were busy quarrelling for scarce resources and for leadership among themselves and have discredited themselves completely” (Dukhnich 2013). Denis Baturin argued that pro-Russian leaders, like Bershikov or Khramov, were quite marginal at that time and their radical ideological position – overtly anti-Ukrainian and anti-Tatar – were not popular among the majority of population (Baturin 2013). According to Yunusov, the only region that manifested more pro-Russian sentiments and where pro-Russian groups enjoyed greater support was Sevastopol. In his opinion, this was due to the fact that the local media outlets and local broadcasters produced media content emphasizing political and cultural ties with Russia and overtly critical towards the Ukrainian policies in Crimea (Yunusov 2012).

Thus, I can conclude that Russia's external political influence in 2010-2012 prevailed over the domestic demand for pro-Russian political ideas. Based upon her own studies, Dukhnich (2013) described the situation in Crimea in 2012-2013: “Current Russian identity has transformed into the 'Russian cultural identity', which is not based on purely ethnic markers, it is rather a supra-ethnic identification, based on sharing of the Russian cultural heritage – like Pushkin or Dostoevskiy.” The expert concluded that elder generation of Russians living in Crimea bore traits of post-Soviet identification, in which ethnic ties were blurred or limited to ties with the Russian language and territory of residence – the Crimea. For these people, Dukhnich argued, their cultural and territorial affiliations did not contradict with the Ukrainian civic identity. They considered themselves Russians living in Ukraine and in their majority were not supportive of radical pro-Russian scenarios (Dukhnich 2013: 71).

The second factor that should be taken to consideration in the discussion of Crimean interethnic relations, is religion. Crimea is the only region of Ukraine where a large population practices Islam. According to the study of Bohomolov, Danylov, Semyvolos and Yavorska, the Crimean Tatars make up 57% of all Muslim population in Ukraine (2005:14). Studies of social identities in Crimea demonstrate that religion is one of the crucial bonds constructing the Crimean Tatar ethnic identity. The researchers utilize the methodological approach of critical discourse analysis to study the representations of the Muslims in Ukrainian public discourse (Bohomolov et al 2005:102). Even though the media discourse was not the primary subject of study, a number of important findings of the authors will be taken to account in my research.

Bohomolov et al distinguish between internal and external layers of public
discourse on Muslims – the 'us-discourse', created by the members of the group and 'them-discourse' - produced by others. The authors propose not only to delineate this dichotomy, but to identify the content of both parts of identity, which includes certain beliefs, linguistic structures, grounded in the existing discursive practices of group self-representation, as well as the image of the group as seen 'from the outside', presented within the discursive practices of the out-group (2005: 103).

With regards to the collective identity of the Crimean Tatars, the study has revealed tensions between the religious and ethnic pillars of their identity. For instance, utilizing the Islamic identity as a powerful tool of mobilization and unification, political leaders of the Crimean Tatars often raise their claims in non-religious terms, emphasizing ethnic markers of their group identity by means of references to deportation of their ethnic group and its subsequent repatriation to Crimea (Bohomolov et al 2005: 127). Similarly, Volodymyr Prytula mentions that the Milli Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, which positions itself as a secular political body, openly opposes the political platform of the Crimean political party “Khizb-ut Takhrir”, which, on the contrary, builds its popularity primarily on religious norms of Islam(Prytula 2012). Bogomolov et al also speak about the paradox of the active presence of the Muslim population in Ukrainian society and the discrete and unsystematic set of social beliefs with regards to this group, ascribed to Muslims by the non-Muslim majority (2005: 80). These gaps of public discourse are filled with the official statements about inter-religious peace on one hand, and xenophobic stereotypes and prejudices amplified by the media, on the other.

Speaking more broadly about the ways the Muslim world is represented by the Western media, Edward Said (1997) characterized this approach as ‘highly exaggerating and stereotyping and to a great extent homogenizing various cultures, political groups and religions of the non-Western world’ (Said 1997, 6). This situation could be extrapolated to the Ukrainian grounds: the Crimean Tatars, who mostly practice Islam, live among the Slavic Orthodox population and represent the whole Muslim world to Ukrainian society with all the accompanying stereotypes, concerns and prejudices about 'Islamic threat and extremism', reproduced by the media. Said states that for the Western media “the term 'Islam' seems to engulf all aspects of the diverse Muslim world, reducing them all to a specific unthinking essence” (1997: 8). The author believes that journalists and the public, instead of analysing and understanding, limits the discussion to “us versus them”. Another notable idea, expressed by Yunas Samad (2007), is about a global shift of the media frame of the Muslims since the 9/11. Before 2001, he argues, ethnic and national markers played a major role in framing of the news related to minority groups which practice Islam, but after the 9/11 events there has been a tendency to homogenize the diverse Muslim communities. The strategy of spinning the 'discourse of threat' in the Ukrainian national and Crimean media will be examined in more detail in the next chapters.
Conclusions

The array of existing studies dealing with the Crimean Tatars provided the set of important findings regarding various aspects of the Crimean Tatars collective identity. Among the key identity features shared by the Crimean Tatars, ethnopolitical and historical aspects are the most important. Political demands, based on the strong collective feeling of belonging to the Crimean land and grounded in the collective tragic memory of deportation, became the foundation of the Crimean Tatar ethnic self-determination and unity. At the same time, language and religion play an important but secondary role in construction of the group’s collective self.

As for the Russian external influence on the social and political life of the Crimean peninsula in 2010-2012, it could be considered disputable and mostly depended on the immediate political situation in broader Russian-Ukrainian bilateral relations, where Crimea often plays as a 'bargaining chip' in negotiations. As the Crimean experts stated, Russian influence of that period, though carried out by the internal Crimean players, like the pro-Russian NGOs and political parties, received little demand from the Crimean population and cannot be considered inherently internal during the period of 2010-2012.

The relations between the Slavic majority of Crimea and the Crimean Tatars were of primary importance in the process of shaping social boundaries between the two groups. Both groups became 'the significant other' for mutual development of the underlying features of collective identity. At the same time, construction of the 'us-good' versus 'them-bad' practices became widely used in public and media discourses. In this regard, chapter 3 will shed more light on the specific discursive mechanisms, utilized by the Crimean media to construct images of the 'other' and to shape the perceived collective characteristic features of the Crimean Tatars. These imagined features, often extrapolated on individual representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, undoubtedly informed the way ethnic groups interact with each other on everyday basis.
CHAPTER 3. PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Having provided the major theoretical frame as well as the social-political context of the study, in this chapter I will proceed to the analysis of the media texts of the corpus of the national and Crimean mainstream media in order to look at the patterns of construction of the Crimean Tatars’ group identities.

In chapter 3 I will explore the patterns of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars and pinpoint key discursive strategies, utilized by the all-Ukrainian and the Crimean mainstream media to construct the identities and ideological affiliations of this ethnic group as well as representations of its individual members. As mentioned earlier, for this purpose I chose to use the methodological means of the critical discourse analysis and apply them for the analysis of the corpus of the media texts of the selected list of the all-national and Crimean mainstream press.

The analysis is seeking to respond to the following research questions:

1. How do the media represent Crimean Tatars at the collective and individual level?
2. Which discursive strategies are dominant in the media representations of the Crimean Tatars on the national and regional levels?
3. How do the existing media representation patterns shape the collective identity of the Crimean Tatar people?
4. How do the alternative discursive patterns of representation manifest in the mainstream media and does it have any impact on the dominating journalist practices on national and Crimean levels of representation?

The discourse analysis of the media texts will be carried out on the following levels of analysis. Fairclough differentiates between the local and global text structures (1995: 104-105). On the micro level I will look at the lexical and grammatical choices, cohesion between the clauses and sentences; the use of intertextuality in the discourse. Macro analysis of the global textual structures envisages study of frames (or discursive practices), their ideological effects on the relations between the actors, analysis of presences and absences in the texts, common sense presuppositions etc.

Study of the representation of social actors in the media discourse makes up a central focal point for analysis. The task of the analysis is to examine existing forms of linguistic representations of the Crimean Tatars as a group and/or as private individuals in the media texts and determine the ideological effects of such representation on the media audiences. Another objective is to study the level of social exclusion or inclusion reflected in the media discourse regarding the Crimean Tatars.
In order to do so, the analysis of the media texts will be conducted using the list of research questions, offered by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). The following questions are considered to be relevant for the analysis of exclusion/inclusion of the social actors:

1. How the persons are named and referred to linguistically?
2. What traits and characteristics are attributed to them?
3. By what arguments individuals’ and groups’ inclusion or exclusion is legitimized?
4. From what point of view these arguments are expressed?
5. Are respective utterances expressed overtly or are they mitigated?

Each of these questions is connected with a certain discursive strategy of “positive self-representation and negative other-representation”, the authors state. Before moving forward, it is worth conceptualizing the term “strategy”. Palli, Vaara and Sorsa (2009: 303) provide broad definition of the discursive strategy as “discourse which has its own specific conditions, that enable certain ways of acting and, at the same time, restrict other actions.” Specking more specifically about the representation of the minority groups, Van Djik speaks about the “strategy of exclusion/inclusion”, as “a process of perception, interpretation, storage, use of ethnic information about minority groups and their actions” (cited in Reisigl and Wodak 1999: 185). Krzyzanowski and Wodak explain that the investigation of the discursive strategies involves the study of the typical schemes of argumentation as well as deconstruction of the linguistic means of realization of these strategies (2009: 21-22).

The variety of strategies proposed by Krzyzanowski and Wodak are the following (2009: 23):

1) Nominalization, which is a construction of in- and out-groups. By nominalization here I mean the use of the noun instead of a verb – shifting the focus from the process to action to its outcome. (Johnstone 2008: 23). Fairclough argues that when the process is “nominalized”, some or all of its participants are omitted (1995: 112).
2) Predication, which stands for labelling of social groups in a positive or negative way
3) Argumentation. This strategy is aimed at justification of positive or negative attributions
4) Framing or discourse representation is targeted at positioning speaker’s point on view by means of reporting, narration or quotation of the described events with either intensification or mitigation of the discriminatory utterances.

The overview of the social-political context as well as the key features of the national and Crimean media landscape, which were pointed out in the previous chapter, demonstrated the general decrease of the use of the overt forms of derogatory and discriminatory rhetoric with regard to the ethnic groups residing in Ukraine. However, many experts, in Crimea particularly, stated the existence
of the certain level of contestation between the adherents of the opposing ideological constructs, presence of the heated public discussions of different versions of the collective memory and other signals of the conflict potential of the region. Continuous attempts to establish and maintain the dominating position of the Soviet-moulded history, Russian language as well as political dominance of the Slavic, pro-Russian groups in the Crimea inform the ways in which media represents the group identities and builds relations of dominance and subordination between them. The aim of this study is to uncover the concrete discursive mechanisms of such domination as well as outbursts of the alternative, counter-discourses, which attempt to rethink the meanings and values behind the most confronting matters, discussed in the Ukrainian and Crimean media.

3.2. PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE MEDIA DISCOURSE

Let me start from the brief overview of the media sample compiled for this chapter and discuss some of its features.

Table 1. Number of media materials about the Crimean Tatars in the national media during 2010-2012 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media/Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraina Moloda</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommentarni</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo tyzhnia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainska Pravda</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL per year</strong></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of the media materials in the sample of the national media is 287, which includes 103 texts from 2010, 91 from the 2011 and 93 from 2012.

Table 2. Number of media materials about the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean mainstream media during 2010-2012 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media/Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krymskiy Telegraph</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krymskoe Izvestiya</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Krymskaya</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total per year</strong></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of the media materials in the sample of the Crimean mainstream media is 413, which includes 122 media texts in 2010, 134 – in
2011 and 157 – in 2012. As tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, the Ukrainian media outlets keep quite stable interest to the topics related to the Crimean Tatar through these 3 years, with the comparably similar number of materials each year.

It should be mentioned that one of the assumed topics of media interest – the date of the commemoration of the Crimean Tatar people’s deportation – was not among the peak topics both at the national and regional levels.

According to my findings, top news from the Crimean politics often bring the Crimean Tatars’ issues to the media limelight. For instance, the most actively discussed issues, related to the Crimean Tatars, include issues of the national and Crimean politics, where the Crimean Tatars play an active role. For instance, the peak of the media interest in March of 2010 (with 18 publications in the national media) is dedicated to the reaction of the Crimean Tatar political leaders on the nomination of Vasily Dzharty on the post of the Prime-Minister of ARC, as well as the nomination of Anatoliy Mogiliov the new Prime Minister of the ARC in November 2011 and the mediatized public discussion of his quite tense relations with the Mejlis resulted in 23 publications in the national media during this month.

3.2.1. GENRES

The detailed analysis of the sample of media materials allows identifying the most commonly used media genres. As Richardson states, discursive genre is “a product of a constellation of discursive practices”, which was created in accordance with particular production techniques in specific institutional settings (2007: 76). Therefore, genres can be approached in terms of their organizational properties and the structure they inform to the particular piece of text at various levels. According to Fairclough, genres provide sets of the more or less fixed conventions of the linguistic tools to represent an issue or to report news (1995:18). In this sense the term “genre” is similar to the term “media format”, which also implies certain schemes, structures and stylistics characteristics, the utilization of which leads to facilitation (and routinization) of the news production and consumption. On the other hand, as Fairclough argues, following the rigid generic structures in the news production often leads to reduction of the information diversity and silencing of certain issues (1995: 86). In this regard, Kulyk stresses on the communicative goal, which a particular text has to achieve, being a product a respective discursive practice or genre (2010: 22).

All media texts in the sample have been attributed to the following media formats: news, interviews, analytical articles, feature stories, opinion articles and other formats. Below are the definitions of the main media formats, which I use in the research:

News, being the most commonly used media genre, is a short, laconic and simple piece of text, which reports on the current events. Riggins admits that the
news is considered more bias-free and more reliable than other types of media output by the target audience. ‘News is perceived as facts’, the scholar claims (Riggins 1997: 13). Richardson defines news discourse as “a system of selection and organization of statements on a particular subject, conducted by a news institution and based on the institution’s values” (Richardson 2007: 76).

According to Fairclough (1995), information provided in the news as a fact, using categorical modality, leads to the normalization of the ideological frames encoded into the news texts and smoothes the unchallenged perception of the given frame by the audience. Moreover, Fairclough calls the news the factor of the social control, which is carried out by means of consent and removal of the markers of authority from the discourse (1989: 37).

Moving to the other types of genres, Kulyk distinguishes between the two wide groups of genres: opinions and analytical articles, interviews, letter to the editor can be characterized as more ideologically-charged and critical types of media genres, while news and feature stories can be visibly less ideological and contain uncontested forms of representation of the social actors (2013: 72-73).

News, interviews and opinions provide representation of voices of the actors: where in the news pieces the reported speech is used, interviews provide original quotations from the conversation with a subject, while in the opinion articles a personality represents herself, by publishing her own text.

Analytical article is a broader type of media text, usually longer then a regular news piece, which provides more in depth discussion of the pros and cons of an issue, its consequences and possible reasons behind it. Normally, in the analytical media text background and social context of the discussed events is presented, various often contradictory voices are balanced, but the conclusions are drawn by the reporter or the analyst.

Feature story is a type of media text which represents a particular phenomenon, personality or event, by using vivid descriptions, dialogue and detail; it is more versatile stylistically and often aims to draw emotions from the audience about the described event or person.

Other media formats may vary from the reviews of the theatrical performances, and gossips to “vox populi” and ratings.

It should be mentioned that the Crimean media have demonstrated differences in the list of conventional genres compared to the national media. The Crimean press often used greater variety or a mix of genres. In addition, some Crimean media outlets have demonstrated cases of infiltration of author's opinion into the news or reports. Such type of media materials could be called 'opinionated news' and have been grouped under the category of 'other' in the general coding system together with other less often used formats.

It should be mentioned, that each media outlet has its own “traditional” set of genres used by the given media on the regular basis, which greatly informs the
general picture of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars. Despite the variety of genres present in the Ukrainian media sphere, the data in the charts shows that news and analytics were the most frequently used genres in the media discourse on the Crimean Tatars.

*Chart 3. Media formats used by the national media with regard to the Crimean Tatars in 2010-2012*

The Crimean media, in turn, demonstrated the use of the following formats.

*Chart 4. Media formats used by the Crimean media with regard to the Crimean Tatars in 2010-2012*
the analysed period in the national media there were 140 pieces of news, which makes up around 50% of all media materials. In the Crimean media sample this figure is lower – around 37%. This can be explained by the fact that the Crimean sample of the media outlets is much smaller and does not include internet media or many daily newspapers, which conventionally focus on the news format.

For instance, “Ukrains'ka Pravda”, the all-Ukrainian internet media, published 71% of its information about the Crimean Tatars in the genre of news, which is one of the typical genres for this internet media. At the same time, national political-economic weekly “Komentari”, which focuses mainly on the analytical formats, published one third (25 out of 75) of all analytical materials on the matter at the national level during 3 years. As for the personalized format of opinion articles, “Ukrainska Pravda” and “Korrespondent” magazine published the majority of the materials of this genre under the “Blog” rubric. The Crimean press also has its own special features: in the Crimean daily “Krymskiye Izvestiya” analytical materials make up only 2,3% of all texts, while in “1 Krymskaya” weekly this figure is 28%. Analytical articles and interviews in the national and Crimean sample are kept at the similar level: pieces of analytic make up 26% and interviews – 4% at the national level, and 25% and 4% - at the Crimean level respectively.

### 3.2.2. TOPICS (THEMES)

Besides of the major media genres, it is important to discuss the thematic scope of the analysed media sample. For this matter, I defined 6 broad thematic areas as follows:

1. Politics, which involves various issues of the current politics, both national and regional.
2. Culture, including the issues of language.
3. Social sphere, which involves issues like distribution of land, social support of the returnees, other issues
4. History and memory. In this group I have included all instances of mentioning of the Crimean Tatars in the articles about all periods of history, including the materials on commemoration of the memory of deportation of the Crimean Tatars of 1944.
5. Religion.
6. Criminal issues, which includes various pieces of information about crime involving representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, or touching upon crimes relevant to the Crimean Tatars’ life
7. Other materials.

Obviously, the proposed division is not absolute and is quite contingent, as many materials could be attributed to more than one theme, or many historical or social issues could be represented by the media as political. However, the coding was conducted, based on the most prominent theme, which can be traced in the text and grounded in the personal experience of the interpreter. Following the coding procedure according to the above-mentioned list of topics, the following
results were obtained.

*Chart 7. The key themes of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars in the national media, 2010-2012*

![Chart 7](image)

Political sphere is the major subject-matter of the analysed media sample, making up 41% of all media materials, cultural and historical issues make up 17% and 11% respectively. As we can see from the chart, social as well as criminal frames are not among the dominant ones in the national sample, making up 5% and 3.8% respectively.

*Chart 8. The key themes of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean media, 2010-2012*

![Chart 8](image)

The dominant tendency is clearly visible for both media samples: the political prevails over social and cultural. There could be two possible explanations of this fact: lack of the media interest to social and cultural themes and a convention to frame many events of social life as political. I will discuss these issues further in the chapter.

It is also worth noting that the Crimean media pay much more attention to the social issues than the national media. As Crimean media expert Serhii Kostynskyi believes, the Crimean media are more oriented on the local news, which is predominantly of social character, like issues of education, social infrastructure, health etc (Kostynskyi 2013). In addition to this factor, the topic of land distribution (often labeled as “problem of self-seizures” in the media) is one of the most acute and often gets in the limelight of the Crimean media.
Among other broad subject-matters, the criminal theme remains marginal at both levels.

At the Crimean level the theme of religion remains marginal compared to political and social topics: both “Krymskiy Telegraph” and “1 Krymskaya” published 6 articles each on this matter during 3 years and “Krymskiye Izvestiya” – only 2. At the same time, national media cover this topic regularly.

Chart 9. The theme of religion with regard to the Crimean Tatars, national media, 2010-2012

As seen on the chart, the topic of religion at the national level is mostly covered by the 2 media outlets: “Ukraina Moloda” and “Komentari”. Combining the findings about these media outlets’ commonly used genres and themes the following conclusions can be made. Covering the topic of religion, “Komentari” newspaper, writes mostly in the form of broad analytical articles, providing expert comments, discussing the trends and relationships between the key social actors in the given sphere. “Ukraina Moloda”, in turn, covered the theme of religion reducing the representation of the religious affairs to the brief pieces of news about current affairs. Both media outlets chose particular topics of interest and the appropriate genres to represent them according to edition’s ideological orientation, general style of texts and niche on the media market.

The quantitative analysis of the analysed media sample allows making a number of important conclusions:

The interest to the issues related to the Crimean Tatars is higher at the local Crimean level and can be characterized by more diverse topics and genres used to cover them, compared to the national level. The political issues, which generally prevail over all other subject matters in the media, are more actively covered by the national media, while Crimean media cover also a great deal of social and cultural news on the matter. In addition to the set of media genres, traditionally used in the media, each media outlet, based on its type (daily or weekly newspaper, internet media etc) and ideological position utilizes its own particular set of genres and themes of interest, which shapes the general domain of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars.

The analysis of generic and thematic profiles of the selected national and
Crimean media outlets demonstrated the general tendency to use seemingly ideologically neutral and balanced media genres and to avoid the themes (like criminal news and religion), which could potentially carry derogatory or discriminative rhetoric. Nevertheless, some cases of the use of ‘mixed’ genres was detected, which could speak about the existence of the disguised discursive strategies for realization of manipulative or ideologically-backed goals of the certain media. I will speak more about this matter in the next sections of this chapter.

3.2.3. REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL ACTORS

Representation of social actors or subjects in discourse derives from the general statement that discourse reflects (and influences) relevant social practices, which in reality involve a number of actors. Active or passive, collective or individual: subject positions of these actors inform the ways they are represented in the discourse about these practices.

Before conducting an analysis of the social subjects’ media representation, it is important to bring Van Leewen’s remark into the discussion. He notes that analysts of discourse are focused on the social, not purely linguistic strategies of the subject representations. He claims, however, the representational choices in the discourse are tied to a set of specific linguistic and rhetoric realization options, which need to be examined (Van Leeuwen 1996: 34). Further in this subsection I will examine major patterns of group wording, collective and individual agency of social actors as well as personal representations of the Crimean Tatar individuals. I will also look at media representation of the Milli Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, as a unique national body of authority.

3.2.3.1. Wording

Norman Fairclough talks about the interconnection between the choice of the vocabulary in naming of a certain social group or practice and the variety of categories and ideological implications each naming draws into the discourse (Fairclough 1995: 114).

As for the most common wording used in the media to represent Crimean Tatars, I have defined the following:

1. Generic references “the Crimean Tatars” used in various thematic contexts prevail in the media. The generalized reference “the Crimean Tatars” is often used to signify representatives of a given group involved in an activity: “The Crimean Tatar voters traditionally support parties of the national-democratic spectrum”23 Van Leeuwen explains generic references as those which treat members of a particular group as “specimens of those classes”

(1996: 46), and therefore, all the group members are implicitly ascribed with a
certain set of political or social characteristics, like the lack of knowledge about
other cultures or affiliation to one political party. In any case, the use of this
generic reference leaves room for ambivalence, as in various contexts it could
mean both group as a whole or part of its members. Such multi-contextual
nature of the reference can explain the prevalence of its use by the media. It
should be noticed, that the Crimean media frequently omit the geographic
marker “Crimean” and use a shorter form “the Tatars” to refer to the group,
relying on the common sense of the local audience to make an attribution, as
well as denying the Crimean Tatars' own insistence on being called “Crimean”.

2. “The Crimean Tatar people.”24 The wording “the Crimean Tatar people” is
used in the media representation much more rarely then the generic term
discussed above. While the latter can be used in the variety of contexts, the term
“Crimean Tatar people” points directly to the group as a whole and, therefore,
limits the utilization of the term to the ethnicity-driven contexts.

As mentioned above, the term “The Crimean Tatar people” directly points to the
national nature of the group, implies the certain set of national characteristics,
references to people’s past and present day political activities. This term is also
interconnected with the collective memory of the Crimean Tatars, in particular
the memory of deportation of 1944, which is perceived as an integral part of the
Crimean Tatar national self-consciousness. Notably, in the national media the
depортation is placed as a reference point for the Ukrainian ethnic consciousness,
where the memory of deportation is incorporated into the broader milieu of the
Ukrainian national collective memory: “We still need to realize the calamity of
the Crimean Tatar people as our own, its deportation right after the return of the
Crimean under the Soviet control. It is the same war, its same Ukrainian
account”25.

Many instances of the use of this term are clearly marked as political. First and
foremost, this term appears in the official names of the Crimean Tatar national
bodies of authority “the Milli Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people” and “the
Council of representatives of the Crimean Tatar People by the President of
Ukraine”. In other cases, the term is strongly tied with the current political
discussion of the national rights of the Crimean Tatars or analysis of the
outcomes of electoral campaigns etc.

The Crimean media discourse makes use of this term in a slightly different
context. The ethnic memory of the Crimean Tatar people is primarily unified
with the one of the other ethnic minorities of the peninsula, which suffered
through similar repressions during the Stalin's era: the Greeks, the Armenians,
the Bulgarians and others. Representatives of the Crimean majority – the
Russians – are omitted from this list as a group, which doesn't share similar

24 Кryms'kotatars'kyi narod
25 “Nam shche nalezhyt' usvidomyty jak svoyu bidu I bidu kryms'kotatars'kogo narodu, yogo deportatsiyu vidruzu pislya
povernennia Krymu pid radyans'kyi kontrol'. Tse ta sama viyna, toy samyi fiji ukrainins'kyi rakhunok” In: Z vysoty
nezalezhnosti natsiya pobachyt' viynu// Ukraina Moloda, 21.06.2011
tragic memories: “In the Crimean history different events happened, tragic – among them. There were – deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans and representatives of other peoples”. Moreover, certain media overtly point to the contradiction between the versions of memory of ethnic minorities and the post-Soviet Russian majority, which lives in the Crimea: “Too bad that for them our Victory – is their deportation”. This is a notable example of construction of exclusion of the ethnic minority groups based on the differences in the collective memory of the in- and out-groups.

3. Term “repatriates” is also widely used to refer to the Crimean Tatars as a group. The word itself implies connotation with the process of repatriation from the deportation, where the majority of the Crimean Tatars have been living since the 1944. However, this term allows journalists to avoid the use of direct ethnic markers, has no overt historical or commemorative implications. It mostly points to the present-day social and economic demands of the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups to the local and national governments – and particularly in the issues of distribution of land plots: “the Crimean government started the inventory of the land plots, taken by the repatriates”.

4. Another way to refer to the return of the Crimean Tatars from exile in Central Asia is to represent this process as impersonal noun (the quantity), as aggregation: “in the “Tatar” regions of the peninsula – apart from Bakhchisarayskiy, it is also Kirovskiy, - the number of repatriates has already overstepped the quarter of the population”. Aggregation is commonly used to represent statistical features of the group, where members of a given group are treated 'as statistics', Van Leeuwen argues.

5. Terms like “earlier deported citizens”, “deportees”, “members of the deported people” and other synonyms are also used to represent certain features of the Crimean Tatars’ group identity. These terms are used in the multiple discursive practices. Firstly, these terms appear in the media texts reporting political debate about the securing of the Crimean Tatar people’s political and socio-economic rights, references to Crimean Tatars as to the source of “the problems” for the national and local authorities, which need to be solved. Additionally, they are used in references to the historical events of the Stalin’s mass deportations of 1944, which often means mentioning other small ethnic groups, which have also been repressed.

And lastly, the terms are used by the media in the news about commemoration ceremonies of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars held on May 18 each year.

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28 “Krymskoe pravitel’stvo zanialos’ inventarizatsiey zemel’, zaniatykh repatriantami” In: Belo-golubye reshili sozdat’ tatarskuyu partiyu// Kommentarii, 23.07.2010
The legitimacy of the use of the term “deportees” was publicly challenged by the top Ukrainian state official Mykola Azarov. The reported speech is used by the Crimean newspaper “Krymskiye Izvestiya” to report his statement: “When a deputy of the Supreme Council of ARC Lentun Bezaziev asked about the funds for the resettlement of deportees, the head of the government suggested to stop calling themselves that, because the Crimean Tatars have already integrated into the Ukrainian people and became its integral part”.\(^{30}\)

This evasive public statement speaks about the unwillingness of the Ukrainian authorities to discuss the legal status and the respective rights of the formerly deported people. The media outlet, which reported the Prime Minister's speech, allied with the statement and didn't discuss or problematize it.

Similar mild form of deligitimization of the term is often used by «Krymskiy Telegraph». The term “deportees” is put in quotation marks with a remark, which aims to problematize the naming of the Crimean Tatars as deportees, which has become commonsensical for many other media outlets and is conventionally used without parenthesis.

6. Terms “indigenous people” or “native population”. The naming “the indigenous people” is used in the number of quite specific instances.

This term is utilized in the public discourse by the Crimean Tatar political elite at the both national and Crimean media discourses. Crimean Tatar politicians often stress the fact that their population is indigenous to the Crimea. That’s why the term “indigenous people” is most frequently present in the quotations of Mustafa Dzhemilev and other Crimean Tatar politicians reported in the news.

This term appears in the analytical expert articles on various issues related to the Crimean Tatars: issues of language, memory of deportation and specifically topic of recognition of the special status of the indigenous peoples in Ukraine and their respective rights. In the discourse of deportation of 1944, the victims of the forced removal – the Crimean Tatars – are named the indigenous or native inhabitants: “in 1944 during the deportation of the Crimean Tatars all indigenous inhabitants had been removed and the village was renamed to Krepkoe”\(^{31}\). Within the framework of the deportation discourse, the Crimean Tatars are often grouped with other indigenous peoples of the Crimea. This type of discourse normally does not challenge the indigenous status of the Crimean Tatars, however, the discussion of the rights and privileges which should be granted to the indigenous population, which had been deported is omitted. In some cases the term “the indigenous people” is used as a substitute of the name “the Crimean Tatars”. “The Official Kyiv is in no hurry to actually solve the


problems of the native population of the peninsula". This utilization of the term means that the indigenous status of the Crimean Tatar people is not questioned, it is perceived as a common sense.

However, in the other analytical materials, the term “indigenous” is used with a remark “as considered by the Crimean Tatars”. This points out to fact that there is a discussion about this subject matter, sharing an idea that there are other parties of this dispute that may have an opposite opinion.

Generalizing from all mentioned examples of naming of the Crimean Tatars, it is important to bring about Fairclough’s (1995) argument which he is making about the naming of the social minority groups in the media. His comment seems relevant to my analysis and should be mentioned here. He claims that despite all the variety of word choices in naming – in our case “the Crimean Tatars”, “repatriates”, “formerly deported people”, “members of deported population” etc – all these naming refer rather to the current position or condition of the group, created in the past, or just refer to the people’s belonging to a certain ethnic group, but they so not imply granting any privileges or specific rights. On the contrary, in many contexts we have seen that these naming tend to signify rather a potential problem or threat to the majority group. Even though some namings like “deportees” and “repatriates” imply references to deportation, which is a forms of repression against this group, the dominance of the pro-Russian (or Slavic) majority shapes the media discourse in a way to omit or publicly delegitimize the implications to privileges and legal status of the Crimean Tatars as an oppressed or native group, by keeping the use of the respective namings marginal.

3.2.3.2. Agency of social actors

Agency of the social actors in the various media outlets can vary. By “agency of social actors” in the discourse I the way social actors are represented in various social contexts as subjects and central actors or as passive recipients; or the forms where the subjects of the action is either completely eliminated or suppressed to the background (Fairclough 1995, van Leeuwen 1996).

The voices of the majority groups or the power holders are conventionally provided more space in the media discourse. By voice I mean the representation of collective or individual speakers, who speak for themselves in the media or whose speech is reported (Fairclough 1995: 80). It should be noted that Jan Blommaert defines the voice as “a capacity to accomplish the desired function through the language, a capacity to make oneself understood” (2005: 68). But this capacity, he claims is not something self evident, it depends primarily on the possibility to access what he calls order of indexicality, the norms and rules of language, which are produced systemically and are often related to social

32 “Ofitsial'ny Kiev ne speshit na dele reshat' problemy korennoj natsii poluoastrova.” In: Mustafa Dzhemilev. №95. National rating of the top 100 politicians // Korrespondent, 20.08.2010
inequality. (Blommaert 2005:73).

Voice can be identified with a particular social actor, can be anonymous or can be left unidentified. The strict boundaries between the reporting discourse (the one maintained by a journalist) and the reported (the one of a speaker) are kept with the help of the quotations and the use of direct speech. The use of quotes allows an audience a witness the events the media is talking about, gives the news more credibility. The reported speech, in turn, the news without quotations of the speakers could shift the emphasis and blur the original speaker’s position.

As Fairclough argues, even when the direct speech is used, the power relations between the key subjects of the discourse come into play. There is a hierarchy of voices – some voices are given prominence, placed in the lead of the news, some are marginalized and placed at the bottom of the text (Fairclough 1995: 81). Norman Fairclough distinguished between four levels of information presentation in the text (quoted in Riggins 1997):

1. Foreground – present and emphasized information, presented as primary
2. Background – explicitly stated but un-emphasized information
3. Presupposed information, which suggests meaning within the given context
4. Absent information - relevant information which is not mentioned in the news.

It should be mentioned here that there is no direct correspondence between the use of the quotation and a reported speech and foregrounding and backgrounding of the information: the foregrounded utterance can often be presented as a reported speech and the information at the background can be quoted.

Absence is common instrument for framing information. Admittedly, as every position and fact cannot be presented within the limited framework of media texts, certain information is always excluded (Street 2001). However, silencing can also be an efficient discursive strategy of exclusion – in other words, systematic absence of the voice of the minority ethnic group in the media discourse.

In the analysis of the agency of the Crimean Tatars I will distinguish between the two main forms of agency: representation of the individuals or groups as patients or as agents. In the instances of both individual and collective representation of the Crimean Tatars, their agency can also be different, depending on the topic, media format and ideological stance of the media outlet.

As a rule, the media interest in the Crimean events rises with each new conflict or scandal involving members of the Crimean Tatar community or elite. But media materials covering the event tend to focus on the event itself (fight, protest, tent city etc), without giving reasons or explanations for the conflicts. Voices of official bodies, representatives of the authorities – the voices of the
'non-Tatar majority' representatives – are prioritized and are referred to as expert opinions. Statements of the positions of the Crimean Tatars are shorter, in comparative terms, and are often assigned to the background of the text.

Turning to individual representations, the article “The right to headscarf”, published in “Ukraina Moloda” national newspaper, is dedicated to the court case of the Crimean Tatar Muslim Susanna Ismailova, demanding the right to be photographed for passport wearing headscarf. In the leading part of the news the author uses reported speech to write about the arguments Muslim women are putting forward in support of their demand: “Muslim women stressed that those, who stand for the followers of Islam “the right to being headscarf free” do not ask the women themselves.” Speculating about the pros and cons of wearing khidzhab in the European countries, the voice of the women themselves remains suppressed. The voice of the key subject of the court appeal, Susanna Ismailova, is absent in the text. The only quotation of the leader of Muslim Women’s League is provided at the last paragraph of the news.

Another media outlet, “Segodnia” daily, reports the same news using the quotation of Ismailova in the second paragraph of the news. In the direct speech, the woman voices her argument: “I am wearing headscarf for 10 years, as it is assigned by the Koran, - tells Susanna to “Segodnia”. … This is our lifestyle and living in the democratic country we should have a right to that.” Apart from Ismailova’s quotation, other three voices are represented with the quotes: the voice of Ismailova’s attorney, and voices of the two Muslim women, who express their positions on the matter.

As we can see in the first article, the voice of woman, who is struggling for her right is absent and the point of view of other Muslim women is suppressed, while the second article demonstrated another hierarchy of voices. It provides space for discussion of the issue to the Muslim women themselves and to Ismailova, treating them as active subjects of this discourse. It is quite notable that in none of the materials, the voices of the representatives of the official state institutions or experts have been provided.

**Passive forms of collective representation**

Turning to the collective representation of the Crimean Tatars, there are situations, when the Crimean Tatars are directly mentioned in the media texts, but not as active parties of the process, but rather as patients. Fairclough explains this referring to patients as people who are not doing the action by themselves, but are being affected by the actions of the others, or as participants of the more broad processes, which they can’t influence directly. (1995: 112). The “subject-patient” relations in the discourse reflect the existing power
relations in the social reality.

This is manifested in the following discursive forms. The use of the verbs, which express weak position of the group against the other empowered player. It is worth mentioning here that social passivity can be in contrast with grammatical passivity. Like in our case, when the use of the words like “ask”, “plead” implies only their social passivity, incapability of achieving something on their own, with an external support: “Tatars ask Yanukovych to refrain from formation of the council”.

Crimean Tatars as represented as passive recipient of support from the “stronger and more experienced” party, or the utterance reflects implicit consent from a strong powerful figure, while the Crimean Tatars are pictured as a powerless, voiceless group, aggregated as recipients of a power-holder's decision. A power-holder in this case is omitted or unnamed. One of the dominant patterns implies the use of passive voice in utterances like “They were allowed to return”: “After the Second World War the people went through deportation… and only during perestroika times, after 1989, they were allowed to return”.

Another example from the Crimean newspaper “Krymskiy Telegraph” - the title of the article “Simpheropol authorities have calculated, how much the Tatars will cost” implies not only representation of the Crimean Tatars as passive 'recipients of the state support', but also as a 'burden' to the state and, therefore, to implicitly present 'us'- 'the taxpayers'.

Active forms of collective representation

On the other hand, these are instances, where the collective representations of the Crimean Tatars are expressed in active forms. This usually happens in the news about confrontations, street actions and fights which involve Crimean Tatar people representatives. In these cases, the Crimean Tatars are represented as an active subject of an action, with the strong agency. However, the context in which these actions are represented rather speaks about their active position as a group, which carries potential threat to normal people, causes social disturbances and even leads to violence. The linguistic structures from the military discourse are often used in narrations of the actual events, in order to amplify the aggressive or scandalous character of the events: “The Tatars were fiercely resisting, but had been defeated by the riot police using armoured vehicles.”

Even in cases when the reasons for the deviant or violent actions involving Crimean Tatars are explained, they are reported as key subjects of the news, and therefore the parties, who bear all responsibility. They and shown as hooligans

36“Posle Vtoroy mirovoy voyny narod podvergsia deportatsii... i lish vo vremena perestroyki, posle 1989 goda, im razreshili vernut'sia.” In: Bol'shaya rodina dlia nazmen'shinstv // Segodnia, 10.01.2011
37Vlasti Simpheropoliya uzhe podschitali, v kakuyu summu oboydatsia tatars //Krymskiy Telegraph, № 122, 11.03.2011
38“Tataryotchayannosoprotivivlialis', no byli slomlenymlitsevskim spetsnazom s ispol'zovaniem bronetekhniki.” In: Ministry Azarova: znakomye litsa i novichki // Segodnia, 12.03.2010
who “throw eggs” or “break down an exhibition”, and the people or organizations, which caused these confrontations by their provocative or disrespectful deeds remains unidentified or their agency is suppressed. When it turns to the news about political struggle, which involves Crimean Tatars, the active forms of verbs are also used. In this context Crimean Tatars usually represented as “protesters”, rather than “experts”, “moderators” or “peacemakers”: Crimean Tatars normally “demand”, “call for”, “express protest” and “resent”, and quire rarely “propose”, “compromise”, “submit” or “analyze”. As opposed to what was previously mentioned about the construction of the socially passive image of the Crimean Tatars, the active words like “demand” and “protest” are often associated either with aggression or provocative nature of the activities described and being frames respectively: “At the beginning of March a rally in Massandra took place, where the deported citizen of the Crimean Tatars expressed the extreme outrage with the actions of the deputies of the village headed by Lubov Arzamasova.” 39

Together with such representation of the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainian national and Crimean authorities are represented as “active”, “constructive” and “ready to for the dialogue”: “I will go there (to the Crimea – A.B.) and will deal with everything on the ground, because we are now fixing the situation with the Crimean Tatars and with their leaders.- said Mykola Azarov.” 40

In Van Djik’s terms, this discursive strategy is called “positive self-presentation VS negative other-presentation” (1995: 8) and is considered one of the most commonly used strategies of exclusion of the minority groups.

Summing up, I can conclude that collective representations of the Crimean Tatars can be divided into two large groups: cases, when their agency is suppressed in the relations with more powerful social players, normally representatives of the “majority” groups or state power holders. The political power and capacity of social influence of the latter are often juxtaposed by the “social passivity” of the Crimean Tatars, reflected with passive forms of verbs and use of the “passivating” vocabulary. The second group of examples, on the contrary, presents the Crimean Tatars as active players. However, this happens mostly in the news about protests, street actions and political confrontations, where Crimean Tatars are portrayed as primary source of social unrest or conflict and their active position underlines their seeming aggression and deviance.

39 “V nachale marta sostoyalsia miting v Massandre, gde deportirovannye grazhdane iz chisla krymskotatarskogo naroda vyrazili kraynee vozmuшенie deystviyami deputatskogo korpusa poselka vo glave s golovoy Liubov'yu Arzamasovoy.” In: Byt' ili ne byt' mezhnatsional'nomu konfliktu?//Krymskiy Telegraph, № 21, 7.03.2009

3.2.3.3. Personal representations

Besides the collective representations of the Crimean Tatars, the media discourse contains also personal accounts of the individual members of the Crimean Tatar people. Personal representation of social actors envisages presence in the discourse of the individuals (rather than groups), with their specific features (like name, age, social status etc). But as van Leeuwen argues, quite often individual social actors can be represented in terms of their unique identity or by being nominated or by being categorized in terms of identities and functions they share with others as member of a certain social group (1996: 52).

As Teun van Dijk (2005) argues, the symbolic elites, such as politicians, scholars, people of culture and arts – play a special role in reproduction of the dominant knowledge and ideology in society. The ethnic minority elites, however, have lower status of expertise in the general hierarchy of knowledge and are often marginalized as public speakers and commentators for the media.

As for the media representation of the personalities, representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, the list of the specific persons as well as their unique features reported in the national media is quite short. Political leader of the Milli Mejlis, MP Mustafa Dzhemilev is the most often mentioned representative of the Crimean Tatar people. In the sample of the national mainstream media texts of 2010 – 2012 his name was mentioned 293 times, while the name of the MP, Refat Chubarov, the deputy head of the Milli Mejlis – 75 times, another well-known Crimean politician, the Crimean Tatar Ilmi Umerov was mentioned 39 times. Dzhamala – the jazz-singer of the Crimean Tatar origin – only 27 times. At the all-Ukrainian level, the most frequently quoted Crimean Tatar, whose comments on the current events in the political sphere are referred to as expert ones, is Mustafa Dzhemilev, who is conventionally nominated according to his national organization and parliamentary affiliations “Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, member of NUNS”.

The Crimean media, on the contrary, use much more personal references to the Crimean Tatar politicians, civic activists, artists, religious leaders as well as “ordinary” people. The number of the Crimean Tatar politicians, whose voices are regularly reported by the media is more numerous and diverse, presenting a larger variety of names and organizations. For the Crimean media, the information about Crimean Tatar personalities are considered local and, therefore, more newsworthy. The names of the Crimean Tatars politicians - political leaders of the Milli Mejlis, Crimean Tatars who have been appointed heads of the Crimean district state administrations, members of local councils of self-government – are among the most frequently mentioned names in the Crimean media. The personal activities of The Crimean Tatar members of the Parliament of ARC are reported in the respective section of the news paper

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41 NUNS – abbreviation for Nasha Ukraina-Narodna Samooborona (Our Ukraine-People’s Selfdefence) bloc of political parties in Ukraine.
“Krymskiye izvestiya” - “Deputies corpus” - together with other MPs. This is a structural tool, which leads to normalization of the social perception of the political integration of the Crimean Tatars into the bodies of power at the ARC.

Apart from the newspapers, which represent the official position of the Crimean parliament, other Crimean mainstream media represent members of the Crimean Tatar political elite according to their ideological affiliations and their attitudes to the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group in general. As mentioned earlier, “Krymskiy Telegraph” takes an extremely anti-Tatar and anti-Mejlis stand and in personal references utilizes the nominations, which emphasize illegal status of Mustafa Dzhemilev as head of Milli Mejils and puts down his claims for power and control over the whole ethnic group of the Crimean Tatars: “Mustafa Dzhemilev, by this day unchangeable (because of his personal ambitions) self-proclaimed leader of the Crimean Tatars.”

Contrary to the latter, “1 Krymskaya”, which is quite loyal to the Crimean Tatars, underlines the extraordinary influence and authority of Dzhemilev among the Crimean Tatar political elite. “-Aga” - The Crimean Tatar national form of addressing to a respected man is used: “Mustafa-aga, giving up his post and moving aside, will be patronizing his successor, will be so to speak, keeping the reigns, directing his from the top of his authority, correcting the political course of Mejlis.”

It is important to pinpoint that in the national media the Crimean Tatar experts are only given voice to comment on the issues related to their own people. The experts – representatives of the ethnic minority very rarely comment on the topics of the general interest, which are not directly related to the concrete affairs of their minority group. But at the Crimean level, these boundaries are not so obviously drawn by the media and the Crimean Tatar speakers comment on the variety of issues, including the ones of the general interest. For instance, in the text about the Crimean student life the comment of the Crimean Tatar student activist, referred to as “Head of the student council of the Faculty of the Crimean Tatar and Turkish philology of the Crimean engineer-pedagogical university Eskender Ganiev” is provided together with the other students, who are referred to by the Slavic names.

According to van Leeuwen, together with nominated forms of personal representation, there are also, categorized representations of the social actors which characterize individuals according to a certain social function or activity or according to their relational status. For instance, the Crimean Tatars, which are referred to by the name, are also represented according to their immediate function or activity. This brings in certain contextualization of the information given in the news and the role, which these individuals play in the reported

43 “Mustafa Dzhemilev, po sei den’ bessmennyi (iz lichnykh ambitsiij) samonazvannyi lider krymskikh tatar” In: Politprosvet, ili ne boyste’ khomyachkov //Krymskiy Telegraph, № 192, 3.08.2012
44 “Mustafa-aga, ustupiv svoy post I nemnozhko otoydya v storonu, budet opekat’ i, tak skazat’, vesti pod uzdtsy, napravliat’, s vysoty svoego avtoriteta korrektirovat’ politicheskiy kurs Medzhlisa.” In: Medzhlis budet s Yatseniukom -Timoshenko ili proignoriruet vybory// 1 Krymskaya, N 442, 27.04-3.05. 2012.
45 “predsedatel’ studoveta fakul’teta krymskotatarskoi i turetskoi philologii Krymskogo inzhenerno-pedagogicheskogo universiteta (KIPU) Eskender Ganiev” In: Skol’ko stoit byt’ studentom??//1 Krymskaya, N 409, 27.01-02.02.2012.
events. There are also special types of personal references – nicknames – which are also used by the media to point out certain features of a person, but in more outstanding often scandalous way. In the Crimean press, one of the Crimean Tatar activists Daniyal Ametov is nicknamed as the “king of self-seizures”. “Krymskiy Telegraph” uses this reference to stress Ametov's allegedly illegal activities: “the Crimean “king of self-seizures” Daliyal Ametov is accused of the organized resistance…” At the same time another Crimean newspaper “I Krymskaya” demonstrates more neutral position towards Ametov and his activities, which is reflected in distancing from the direct use of the nickname: “Ametov, labeled in the Crimean press as “king of self-seizures”. As for the relational representations, they are used to bring into the picture the interpersonal relations, which could be newsworthy and serve the interest for the public. For example, the title “Grand-daughter of Mustafa Dzhemilev hung herself” doesn’t represent the deceased child by the name, but by her family relations to the well-known public figure Mustafa Dzhemilev. For the comparison, “Ukraina Moloda” reported the same news using the personalized reference in the title “The death of little Dzhenike”.

The impersonal representations of the Crimean Tatars can be found mostly in the news about street protests, clashes with the police or other actions, which imply violation of civic order: “self-seizers”, “protesters”. Or there could be neutral impersonal references “a group of Crimean Tatars” etc. These references do not specify any social characteristics of the people, included into the referred groups, the aggregated group identification is made according to one dominating function. The association of this function with the group is purely ideological and can be a powerful tool of social exclusion. Van Leeuwen argues, that “the systematic use of impersonal references and impersonal adjectives (like “black, poor, unskilled, Muslim”), which omits the use of the unique identifications, are used to discriminate the actors and stress on the social boundaries between the groups” (1996: 60).

One of the media genres which allows revealing personal characteristics, visions and values of an interviewee, is an interview. This genre gives an audience a multi-faceted picture of the personality’s points of view on the specific issue or on the number of themes of social importance. According to the journalists’ practices, the interviews are taken with the personalities, who represent political, business, or academic elites, with those, who bear some kind of an interest for the audience either as experts in their field, or as politicians, or as celebrities or as in some way unusual personalities.

In general both national and Crimean media use the genre of interview quite rarely. Most popular types of interviewees are politicians, experts of various kinds and cultural figures, like writers, musicians or film directors. Out of 12

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46 “Krymskogo “korolia samozakhvatov” Daniyalya Ametova obviniaют в организатсii ...” In: A “korol”-to podsuden! Krymskiy Telegraph, № 83, 27.05.2010
47 Povesilas’ vnuchka Mustafy Dzhemileva // Segodnia, 15.08.2012
interviews, which have been included into the sample of the media texts of the national media outlets, only 6 were with the Crimean Tatars: 3 – with Mustafa Dzhemilev, and 3 with popular cultural figures: with singer Dzamala, with Akhtem Seytabluev, the film director and with the well-know musician Enver Izmaylov. The business, academic or other Crimean Tatar elites have not been interviewed by the national media during the given period. At the level of the Crimean media there was greater variety of interviewees: out of 19 interviews, 5 were with the representatives of the Crimean Tatar political, cultural elites as well as with a senior media professional.

As for the personal representations, the results of my study have exposed the overwhelming prevalence of the group representations over personal ones. Personal accounts, in turn, are quite often categorized according to the specific context of the news and often build the one-sided biased vision of the personality. The impersonal representations attribute the people to a certain group, which is often related to social exclusion and discrimination. In general, the audiences of the national mainstream media are familiarized only with a very limited list of the Crimean Tatars, majority of whom are representatives of the political and cultural elites. Mustafa Dzhemilev remains the only well-known Crimean Tatar, who is a key newsmaker of the national level, who gets often quoted and interviewed by the media.

In the next section I will examine the key patterns of media representation of the specific social actor, which play a key role in construction of the collective identity of the Crimean Tatars: the Milli Mejlis.

3.2.3.4 Representations of the Milli Mejlis

It should be mentioned that the Crimean Tatars is the only ethnic minority in Ukraine, which has its own national representative bodies. The work of these institutions is based on the democratic principles of elections. During the analyzed period of time the Milli Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People was the national executive body of authority of the Crimean Tatars, the regional network of Mejlises served as local bodies of the national self-governance. There was also a national parliament the Kurultay, members of which were elected by the Crimean Tatar communities in the Crimea. While the legal status of these institutions in the unitary state of Ukraine was and still is problematic, their legitimacy and social recognition was mostly not questioned in the media discourse. According to my findings, it was generally considered as an equal political player in the Crimean and all-Ukrainian politics. But even though the level of support of Mejlis among the Crimean Tatar population was high (Prytula 2013, Kostynskyi 2013), there were other Crimean Tatar national political parties and organizations, which had their own supporters and were often presented as opposition to Mejlis. The most notable were political party Milli Firka, organizations “Sebat” and “Avdet”, Muslim party Khizb-ut-Takhrir and others.
Nevertheless, Milli Mejlis (together with its leader Mustafa Dzhemilev) remains well-known and recognized Crimean Tatar institution. There number of important features of its media representation:

In the national media there is a strong tendency to generalize Mejlis (and its supporters) to the whole Crimean Tatar population. “Mejlis” is often used as a substitute for “Crimean Tatars”: “Mejlis disrupted the communists’ rally in Simferopol”. This rhetoric trope, synecdoche, which is a form of metonym, is a trope in which “a word or an object is substituted for another from semantically related field” (Richardson 2007: 67). Wodak et all speak about the use of synecdoche as one of the frequent media strategies when an object as a whole is substituted by its part, members of the whole group or people are replaced in the discourse by the name of an institution, which represents them (1999: 44). The use of such substitute implies the commonsensical belief that the Mejlis has political control over the majority of the Crimean Tatar population.

In the all-Ukrainian mainstream media most of the other Crimean Tatar national political parties and organization are named with an obligatory reference to Mejlis – either “opposed to Mejlis” or “loyal to Mejlis”: “In the list of this party there are members of the so called National party Milli Firka, opposed to Mejlis.” The use of Mejlis as the reference point indirectly speaks about the existence of the dominant perception among the Ukrainian media of Mejlis as central and the most influential Crimean Tatar political institution, which dominates in the spectrum of the Crimean Tatars national political organizations. Consequently, all other political organizations of the Crimean Tatars are presented as smaller and less influential or dependent on Mejlis’s position.

On the other hand, the political competition within the Crimean Tatar national movement, the struggle between the Mejlis and other national organizations is represented in both national and Crimean media. Mejlis and its opposition are presented as equal subjects of the political process; both parties take active position in this struggle and are given an equal voice in the media.

This pluralistic approach to representation of Mejlis together with its opposing parties reflects the unspoken assumption about the democratic processes of checks and balances happening within the Crimean Tatar political movement, where various groups of interests compete with each other. In general this assumption normalizes the existence and (re)production of the general belief in democratic and open nature of the Crimean Tatar institutions. By unspoken assumption here I mean “a taken-for-granted, implicit claim, embedded within the explicit meaning of the text” (Richardson 2007:63).

Apart from that, certain Crimean media tend to challenge the legal status of

48 “Mejlis zirvav mityng komunistiv v Simpheropoli” In: Tatas’kymy yaytsiamy – po Symonenku //Ukraina Moloda, 29.08.2012
49 “Po spisku etoy partii idut oppozitsionnye mejlisu chleny tak nazываemoy national’noy partii Milli Firka” In: Nazhdachno–barkhatnyi sezon // Zerkalo nedeli, 30.10.2010
Mejlis and its legitimacy in the Crimean political sphere. This is done in various forms. “Krymskiye Izvestiya” uses argumentation, but “Krymskiy Telegraph” uses delegitimizing namings without explanation. “Krymskiye Izvestiya” publishes opinion of the pro-government and anti-Mejlis member of the Crimean Parliament, Crimean Tatar Lentul Bezaziev, who provides critical arguments against the legitimacy of Mejlis: “Dzhemilev argues that they (the Mejlis – A.B.) have been elected by people, but this is an ipse dixit. Members of the Mejlis make up 5% of the Supreme Council of Crimea (and those have been elected with the help of Rukh).”

“Krymskiy Telegraph”, in turn, emphasizes the illegal status of Melijis and undermines its right to represent the Crimean Tatars as a national group without any argumentation. For this purpose, the newspaper uses discursive strategy of overwording (Faiclough 1992:193), the utilization of the great variety of synonyms and adjectives, as an expression of the author’s preoccupation with a theme or subject-matter, based on their ideological stance. In our case, the use of overwording stresses upon the negative, illegal nature of the Milli Mejlis as an elected institution of power: “leader of the local ethnic “parliament”… they are promoting actively their illegal body”. Often the word parliament is used in parenthesis, which directly questions its legitimacy: “But right after the meeting in Kyiv member of the Crimean Tatar “parliament”…” As for the naming of this institution, the results of my analysis have shown that there is no one dominant convention of literation. By literation here I mean journalists’ convention of using capital or lower case letter in the writing the names of the people or objects. Some media routinely write “Mejlis” with the capital letter, following the general convention of the Ukrainian or Russian orthography code of writing the official names of the institutions of state authorities and local self-governance, and others write the name from the lower case letter.

Among the national press newspaper “Segodnia”, and “Ukraine Moloda” as well as magazine “Focus” follow the capital letter convention: “…Crimean Tatar Mejlis has turned its orientation from Yushenko on Tymoshenko.” At the same time part of the mainstream national and Crimean media conventionally write “Mejlis” from the lower case letter. Following this convention, “Komentari” and “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” newspapers, use this name mostly in analytical articles in the contexts, where “Mejlis” is normally mentioned as equally-weighted player of the Crimean politics. Crimean mainstream newspaper “1 Krymskaya” and “Krymskiye Izvestiya” also commonly use the lower case literation for Mejlis: “representatives of Mejlis have been criticizing A. Mogilev for notable events,

50 “Dzhemilev utverzhdaet, chto ikh izbral narod, no eto to'ko goloslovnoe zayavlenie. V Verkhvnom Sovete Kryma chleny medzhlisa sostavlyayut 5% ot obshego kollichestva deputatov i te izbrany pri pomoshi Rukh” // Lentun Bezaziev: “Segodniashniy mir ne menee zhestok, chem voyna”// Krymskiye Izvestiya, 09.12.2011
51 “lider mestnogo etnicheskogo “parlamenta” ... svoy nelegitimchyi organ oni nastol'ko “prodvigayut v narod”... ” In: Den'gi reshayut vse?// Krymskiy Telegraph, № 152,14.10.2011
52 “Odnako srazu posle vstrechi v Kieve predstaviteley krymskotatarskogo “parlamenta”...” In: A tatar-to bol'she ...// Krymskiy Telegraph, 7.10.2011
53 “…krymsko-tatarskiy Mejlis pomenial orientatsiyu s Yuschenko na Timoshenko” In: V desyatochku // Segodnia, 19.01.2010
which happened 4 years ago at the Ai-Petri plato.”

The reasons behind the existence of these naming conventions could be explained when studying the discourse production routines in these media outlets. As Valentyna Samar, Crimean correspondent for “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” weekly argues, the convention to write “Mejlis” from the lower case letter is “an established editorial practice of the newspaper” and has nothing to do specifically with the representation of this Crimean Tatars and their political organizations, as it derived from the newspaper’s general practice of literation of social institutions. Though, she admits, the Crimean media tend to write Mejlis from the capital letter, which she also finds correct (Samar 2013). Igor Semyvolos also believes that conventions of the lower case literation employed by the national media are not dictated by the attempt to diminish the political weight of Mejlis and its leaders (Semyvolos 2013). Based on this argument, I can assume that the convention to use lower case letter in naming of Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars could be explained by the general orthographic routines established by a particular media outlet and either doesn’t bear any deliberate ideological goal or this goal has been naturalized to the extent it has become common sense (Fairclough 1989:107). However, the real ideological impact of the discussed conventions could only be estimated by the analysis of the audience perceptions of the news about Mejlis using both literation conventions.

3.2.4 THE CRIMEAN TATARS IN THE MEDIATIZED POLITICAL DISCOURSE

The media discourse about politics, as I have demonstrated earlier, is the leading and dominating type of discourse, in which the Crimean Tatars are mentioned both collectively and individually both at the national and regional media. There are number of features which define the character and the tone of the media representation of the political relations between the Crimean Tatar national bodies of authority and the Ukrainian national and regional political elites.

In general, the national mainstream media represent the Crimean Tatars, as a political force, one of the players of the regional Crimean politics.

The political relations between the Crimean Tatars and the Crimean authorities are framed as conflictous and scandalous. This discursive strategy is realized, among the other means, by means of the warfare metaphors. This discursive strategy is commonly used by the media internationally to represent the political struggle, as Lakoff and Johnson point out “arguments are often performed, structured and talked about in terms of war” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10) The discursive communication between the Crimean authorities and the Crimean Tatars is often described in the “war and peace” terms: “The authorities of the peninsula are ready to bury the hatchet.” The solution for one of the most

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54 “…predstaviti mejlisa nezo kritikovali A. Mogileva iz-za izvestnykh sobytii chetyrekhletney davnosti na plao Ai-Petri” 
In: Final “premieriady” // Krymskiye Izvestiya, 09.11.2011
conflictous issues in the contemporary Ukraine is underway – the problem of self-seizures of land plots by the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean government and Tatars are close to signing the “peace agreement”.55

3.2.4.1. “The Crimean Tatar problem” and “the problems of the Crimean Tatars”

“The Crimean Tatar problem” is a fixed rhetoric expression, which reproduces the commonsensical perception of the Crimean Tatars “as a problem in themselves”. This utterance, however, is rooted in the Soviet term “the national problem” or “the national question”, which means a set of policies towards a minority or periphery group developed and maintained by the central authority or the titular ethnic majority. In other words all political, economic or social activities towards the minority group are framed in the national terms and bear a clear implication of the asymmetrical distribution of power between the center and periphery. What is important about the use of this utterance, is that its meaning in a particular text is very rarely explained, and used as a cliché:

“Party of Regions tackled the Crimean Tatar problem with its inherent persistence”56. This representation also goes in tune with the conclusions of van Leeuwen, who defines social category of “exclusion” mainly through the excluding of a subject or details of its activity from the discourse. Quite often, he states, the social or political context is completely excluded, based on the common sense or assumption that readers know these details already (van Leeuwen 1996: 38).

However, as it was mentioned earlier, the statements, which frame the Crimean Tatars as “a source of various kinds of problems”, are quite typical for the national media. These references go very much in tune with the conclusions of van Djik (1984), who states that discursive strategies aimed at portraying minorities as a problem is a way to rationalize and justify the discrimination against them, to categorize the experience of social interaction with these groups in the simplified and stereotyped way.

The list of problems, addressed by the journalists as well as by the speakers, whose positions are reported in the national press, most often includes “the problem of land” or “the problem of self-seizures”, “the language problem”. But quite often specific issues, which need to be solved, are completely absent in the discourse, the generic substitute utterance “problems of the Crimean Tatars” is used instead, relying on the common sense of the audience to fill in the gaps. It is notable that these generic forms appear, when it comes to the discussion of the concrete steps of the government needed to be done in order to solve these specific problems. In addition, even more evasive meaningless utterances

56 “Partiya regionov podoshla k krymskotatarskoy probleme s prisuschemi yei naporom” In: Popali v goriachuyu tochku // Focus, 2.07.2010
referring to “care” and “constructive work” are used: “President Viktor Yanukovych delegated the leaders of autonomy to study the problem (problem of land distribution regulation — A.B.) deeply and fully and come up with an optimal decision in the strict accordance to the law.”

Moreover, these problems are presented as “traditional” and “long-lasting”, so there is no need to discuss them in detail: “Crimean Tatars have long-lasting problems – land, language issues, self-governance.”

The excessive use of the word “problem” in the context of relations between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian and Crimean governments can explain the main features of these relations as well as many critical statements about the efficiency of the national policies towards this ethnic group. The use of the noun “problem” emphasizes on the state of the matter, not on the process or activity and, therefore, allows to hide the actual responsible actors.

The structure of this prevailing discursive practice allows the power keeping social actors – bodies of the national and regional authority – to stay away from the actual social discussion of the reasons and consequences of these ineffective policies and possible penalties of their malrealization. The references to the unequal dominating character of the power relations between the government and the Crimean Tatar’s political elite are present in the media texts indirectly in a number of forms. Relations between the key political actors are labeled as “problematic”, again, without a detailed explanation of the meaning. While using of the passive utterances like “problems are not solved”, the main subject of action – the government – is either completely omitted from the sentence or the agency of the key social actor is suppressed: “Problems of the native people of Crimea remain unsolved, and the law on restoration of rights of the people who have suffered through ethnicity-based deportation is not adopted.”

Speaking about the rhetoric tools utilized in public discourse to describe the problems, which the Crimean Tatars face and the activities, the authorities take (or do not take) to solve them, the media often reports metaphors used by the state officials to avoid clear and straight forward formulations and modalities which ends up in diluting the responsibility for the lack of progress in policy implementation. Norman Fairclough argues that various discursive strategies aimed at sustaining unequal power relations are carried out by common sense, which helps “deflecting attention away from an idea, which could lead to the power relations being challenged or questioned.”

3.2.4.2 Crimean Tatars - “the unsatisfied”

In the Crimean mainstream media the discourse on the “Crimean Tatar problem” is represented in its own specific variation, which may be called “the discourse
of the unsatisfied”. As a part of the strategy of “positive self-representation and negative other-representation”, mentioned earlier, the Crimean media portray the Crimean Tatars together with the Crimean Tatar political elite, which represents the group in the bodies of the regional authority, as “unsatisfied”, as the one, which can't stop criticizing the majority-backed decision-makers and demanding the privileges for themselves. Various Crimean media outlets demonstrate this strategy in more subtle or more scandalous forms. “Krymskiy Telegraph” labels the Crimean Tatars as “resentful”, who are abusing “all the best in the Crimea”: “All the best at our Crimea – is exclusively to the Crimean Tatars. Taking to account that there are more than 100 ethnic groups in the republic, the special treatment of only one group of repatriates, who always call themselves offended, can not stay unnoticed.” 59

It is notable that “us” in the utterance “at our Crimea” means the indirectly presented main actor, the majority, which provides all the goods, while the Crimean Tatars – are portrayed the ungrateful recipients of privileges provided in prejudice of other groups of deportees.

Refat Chubarov, the Crimean Tatar member of the Crimean parliament is called by “Krymskiy Telegraph” the “Unsatisfaction of the year”60 for being too critical about the inefficient work of the Crimean authorities in implementation of the state support programs for deportees. The shift of the emphasis to the MP's “unsatisfaction” veils the faults in the work of the autonomy's state officials, leaving them undisussed and unproblematised: “Member of the Crimean Parliament Refat Chubarov appeared to be the most “unsatisfied” activist of this year. At first we were short of money for deportees. Then suddenly it came out that the budget funds have not been used at all…”61

“Krymskiye Izvestiya” follows the same pattern, systematically mentioning Chubarov's critical comments as opposed to “the constructive work” of the pro-government members of the Crimean parliament. In order to pinpoint the critical manner of Chubarov, the newspaper uses common sense implications to naturalize the Crimean Tatar MP's behaviour as a “never ending criticizer”: “in the group of the unhappy about the language, obviously, was Refat Chubarov.”62 Systematic use of the “us-good” VS “them-bad” strategy in representing the Crimean Tatar politicians as opposed to the non-Tatar officials, the Crimean media construct a commonsensical image of the “unsatisfied” and “scandalous” Crimean Tatars as a minority group, as an image of a single representative is often adds to a generic bias about the minority group as a

59 ... samoe luchshee u nas v Krymu – iskluchitel'no krymskim tataram. Yesli uchest', chto v respublike prozhivayut predstaviteli bolee 100 national'nostey i etnicheskikh grup, to osoboe otmoszenie i vniamanie lish k odnoi national'nosti repatriantov, vchego nazyvayaschikkh sebya obizhennymi, ne mozhet ostatsia nezamechennym” In: Greki stali chast'yu mejlisa// Krymskiy Telegraph, № 185, 15.06.2012
60 “Nedovol'stvo goda”
whole.

3.2.5. Discourse of threat

Taking into consideration the transitional character of the Ukrainian media discourse and public sphere in general, it should be mentioned that discourses of threat, menace and conspiracy have become widespread. The actualization of ideas of internal and external threat in the public rhetoric has become common (Kulyk 2003). Official and political rhetoric emphasizes the priority of the national interest and national security. As Kulyk admits, transitional Ukrainian discourse is characterized by the type of social consciousness, which often justifies non-democratic actions on the part of the authorities, or at least fails to question these. As a consequence of the discourse of threat, minority groups are often presented as a personification of the threat and subsequently often feared. Here is an example, when the argument “We will have the second Palestine/Chechnya in the Crimea” is used to justify the xenophobic “call for action” to the authorities towards the Crimean Tatars. These actions could imply any form of authoritarian intervention and will not be questioned by the society, for it is allegedly done in the name of the civic peace and order of the ethnic majority: “The rise of tension in the Crimea turns Crimean Tatar problem into the copy of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Authorities have to take action”.

The notion of “the Crimean Tatars as a potential threat” is an integral part of the “discourse on the Crimean Tatar problem” discussed above and is developed in both national and regional media discourses. The vaguely explained “problems”, which Crimean Tatars bring to the region as a national minority group, increase social exclusion and draw social boundaries between ethnic groups living in the Crimea. The constant references to the potential violent scenarios of the problem resolution as well as reproduction of the fear of state disintegration are the most common forms of building of the topos of threat. The linguistic strategies of discursive constitution of threat may range from explicit to vaguely threatening statements. The indirect hints to the Crimean Tatar separatism are common for the national press: “The official Kyiv does not hurry to solve the problems of the peninsula’s native nation, and the separatism is rising amongst the Crimean Tatars.”

Scenarios of separation of the Crimea from Ukraine – is an issue, which has been discussed in the media actively during the last decade. The possibility of the Crimea’s secession is presented as realistic due to the inefficient policies of the national Ukrainian government in the Crimea, tensions with the Crimean Tatars and the growth of the Russian political influence in the region. The use of nominalization “the growth of separatism”, however, omits the discussion of the agents directly involved in this process. Moreover, this metaphor implies the natural and inevitable nature of the process making external agents, who may control it, unnecessary.

63 “Офіційний Київ не спешит на дея ршат проблеми кorenнiй нatsii полюстроva, дa l v srede samikh tatar narastaet separatizm….” In: A small great politician. Mustafa Dzhemilev, position 95, National rating of politician// Focus, 20.11.2010
Van Djik argues that the discourse of threat and interethnic tensions is drawn upon by framing social and economic conflicts as interethnic and inter-religious. This effect becomes even more easily achieved, when there is a lack of expert discussion of the reasons behind the social disturbances and the unproblematicized way of representation of the current affairs by the media (van Djik 1991). The media often speak about “tendencies” and “growing numbers”, but provide little room for explanation of nature of these tendencies and the expert evaluation of their consequences:

The threat of the 'Islamic radicalism' is one of the most wide-spread themes developed by the media within the general discourse of threat. The speculations about the growth of the Islamic extremist organizations in the Crimea take place in both national and Crimean media.

Various metaphors and comparisons are inevitable linguistic tools widely used to construct of the discourse of threat and interethnic tensions. The Crimean peninsula is frequently called “the hot spot” of Ukraine, which implies its interethnic conflict potential. For example, see the titles of the articles in “Kommentari” - “The last hot spot of Ukraine”, 64 or in “Focus” - “Hit into the hot spot”.65 The metaphors of burning and explosions add the flavor of scandal and sensation to the media materials on this matter: “The new authority risks devastating the relations between Kyiv and Crimean Tatars, which have been establishing for years. The situation may become explosive.”66

Comparison of Crimea with other conflictous regions like Palestine, Chechnya and Kosovo has become a traditional way of drawing on the discourse of interethnic conflict. Notions of “Palestine” and “Chechnya” are used as a fixed commonsensical concept, their ideological meaning is believed to be shared by the audience, and could signify anything from terror, civil unrest to ethnic cleansing, adding to the general state of emergency, presented in the media discourse. For instance, Crimean newspaper “Krymskiy Telegraph”, which is regularly using hate speech and other overt forms of discrimination towards the Crimean Tatars, draws in the discourse of threat as a regular tool of preserving the anti-Tatar and anti-Muslim histeria among its readership. According to the newspaper's position, the major source of threat to the Slavic population is brought by the Crimean Tatars' struggle for civil rights: “it is worth recalling the mass riots of the 90s and numerous “acts of disobedience” at the Lenin Square and places of self-seizure. These “actions”, fights and all sorts of outrages, organized by the “peacemaker” Mejlis, falls under two articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: #293 – “group violation of civic order”…” 67

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64 Poslednyaya goryachaya tochka Ukrainy// Kommentarii, 10.12.2010
65 Popali v goryachuyu tochku// Focus, 2.07.2010
66 „Novaya vlast’ riskuyet razrushiti vystavayemye godami otnosheniya Kieva s krymskimi tatarsami. Situatsiya na poluostrove mozhhet stať vzryvoopasnoy” In: Popali v goliachuyu tochku// Focus, 2.07.2010
While some media actively construct and reproduce the discourse of threat in more intensified or mitigated forms, there are media materials, which criticize the references to extremism and underline their artificial character. They directly point to the fact that political parties use this rhetoric of threat to build the support of their electorate: “These are only echoes of xenophobic hysteria that we saw in the Crimea in 2004. Then the deputies and top-officials in plain text in the squares and on the air frighten us with extremists and the Crimean Tatar national autonomy”68. Norman Fairclough refers to such discursive strategy in terms of foregrounding of common sense, when either deliberately or unintentionally “people become self-conscious about the things they usually take for granted.” (Fairclough 1989: 106) However, as Crimean journalist and political expert Nariman Dzhelyal (2013) argues, this critical counter-discourse, which aims to reveal the artificial nature of such allegations and to expose manipulations of public opinion, is still quite rare in the Crimean media discourse, compared to the dominant pattern of stirring up the state of emergency. The result of my study confirm this statement: in my sample of the media texts for 3 years I have found only 4 articles on this matter in both national and Crimean press.

3.2.6. 'Land self-seizures' VS 'glades of protest'

“The land problem” is one of the most prominent and burning issues related to Crimean Tatars, which is actively discussed in various forms in the national and regional media discourses. The demand to solve the land issue – is one of the political demands brought forward by the Crimean Tatar national movement to the Ukrainian authorities. The public discussion of the Crimean Tatars’ right to own the Crimean land is related to the dispute of the special status of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous to the Crimea and as forcibly displaced, deported people, which has a right to reclaim its pre-deportation property and to settle down at its native territories. It is notable that these discussions, present at the level of experts, are kept away from the mainstream media. Instead, the media version is constructed in the limited and simplified terms and can be framed as “problem of self-seizures”. The term “self-seizures” is widely used as a label referring to the land plots, occupied by the Crimean Tatar local communities, without obtaining official permission from the local authorities. Similarly, the use of the term “self-seizers” to label the Crimean Tatars as a group is an example of metonymy.

Even though reasons behind the phenomenon of “land self-seizures” is discussed in the media (the most prominent of them are inefficiency of state policies of land distribution and corruption), the emphasis in discussion is often shifted. The authorities are portrayed as “struggling to solve the problem”, while the

Crimean Tatars, as an ethnic group, are presented as the major violators of the law and social order is “unwilling to make a step forward”.

In order to raise the issue of responsibility for the take up of the land both “Krymskiy Telegraph” and “1 Krymskaya” shift the emphasis speculating on aesthetic side of the process using long narrations: “Territory of autonomy each year becomes covered with toilet-like sheds like a dog with fleas, and attempts to free it (even in court ) stop at the physical impossibility of performance: a horde of self-seizers willing to hurt down any member of the government, but would not give up what it consider his”69; “We, the Crimeans, over the past decade have somehow got used to the phenomenon of self-seizures. Glades of protests surrounding the city, spoil not too attractive sight of the city. But guests of the peninsula always wonder: how come for so many years after the return of Crimean Tatars to their historic homeland government can not solve their problems with the land.”70

The ideological positions of the two media outlets can be clearly distinguished by the differences in style and rhetoric of the two media narratives. In addition, the blame for not solving the issue of land distribution is placed on the Crimean Tatars in the first case and on the Crimean authorities in the second.

Disregard to the subject of responsibility, the problem of “self-seizures” is perceived to be so strongly tied with the Crimean Tatars, that the term “land self-seizers” is often used as a synonym to “repatriates” or “the Crimean Tatars”. This commonsensical default-identity becomes even clearer in the instances, when the media utilize additional remarks when they point out the existence of the non-Tatar land self-seizers.

However, together with the dominating practice of use of the term “self-seizures” another term “glades of protest” is used by the media, not so widely however. It frequently doesn’t substitute the former label, but used together in the same articles as a synonym to the terms “self-seizures” or “unauthorized land occupation”. The term “glades of protest” together with another naming “self-returns”71, is promoted in the public and media discourses by the Crimean Tatars (Muratova and Kuts 2011:8) and bears the meaning quite different from the conventional label “self-seizure”.

While the term “self-seizure” and “self-seizer” refer to the illegal activity, which violates social order, implies punishment by the law and does not discuss the reasons of this acts. These terms are based on the commonsensical assumption that, land take-up normally can’t happen with any permission of the authority

69 “territoriya avtonomii s kazhdym godom obrastae postroykami tipa “sortir”, kak sobaka blokhami, a popytki jeje osvobodit’ (dache chezer sud) upravlyutichia v fiziicheskiy nozmozhnost’ ispolneniya: orda samozakhvatchikov gotov pokalichit’ liubogo predstavitelia vlasti, toliko by ne odar’, chto shchtaet svojim.” In: Da chto on mozhit, etot “lider”?// Krymskiy Telegraph, № 115, 21.01.2011

70 “My, krymchane, za polvedniye desyatitiya uze kak-to privymli k takomu yavleniyu, kak samozakhvaty. Polyamy protesta, okrushayushchiye goroda, poritiak ikh I bez togo ne slishkom privlekatel’nyj vid. A vo gosti poluostrova vosedga interesayutichia: neuzheli za toliko let s momenta vozvrashcheniya krymskih tatar na istoriicheskuyu rodinu vlast’ ne mozhit reshit’ ikh problemy s zemley.” In: Na osvobozhdeniye samozakhvaty udyut gody//1 Krymskaya, No 425, 25-31.05.2012

71 Samovozvraty
and, therefore, violation of this assumption challenges the legitimacy of the Crimean central and local governance. The terms “glades of protest” and “leader of the glades of protest”, in turn, point primarily to the right of the group to protest against the unfairness and maltreatment, they imply the positive democratic nature of the activities and present the protesters in the legal and legitimate light.

“Ukraina Moloda” newspaper, for instance, using both terms, utilizes term “self-seizures” but with a remark “so called”, which raises the question of credibility of the term: “...dictated by “intention to end the situation related to the so-called Crimean Tatar land self-seizures”, - the press-service of the Council of Ministers of Crimea report. These Simferopol is surrounded by such “glades of protest” since March 2006”. Crimean media also widely use both terms, but the naming “glade of protest” can also be utilized in the critical manner, which bears an implication that for some people, seizing the land plots is not necessarily a need for the place to live. This implicit statement thus aims to undermine the whole idea of taking over the land as a form of a civic protest: “For this elderly woman this is not a “glade of protest”, it is the only available place to live.”

Together with use of the discussed terms with various ideologically charged contexts, certain analytical materials in the media also argue that the problem of self-seizures goes far beyond the actions held by the Crimean Tatars, the argument which works on deconstruction of the dominant convention of attribution of the issue with the Crimean Tatars only, often mentioning the multiethnic character of this phenomenon.

Thus, we can observe the process of normalization of the use of alternative term “glade of protest” in the media texts together with the prevailing label “self-seizure”. Even though, both national and Crimean media often utilize the term “self-seizers” as a default identity marker of the Crimean Tatars, the emergence of the counter-discourse is in place, where the new term “glade of protest” - which draws the concepts of legitimacy and civic activism into the discussion – has become a variation of the norm. In Fairclough’s terms, this means nascence of ideological diversity and, according to the author, persuasive effect of the dominating practice has been significantly challenged by bringing the alternative meaning into the regular use (1989: 86).

3.2.7. STRATEGIES OF EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION

Apart from the discursive exclusion examined in previous sections, elaborated by means of aggregated and depersonalized naming, passivation of social actors and construction of the discourse of threat, the discursive othering of the

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73 “Dlya pozhiloy zhenshiny eto otniud' ne “poliana protesta”, a edintvennoye vozmozhnoe mesta zhitel'stva.” In: Spetsforum dlia “mirotvortsa”// Krymskiy Telegraph, No 135, 17.06.2011
Crimean Tatars can also be carried out by a number of other means.

The ethnic minority group of the Crimean Tatars constitutes the 'other' for the majority of the Ukrainian population and Crimea in particular, and thus, feelings of rejection and solidarity towards them are ambivalent and depend on the particular context. At the national Ukrainian level, the Crimean Tatars are primarily associated with the inhabitants of one of the Ukrainian regions – the Crimean peninsula and therefore, generally included into the all-national identity, which implies the civic unity of all groups residing in Ukraine. As I have shown earlier, in the sphere of the Crimean politics the Crimean Tatars are also considered as a significant actor and generally included into the in-group of the Crimean political forces: “At the side of Yatsuba there are Tatars, Crimean elite, and he is an insider in Kyiv and considered a political heavyweight”.74

On the other hand, the Crimean Tatars are often represented as one of the largest and most visible ethnic minorities living in Ukraine and differentiated not according to the political or civic affiliations, but solely in ethnic and religious terms. But recognition of such differences does not always mean exclusion. The national newspaper “Ukraina Moloda” in the article “Same as us” constructs the boundary between the Ukrainians as a 'we' default national group and the Crimean Tatars as 'them' according to the scheme: “they are not us, but the same as us”. The use of the euphemism “respect to the 'non-ours”75, speaks about the relations of recognition and solidarity of the majority group with the 'other'.

Another form of inclusion of the Crimean Tatars into the group of “hosts” of the Ukrainian land can be found in the Ukrainian nationalist discourses represented in the media. The Crimean Tatars, as an ethnic group indigenous to the Crimea are often united together with the titular ethnicity, the Ukrainians, in opposition to other ethnic groups, who are represented as 'non-native' or 'foreign' to the Ukrainian land: “In Ukraine there are two nationalities, which live on their own lands – Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Representatives of other nationalities – they are guests, who for various reasons inhabited Ukraine and became its citizens”76

The Crimean mainstream media, in their turn, construct the relations between the groups residing at the peninsula mostly based on the ethnic grounds. The ideological construct called “multiculturalism” in the Crimean public and media discourses prevails in framing of the relations between the ethnic minorities of the Crimea. The key feature of this discursive construct is that multiethnic solidarity in Crimea is expressed solely by the acknowledgment of cultural diversity, while the political rights of the groups remain backgrounded or

75“Pozhanna do “ne svogo” ” In: Taki zh jak my// Ukraina Moloda, 16.11.2010
76“V Ukraini je dvi natsional'nosti, jaki zhyva' na svojih zemliakh, - tse ukrajintsi ta kryms'ki tatary. Redstavyky inshykh national'nostey - tse gosti, yakiz riznykh prychnykh oselylys' v Ukrajini I staly jiji gromadianamy.” In: “Movnyj vuzol” mozhna rozviazaty, beruchy priklad z Rosiji // Ukraina Moloda Ukraina, 8.07.2010
excluded. This strategy becomes particularly visible in the media texts of the “Krymskiye izvestiya”, the official medium of the Crimean authorities. “In the multiethnic Crimea, where each cultural community preserves its traditions, folk art can not be forgotten. Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars, Greeks strive for self-realization through culture, as a way of reinstating their uniqueness.”

I argue that by reproducing the concept of the “multicultural Crimea”, the Crimean media help the current political elites sustain the status-quo of their political dominance.

In the media discourse this dominance is also carried out by means of “the structural exclusion”. “Krymskiye Izvestiya” publishes all information related to the affairs of the Crimean ethnic groups under the section entitled “Interethnic relations”. This section contains mostly news of social and cultural character, reports from the commemoration events of the important historical dates of the largest ethnic minorities, information about the cultural festivals organized by the local ethnic groups; news about support programs of the local authorities to the ethnic communities etc. At the same time, the section “Politics” of this newspaper (two front pages) contains little or no references to the political activities involving ethnic minorities. Thus, the very structure of the newspaper leads to the systematic exclusion of the ethnic minorities from the political discourse of the Crimea; the official state-sponsored newspaper of the Crimean parliament limits its reports about them to cultural and social spheres. Other newspapers in my sample have more flexible structure and news involving ethnic minorities are normally scattered through various sections.

The cultural dominance of the majority group (the Russian-speaking Slavs) is also reproduced by means of references to the supposed common sense (Fairclough 1989). For instance, the dominance of the Russian language, “as a language of interethnic communication”, “language which everybody speaks” in Crimea is reproduced in the following way: “If needed we will open Armenian, Greek classes. Crimean Tatars often want to get into the Ukrainian class. But the language of communication remains the same. If during classes the hardships arise, the teacher turns to Russian.”

The discursive strategies of othering are also constructed based on religious differences between the Muslim Crimean Tatars and predominantly Christian Orthodox ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. For instance, feature articles in “Segodnia”, entitled “Why our people are turning to Islam?”, and in Korrespondent, called “The peninsula of crescent”, point to the fact that ethnic Ukrainians are converting to Islam. This fact is represented as ‘shocking’ and

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77”V mnogonatsional‘nom Krymu, gde kazhdoe kul’turnoe objedineniye stremit’ k svoim traditsii, narodnoye tvorchestvo ne moglo byt’ predano zabveniyu. Ukraintsy, russkiye, krymskiye tatary, greki stremit’sya k samorealizatsii menno cherez kul’turu, takim obrazom uverzhdaya svoyu samobytnost’.” In: Tatarskiye chastushki, ukraintsy pesni, bolgarskiye pover’ya// Krymskiye Izvestiya, 19.01.2012

overtly problematic, by means of the respective lexical choices: “Seeing their
daughter in khijab, parents were shocked and have been persuading her to reject
the faith, alien for Ukrainians.”
Overt problematization of such conversion is
rooted in the unspoken assumption that the ethnicity and religion are strongly
connected markers of identity and are perceived as a fixed and pre-given union.
According to the same presupposition, the Crimean Tatars are represented in the
media discourse as Muslim by default, and therefore, different from the “us”-group, which is presupposed to be Christian. This discursive strategy excludes
not only the Slavs, who have started practicing Islam, but all followers of this
religion. The Crimean newspaper “Krymskiy Telegraph” shares the same
ideological presupposition of the fixed bonds between ethnic origin and religion
(silencing completely an idea that people could be atheist) represents Slavs, who
have converted to Islam, with a scandalous nickname “rightful Slavs”.

At the Crimean level, the Crimean Tatars, as a group, are being assimilated into
a larger collective of “the Crimeans” in certain discourses and being excluded
from it as ‘outsiders’ in other discourses. This is an example, when legitimizing
the existence of the 'other', the notion of 'self' conveys the negotiation of several
identities simultaneously. As Van Leeuwen argues, such association and
dissociation of social actors into groups, based on the common actions, interests
or values, and flexible and often change from one text to another (1996:50).

For the 'majority group' living in the Crimea, ‘selfhood’ means being a Crimean
as opposed to a Ukrainian (by ‘Ukrainian’ people understand a person living in
the Ukrainian state, but outside the Crimea) and being a Slav as opposed to non-
Slavic national groups living in the peninsula, above all Crimean Tatars. In the
first case Crimean Tatars are included in the “Crimean” identity, in the second
case the Crimean identity bears Post-Soviet cultural and historical legacy and
constructs an opposition with the one of the Crimean Tatars. The ideological
nature of this contradistinction informs the meanings utilized to provide reasons
standing behind this unity or divide.

The utterance which I have mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter –
“Too bad that our Victory – is their deportation” makes up a bright example
of exclusion built upon the differences of the collective memory of the World
War II. In this case ‘us’, “the Crimeans” is a group, which shares post-Soviet
sentiments to the great Victory and their official Soviet memory of the War
excludes the memory of Stalin's repressions against many ethnic groups,
including the Crimean Tatars.

Another example of the use of the naming “the Crimeans” is constructed on the
seemingly neutral territorial meaning of this word, which is inclusive for all
peoples living in the Crimea: “…She is native and close, Susanna

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79“Uvidev doch v khidzhabe, rodieli debuskhi prishli v uzhas. Dolga pytal'si' ugovorit' otkazat'sia ot chuzhdoj dlia ukraintsev
very” In: Pochemu nashi luidi prinimayut islam? // Segodnia, 14.01.2011
80“Ochen' zhal', chto dlya nikh nasha Podeba – eto ikh deportatsiya.” In: Dva dnia v maye // Krymskiy Telegraph, № 181,
18.05.2012
81I will speak more about these ideological differences in the next chapter.
Dzhamaladinova, she is ours. Yes, everything is clear: Kiev, Yurmala, TV, but many Crimeans consider and will be considering her to be ours.”82

The collectivization of groups reflected in the use of nouns like 'our', 'us', “the Crimeans” plays an important identity-building role in the discourse and reflects common values of the members of this particular group in this particular context.

Social exclusion can also take forms of the overt hate speech, where a common imagined feature of an ethnic minority group is being attributed to the all representatives of the given group: “Following their national tradition Crimean Tatars decided not to get authorization for the construction site.”83

According to my findings and opinions of the media experts interviewed, these forms are marginal for both national and Crimean media discourses.

As I have demonstrated in this section, unspoken assumptions and commonsensical presuppositions are among the most efficient discursive tools used in the media to construct group identities of 'us' and 'them' as well as to reproduce the existing relations of political and cultural dominance of the majority group over the minorities. The contingent and reflexive nature of the identification dichotomies, allows concluding that for each particular ideological goal, specific set of meanings, themes and contexts is used. Soviet version of the memory of World War II is used to stir up collective identity of the Slavic majority of the Crimea and effectively exclude the Crimean Tatars, with their negative and traumatic recollections of the same historical page. At the same time expressing of solidarity with the Crimean Tatars, allows Ukrainian nationalist narrative to reinstate its own titular position in Ukraine opposing the pro-Russian claims for power.

At the Crimean level, the use of ethnic markers prevails over civic and territorial approach to the relations between groups, religion and culture are drawn in the media discourse to build boundaries between the 'Slavic' and 'Turkic', 'Muslim' and 'Christian Orthodox'. However, as Fairclough put it, “ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible” (1989: 85) and the open forms of hate speech and exclusion are least effective by influencing the media audiences. Therefore, sophisticated and subtle forms, like structural exclusion, the rhetoric of multiculturalism, are far more efficient in terms of reaching their ideological goal – which is a sustaining of the political and cultural domination of the majority group – and prevail over hate speech both at the national and Crimean levels.

3.3. CONCLUSIONS

82 “…ona rodnaya i blizkaya Susanna Dzhamaladinova, ona nasha. Da, vse poniatno: Kiev, Yurmala, TV. No ochen’ mnogkiye krymchane schitali i schitayut jeje svoeye ” In: V krymu ty doma, Dzhamala, I sdes’ tebe rady//1 Krymskaya , No 403, 9-15.12. 2011

83 “Po svoeye natsional’noy traditsii krymskiye tatary reshili ne soglasovyat’ stroitel’stvo” In: Sam sebe Golova// Krymskiy Telegraph, 25.06.2010
One of the central findings of this research is that the implicit and indirect forms of discrimination of the Crimean Tatars prevail in the media discourse over the open forms of hate speech and other obvious public manifestations of intergroup domination. Van Dijk speaks about ideological and structural nature of such domination, which includes “political, economic and socio-cultural structures of inequality, processes and practices of exclusion and marginalization, as well as socio-cognitive representations required for such structures” (1991: 27). In practice, the major patterns of the discursive representation of the Crimean Tatars as a minority group have demonstrated their weaker social and political positioning, presented them as less powerful and dependent social actors, as well as the source of potential threat and burden for the majority group. Many of these representations have been realized through structural means, such as media formats (lack of use of the personalized media genres like interviews or blogs), structural discrimination embodied in media outlets’ sections compiling (like the section “Interethnic relations” in the newspaper “Krymskiye Izvestiya”) or providing less room for voices of the representatives of the minority group and other conventions.

The ideological forms of inequality have been manifesting in the discourse mainly through the more or less subtle, indirect and therefore less open and less obvious forms of discrimination, which are variously called 'new' or 'symbolic' racism, as opposed to the “old” racism, which envisages overt blatant rhetoric mechanisms (van Dijk 1995, Wodak et all 1999, Fairclough 1989). Van Dijk argues that the shift from the 'old' to the 'new' racism could also be called a switch from racism to ethnicism – an ideology, which “recognizes socio-cultural differences between the ethnic groups, but denies differences in power and hence the dominance of the western culture” (1991: 28). In our case, the cultural and political domination of the Russian-speaking Slavic majority of the Crimea is manifested in a number of aspects:

1. In sustaining of commonsensical beliefs (such as that the Russian language is the only language of the intergroup communication etc);
2. In imposing the official Soviet version of the memory about the World War II and rejecting or silencing the alternative versions promoted by the minority groups;
3. In public denial of the right to protest and demand rights and freedoms for the people, who has suffered through the repressions, which is manifested in scandalous forms of labelling of the Crimean Tatar activists, who demand social support and fair procedures of distribution of land plots etc.

As Krzyzanowski and Wodak argue, the construction of 'us' and 'them' is basic foundation of social exclusion. The discursive construction of the latter includes both overt and mitigated forms of labelling of social actors, generalization of negative stereotypes, exclusion of many and politically correct inclusion of some (Krzyzanowski and Wodak 2009: 13). As I have shown in the chapter, the Crimean Tatars are widely labeled in the media as “land self-seizures”, and the
deviant, criminal activities or other negative characteristics of the individual representatives of the Crimean Tatar people are frequently projected on the group as a whole. Furthermore, while the majority of the group representatives are shown in the generalized depersonalized forms, certain members of the political and cultural elite (like the Mejlis leader Mustafa Dzhemilev or musician Enver Izmaylov) are included into the national political and cultural discourses as equal to the representatives of the ethnic majority elites.

As for the general patterns of the media representation, which can be derived from the analysis of the national and Crimean samples of the media texts, the following key features can be listed.

Both national and Crimean mainstream media write about the topics related to the Crimean Tatars on a regular basis. Their interest, however, is dictated by the information causes created by the key social actors involved. The process of attracting media’s attention is double-sided: the topics of interest at the national level trigger the regional Crimean Tatar-related issues and contrariwise, the events which happen on the regional level, often lead to actualization of the Crimean Tatar's issues in the national media discourse (Samar 2013).

Topics from the political sphere prevail over the social, cultural issues both in the national and Crimean media. In addition to this politics-bound phenomenon, many social and cultural themes are often framed in political terms: the discussion of the issues of housing or education often is shifted from the discussion of the problems of the particular people to the discussion of the laws or state programs, conflicts between politicians with regards to the discussed matter or representation of the positions of the key political parties or figures on the matter. First of all, Crimean media expert Serhii Kostynskyy believes, that the Crimean Tatars themselves tend to promote political issues more actively than others, as the most important for them question of political and legal rehabilitation lies in the political sphere (Kostynskyy 2013). Secondly, there is global tendency to focus on covering the political institutions and events as a reflection of the central interest of the audience’s, who are potential advertisers and can bring benefit to the medium (McCullagh 2002:79). The omission of marginal or potentially conflictous themes, replacement of the analysis of trends with the reporting of the events and scandals from the current political life helps diluting the power of particular groups and individuals in the eyes of the media audiences (Kulyk 2010:130).

The criminal frame, which is, as van Djik mentions, is a traditional tool of creation of the negative image of the minorities, is not so widely represented in the media. Moreover, many media outlets tend to omit the utilization of the ethnic markers in representation of the subjects in the criminal news. The convention of stressing the features which refer to “ethnic origin” of the subject in the media discourse is decreasing, the experts argues (Kostynskyy 2013, Semena 2013). Mostly, this is happening due to the existence of the number of social institutions, which maintain media watchdog function (like Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People, hate speech monitoring project at IPC\textsuperscript{84}) and publicly expose cases of the overt discrimination of the ethnic groups by the Crimean media, including by the use of ethnic markers in the criminal news.

The ideological nature of the choice of vocabulary has been clearly demonstrated in the naming of the Crimean Tatars as a group. As we have seen, the convention of using the generic wording “the Crimean Tatars” dominated the media discourse and news texts in particular. The terms like “the Crimean Tatar people”, “the repatriates” or “the deportees”, which refer to the specific features of the group as such and hence imply their special status or rights, are either used not so widely, or utilized in the context, where their meaning is limited to the synonym of the simple name of the group. The terms “native” or “indigenous” people are mostly promoted by the Crimean Tatar political elite. The omission (and even publicly confronting) of the use of the terms like “indigenous” or “deported” people with regards to the Crimean Tatars by the representatives of the Crimean and national authorities speaks about their unwillingness to adopt necessary norms to secure rights and privileges for this minority group.

The personal representation of the Crimean Tatars, being quite limited at the national level, increases and diversifies in the Crimean mainstream media. Besides of the leader of the Milli Mejlis Mustafa Dzhemilev, who was the leading Crimean Tatar recognized in the national media in 2010-2012, the Crimean press spoke about various representatives of the Crimean Tatar political, cultural and business elite. The average people, however, received little to no media representation.

As for the agency of the Crimean Tatars the research has revealed the following: in the general news the agency of the collective is mostly suppressed or passivated, they are represented in the less powerful position of the “suppliant” or “recipient”, in many instances the subject of the action is back grounded or completely omitted. But in the news about conflicts, street confrontations or scandals, the Crimean Tatars are often positioned an active subject, which “demands” and “criticizes” rather than “seeks compromise or dialogue”. This discursive strategy builds on the negative image of the Crimean Tatars as a potential threat to civic order and a source of various problems.

The discursive strategy of 'positive-self' and 'negative-other' representation typical for the discriminatory rhetoric of ethnicism (van Djik 1991) is widely present in the media, particularly at the Crimean level. Not only the Crimean Tatars are represented as a source of various “problems”, which the majority has to solve, they are also portrayed as “unsatisfied”, filing “groundless claims”, which also adds to their negative image of the 'other'.

The discourse of threat makes up a major anti-Tatar strategy, which is realized in more or less overt forms by the media outlets, which share strong opposition to the Crimean Tatar as Muslim and “visible” minority in the Crimea. The issues of separatism and a treat of the spread of the extremist Islamic organizations in the

\textsuperscript{84}Project of the Information Press Center, Simpheropol, Crimea. Available at www.ipc.crimea.ua

123
Crimea, as well as commonsensical references to conflicts in Chechnya and Palestine are brought forward to construct islamophobic prejudice amongst the audiences of these media.

Public discourse, and media discourse is particular, according to Wodak and Reisigl (2001), serves both to legitimize and reproduce discriminatory and exclusionary practices and to criticize and confront existing ethnicist conventions promoting more inclusive practices and ideas. As we have seen earlier in the chapter, the commencement of the alternative or counter-discourse, which aims to confront the dominative conventions and discursive structures but to promote its own terms and their respective meanings, to build its own patterns of representation of the ethnic minorities. The manifestations of such counter-discourses can be seen in the emerging of the terms like “glade of protest” as opposed to “self-seizures”, in the attempts to publicly expose the manipulative strategies of the bringing in issues of “Islamic extremism” and “terrorism” into the public discourse prior to the elections, or in exposing the artificially constructed dichotomies of “us-Orthodox-Slavs” and “them-Muslim-Tatars”. In addition, another powerful counter-discriminatory process is the building of the new meaning of the word “the Crimeans”, which now more often tends to include all inhabitants of the peninsula, turning from containing ethnic to more neutral territorial markers.

“May 18 for the Crimean Tatars stopped being only a commemoration date long time ago. In the modern history of the people – this is a day of struggle for their rights. Firstly – the memory day, and then – the day of struggle.”85

In this chapter I will explore the media representation of the historical pillar of the Crimean Tatar people’s national identity. For this purpose I chose to examine the media representations of one of the most notable and tragic historical events in the Crimean Tatar people’s history – the deportation of the Crimean Tatars held on May 18, 1944 by the Soviet totalitarian regime.

4.1. Why deportation?

The decision to choose this particular historical event’s representation as a subject of analysis is based on the preliminary research of the media discourse on the Crimean Tatars. The deportation is the only event which is systematically mentioned in the mediated public discussion about the Crimean Tatars, their status as a national minority or as an indigenous people to the Crimea. The deportation is also inherently present debate about the political and economic claims the Crimean Tatars lay before the Ukrainian government. As I will show further, the memory of deportation has become a constitutive narrative for the Crimean Tatars’ national identity as well as one of the key characteristic features of their identification by the majority out-groups.

Besides, the historical narratives of deportation and the discussion about the reasons behind it remain a disputed topic in the Ukrainian public discourse – the opposing versions of memory about deportation, brought forward by various social actors, compete in the contemporary Ukrainian mediatized public discourse. These versions also being interwoven in a certain form with the dominant national memory of the Second World War and the Stalin’s repressive politics against Soviet national groups. The references to this deportation of the Crimean Tatars are being used by the national and Crimean political elites to create a vision of the public political solidarity with the Crimean Tatar people as well as to build the grounds for integration of the memory of this national group into the larger national Ukrainian memory. Confronting versions of memory of

deportation inform differences in media representation of this historical event and its commemoration by the different media. National and regional mass media serve as a powerful tool for both construction and shaping of this memory and in many ways define the ideological framework and dominant perceptions of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian society.

This issue could be approached by using the theoretical concept of “memory-setting” (by analogy with the media’s social agenda-setting function), which means the ability of the media to set up the public memory agenda (Klinger-Vilenchik 2011: 227). Klinger-Vilenchik (2011) argues that the media have much ideological power in the process of reporting one historical events and silencing the memory of the other as well as in discussing the meaning assigned to events, characters and images of the past shaping in this way the national collective memory.

Taking into account the process of social construction of the Ukrainian national memory, I aim to discuss the key features of the mediated meta-narrative of deportation of the Crimean Tatars and to explore how they fit the dominant historical meta-narratives, which exist in Ukraine. In this chapter I use the terms “meta-narrative” and “narrative”. By “meta-narrative” I mean broad discursive and ideological framework of building of a single “narrative”. I will explain these terms in more details later in this chapter.

The study of interrelations between media, memory and social groups allows to reveal not only the mechanisms which define different versions of memory, but also study the boundaries of collective – the interplay between the regional and national collective identities (Neigel, Zandberg, Meyers 2011:156). The theoretical tools of combining the study of the media discourse and the study of the collective memory is relatively new to the Ukrainian scholarship. The deportation of the Crimean Tatars as a scholarly subject of analysis has been approached from the side of history, political science, memory studies, but in my opinion, the concept of the “mediatized memory” allows bringing deeper insights on the interrelations between the various versions of the memory as represented by the media outlets with different and often opposing ideological stance.

An important and innovative part of the study is the analysis of the representation of deportation and its key narratives in the Crimean Tatar national media. I will focus on the examination of the discursive strategies utilized by the national minority media to bring forward certain historical arguments and stories which could substantiate an alternative version of the historical narrative.

Another research goal for this chapter is to trace any changes in the media representation of this historical issue with the change of the ruling political elites. The period of 6 years gives room for chronological analysis of the mediatized public rhetoric and media representations of deportation during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2007-2010) and Viktor Yanukovych (2010-
This chapter, in turn, seeks to provide answers to the following research questions:

1. How does the media representation shape the collective memory of deportation of the Crimean Tatar people?

2. How do the media representations of deportation vary on the Ukrainian national, regional and Crimean Tatar national levels, how they are being integrated into or opposed by the dominant ideological frameworks on each level of collective?

3. How the alternative historical narrative of deportation created and maintained by the Crimean Tatar national media interrelates with the dominant historical narratives of Ukraine and Crimea?

4. Have there been any changes in the media representation patterns and public rhetoric about deportation over the given period of time during the ruling of different political elites in Ukraine?

Defining collective memory as “a cultural field of struggle over meanings and values” (Katriel and Shavit 2011), I am interested in the processes of integration or re-negotiation of the dominant memory frameworks by the oppositional or alternative voices, and, in particular, in the role which personal memories play in re-shaping the national memory as an institutionally controlled milieu. Thus, in my analysis I will focus on the personal memories of the Crimean Tatar deportation survivors and people, who lived through Second World War and exile in Central Asia reresented in the media discourse. In this chapter I will look broadly at the media discourse on deportation in the way in which dominant and minority groups explore and negotiate the historical component of each other’s national identity. I argue that this discussion is brought forward by the national elites in order to raise the national consciousness of the groups for the purpose of political mobilization.

4.2. Dominant and alternative historical meta-narratives in Ukraine

Looking at the history of Ukraine in the broader context, the question remains whether we should include the Crimean Tatar national history and the history of the Crimean peninsula into the Ukrainian national historical perspective. Here it should be stated that Paul Robert Magocsi (2010) distinguishes between 4 historical viewpoints onto the history of Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, Ukrainian and Soviet. Including or excluding certain historical periods and geographical locations, each of the viewpoints imposes certain political and ideological framework on history. Russian viewpoint, for instance, focuses on the history of the East Slavs – Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians under the rule of the Russian Empire, thus presenting the history of Ukraine as a Russia’s province in the works of Karamzin and Soloviev. Polish historians saw lands on
the right bank of the Dnieper as integral part of Poland, in a similar way stressing “the peripheral nature of the Ukrainian development” (Magocsi 2010: 18) within Polish historical tradition. Ukrainian historians, Magocsi claims, attempted to underline the unique features of Ukrainians and their history to undermine the unity of Eastern Slavs. Myhailo Hrushevsky began to develop an independent Ukrainian historical tradition, according to which history of Ukraine started in pre-Kievan Rus times and has been lasting until present.

During the Soviet times, national historical schools have been eliminated and the concept of Russia as “elder brother” and the “brotherhood of the Soviet peoples” have been introduced. Volodymyr Masliychuk states that Soviet historiography has been constructed “as a sum of the national historiographies of the Soviet republics with a leading role of Russia” (2013: 23). The Ukrainian Soviet vision of history, according to Masliychuk, presented the Ukrainians as “eternally striving for reunion with a brotherly Russian people”, the Crimean Tatars were denied of right for their distinctive national history and were portrayed as “nomands and mercenaries for the other states” (2013: 25).

Given the ideological nature of all these historical viewpoints, Magocsi chose to take the alternative “geographical” stand in defining the history of Ukraine as “choronological sequence of events that have taken place on the territory of what since December 1991 is an independent Ukraine” (2010:24). Taking on board his approach, I agree that the history of Ukraine is the history of all peoples living on its present-days territory. Thus we can state that the history of the Crimean peninsula and the national history of the Crimean Tatar is an integral part of the Ukrainian historical context and the memory of the events happening in the XXth century in the Crimea could be embraced by the larger Ukrainian historical meta-narrative.

Looking at the contemporary historical narratives of the Crimea, Greta Uehling, argues that views of the past of the Russian Slavic majority and the Crimean Tatar community compete in the public sphere, each one trying to impose its own interpretation of the historical events. Uehling argues that this process of collective (re)interpretation of the past is an important part of politics of memory and uses the term “management of memories” to define it For the Crimean Tatar, she argues, the past is of a particular importance as it emphasizes the centrality of their strive to return to the Crimea from exile: “the need to reclaim the past is vital both for construction of the historical continuity of their homeland loss and for negotiation about their future” (2004:6). The practices of collective remembering of homeland played central role for the Crimean Tatars in sustaining their desire to repatriate. Uehling also points out the importance of the collective memory about deportation for the Crimean Tatars group identity, which “helps to shape the structure of feeling of belonging which made Crimean Tatars believe they are linked to one another and to the land” (2004: 8)

Discursive approach to the analysis of memory allows us to step beyond the individualistic, psychological understanding of memory – which treats memory
purely as a set of individual emotions and recollections of the past – and to apply social constructivist frame for the study of memory. Thus, taking to account “the feeling of belonging to the native land” Uehling is talking about and which lies in the core of the Crimean Tatar national identity is not an individualistic private sentiment, but the collectively shared social feature constructed discursively during social interactions and grounded in the certain version of the collective recollection of the past.

Volodymyr Kulyk (2012) distinguishes between the two major dominant meta-narratives of memory in Ukraine, which he calls the “Soviet” and the “Nationalist”. He argues that due to different historical experiences and political affiliations of various regions of Ukraine – one or another narrative plays a more dominant role in shaping the character of the national identity in Ukraine. Each of the historical narratives is embodied in the respective public discourses. According to the sociological survey he refers to, the population of the Southern regions of Ukraine and Crimea shares predominantly “Post-Soviet” or “Pan-Slavic” historical narrative: around 60% of the population of this region believes that the history of Ukraine is an integral part of the common history of the great Slavic people together with the history of Russia and Belarus. The Ukrainian nationalist meta-narrative on the contrary emphasizes pro-Western, pro-European historical ties of Ukraine and promotes Ukrainian national values like language and culture and the Ukraine-centered approach to history. This approach in general term lies in the foundation of the Ukrainian official politics of memory. But despite the existence of the dominant versions of the national memory, many historical events and period are still highly disputed. Historical narratives about the Second World War and the Stalin’s repressions (the memory of deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 and the discussion of its reasons is an integral part of this historical discussion) are among these disputed historical issues.

These discussions could be placed into a broader context which Pierre Nora (2012) calls a conflict of the national history and memory. These conflicts over past happen, Nora argues, in the post-colonial societies, where memories both of previously oppressed individuals and social groups haven’t been included into an official “national” historical tradition. In our case the Crimean Tatar version of the memory of deportation has been silenced during the Soviet and nowadays they demand reconsideration of the “official” Soviet version, which is still shared by the bearers of the post-Soviet, pan-Slavic historical narrative. In the meantime, justification of Crimean Tatar people’s deportation and denial of their right to return to the lost homeland derives from the official Soviet history and shapes the modern Crimean public discourse about Second World War. Many representatives of the political and academic elites do not wish to recognize alternative point of view on deportation because it confronts their inhabited narrative of heroic and victorious Soviet Army and its leaders, who liberated the world from Nazi invasion. No doubts, this version of history also used for ideological and political purposes with regards to sustaining Russian influence.
in the Crimea.

As the dispute over the meaning of deportation unfolds, the Crimean Tatar national newspapers, historians and public figures use the memories of the survivors of deportation as a counter-argument for an alternative view on the Second World War – its real face and consequences for the national groups in USSR. In this context the Crimean Tatar national narrative has much in common with the Ukrainian nationalist historical narrative, which provides calls OUN and the soldiers of UPA86 “Ukrainian national patriots”, instead of using the Soviet label “collaborators”.

The study of narratives of deportation conducted by the group of Eastern European scholars entitled “Crimean tatars: Remembrance of deportation and the young generation” (2010) provides a number of important insights on the framework of the collective memory of deportation and Crimean Tatar national identity. Firstly, the practices of remembrance form the cultural memory concept, which according to Jan Assmann (cited in Whitehead, 2009: 132), manifests itself in ritualized recitation – the personal stories of deportation survivors is one of the important family rituals of the Crimean Tatars, with an obligatory respect to the bearers of memory – grandmothers and grandfathers, who lived through deportation and remember life in the Crimea before deportation. Cultural memory also involved public commemoration rituals – annual commemoration of the victims of deportation on May 18, monument to victims of deportation erected recently in Sevastopol, local annual gatherings of the families who lived in the same village prior to the Second World War etc.

It is important to mention here that the study of the narratives of deportation, conducted by Aleshko et al (2010) is based on the interviews with the Crimean Tatar youth, who re-constructed the stories of deportation heard directly from their grandparents, not from the media. Nevertheless, the analysis of the interviews provides valuable and relevant insights on the structure of narratives of deportation and serves as a proof of their centrality in shaping the present-day relations within the Crimean Tatar national community.

For many interviewees knowledge about the details of deportation equals patriotism and strong feeling of belonging to the Crimean Tatar nation: “I know people, who do not care, they are not interested in deportation... they are not patriotic” “In the families”, where there are elderly people, who often talk about deportation, children often speak the native language87

In the collective memory of the Crimean Tatars the history is strictly divided into the one “before and after deportation”: “we divide our history on the periods before and after deportation, in order to revive our culture we have to

86OUN – “Organizatsiya Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv” – the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists, UPA – “Ukrainska Povstannya Armiya” – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – the key actors during the Ukrainian nationalist resistance movement in the 1940s.
87“Ya znanu liudey, kotorym vse ravno, ne interesuyutsia deportatsiey.... oni ne patriotichny”, “V sem'jakh gde zhivut stariki, chastot govoriat o deportatsii, tam deti znanuy rodnoy yazyk”.

130
know what was before deportation" 88
Many respondents expressed great respect for the bearers of memories of deportation – grandmothers and grandfathers – and referred to to the family as a primary source of “true” information about deportation, language and traditions, which, in their opinion, shape the content of the Crimean national identity.
All personal stories of deportation have a lot of common features and possess a distinct territorial sentiment, affiliation with the Crimean land: “he had a strong desire to return to historical, true Motherland”, “I used to tell them that I am going to my Motherland, Motherland – is a place where he bones of my ancestors are left, where my people is coming from” 89
The research findings demonstrated that collective memory of deportation is considered a major factor of unification of the Crimean Tatar people, key factor of construction of their national identity: “deportation for the Crimean Tatars – as a symbol of unity for other peoples”, “this unites and consolidates our youth” 90. Even in the situation when not all Crimean Tatars speak native language or follow national traditions, the commemoration of deportation day is considered crucial for the national self-identification.
Many narratives of the Second World War emphasize the facts of Crimean Tatars fighting in the Soviet army, loyal to Soviet regime and being Soviet partisans during the German presence in Crimea: “[grandfather] in his 18 years was digging trenches for Motherland, for the Soviet Union, been a very close friend with Akhmet-Khan Sultan, who was twice the Hero of the Soviet Union”, “When my grandmother was deported with two small children, my grandfather was holding the defence of Sevastopol!” 91

4.3. NARRATIVES OF DEPORTATION: MEDIA REPRESENTATION BY THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONAL MEDIA

4.3.1 NATIONAL MEDIA ON DEPORTATION

4.3.1.1 Sample of the media texts

For the national level of the media coverage I took a broad sample of media outlets and included national newspapers, that published reports related to the deportation of the Crimean Tatar during the mid May during the period of 6 years – 2007 to 2012. As a result of the text sampling procedure, I chose 184

88 “my delim nashu istoriyu na do I posle deportatsii, chtoby vozrodit' nashu kulturu my dolzhny znat' chto bylo do deportatsii.”
89 “u nego bylo sil'noe stremlenie vernut'sia na istoricheskuyu, iskonnuyu Rodinu.” “Ja gorovila im chto edo na Rodinu, Rodina – eto mesto gde ostalis' kosti moikh predkov, otkuda proizoshel moi narod.”
90 “deportatsiya dlia krymskih tatar – kak simvol objedineniya u mnogikh narodov”, “eto objediniaet I konsolidiruet nashu molodezh”
91 “[dedushka] v 18 let kopal okopy za Rodinu, za Sovetskiy Soyuz, ochen' blizko druzhil s Akhmet-Khanom Sultanom, dvazhdy geroem Sovetskogo Soyusa”, «Kak raz kogda babushku deportirovali s dvumia malen'kimi det'mi, moy ded derzhal oboronyy Sevastopolia». 131
media texts from the all-Ukrainian media.

In general the topic of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation is not a priority and is not covered on the regular basis. During 2007-2012 only the top-rated TV channel Inter and 5 Channel produced 10 news stories each about deportation and its commemoration during the given period, the rest of the TV channels made 3-4 news reports in average or didn’t provide any coverage at all during 6 years.

*Table 1. National media outlets coverage of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, May 17-19, 2007-2012*\(^9^2\)

\(^9^2\)There may be faults in final number of news stories due to unavailability of video archives.
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As for the national printed media outlets, there are newspapers like “Den’”, “Ukraina Moloda”, “Kommersant Ukraina”, “Uriadovy currier”, which systematically cover this topic each year, but the majority of the newspapers, as the quantitative analysis clearly demonstrates, write about the deportation only once in a few years. Chronologically, the media coverage of the topic remained stable with an average of 30-35 publications in the national media each year.

4.3.1.2. Media representation of deportation

Thus moving from the general statement that national memory is comprised of the local, regional and national levels, where each level takes its role in the construction of the collective construct of the memory, Barbie Zelizer (2011) argues that moving from the local to the national (and further to the global) level of representation by the media, the particular memory or recollection lose its grounds – the initial connection to the first-hand experience which produced it, “its important nuances, ambiguities and hesitations” (2011: 29). She calls this process “cannibalization of memory” by the global media. Even though she applies this term to the global media representation of memory, the tendency to simplify and local memory on the national level remains true for the case of the Crimean Tatars memory of deportation. And even more, given that the topic of deportation of the Crimean Tatars is not only a regional Crimean issue, it is also a national minority’s issue; this statement becomes even more relevant to my study.

Therefore, application of the features which characterize the process of “cannibalization”, according to Zelizer, provides a theoretical tool to explain the patterns of media representation of the Crimean Tatars’ deportation by the national media.

The first feature of cannibalization is minimization, which stands for the limiting the scope of an event, be it a warfare, disaster or a trauma, lack of details and expanded attention on the reasons and consequences of the events covered. Applying this model to the Crimean Tatars' media representation, I can point out similar practices of representation.

First of all, representation practices lack regularity and are characterized by the simplification. The majority of the mainstream media on the national level do not cover this event every year (with minor exceptions). The annual day of commemoration of the victims of the deportation, the May 18, is usually not a decent information cause by itself: normally media write about it when there is an additional issue related to this topic, often a scandalous one. The bright example of such coverage in May 2012 is a public statement of Petro Symonenko, the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who proclaimed that the Crimean Tatars deserved to be deported and even more that the Stalin protected them by forcibly removing them from peninsula, avoiding
their execution as “traitors” of the Soviet people. Such statement has turned media’s attention to the issue of deportation and stirred up the public discussion on the national level. But even that discussion didn’t go into the detailed discussion of the deportation itself, its scale, social and political consequences for the particular national group, but has been often limited to the discussion on the moral appearance of the national politician as well as possible responses of the Crimean Tatar leadership in response to such proclamation. In this regard, Volodymyr Kulyk talks about the tendency of the mainstream media the reduce of media coverage of the commemoration of the anniversaries to their political dimension as means of delegitimization of their historical significance (2011: 299).

Another example is a conflict between the Crimean Tatar movement and Anatoliy Mogilev, the newly appointed head of the Crimean Cabinet of Ministers, which has become “the main intrigue” of the deportation commemoration news in 2010, according to “Kommentarii”: “May 18 – anniversary of the Crimean Tatars' deportation. The major intrigue of this year, weather during the rally Premier Anatoliy Mogilev will be booed off, as the one announced to be an enemy to the Crimean Tatar people for the break down at Ai-Petri and for his statements in support of deportation.”

Reporting about the annual commemoration actions of the Crimean Tatar, media conventionally provide a short historical background about the event. However, often the important historical details are not included. For instance, media mention the “official” reasons for deportation, but do not mention that later in 1989 accusations in treachery have been removed by the USSR Supreme Council decree: “On May 11, 1944 Joseph Stalin signed the degree “On resettlement f the Crimean tatars from Crimean ASSR to Uzbek SSR”, in which they were called “accomplices of fashists”. During the deportation, which started on may 18 and ended on may 20, around 200 thousand people have been displaced. Since 1991 annually on May 18 in Crimea mourning meeting are being held. " This 'gap' in the historical reference creates an unspoken implication, that the Crimean Tatars have been prosecuted fairly, which changes profoundly the whole nature of the commemoration practice. Another feature Zelizer names is substitution of the local experience for the similar examples from another countries, nations or historical periods.

National media covering the topic the Crimean Tatars deportation, often portrays deportation not as a national tragedy for the Crimean Tatars, but through the broader prism of the Stalin’s deportations of other small nationalities of the

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94“18 may — godovshchina zdeportatsii krymskikh tatar. V etom godu glavnaya intriga — ne osvistae li na mitinge premiera Anatoliya Mogileva, kotoryi objevlen vragom krymskotatarskogo naroda za pogrom na Ai-Petri i vyskazyvaniya v zashchitu deportatsii.” In: Mogilev zakluchil peremirie s tatarami. // Kommentarii, 11.05.2012

USSR in the 1941-46 or through the Stalin’s repression policies in general, which often includes the mentioning of repressions against the ‘titular’ national group – the Ukrainians. From one hand such framing of deportation at the national level gives a sense of solidarity of the two peoples – the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainians –, who both suffered the repressive policies during the Soviet period and to some extent includes the Crimean Tatars into the common group of peoples – victims of Stalinist totalitarian traumatic legacy. But from the other – this discursive strategy clearly shifts the focus from the problems, which are specific for the Crimean Tatars and blurs political responsibility of the current national government to restore historical justice.

The third feature, pinpointed by Zelizer, is transportation, which she uses to show how local frames of the original events are displaced by the later interpretations, which often have no connection with the true stories. This type of coverage often has nothing to do with the actual meaning of the event and what really happened, pushing aside the actual discussion (Zelizer 2011: 30-33).

In our case, the reports of the annual rally held by the Crimean Tatars in Simferopol, often covered quite roughly, referred to as “another Crimean Tatars’ demonstration” with the narrations of people marching in columns and shouting slogans, which could be any demonstration for any cause, works a replacement of the actual acknowledgement of the importance of this historical events for this national group, discussion of its meaning (or meanings) for particular people and families or for the state in general. This is achieved by publication of the reports from the street demonstration, with the focus on the issue of the civil order, not the meaning of the gathering: “Main department of the Ministry of Interior in Crimea states the readiness to secure civic order in Simpheropol on May 18 during the marching of the columns of the Crimean Tatars. The columns are to walk from the outskirts to the city centre, where the massive rally, dedicated to the 68th anniversary of the deportation from Crimea will take place; and appeals to the inhabitants of the peninsular to be tolerant to each other.”

The media representation of this topic at the national level to the greatest extent shapes the features of the dominant public discourse on deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian society. The dominant discourse generally accepts the framing of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars as an outstanding tragic event in the Crimean Tatar history and acknowledges the general need to provide political rehabilitation and economic support to the returnees. This acceptance often happens at the all-Ukrainian level within the broader context of condemning Stalin’s repressive policies and Soviet propaganda labelling: “And Joseph Stalin, throwing ethnic groups into the mincer of deportations, is still perceived by some of them as “a father of peoples”. It is the stalinists and their followers, who support the Soviet propaganda cliché about the “collective

96 “GU MVS v Krymu zayavlyaye pro svoyu gotovnosti zabezpechity gromade'kyj poriadok u Simpheropolis 18 travnia, pid chas rukh kolon kryms'kykh tatar. Kolony proshot' vid peredmis' do centru, de vidbude'sia masovyi miting, pryurochennyi 68-ty zhinnyy deportatsii z Krymu; to prosyut naselennia pivostrova byty tolerantnym odyn do odnogo.” In: U den deportatsii kryms'ki tatary zberut'sia v zentri Simpheropolia, UNIAN information agency, 18.05.2012

136
responsibility” of peoples about the actions of their individual representatives.” This set of ideas is becoming normative among the mainstream national media of Ukraine and generally dominates over the other historical meta-narratives, drawn by the group of mass media outlets, which reflect alternative versions of the collective memory of the Second World War, sharing Soviet legacy and expressing more pro-Russian positions.

4.3.1.2.1. Wording

As for the wording conventionally used to refer to the deportation, there is no single commonly used term to refer to the analysed historical event. First of all, it is important to point out that by wording here I mean set of words, used to refer to an event, names under which it is known. As the research finding demonstrate, the national media use predominantly the term “deportation” to refer to this historical event in the variety of genres and contexts. However, additionally, national mainstream media use comparatively neutral terms as synonyms to the word “deportation”. There are two types of wordings used in this regard: evasive terms, which do not imply any political responsibility like “wandering” or the ones, which imply only idea of deliberate displacement for an unspecified reason “forced resettlement from homes”, “special operation of deportation” and the ones expressing grief and mourning: “one of the hardest episodes in history of the Crimean Tatars people”, “history, woven from pain and long years of suffering”, “tragedy”.100

In addition to the conventional wording itself, each of the terms used to refer to the Crimean tatars deportation, implies certain ideological frame and therefore imposes its meaning onto the nature and characteristics of the identified event. For instance, internet media often use terms like “replacement” or “forced resettlement” (“15 thousands of Crimean Tatars came to a rally, dedicated to the 68th anniversary of the forced resettlement to Central Asia, Siberia and Ural.) as a synonym to the word “deportation”, which also shifts the historical frame away from the actual events, as resettlement is a rather broad term, which could mean migration of the groups of people within one region and doesn’t necessarily has to be violent. Also there terms lack ethnic markers and can be applied to any social group of people, while the historians prove the deportations of 1944 has a clear ethnic marker and has been targeted solely against the small ethnic groups of the Crimean peninsula.

97 “A Iosif Stalin, shvyriayushchiy etnosy v myasorubku deportatsiy, mnogim I spravdu predstavliaetsia “otzom narodov”. Imenno stalinisty i ikh edinomyshlenniki podderzhivayut sovetskiy propagandistskiy shtamp o “kolektivnoy otvetstvennosti” narodov za deystviya ikh otdel'nykh predstaviteley” In: Krymskiy test. // Ekonomicheskiye Izvestiya, 19.05.2011
98 “Spezoperatsiya z deportatsiy” In: Tyazhka dolia kryms'kykh tatar// Uriadovyi kurier. 18.05.2012
99 “Odin iz samykh tyazhelykh epizodov v istorii krymskotatarskogo naroda” In: Lishennye rodiny: Krymskie tatary otmetili godovshchinu deportatsiy// Podrobnosti nedeli, Inter. 23.05.2010
100 “Istoriya, zitkana z bolu I dovgykh rokiv poneviryvan”, “tragediya” In: Deportatsia: drugyi akt tragedii // Den’. 17.05.2012
Moreover, by default, the ideological meaning of the “tragedy” mentioned in the media texts is limited to the deportation itself and generally excludes the broader context of the repression policies executed by the Soviet regime besides deportation – living in labour camps, deprivation of the right to return to their homeland, denial of the freedom of the ethno-cultural self-determination and self-expression etc.

Certain media utilize terms, which refer to the large-scale violence and imply criminal responsibility, such as “Crime without time limits.”\textsuperscript{102}, “Forceful deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 by the Stalin's regime de-jure and de-facto is a crime against humanity and the act of genocide against the entire people.”\textsuperscript{103}.

The term “genocide” in referral to the deportation is rarely used in the media texts at the national level. Only a limited pool of the Ukrainian nationalist media regularly used the term “genocide” as synonym to the word “deportation”, as well as in order to define its nature and scale. This tendency can be explained by the nature of the term itself: the term “genocide” is a part of international law and explicitly conveys the need for the legal recognition of the crime against humanity and implies respective procedures of prosecution of the actors and political rehabilitation of victims. For this reason, media which take the pro-Soviet ideological stance tend to avoid or even openly confront the use to this term, as its use directly means the needs pronounce Soviet Union and its successor state – Russia – to take responsibility for this and similar crimes. For instance, “Rabochaya gazeta”, which shares quite overt pro-Russian and pro-Soviet ideological stance, on the contrary completely omits the term “genocide” in referring to the deportation for the Crimean Tatars and uses arguments typical for the Soviet historiography about “the nation of the traitors” to legitimize its position: “from the side of mejlis we still haven't heard condemning of those who supported the Nazis. And according to the draft law, former guard of the concentration camp in fact is becoming the victim of Stalin's genocide.”\textsuperscript{104}

The majority of mainstream media follow the general 'centrist' convention of the Ukrainian media is to report the Crimean Tatars’ call to recognize the deportation a “genocide” as one of the central political demands of the Crimean Tatars, but mostly to avoid using it other contexts:“Crimean Tatars, at the anniversary of deportation of 1944, demand to recognize these past events as genocide.”\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} “Zlochyn bez terminu davnosti”// Sil'vi li visti, 22.05.2012
\textsuperscript{103} “Nasyl'nytska deportatsiya stalins'kym rezhymom kryms'kykh tatar v 1944 rotsi de-jure I de-facto ja zlochynom proty liudyannosti I aktom genotsydu proty tsioLOGo narodu.” In: Nalyvaychenko: Symonenko maye ponesty kryminal'nu vidpovidal'nist' za vypravdannia zlochyniv stalinizmu. // Radio Svoboda, 16.05.2012, available online at http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/24582943.html
\textsuperscript{104} “So storony medzhilsa my tak i ne uslyshali osuzhdeniya teh, kto vystupil na storone natsistov. A soglasno zakonoproektu, byvshy okhrannik konzlageria fakticheski stanovitsia “zhervoy staliniskogo genotsida”. In: Krymskotatarskiye strasti// Rabochaya gazeta. 18.05.2012
\textsuperscript{105} “Kryms'ki tatory, v richnytsu deportatsii 1944 roku, vymagayut' vyznatyi todishni podiji genotsydom”// Novy Kanal. 18.05.2007
4.3.1.2.2. Genres

Speaking about genres most commonly used to represent the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, news remain the most popular genre. Among various types of media, all-Ukrainian internet media, which also have included into the media sample for analysis, have been publishing the majority of the news pieces about the deportation of the Crimean Tatars on the eve of the May 18 commemoration.

It is important to state that the top-rated internet news outlets “Ukrajinska Pravda” and “Korrespondent.net” normally do not produce their own news on the deportation day – overwhelming majority of the news is cross-posted from other internet sources like Radio “Svoboda”, “Kommersant Ukraine” or “Interfax” information agency. The only notable exception is “Istorychna Pravda”\textsuperscript{106}, which publishes 1-2 articles on the deportation of the Crimean Tatars on May 18 each year since the project’s launch in 2010. The latter, however, is specializing not on the news genre, but on the expanded analytical forms, such as historical investigations and thematic historical reviews.

Taking more specifically about the analytical articles regarding the Crimean tatars' deportation, this type of media materials follow the general pattern: annual coverage of the deportation commemoration for the media is not only a time to remind their audiences about the historical details of deportation and report the commemoration practices themselves (like solemn mass meetings, concert-requiems and candle lighting actions), but to remind the readership about the Crimean Tatars themselves and their current political activities. That’s why the analytical materials about the Crimean Tatars often do not touch upon the issue of deportation directly, but rather tend to focus more on the current political negotiations of Mejlis with the local Crimean and the national government, are also published around May 18. The event from the past serves a powerful information cause for the media on the national level to discuss the present. One of the headlines of the analytical article on the “Ukrainska Pravda”, published on May 18, 2012: “The anniversary of deportation: problems of the Crimean Tatars remain”\textsuperscript{107}.

The use of another genre of personal memories of deportation in the media texts of the national media is quite rare (there are 12 materials with the personal narratives out of the 184), but the narratives that are published generally follow the same structure of the ones which are published by the national Crimean Tatar media (see in detail in the respective section) – they represent personal recollections of the deportation survivors. These narratives reflect the moments of unexpected coming of soldiers and accusations in treachery and then draw pictures of forcible displacement and inhumane treatment of the people, mass violence and deaths. The genre of personal narratives also serves to build a powerful counter argument for the betrayal as they contain a lot of details, aimed

\textsuperscript{106} www.istpravda.com.ua – a structural section of the “Ukrainska Pravda” portal, which is specializing on the publications of the disputed topics of the Ukrainian history.

\textsuperscript{107} “Rokovyny deportatsii: propilenni kryms’kykh tatar zalyshayut’sia”, // Ukrajinska Pravda, 18.05.2012, available online at http://www.pravda.com.ua/inozmi/deutsche-welle/2012/05/18/6964825/
at showing that Crimean Tatars were fighting at the frontline in the Red army: “... the military people came and announced that in the name of the law in 15 minutes we must be at the gathering point in order to leave Crimea. My aunt, the only one who knew Russian, told the officer, that the father of the little boy in her hands, is fighting with fascists at the front now, and that it not likely, that we will wait for him to return and then we will decide who is the traitor. But she was told that she already used 3 minutes and she has only 12 minutes left to pack.”

In addition to this, the idea of “unfairness of accusations” and the need for restoration of historical justice is frequently brought forward in the personal narratives: “I am arriving at Simpheropol railway station and I was surprised not to see a single Crimean Tatar around. A passer-by told me that they have been removed. I decided to go to the city commendant. The questions kept arising in my head “For what?” “Why?”. Commendant looked at me strictly and asked: “And what do you want?”. I said I couldn't find my parents, relatives and friends. “Don't you know that they all have been removed for being traitors of the Motherland” - said the general. I couldn't understand how children, elderly people and those fighting at the frontlines could be traitors of the Motherland. Commendant showed me off to the door. Pain of despair, anger and resentment was tearing my soul apart.”

4.3.1.2.3. Subjects and sources of reference

Among the main subjects of the national media discourse on the Crimean Tatar deportation there are mainly national political figures: the President of Ukraine, MPs, leaders of the pro-government and opposition parties as well as Crimean autonomy political leadership. Among the Crimean Tatars only MPs and leaders of the Milli Mejlis Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov are among the traditional opinion makers on this topic. It is important to mention, that even though the public discussion often involves interpretation of the historical events, voices of the professional historians and experts are usually not presented. Kulyk states in this regard, that the lack of expert opinion in the media representation of the historical event is a general feature of the Ukrainian media discourse (2010: 277). One of the rare exceptions is an interview with historian Norman Naimark, published by the “Ukrains'kyi tyzhden’” magazine, who discusses the reasons to call deportation of the Crimean Tatars a genocide.

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108 “... yavilis’ voennye, kotorye objavili chto imenem zakona cherez 15 minut my dolzhny byt’ na punkte zbora dlya vyjezda iz Kryma. Moya tetia, edinstvennaya, kto vladel russkim jazykom, soobshila ofitseru, chto u nce na rukakh mal’en’kiy mal’chishka, otez kotorogo voyuet na fronte s fashitami, I mozhet byt’ my podozhdiam poka on vernetsia, a potom razbermania kto tut predatei'. No je bylo objavleno, chto 3 minuty ona uce izrashkodovala, tak chto na zbory ostalos’ vsego 12 minut.” In: “Ochen’ vazhno, chto vy vernulis’!” // Den’, 18.05.2011

The historian doesn’t give a direct answer to the question, but he provides his opinion on the logic behind deportations of 1941-1944: “Stalin and Beria wanted the small ethnic groups (like Crimean Tatars) to disappear as separate nations, to assimilate in the giant mix of the peoples of Central Asia, lose their national identity.”

In the mediatized discussion of the reasons of deportation, the media texts about deportation provide quotations or references to the archival documents as a source for statistical information or documental proofs of Stalin’s official decisions about deportation. For instance “Rabochaya gazeta” quotes the GKO decree about deportation of the Crimean Tatars: “This operation started on May 18 and lasted for days. Every deportee on the way was assigned to have warm food, 500 grams of bread a day, meat, fish, fats. In every carriage there was a doctor and a nurse. Deported people were allowed to take with them up to 500 kilograms of belongings for every adult. For the property left behind, they received documents, according to which they received equally-priced property at the destination places in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Also every family received zero-interest credit for seven years for the resettlement. Out of 151.720 Crimean Tatars deported in May of 1944 to the Uzbek SSR, 191 people died on the way.”

One of the distinctive features of this representation strategy, used by the pro-Russian media outlets, is a publication of the archival documents of the Soviet times without any expert commentary or explanation accompanying them. As a result, information provided about the details of deportation is presented to the readership of the newspaper as a fact, ideological nature of this document is not questioned and no profound expert analysis of reliability of this source is made. This information is used to construct positive (or at least not negative) treatment of the deportees by the Soviet authorities, stresses on the relatively human conditions of the resettlement, which greatly contradicts with the horrific imaginary built up and promoted by the Crimean Tatars and their supporters. In this case, the alternative version of the past is being constructed for purely political reasons. For this reason I can argue that the disputes over the different versions of the past are only important as an argument in the today’s political discussions about the current status and the political claims of the Crimean Tatars to the Ukrainian government. The restoration of the historical truth about the Crimean Tatars is only a secondary aim in these mediated public discussions.

110 “Stalin i Beria khotily, shob mali etnichni grupy (jak ot kryms’ki tatary) znykly jak okremi narody, shob vony asymiliuvaly s velykomu zmishanni narodiv Tsentral’noji Azii, vtratyly svoju natsional’nu identychnist’” In: Vbyvstvo narodu, // Ukrajins’kyi tyzhden’, 13.05.2011
111 ГКО – abbreviation for “Grazhdanskiy Komitet Oborony”, Civil Defence Committee – the key executive body of authority in the USSR.
4.3.1.2.4. Mediatized political discourse on deportation

As I argued above, the public discussions of present politics prevail in the media representation of the deportation, over the commemoration of the tragic past. Among the central disputes extensively covered by the national media within the framework of the general representation of deportation, are the discussions over the political responsibility and political obligations which are to be executed towards the Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian government. Public statements by the state politicians of the national and regional levels are the integral part of the media discourse on the Crimean Tatars’ deportation. Analysis of the discursive features of these statements allows making conclusions about the meanings ascribed to deportation and its respective present-day political consequences.

Within the framework of this research, I analyzed annual statements of the two Ukrainian Presidents Viktor Yushchenko (2007-2009) and Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2012) published in the official state newspaper “Uriadovyi Kurier”. Statements of both President Yushchenko and Yanukovych and their administrations rarely went beyond formal acknowledgement of the need to commemorate the memory of the victims of the deportation and once again stressing the unity of all national groups in the Ukrainian state. Thus, analysis of the media representation of the public statements of both Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych issued routinely on the day of May 18, demonstrates similarities in their rhetoric, despite their belonging to the different political elites with opposite ideological stances. Both administrations predominantly use May 18 to put forward promises to recognize the rights of the Crimean Tatars who lived through deportation and solve their acute problems.

Viktor Yushchenko clearly marks his public appeal of May 18, 2008 with ethnic markers, defining the Deportation commemoration day as a solely Crimean Tatars’ ethnic mourning day, and therefore as a potential threat to raise interethnic tensions between the pro-Russian majority and the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea. Thus the day of commemoration of the victims of deportation is perceived as potentially conflictous by the official Kyiv: “We will not allow to any of the avanturistic force to play the inter-ethnic card in its own interest both in Crimean Autonomous republic and in Ukraine in general. I call everyone for unity and mutual understanding.”113

The annual statement of President Viktor Yanukovych with regards to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, in turn, doesn’t speak directly about any ethnicity-driven confrontations. Similarly to his predecessor, Viktor Yanukovych refers to general concepts of interethnic understanding and mutual respect, using the inclusive ‘we’ pronouns, which could be referred to all ethnic groups residing at the territory of Ukraine: “…the memory calls us for mutual respect, ...

113 “My ne dopustim, chtoby kakaya-libo avantiurnaya sila razygryvala v svoikh interesakh mezhetnicheskuyu kartu kak v Krymskoy avtonomnoy republike, tak i v Ukraine v celom. Ja prizvyayu vsekh k edinstvu i vzaimoponimaniyu”. In: Ogniom i svechoy, //Kommersant Ukraina, No 80 (665), 19.05.2008
we all share the same destiny and only together, with joint efforts we can build the country.”\textsuperscript{114} Unlike Yushchenko, in his annual statements published on the day of commemoration of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Yanukovych tends to omit the direct references specifically to the Crimean Tatars, broadening the scope of addressees to “all victims of Stalin’s deportations”: “Today we are mourning and bending our heads remembering all those who died during Stalin's deportations.”\textsuperscript{115}

It is fair to say that both Viktors referred to the Stalin’s repressions in their public appeals about deportation, but ideological stance of Viktor Yushchenko is much more inherently Ukrainocentric: he frames the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime conducted against the Crimean Tatars and other small ethnic groups by reinstating repressions against the Ukrainians as a central reference point, assigning, however, the word “Ukrainians” an ethnic rather than civic meaning, which would embrace all citizens of Ukraine: “Totalitarian system was an evil enemy of all peoples, which have been unlucky to get under its domination. The Ukrainians, which suffered the terror of Holodomor, deportations to Siberia, political repressions, deeply empathize with the Crimean Tatars and all nationalities, deported from the peninsula. Memory of these hard times – is a common memory of our nation. Your pain – is our common pain...»\textsuperscript{116}

By distinguishing between “your pain” (you, the Crimean Tatars) and “our pain” (us, the Ukrainians) he draws social boundaries between the two ethnicities, stressing the subordinate position of the former. But, on the other hand, be emphasizes the common feature of the two – shared memory of the victimhood. What we see here is an attempt to construct the common national memory of this historical period with the memory of Ukrainians’ sufferings in the centre and similar memories of other national minority groups incorporated around it. By such discursive strategy Viktor Yushchenko and his ideological supporters may have tried to build the Ukrainian nation, based on the ethnocentric principle of inclusion of the particular memories of the ethnic minorities into the broader version of the common national historical narrative, but totally leaving out the civic paradigm from the national memory discourse.

While “Uriadovy Kurier” conventionally publishes presidential statements as separate texts without any commentaries, other media outlets often overtly challenge the populistic nature of this rhetoric and questione the chances to solve the most burning issues, like transparent schemes of land distribution in the Crimea: “Viktor Yushchenko demands from the cabinet, the law-
enforcement and prosecutor's office to deal with the distribution of land among the Crimean Tatars. The head of the state gives a month for this… Some assume, that Crimean officials will ignore him.” 117

It is also relevant to examine how other high-level state officials use the terms while referring to the deportation and its sense for both Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state. For Vasyl Dzharty, the head of the Cabinet of Ministers of ARK in 2010-2011, the representative of the regional political elite, participation in the public discussion on deportation is primarily a chance to demonstrate the success of his administration in preserving intercultural peace and prove his efficiency as a political manager of the region which is considered potentially conflictous. His statements with regard to Crimean tatars deportation, reported by the media, shift away from discussion of the historical meaning of deportation itself, but preoccupied by the current state of interethnic relations in Crimea: “We are rightfully proud that during the times of Ukraine's independence we didn't have any serious interethnic conflicts. This demonstrates that we are one nation, whose monolith nature can never be broken by no one.” 118

In most cases the discussion of the failures of the government to fulfil its obligations in providing support to the Crimean Tatar returnees, recognizing their political rights is omitted by the mainstream media. Even more, pro-government media question the necessity to contribute as a state to resettlement and cultural development of the Crimean Tatars. This argument is framed in the following way by “Segodnia” newspaper: “We pay so much taxes, to pay even more for Stalin and his decisions of 1944? Besides, at that time Crimea was NOT EVEN A PART of Ukraine!” 119

4.3.1.3. Conclusions

The media representation practice of deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the national media during 2007-2012 has been quite unsystematic and often required an additional more scandalous information cause to attract media’s attention.

Traditionally, only a limited group of the pro-Ukrainian media outlets cover this topic in more or less detail every year. Discussion of the central tragic moment of the Crimean Tatars collective past on the national level often turns into the discussion of the current status of this national group and serves as a justification (or rejection) of their current political claims. The competition between the two meta-narratives – pro-Russian, post-Soviet and Ukrainian nationalist (Kulyk 2012) in general features defines the character of the debate about the Crimean Tatars’ today’s status as well as defines the way deportation is

117 “Виктор Янукович вимагає від кабінету, силовиків, прокуратури розібратись з видаливши землі кримським татарам. На цьому основі можна говорити про те, що ми не маємо серйозних міжетнічних конфліктів. Це переконання, що ми є одним народом, який не може бути роздрібнений.” // UT-1, 15.05.2008

118 “Ми по праву гордимся тем, що у графіці не було серйозних міжетничних конфліктів. Це робочий переконання, що ми є одним народом, який не може бути роздрібнений." // Ukraina moloda, 19.05.2011

referred to in the mainstream media. Ukrainian nationalist media outlets use the term “genocide” when referring to the deportation of the Crimean Tatar, while media outlets, sharing Soviet historical legacy, tend to avoid using this term or use euphemisms and limit their coverage of the deportation commemoration practices to the reports of the street actions and demonstrations, not focusing on the historical meaning of the events.

The key features of the discursive practice of representation of this topic are the following:

- Lack of historical background and expert-lead discussion of the scope and consequences of the deportation, which shifts the narration from the actual recollection of the past and finding historical truth to the ideological dispute.

- The dominant markers which provide meaning to this historical event are evasive, particularly when used by the national politicians, and aimed to disguise the political responsibilities for the consequences for the Ukrainian society and public policy.

- Representatives of the opposing political parties, the two Presidents of Ukraine, during their time in the office both used populist rhetoric aimed to call for unity of all ethnic groups in Ukraine and at decreasing of the interethnic tensions in the Crimea. At the same time, Viktor Yushchenko has been more consistent in his strive to build a modern Ukrainian nation with the members of all ethnic groups living in Ukraine, constructed around the remembrance of the common tragic events in the history of the XX-th century, like Stalin’s repressions against the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars. Following this pattern, media often represent the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in association with the broader historical context of the Stalin’s repressions against other ethnic groups of the Crimea (Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans) as well as with the repressions against Ukrainians. The idea of all-Ukrainian unity of all nationalities reflect the need of the official Kyiv to impose its state national ideology on the regional and ethnic groups of Ukraine, to ensure the power relations of subordination and its state national ideology on the regional and ethnic groups of Ukraine.

As I will show in the next sections analysing the Crimean and the Crimean Tatar national media, the level of detalization and attention to the collective memory of deportation increases when moving down from the national to the local level of media representation.

### 4.3.2. Narratives of Deportation Represented in the Crimean Media

#### 4.3.2.1. Sample of the Media Texts

The following Crimean media outlets have been included into the media
monitoring: all-Crimean newspapers “Krymskaya Pravda”, “Krymskaya Gazeta”, “1-aya Krymskaya”, “Krymskiy Telegraph” and “Krymskiye izvestiya” (the official newspaper of the Supreme Council of the Crimean Autonomous Republic); local newspaper “Sevastopolskaya Gazeta”, 2 leading regional information agencies “E-Krym” and “Crimean Information Agency”; and the top-rated private regional TV station “Chernomorskaya”.

The choice of the media outlets provides a variety of the forms of property, circulation, territorial coverage as well as political affiliations and formats of the media products produced to the chosen sample of media.

During the time period of May 17-19 of 2007-2012 the mentioned media outlets produced the total of 167 media materials related to the deportation of the Crimean Tatars of 1944.

Table 1. Media materials on deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Crimean Media, May 17-19, 2010-2012\textsuperscript{120}

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| Total                     | 36   | 29   | 39   | 32   | 27   | 5    |

Research findings show quite systematic character of representation of this topic – each year the Crimean media produce 1-2 reports related to the deportation, information agencies – 15 materials every year in average during the given period in May. Thus, compared to the national level representation, I can argue that this topic is much more a priority for all Crimean media.

4.3.2.2. Media representation of deportation

4.3.2.2.1. The Crimean Tatars in the Crimean politics of memory

According to the results of the sociological survey, cited by Kulyk (2012), the population of the Southern regions of Ukraine and Crimea share predominantly

\textsuperscript{120}For the weekly newspaper “1 Krymskaya” the issue for the respective week is included into the monitoring. In 2010 some of the newspapers published reports on the deportation day commemoration on May 20. For “Krymskiy Telegraph” and “Krymskiye Izvestiya” newspapers the online archives of 2007 are missing. Information agencies KIA and E-Krym only started to work in 2008, video archives of Chernomorka TV are not available for the indicated dates. All missing media texts in the table are marked as “n/a”, if there was no coverage – I use the “0” mark.

146
Post-Soviet or Pan-Slavic historical meta-narratives: around 60% of the population of this region believes that the history of Ukraine is an integral part of the common history of the great Slavic people together with the history of Russia and Belarus. As a result of these pan-Slavic sentiments, the dominant historical meta-narrative of Crimea has no place for the Crimean Tatars’ history and provides no historical legitimation for their historical ties with the territory of the peninsula.

The Crimean media, moving along the lines of this master meta-narrative, mostly exclude Crimean Tatars from the group of the “legitimate owners” of the Crimean land is both symbolic and economic, depriving them the right to lay political and economic claims on the state-sponsored repatriation. As a result, the alternative historical meta-narrative is being constructed by the Crimean Tatar community of the Crimea, which is aimed at restoration of historical justice and promotion of the forcibly silenced memory of deportation of 1944 in their own national version of it. These historical meta-narratives serve as an effort to both build a unification grounds for the Crimean Tatar national identity and to justify the need of the en masse return to the Crimea and claims for the legitimate status in the eyes of the Slavic majority. The competing meta-narrative of the Crimean Tatar people’s history is built around the alternative to the official Soviet version of the reasons of deportation, scale of devastation and the activities of the Crimean Tatar national movement of 1950 – 80s, the primary goal of which was the political rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars and return to their home land. The official Soviet post-war historiography and propaganda labels the Crimean Tatars “the nation of collaborators” to the German Army and justifies the forced removal of the whole Crimean Tatar civilian population from the Crimea in May 1944. Later protest actions of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar national movement are framed in the “extremist” terms. All these features are reconstructed in the present day Crimean media discourse with regards to the Crimean Tatars and to a large extent define the general frame of the media representation of the deportation.

Speaking more broadly, the commemoration of the Crimean Tatars' deportation on May 18 fits into the official politics of memory of Crimea, which includes commemoration of other historical events. It is important to draw a broader picture of the Crimean regional politics of commemoration to see, how the Crimean Tatars’ deportation commemoration practices fit into the dominant practices of collective remembering constructed in the Crimean media discourse.

The primary feature of the Crimean commemoration patterns is incorporation of memories of deportations of the small ethnic groups which happened during 1941-1944 into a single commemoration cluster initiated and controlled by the Crimean authorities. Deportations of ethnic Germans in 1941, Crimean Tatars in May 1944, Armenians, Greeks and Bulgarians in June 1944 are included into one historical event, unified by the broad historical context of Stalin’s repressions against the small ethnic groups.
The similar commemoration practices have been developed and are being annually sustained by the Crimean authorities together with the respective national communities: each year Crimean state officials lay commemoration wreaths to the respective monuments and participate in the public mourning meetings with regards to remembering of the victims of these repressions. The public rhetoric is very similar during all these events. “Krymskiye Izvestiya”, the state-sponsored newspaper, has a separate page entitled “Interethnic relations”, which serves as a media medium for display of the official politics of memory realized by the Crimean authorities. According to the structure of media representation, utilized by “Krymskiye Izvestiya”, all tragic events are merged into one “tragic historical page.” Similar commemoration practices are organized and covered by the media about the unity of all Crimean peoples in grief over “the tragic pages of history” are voiced by the Crimean officials participating in the commemoration ceremonies: “Today we have a memory day, the memory of deportation... it touched upon Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Armenians and other nationalities... deportation – is a crime, which has no limits, no time limits”, - stated head of Cabinet of Minister of Crimea Vasily Dzharty.121

The tragic memory of the Jews and the Krymchaks, executed by the Nazis in Crimea in 1941, is also included into the official politics of commemoration. Each year similar commemoration ceremonies are organized, however, the discursive practices around these commemoration rituals are somewhat different. While the public rhetoric around the deportations organized by the Soviet regime is quite neutrally and evasively worded, the references to the Nazi’s repressions against the Jews and the Krymchaks are much more critical and straightforward, in terms of word choice and stylistic. The repressions are often called “a fascist terror”, “a genocide”. In this media representation, political responsibility of Nazi occupiers is not disguised, but put forwards explicitly in very rough terms, which are rarely found in descriptions of repressions organized by the Stalin’s regime: “We know about the animal cruelty of fascists during the years of the Great Patriotic [war], about how Hitler invaders have been shooting down the innocent people, trying to eliminate the entire nations.”122

Further in this section I will look at the key narratives constructed by the Crimean media in mid-May each year as they cover the day of commemoration of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars from the Crimea in 1944.

4.3.2.2.2. Narratives of commemoration of the Crimean Tatars deportation

121 “Segodnia u nas den’ pamiati, pamiati dnia deportatsii... eto kosnulous’ krymskikh tatar, grekov, armian I drugikh national’nostey... deportatsia – eto prestuplenie, kotoroe ne imeet granits, vremennykh granits”, - ometil na mitinge Predsedatel’ Soveta ministrov Kryma Vasily Dzharty.” In: V Simpheropole proshel miting k godovshchine deportatsii krymskikh tatar // E-krym. 18.05.2011

122 “My znaem o zverstvakh fashistov v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy [voyny], o tom, chto gitlerovskie zakhvatchiki rasstrelivali nevinnikh liudey, pytayas’ uничтожить tselye natsii” In: V nashikh silakh sokhranit’ pamiati’ // Krymskie Izvestiya, 29.11.2011
In the general structure of the media representation of this event, the coverage of the commemoration practices and rituals remains central and is defined by a number of features. Among them I can point out the following:

The primary feature is undermining the importance of the Crimean Tatars’ collective memory by presenting the commemoration of deportation as a routine, “as another demonstration, with the same political slogans each year”. This discursive strategy is widely used by the Crimean mainstream newspapers, which are in the ideological opposition to the Crimean Tatars’ version of the Crimean and Soviet history and in various forms deny their right for commemoration. In most cases it is done in the subtle indirect forms, without using overt discrimination or hate speech, by limiting the explanation of historical background and “routinizing” the commemoration activities: “As usual on May 18, during the day of commemoration of deportation victims, the participants of the rally from all the cities and districts of autonomy have been brought to Simpheropol well in advance (74 thousand of budget grivnas have been spent on this). In the strict accordance with the ritual they were marching into the city in 5 organized columns.”

Framing the coverage of commemoration street demonstrations as actions, which potentially disturb civic order. This is achieved by positioning the annual commemoration meetings as scandalous, potentially conflictuos, the one which require taking extraordinary security measures: “Unlike in Simpheropol, mourning meetings in Sevastopol have always been held without loud political statements and scandals.” By reporting the announcements of the Crimean police about activities aimed at securing the order during the commemoration activities of the Crimean Tatars.: “Due to the forthcoming events dedicated to the anniversary of the Crimean tatars’ deportation, the personnel of the Ministry of the interior in Crimea has been put on the alert operation mode.”

The discourse of potential threat is also brought forward, by providing the details of the security measures taken by the law enforcement authorities and failing to question the need for such heavy police presence: “During the Deportation day in the Crimean capital there were no accidents, the police reported. During the mourning march and meeting around 2000 policemen have been securing the order, the cars of the Ministry of Emergency and ambulances have been patrolling the area”.

123 “Kak vsegda 18 maya, v den' pamyati zhertv deportatsii, uchastnikov traurnogo mitinga iz vsekh gorodov i rayonov avtonomii zablagovremenno priezeli v Simpheropol (na eti tseli bylo vydeleno 75 tysyach budzhetnykh griven). Estrogom sootvetstvii s ustanovlennym ritualom oni vkhodili v gorod pyatyu organizovannymi kolonnami.” In: Spravedlivost po-medjlisovski //Krymskaya Pravda. №84 (24667), 19.05.2009

124 “Priniataya po itogam mitinga rezolutsiya soderzhala tot zhe standartnyi nabor trebovaniy, chto i transparanty.” In: Skorb' i … torg // Krymskaya Pravda, №86, 19.05.2010

125 “V otlichiye ot Simpheropolia, traurnye mitingi 18 maya v Sevastopole vsegda obkhodilis' bez gromkikh politicheskikh zayavleniy i skandalov.” In: Den' pamyati // Sevastopol'skaya gazeta. 20.05.2010

126 “V sviazii s predstoyashchimi meropriyatiami po sotchayu godovshchiny deportatsii krymskikh tatar v Krymu lichnyi sostav organov MVD pereveden na usileniy variant neseniya sluizby.” In: “Krymskaya militsiya prigotovilas' k provokatsiyam v Den' pamyati zhertv deportatsii”// E-Krym, 17.05.2012

127 “Den' deportatsii v krymskoy stolitsе obozlos' bez proishhestviy, soobshchili vnilitii. Za poryadkom vo vremya
The media representation is also characterized by limiting the subjects of the commemoration narrative and domination of the voices of the Crimean political leadership in the commemoration rituals coverage. News reports from the annual commemoration activities on May 18 (demonstration and requiem-concert) are often limited to the information about the participation of the Crimean government officials and top-level politicians; their public statements are quoted extensively. From the Crimean Tatars, only the Medjlis leaders Dzhemilev and Chubarov are often mentioned. Other representatives of the Crimean Tatar political, cultural or religious elites are normally not mentioned in the context of the commemoration. In the media discourse of deportation on the Crimean level, the agency is upheld by the Crimean authorities, not by the Crimean Tatars.

The domination of the media presentation of the Crimean Tatars' deportation by the Crimean political elites is also accompanied by the domination of the ideological frames of the deportation promoted by them. One of the most commonly represented idea, promoted in their public rhetoric by the ruling Crimean pro-Russian officials and covered by the Crimean media, is an idea of “all-Crimean unity”, which echoes with the rhetoric of the “all-Ukrainian unity” voiced by the national leaders. For the majority of the Crimean media, May 18 is presented as a day to reinforce the all-Crimean identity, unity of all ethnic groups living in the peninsula. This idea sounds overtly in headlines to the articles about deportation: “We all have a common calamity”, “Crimea – is our common home. There's nothing to divide.” Furthermore, leader of the “Russian unity” Sergei Aksenov also makes public similar ideas of unity of all Crimean national groups: “In the past we have a lot of things which unite us, but also things which separate Crimean of different nationalities. But most importantly - we have a common future. And if so we have learn how to live each others misfortunes and happy moments. Today, on May 18, we grieve together with the Crimean Tatar people.” In my reading, the promotion of the idea of unity is a discursive strategy which is aimed at embracing in a diluted form the Crimean Tatars’ national identity under the broader umbrella of the Crimean identity, which is in turn dominated by the Russian political and cultural influence. This is done to keep the status quo of the Russian ideological domination at the peninsula and to control the Crimean Tatars and other national groups of the Crimea.

Simplification and limited coverage of the historical background of the deportation and its consequences is also one of the features of the media

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126 “…Na vsekh i beda odna”// Krymskiye Izvestiya. 18.05.2012
128 “V proshlom u nas est' mnogo takogo chto nas objedinyaet, a est' i to chto razjedinyaet krymchan razlichnoy natsional'nosti. No glavnoe – chto u nas obshee budushee. A raz tak, my dolzhny nauchisya zhit' obshimi bedami i radostiami. Segodnia, 18 maya, my skorbiym vmesne s krymskotatarskim narodom.” In: Lider “Russkogo edinstva” nazval godovshinu deportatsii datoy diya vsekh krymchan. //E-Krym. 18.05.2010
representation. The mediatized discussions of the actual historical meaning of deportation, its consequences for the Crimean Tatar people, other repressive policies which followed the deportation – these topics are scarcely presented in the Crimean media discourse. Similarly to the practices implied on the national level, the media discourse on the deportation in Crimea provides a limited scope of the historical discussion and provides little to no expert evaluation of the historical period of the Second World War and the Stalin’s repressive policies. Normally, internet media use the format of short historical reference notes, which is published at the bottom of news about deportation commemoration activities. Such concise media format usually represent the deportation, as a historical event, in the quite neutral and unbiased way, however, leave no room for any detalization or expanded expert commentary. For instance, information agency E-Krym, uses the following reference note on deportation: “NOTE: May 18, 1944, after being accused of collaboration with the german army, 180 thousand Crimean Tatars massively underwent deportation. According to estimations of the Crimean Tatar national movement activists, during the deportation process and over the next two years after it, more then 46% of the population had died. Commemoration events dedicated to the anniversary of the deportation are being held annually” 131

Among other, the references to “the issue of collaboration of the Crimean Tatars” are present in the historical narratives on deportation in different forms. For example, “Krymskaya Pravda”, the newspaper which openly positions its critical stance against the “attempts to re-write the Soviet history”, published in 2012 the full text of the archival document, the official telegram to Beria from May 20, 1944, about the course of the deportation operation, where among other details the following is mentioned: “Over the course of resettlement of the Tatars arrested of anti-Soviet elements – 1137 ppl., and during the whole operation – 5989 ppl., Withdrawn weapons during the resettlement: mortars – 10, machine gun – 173, guns - 192, rifles – 2650, ammunition – 46603 items. During the whole operation withdrawn: mortars – 49, machine guns – 622, guns – 724, rifles – 9888 and ammunition – 326887 items”132 Even though the journalists of “Krymskaya Pravda” do not accuse Crimean Tatars directly of anti-Soviet collaboration, they reinstate the dominant Soviet historical narrative by publishing the Soviet archival sources, which justify that. The publication of the Soviet archives without expert commentary creates the powerful ideological affect on the readership of the newspaper, an implication that the very existence of this document serves a proof for collaboration of the Crimean Tatars, 131 “SPRAVKA: 18 maya 1944 goda po obvineniyu v sotrudnichestve s germanskoy armiey massovoy deportatsii iz Kryma podverglis’ bolee 180 tys. Krymskikh tatar. Po otsenkah aktivistov national’nogo dvizheniya krymskikh tatar, v khode deportatsii v pervye dva goda posle etogo pogiblo ne menee 46% ot chislennosti naroda. Ezhegodno k godovshchine deportatsii provodyatsia traurnye aktsii.” In: Na miting v godovshchinu deportatsii v Simpheropole sobralos’ 20 tys. Krymskikh tatar.// E-Krym, 18.05.2012

completely leaving out the discussion about the reliability of the source and social-political context of that historical period.

The narrative of “collaboration” is continuously brought forward in the deportation coverage by “Krymskaya Pravda”, when in 2011 the newspaper published the survey, conducted among the Crimean students, asking the following question: “Question: “In may 1944 State Committee of defence of the USSR adopted a decree on the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars from the Crimean territory, due to the reason of allegedly mass collaboration with german-fascists occupants. What is your attitude towards this historical fact?”

Even though the remark “allegedly” is used, the very formulation of the question reproduces the dominant Soviet narrative of collaboration of the Crimean Tatars. The event of publication of this type of survey at the day of deportation of the Crimean Tatars is discursive strategy, which aims to delegimitize (though in a very subtle form) the meaning of deportation by shifting its meaning from unquestionably criminal and tragic to questionable and disputable.

Speaking about the features of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars' deportation, one can speak about the tendency to use of neutral and evasive terms to refer to deportation. As we have seen earlier on the national level, the term “genocide” in referring to the deportation is regularly used only by the Ukrainian nationalist media. In the mainstream Ukrainian media this term is hardly used. Evasive and neutral terms are used instead. The Crimean media demonstrates greater variety of word choice when referring to deportation.

Firstly, the demand to recognize deportation as a genocide, voiced by the Crimean Tatar political leaders, is quite often reproduced in the media materials about the annual commemoration meetings on May 18. The term “genocide” is mentioned in the media coverage of the other commemoration practices, as one of the central political demands of the Crimean Tatar national movement, and is being reproduced without questioning: “During the street action on Lenin square contours of Crimean peninsula have been formed from the lit candles, with the number 68 and a sign “No genocide”. Action participants appealed to all countries of the world to recognize deportation of the Crimean tatars as act of genocide”.

Crimean politicians, however, tend to avoid the use of the term “genocide” in their public rhetoric. The Crimean media outlets, in turn, tend to simply reproduce these statements without their challenging or problematization, publish direct quotes from Crimean officials. For instance, the statement of the deputy speaker of the Crimean Parliament Grigoriy Yoffe, appeared in the “Krymskiye Izvestiya”, in the following forms: “...called forced

133 “…Vopros: “V maye 1944 goda Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony SSSR prinyal postanovleniye o vyselenii krymskih tatar s teritorii Kryma po prichine jakoby massovogo sotrudnichestva s nemetsko-phashistskimi okupantami. Vashe otnoosheniye k etomu istoricheskому faktu?” In: Molodezh Kryma o deportatsii krymskih tatar, bolgar, grekov i armian. // Krymskaya Pravda. 18.05.2011

resettlement of the Crimean Tatars “unprecedented, inhumane in its core and violent action, caused by the crimes of the totalitarian stalinist regime and leading to the tragedy of the whole people” 135; “Deportation – is our common pain, grief of thousands of people, crippled destinies.”136 Publishing these evasive statements of the political figures about deportation, replicating their vague definitions of deportation which refer to the collective pain, the newspaper adds to the reinstating of a popular unspoken implication, shifting the public discourse from discussions about political responsibility and historical injustice to pure mourning and grief.

In general, the Crimean officials omit public discussions about the political consequences of deportation by utilizing general evasive terms to speak about its meaning. The use of terms like “eviction”, “forced removal”, and even more neutral “relocation” instead of “deportation”, could be considered one of the characteristic features of media representation of this historical event during all 6 years under analysis.

Limited use of the personal recollections of deportation, manipulation with the details of personal memoirs of deportation is also present in the media discourse on deportation. In the corpus of the media texts on deportation published in the Crimean mainstream media during the analyzed period of 6 years, I have found only 12 media materials, which contain personal stories of the deportation survivors – 4 of them have been published in “Krymskie Izvestiya”, the newspaper of the Crimean parliament. In general the interest to the personal memories of deportation is quite low among the Crimean mainstream media. The published recollections in general features follow the similar narrative structure, presented earlier for the media representations at the national level. The plot of these personal stories usually including unexpected show up of the soldiers, accusations in treachery, descriptions of inhumane conditions of trip to Central Asia, surviving in forced labour camps in exile, descriptions of mass deaths and hunger. The idea of injustice of the repressive policies is also voiced in these narratives, similarly to the mediated personal narratives, quoted above.

It is quite notable, however, how personal narratives can be modified (or even deliberately manipulated) in detail to fit the opposite ideological framework. For instance, a personal narrative of a Crimean Tatar deportation survivor, published “Krymskaya Pravda”, underlines the Soviet loyalty of the family of the Crimean Tatars, their men being members of the Communist party and serving the Red Army. But when it comes to the description of the deportation, the woman says they had 24 hours (not 15 minutes) to prepare for the resettlement and all other

135 “…nazval nasil'stvnomoe pereiselenie krymskich tatar “besprezedentnoy, beschelovechnoy po svoey suti i zhestokosti aktsiyey, yavivsheysia sledstviem presputleniy totalitarianogo stalinistogo regima i privedshey k tragedii tselogo naroda” In: K tragedii privel totalitariizm, //Krymskiye Izvestiya, 18.05.2011
repressive details are carefully omitted: “My father, communist, dies during the defence of Sevastopol in summer of 1942, but the funeral note we have received only in two years, after the liberation of Crimea. My mother and grandmother didn't have time to mourn him, the new tribulation came – it was ordered in 24 hours to leave everything behind and to go. My mind understands, that the whole people has been punished for a handful of traitors, but they were not only among our people. And my father in particular, he was not a traitor: he fought, was presented to the medal “For courage”, dies for the his Motherland” 137 This example demonstrates, that personal narratives are being socially and ideologically constructed to fit the dominant or the counter narrative and cannot reflect the historical “truth”. Rather they provide a proof for the one or another version of the memory constructed by the majority or minority groups.

4.3.2.2.3. Mediatized political discourse on deportation

The current political discourse represented in the media is an important and inevitable part of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars' deportation. For both Crimean Tatars and the Crimean authorities the deportation commemoration day is a political opportunity: for the Crimean Tatars to raise publicly their demands and for the Crimean officials – to report about their achievements in the public policy on repatriation. As I argued earlier, on the national level, media discourse on deportation embraces the issues of the political rehabilitation of returnees and public discussion of status of indigenous people. On the regional level these issues are also quite actively discussed, but the dominant framing of mainly constructed around financial support and resolution of the current social and economic problems of the Crimean Tatar repatriates. For the regional media the local scandals around land distribution among the Crimean Tatars returnees (which is often labeled as “the self-seizures problem”) is more important and more commonly discussed, than topics like recognition of deportation as genocide. In my opinion the reasons for that are the following: the vital political decisions such as recognition of the deportation a genocide are within the jurisdiction of the national state authorities, while the social and economic issues are often left within the responsibility of the local authorities of the ARC. Besides, the questions of land distribution, providing social support to the returnees are of everyday concern of local population of the Crimea and therefore these issues are more likely to be covered by the Crimean media.

Among the other key features of the media representation The political part of the narrative of deportation is directly related to the discussion of the current activities of the Crimean authorities on providing support to the Crimean Tatars

137 “Moy otets, komunist, pogib pri oborone Sevastopolia letom 42-go, no pokhoronku na nego my poluchili tol'ko cherez tva goda, polse osvobozhdeniya Kryma. Ne uspeli mama I babushka oplakat' ego, kaka novaya beda – v drudzat'cherye chasa prikazano vse brossit' i ehat'. Umom ja ponimayu, chto ves' narod byl nakazen iz-za gorstki predateley, khotya oni byli ne tol'ko sredi nashikh. I konkretno moi otets predatelem ne byl: on voeval, byl predstavlen k medali “za otvagu”, pogib za svoyu Rodinu.” In: Skorb’ … I torg. //Krymskaya Pravda. 19.05.2010
returning from the deportation. However, various media, due to their different ideological and political affiliations, frame this discussion differently, some silencing the failures of the Crimean government to carry out efficient public policy with regards to repatriation; some allow overt critique of both Crimean and national government of inefficiency. There is no clear tendency of change in the media representation tone of the Crimean government activities with the change of the political elites in Kyiv in 2010. The reference point here is not the loyal or critical attitude to the respective government in power, but the attitude to the Crimean Tatars and acknowledgement (or rejection) of their demands. During the 6 years of analysis there was a high level of rotation of the leaders of the autonomy, and all of them have been criticized by the media for their inefficiency. Nevertheless, during the whole period of study, the media had been reporting the Crimean officials placing the blame for the lack of funding of the repatriation programs on the national Ukrainian decision-makers. For instance, in the news report about the commemoration meeting in Simferopol, TRK “Chernomorskaya” quotes Vasyl Dzharty, who claims: “Our main objective is to act in the way that all Crimean Tatars, who underwent deportation, as well as their descendants, could feel the support of the authorities.” However, Crimean newspaper “Pervaya Krymskaya” openly points to the lack of initiative to solve “the Crimean Tatar question” by the national politicians: “....After May 9 Yanukovych met tet-a-tet with the Crimean Premier Vasiliy Dzharty, but the issues raised by the mejilis have been defiantly silenced again.” In addition the discussion about the efficiency of the state repatriation programs is often used by the Crimean politicians to criticize the political forces of the Orange bloc, which had previously been in power before 2010 and then went in opposition to the government of Viktor Yanukovych, thus, shifting the political responsibility for the previous ineffective policies: “This Orange authority, you know them well. Crimean Tatars, unfortunately, supported it, and were mistaken about him [President Viktor Yushchenko], and five years have been discarded in vain, - complained Crimean speaker Vladimir Konstantinov. At the same time, the current head of state Viktor Yanukovych, according to the speaker, “very energetically” took to solving the problems of repatriates, and bodies of authority have already received respective orders.” By criticizing the inefficiency of the President Yushchenko’s administration to solve the Crimean Tatar problem, Vladimir Kosntantinov also indirectly blames the Crimean Tatar leadership for their political alliance with the “Orange bloc”. The promises to
solve the problems during next 5 years given by the Yanukovych’s government, however, sound quite populist, the actual steps reported are limited to only “giving the respective orders”.

At the same time, other media outlets, particularly the ones representing pro-Russian ideological block or the pro-government ones (like “Krymskiye Izvestiya” or “Krymskaya Pravda”) tend to silent the failures of these policies and focus on the “positive” activities of the authorities in more detail. The news often cover news like opening of the Crimean Tatar class at one of the schools, holding a Crimean Tatar national festival and other local cultural initiatives, which are presented as an “achievement” of the Crimean autonomy’s government. “According to him, during the last year from the state and republic budget around 1,3 bln hrn. were allocated for repatriates' resettlement. “The houses, hospitals and schools are built. Infrastructure is created, the historical and cultural monuments are restored”, - Georgiy Psarev reassured.” 142 “In the Crimean budget for 2010 for social-cultural development of the deported citizens 4.5 mln. were allocated, which is on 8,9% or 400 thousand hrn. more than in 2009.” 143 Besides mentioning the net figures, this type of news doesn’t give a realistic picture about the general amount of the financial help necessary to improve the situation.

4.3.2.3. Conclusions

In general features the state politics of commemoration of the tragic events in the history of the national minorities of the Crimean peninsula is carried out in a way to accommodate the interests and needs of all national groups living in the peninsula and are being elaborated according to the similar commemoration patterns. However, the convention of merging the tragic past experiences of various ethnic groups under one umbrella of “victims of Stalin’s deportations” leads to further simplification of the collective memory, lack of detailed analysis and recollection and, most importantly, to the blurring of the political responsibility about the present day decisions and obligations to restore historical justice and to provide support to those returning from exile.

During the period of 6 years I have analysed, the commemoration rituals initiated and held every year by the Crimean Tatars’ political elite, mostly Milli Mejlis, receive quite similar coverage in the Crimean media every year, without any visible changes in patterns. The frames of coverage remain mostly neutral, while discrimination is put in subtle and indirect forms. The discussion of the land scandals and other current political issues often tend to be more important

143 “V biudzhe Kryma na 2010 god na sostial'no-kul'turnoe razvitiye deportirovannykh grazhdan zalozheno 4,5 mln. grn. chto na 8,9% ili 400 tys. grn. bol'she chem v 2009 godu.” In: Iz biudzheta Kryma na sotsialno-kul'turnoye razvitiye repatriantov napraviat 4,5 mln. grn.// E-Krym, 17.05.2010

156
in the media coverage than the commemoration itself.

At the same time, the Crimean autonomy leaders are conventionally reported by the media on this day, giving promises and reporting about their successes in sustaining interethnic peace at the peninsula as well as holding the lead in the commemoration-related ceremonies. The recollection of the deportation itself as well as the expert discussion of its true meaning and consequences is left secondary or framed in the way to fit the existing post-Soviet historical meta-narrative, which dominates among the Russian-speaking majority of the peninsula.

4.3.3. DEPORTATION THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR MEDIA

«...On May 18 all Crimean Tatars are united by the memory of the past...”¹⁴⁴

The picture of media representation of the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars would be incomplete without including the Crimean Tatar ethnic minority media into the analysis.

I this section I argue that the national minority media are an important milieu to examine as they produce the alternative – and sometimes the counter – discourse to dominant one(s) and allow national groups to channels their own agenda and points of views on the issues of the specific interest to their national audiences, which are often concealed by the mainstream media. As Stephen Riggins (1992) points out is his study of the ethnic monitory media, mainstream media tend not only to ignore minorities, but often “tend to present them in terms of the social problems they create for the majority” (1992: 2). As I have shown in the sections above, this statement is true for the presentation of the Crimean Tatars, their history and social problems.

It also has to be mentioned that national minority agenda setting is not the only function of the national minority media, they also play a crucial role in preserving and promoting of the group’s cultural and political identity and historical heritage. Social agenda created and promoted by the ethnic media can include discussion of the group’s collective vision of the past, political and social issues of current interest. Ethnic minority media can emphasize certain political arguments, build consensus among the members of the group on the certain points, reveal the unknown facts by holding investigations, mobilizing its audience and shaping their collective attitudes.

As Riggins argues, the emergence of the national media is often closely related to the activities of the national movements, and thus, are essential for sustaining collective goals for the changes promoted by these movements.

¹⁴⁴“18 maya vse krymskiye tatary ediny pamiat'yu proshlogo ...» In: «Pomnim, ne zabudem!» // Golos Kryma, 20.05.2011
Even though, national minority media generally work for preservation of the national cultural distinctiveness, language and culture, there is always a tendency that media also works for assimilation into values and social codes of the majority (Riggins 1992). The assimilation in this case, however, does not necessarily mean the complete loss of the group’s ethnic identity. Emphasizing the “dual role” (meaning both assimilation and sustaining of the ethnic uniqueness) of the national minority media, Riggins speaks about a number of journalist practices, language, institutional and economic constraints which may lead to more integration as well as to cultural assimilation of the national minority audiences into the “host” society. In any case, the degree and balance between the struggle for the national survival and assimilation, is always specific for each case and the sociopolitical context is to be taken into account. Nonetheless, I argue, that by borrowing genres and formats, journalists’ practices of the media production as well as the technologies (like online and social media), dominant ideologies and narratives are being re-produced and shared both explicitly and implicitly by the ethnic minority media outlets. Further in this section I will explain these mechanisms in more detail.

4.3.3.1. Sample of the media texts

The sample of the media texts taken for analysis includes media materials of the Crimean Tatar information agency QHA (during the periods of May 17-19, 2007-2012), the weekly Crimean Tatar newspapers “Golos Kryma”, “Avdet” and “Poluostrov”, during period of 14-20 May of 2007 to 2012. Similarly to the All-Ukrainian and All-Crimean media samples, the timeframe, chosen for the study is related to the annual date of commemoration of the victims of deportation of the Crimean Tatars, which happened on May 18, 1944. The longer period of 2 weeks is taken to embrace the technological period of news production in various types of outlets.

*Table 3. National Crimean Tatar media on the deportation, May 14-20, 2007-2012*

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The table shows the number of media materials published on the topic of deportation by the 4 Crimean Tatar national media outlets. It should be mentioned that in 2012 “Poluostrov” has been sold to another owner and though continues to dedicate a lot of its content to the Crimean Tatars’ affairs, can no longer be considered belonging to the pool of the national Crimean Tatar media.
As clearly seen from the table, in 2012 “Poluostrov” did not cover the deportation day commemoration at all. It is hard to provide a reliable comparison of the number of media materials published in the regional and the Crimean Tatars’ national media, however, the general assumption is that for the national Crimean Tatar media this topic is of much higher priority as the results of the media monitoring demonstrate. If one compares an average number of annual publications on the topic of deportation of the Crimean weekly newspapers, like “1 Krymskaya” or “Krymskiy Telegraph”, which produce 1-2 publications each year around May 18, Crimean national weekly “Golos Kryma” produces 5 times more materials on the topic.

4.3.3.2. Media representation of the deportation

As for the content of the media texts published by the Crimean Tatar national media, the variety of issues related to the deportation and the choice of genres to convey them is much more diverse than in the Crimean and all-Ukrainian media. Firstly, the Crimean Tatar national media openly manifest that the topic of deportation is central for their agenda. For instance, QHA – Crimean information agency has a specific section on their website entitled “Deportation”, under which all recent materials on the matter is being gathered. Genre-wise, in additional to news and reports, Crimean Tatar media outlets publish a lot of personal memoirs of deportation and after-deportation life of the Crimean Tatars, letters as well as interviews and profiles of the Crimean Tatar personalities of various kinds of both present and past. Poems about deportation are also a quite popular genre in these media outlets. Personal memories of the deportation survivors, Crimean Tatars, who fought in the Red army during the World War II make up an essential part of the media content of these media outlets. From 381 media materials of the Crimean Tatar media 15 are personal memoirs – 11 of which are recollections of deportation and war.

4.3.3.2.1. Representation of the commemoration practices of the Crimean Tatars deportation

The representation of the annual commemoration practices of the Crimean Tatars' deportation plays central role for the Crimean Tatar national media. Quite notably, the Crimean Tatar media, which also publish reports from the annual street manifestations on May 18, the openings of the memorials to the victims of deportation, requiem concerts and other official and informal forms of commemoration, pay much more attention to the meaning of the events, underline their importance for the national group and provide more historical details, than the Crimean mainstream media.

The distinctive features of this media narrative are the following: Profound historical and ideological background, the media coverage focuses not only on the event itself, but on its meaning The mediated collective memory of
deportation and its present date consequences for the whole Crimean Tatar people is a dominant frame of representation of this historical event by the Crimean Tatar national media. The past tragic historical event and present political situation have been structurally combined into one narrative, which serves a number of important functions:

The use of 'we' referring to the whole national group, the idea of a moral imperative to remember the past as well as historical continuity of the national tradition of remembrance: “We have to remember this!.. Every Crimean Tatar has to keep this date in his heart and thoughts.”145

The national tragedy of deportation is a major justification argument for present political demands, which is framed as “restoration of rights”, implying that the rights have been taken away from the group in the past unfairly, illegally. The use of the term “indigenous people” in this context, underlines not only the special status of the Crimean Tatars, but emphasizes even more the deliberate unfairness and brutality of repressions against the whole ethnic group, allows overt forms of critique: “The last two centuries, after the forceful annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Empire and devastation of the Crimean Tatar statehood, the targeted policy of arbitrariness and lawlessness has been executed against the indigenous people of Crimea, which has been aimed at physical and spiritual annihilation of the Crimean Tatar people.” 146

The preservation of the memory of deportation through commemoration portrayed as a distinctive feature of the Crimean Tatar national identity; the remembrance of the deportation as a “national tragedy” is what makes Crimean Tatars who they are. This context one could argue that the feelings of the collectively shared injustice, victimization of the whole people are the connecting grounds for the national self-identification. QHA reports the words of Refat Chubarov in this regard spoken at the requiem concert: “Everyday our relatives and close people are passing away, - those who went through the Deportation itself, who were burying their parents, brothers, sisters, dying of cold and hunger in the spacial settlements. They are passing by, not receiving the long-awaited justice, because the state didn't bother telling when they were alive: “Apologies, you have been lied about, your Motherland, your name, language has been taken away from you, you have been killed and jailed, because you are Crimean Tatars.”147

Together with uniting “victimization” theme, the opposite motive of “the nation

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146“Posledniye tva stoletiya, posle nasil’stvennyoi anneksii Kryma Rossiiyskoy imperiey i razrusheniya gosudarstvennosti krymskih tatar, v otmoshenii korennogo naroda Kryma osushchestvliias zelenapravleniya politika proizvola I beznakazannosti, kotoraya stavila svojoj tsely'yu fizicheskyo I unichtozheniye krymskotatarskogo naroda.” In: V sele Yarkoe Sakskogo rayona pochtili pamiat’ zhertv Deportatsii, //QHA, 17.05.2010
147 “Kazhnyi den' ukhodiat nashi rodyne I blizkiye – te, kto neposredstvenno podverglis’ samoy Deportatsii, khoronili umershikh ot goloda I kholoda roditeley, brat’yev, sester v mestakh spezposeleniy. Oni ukhodiat z zhizni, tak I ne dozhadvashis’ spravedlivosti, ibo gosudarstvo ne udosuzhilos’ esche pri zhizni skazat’ im: ‘Prostite, vas obolgalis, u vas imialis Rodinu, imya, yazyk, vas ubivali I sazhali v tur’mu, potomu chto vy krymskiye tatory.” In: Vecher-requiem v paniat’ o zhertvakh Deportatsii. //QHA. 17.05.2012
of activists and fighters” is also present in the picture. The topos of return to the motherland plays here as a central historical moment of the national empowerment: “Mass return of the Crimean Tatar people to its Motherland, has been made possible because of the selfless struggle of the people with the totalitarian regime, which coincided with the collapse of the USSR and with establishment of the independent Ukrainian state.”148

While the deportation and repressions are described using passive forms: “were deported”, “were deprived of homeland”, “the attempts to return were brutally stopped by the Soviet authorities”; these empowering moments are presented using active verbs: “the Crimean Tatars were fighting against Nazi invaders”, “the national movement was struggling to restore historical justice” etc.

One of the notable features of the representation of deportation in the Crimean Tatar ethnic media is greater detalization of the commemoration activities and practices, compared to the all-Crimean and national media presentation.

The news reports published in the Crimean Tatar national media provide a wider picture of commemoration practices of deportation both from the Crimea and abroad. Firstly, greater variety of events reported as well as geographical locations of commemoration: “Crimean Tatar youth conquered the Chatyr-Dag summit”149, “In Akmeszhit, Alushta, Sudak, Moscow, Lvov, KIev and Tbilisi remembered about Deportation.”150

Secondly, strong ties with international Crimean Tatar diaspora as well as international political activities of the Crimean Tatar leadership aimed at recognition of the deportation internationally are presented in the media discourse: “Crimean Tatars of the USA will commemorate the memory of the victims of Deportation.”151

Crimean Tatar ethnic media allow wider representation of voices of Ukrainian and international political and civic leaders, who support Crimean Tatars and their political demands. According to the informal convention in the mainstream Crimean media, the representatives of the local Crimean authorities and the President of Ukraine are the key non-Tatar figures who are providing voices in support of the Crimean Tatars, who publicly express condolences during the commemoration of victims of deportation. However, Crimean Tatar media give room for a greater variety of voices in their supporters and allies. Among them national politicians from the opposition, who traditionally support Crimean Tatars, heads of international institutions and the civic human rights activists: “Human rights defenders and politicians mourn together with the Crimean Tatar people.”152; “In front of the gathered people spoke MP, deputy head of the

148 “Massovoe vozvrashchenie krymskotatarskogo naroda na svoyu Rodinu, stavshee vozmozhnym blagodaria samootverzhennoy bor'be samogo naroda s totalitarnym regimom, sovpalo s raspadom SSSR I so stanovleniem nezavisimogo Ukrainskogo gosudarstva.” In: V sele Yarkoe Sakskogo rayona pochtili pamiat' zhertv Deportatsii, //QHA, 17.05.2010
149 “Krymskotatarskaya molodyozh pokorila vershynu Chatyr-Daga.” //QHA, 17.05.2010
150 “V Akmeszhitie, Alushte, Sudake, Moskve, Lvove, Kieve i Tbilisi vspomnili o Deportatsii”. //QHA, 18.05.2011
151 “Krymskiye tatyry CSHA pochtut pamiat' zhertv Deportatsii.” // QHA, 18.05.2011
152 “Pravozashchitniki i politiki skorbiat vmeste s krymskotatarskim narodom” // QHA, 18.05.2012
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the VI gathering, BUT faction member Nikolay Tomenko. In his address member of parliament pointed out, that it is important for the ukrainian society that the draft law on rehabilitation of the Crimean tatar people to be supported.\footnote{Pered sobravshimisia vystupil narodnyi deputat Ukrainy, zamestitel' Glavy Verkhovnoy Rady Ukrainy VI sozyva, chlen fraktsii BYUT Nikolay Tomenko. V svoem vystuplenii narodnyi deputat otnetil, chto dlya ukrainskogo obshchestva ochen' vazhno, chtoby byl podderzhan proekt reabilitatsii krymskotatarskogo naroda. " In: Traurnyi miting: Plakida – ob urokakh istorii, Tomenko – o pozore Ukrainy. //QHA, 18.05.2012}

Keeping up the variety of activities, locations and voices in the media coverage of the deportation commemoration practices, makes up a discursive strategy aimed at underlining the importance of memory of deportation as a Crimean Tatar national construct for the group’s national self-identification and unity; as well as athaping the particular version of the historical narrative of deportation, which could serve the ideological needs of the Crimean Tatar national movement –providing arguments for the current political demands. The media coverage also aims at pointing out the international support and solidarity with the Crimean Tatar diaspora as well as other groups, who have suffered from political repressions during Soviet period, to gain international recognition of the national tragedy, which is being marginalized by the national Ukrainian authorities.

As for the chronological dimension of commemoration pattern, I can argue that during the period of analysis, specific media convention of commemoration has been established by the national Crimean media, which has been continuously repeating each year. Both “Avdet” and “Golos Kryma”, the most popular newspapers among the Crimean Tatar readership, dedicate a special issue of the newspaper, where they publish a number of media materials of the specific genres. Among the most commonly used genres are the following:

1. Reports from commemoration mass meeting in Simferopol, held on May 18 each year.

2. Texts of the official documents dedicated to the solemn date, like Resolution of the meeting, text of leader of Mejlis speech, text of the annual official appeal of the President of Ukraine with regards to the commemoration of deportation.

3. Personal recollections of the deportation survivors and letters with memoirs of the Crimean Tatars, who have lived through WW2.

These and other types of media texts are to be found in the Crimean national newspapers each year on the regular basis. In addition, Crimean Tatar information agency QHA each year publishes very detailed reports from the course of the commemoration ceremonies from all Crimean cities as well as posts photoreports from the official events like laying of flower wreaths of the representatives of the Crimean autonomy’s politicians and the Crimean Tatars political leaders. During the analysed period the nature of the media coverage of
the deportation commemoration can be characterized as well-established and
detailed with the developed and regularly repeated routines.

4.3.3.2.2. Mediatized political discourse: between memory and politics

The Crimean Tatar national media focus on the coverage of the commemoration
practices of the deportation, much more than All-Ukrainian and all-Crimean
ones, framing it as a central national tragedy for the Crimean Tatar people.
However, the political issues are also of great importance and make up around
half of the media content during the given period.

The range of the political questions discussed in the Crimean Tatar media is
quite similar to the ones presented in the Crimean mainstream media – the
problems of land distribution, implementation of the national programs of
resettlement of the returnees, financial challenges etc, but the Crimean Tatar
national media frame them in other way, placing their own emphasis and adding
specific arguments.

Comparing the political agenda of the Crimean Tatar national media with the
one of the all-Crimean and all-Ukrainian mainstream media, the following
points should be mentioned.

The Crimean national media take a much more overtly critical stance while
writing about the policies and decisions of both local and national authorities
with regards to the Crimean Tatars repatriation and providing social aid as well
as to acknowledging the historical injustice of deportation. As an illustration to
that, the absence of the official statement of the President of Ukraine on the
deporation commemoration day in 2011 has been considered as stepping out of
the commonly accepted practice and has been presented quite critically by the
QHA information agency and considered to worth a separate news piece:
“President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych still hasn't expressed his condolences
to the Crimean Tatar people, which has been forcibly removed from Crimean 67
years ago in may 1944.”

Similarly, failures of the national government to fulfil financial and economic obligations are framed in the media rhetoric explicitly critical, such as “state has completely turned its back on the problems of repatriates.”

The political demands of the Crimean Tatars are explained and discussed in
detail, unlike in the Crimean mainstream media, the “deportation argument” is
frequently used to stress the need to reclaim the political rights. Such as, the
public references to demand for the national Crimean Tatar statehood: “We have
been deprived f the land, property, statehood. If not the deportation, out people
would have been living according to European standards! I am sure we will

154 “President Ukrainy Viktor Yanukovich poka ne vyrazil soboleznovaniya krymskotatarskomu narodu, kotoryj 67 let nazad
podvergla nasil'vremenomu vyseleniyu iz Kryma v maye 1944 goda.” In: Garant poka ne posoboleznoval krymskotatarskomu
narodu. //QHA, 18.05.2011
155 “Gosudarstvo polnost'yu otstranilos' ot resheniya problem repatriantov”, - Dzhemilev. //QHA, 18.05.2011
return our statehood! We are fighting for it! - summed up Smedliaev (Head of the Secretariat of Mejlis of the Crimean tatar people Zair Smedliayev).”\textsuperscript{156}

Additionally, the detailed media coverage of the demands to recognize Crimean Tatar language as the Ukrainian state language, as well as local claims in economic, social and cultural spheres – particularly the demands to return of the property, owned by the Crimean Tatars before the deportation: “Crimean Tatars of Ak-Yar (Sevastopol) demanded from authorities to return historical names to inhabited localities at Ak-Yak, provide land plots for individual housing within the city line, return the land plot at Ochakovtsev street formerly belonging to the Great Mosque.”\textsuperscript{157}

Crimean Tatar national media give more room to the representation of various Crimean tatars political groups and organizations, moving away from the dominating position of the Milli Mejlis, as a sole power-holding body of the Crimean Tatar people. The central role of Mejlis and its leadership is challenged by the coverage of political activities of other national Crimean Tatar organizations, particularly during the commemoration activities. Even though these political forces are called “oppositional to Mejlis”, which could imply that Mejlis is still considered as key power-holder, generally fragmentation of the political spectrum of the Crimean Tatar political elite is presented as normal and not questioned in the media discourse. For instance, the political legitimation of the Crimean Tatar National Front (KNF) is made by placing this organization within the broader context of the “Crimean Tatar national movement”: “activists of KNF and veterans of the Crimean Tatar National movement launched a hunger strike at the Lenin square.”\textsuperscript{158} Participation of another Crimean Tatar party “Milli Firka” in the annual commemoration ceremonies is also covered by the QHA information agency.

4.3.3.2.3. Historical narratives

Historical narratives are important field of reference for the Crimean Tatar ethnic media in the context of the coverage of the deportation commemoration.

Frequently Crimean Tatars are aiming to challenge the commemoration practices of the Russian majority of the peninsula, which impede with their vision of the past. Doesn’t this only create an open tension between the two collective memories, but also speaks about their active stake in challenging the hierarchy of the historical narratives: “participants of the mourning meeting in Yalta, dedicated to the 66\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Deportation of the Crimean Tatars,

\textsuperscript{156}“U nas byla otniata zemlya, imushchestvo, gosudarstvennost’. Esli by ne bylo etoy tragedii, nash narod zhe davno by zhyl po evropeyskim standartam! Uveren, cho my vernem nashu gosudarstvennost’! My boremstva za eto! -, rezioniroval Zair Smedlyaev. (glava Sekretariata Mejlisa krymskotatarskogo naroda Zaur Smedlyaev) In: Krymskotatarskiy narod vernet sebe gosudarstvennost’, - Smedlyaev//QHA, 18.05.2012

\textsuperscript{157}«Krymskie tatary Ak-yara (Sevastopolia) potrebovali ot vlastey vernut’ naseleennyx punktam Ak-yara istoricheskie nazvaniya, predostavit’ zemelnye uchastki pod individual’noy zhilishnoye stroitel’stvo v cherte goroda, vozvratit’ ranee prinadlezhashhego sobornoy mecheti uchastka zemli na ulitse Ochakovtsev.» In: Krymskiye tatary Ak-Yara potrebovali ot vlastey vosstanovit’ ikh prava. // QHA, 19.05.2011

\textsuperscript{158}„Aktivisty NKF i veterany krymskotatarskogo national’nogo drizheniya nachali golodovku na ploshchadi im. Lenina.” In: NKF Activists started a hungerstrike // Golos Kryma 18.05.2012
demanded from the authorities not to allow commemoration of the memory of “persecutors of the Crimean Tatar people” - Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and Ekaterina II.”

There are number of historical narratives represented in the media texts related to the deportation. Among them the narratives related to the participation of the Crimean Tatars in the Red Army and Soviet partisan movement in the Crimea during the Second World War. This narrative provides arguments for the fact that Crimean Tatars heroically fought in the red army together with other nationalities of the Soviet Union, stresses their loyalty to the Soviet values.

It is important to mention, that in its linguistic structure and word choice, this narrative very much replicates the official Soviet rhetoric, used to refer to the Second World War framing its as heroic ballet of the great Soviet people with the “German-fascist invaders”, framing this propaganda discourse as a “black and white” struggle world evil. Similar linguistic constructions are frequently found in the Crimean Tatar texts, which paradoxically aim to present the arguments opposing the official Soviet statement about Crimean Tatars as ‘traitors’: “From the first day of treacherous invasion of the fascist hordes to our Motherland, Crimean Tatar people, together with other brother peoples, stood up to the protection of the Fatherland from fascism.”

This and other numerous examples of the Soviet-style rhetoric utilized by the Crimean Tatar media to create arguments in favour of the Crimean Tatars’ loyalty to the Soviet regime during the war could be explained in the two-fold way. Firstly, this is a case of the implicit penetration of the features of ideological framework, which is dominant at the Crimean peninsula among the pro-Russian majority. This type of ideological rhetoric has become so overwhelming and normative, that even the counter-discourse, which is building an alternative picture of the historical events, reshaping the existing frames of collective memory about this period, is packaging its counter-arguments in the similar terms and utterances to persuade its audience. From the other hand, one can argue that Crimean Tatars themselves often sincerely share this Soviet legacy and pro-Soviet patriotic sentiments about the war, with the only exception that they are left with the deep collective feeling of unfairness and offence about the Stalin’s decision to deport their people for no profound reason: “Feeling of humiliated human dignity didn't leave me during all my life. There was always a question “Why?”

This theme of unfairness, framed as both personal and collective national

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159 “V Yalte uchatniki traurnogo mitinga, priurochenny k 66-oi godovshchine Deportatsii krymskotatarskogo naroda, potrebovali ot vlastey ne dopustit’ uvekovechenie pamiati “goniteley krymskotatarskogo naroda” - sovetskogo diktatora Yasifa Stalin I Ekateriny II.” In: Krymskiye tatary Yalty potrebovali ne dopustit’ ustanovleniya pamiatnikob Stalinu I Ekaterine II// QHA, 19.05.2010
160 “S pervogo dnia verolomnogo napadeniya na Rodinu faschistskikh ord krymskotatarskiy narod, naravne s drugimi “bratskimi” narodami, vstal na zashchitu Otechestva ot faschizma.” In: “They fought for the Motherland, which has been taken away from them”// Golos Kryma, 28.05.2010
161 “Chuvstvo askorblennogo chelovecheskogo dostoinstva, obidy ne pokidalo vsiu zhizn’. Vsegda stoyal vopros “Za chto?” In: Svidetel’stvo prestupleniya.//Golos Kryma. 13.05.2011
trauma, is widely present in the media texts related to the deportation in various forms.

4.3.3.2.4. Personal memories and recollections of deportation

Personal recollections of deportation day published by the Crimean Tatar media on the regular basis every year, all have a very similar narrative structure and make up a certain sequence of details and events, which greatly follow Todorov’s model of the narrative (cited in Lasey 2000, 21), discussed in previous sections. Further I will present the structure of the personal narratives in more detail.

First common detail of the narrative is the moment of peaceful family life on the eve of deportation, in Todorov’s terms “a state of equilibrium”. As most of the people, who are currently sharing their memories were children at the time of deportation, and many of the memories include images of close family relatives, and particularly, mothers: “On May 18 my mom with my aunt Emine started a huge washing up – drabbled in two large copper washbasins all our bed linens and winter clothes. The summer is approaching!”

The second stage, the moment of soldiers coming and short and hasty preparations to leave home, Todorov’s “disruption of equilibrium by action” – a narrative detail, present in the majority of personal recollections of deportation, as a focal point of each story, which included descriptions of:

- Knocking of the soldiers in the door and a call to leave house in 15 minutes.
  “Armed soldiers waked up everyone in the house, having said that they are being removed far away. They ordered to take only valuable things and gave us 15 minutes for preparation. Ayshe could barely dress the sleepy children, who couldn't understand what is going on and wanted to come back to sleep.”

- Bringing people forcibly to the livestock train carriages: “we all were pushed into carriages, those who couldn't climb up on their own, have been taken by arms and legs and thrown in. There were 30-40 people in the carriage, unbearable fug, doors did not open for two days.”

- Conditions during the trip: images of people dying during in the train trip, inhumane conditions, no food and medical care: “In the evening of the next day we have been put into the carriages, floors covered with hay. We were travelling for 3 days with the door closed. When the doors opened everyone rushed to get water... people died on the way. The dead bodies..."
Further on, the narratives touched upon obscurity of the actions of authorities, people trying to find out what is happening to them and trying to find out the destination of their dislocation, “recognition of the disruption”: “In the holes of the carriage we tried to look out to see where we are being taken to. But how can you find out, where are you? When the never-ending woods started, someone heard saying we are being taken beyond Ural.”

Another common episode in the narrative is the protest against deportation, which is inherently present in the majority of the personal narratives in various forms. Most commonly, by providing justifications that family members and relatives are soldiers at the Red Army, “attempts to repair disruption”: “Mon and aunt Emine are rushing around the flat and I am screaming: “My father is at the front, protecting the Motherland!”

The Torodov's 5th stage of narrative “reinstatement of equilibrium” in many of the analysed narrations is either absent or presented in negative light. In fact, the “new equilibrium” for the majority of deportation survivors – is settling down in exile, surviving through the new challenges. The memories of horrors of deportation were often extended by the memories of living in the Central Asia in the labour camps: “Being 4 years old I became an orphan. There were four of us left: elder sister Sherpe, Zebide, Yusuf and me. We were housed in the barracks previously used by the prisoners. Elder sisters started working in the cotton fields, to gain at least some money. My brother and me we were begging for money on the street.”

Undoubtedly, the narrative of deportation of the Crimean Tatars of the 1944 and the one of the life in exile, described in the personal stories in such a great detail is a collective reconstruction of the traumatic experience of the past. Given the political and historical context of these memories, when for the long time during Soviet times the survivors of deportation could not share these memories publicly, the idea of preserving this traumatic memory for the next generations was the only hope to get political rehabilitation for the unfair accusations of the Crimean Tatars of treachery and has been considered as a profound argument for their return to the Crimea from exile (Uehling 2004). Nowadays, after the return to their homeland, the memories of deportation previously silenced and now released publicly by means of the mass media, are still serving both as justification of the return and demands of the political status of the Crimean

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165 “vecherom sleduyushcheho dnia nas pogruzili v vagon, zastelenye solomoy. Yekhlali s zakrytymi dveriamy troe sutok. Kogda dver' otkrylas’, vse brosilis’ za vodoy ... v puti luidi umirali. Pokojnikov ostavili na polotakh zheleznoy dorogi.” In: Uberech' by Krym ot voyny pozharnishch// Golos Kryma, 21.05.2010
166 “...v shcheli vagona pytalis’ razdliadet’, kuda nas vezut. No razve poymesh, gde ty nakhodishsia? Kogda poshli beskonechnye lesa, kto-to uslyshal, chto vezut nas za Ural.” In: Izgnannitsy //Golos Kryma,18.05.2012
167 “mama s tetey Emine mechutsia po kvartire, a ja krichu “U menia papa na fronte, Rodinu zashchishaet!” In: Izgnannitsy// Golos Kryma, 18.05.2012
Tatar people as an integral part of the peninsula’s past and present.

For similar reasons, another set of personal narratives is being put forward by the Crimean Tatar national media – the personal recollections of the Crimean Tatar soldiers fighting at the frontline in the Red Army, participants of the Soviet partisan and clandestine units. Quite often these narratives are accompanied by the deportation recollections and published as a single story of a person or a family.

The key elements of this narrative are the following: Heroism and bravery of the Soviet Crimean Tatar soldiers at the frontline, their loyalty to the Soviet values. The Crimean Tatar soldiers are portrayed as honorary members of their group – the army, they do what they are “supposed to”, – according to commonsensical expectations from a narrative character a “hero” or a “warrior” - they fight with the Nazis: “The flights of the crews of the 101st aviation regiment to the Crimean partisans have been largely ensured by the expertise of the navigator Osman Akimov, who has been leading the planes above the sea, through the flak of the shore battaries…” 169 The “tragic finale” of this stories happens, when the brave soldiers return home from the front and find out that their families are deported from their homes for being called “the traitors”. Similar type of more explicitly stated notion of unfairness towards the Crimean Tatars is present in the wartime memories of the Soviet partisans: “After the liberation of Simpheropol from fascists P. Yampol'skiy called me, hugged me and said I will be presented to the government prize. I was told to come to party executive committee and write down a report about my undercover work, which I have done. It was a month before the removal of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea. Finally, that was the gratitude to the Crimean Tatar frontmen, partisans and undercover agents, who have been protecting the Motherland.” 170 The personal recollections of the Crimean Tatar soldiers and partisans is an example of how personalized history and memory of the past is used as a counter argument to the official Soviet historiography, which operate the archival documents as key evidences of the Crimean Tatar collaboration. Russian historian Kulpin (1997) underlines, that all generations of the Crimean Tatars have been looking for the counter arguments to wash away the “traitors” label, placed on them by the official Soviet history. The practice of gathering and publishing such personal narratives by the Crimean Tatar media nowadays seems to be a significant strategy of the shaping the collective image of the Second World war, particularly in the situation when the facts of the Crimean Tatars participation in the Red Army and partisan movement are being mostly silenced or underrepresented by the mainstream Crimean media.

169 “Polety ekipazhey 101-go aviapolka k krymskim partizanam vo mnogom obespechivalas’ masterstvom chuturna Osmana Akimova, provodivshego samolyoty nad morem, skvoz’ zenitnyi ogon’ beryegovikh batarey..” "In: Vozdushnye perevozchiki pomogali partizanam // Golos Kryma, 20.05.2011

170 "posle osvobozhdeniya Simpheropolia ot fashistov P. Yampol'skiy vyzval menyia k sebe, obrnal menyia i skazal chto predstavit menyia k pravitel'stvennoy nagrade. Mne bylo skazano chtoby ja poshel v obkom i napisal otchet o vseh prodelannykh podpol'noy rabote, chto ja i sdelal. Eto bylo za mesyaz do vysylki krymskih tatar iz Kryma. Takova v itoge okazals' nagrada frontovikam, partizanam i podpol'schikam iz chisla krymskih tatar, zashchishavshykh Rodinu... " In: Eto prishla voyna //Golos Kryma, 21.05.2010
4.3.3.2.5. Narratives of collaboration - “lieux d’oubli”

Expert-level historical discussions about whether cooperation or non-cooperation with the German occupation regime could have been the real reason for Stalin to remove the Crimean Tatar population from the Crimea (see for instance Williams 2001, Allworth 1998, Uehling 2004) are rarely mentioned in the media and are marginal for the public discussion of the reasons of deportation. On the contrary, the dominant historical narrative imposes the discussion along the lines of the dichotomy Crimean Tatars being “guilty/not guilty in treachery”, “the whole nation deserves/does not deserve to be punished” etc. The professional voices of historians are mostly not presented in this discussion.

As for the Crimean Tatar national media, as we have seen above, utilizes personal memories as a tool of creating a counter-discourse with regards to this historical period tends to omit the topic of collaboration in it publications. Only one publication out of 15 personal memories touches upon the life of the Crimean Tatars during the Nazi occupation of the Crimea. The issue of collaboration is presented in the context which justifies the decision of a certain number of the Crimean Tatars to cooperate with German authorities, emphasizes their small numbers and neutrally names the participants “volunteers”. The word in the text in put in quotation marks, which here means distancing from this group, similarly, the use of noun “them” reflects the strategy to exclude this group from the rest of the Crimean Tatars. But at the same time, their activities are justified, the reasons for collaboration explained in detail, the description is rather neutral. The “volunteers” are overwhelmingly portrayed as “victims” and “hostages of circumstances”: “Reluctance to be taken for the forced labour to Germany made them chose another, slippery way. They were not particularly active in their duties, tried not to harm their fellow villagers. The only exception was the people, who have been collectivized by the totalitarian regime and sent to the far away lands... The “volunteers” survived in the turmoil of the war, scared of revenge from the reds, fled to the West and tried to move from there to Turkey and other countries...”

An interesting personal recollection of the deportation, also published in “Golos Kryma” newspaper by Oleg Ridin, a Russian citizen, who has witnessed deportation of the Crimean Tatars as a child and questions its reasons, by placing the collaboration of the Crimean Tatars into the broader context together with other Soviet peoples. However, he states: “The traitors must be, obviously, punished. But in this case the entire peoples have been prosecuted!”

171 “Nezhelanie byt’ uvezennymi na raboty v Germaniyu vynudilo ikh poyti po drugomu, skol’zkomu puti. Oni osoboy retivosti ne proyavili, staralis’ ne delat’ zla odnosel’cham. Isklucheniye mogli predstavliat’ te, kogo totalitarnyi regim raskalchal i otravil v dal’nye kraya... Vyzhyvshie v kruzoverti voyny “dobrovol’tsy”, opasayas’ raspravy so storony krasnykh, ukhodili na Zapad i otuda staral’s’ perevrat’sia v Tursiyu ili drugie strany...” In: Svidetel’stva prestupleniy// Golos Kryma. 13.05.2011

172 “…Nakzat’ predateley, konechno, sledovalo. No v dannom sluchae okazalis’ nakazannymi tselye narody!...” In: Chernye dni krymskih tatar // Golos Kryma, 20.05.2011
sympathetic to the Crimean Tatars and their national tragedy still shares commonsensical presupposition that “traitors of the Soviet state must be prosecuted”. Thus he points to the ideological framework, which derives from the legacy of the Soviet propaganda and currently reproduced by the people who have pro-Russian, pan-Slavic sentiments. This cliché presupposes not only the undoubtful belief in existence of “traitors of the Soviet state”, but doesn’t even question the ideological nature of the word itself. Allowing such arguments in the Crimean Tatar national media discourse, which attempts to position itself as an alternative to dominant pro-Russian one, could be considered as another instance of the penetration of the dominant ideological framework together with its clichés and presuppositions into the discourse of national minority media.

On the contrary, a historian Vadym Makhno, who is interviewed by “Golos Kryma”, provides his personal opinion on deportation and criticizes the official Soviet label “collaborator-nation”\textsuperscript{173}, gives no opinionated comments about the guilt of the Crimean Tatar people, who have been collaborating with the Nazi occupational authorities during the war. Instead, he talks about his own historical research outcomes on the collaboration activities in the Soviet South-Western borderlands during the Second World War. In his argument, reported by the newspaper, he attempts to reshape the ethnic-bound accusations in collaboration, stating that Russians and Ukrainians have been also participating in the German collaboration units, which normally comprised from the mix of nationalities: “There were never ethnically “clean” units. In Sevastopol there was a Russian police, but out of 300 people, 35 were Crimean Tatars, 5 Ukrainians …. Crimean historians do not make notice, that in the Alushta Tatar battalion, one third were the Cossacks from Cuban”\textsuperscript{174}.

Given the extremely limited number of texts about collaboration compared to the great number and detail of the narratives of deportation and glorious fights of the Soviet Crimean Tatars soldiers I can talk about the tendency to omit the most painful and disputable moments of history, like the issue of collaboration, in favour of another ones, more important for the current Crimean Tatar’s national identity construction and strive for political recognition. The historical pages of collaboration can be called in Pierre Nora’s terms “lieux d’oubli”, “sites of forgetting” (cited in Whitehead 2009: 145) – moments of conflict in the past which Crimean Tatars as a national group try to exclude from its socially constructed collective memory about Second World War. These findings, however, can not be considered final and require further exploration using broader sample of media texts as well as more interviews with journalists of the Crimean Tatar ethnic media.

\textsuperscript{173} “narak-kollaboratsionist”

\textsuperscript{174} “Nikogda ne bylo chistykh chastey. V Sevastopole byla Russkaya politsiya, no iz 300 chelovek 35 byli tatarami, 5 ukraintsamami... krymskiye istoriki ne zamechayut, chto v Alushtinskom tatarskom batalyone, tret’ sostavliaли kubanskiye kazaki... ” In: V. Makhno: “Ja nikogda ne vozminimal yarlyki tipa ‘narod-predatel’” // Golos Kryma, 14.05.2010
4.3.3.3. Conclusions

For the Crimean tatar ethnic media representation of the deportation and its commemoration practices is the central and the most important subject matter. Even though, my analysis in this chapter only covered a short period of time in May of 2007-2012, the findings presented in previous chapter demonstrate that the media materials dedicated to the deportation are published by the Crimean Tatar ethnic media regularly all year round.

The Crimean Tatars' national practices of deportation commemoration include the large media component. Among other features, the media coverage of the deportation places a lot of emphasis on the detailed and vivid reporting of the commemoration activities carried out by the Crimean tatar communities across Crimea, Ukraine and worldwide.

Additionally, Crimean Tatar ethnic media provide room for publication of the personal recollections of the deportation survivors, extensively using the genre of personal narrations to represent the memory of deportation in the media discourse.

The media representation of the deportation in the Crimean tatar ethnic media is often ideologically charged, stressing on the need for national unity of the Crimean Tatars in the collective remembering of the tragic history of deportation as well as for the restoration of historical justice towards the ethnic group. Crimean Tatar media also allow much more critical remarks towards the Crimean and national authorities, emphasizing the inefficiency and pointing to failures of the state policies on providing support to the Crimean Tatar repatriates.

The commemoration of deportation serves as powerful national identity marker for the Crimean Tatar people, works as a unification instrument. This unity frame is present in the media representation of commemoration practices in many forms and is, most importantly, used to construct an alternative media discourse on the Crimean tatars' deportation, promoting their national version of the collective memory of this historical event in the situation, when the mainstream media mostly underrepresent this event or share the dominant post-Soviet imaginary of the deportation.

4.4. CONCLUSIONS

The collective memory of deportation of 1944 represented in the Ukrainian media discourse is one of the key features, through which the population of Ukraine builds its perception of the Crimean Tatar people both in the Crimean peninsula and in other regions of Ukraine. These perceptions, however, are also strongly influenced by the existing sets of ideas and judgments about the past – the dominant historical meta-narratives, “archives of the cultural memory” (Assman 1995), which serve as reference points for the groups in making meaning of the past events. The shift from the purely “national” to “territorial”
appreciation to the Ukrainian history, which was happening during the last two decades (Masliychuk 2013), allows broadening the general historical perspective and embracing ethnic minorities' histories into a common space of the Ukrainian collective imaginaries of the past.

Remaining a disputed issue for some social actors in the Ukrainian society, deportation of the Crimean Tatars is generally considered one of many crimes of the Soviet totalitarianism, forcibly silenced for decades, and belongs to the list of pages of the Ukrainian history, which demand reconciliation by the present day elites. The groups, who share the Soviet and the pro-Russian historical narrative, often justify the deportation, by placing the blame on the Crimean Tatars for collaboration with the German troops during the Second World War.

In the situation, when the Southern regions of Ukraine remain predominantly under the political and ideological influence of the Russian and Soviet historical legacy, the Crimean Tatars, who consider Crimean peninsula their native land, found themselves in the situation when they have to construct and promote their own version of the memory of deportation and their participation in the Second World War, in order to justify their will to return from exile and reestablish their historical and cultural ties with their land.

The tragic and traumatic character of the collective memory of deportation plays an important unification function for the Crimean Tatars as a national group – the tragic events, collectively remembered and commemorated, stress the unity of the past and present for the Crimean Tatars, their connections with each other and with the native land they were deprived of. The need to reclaim the historical justice becomes a driving force for the present day the Crimean Tatars national movement, and shapes the character of its political and economic demands.

The nowadays public discussion about the current status of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine, their relations with the Slavic majority is predominantly mediatized on both national and regional Crimean levels. The analysis of the practices of the media representation of deportation on the national, regional and Crimean Tatar ethnic media levels provide an insight into interrelations between the dominant and alternative historical meta-narratives which exist in Ukraine and allows coming up with a number of conclusions.

One can speak about the tendency of decreasing of the media interest and reduction of detalization of discussion about deportation when moving from the local to the national media level. At the same time, the general intensity of coverage remains more or less stable over the period of 6 years from 2007-2012. This means that the interest of the media to the topic did not change with the change of power-holding political elites in 2010.

The historical frame of the media discussion of deportation is quite often substituted with the political debates; the historical facts and expert-led discussion is - with minor exceptions - absent from the media discourse. This
substitution of the commemoration practices with the political debate leads to the conclusion about the tendency to exclude the deportation from the common all-Ukrainian commemoration practices during the analyzed period of time.

The representatives of the Crimean Tatars national group quite often do not have a leading role in the discussions of deportation, the primary control over the commemoration discourse is held by the Ukrainian national and Crimean political officials.

The Crimean Tatar national media actively use personal recollections of the deportation survivors to draw the alternative memory of deportation and to challenge the official Soviet history for deportation, the officially recognized in the USSR reasons behind it. The national and Crimean media, in turn, publish personal memories of deportation survivors quite rarely. These features are distinctive for the media representations on both national and regional levels.

The case of the Crimean Tatar’s deportation became a clear illustration of the similar processes taking place in other post-Soviet regions, like in Chechnia, where previously silenced memories of cases of social injustice were later used by the national minority groups in their political struggle (see for instance Campana 2012). Similarly in Crimea, the collective memory of the forced deportation was used for the present day political activities and strengthening of the Crimean Tatar national movement for political recognition and self-identification. The Ukrainian media, however, representing this struggle often tends to sustain the status quo of the dominating state institutions, omitting overt critique of the government’s failure to solve many social and political problems of the Crimean Tatars, excluding the voices of the Crimean Tatar community from the public discussion, focusing instead on the coverage of conflicts and scandals involving the Crimean Tatars as well as providing a limited space for the expert discussion of the 'true' historical meaning of deportation.
CONCLUSIONS

Referring back to the key research questions set for this study, the following conclusions are to be made.

The use of the theoretical and methodological approach of the critical discourse analysis allows drawing fundamental conclusions about the ways in which media discourse reflects and shapes popular beliefs about the Crimean Tatars, which features and narratives constitute their ascribed image in the Ukrainian society during the given period of time.

The “hybrid” type (Dyczok 2009) of the media system in Ukraine, close ties between the media owners and political elites became another crucial feature of the Ukrainian media landscape, and this is particularly true for the analyzed period of 2010-2012, when power-holding political elites, headed by Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions as well as the affiliated business elites, were actively expanding their control over the media market in Ukraine and in Crimea in particular. The overwhelming dependency of the media content on the political interests and ideological affiliations of the media owners (or controlling business and political elites) was shaping the character of the media representation of the important social and political topics, including the ones related to the representation of ethnic groups in the media. Consequently, such representation was characterized by the lack of objective and critical journalistic practices, prevalence of non-reflective genres of news in the structure of media coverage of social and political events, limited level of discussion and problematization of the policies and statements of state officials etc. In addition, the media representation often lacked expert commentaries and expanded contextualization of both present-day political decisions and historical events.

In general, the Ukrainian media discourse with regard to the Crimean Tatars during the analysed period was quite discreet and unsystemic. The national mainstream media tended to cover the events related to the Crimean Tatars in regard to the very limited number of the information causes. The outcomes of my research demonstrated the overwhelming prevalence of the political topics in the structure of the media coverage of the events and topics related to the Crimean Tatars. Moreover, issues of social and economic life, such as the land distribution and issues of education in native language, or the commemoration of the deportation, were framed primarily as political. The media coverage of the Tatar-related politics (mostly statement of politicians voicing demands of the Crimean Tatars about the special status and political rehabilitation, and mass protest actions organized by the Crimean Tatars) and annual commemoration events related to the memory of victim of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars of 1944 constitute the two dominant subject-matters within the mediatized public agenda on the Crimean Tatars. The generic types of references to the Crimean Tatars as a group of “repatriates” or “returnees”, the active process of political negotiations with regard to the state support of repatriation, and the centrality of the memory of deportation for their national self-identification were
the key features that inform the ascribed collective identity of the Crimean Tatars in the media discourse of Ukraine.

The analysis of the discursive strategies of exclusion and other forms of othering of the ethnic minorities, used by the media, was among the most important research objectives of the study. The research findings provided the detailed overview of various strategies of exclusion, used by the media at both national and Crimean levels, and allow concluding that the subtle and hidden forms of exclusion greatly prevail over the overt forms, like hate speech and derogatory rhetoric towards the representatives of the Crimean Tatars. The subtle forms of exclusion often mean the use of structural discrimination, generic representations of social actors, systematic use of passive forms to construct the agency of the social actors, who represent the minority group, use of nominalization to disguise the actual power-holders in the media discourse, limiting the quantity and the variety of voices of the Crimean Tatars in the media coverage, prevalence of group as opposed to personalized representations of the minority social actors in the media discourse. The actual needs and demands of the ethnic group are frequently framed in terms of “the source of problems” and referred to as a “burden to tax payers” and a “potential threat to stability” of the majority. All mentioned mechanisms of media representations greatly dominate in the media and often become journalist routines. Thus, my research findings resonate with the conclusions of the similar studies made by the western scholars, like van Djik, who stated that “immigrants, refugees, ethnic minorities ...are increasingly associated with socio-economic and cultural threats, deviance, crime, and violence, or at least with problems primarily blamed on them” (1993: 37). Similar conclusions were made in the study of the media representation of Kurds in the Turkish press (Sergin and Wall 2005).

Additionally, van Dijk emphasizes that the discriminatory practices are often packaged in seemingly neutral linguistic forms, which makes him conclude that the “new racism” has come to replace the “old racism” and the overtly discriminatory forms were softened by the introduction of “political correctness”. However, van Dijk argues that the genuine discriminatory attitudes towards the minorities have hardly changed (1991,1995). Taking the case of Ukraine, the rare cases of the use of the overt hate speech in the media texts were pointed out, however, most of these case were carefully monitored by the experts and often publicly challenged both by the Crimean Tatar community and the Ukrainian journalist community. For this reason I argue that the overt forms of hate speech against the ethnic groups did not become a norm in the media use in the Ukrainian and Crimean media discourses during the analysed period. In this regard, the patterns of the media representations of the Crimean Tatars generally fit into the broader pool of studies conducted by the Western scholars while analysing representations of the ethnic minorities in the European media.

At the same time, there are number of features, which make the study of the media representations of the Crimean Tatars unique and non-conventional. The
multi-faceted nature of the collective identity of the Crimean Tatars, as a group with a unique religious and ethnic identity, forcible deportation and return from exile as key features of their national self-identification as well as their active political position made their mediatized image stand out among the other studies of ethnic minorities at the Post-Soviet region. Additionally, post-Soviet sentiments which shaped the dominant ideological frames in the public and media discourse of Crimea during 2007-2012, inform the character of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars and its niche in the fundamental contestation between the two versions of the past and future of Ukraine.

Speaking about the ideological frames dominant in the public and media discourses of Ukraine during 2007-2012, many scholars agree on the clash between the two leading meta-narratives or ideological imaginaries: the so-called Ukrainian national, democratic, pro-European set of popular beliefs about the country, its collective memory and the future path and the so-called pan-Slavic, post-Soviet imaginary, which contains a strong pro-Russian and post-Soviet sentiments. My research has demonstrated that the media outlets, sharing one of the mentioned meta-narratives, represented the Crimean Tatars, their political demands and collective memory in a different way. The former group of the media outlets gave more room to the voices of the Crimean Tatar political leaders, regularly reported on the events related to their political and social life, used inclusive linguistic forms to refer to this ethnic group, its history and culture. The pro-Russian media outlets tended to omit the detailed coverage of the Crimean Tatars' life, limited the coverage to the news about the protest actions using predominantly the frames of scandal and threat to social order, regularly silenced the voices of the Crimean Tatar group representatives, frequently used the overt or subtle forms of delegitimation of their political demands.

Apart from the ideological contestation at the national level, my research findings also revealed the similar conflict within the Crimean media discourse. I argue that there is a fundamental and multi-faceted dominance of the Russian political and cultural domain over the other political and cultural identities and ideological positions in the Crimean media discourse. This dominance manifested systematically both though overt and subtle discursive mechanisms. Among the most prominent ones the following could be named:

The Russian cultural dominance was reestablished and sustained by the representation of Russian language as the language of interethnic communication, where other languages are assigned secondary roles of “minority languages” which “should be protected”. Similarly, the idea of collective memory of the tragic past of the “ethnic minorities of Crimea” was often challenged, in the more or less overt forms, while the dominant Russian-backed version of the World War 2 was imposed through the Crimea mainstream media. And finally, the Crimean media regularly promoted the idea of the “all-Crimean unity” of all ethnic groups of Crimea, as one of the dominant frames of
the mediatized rhetoric of the Crimean political leaders, which implies the subordinate roles of the ethnic political elites under the umbrella of the political elites, which represent the Slavic majority of Crimea.

According to Norman Fairclough, critical discourse analysis is primarily targeted at the analysis of the discourse practices as an ultimate mediators between the texts and broader socio-cultural practices (1995: 59-60). In addition, critical discourse analysis allows tracing the relations of inequality and power struggle between the key social actors and to explore how these relations are reflected in various types of discourse, and in the media discourse in particular. As Fairclough argues in this regard, the media discourse in general features reflects the existing social relations in society (1995:45).

The current study also demonstrated how hidden and non-obvious forms of discrimination in discourse are used by the power-holding elites to maintain the status-quo, and, on the other hand, how the counter-discourse, promoted and sustained by the Crimean Tatar ethnic media, adds to questioning of the existing relations of dominance and proposes alternative meanings to the socially important events.

One of the key conclusions of the present study is that along with the strong movement to establish the Russian political cultural dominance in the Crimean media discourse, there were constant attempts to build a counter-discourse, which seeks to promote alternative historical and present day political agenda, as well to undermine the political dominance of the power-holders. In the situation, when the Crimean Tatar political elites got constantly involved into the open contestation with the local state officials, openly pointed to the inefficient polices of repatriation, demanded rights and privileges for the representatives of their community, the Crimean mainstream media, controlled by the Crimean politicians, used various discursive strategies aimed at delegitimization of the Crimean Tatar leaders. The media often labelled the Crimean Tatar leaders as “unsatisfied” and referred to them as the “source of problems”, shifting the frame of mediatized discussion about the land distribution from the issue of state policy to the issue of deviance, crime and threat to social order. In addition, Crimean mainstream media systematically challenged the legitimacy of the Milli Mejlis and its leaders, as an equally empowered political subject and representative ethnic body of authority, using, however, mostly indirect and subtle forms.

In this regard, the analysis of the media discourse produced by the Crimean Tatar ethnic media is crucial for understanding the mechanisms used by the ethnic group to fulfil the two-fold strategies. Firstly, the Crimean Tatar ethnic media work to promote and strengthen the Crimean Tatar culture and language within the Crimean Tatar community, moulding the national unity and the national self-consciousness. Secondly, the media are actively counteracting the dominant image and popular beliefs about the Crimean Tatars, providing the more vivid and diverse information about everyday life, religion and culture of
the ethnic community; constructing the alternative meanings of the historical events, stressing on the counter-arguments to oppose the version of history shared by the Slavic majority of Crimea. One of the outstanding feature of constructed counter-discourse, is the systemic use of the personal narratives of the deportation survivors as a key genre, through which deportation is represented by the Crimean Tatar national media.

In order to complete this research and, consequently, make the outcomes more solid and coherent, the analysis of the media discourse production and consumption could be carried out. However, in the spring of 2014 the social-political reality in Crimea changed dramatically, leading to establishment of the new relations of power and subordination between the political actors in Crimea that inevitably changed the nature of the relationships between the Crimean Tatar community and the occupant Russia-backed authorities. Taking to consideration the changes in the political agenda in Crimea and in Ukraine under the conditions of the military conflict with Russia and Russian annexation of Crimea, the primary research objectives for further analysis should be focused on the patterns of discursive (de)legitimation of the Crimean annexation through the media as well as on the examination of possible changes of the media representation of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean and all-Ukrainian media discourses since the spring of 2014.
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APPENDIX 1. List of interviews

3. Olga Dukhnich, PhD, senior teaching fellow at the National Tavricheskiy Univerity, Simpheropol, 14.10.2013
4. Serhiy Kostynskyi, political analyst, senior executive at Moremedia, Crimean advertisement center, Simpheropol, 14.10.2013
6. Mykola Semena, head of the expert team of Crimean hate speech monitoring group, correspondent of “Den’” in Crimea, Simpheropol, 15.10.2013
7. Denis Baturin, independent political consultant, member of the Expert-Analytical Council by the Cabinet of Ministers of ARC, Simpheropol, 16.10.2013
9. Nariman Dzhelyal, editor of the Ukrainian news section, anchor at the political talk show “Debaty” at ATR TV channel, Simpheropol, 16.10.2013
10. Ihor Semyvolos, deputy director of the Association of the Middle East Studies, 29.10.2013, conducted via Facebook.