

**BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST:
PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES**

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INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the newly independent states created a new geopolitical situation, not only in Eastern Europe, but on the global level as well. The West lost its main enemy, the Cold War is over, and many Americans believe that there are no grounds for U.S. involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet Union. However, Russia remains a great power with a huge nuclear arsenal, and the future of economic and political reform is unclear, as its foreign policy, especially in the so-called “near abroad.” The conflicts in this region influence the domestic and foreign policies of Russia and destabilize the situation in Eastern Europe, providing new challenges for Western policy in this region.

Independent Ukraine, with a population of more than fifty million, has emerged as one of the main players in Eastern Europe, and Ukrainian-Russian relations are crucial for the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The interest in Ukraine has been increasing in Western capitals.

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the factors which define choices for Ukrainian foreign policy. The starting point for the research is the following hypothesis:

Nowadays the fact of Ukrainian independence is accepted by every serious political force in Ukrainian society, even Communists. However, there are debates on the following issues:

1) Future foreign policy orientation of Ukrainian state: integration into European institutions, into the CIS, or balancing between the two centers? In case of “entry” into Europe together with Russia or not?

2) The model of Ukrainian society: what would be the balance between Russian and Ukrainian language and culture? This balance could influence foreign policy orientations as well.

Our thesis is that despite the immense influence on Ukraine by external factors, especially Russian position, the crucial factor is the internal development, inner cohesion of Ukrainian society.

That is why, we start in part I with the discussion of ethnopolitical constraints on foreign policy which includes ethnolinguistic and regional factors of Ukrainian geopolitical orientations. The role of elites, the state, and symbols in constructing new nation is shown as well. At the end

of the chapter confessional factor is also briefly covered. The analysis of domestic factors of Kyiv's foreign policy is continued in part II which discusses the possible impact of the restructuring of Ukrainian political spectrum on interethnic stability and on geopolitical orientations of Kyiv. In our opinion, the analysis of economic factors needs special research. However, as these factors are of cardinal importance we attempt to cover them briefly in part III. In part IV the continuity between geopolitical choices of presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma is shown. It analyzes also the role of Russia's factor in defining Ukrainian choices. Finally, part V deals with the question of Ukraine's integration into European institutions. Conclusions include scenarios of Ukrainian place between Russia and the West as well as recommendations how to reach the optimal options.

Reviewing the literature on the topic, it is necessary to stress that until recently Ukraine was to a great extent *terra incognita*, and not only for the West. The history of Ukraine was distorted by Soviet propaganda; many documents were concealed from the public, as well as from most of the scholars. Even now, Ukrainian literature on the subject is to certain extent polarized along ideological lines, though most of the scholars support the "European" choice: a kind of balancing between Russia and the West, while moving at the same time in Western direction.

In the first years of Ukrainian independence it was rather difficult for Western scholars to understand the role of the Ukrainian national movement and its dynamics. For more than forty years, relations with the Soviet Union had defined American foreign policy to a great extent, and psychological factor played an important role "at the highest levels" as well.¹

Difficulties in adaptation to the new situation can also be explained by the crisis in Sovietology. Despite indisputable successes, there was a number of drawbacks. Sovietologist Peter Rutland summarized rather common explanations of this crisis:

- political bias, either of the left or the right
- lack of grounding in the languages and histories of Soviet nationalities;
- difficulties in getting information
- the seduction of leading academics into the role of media pundits;

¹ "Bush's sympathy... suggested an almost emotional preference for familiar processes and gradual, orderly change, even at the sacrifice of democratic ideals" (Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, 1993), p. 87.

- “professional, personal, and political rivalry left *émigré* scholars ‘out in the cold,’ and prevented Sovietology from benefiting from their insights.”²

In comparison with other studies on Soviet nationalities, Ukrainian studies were rather developed. Nevertheless, as American political scientist Alexander Motyl pointed out, they “were frequently considered irrelevant to ‘real’ politics in the USSR, politically motivated by *émigré* agendas, and emotionally charged by nationalist perspectives. In a word, it was supposed to be ‘unscholarly’.”³ It also led to the underestimation of the Ukrainian national movement.

Nevertheless, the situation after dissolution of the Soviet Union demanded new theoretical reconsiderations. Therefore, the “Russia-first” approach was supplemented by the “Russia-second” approach. Several important works with deep understanding of Ukrainian problems were published. Of special importance for this research were publications and interviews with Dr. Sherman Garnett (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Dr. Alexander Motyl (Harriman Institute, Columbia University), Dr. Roman Solchanyk (Rand Corp.), Dr. Andrew Wilson (School for Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London), Dr. Taras Kuzio (Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham), Prof. Gerhard Simon and Dr. Olha Alexandrova (Federal Institute for East European and International Studies), and Dr. Arkadiy Moshes, one of few Russian scholars with a good expertise in Ukrainian affairs (Institute of Europe, Moscow).

The author is grateful for the possibility to use sociological data provided by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Democratic Initiatives Center (both based at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy). Among lots of Ukrainian colleagues, I would like to express my special thanks to Gen. Vadym Hrechaninov (President of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine), Dr. Olexander Pavliuk (Director, Kyiv office, Institute for East - West Studies), and experts of the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies (headed by Prof. Olexander Potekhin) which prepares in English with the support of Friedrich Eber Foundation quarterly monitorings of Ukrainian foreign policy. I am also grateful to experts of the Center for Political Analysis at one of the leading Ukrainian newspaper *Den’* (“The Day”) where a number of the author’s articles on the topic of this research was published. Since the beginning of this research the author co-edited the book *Formation of the Branches of Power in*

² Peter Rutland, “Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem,” *The National Interest*, No. 31 (Spring 1993), p. 112.

³ Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York, 1993), p. 5.

Ukraine, 1991 - 1996 (Kyiv, 1997) which was extremely helpful in understanding domestic sources of Ukrainian foreign policy. Among our publications there is also a paper “Ukraine, Belarus’, and Moldova: Prospects for Stabilization and Western Options” in *Political Science, Ethnology, and Sociology: Materials of the III Intern. Congress of Ukr. Studie* (1996) and a review in the Moscow’s journal *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology* (No.1, 1998). A number of aspects of the topic were discussed in author’s talk “Ukraine: back to Europe?” at School for Slavonic and East European Studies (University of London) and presentations: “The West and Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine” (“Geopolitical Future of Ukraine,” Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy, March 1998); “Ukraine, Belarus’, and the Prospects for Cooperation in Central-Eastern Europe” (“Belarus’ in the International Setting,” Carnegie Endowment, Minsk, Oct. 1997); “Russia and Elections in Ukraine” (“Perspectives of the Relations between the EU and Ukraine,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, Kyiv, Sept. 1997); “Ukraine and European Security” (“Eurasian Security in the Era of NATO Enlargement,” Prague, Aug. 1997).

I. ETHNOPOLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY

In the first years after independence the spectrum of opinion in Ukraine regarding the fundamental threat to its independence fell between two poles. Extreme forces at one end of the spectrum (so-called “national-radicals”) saw the threat in Russia’s position and the support for separatism (first of all, in Crimea). In this case, Russian-speaking Ukrainians were accused of faint-heartedness or even equated in pseudo-revolutionary polemical style with “janissaries”. Then the way was clear: offensive tactics, based on anti-Russian slogans and oriented toward swift Ukrainization. The other extreme was to see in Ukrainian state-building (as it was done in the Russian Empire) the “machinations of Galician separatists,” results of “Western intrigue”. In this instance the way out was seen in close integration with Russia, the federalization of Ukraine, the ratification of the Russian language as an “official” language or even as a second state language.

Nevertheless, the ideas of federalization and the upgrading of the status of the Russian language were rejected in new Ukrainian Constitution adopted on June 28, 1996. (Federalization, attractive as a model for a democratic and multicultural society, could stimulate

during the transition period centrifugal tendencies. Therefore, it was seen only as perspective for future stable democratic society.) The fact that rights and national-democrats were joined by centrists and part of the left deputies became crucial for the adoption of the Constitution.⁴ Thus, the “middle-ground” approach dominates and, the most likely, will dominate Ukrainian political scene.

Though the role of external factors for determining foreign policy orientation is extremely important, sometimes it is exaggerated in the radical views on the left and on the right. Most experts (both in Ukraine and abroad) agree that the key factor is the internal development. First of all, it is necessary to stress two ethnopolitical factors:

- 1) position of national minorities and the Russian community in Ukraine
- 2) position of the Ukrainian ethnos itself.

According to the census of 1989 (the first census in independent Ukraine is scheduled for 1999), Russians make up 21% of Ukraine’s population,⁵ while other national minorities comprise 6% (Russians could hardly be seen as national minority from classical definition, taking into account their privileged position in the former Soviet Union, the role of Russian language and culture, centuries of Russification of Ukrainian ethno⁶). The future of Ukraine and its foreign policy to a great extent depends on these circumstances.

In contrast to the Baltic countries, the 1991 Ukrainian law on citizenship was based on the zero option, which meant that any resident of Ukraine at the moment this law was passed automatically received Ukrainian citizenship. Despite some statements from pro-Russian politicians that the state favors ethnic approach in defining the “Ukrainian nation”, the new Constitution fixed in the introduction a compromise between notions of “nation” and “people” – a bit clumsy from academic viewpoint but politically justified (in the preamble to Ukrainian Constitution there are the clauses on “Ukrainian people – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities,” on “the right of Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian people to self-determination”).⁷ The Russian language is a compulsory subject in many schools, predominates in many universities in eastern

⁴ *Formation of the Branches of Power in Ukraine, 1991-1996* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 86-88.

⁵ As the census was held in Soviet time, there is a high probability that the number of Russians was exaggerated a bit. For discussion of the more recent trends, see Stephen Rapawy, *Ethnic Reidentification in Ukraine*, U.S. Bureau of Census, Washington, DC, IPC Staff Paper No. 90, August 1997.

⁶ Volodymyr Kulyk, one of the leading journalists of the national-democratic movement, wrote about this reevaluation of previous views in his article “Farewell to Kruty,” *Suchasnist*, No. 12 (1994).

⁷ *Constitution of Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1996) (in Ukr.), p. 3. Translated by author.

and southern parts of the country, it retains its wide circulation in the mass media, on TV; most of the circulation of Ukrainian newspapers is still published in Russian.⁸

In contrast to Russia with its notorious anti-Semitic Pamiat and other similar organizations, in Ukraine there are no anti-Semitic movements which enjoy any significant public support. This does not exclude the possibility that one can hear such statements from marginal politicians or find it in certain newspapers with limited circulation. However, official Kyiv in every possible way demonstrates his attention to the Jewish minority (an example of which, in part, was Kuchma's visit to the memorial ceremony in Auschwitz in 1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II). This approach, to a large extent, is the result of the policy of national-democrats and dissidents who learned the real (not declared) internationalism in Soviet camps. The tolerant position of the leaders of the national-democratic movement towards national minorities explains, to a great extent, the absence of interethnic conflicts on the Ukrainian way to independence in late 1980s and early 1990s. It was one of the important factors which contributed to positive changes in Western, namely American, attitude to the independence of Ukraine.

Unfortunately, Jewish immigration from Ukraine still continues. It is connected, first of all, to difficult economic situation. The state cannot provide substantial financial help to Jewish and other ethnic communities. It is necessary to add that public opinion in the West, including influential Jewish communities as a result of Soviet propaganda sometimes still retain the stereotype: Ukrainian = anti-Semite. *This stereotype can be dispelled only through mutual efforts, in part by drawing attention to painful periods in Ukrainian history. Steps from both sides are needed. Meanwhile, Western governmental officials who find themselves in Kyiv and visit Babii Iar overlook the modest monuments to the victims of 1933 famine.*

An important role could be played by Jews from Ukraine who reside now in Israel and the USA. One could recall such famous Jews born in Ukraine as Golda Meir and Vladimir Zhabotinsky (the latter did so much for mutual understanding between the Ukrainian and Jewish people). *Immigrants from Ukraine could do much to promote good relations between their state*

⁸ The situation of ethnic Russians in the CIS countries was widely discussed in the Western literature. See, for example, Jeff Chinn, Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States* (Boulder, Co, 1996); Neil Melvin, *Russians Beyond Russia. The Politics of National Identity* (London, 1995); Paul Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics* (London, 1995).

*and Ukraine. In this sense the idea of “triangle” Ukraine – USA – Israel put forward by Ukrainian diplomats could become fruitful.*⁹

On the Western borders of Ukraine the situation with national minorities in 1990–1991 was complicated by the fact that the formation of the present Ukrainian borders was completed during World War II and soon afterwards (including such events as Soviet attacks on Poland and Romania after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). Some territorial claims were put forward to Ukraine by ultra-radical forces in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Together with the activity of certain anti-Ukrainian circles in Russia, it could create a potential zone of instability along Ukraine’s borders. However, these trends were not dominant in the political life of most of Ukraine’s neighbors. Ukrainian national-democrats also did not make territorial claims toward neighbors. Despite the fact that borders of Ukraine (including the Russian-Ukrainian border) did not follow ethnic lines (some Ukrainian territories were included in Russia and partially in Poland), leaders of national-democrats were in favor of the inviolability of postwar borders. An important role was also played by the insistence of Ukrainian diplomacy. As a result, a series of treaties was signed with Ukraine’s neighbors which resulted finally in the signing of treaties on friendship and neighborhood with Russia and Romania. (In these two countries the forces which put forward territorial claims were the most active. It influenced relations with Ukraine on interstate level, and the Ukrainian-Russian treaty has not been ratified yet by Russian Duma). Nowadays, concrete and practical steps should be taken for the demarcation and delimitation of borders.

Thus, despite the Soviet heritage Kyiv has managed to avoid dangerous conflicts. According to the reports of both Western experts and official circles, Ukraine’s policy toward its national minorities clearly stands out in a positive way against the background of other countries in Eastern Europe and Russia. The fundamental problems of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policies are tied to the fact that there is no unity within Ukrainian nation itself.

According to the results of the study conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology based at UKMA in early 1994, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians comprise approximately 40% of Ukraine’s population, while Russian-speaking Ukrainians number

⁹ For details, see *Israel - Ukraine - the US* in: *Examining the New Realities of Ukraine* . Transcript of a Dialogue Sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the Embassy of Ukraine, Wash. 1996 (Kyiv, 1997) (in Ukr.), pp. 47-50, 61-75.

33–34% and Russians – 21%.¹⁰ Thus, though Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians comprise a plurality in comparison with Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians (we use this term as there are also 1–2% of Ukrainian-speaking Russians), they are not an absolute majority. The presidential elections of 1994 showed also the split in support of two main candidates – Kuchma and Kravchuk – between right-bank Ukraine, on the one hand, and eastern and southern regions where the Russian-speaking population predominates. According to the data of the same study, 46% in eastern Ukraine favored Ukraine and Russia remain independent, friendly nations whose borders require no visas or customs (supporters of “closed” borders comprised 3.8%), while 48.5% at that time favored union with Russia.¹¹

However, does this mean that Ukraine must “split”, the possibility of which was referred to in the CIA’s sensational report in early 1994? Western mass media or even experts feared “a huge Bosnia”, but larger and with nuclear weapons and power stations. The reality did not bear out these forecasts; moreover, there are grounds for optimistic scenarios.

The boundaries between the three ethnolinguistic entities are blurred, as the languages are very close. In fact, the very division of Russian- and Ukrainian-language speakers is rather schematic. Most of the population is bilingual. If we observed earlier a process of Russification, beginning in 1989 one could observe a transition by the democratically oriented intelligentsia in favor of the Ukrainian language. This process, in our opinion, escaped the notice of many researchers, particularly Western scholars. It was tied not only to “rational choice”, but also to deep emotional psychological factors, burgeoning pride in one’s nation and its history and culture. Later, this process embraced the large part of state apparatus. Moreover, being a speaker of the Russian language or even ethnic Russian by no means is the deciding factor in defining political orientation.

If we are to voice misgivings that in the process of state-building Kyiv is experienced the “temptation” to assimilate the Russian-speaking population,¹² one should also take into account that, first, even under Kravchuk, who was criticized in the east of the country for “nationalism”, this process was merely weak and inconsistent reaction to the consequences of 300 years of

¹⁰ Valeriy Khmelko, “Political Problems of Ukraine and the Position of Social-Democracy,” a paper presented at the Conference “Social Democrats in Ukraine: Realities and the Prospects of Development”, Kyiv, Oct. 14-15, 1995. See also Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, “The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine” in *People, Nations, Identities. The Russian-Ukrainian Encounter (The Harriman Review)*, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 1996), pp. 81-91.

¹¹ Ibid.

Russification. Second, it is essential to take into account the tolerance that as a whole characterizes Kyiv's position. There is no real threat of forced Ukrainization, but the idea and the image of this threat do exist (this perception is shared by some representatives of liberal Russian-speaking intelligentsia and is exploited by the Left and pro-Russian forces). One can hear from some national democrats and representatives of radical circles in Ukrainian diaspora: but a policy of Ukrainization was implemented in the 1920s and 1930s. However, one should not forget that it met with considerable opposition within the ranks of the Communist Party itself and this opposition in the absence of democratic process was overcome through force. Nowadays, it is necessary to take into account the role of the Russian language in the society and the orientations of the considerable part of the population, especially in the east and in the south.

It has already become a commonplace to note the presence of the re-integrationist (imperial) trends in Russian policy. That is not surprising. As political scientists point out, manifestations of nationalism intensify in the process of democratization. It is important, however, that the phenomenon of Zhirinovskiy has not elicited a reciprocal response in Ukraine.¹³ And it is not at all a matter of Ukrainian elite being "better" than the Russian one. Kyiv's position is the best possible rational choice that could be made by Ukrainian politicians; a policy of forcible Ukrainization is dangerous.¹⁴

Ukraine did not split in the most difficult year of 1993 when inflation was 10 000% (last year, according to official statistics, it was 10%). Sociological polls taken in early 1994 showed that only 1% of respondents in Lviv and 5% in Donetsk (the main cities in the west and the east of Ukraine) wanted Ukraine to cease to exist as a united nation.¹⁵ In reality, there is no ethnic stratification in the east (namely in the Donbas) in favor of Ukrainians: this fact prevents the strengthening of separatist movement.¹⁶ The attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians towards idea

¹² Dominique Arel, "The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in the Former Soviet Union* (Armonk, NY, 1995), 157-88; Dominique Arel, "A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, No. 12 (Jan.- March 1996) pp. 73-90 .

¹³ Jack Snyder, "Organizing Political Space in the Former Soviet Union," a paper presented at the conference "The Crimea: Post-Imperial Perspectives on a Regional Conflict," Columbia University, Dec. 14-15, 1995, pp. 19-20. See also Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, no. 3 (May-June 1995), pp. 79-97.

¹⁴ Alexander Motyl, "Structural Constraints and Starting Points: Post-Imperial States and Nations in Ukraine and Russia," a paper presented at the conference "Post-Communism and Ethnic Mobilization," Cornell University, April 21-23, 1995, p. 6.

¹⁵ Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Shifting Identities in Western and Eastern Ukraine," *The East and Central Europe Program Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1995), p. 7.

¹⁶ Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, "Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilization in Eastern Ukraine and North-east Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1997, pp. 853-856; David Meyer, "Why Have Donbas Russians Not Ethnically Mobilized Like Crimean Russians Have? An Institutional / Demographic Approach," in John Micgiel (ed.), *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives* (New York, 1996), pp. 317-329.

of independent Ukraine are only slightly different: this attitude depends not on the ethnicity but on the educational level.

Analyzing the situation in the east of the country, one should also take into account the following facts. First, historically the territory of the Donbas is not Russian, many villages in the region are Ukrainian-speaking (a fact that commentators both in the West and in Ukraine itself often forget to mention). Second, the leaders of the miners' movement understand that they have no prospects within Russia as mines in the Donbas are not competitive compared to the Kuzbas in Russia. At the final stage of *perestroika* Yuri Boldyrev, one of the pro-Russian leaders of miners' movement in the Donbas, frankly stated: "our attitude to Rukh is suspicious. Nowadays they (not us) are looking for alliance. The economic situation in the Donbas could make us support political self-determination of Ukraine as independent Ukraine needs the Donbas, its own coal which, anyway, will be more expensive than coal from Kazakhstan and Russia. Economics could make us choose the policy which are not close to us."¹⁷ In 1991 the miners' movement in fact allied with Rukh to support the independence of Ukraine.¹⁸ (Nowadays, on the one hand, miners' movement use yellow-blue Ukrainian banner; on the other hand, the absence of an adequate social support from Kyiv and understanding that Russia is not going to support separatism in the Donbas led to distancing of the significant part of population from active politics. Now it relies on itself: its own plots in the villages, small business enterprises etc.). Third, even in the critical year of 1994 the elected mayors of the three largest cities in the Donbas (Donetsk, Luhansk, Mariupol) were not left-wing, but centrists favorably disposed to the idea of Ukrainian state. Finally, despite quite clear regional (east - west) pattern in Ukrainian politics, it looks very difficult to unite Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa against "nationalists" because of competing leaders and centers.

Russian-speaking leaders do not feel excluded from political struggle in Kyiv, and they feel more realistic to compete for seats and resources in Kyiv than in Moscow. The problem is that this struggle should not lead to a kind of "Latinoamericanization" and domination of the politicians from one region (which was seen by the analysts as the serious danger, though the last year showed that the so-called "Dnipropetrovsk clan" was split between Kuchma and ex-premier Pavlo Lazarenko).

¹⁷ Cited in Moscow newspaper *Commercant*, July 2, 1990, No. 25.

¹⁸ For a more detailed account, see two-volume edition: Anatolii Rusnachenko, *The Awakening. The Labor Movement in Ukraine in 1989-1993*, Kyiv, 1995. The second volume is exclusively compiled of the original documents.

It is a different matter *how* the future of Ukraine is envisioned. Clearly, in Donetsk they want to secure the future of the functional use of the Russian language in official spheres and higher education and they want to maintain close ties with Russia. *Thus, the search for symbols in history and contemporary politics that could become meaningful for both Eastern and Western Ukraine acquires a particular significance. Say, one of the proposal for new Ukrainian coat of arms is to depict Galician lion to one side of the “trident”, and to the other - a Zaporozhian cossack. It should stress the integrity of Ukrainian history.*

Another factor which could influence Kyiv’s orientation is religious, though it is less important than ethnolinguistic as the atheistic propaganda in Soviet Ukraine was extremely strong and two national churches – Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs) and Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UHKTs) – were in underground. In the period of *perestroika* the conflicts among different confessions became acute, connected to the return of properties to UAPTs and UHKTs which were seized by the Russian Orthodox Church. Communist apparatus also tried to fuel the conflicts in order to weaken opposition. Besides, there was the struggle for the spheres of influence between UAPTs and UHKTs. After the independence there were splits both within Russian Orthodox Church and UAPTs. As a result, the so-called Kyiv Patriarchate which supports the idea of Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent from Moscow emerged. However, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is still the most powerful church in Ukraine (see table 1) which could be an additional instrument in Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. With the support from Ukrainian state the memorandum on non-use of force in interconfessional relations was signed in 1997. Nevertheless, the conflicts (though without use of force) have not been stopped.

Traditionally an important role in the right center of Western societies is played by Christian Democratic Parties. This role could be played by Christian Democrats in Ukraine as well. However, Ukrainian politicians which declared their Christian Democratic orientation were split among four parties with the word “Christian” in their title.

Table 1. Religious Communities in Ukraine (1996)¹⁹

<i>Orthodox</i>	
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UPTs)	6,882
Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UPTs – KP).....	1,529
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs)	1,167
<i>Catholic</i>	
Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UHKTs)	3,098
Roman Catholic	716
<i>Protestan</i>	3,699

Nevertheless, the positive thing is the fact that this split do not coincide with confessiona division. The quarrels about what is more “Ukrainian,” Orthodox or Greek Catholic Church, should be put aside. In Ukraine there are also Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims. There should be religious freedom for all. At the same time, *Ukrainian society, intellectuals, and church leaders should be more insistent in supporting trends for unity of the Ukrainian churches. In this case the dream of influential Ukrainian church figures about creation of Kyiv Patriarchate which could be a partner, not a vassal, of the Vatican and Moscow could be realized.*

¹⁹ Mykola Tomenko (ed.), *ABC of Ukrainian Politician. A Reference Book* (Kyiv, 1997) (in Ukr.), p. 210; See also, Taras Kuzio, “In Search of Unity and Autocephaly: Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches,” *Religion, State, and Society*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1997), pp. 393-415.

II. RESTRUCTURING THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND KYIV'S ORIENTATION

Since *perestroika* political development in Ukraine has shown that most decisions in the country are made by compromise. In contrast to many other countries of the CIS Ukraine gained independence and is developing without bloody interethnic conflicts, without violent conflicts between branches of power. Ukraine became the first country of the CIS where both parliament and President were re-elected democratically. The new Constitution of Ukraine (though adopted with great delay in 1996) was the result of compromise as well. Kyiv solved this problem in an “evolutionary”, in comparison to the “revolutionary” Yeltsin way, an armed assault on Russian parliament. Such specifics of the political process in Ukraine is explained by various factors, though it could also testify that political culture of compromise, the so-called *civic culture*, which is the important factor of civil society, is being formed.

However, the reverse side of the transition period in Ukraine is the strong influence of the remnants of Communist past. This influence was not radically restricted as in Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic countries. It hampers the reformation of the country. As a result, political and economic situation has not been stabilized yet.

The process of development of civil society is underway, albeit slowly. This process is also lagging behind its analogous processes in the post-communist countries of Central Europe or the Baltic countries. However, it is important to take into account that in Soviet Ukraine sprouts of civil society were destroyed systematically more vigorously than in Russia itself. Nowadays in Ukraine there is a number of NGOs which help to form public opinion, to increase the level of political and legal culture, to defend human rights etc. *The West could stimulate these positive changes which could lead to the stabilization of the atomized Ukrainian party system.*

The political “structurization” of Ukrainian society has been speeded up after the introduction of a mixed electoral system and the elections of 1998. The possible impact of the restructuring of Ukrainian political spectrum on interethnic stability is of extreme importance for the geopolitical orientation of Kyiv.

In analyzing the situation in Ukraine the Western press has often made the same mistake. It characterizes the supporters of Ukrainian independence, of Ukrainian language and culture a

“nationalists” with a certain negative flavoring (it is different from the neutral-academic approach in the West which view “nationalism” not as an extreme radicalism but as a movement for “nation-state”, autonomy or defense of common rights for ethnic community - that is, the synonym for “patriotism”). However, first, the extreme forces (UNA-UNSO) garnered only 3 seats in parliamentary elections of 1994; during elections of 1998 they got none; instead the even more extreme Social-Nationalist Party entered the Rada with only 2 representatives elected in single-mandate districts, in party lists parties with radical nationalist orientation failed to overcome the 4% threshold.²⁰ Second, the term “nationalist” carries a negative connotation in the former republics of the USSR where one still strongly feels the influence of Soviet propaganda. (In the West the word “patriot” is used in positive sense, although this word has also been discredited in the post-Soviet space, owing to the activities of the “national-patriots” in Russia). Therefore, in our opinion, in the circumstances of Ukraine it is better to distinguish between “national-democrats” and “national-radicals” (“nationalists”).

In the course of the electoral campaign of 1998 one could hear sometimes from the Right that the main task of two right electoral blocs – the radical National Front and moderate Rukh – should be struggle not so with the present-day Communist Party but with former Communists who remain in power and conduct policy harmful to the country. In order to estimate this viewpoint, it is necessary to realize where the main threat to Ukrainian statehood lies. To our mind, the main threat is the unsolved socio-economic problems. However, does it mean that the main attack should be on present-day power structures? The answer to this question is not necessarily positive. First, there were two contradictory trends. On the one hand, the prestige of state structures among the Ukrainian population is low. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the former Communist nomenklatura supported its own (although post-Communist) Ukrainian state. As a result, the so-called non-institutionalized “party of power” became the real force in Ukrainian politics. This process was connected not only with the nomenklatura-led privatization or career interests, but also with the influence of national consciousness latent under Soviet regime (first Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and first speaker of Ukrainian Rada Ivan Plushch are only the best examples of these changes). These part of former nomenklatura does not want a communist revenge or integration with Moscow. Second, in certain spheres of life the “retreat” of the Ukrainian language has been stopped; mastering of the

²⁰ Ivanna Klimpush, “New Parliament and the Foreign Policy,” *Zerkalo nedeli*, April 4, 1998 (in Russ.).

Ukrainian language has become a factor of prestige and broadening opportunities for one's personal career. That is why, criticizing controversial and even destructive course of the oligarchy in socio-economic sphere (and the good thing with the National Front is that demystifies its "state-building" role), it was necessary at the same time to use the oligarchy as an ally (though uncertain) against the Communist threat.

Besides, there was no united right-wing bloc. Both national-democrats and national-radicals have limited electoral bases. The results of all the elections held since 1990 show: they were never supported by more than one-fourth of the electorate. Moreover, the National Front competes with Rukh for the same "national-democratic" electorate. Thus, the National Front secured elections of 5 deputies in single-mandate districts, in party lists it did not overcome the barrier, but took away from Rukh almost 3 %.

Finally, it is unclear how the re-configuration of the right forces and formation of a strong nationalist force could influence Ukrainian politics. One of the reasons for the stable interethnic situation in Ukraine is that nowadays it is not necessary for common people to make clear-cut choice between two linguo-cultural orientations – so-called Ukrainophones and Russophones (though as it was stressed above the very terms are schematic). It is also clear that the sphere of use of Ukrainian language should be enlarged. At the same time, the theoretical possibility of the domination on Ukrainian political scene of the right-wing radical nationalist bloc and the Communists – that is creation of the polarized political system – could lead to a division of Ukrainian society into two or even three (plus ethnic Russians) communities and could negatively impact Ukrainian politics.²¹

*Another idea, formulated already in academic literature, seems to be more perspective: the idea that Ukrainian national movement for the third time after World War II faces the necessity of "historic compromise."*²² It was made for the first time at the III Congress of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1943, when the realities of Eastern Ukraine were taken into account, and the notion of "integral nationalism" was rejected (at least, in the program documents), while the notion of "democratic nationalism" was put forward. Second - in 1989-1991, when national democrats made a compromise with the national-communists led by Kravchuk in order to gain Ukrainian independence. Nowadays, *for the third time, there is the*

²¹ For pre-electoral debates over this issue, see articles of Anatoliy Rusnachenko and Olexiy Haran' in *Den'*, No. 66, 84, 1997.

²² Olexiy Haran', "Thinking of the Book of Myroslav Prokop," *Suchasnist'*, no. 12 (1995), p. 128. The English language variant of the review was published in *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, v. 21, no. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1996), pp. 315-316.

necessity of such a compromise: between national democrats and centrist-”Easterners” (they should include more liberals-reformists than representatives of the “party of power”). Without such a coalition national-democrats do not have any chances to come to power. Perhaps, in order to make such a compromise the new force should arise from national-democratic camp. This force could embrace the left-center and right-center and support Ukrainian statehood. Moreover, such a force, which could distance itself from the present Administration and formulate a clear course for a radical reform, could put forward its own candidate for Presidency who criticizes Kuchma from the right. The possible unity of national democrats and centrist-”Easterners” could open perspectives to reduce leftist influence (the Left in Ukraine does not mean to be social-democratic, they have Communist and Socialist political views which are hardly compatible with market and democracy in the Western sense) and for a breakthrough of national idea to the east of the country.

There were several such attempts in Ukraine. One was connected with the creation of Popular-Democratic Party when it was supported by several well-known national democrats (Olexander Yemets, Taras Stetskiv, Ihor Koliushko). But the dominating role within the party belongs to “party of power” which is responsible for the present economic situation. Among other attempts one could mention two blocs: “The Bridge” (which include Social-Democrats, centrist national-democrats and representatives of the directorate from the East) and right-center “Forward, Ukraine” based on the “Reforms” faction. However, both blocs split and, as a result, the structures which appeared did not overcome 4 % barrier in party lists (with the exception of Social-Democrats which gained only 4,01 % due to success in one region – Transcarpathia – where they gained one-third of the votes).

Another attempt was made by Social-Liberal Organization (SLOn) which considered themselves to be representatives of liberal Russian-speaking intelligentsia, representatives of the so-called “third force” in Ukrainian politics. They declared their orientation to reforms, middle class, intellectuals, “people’s capitalism” (as different from “nomenklatura capitalism”). At the same time they favored official status for the Russian language and priority of ties with Russia and the CIS.

This position, especially before parliamentary elections, was understandable. The organizers of SLOn did not cover their aim: to seize the votes of Russian-speaking electorate. However there is no clear answer to the question: how is it possible to become part of Europe

(which is official aim of SLOn) and to place priority on ties with Russia and the CIS where technologies are no more advanced than Ukrainian ones?

Nowadays a number of factors hampered the formation of powerful organizations of “Russian-speakers” (during elections of 1998 three parties which tried to play a “pure” Russian “card” failed. Only the Communists who tried to embrace slogans of social protection and tie with Russia managed to attract the votes of the part of “Russian-speakers”.) Socio-economic and political opportunities for the population are not limited by ethno-linguistic criteria. Russian-speakers do not have their own clear-cut identity; they are “split” between “Ukrainians”, “citizens of Ukraine”, “Russians”, “Russians in Ukraine”, even “Soviet people”. The Russian-speaking elite is to the great extent “technocratic”. It is known that to form powerful ethnopolitical movement it is necessary to have intellectuals who could provide slogan necessary to mobilize an ethnic community. Comparing the situation in the Donbas and north-east Estonia, Andrew Wilson and Graham Smith from Cambridge point out, “although local parties and political organizations in the Donbas are stronger than in north-east Estonia, in both localities an influential diasporic intelligentsia able and willing to promote identity formation and group action is lacking. Consequently, we cannot therefore presume that, even if economic conditions deteriorate further in both regions, this will necessarily trigger off an irredentist nationalism.”²³

In this regard, Crimea is a specific case. It is the only region in Ukraine where Russians comprise majority (almost 60%) and which at the same time is the historic land of Crimean Tatars (a bit more than 10 %) ²⁴. In Crimea there is a struggle for power and for control over the process of privatization between influential groups associated with “party of power”, namely with former Crimean Prime-Minister Anatoliy Franchuk (Kuchma is father-in-law of Franchuk's son). However, it is important to stress that these groups see the future of Crimea within Ukraine. Important players in Crimea are also local Communists as well as the Soyuz (Union) Party. Both parties are in favor of closer relations with Russia. However, the victory of pro-Russian forces in Crimea in 1994 paradoxically led to their split; they demonstrated adventurism, own ambitions which created for Kyiv the possibilities to

²³ Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilization in Eastern Ukraine and North-east Estonia,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1997, p. 861.

²⁴ Fedir Zastavny. *Geography of Ukraine* (Lviv, 1994) (in Ukr.), p. 413; Andrew Wilson, “Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), *The Tatars of Crimea. Return to the Homeland* (London, 1998), pp. 282. The figures are approximate as the last census was held in 1989 and the number of Tatars who came back is sometimes difficult to estimate.

intervene and to reduce the scope of power of the Crimean authorities. After the elections of March 1998 the leader of the Communist Party of Crimea Leonid Hrach became the speaker of Crimean Parliament (it was done with the tacit support of President Kuchma who preferred to see strong personality of Hrach as a Crimean leader than as the leader of Ukrainian Communists). As a result of compromise a member of the pro-Presidential NDP (Popular-Democratic Party) became Prime-Minister of Crimea.

Until recently, Ukrainian parties of national-democratic orientation were weak in Crimea. However, Crimean Tatars and Rukh support each other since the end of the 1980s. The leader of Crimean Tatars and former dissident Mustafa Cemiloglu was elected to Ukrainian Rada as N 9 in the party list of Rukh. It is understandable that Crimean Tatars supported Rukh during elections.

*In Crimea with three clearly defined communities (the Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars) it is possible to discuss the possibility of implementation of the elements of “consensus democracy”. Namely, one of the elements was the quota for Crimean Tatars and some other small ethnic groups in Crimean Rada. Crimean Tatars proposed to form a second Chamber, a Council of Nationalities. These proposals are to be discussed in constructive atmosphere. Kyiv demonstrated its attention to the problems of Crimean Tatars. Unfortunately, sometimes there were not enough finance, sometimes – political will to pursue concrete steps. (To be just, it is important to mention that it is Ukraine and not Russia, despite promises from Moscow, which bear the main financial burden of the re-settlement of Crimean Tatars who are coming back to Crimea).*²⁵

Sometimes, there are forecasts that someday Crimean Tatars will begin to voice slogan of alliance with Turkey, where Islamic radicalism is becoming a real danger; thus, it is important to side with Russia against “Islamic threat”. However, the historic and cultural heritage (tie between Crimean Tatars and Turkey) is a fact which cannot be ignored. Another thing is the reaction of Crimean Tatars, if they feel that the Ukrainian state does not protect their rights. Could this lead to weakening the position of pragmatists and strengthening radicals in the Mejlis (the Crimean Tatar parliament)? Therefore, it is necessary that Crimean Tatars feel that they are not deprived in Ukraine and, in this case, they continue to be loyal to Ukrainian state. It is

²⁵ For more details, see *Crimean Tatars: Repatriation and Conflict Prevention*, Open Society Institute, New York, 1995; Maria Drohobyck (ed.), *Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects*, New York, 1995; Edward Allworth (ed.), *The Tatars of Crimea. Return to the Homeland* (London, 1998).

necessary to add: one of the reasons why Crimean Tatars did not support separatist slogans to return Crimea to Russia was not only common struggle of Ukrainian dissidents and leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement against totalitarian regime, but their rational understanding – as a part of Russia Crimea could be only one of many autonomies, while as a part of Ukraine it has all the chances to attract special attention from Kyiv. Ukrainian aid to Crimean Tatars will also help to increase Kyiv's prestige in the Muslim East, to promote good contacts with Arab countries – oil exporters which is a serious factor in contemporary geopolitics.

The continuation of the present course will lead to further (though rather slow) state-building and formation of civil society. Nevertheless, analysts should also take into account scenarios which could be dangerous to Ukrainian statehood. Until recently, lagging of reforms was justified by the fact that Ukraine faced huge challenge: building a nation-state, civil society, democracy, and market simultaneously; it could not be achieved in one step. However, nowadays we have all the attributes of state, numerous state apparatus without an adequate economic background.

The most probable real rival of President Kuchma during next presidential elections in 1999 will be not from the right, but from the center (Marchuk) or from the left (Moroz). It is highly probable that in the runoff the struggle will be between the centrist (Kuchma or somebody else) and the left candidate. It could lead to polarization between the east and the west of Ukraine and new debates on the foreign policy orientations.

The fact that a Left victory in the parliamentary elections of 1998 (though not an absolute majority in the parliament) could be followed by the chances for victory of the Left candidate for Presidency (Olexander Moroz, Socialist speaker in former Rada) does not mean that the West should try to isolate Moroz, leaving him only one option, a pro-Russian orientation. *On the contrary, it is important to try to influence him to drift toward Ukrainian social-democracy. Some steps have been already made through the Socialist International, seminars in Ukraine and in the West with participation of the Left deputies. It should include “education” of Ukrainian Left, namely in the sphere of foreign policy.* (Unfortunately, in 1995-96 Moroz and his advisors made serious mistakes which damage Ukrainian image in international arena: his proposal to celebrate in 1995 50th anniversary of Yalta conference, or his proposal in 1996 to link NATO expansion with accession to it of Ukraine, Russia, and... Kazakhstan).

Moroz has demonstrated certain potential to move to the center. This is proved by the expulsion from the party of Left radicals and his role in adopting the new Constitution.²⁶ Perhaps he could also influence those Communists who have capabilities to evolve. Nevertheless, his dependence on strong Communist ally could be too dangerous.

The realization of this scenario depends to the great extent on the regrouping of forces on the left flank: 1) drift of the Socialists to the center; 2) changes in the ideology of the Communists. Socialist are more “pro-Ukrainian” than Communists, and Olexander Moroz tries to portray himself as the leader of respectable, not populist, force. There is a group within the Communists who would like to adapt themselves to realities of independent Ukrainian state. An interesting episode happened during the congress of the CPU in March 1995: because of the protests of the delegates from Western Ukraine, the congress did not fix in the program of the CPU demands for “two state languages” and limited demand for the “official” status for the Russian language. However, during elections of 1998 the CPU once again put forward the slogan of “two state languages.”

Nevertheless, traditions of Ukrainian national-communism provide a certain hope for positive development. National-communism played in Ukrainian history both a “revolutionary” and “conservative” role. Nowadays, after the collapse of the Communist system, the term “national-communism” is used mainly in a negative sense: it means conservation of power in hands of Communist nomenklatura or even return to Communist rule (“conservative” national-communism). However, in 1990–91 “national-communism” did not exhaust its potential to adapt to the historic development. It influenced the compromises between national-communists led by Kravchuk and national-democrats which fostered the peaceful transition to Ukrainian independence. Former Ukrainian dissident Ivan Dzuba (his famous *Internationalism or Russification?* was written in the 1960s under strong influence of national-communist ideas) stresses that even those who tried in 1920s to reconcile Ukrainian national-communism with Bolshevik dogmas, “inserted into Communist ideology more democratic context and were in favor of more pluralism than in orthodox Communist thought.”²⁷ The first variants of Rukh program were influenced by “revolutionary” national-communism as well. Though nowadays

²⁶ See also the speech of Olexander Moroz at VI Congress of the Socialist Party in *Tovarysh (Comrade)*, June 1998, No. 25.

²⁷ Ivan Dzuba, “Ukraine and the World,” in Ihor Ostash (ed.) *Quo vadis, Ukraine?* (Odesa, 1992), p. 25. For a very good analysis of Ukrainian national-communism, see James Mace. *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

Ukrainian Communists are very orthodox in their ideological stance, one could not exclude the possibility that in the long run at least part of them could follow the way of Polish and Lithuanian Communists. Even now, the Communist in the Rada are transforming from anti-systemic into the so-called “systemic” opposition.

Activity in the Left-Center was demonstrated by former prime-minister Yevhen Marchuk. He is the head of the faction of Social-Democratic Party (United) – SDPU(o). This party has not been transformed yet into real social-democratic party; there are influential businessmen in the party, but not trade union leaders which are traditional partners of social-democracy. However, in perspective SDPU(o) could evolve into Western style social democracy and become a serious force in Ukrainian society.

The more or less Western orientation of Yevhen Marchuk does not exclude the possibility of his playing the Russian or “Eastern” card in the future elections to gain the votes in the east of Ukraine (at least, after publications in *Den* of two program articles about the necessity of more pragmatic line towards Russia, it seems to be the aim of Marchuk).

Western experts usually stress that the Ukrainian Parliament and the government, not the President, are responsible for the lack of reform. In our opinion, part of responsibility should be shared by Kuchma. In order to be reelected Kuchma needs improvement in economy (otherwise, his only card will be struggle against “Communist threat”). But radical economic reform could intensify pro-left sentiments, especially in the east.

In this case, the best chance for Kuchma is to make somebody else in the government responsible for the hardships of radical reforms (who could be sacrificed before elections). And the West should condition its aid to Kyiv on concrete steps to reform the Ukrainian economy. Taking into account corruption and the electoral struggle in Ukraine, such Western position could become one of the most important factors to reform Ukrainian economy and to fulfill Kuchma’s promises of 1994 to declare war on corruption. This scheme has already worked. When in 1997 in the West, namely in US Congress, the campaign started to reduce or even stop American aid to Ukraine, President Kuchma created Consultative Council, comprised of the most influential foreign investors, and finally adopted the anti-corruption program.

III. ECONOMIC FACTOR

In the process of transition the role of external factors of economic stabilization become extremely important. However, direct foreign investments comprise approximately \$ 2 billion for Ukraine which is very low. For the period of 1990–1996 investments per capita for Ukraine were at only \$23 (compared with Hungary – \$1,256, the Czech Republic – \$617 who are leader in this process, Estonia – \$558, Russia – \$42, Romania – \$61, Turkmenistan – \$81 etc.)²⁸

According to official figures of Ukrainian Committee on Statistics, the geographical structure of direct foreign investment to Ukraine on January 1, 1997 was as follows:

Table 2.

Total:	2053.8 (\$, million)	%
USA	381.2	18.6
The Netherland	214.0	10.4
Germany	184.7	9.0
Russia	150.4	7.3
Great Britain	149.9	7.3
Cyprus	125.6	6.1
Liechtenstein	123.4	6.0

In 1997 \$ 759.2 million of investments came to Ukraine which was 43% higher than in 1996. In general, investments from the EU comprised 38% (that is more than the USA and Russia taken together). This fact is stressed by the EU analysts in Kyiv.²⁹ However, one should take into account that in reality investments from Russia could be much higher (as many Ukrainian companies have Russian origin, the same is true for third countries, Cyprus and Liechtenstein).

The largest amount of investments came to the food industry – \$422.1 million (20.6%), domestic trade – \$337.6 million (16.4%), finance, credit, insurance, pensions – \$174.1 million

²⁸ IMF. World Economic Outlook. Globalization: Opportunities and Challenges. May 1997, p. 156.

²⁹ *European Union and Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1997), p.4

(8.5%); machine-building – \$ 168.7 million (8.2%); chemical industry – \$141.2 million (6.9%), construction – \$90.6 million (4.4%). Thus, the investments are concentrated in those sphere where they do not play an important role in the modernization of the Ukrainian economy. They could be easily transferred from the country.

As the process of large privatization in Russia is coming to an end, the activity of Russian capital in Ukraine could increase. In general, this is a positive process. It will increase the interest of Russian politicians and businessmen in the political stability in Ukraine, effective functioning of Ukrainian economy, stable supply of energy resources to Ukraine. However, the diversification of economic ties is important as well. The dominance of Russian capital in strategic spheres of Ukrainian industry could increase Ukrainian dependence on Moscow. Meanwhile, there is a trend for compromise and agreements between powerful Western and Russian companies (say, agreements between Shell and Gazprom, British Petroleum and Lukoil). In this situation Ukrainian possibilities for maneuver could be reduced. Hence, the best way for Kyiv is to create attractive conditions not only for Russian capital (which is ready to work in the atmosphere of corruption resembling Russian situation) but for Western business as well.

The West is also interested in avoiding conflicts with Russia, in political and economic stability in Ukraine, reforming of Ukrainian economy, and its openness to foreign capital. Surely, there could be some negative effects for Ukraine as well. In the monograph, prepared at the National Institute for Strategic Studies within the structure of the Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine, it is pointed out: Ukrainian government followed the demands of IMF and liberalized foreign trade to such an extent that it caused transformation of Ukrainian economy into raw supplement of the West, domination of foreign goods in Ukrainian market, collapse of national producer. Tight monetary policy imposed by IMF was also negative factor for national production.³⁰ Moreover, because of the unrealistic tax burden, most of the profits of Ukrainian entrepreneurs are in the shadows, and the possibilities for legalization of shadow capital are absent. Thus, there is a great danger that in case of so-called “money” (no “certificate”) privatization national capital will be outflanked by foreign companies. However, one should not try to paint Western capital black for any imagined intrigue “to oppress Ukraine economically” (as was depicted by Kuchma’s advisors shortly after presidential elections of

³⁰ Volodymyr Shlemko and Ihor Binko, *Economic Security of Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1997) (in Ukr.), p. 91.

1994. At that time they followed the ideological clichés of electoral struggle and were close to the so-called “Eurasian” approach).³¹ Such an approach will only follow Communist propaganda.

It is understandable that in all post-Communist countries speculative business and so-called “crooks” are the most active at the first stage of transformation. This capital tries to bribe the state bureaucracy in order to outflank competitors and to have superprofits without any serious investment in the economy in transition. The longer the rules of the game are not clear and transparent, the better is the situation for such capital and corrupt bureaucrats. However, experts of Center for Economic Analysis a *Den*’ point out, “banana Ukraine” for the West could become dangerous: compradors could be easily “bought” by ideologically and geographically more close rivals, i.e. Russia.³² Large Western companies are disturbed by the possibility of involvement in corruption scandals with the danger to lose invested capital. That is why, it is important for Ukrainian government to create the necessary environment for non-speculative business which prefers stable profits, not speculative superprofits. Only in this way the possibilities for cooperation between national and foreign capital could be created. At the same time it is important to define clearly and transparently list of strategically important enterprise which remain under the control of the Ukrainian state or large national capital.

The agreement between Korean company “Daewoo” and Ukrainian AutoZAZ plant to produce cars for East European market created contradictory reaction among Ukrainian experts and public opinion. After the decision of the Ukrainian government to limit the import of used cars from Western Europe (they are rather cheap and thus highly competitive in the Ukrainian market) possible negative consequences include possibility for AutoZAZ to become a monopolist on the Ukrainian market. This has already created an atmosphere of dissatisfaction from the EU officials and experts which mention that it could seriously damage development of relations between the EU and Kyiv. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the first serious foreign investment in Ukrainian heavy industry.

In 1997 the geographical structure of Ukrainian foreign trade was as follows (see table 3):

³¹ Dmytro Vydrin and Dmytro Tabachnik, *Ukraine on the Threshold of XXI century* (Kyiv, 1995). However, very soon the choice was made in favor of closer relations with the West. See, parts 4-5 of our research.

³² *Den*’, Sept. 30, 1997.

Table 3.³³

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN 1997, in \$ million

Country	Trade	Export	Import
Russia	11560.9	3723.0	7837.9
Germany	1877.5	568.6	1308.9
China	1226.5	1100.9	125.6
Belarus'	1216.9	825.5	391.4
Turkmenistan	1149.0	176.7	972.3
USA	951.3	300.4	650.9
Poland	930.2	380.3	549.9
Turkey	832.8	670.8	162.0
Italy	795.4	395.0	400.4
Hungary	516.1	318.8	197.3
Total:	31359.9	14231.9	17128.0

Russia remains the main partner of Ukraine. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties in recent years, there are certain achievements in the diversification of foreign trade. In 1996 Russian part in Ukrainian export comprised 38,7%, in 1997 – 26,2%, in Ukrainian import – 48% and 45,8% respectively.³⁴ The EU became the second largest partner of Ukraine (though its part is considerably less than part of Russia).

The least diversified area for Ukraine is supply of oil and gas. Despite all words on the official level there are no serious changes. The debt for energy resources to Russia comprises a considerable part of Kyiv's foreign debt.³⁵ Though Ukraine buys natural gas from Turkmenistan as well, the transit of this gas is also through Russian territory which gives the opportunity to Moscow to control the conditions of this transit and, by these means, to control the final price for Turkmen gas. There are ideas about "triangles of cooperation" Ukraine – Iran – Turkmenistan and Ukraine – Turkey – Iran. However, these ideas until now have not produced considerable results. (The development of relations with Iran is criticized by the USA. The pressure from Washington made Kyiv to refuse to supply turbines for Russian-Iranian contract to build nuclear

³³ According to the official data cited in *Financial Consulting*, No. 12, 1998 (in Ukr.).

³⁴ *Financial Consulting*, No. 12, 1998; Volodymyr Shlemko and Ihor Binko, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

power station in Iran. As a result, the Turboatom plant in Kharkiv lost a contract). This position of official Kyiv was criticized by many Ukrainian politicians and economists. It is important to take into account that a lot of American allies despite the criticism from Washington continue to maintain economic ties with Iran. Nevertheless, because of economic and political weakness of Ukrainian government it is much more difficult for Kyiv to defend its own interests in dialogue with Washington.

The idea to build an Odesa – Brody pipeline that will connect the Ukrainian transit system to European pipelines seems to be promising. However, the oil terminal in Odesa has not been constructed yet. Strangely enough, the Ukrainian government is not tough in implementing this project. (Thus, the rumors about activity of Russian lobby spread). Kyiv also hopes for development of relations with such gas exporter as Uzbekistan, and for creation of the transport corridor through the so-called “GUAM”: Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaidjan – Moldova³⁶ (though abbreviation does not seem to be good as it could revive accusation from the Left that former republics of the Soviet Union are turned into American protectorates). But in this case the problem remains as well: how to pay for gas even if it comes not from Russia.

During the closed international tender in 1996 the Russian TVEL company was selected as the partner for creation in Ukraine of a joint venture for production of fuel for nuclear power stations. But, according to the project proposed by TVEL, the production of the main components of nuclear fuel will remain in Russia. Thus, Ukraine will be dependent almost exclusively on Russia in terms of main energy resources – gas, oil, and nuclear fuel.

The main possibility to reduce this dependence is to lessen energy consumption in Ukraine. Meanwhile Ukraine is the largest importer of natural gas in the world and the first consumer of it per capita. According to the National Energy Program, it is possible to reduce the level of consuming of natural gas in 2010 by 32.3% compared to 1990, its import by 49%. The adequate use of the fuel and gas fields in Ukraine itself will increase production two fold and save more than \$2 billion annually.³⁷

The fate of the coal industry in Ukraine is also a burning problem. Many mines are non-profitable and will have to be closed. At the same time, there is competition from the Russian

³⁵ See, for example, Volodymyr Shlemko and Ihor Binko, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 29.

³⁶ For more detailed discussion of the idea on the semi-official level, see the monograph of the National Institute for Strategic Studies Olexander Belov (ed.) *National Security of Ukraine, 1994-1996* (Kyiv, 1997), (in Ukr.) pp. 119-120.

³⁷ Volodymyr Shlemko and Ihor Binko, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

and Polish coal industries. Should the domestic producer be defended? This question is under serious debates among Ukrainian politicians and economists. Such examples could also be found in heavy, light, and food industry. There is a decline in all these branches while the import of foreign goods is growing. At the same time, there are enterprises which are quite competitive even despite the absence of necessary advertising (products of the Obolon' plant producing drinks is quite competitive even with production of such companies as Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola).

The positive examples could be found in heavy industry as well. The new agreement between the EU and Ukraine on the trade of the products of steel industry for 1997–2001 (signed in July 1997) will guarantee for Ukraine certain stable growth for export of this industry to the EU. According to this agreement, the markets of the EU will be gradually opening, taking into account creation of competitive environment in this sector of Ukrainian industry.³⁸

Another example of the domestic producer being competitive is the aircraft industry, especially cargo aviation. The question of joint production of transport airplane AN-70, which could be produced in cooperation not only with Russia, but also with Germany, is now under discussion. It is also symptomatic that the NATO peacemaking forces in Bosnia used ten IL-86 aircrafts of the Ukrainian military cargo aviation.

Important problem is the diversification of the ties in the military-industrial complex (a last year Russian orders made more than 80% of Ukrainian military output). Thus, the task is to identify the most competitive branches within the military-industrial complex, to try to seize foreign markets, especially in the Third World. An encouraging example is the tank contract with Pakistan for supply of 320 tanks T-80UD. Although Russia participated in tender, it was won by Ukraine. Russian attempts to impede the implementation of this contract were overcome. Some necessary parts were bought in Poland, and then Ukraine started to produce all the spare parts on its own. Realization of this contract made it possible for more than 200 Ukrainian enterprises to receive orders. The total value of contract is about \$600 million.³⁹

In some spheres (construction of power stations, missile industry) the breakthrough is possible to the markets of developed countries of the West as well. Now Ukraine is involved

³⁸ *Ukraine and the EU: Present Situation and the Prospects for Mutual Relations* (Kyiv, Dec. 1997) (in Ukr.), p. 23. This analytical report is prepared by Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research headed by Olexander Razumkov, former first adviser to President Kuchma, nowadays Deputy Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine.

³⁹ *Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine*, Jan. - March 1997, pp. 51, 65.

into more than 100 commercial projects. Say, according to the Globstar international project, 36 of 48 low-orbit satellites will be launched by Ukrainian Zenith carrier. The other program, Sea Start, envisages more than 800 flights during the next decade. The international consortium for implementation of this project comprises of the American Boeing Corporation (40% of shares), the Russian Energy enterprise (25%), the Norwegian Kwerner ship-building firm (20%), Ukrainian enterprises (15%).⁴⁰

The Ukrainian Parliament has already adopted the Concept of National Security. It should develop on its basis the Concept of Economic Security of Ukraine for 10–20 years and should adopt the Law On the Economic Security of Ukraine. While stimulating the domestic producer, it is necessary to reject the temptation of dumping of traditional export production. Such attempts will have a boomerang effect and will be counterproductive: the country-importer will use antidumping measures. It is important to stimulate 1) the export of ready-made production, services, know-how, geological, transport, and other services; as well as 2) to increase domestic production of turbines, planes, ships, machines, electronics, transport, agricultural equipment etc., thus reducing gradually imports of these sectors.

Special attention should be paid to those branches which could provide a quick return. That is why it is important to cancel limits on the development of small and medium business, to stimulate food, light industries, and agriculture which production was greatly reduced because of foreign competition; to create the system of privileges in these spheres for the domestic producer to fill Ukrainian market with cheap, top quality goods. There is a possibility to increase export of these sectors (namely, crops, sugar, vegetable oil) to the countries of the CIS. It is understandable that all this can not be done without land reform in Ukrainian agriculture which is still blocked by the Left in Verkhovna Rada.

Moreover, in general, the perspectives of economic reform do not seem to be good because of the presidential elections in Autumn 1999. Therefore, as it was stressed above, the role of the West and its attempts to influence the fate of Ukrainian reforms should not be overlooked.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

IV. GEOPOLITICAL CHOICE OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

For close neighbors of Ukraine in Central-Eastern Europe (to which, as Ukrainian officials nowadays continue to stress, it belongs both geographically and historically) the question of independence was solved unequivocally after World War I (Poland, Hungary, Romania) or at the end of 1980s (Slovakia, the Baltic countries). Moreover, the leading parties of these countries – whether Left or Right – made an unequivocal and in all likelihood irreversible choice in favor of Europe. After the failure of the putsch in the USSR and the acceptance of the Act of Ukraine's Independence in August 1991, after the ban of the Communist Party of Ukraine and drift away from Russia of the national-communists led by Leonid Kravchuk to the accompaniment of slogans of democracy and market, it seemed that the primary forces of Ukraine had become pro-Western.⁴¹

Before the dissolution of the USSR, fear of the balkanization of the Soviet Union, desire to preserve good relations with Gorbachev on the question of nuclear disarmament and global security led to Western underestimation of the national-liberation movements in the USSR, namely in Ukraine (in 1990 in Kyiv British Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher compared Ukraine to California; even at the beginning of August 1991 in Kyiv US President George Bush unequivocally supported the Union Treaty and criticized “suicidal nationalism” – the speech became known in the West as “Chicken Kyiv speech”). Almost until the last minute Western politicians hoped that it would be possible to preserve the Soviet Union in some form or another. However, the Ukrainian drift to independence made them to correct their policy. On the eve of Ukrainian referendum on independence President Bush, interested in support of Ukrainian diaspora during the presidential elections in the United States, finally stated that Washington would recognize the results of referendum. Actions of the Ukrainian diaspora in the United States played an important role in this change, but the main factors were peaceful, evolutionary way of Ukraine to independence, adoption by Verkhovna Rada on November 1, 1991 of the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, persuasive results of referendum on independence on December 1, 1991.

⁴¹ Adrian Karatnycky, “The Ukrainian Factor,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 107.

Both national-democrats and the ruling elite, inexperienced in international politics, believed that the West was prepared to accept the new state with open arms. However, even after the referendum, this appeared to be naive and unjustified. The Russocentric orientation of the West still dominated; the West tried to solve all the problems in the CIS through dialogue with Moscow. Ukraine was seen as unreliable, “capricious” country which suddenly acquired nuclear status. Making pressure on Kyiv for nuclear disarmament, the West at the same time was in no hurry to start long-term programs for economic cooperation with Ukraine. This Western position became one of the arguments that Leonid Kuchma used in 1994 at the beginning of his tenure as president, when justifying the course of “strategic partnership” with Russia.

At the same time, owing to 300 years of Russification, one still finds among a segment of the population (first and foremost in the eastern part of the country) echoes of the slogan for confederation or federation with Russia. There is a strong influence of regionalism on the vision of Ukraine’s future in the international system. It is clear that the position of eastern region excludes the possibility of an abrupt drift away from Russia. (That would be possible only in the event that neoimperial and authoritarian tendencies in Russia’s policy were to sharply intensify. Moreover, if the West should consider such a development an immediate threat, it cannot be ruled out, in the opinion of Alexander Motyl, that the West would embark on a policy of massive economic and military aid, as was the case with U.S. policy on South Korea.⁴² But at the present time such a development is hypothetical). Therefore, in the course and after elections of 1994 Ukrainian society was caught in a bitter polemic about the prospects of the foreign policy orientation of an *independent* Ukraine.

According to the “clash-of-civilizations” approach advocated by Samuel Huntington, the dividing line between Orthodox civilization and the West (Catholic and Protestant world) splits Ukraine. Ukraine was the place where civilizations met each other: Catholic West, Orthodox South and North, Turkic-Muslim East. Ukrainian history synthesized all that (one could see the attempts of such synthesis, for example in the 1920s in the approaches of Ukrainian national-communist Mykola Khvylioviy with his contradictory slogans of “spiritual Europe”, “away from Moscow” and “Asian Renaissance,” which Ukraine, in his opinion, should lead).

One could hear that Slavic-Orthodox world is not as bourgeois as the Western one, the spiritual values in Orthodox world are stronger than material ones, and that is why, there is no

⁴² Alexander Motyl, “Will Ukraine Survive 1994?” *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (Jan. 1994).

real Westernization in Russia, Belarus', Romania, Bulgaria. The thesis is very contradictory a coming to power of anti-Communist opposition forces in Romania and Bulgaria, the start of the radical reform could correct the situation soon. It is true that Slavic culture is very different from Western culture, it really pays more attention not to material values but to spiritual ones; however changes in the process of adaptation to the market values and post-industrial society are inevitable. And the task for this part of the world is to preserve its own cultural values while adapting them to the new situation.

The values of Slavic world do not necessarily contradict the return to Europe: beside Russia, Slavic world embraces Poland, the Czech Republic, other countries which see themselves to be part of the West and of Central Europe. (It is interesting that if we consider part of Russia to the Urals to be Europe, in this case geographic center of Europe is situated not far from Ukrainian town of Rakhiv in Transcarpathia).

Adherents of “clash-of-civilizations” approach should not forget that notion “the West” is rather broad as it embraces Europe, the USA, and Japan. It is understandable that American mentality with its accent on extreme individualism is not close to Slavic one.⁴³ Ukrainian mentality is closer to European, combination of individualism and collectivism (though not in primitive, vulgar sense as it was used in the Soviet Union).

However, we argue that Ukrainian history could not be explained by the cultural factor alone. It was much more complicated. The present situation could not be explained by simple references to history as well: it depends on the correlation of political forces. This is proved by the changing approach of the present Administration. During his electoral campaign Leonid Kuchma referred several times to “Eurasian space”. After elections the rhetoric that so irritated Russia was muffled (although as Kravchuk embarked upon the building of a new government, army, and diplomatic service, his course and rhetoric could not have been otherwise). Both national-democrats and Western experts warned about the danger of turning Ukraine “back to Eurasia”.

But very soon Kuchma began to solve the problems of strengthening the Ukrainian state better than Kravchuk did: restructuring Ukraine's debt to Russia, weakening separatist forces in

⁴³ Former director of Radio Free Europe wrote: “Some of the problems with which Ukrainians and Russians confront us are obscure, metaphysical, and very Slavic. They take us into first and last things in human and extra-human existence. They do not sit well with our pragmatic and utilitarian turn of mind. But these are questions history has put on our agenda; we may not always like them, but we cannot evade them. It may well be that our distant successors, chronicling the decline and fall of the Soviet empire, will say of our age that the

Crimea, signing in 1997 the Treaty with Russia and the Charter with NATO on distinctive partnership. His policy thus represented a continuation of Kravchuk's policy in many ways, but a more effective one. While balancing between Russia and the West, he began to move cautiously towards the West, and last year Kuchma proclaimed that the strategic aim of Kyiv is integration into European and transatlantic (!) structures.

In our opinion, the majority of Kuchma administration officials may be characterized as the "second wave of the nomenklatura". They were less ideological than the "first wave" of party workers upon whom Kravchuk leaned, they were more pragmatic, younger and more energetic, and finally, taking into account the *Realpolitik* of post-Soviet societies, they were more suited than the national democrats to the realization of a number of transformations.

In many foreign policy issues (for example, the CIS, integration into Europe, the division of the Black Sea fleet, the conflict in Yugoslavia) the Kuchma administration (like the Kravchuk administration) found itself being influenced by the contradictory orientations of public opinion. While distancing itself from his predecessor, the policies of whom were judged to be "nationalistic" by Eastern Ukraine, Kuchma at the same time had to take into consideration the position of those who voted for Kravchuk (the lessened influence of the national-democrats notwithstanding). Thus, the logic of state-building makes Ukrainian politicians, on the one hand, to try to balance the influence of regions in foreign policy, on the other hand, to set a course of integration into Europe.

Positive changes towards Ukraine were made in the West as well. As it was noted above, the results of the 1994 elections in Ukraine were unequivocally seen in the West as the victory of the Left and pro-Russian forces. However, afterwards it became clear that the Left did not dominate in Parliament, though they could block a number of vital decisions. On the issue that was the most disturbing for the West – the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine – the Ukrainian elite and public opinion reached a definite consensus: a "trade" for receiving aid and guarantees of Ukraine's security. Moreover, as surveys of public opinion showed, there were not significant divergences of opinion by regions, but the largest support for this position was to be found among people with a higher education.⁴⁴ Kuchma himself had come out in favor of the same

world's reorientation toward a safer and less warlike order had its roots in the great seed-bed of Slavic suffering" (George Urban, "The Awakening", *The National Interest*, No. 27 (Spring 1992), p. 46

⁴⁴ Victor Nebozhenko, "Public Opinion on the Main Priorities of Ukrainian Foreign Policy," *Political Portrait of Ukraine*, No. 5 (Dec. 1993), pp. 10-12.

position during his tenure as Prime Minister. The Ukrainian Parliament's ratification of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Kuchma's discourse of compromise in regard to Russia, the first steps on the path of reform (though, as it appeared lately, inconsistent and unrealized), and the main thing - the Chechen escapade and growing anti-Western tendencies in Russia's politics – all ensured the West's support of Kuchma's policies.

Surely, the declaration of strategic partnership with Russia gave rise to a certain ambiguity in relations with Moscow which provoked apprehension not only among national-democrats, but in the West as well. But Russia has trump cards that cannot be ignored (above all the dependence of Ukraine on Russia's energy resources). Kuchma's policy, therefore, combined flexibility and rigidity. He declined the customs union, the joint guarding of borders, full membership in the CIS in the economic sphere, although there were agreements on creation of intergovernmental economic committee and joint air defense.

One of the results of the Russian escapade in Chechnya became a better understanding by Ukrainian society of the non-democratic tendencies in Russia's policy, both domestic and foreign. These events greatly influenced the common Ukrainian citizens, including in the eastern regions, helping them to understand the independent position of Kyiv in international affairs.

However, the question arises: will Russian society reject the stereotypes of the past and recognize in reality, not on paper, the right of Ukraine for its own choice of the future, including its participation in international organizations?

Even in the elite academic journals published in Moscow, one can find juxtaposition of the views of the "real Ukrainian scholar" Kostomarov about the existence of "two Rus' nations" and Hrushevsky (this juxtaposition is not correct and this is evident to every student of Ukrainian history) who "all his powerful energy and talents directed to the aim of splitting Little Russian (Ukrainians) and Russians... But he did not invent this ideological historical schemes with definitely racist coloring. These ideas used by Ukrainian nationalists were invented by Polish chauvinists in XIX century with the only aim – to make a quarrel between Little Russians and Russians in order to split the Russian Empire from within."⁴⁵

Such publications show the depth of stereotypes among Russian elite. *One of the possible solutions to improve the situation is the teaching of Ukrainian history, culture, language a*

⁴⁵ Sergey Samuilov, "On Some American Stereotypes towards Ukraine," *USA: Economy, Politics, Ideology*, No. 3-4, 1997 (in Russ.). The author is the Head of the Division at the Institute for American and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. His article is the response to: John Mroz and Olexander Pavliuk, "Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.75, No. 3 (May/June 1996), pp. 52-62.

Russian universities. Ukrainian lecturers should be involved in this process, Ukrainian book should be translated into Russian.

At the same time, it is necessary to stress that the position of the executive power of Russia, including President Yeltsin, seemed to be rather balanced and realistic. In 1997 he finally visited Kyiv and signed the so-called “grand, all-embracing” treaty with Ukraine in which the territorial integrity of Ukraine was recognized. However, periodically either the Russian Duma or Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, while visiting Crimea, declare that Sevastopol is “Russian city”. It is symptomatic that while the Verkhovna Rada ratified the treaty with Russia, the Duma has postponed even including of the question of its ratification into agenda.

Considering the fact that the most likely course of Russia is the acknowledgment of Ukraine’s independence under conditions of concerted implementation of economic and political levers of pressure, attempts to pressure Kyiv will continue. In the course of the electoral campaigns of 1998 and 1999 there are fears in Ukrainian society as to the role of Russia. Are they justified? First of all, almost every potential candidate for the Ukrainian presidency will appeal to the electorate in the East and declare his desire for mutually beneficial relations with Russia. This is understandable. However, it should not be used by external forces to intervene in Ukraine’s domestic affairs.

It is not a secret that imagemakers from Russia are used by different political forces in Ukraine. Thus, these imagemakers have opportunities to collect important information about Ukrainian society, its elite, teams of candidates. There are fears that it could be used by those politicians in the Russian Federation who dream of increasing their influence on Ukraine. At the same time, in Ukraine there are already qualified sociologists, psychologists, and imagemaker with experience of participation in electoral campaigns (the successful campaign of the Green Party in parliamentary elections of 1998 is a good example). However, there is no starting capita for such a business. Thus, *Ukrainian entrepreneurs could help to create such structures in their own interests. It will save Ukrainian money, it will reduce the possibility of negative external influence and demonstrate that Ukrainian society is developed enough to carry out electoral campaigns independently of foreign influences.*

In the course of the elections of 1998–99 the tension over Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, and Sevastopol could be artificially increased. Before parliamentary elections in Crimea in March 1998 Kuchma wanted to secure his position in the region: 1) as previously,

the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol are not subordinate to oblast' (regional) but to all-Ukrainian structures. Hence, Sevastopol will not have the representatives in the Crimean Parliament, and, it is important to say, there were no strong protests about this in the Crimean Parliament; 2) Kuchma vetoed the new law for elections to the Crimean Parliament supported by the Verkhovna Rada which tried to introduce the mixed (50:50) system in Crimea (as in all Ukraine). The Rada did not have the possibility to overrun this veto. These events could postpone elections to the Crimean Parliament which favor Kuchma and former Crimean Prime Minister Franchuk. Thus, the Rada had to agree with the majoritarian system in Crimea. But this system also favors the so-called non-institutionalized "party of power" (under former law 14 seats out of 100 were reserved for party lists plus 14 seats for Crimean Tatars); 3) Kuchma appointed acting head of Yalta City Council (this city is one of the constituencies of Franchuk's family). Most political forces in Ukraine criticized this step of the President as unconstitutional. Supporters of Kuchma said he had to intervene in Crimean affairs because the level of criminality in the region (including attempts to kill businessmen or public figures) is very high.

Kuchma's clumsy actions led to reactivating separatist forces which declared their desire to discuss again the status of Crimea and its Constitution. In its turn, the Russian Duma postponed debates over ratification of Russian-Ukrainian Treaty.

There are different forecasts for future developments: A) Kuchma could use criminal and pro-Russian activities in Crimea as pretext to justify the state of emergency in Crimea or even in the whole Ukraine, to introduce direct Presidential rule in Crimea, and to present himself as the guarantor of Ukrainian integrity. Former President Kravchuk tried to play the same card in Spring 1994 without success. At the same time, after the election of pro-Russian Crimean President Meshkov in 1994, Kuchma with the help of then Prime-Minister Marchuk managed to discredit him and the Russia block, to abolish Crimean Presidency, to split the Russia block, and to stabilize the situation in Crimea. Nevertheless, now his policy seems rather clumsy.

B) However, there is also a different interpretation of the possible outcome:

Kuchma really has no card to play before the presidential elections. His popularity is low as he could not manage to introduce the real reforms in Ukraine. The West is also disappointed by this. Hence, there is a suspicion in Ukraine that he could try to receive financial support for

his campaign in Russia. During his meeting with Yeltsin at the beginning of 1998, Russian President declared his support for Kuchma in this campaign. In 1994 he also supported Kuchma. But then Moscow was disappointed by his foreign policy and his refusal to give the Russian language official status in Ukraine. Now Moscow could try to receive something in advance: 1) privatization of strategic and the most profitable Ukrainian enterprises by Russian capital; or 2) Russia could try to strengthen its position in Crimea, in general, and Sevastopol in particular.

The main Russian military object in Ukraine is the naval base in Sevastopol. After prolonged and difficult negotiations a compromise agreement has been reached: the lease will last until 2017. According to the Ukrainian Constitution, there should be no foreign bases on Ukrainian soil. Thus, the special article was included into “transitional clauses” of the Ukrainian Constitution. Except for this base, another object used in the interest of Russia is the Nytko (Thread) take-off and landing system in Crimea which belongs to Ukraine and is exploited by Ukrainian servicemen only for the training of the pilot staff of the Russian Navy (on compensation basis) as Ukrainian Navy has no aircraft.⁴⁶

Ukraine has signed the Agreement on Creation of the Joint Air Defense System (JADS) of States Members of the CIS, but with a stipulation – “taking into account the national legislation of Ukraine”. It means that Ukrainian participation in JADS is reduced to

- servicing of air defense technical means,
- working out programs for modernization and prolongation of the exploitation resource of air defense means,
- placing orders at Ukrainian enterprises, and
- producing air defense means.

Ukraine allots to the JADS only an insignificant quantity of roster air defense means. In fact, during peace time its participation in JADS is limited to joint control over the order of use of the air territory, and assistance to aircraft under *force majeure* situation. Kyiv did not sign the concept of protecting the air territory of the CIS countries adopted by the countries of the CIS on January 19, 1996 and did not join the provisions for the main trends of implementation of this concept.

In general, Ukrainian cooperation with the CIS in the military sphere is to a large extent restricted to relations on a bilateral basis with Russia (as it depends on Moscow in a lot of cases in

⁴⁶ *Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine*, Oct.-Dec. 1997, pp. 61-62.

military-technical aspects) or with those countries in which it is interested strategically (Moldova, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan).

The annual plan of cooperation with Russia in military sphere contains not more than 10 joint exercises, only four of them were fulfilled in 1996. To compare, according to the schedule of military cooperation with the United Kingdom Ukraine fulfills more than 70 measures annually. As a whole, 228 measures within the framework of bilateral cooperation with NATO countries and about 200 measures within Partnership for Peace program were conducted.⁴⁷

According to the poll conducted in April 1997, Ukrainian officers compared with population are less adherent to integration in any direction (eastern or western) perhaps because of the corporate character of the very military organization and because they do not want outside influence. However, among those who are interested in the process of integration there is a certain preference (though not significant) to NATO – 23% (12% in 1996), while for Russia – 20%. 37% of the questioned officers speak for joining the EU, while only 24% – for integration into the CIS.⁴⁸

The question about the future of the CIS is connected very closely with the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations. This question is viewed from diametrically opposite positions: reintegration or “civilized divorce”. There are many agreements within the CIS, but they are not implemented in practical life. It appears that the mechanism of the CIS in its present form do not work. Organization has been transformed into the certain “club of presidents.”

Ukraine is not against deepening cooperation within the CIS, but it is against the creation of supranational integrationist structures. That is why, Kyiv is in favor of developing, first of all, bilateral relations within the CIS. There are different trends and configurations within the CIS.

On the one hand, an alliance of Central Asian states is emerging. In many cases it shows an independent stance from Moscow. On the other hand, Minsk was in favor of closer ties with Russia. It was one of few Russian successes in the CIS. However, the statements of Ukrainian Left about the achievements of President Lukashenka in maintaining the “stability” of Belarusian economy, payments of salaries do not correspond to the real trends of Belarusian life. In fact, Minsk receives a dotation from Russia, first, because of the political intentions of Moscow second, because of the transit of goods through Belarus’ but not through Russian customs on

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 62.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.58.

Belarusian-Russian border. There is an authoritarian regime in the country, the isolation from international community is increasing. Violation of human rights in the center of Europe explains to a great extent the tough reaction of the West to this regime.

Kyiv is not indifferent to the fate of democracy in the neighboring country. Events in Belarus' should become for Ukraine one more vaccination against communism and should push to greater geopolitical self-determination. However, in the Ukrainian approach to Belarus' there is a traditional for international relations contradiction between *Realpolitik* and support of democracy. Kyiv prefers not to isolate Minsk but attempts to influence its position through dialogue. This approach could be explained not only because Ukraine is interested in good relations with its neighbor, namely because of economic cooperation. It is evident that the aim of Kyiv is also to show its own example of maintaining dialogue with the West, to become a mediator between Belarus' and international community, and to demonstrate to its neighbor the advantages of its European choice. It is a difficult job but the aim is worthwhile.

V. PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION INTO EUROPEAN STRUCTURES

The sphere of foreign policy is perhaps the only one where views of Ukrainian ruling elite are not lagging behind public opinion and are ahead of it, helping to form new approaches in the public opinion. According to the polls conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Center in late 1996 and early 1997, 85% of experts (representatives of executive and legislative branches, armed forces and mass media) consider that joining NATO (in perspective) will not contradict national interests of Ukraine.⁴⁹

However, these results look too optimistic. First, in the Ukrainian establishment there are influential groups which are against it. During the visit of NATO Secretary General to Kyiv in May 1997 for the opening of NATO information center, 187 deputies (not only from the Left but also some members of Unity and Interregional Deputy Group considered to be centrists) formed the group Ukraine - Outside NATO. Second, according to Democratic Initiatives joining NATO in perspective is supported by 38% of the population, 21% is against, and 42% do not have clear

⁴⁹ *Ukrainian Foreign Policy and Public Opinion* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 67-68.

views. Moreover, it is clear that there are serious differences between the East and the West of Ukraine.⁵⁰

The best option is consensus of the main domestic forces over the priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. Now this does not exist. The gap between the views of the elite and public opinion could be used by anti-Westerners, especially during an election campaign. This does not mean that the executive branch should look leftward, but it is necessary to move to Europe with great insistence and an adequate informational activity.

One could think about the possibility to define Kuchma's foreign policy as a certain kind of "Ukrainian Gaullisme": Ukraine is a member of the CIS, but Kyiv refused to join its collective security structures and it did not sign the CIS Charter; at the same time *rapprochemen* with the West is pursued. However, this maneuvering in Gaullist style is not supported by economic modernization.

In our opinion, the Romanian experience in dealing with European and transatlantic structures is very important for Kyiv. Recently Bucharest had rather bad image in the West: territorial claims on neighbors and problems with its Hungarian minority. However, these problems were solved, the anti-Communist opposition came to power, and economic reform began (though this process is uneasy and inconsistent). The result is that several NATO member were actively lobbying Romanian accession to NATO before the Madrid summit. The possible conclusion for Kyiv: integration into Europe is possible when there is a will to be reformed and when there is geopolitical self-determination.

There are important changes not only in Ukrainian position, but in Western attitude to Ukraine as well: it is viewed not so as a part of the CIS or Eurasia, but as a part of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the widespread view among Ukrainian right-wing forces that the tension between Ukraine and Russia could make Ukrainian integration into Europe faster, we agree with those analysts (namely with Olexander Pavliuk from the Institute for East – West Studies) who think vice versa: the West is interested in normalization of these relations. Therefore, the real choice is another one: is Ukraine a part of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) which is integrating into Europe or it has another status – different from other countries of this region? A kind of "bridge" between Russia and the West (a notion which quite recently was rather popular among part of Ukrainian elite), not to say of "buffer", could be dangerous in practice. Bridges are

⁵⁰ Ibid. pp. 102, 111.

destroyed in case of threat. Second, despite the positive results of the growing cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – Central European Initiative (CEI), Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), it is unrealistic to expect that the new alliance between the West (namely Germany) and Russia could emerge. Such an alliance was planned by some Polish Right forces and Ukrainian national democrats in the idea of the Baltic – Black Sea confederation, zone of cooperation etc. Cooperation in this area is developing, summits are held. Nevertheless, CEI and CEFTA are not the alternatives to European integration but the “preparatory class” to it.⁵¹

The accession to the EU of the new members from CEE could lead to the deterioration of their economic ties with neighbors, especially in the first stage. The new members will have to leave CEFTA which could lead this organization to become less effective or even to its disappearance. Thus, it will influence political relations in the region, namely Ukrainian-Polish relations. Therefore, as the authors of the research of the Institute of Security Studies of the WEU stress *it is important for Ukraine to join CEFTA before other countries of the region, especially Poland, become the members of the EU as in this case they will leave CEFTA but perhaps could remain in a kind of “special partnership” with CEFTA, thus providing a link between CEFTA and the EU. For that matter it is necessary to adapt the criteria of membership in this organization, strengthening its political dimension. The second important step is the increasing role of the CEI which will embrace the countries with different status (members of the EU, the WEU, NATO, candidates to these organizations and countries outside these organizations).*⁵²

Despite mutual interest, the relations between Ukraine and the EU are not developing quickly enough. The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU came into force only in March 1998 though it was signed in 1994 (because of slow process of its ratification by the parliaments of the EU countries). As the demands of Ukraine and the EU to mutual trade are based on the demands of GATT/WTO, the next step should be the entry of Ukraine to WTO. Afterwards the decision on the question of free trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine could be accelerated (the start of the negotiations is planned for this year). In Autumn 1997 in Kyiv the summit of Ukraine and the EU was held. However, in order to

⁵¹ Olexander Pavliuk, “Ukrainian Foreign Policy: After the Choice,” *Den’*, Jan. 23, 1997.

⁵² *The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe* (Chaillot Papers, No. 26, 1997), pp. 43-62.

develop relations, several impediments should be overcome. From the Ukrainian side, it is necessary to introduce the new legal base to ease foreign investments, from the EU side - to understand the problems of transition economy and to cancel unjustified restrictions on the import of a number of Ukrainian goods.

Last year the Federal Chancellor of Austria Victor Klima stated that his country which in the second half of 1998 will be the head of the EU will favor the preparation of the agreement on the special partnership between Ukraine and the EU. The Austrian Chancellor considers that the EU enlargement is more than the technical question, and it could not be seen only as the creation of a larger market: "It is a political project, which helps to realize the vision of the really united Europe". This step will ease not only the movement of Ukraine to the EU (as nowadays Kyiv could not implement the economic demands of the EU), but also the receiving of the status of **"associate partner" of the EU and the WEU**. It will hamper the creation of a new dividing line in Europe, the danger of which is connected with the "first wave" of NATO enlargement.

A special role in Kyiv's drift to Europe could be played by Poland. Official Kyiv stresses that Polish-Ukrainian cooperation could have the same importance in CEE as French-German reconciliation after World War II for Western Europe. Contrary to historical grievances, Polish-Ukrainian relations are exemplary now, and the Polish leadership (despite changes of parties in power) promotes very actively Ukrainian integration into Europe. Ukrainian diplomacy puts forward the ideas of Ukrainian accession to the Weimar triangle of France – Germany – Poland, though now it seems that these perspectives are becoming more distant. Ukrainian diplomacy should be more active in developing mutual relations with France which has traditional sentiments towards Russia.

Following the creation of a Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion, regularly military exercises Great Britain – Poland – Ukraine started. Ukraine and its neighbors put forward the ideas of forming "triangles" Ukraine – Romania – Poland and Ukraine – Romania – Moldova. It is important to stress that Ukraine as part of CEE could play the role of "motor" for Belarus' and Moldova on the way of these two countries to Europe. But the most important is that all these "geometrical" combinations should be viewed not as an element of old diplomacy, *cordon sanitaire*, but vice versa: in the process of uniting Europe, these structures could become the means for mutual cooperation between Europe and Russia, which is also striving for active cooperation with the countries of CEE for solving European problems.

The Kuchma administration's position on the expansion of NATO – an issue which for a long time (1994–1997) has become central in discussions between Russia and the West – was not at first clearly formulated, though Kyiv was not against NATO expansion. For the Left forces, not only entry to NATO but even cooperation with this organization was unacceptable. All of this made it difficult for Ukrainian diplomats to make use of the fact that Kyiv's position on the expansion of NATO had elements beneficial for the West and its neighbors in Eastern Europe as well as for Russia.

The attitude of official Kyiv to NATO expansion went through several stages. At first, there was no mention about the threats to Ukraine caused by the expansion; then these threats were seen; afterwards Kyiv stressed: we are not against expansion, but our interests should be taken into account, therefore the President spoke out in favor of “evolutionary enlargement”, which also appeared to be a rather cloudy formulation. Finally, the idea of “special relationship” was formulated. As one Ukrainian diplomat put it, Ukraine does not complicate NATO life by the demands to join NATO; therefore, NATO should be “grateful”. This “gratitude” should include: special partnership with NATO, associate partnership with the EU and the WEU, Western support for reform in Ukraine. Nevertheless, nowadays some of the leading Ukrainian officials do not exclude possibility for Ukraine in the future to join NATO, though they stress that now Ukraine is not ready to discuss this question.

NATO did not agree to insert the term “strategic partnership” in the title of the NATO-Ukrainian Charter on distinctive partnership.⁵³ The document is not legally binding. However, the fact that the document was signed at the Madrid summit (where the decision by the leaders of NATO countries to name new candidates for NATO membership was made) was very important. Thus, the role of Ukraine for European security was stressed. Moreover, Helsinki agreements of 1975 were not legally binding too, though they played an important role in providing a new climate in Europe. In the case of Charter, the sides should not overcome the difficulties with the ratification (and not only in Ukrainian parliament: the experience of ratification of agreements between the EU and Ukraine showed that it could last for several years). NATO expansion had already a positive impact on relations between Ukraine and its neighbors (signing of the basic treaties with Russia and Romania).

⁵³ Alternative views of Ukrainian experts on this issue see in “Distinctive Partnership with NATO: A Step to Membership or Non-Aligned Status,” *Den*, March 15, 1997.

It is important how concrete work will be done by the NATO-Ukraine Commission and in the sphere of day-to-day cooperation, especially if NATO agree to cooperate in the sphere where Ukraine has certain achievements (space industry, transport aviation). NATO could also deploy orders for Ukrainian plants of military-industrial complex. Otherwise, the documents which do not provide security guarantees will have only symbolic value - though symbols are important on Ukrainian way to Europe.

Great attention is paid by Kyiv to the prospects of relations with **the Western European Union**. In summer of 1996 Kuchma proclaimed that full membership in the EU is the priority for Ukraine; Kyiv would like to become associate partner of the WEU and is ready to fulfill these obligations unilaterally for a certain period. The status of associate partner means participation in joint maneuvers, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, exchange of information, periodic consultations. Those in the West who are against “associate partnership” of Ukraine stress that 1) Ukraine is non-aligned country and is a member of the CIS; 2) it does not have associate agreement with the EU. It is also clear that if the WEU becomes an integral part of the EU it will complicate Ukrainian association with it. However, there are arguments in favor of Ukrainian position. First, neutral Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland are observers in the WEU. In the new Ukrainian Constitution, there is no mention about non-aligned status. Ukrainian activity in the CIS (which is not a supranational structure) is limited. Second, Ukrainian diplomacy stress the possibility of “multi-speed” participation of the countries of CEE in the EU and the WEU.

During the visit of WEU Secretary General to Kyiv in September 1996 the WEU did not agree to sign with Ukraine a document analogous to the joint statement for the press, signed between Ukraine and NATO in September 1995. However, in the communiqué signed with Ukraine which is not a member of the WEU (the fact appreciated by Kyiv) there was a clause that “Ukraine is an important (though not an associate – *Author*) European partner of the WEU”. The list of possible areas of cooperation includes: participation of Ukraine in the peacekeeping operations of the WEU; cooperation in air lifting as well as between the WEU satellite center and National Space Agency of Ukraine. In June 1997 the document between Ukraine and the Western European Union was signed on cooperation in sphere of long avia-transport liftings. It is important to stress that it is the first document in the history of the WEU with a third country (!).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ For more details, see *Ukraine and the EU: Present Situation and the Prospects for Mutual Relations* (Kyiv, Dec. 1997), pp. 39-41.

Kyiv has already experience of participation in peacekeeping operations together with other countries (namely in Bosnia) and is interested in developing cooperation with the WEU within further development of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).

Therefore, in case of realization of proposed projects, de-facto level of cooperation between Ukraine and the WEU could be the same as for associate partners (or even higher as in aerospace sphere Ukraine has capabilities that other CEE countries don't).

Nevertheless, integration into Europe demands not only formal approval of such a course. First, geopolitical self-determination should be made clear by practical steps of Kyiv and should not depend on domestic struggle and electoral campaign with constant maneuvers between Russia and the West. Second, the “Europeaness” of the country demands also changes in style of thinking from both elites and public. For example, Ukraine is the member of the Council of Europe; this prestigious organization pointed out several successes of Ukraine in building democratic society. However, the question of canceling death penalty has not been solved yet (which is due also to electoral struggle in Ukraine). The fact that Ukraine has not fulfilled its voluntary obligations undermines its prestige in Europe.

Third, and perhaps the most important factor: as it was mentioned above, foreign policy successes of Kyiv do not have necessary economic background.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that because of geography Ukraine and Russia will always be neighbors, and thus they are to look for good-neighboring relations. The question is: what will be the model of these relations: the USA - Canada, the USA - Mexico or Germany - Austria? What will be the role of Ukraine between Russia and the uniting Europe?

In our opinion, the following scenarios are possible for Ukraine's foreign policy orientation.

- 1) Russia's renunciation of imperial policy and the “entry” of Ukraine and Russia into Europe. In this case, Russia will retain its dominance in the economic sphere, but possibly in a form that will be “acceptable” to Ukraine; in the cultural and spiritual spheres Ukraine will drift toward the West. This variant seemed unlikely until recently, given the anti-Western

tendencies in Russian politics. However, after signing of NATO-Russian Founding Act and Ukrainian-Russian Treaty this scenario should not be neglected.

- 2) The coming to power of the Left in the next presidential elections. In the event of somebody like Moroz coming to power, a continuation of the former policy of balancing is possible, but with bows in Russia's favor. However, because of Communist pressure a policy of integration with Russia that could have catastrophic consequences could not be excluded. This is the worst variant for Ukraine and for the West.
- 3) The continuation of the present policy of balancing: a political drift to the West, but accompanied by a good gestures in favor of Russia and possibly even the retention for a significant period of economic dependency on Russia. This option seems the most likely. Economic dependency on Russia could be reduced if the bloc of centrists and national democrats will come to power and the radical reforms will be carried out. If expansionist forces in Russia gain momentum, this may be answered by a reaction of intensifying pro-Western forces in Ukraine.

What could be done, namely by the West, in order to stimulate the process of transformation in Ukraine and to support its integration into Europe?

Summarizing briefly the results of our research we could propose the following steps:

Successful realization of these aims demands, first of all, not so diplomatic actions as economic stabilization and building of civil society.

That is why, in the economic sphere it is important for the Ukrainian government to create the necessary environment for non-speculative business which prefers stable profits. Foreign investments should be concentrated in those spheres which play an important role in the modernization of the economy. At the same time it is important to define clearly and transparently list of strategically important enterprises which remain under the control of the Ukrainian state or large national capital. While stimulating the domestic producer, it is necessary to reject the temptation of dumping of traditional export production. Such attempts will have a boomerang effect and will be counterproductive. The Ukrainian Parliament should develop the Concept of Economic Security of Ukraine for 10-20 years and should adopt the Law On the Economic Security of Ukraine.

The role of the USA in trilateral process of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was positive, therefore it could be applied to the solving of the debt problems with Russia and Turkmenistan. However, the main possibility to reduce this dependence is to lessen energy consumption in Ukraine and, at the same time, to provide the adequate use of the fuel and gas fields in Ukraine itself.

The West should condition its aid to Kyiv on concrete steps to reform the Ukrainian economy. Taking into account corruption and the electoral struggle in Ukraine, such Western position could become one of the most important factors to reform Ukrainian economy and to fulfill Kuchma's promises of 1994 to declare war on corruption.

In the political sphere it is important to stimulate the development of the multi-party system and civil society. The West can help in preparing new professionals and political elite, development of independent mass media, while the OSCE and the Council of Europe watch the situation with human rights. As anti-American feelings are rather strong in Russia, Western Europe is more suitable in some cases for active role in the region.

The West could influence formation of new political forces which could embrace the left-center and right-center and support Ukrainian statehood. The possible unity of national democrats and centrist-"Easterners" could open perspectives to reduce leftist influence. The West should not try to isolate Moroz, leaving him only one option, pro-Russian orientation. On the contrary, it is important to influence him to drift toward *Ukrainian* social-democracy. Some steps have been already made through the Socialist International, seminars in Ukraine and in the West with participation of the Left deputies. It should include "education" of Ukrainian Left, namely in the sphere of foreign policy.

While watching closely the situation with religious freedom, one should welcome the trends for unity of the Ukrainian churches and creation of Kyiv Patriarchate which could be partner to the Vatican and Moscow.

Of special importance is the sphere of ethnopolitic. While guaranteeing the rights of national minorities, it is important to show them advantages of being loyal to Ukrainian state, respectful to Ukrainian culture and language. (One positive example: new TV studios created with participation of American and German companies show in prime time movies of high quality which are dubbed in Ukrainian). It is important to forge new identity based not so on ethnic as on territorial patriotism, to find common historical and cultural symbols for

representatives of different regions (which, as it was mentioned above, should be incorporated into new Ukrainian coat of arms).

The West could advertise “success stories” (Kyiv’s policy towards national minorities) and find better term than “nationalist” in describing state-building process in Ukraine. The stereotype of Soviet propaganda Ukrainian = anti-Semite can be dispelled only through mutual efforts. Jewish immigrants from Ukraine could do much to promote good relations between their states and Ukraine. In this sense the idea of “triangle” Ukraine - USA - Israel put forward by Ukrainian diplomats should be carefully studied.

International organizations as well as Turkey could play an important role in resettlement of Crimean Tatars in Crimea. On the other hand, Ukrainian state is to restore the quota for Crimean Tatars and some other small ethnic groups in the Crimean Rada. Proposals of Crimean Tatars to form in Crimea a second Chamber, a Council of Nationalities, should be discussed.

As to the sphere of foreign policy, the Russian Duma is to ratify the Treaty with Ukraine as soon as possible. To accelerate it, Ukrainian parliament should, perhaps, to ratify or to make a credible statement on its desire to implement agreement over the naval base in Sevastopol reached by two countries.

One of the possible long-term solutions to improve the understanding of Ukraine by Russian elite is the teaching of Ukrainian history, culture, language at Russian universities. Ukrainian lecturers should be involved in this process, Ukrainian books should be translated into Russian.

The understanding that Ukraine is not a part of “Eurasia”, but a part of Central and Eastern Europe should be strengthened. It is important for Ukraine to join CEFTA before other countries of the region, especially Poland, become the members of the EU as in this case they will leave CEFTA but perhaps could remain in a kind of “special partnership” with CEFTA, thus providing a link between CEFTA and the EU. A special role in Kyiv’s drift to Europe could be played by Poland.

It is important how concrete work will be done by the NATO-Ukraine Commission and in the sphere of day-to-day cooperation, especially if NATO agree to cooperate in the sphere where Ukraine has certain achievements (space industry, transport aviation). Important problem is the diversification of the ties in the military-industrial complex. The task is to identify the branches within Ukrainian military-industrial complex which could be competitive with Russian

and Western producers. NATO could also deploy orders for Ukrainian plants of military-industrial complex. Various ties between Ukrainian and Western officers should be continued and promoted.

In order to develop relations with the EU, it is necessary, from Ukrainian side, to introduce a new legal basis to ease foreign investments, from the EU side - to understand the problems of economy in transition and to cancel unjustified restrictions on the import of number of Ukrainian goods (positive example is the new agreement between the EU and Ukraine on the trade of the products of steel industry for 1997-2001).

The main responsibility on the way back to Europe lies on Ukraine itself. However, the positive role of external factors should not be overlooked. This role could be played by the West as well as by those Russian politicians who prefer Russian integration, not confrontation, with uniting Europe.

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