THE CHYHYRYN MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN RIGHT-BANK UKRAINE: CAUSES AND HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES

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Abstract
This study concerns one of the problems in the History of Ukrainian-Turkish relations during the last quarter of the 17th century. The study analyses the pre-conditions, causes and consequences of the Chyhyryn Military Campaign headed by the Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV. To make a scientific evaluation of the said problem, data obtained from Turkish Ottoman and Crimean-Tatar written sources and from Historiography were used. A detailed description of the circumstances of the rising conflict has been provided, and the attempts to settle the acute contradiction between the participants of the respective events peacefully has been discussed. The military actions have been highlighted that relate to the said campaign, as well as its consequences. The military campaign ended in the victory of the Turkish-Ukrainian-Crimean & Tatar Army and the signing of the Bakhchisarai Treaty. Conclusions have also been made and presented.

Keywords: Chyhyryn, Mehmed, Doroshenko, Khmelnytsky, Giray, Crimea.

Öz
TÜRK ORDUSUNUN SAGYALI UKRAYNA'YA DÜZENLEDİĞI ÇIHİRIN SEFERİNİN NEDENLERİ VE SONUÇLARI


Anahtar Kelimeler: Çihirin, Mehmed, Doroşenko, Hımlenitskіy, Giray, Kırım.

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Introduction

According to the data available in the Turkish Ottoman and Crimean-Tatar written sources and, in the Historiography relating to the last quarter of the 17th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Річ and the Tsardom of Muscovy tried to divide Ukraine between themselves. However, the military and political union of the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine with the Sublime Porte, that existed in the beginning of the last quarter of the 17th century, prevented that from happening. The attempts to conquer Ukrainian lands by the said states were opposed at once by the Ottoman Empire resistance and the efficiency of that opposition depended directly on the international situation of the mentioned ally of the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine. Therefore, the purpose of our study is to interpret the information from the Turkish Ottoman written sources, which comment on the basic aspects, causes and historical consequences of separate events relating to the respective historical processes. Attainment of this purpose is to be provided by identification of the importance of the Chyhyryn Military Campaign of the Turkish Army in Right-Bank Ukraine, as well as that of the military campaigns made at the end of the 17th century at the Polish-Turkish Frontier, for the further development of the struggle for Ukraine between the Ottoman Empire, the Tsardom of Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Pre-conditions and causes of the Military Campaign

Within the information concerning the pre-conditions of the Turkish Khan’s Military Campaign against the Tsardom of Muscovy that is available in Turkish Ottoman written sources, particularly in the texts of “The Chronicle” (رَطْبُ المَسْتَرْدُومِ) by Abdurrahman Abdi-Pasha, “History of an Armour-Bearer” (تاریخ نوازندگان) by Fyndyklyly Mehmed-Aga and in works by other chronicle-writers which we have studied, there is data proving that during the time of the second Polish Military Campaign the Tsardom of Muscovy’s Army was attacking the territory of Ukraine. Obviously, under the pressure of the Tsardom of Muscovy, some changes in the foreign policy of Hetman Petro Doroshenko, particularly concerning the Black-Sea vector of the international relations of the Ukrainian Cossack State, took place. In this re-
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gard in the modern Ukrainian Historiography there is the following idea: “A com-
pelled transfer of one of the most devoted adherer of the foreign policy of Bohdan
Khmelnytsky on the side of the Moscow Tsar between October 1675 and September
1676 meant denial of his loyalty to his previous protectors – the Polish King and
Turkish Sultan, who did not want to give up Petro Doroshenko regarding providing
him with “more rights and freedoms” 4. Regarding this point, the mentioned Turkish
archival document – The Royal Edict (Farman) “On granting the Hetman Authori-
ties to Petro Doroshenko” dated from approximately 28 March 1675 according to
the Christian Calendar – demonstrates the fact of the recognition by the Hetman of
the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire.5 In “A Letter from Vizeir Coepruelue Fazíl
Ahmed-Pasha to Petro Doroshenko”, that must have been written in the Turkish
Ottoman language and then translated later into Latin, which, according to the De-
scription of said Fund, is dated from 2 October 1675, reads: “Hetman [Peter] Doro-
shenko, who is proud of his religious devoutness to the Christian leaders and busi-
ness barons, who is an alive proof of the success, and whose virtues are his sincerity
and justice. Concerning the affairs you [Petro Doroshenko] wrote to me, it is I, who
is answering you at once after I received your letters.” Then the document tells us
about the preparation of the Governor Mehmed IV for a military campaign and the
intention of the Grand Vizier Ibragim-Pasha, who was the Commander-in-Chief, to
at that point start off against the enemy of the Ukrainian Hetman. In particular, it is
said, that some time before Petro Doroshenko had informed in one of his letters, that
the enemy’s army had been defeated and destroyed, while the Ukrainian lands were
living in peace. It is also said, that “with the Supreme Lord’s help Petro Doroshen-
ko’s enemies would be crushed, when the Happy Governor [of the ottoman Empire]
had been passing that road”. The Vizier also wrote: “We are aware, that you [Petro
Doroshenko] wrote to you, that, while defending his native land [Ukraine], owing to
our [the Turkish Army’s help], the Enemy’s [Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s] Army
was defeated, and the oppression, having taken place beforehand, was
stopped, though now you swear, that your service would be an example of submis-
sion and respective obedience. From our side, we shall enjoy our Sultan’s generos-
ity and affection”. A separate army was given to serve Petro Doroshenko, while for
defending the Hetman’s country there was left a sufficient number of warriors who
would serve him loyally. In his letter the Vizier points out, that Petro Doroshenko’s
own forces would not be enough for the defense of Ukraine without the support of

5 BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), Ibnûl-Emin Haricîye Vesikalari, Nu: 52, [Petro] Doroşenko’ya
verilen Hatmanlık Beratı.
the Turkish Army. The Vizier warned the Hetman, that no lack of justice and obe­dience should not be felt from his side, which were expected to be required from Petro Doroshenko. It was also underlined, that “the Commander-in-Chief Uzun Ibragim-Pasha of the estimable army ordered, that all the suffered persons, all the population [of Ukraine] having suffered from the repressions should be returned to their initial situations, as it was required by the resolution (the passed and settled affair)”. In his message the Vizier underlined that Hetman petro Doroshenko himself would control governmental affairs. Moreover, to finally settle all the related issues the Governor of the Ottoman Empire Mehmed IV would pass a just and re­solving order.

Other sources of the Turkish origin show that Petro Doroshenko, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, having admitted the Sublime Porte’s Protectorate, became Governor of the whole of Ukraine, and, hence, he found a way to liberate the country from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth шлях до звільнення країни від Речі. As far as the change in the course of Petro Doroshenko’s foreign policy is concerned, Ismail Hakky Uzuncharshyly wrote: “Being not sure of the rightness of his decision, in 1675 this Hetman broke his relations with the Sublime Porte and, under the pressure of a threat of being attacked by the military forces of the Muscovy’s Tsar [Alexey Mikhailievich: ruling years 1645–1676]8, made with that a conspiracy and gave that the Fortress of Chyhyryn. The result was, that in spring of 1677 the Ottoman Empire’s Army headed by Vizeir Ibragim-Pasha, jointly with the Army of the Crimean Khan Selim Giray [1], set off in the said direction, that is against the Tsar of Muscovy” 10. We shall notice, that the changes in the course of Petro Doroshenko’s foreign policy in fact became the cause for the Ottoman Government to open another front - “the Muscovite” front – in the military campaign. This fact is considered in the said Turkish Ottoman written sources as confirmation of the stable policy of the Sublime Porte Government in relation to Ukraine, regardless of the disinclined character of the interstate relations development.

Concerning the scenario of the said military campaign, the decision of the

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6 Три списка съ листов Турецкаго визиря и другихъ чиновниковъ къ Гетману Петру Дорошенку увърительныхъ о присылкѣ къ нему вспомогательныхъ Крымскихъ войскъ // РГАДА (Российский государственный архив древних актов). Ф. 89. Оп. 2. Л. 46. 1675. – Октябръ 2. – (Three lists from letters from the Turkish Vizier and other officials to hetman Petro Doroshenko with assurances to send him additional Crimean armies. // The Russian State Archive of Old Acts. Fund 898 / – Description 2. Letter 46. 1675. – 2 October). 7 1086 АН. 8 The Tsar’s name is given in the transliteration from the original language. 9 1088 АН. 10 Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakki, Osmanlı Tarihi. II. Selim’in Tahta Çıkışından 1699 Karlofoçça Anlaşmasına Kadar, Cilt III, 1. Kısm, S. Baskı, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995, S. 429.
Divan’s decision to give Yuriy Khmelnytsky the authorities of Ukraine’s Hetman was not accidental: that meant supporting the traditions of the relations of allies initiated by Hetman Bohdan Khmenhytsky between the Ukrainian Cossack State and the Ottoman Empire, in particular between the Crimean Khanate. It should also be noted, that such a scenario of the events significantly influenced the religious factor too, - namely, the support of the Constantinople Patriarch’s decision to appoint Yuriy Khmelnytsky Hetman. When characterising Hetman Petro Poroshenko’s activities based on the data received from Turkish Ottoman written sources, one has to take into consideration the following point: “[Hetman Petro] Doroshenko having begun to serve the Tsar of Muscovy, the Ottomans discharged him from the Hetman’s office, while [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky was appointed hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks instead. Besides, [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky was arrested and was kept in the prison in the town of Yedicule 11. For [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky himself was officially a priest, then, according a governmental order and providing a support from the Roman Patriarch Parteniyos IV and a Divan’s translator Mavrokordat 12, [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky got up and went. He was appointed hetman and sent to [Ukraine]. In 1677, after the town of Chyhyryn having been freed from the Muscovites, the newly appointed Commander Sheitan Ibragim-Pasha was delegated to transfer that fortress to Hetman [Yuriy] Khmelnytsky as the new hetman” 13. Therefore, despite the unstable position of the Hetman’s Government, the Sublime Porte tries to observe the previous terms and conditions of treaties on the open support of the Ukrainian Cossack State. The said Commander-in-Chief surrounded Chyhyryn in June 1677. There were swamps on three sides of this fortress erected on a high rock, so one could access it from one side only. Food and ammunition were supplied to the fortress across the River of Tiasmyn 14, while it was guarded by 4,000 Muscovites, Cossacks 15 and Germans. On the 23rd day of the siege forces of the Muscovy were drawn to defend the fortress. Since 16,000 Crimean-Tatar warriors together with a Bosnian Army 16 could not oppose the enemy’s forces, Ibragim-Pasha had to withdraw the siege and retreat with their cannons. Such an unsuccessful military campaign resulted in the loss of their offices by the Commander-in-Chief Ibragim-Pasha and the Crimean Khan (Selim Giray I). The Ottoman Ruler Mehmed IV decided

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11 Yedikule (the Turkish name composed of two words: “yedi” - seven and “kule” - a tower) – located in Istanbul.
12 In the Sultan’s palace.
13 Следнит названий подкрите “Уджек-Кале” - “Уджем-Кали”, (Крепость Османа), - спорадично вики Д. Гайдукевич, Словацька Вікіпедія. Уперше було згадано в 1094 році.
14 Tasma (Turkish Tasmin) – the right sleeve of the River of Dnipro located to the south of the Town of Chyhyryn.
15 Evidently, there are meant the Cossacks that participated in the campaign supporting the Trardom of Muscovy.
16 Participated supporting the Turkish Army.
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to personally head a military campaign to Chyhyryn, and the following spring in 1678 the Sultan started that campaign having appointed the Crimean Khan Murad Giray (ruling: 1678–1683) 17. As far as the above is concerned, it should be noted, that that Khan in one of his letters, written in the Crimean-Tatar language, (“Khan Murad Giray’s Yarlyk to Prince Kashbulat”) wrote being in Bakhchisarai, the capital of the Crimean Khanate, that “… in case the Tsar of Muscovy get his hands off the Barabashes 18 and Kyiv according to the wish of His Highness the Sublime Porte’s Padeshah [Sultan Mehmed IV], and, in addition, if there are re-estated the old friendly relations, then no harm will be brought to the country and native land of the Tsar of Muscovy [Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich], …if you follow our words and contribute to the friendship between our two countries, but if you fail to agree on the said, with the help of our God Almighty on the “Hizir Ilyas” Day” 19, we shall be ready for a military campaign of the Tatar Army against Muscovy…”20. The data from this document is evidence of an attempt at a negotiation process on behalf of the Sultan to peacefully settle the conflict, before settling this conflict under military duress.

To keep on considering the theme we shall note, that the Ukrainian Historiography assesses the appointment of Yuriy Khmelnytsky mainly as negatively, though there was noted, that the Turkish party in the situation that had got then supposed the personality of that Hetman to have been suitable. At the very time Ivan Samoilovych (ruling: 1672–1687), who became the single Hetman at the two banks of the Dnipro, was practicing a pro-Muscovite policy, for which his nomination was not supported 21. As for the causes of the said military campaign, one has to note, that the declaration of war by the Turkish Governor Mehmed IV against the Tsar of

18 There is said about the Ukrainian Barabash Cossacks (Turkish “Barabaş Kazakları”). We may suppose, that this name originated from the family name of the Zaporozhian Cossack Yakiv Barabash. See about that in more detail in Turanly, Fergad. Ibidem. pp. 362, 565.
19 The name of a traditional religious Turkic holiday celebrated in spring (on 5–6 May accordi9ng to the Christian Calendar).
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Muscovy Alexey Mikhailovich, which was named in the Ottoman Historiography as “the Chyhyryn Military Campaign”, was aimed most at the liberation of the said Ukrainian town that had been occupied earlier by the enemy’s forces.\(^{22}\)

**Declaration of the War**

Ismail Hakki Uzunchashyrly also paid a lot of attention in his study to considering the issues, which we have formulated on a base of the above said sources, relating the political activities of the Cossack Hetmans and the causes of the Chyhyryn Military Campaign. For example, the scholar noted: “The Tsar of Muscovy, after several unsuccessful operations of Commander-in-Chief Ibragim-Pasha and the Crimean Khan [Selim Giray I] in 1678\(^{23}\), sent [to Sultan Mehmed IV] his envoy with a letter, in which, without reminding Chyhyryn, he wrote about a possible prolongation of their friendship. But the Ottoman Governor did not agree to this and rejected the proposal of the Tsar of Muscovy, while the reason for that turned out to become the conquer of the above said fortress. The Sultan warned the Tsar, that his reply to the Tsar’s letter would be the liberation of Chyhyryn by the Sultan. On 11 April 1678\(^{24}\) a war was declared on Muscovy.\(^{25}\) It should be said that, despite the attempts of Ibragim-Pasha and the Crimean Khanate to liberate Chyhyryn ending in failure, and in the Tsar of Muscovy’s addressing the Sultan with a proposal to prolong their peaceful relations between the two states, written documents prove the fact of the Turkish Governor’s decisive intentions in the military campaign, so as to liberate Chyhyryn as the Capital Town of the Cossack-Hetman Ukraine. Developing this idea, Ismail Hakky Uzunchashyrly in his academic study said: “Therefore, on 30 April 1678\(^{26}\) the Padeshah personally set off for Silistre with Davus-Pasha,\(^{27}\) where he appointed the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa-Pasha to be Commander-in-Chief, and sent that one to Chyhyryn. When the Army crossed the river of Buh, it was joined by the new-appointed Hetman Yuriy Khmelnytsky and expressed his respect to the said Vizier by kissing the Vizier’s hand.\(^{28}\) When Chyhyryn was in about a three day-and-nights’ travelling, the Crimean Khan Murad Giray (ruling: 1678–1683) also arrived with his army. They together got to the Town of Chyhyryn and after making the sacrificial ceremonies due to the religious dogmas, they

\(^{22}\) İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, aynı eser, Cilt III, I. Kısım, S. Baskı, S. 430–431. Про оборону Чи­

\(^{23}\) 1089 AH.

\(^{24}\) On 18 Sefer, 1089 AH.

\(^{25}\) İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, aynı eser, Cilt III, I. Kısım, S. Baskı, S. 430.

\(^{26}\) In Rebiyulyevvel 1089 AH.

\(^{27}\) Sanjak “Silistre” (Turkish), where the Chief Headquarters of the Army was located, the place for mobilising and training of a permanent army “Kapikulu” (Turkish) for the military campaign to the Balkans. Also see: Note 483.

\(^{28}\) İsmail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, aynı eser, Cilt III, I. Kısım, S. Baskı, S. 430.
surrounded the fortress, where quite a lot of food and military ammunition were available. Then it was known, that to help the fortress some other significant military forces were to come (with 150 cannons for the ground armies) under the head of Romodanovsky, so Kara Mustafa-Pasha jointly with the Crimean Khan [Murad Giray] crossed the River of Tiasmyn and, while moving ahead against the above said military troops, they were defeating the attacks from the fortress itself.  

We also have learned from the written sources studied, that there was a particularly dangerous situation around Chyhyryn Fortress. As the chronicle-writer Fyn-dykly Mehmed Aga wrote in the 17th century, the Muscovite’s Army consisted of about 200,000 persons. In this regard Ismail Hakky Uzunashchyrl noted, that “although the forces of Kara Mustafa-Pasha and the Crimean Khan [Murad Giray], that opposed the warriors of Romodanovsky’s Army, and they managed to stop the enemy attack that was approaching to help the fortress, the next attack by Romodanovsky’s army lasted till the time of the night prayer. The Fortress [Chyhyryn] lost its strength, but the enemy had not been defeated yet. This situation was reported to the Commander-in-Chief [Kara Mehmed-Pasha, and, since the enemy was planning to send new military forces to support the fortress, the Commander-in-Chief was asked to urgently provide an additional troop. The Commander-in-Chief indeed sent help at once to his army and owing to a strong attack the enemy was stopped. But another point that made the situation dangerous was that the enemy had managed to break the front line around the fortress of Chyhyryn. Because of that the Commander-in-Chief, jointly with his subordinated commanders, discussed the situation around the fortress.Ішлося про низький і недостатній моральний рівень воїнів. Відповідно до пропозиції головнокомандувача


31 The Muscovite military forces are meant.

32 There is meant provision of a support to the joint Ukrainian-Turkish Army.
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oblou из фортеци було знято» 33. Hence, when analysing the circumstances related to the events concerning Chyhyryn, one should primarily note the low morale and psychological spirit of the warriors in the Ukrainian-Turkish Army, which did not favor a successful continuance of military actions directed at the liberation of the said town. Ismail Hakky Uzunchaschyly, while continuing to consider the raised problem, pointed to an improvement in the complicated situation the Cossack-Ottoman military forces were in, underlining that that had happened owing to the very thoughtful and reasonable actions of the Vizier.

Chyhyryn Sieged

The further development of military actions is characterised by the following scenario: “The Muscovite troops which were moving to help the fortress [of Chyhyryn] were managing to advance step-by-step ahead, and when they got the upper swampy part of the River of Tiasmyn, the Muscovite’s army had got a respective combat site. At night about 50,000 warriors were delivered to the fortress. Despite the complicated situation the Ottoman-Cossack Army happened to get in, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish-Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar Army managed to manifest his personal reasonability and thoughtfulness, in addition he tried to increase the moral spirit of the rest of the commanders. It was then, that Barabash Cossacks came to help the Tsarist Army, who attacked the enemy, forming in such a way a separate front for military actions 34”. So, one can see from the given text, that a numerous army of the Tsardom of Muscovite held a superior position, and some Ukrainian Cossacks were participating in the actions on its side.

After overcoming the above said difficulties, the Turkish-Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar Army developed military actions in different directions, which were accompanied with violent battles. The said actions resulted in the defeat of the Tsardom of Muscovite’s Army, and the fortress of Chyhyryn was liberated. And so it happened that the said chronicle-writers and the respective archival documents inform us of the application of a new tactics of holding the battle by warriors of the Turkish-Ukrainian Army, specify the chronology of the respective battling events, as well as fix the fact of completing the said military campaign with in the victory of the Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar Army. As the Ottoman Army was fighting, on one side against the army of the Tsardom of Muscovite, which was besieging the fortress of Chyhyryn, and, on the other side — against the armed forces of the very enemy that was approaching the said fortress, and hence it found itself in a serious situation 35. However, elite forces soldiers, having used an underground passage, accessed the fortress and twice conducted devastating attacks against the enemy. This was followed by strong attacks from the

Sublime Porte’s Army. On 21 August 1678, the 33rd day of the battle, the military forces of the enemy defending Chyhyryn were defeated, the fortress was raised to the ground and 30,000 of their soldiers were taken prisoner and executed. Based on the written sources available to him, Ismail Hakkı Uzuncharşılı wrote the following: “A 200,000-Army of the Tsar of Muscovite, made of the [Barabash] Cossacks and Tatars 37, came onto the opposite bank of the river of Tiasmyn, so as to help the fortress of Chyhyryn, and witnessed the fortress having been conquered. That was the cause for losing all hopes for a success in the military actions, hence it was decided to retreat aside from the river of Dniipro, so as to provide one selves there with conditions for a self-defense. By that time this army had been surrounded directly by the forces of the Crimean Khan [Selim Giray I] and the Commander-in Chief of the Ottoman Army [Kara Mehmed-Pasha]. A bloody battle occurred. The Tsarist Army defended very well, so the try to wipe it out happened to be a failure. The ottoman Army had very little of food, hence the time came to get back home” 38. It should be noted, that, as a result of the Muscovite-Turkish War, the Hetman Capital of Chyhyryn, that was supposed to be the most important of all the Ukrainian fortresses, was liberated. The Turkish Ottomans felt very bad for a long time, though they did manage to stand up owing to the help of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa-Pasha. In September 1678 the Army of the Sublime Porte returned home 39. The Crimean Khan Selim Giray I came home with his army too. Restoration of Chyhyryn was absolutely impossible for the town had been raised to the ground. The Chyhyryn Military Campaign demonstrated that the Tsarist Army was a dangerous enemy, which made Sultan Mehmed IV consider the situation very seriously 40.

Consequences of the War

Ukrainian historians, when analysing the documents available to them, also made a reconstruction of the military campaign we have considered. For example, Yuriy Mytyshyk wrote about the consequences of the war: “The War of the 70s [the 18th century] between Muscovy, from one side, the Ottoman Empire with its vassal – the Crimean Khanate and the Nogay Hords – from the other side, for mastering their lands of the Right-Hand Bank of Ukraine completed in signing in Bakhchisarai on 23 (13) January 1681 a treaty of peace between these states. Due to Bakhchisarai Treaty of Peace the

36 3 Rejep, 1089 AH.
37 The Kazan Tatars are meant (Turkish “Kazan Tatarları”), the so called Eşker Tatars (Turkish “Eşker Tatarları”) and the Tur Tatars (Turkish “Tur Tatarları”), as well as the Kalmuks (Turkish “Kalmuklar”) and others. See.: İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşı, aynı eser, Cilt III, I. Kısım, 5. Baskı, S. 432.
38 Göş, yer.
39 Rejep/Shaban 1089 AH.
border line between the Ottoman Empire and Muscovite State was to be set up along the river of Dnipro. Turkey was to include to its territory the Northern Kyiv Region, Braclaw Region and Podillia Area, while Muscovy was to have the Left-Bank Ukraine and Kyiv. For a bout 20 years the territory behind the Southern Buh and Dnipro, including Chyhyryn with its outskirts, were to be not settled" 41. The Ukrainian historian thoroughly analysed the consequences of the Chyhyryn War and Yuriy Khmelnytsky’s activities in the revival of Right-Bank Ukraine, partially for Chyhyryn. This was alongside the Crimean military marches made with the joint efforts of the Muscovite-Ukrainian Army, protected by the Polish King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Jan III Sobeski of the magnate latifundia on the Ukrainian lands, etc. 42.

If one should continue to consider the consequences of the Chyhyryn Battle, one cannot do so without paying attention to the data obtained from the works by Turkish chronicle-writers and historiographers, who efficiently used the “vekayina-me” materials and documents from the Sultan’s administrative offices. For example, Ismail Hakky Uzuncharshyly stated: “Returning of the Grand Vizier [Kara Mustafa-Pasha] home did not become the end of the Muscovite military campaign” 43. The Vizier was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Army, and he stayed in the town of Babadagy. The said Turkish historiographer also underlined, that “the Governor of the Bosnian Area within the Ottoman Empire Defterdar Ahmed-Pasha received the order to construct two fortresses on the Dnipro so as to strengthen his positions there, provide control of the respective border 44 and guarantee protection of Ukrainian lands. In 1679 45 the construction of the fortresses was complete and defenders of the fortresses were appointed 46.

We note, that, despite the victory in the Chyhyryn War, Sultan Mehmed IV intended to continue the military campaign against the Muscovite Tsardom and declared the preparations for the next military march. Among the most important events in the development of the military events of that time we can include the implementation of the above said Crimean military campaigns 47, organised by the Muscovite Tsar Fiodor III Alexeyevich. It is known, that when the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief Kara Mehmed-Pasha was staying in Babadagy, he received

41 Concerning the Treaty6 on Peace made between the Tsardom of Muscovy and the ottoman State in 1681, Kinross notes, that according to that treaty, the Turkish party was to cancel all its claims to Ukraine (Lord Kinross. The prosperity and degradation of the Ottoman Empire. / Transl. from English by M. Palnikova. Moscow : Kron-Press, 1999. p. 368.
45 1090 АН.
from the Crimean Khan Murad Giray a notice indicating that the Muscovite Army was getting ready again to begin military actions. In September 1680 important statesmen were invited to the Sultan’s Palace to discuss the possible development of the events. It was decided, that the military campaign would be headed by the Padeshah himself, and that is why the Governor of the Sublime Porte with its army went to the town of Edirne (Adrianople).

When the Muscovite Tsar discovered that Sultan Mehmed IV was going to set off on a military campaign against him, he addressed the governor of the Sublime Porte, with intermediation from the Crimean Khan Murad Giray, offering to make a treaty of peace. On 11 February 1681 a peace treaty was signed. That treaty consisted of 12 articles, and it was to be valid for 20 years. In particular, the treaty provided, that the lands on the Right-Bank of the Dniapro would stay under the power of the Ottoman Empire, while the city of Kyiv with all its fortification structures and a few palankas (small fortifications of a Cossack regiment) were to remain under the power of the Tsar of Muscovy. Neither the Ottomans, nor Muscovites were to build any fortresses from the borders of the fortress of Kyiv to the borders of the Potkal Cossacks, which is on the territory between the rivers of Dniapro and Buh. The Potkal Cossacks were permitted to sail in the Black Sea for fishing. Due to the said treaty, the Crimean Khan Murad Giray had no right to stand on the offensive on the lands of the Muscovite Tsar, while the people having been taken prisoners beforehand (obviously, meaning the prisoners taken during the Chyhyryn Battle and the Crimean military marches of the Muscovite’s Army), were to be given freedom. Because of the said treaty, the military campaign having been planned by the Turkish Sultan was cancelled, and Mehmed IV returned from the town of Edirne to the capital of the Ottoman Empire – Istanbul.

**Conclusions**

Summing up the evaluation of the data from written sources related to one of the most important problems in the History of the Ukrainian-Turkish relations during the respective period, we have made the following conclusions: 1) participants in the Chyhyryn Battle were, on one side, the Ottoman Empire, and on the other, the Tsardom of Muscovy; 2) the cause of the War was the conquering of the fortress of Chyhyryn by the military forces of the Tsardom of Muscovy and the change, under the pressure of the Tsar of Muscovy, by Petro Doroshenko in the course of his foreign policy; 3) because of setting up a diarchy in the Ukrainian Cossack State, the latter behaved in its actions both on the side of the Ottoman Army (Hetman Yuriy Khmel-

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48 Shaban/Ramazam 1091 AH.
49 22 Mugarren AH. About the date of signing this Bakhchisarai Treaty see: Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. С. 290. – (Mytshyk Yu.A. Ibidem. p. 290).
50 İsmail Hakki Uzunçaşılı, aynı eser, Cilt III, I. Kısm, 5. Baskı, s. 433; Мицик Ю. А. Назв. праця. С. 290.
51 İsmail Hakki Uzunçaşılı, aynı eser, Cilt III, I. Kısm, 5. Baskı, s. 433.
nytsky), and on the side of the Muscovite Army (Hetman Ivan Samoilovych); 4) the aim of the military campaign of the Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV against the Tsardom of Muscovy was to liberate the town of Chyhyryn, but the audacious battles resulted in running that town into the ground; 5) the war between the Tsardom of Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire had serious economic and political consequences for all the states-participants; 6) the military campaign ended in the conclusion of the Bakhchisarai Treaty of Peace in January-February 1681.

Assessments of this war in the Ukrainian and Turkish national Histories differ from each other significantly. The arguments and facts we have presented, having received them based on our analysis of the above said written sources, enable us to come to the conclusion that Turkish historiographers mainly stress the common interests of Turkey and Ukraine in the said war, while the academic studies of Ukrainian scholars, especially the ones belonging to the Soviet period, call this historical period “the Ruin”. However, an analysis based on a study of sources give us grounds to think that nowadays there are no completely objective historical facts to suppose the Ottoman Empire had been the aggressor in the said war. Despite this fact, the archive documents demonstrate evidence of an attempt to negotiate a peaceful process in the hope of a peaceful settlement by the Sultan of the above said conflict before settling that conflict with a military force. The Chyhyryn Military Campaign of Sultan Mehmed IV himself in reply to the aggression of Muscovy ended in the victory of the joint armed forces of Ukraine and Turkey, but, certainly, all those wars came with ruinous consequences as their arena was the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, when studying the history of the development of the relations between the said countries during the last quarter of the 17th century, in order to provide an objective highlight, one has to take into account the information available in the Turkish Ottoman and Crimean-Tatar written sources and in general historiographical documents.

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