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Ottoman Empire after the defeats of its military forces in the Khotyn Military campaign, resulted in incapability of this state to provide help to the Crimean Khanate in suppressing by that the protesting movement of the population, and that made the ruling circles of the Crimean Khanate search a political union with the Zaporozhian Sich, that in the second quarter of the 17th century turned into one of the most powerful at that time military force, which both the Ottoman Empire and the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth had to think of in their activities. It was this fact that became a pre-condition for strengthening the military and political cooperation between the Cossack-Hetmanic Ukraine and the Crimean Ulus. However, such a scenario of the events made it possible a development of the cultural relations between these countries which require making further studies.

**Key words:** military cooperation, an Ottoman-Turkish written source, historiography, the Ottoman Empire, Khotyn, the Zaporozhian Host.
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the time of the end of Khotyn War till the 40s of the 17th century, requires a thorough academic analysis with taking into account the data available in Turkish-Ottoman written documents and in that historiography. In particular, there are issues related to the influence of the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks, as well as the effect of their military marches in the Black Sea, on the relations between the Ottoman Empire, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovia. When pondering the consequences of the Khotyn War, for instance, the causes that contributed to the convergence of the Crimean Tatars with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, in our opinion, one should mind the historical event having been fixed in the Turkish-Ottoman chronicles of that time (Ostapchuk, 1989, p. 23–48). The essence of that event is tries of the Sublime Porte and those of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to set up mutual relations. However, the Khotyn War demonstrated the impossibility for those endeavours to come true, as neither party was capable of keeping under control the population in the border area, that is the Crimean Tatar and the Ukrainian Cossack ones. Moreover, in 1623 the Budjak Tatars (Başer, 2010, p. 11‒75; Khalymonenko, 2010, p. 57), headed by Mirza Kantemur, after the said war became as strong as ever, which turned out for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth a threat not the least, that the threat from the Crimean-Tatar Army. Considering the principal problem of our study, it is important to note that the unsuccessful Khotyn military march, headed personally by Sultan Osman II Gendj, resulted in a destabilisation of the internal political situation in the Ottoman Empire, which became be manifested in uprisings that started to occur in different regions of that country, including its capital – the city of Istanbul. Besides, the situation in the country got aggravated by the fact, that it was the time, that the Irani-Turkish war began (Öztürk, 2004, p. 367). This internal political factor also contributed to an extension of the rebellion movement towards the Turkish possessed areas in Northern Black-Sea Area, particularly onto the territory of the Crimean Khanate.

The analysis of sources and recent studies. The problem of an academic study about the military cooperation between the Zaporozhian Host and Crimean Khanate was in the centre of fundamental studies made by a serious of national and foreign scholars: Yu. Mytsyk «From a source about the history of the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate between the 16th and the first half of the 18th centuries» (2010), V. Brekhunenko «Cossacks on the Steppe Border of Europe: a typology of the Cossacks communities between the 16th and the first half of the 17th centuries» (2011), F. Turanly «The Cossack period in Ukraine’s history in Turkish Ottoman written sources (the second half of the 16th century – the first quarter of the 18th century)», (2016), Y. Öztürk «Relations Between the Turkish Empire, Zaporozhian Cossacks and Crimean Khanate in the first half of the 17th century» (2018) and others.

The publication purpose. Analysis of the data available in the Turkish-Ottoman chronicles we have studied about the Cossack-Hetmanic Ukraine in the first half of the 17th century and about its relations with the Ottoman Empire, as well as identification of the circumstances under which there was rising of the military and political cooperation between the Cossack-Hetmanic Ukraine and Crimean Khanate.

Statement of the basic material. Under the conditions having set up the government of the Sublime Porte was not able to help the Crimean Yurt in suppressing the protesting movement of the population of that one, which was a real threat for the government of the said state formation in terms of possible losing its control over the Crimea. This fact compelled the ruling circles of the Crimean Khanate to look for a political union with the powerful at that time military force – the Zaporozhian Host. One should also take into account the point, that one of the most forcing reasons for massive uprisings of the Crimean Tatars was the execution of
the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray II following an order of the Turkish Sultan, and even the high status of the khan did not save him. In response to that execution the sons of the dead khan, Saadet and Murad, organised a rebellion of the population in the Crimean Khanate as a protest against the actions of the Sublime Porte. But the attempts of the khan’s descendants turned out to fail, and they, having been defeated, started to maintain their own relationships with the Ukrainian Cossacks, as well as with the Nogay Tatars, that were under the subordination to the Muscovia Tsar Mikhail Fiodorovich Romanov (ruling: 1613 – 1645). These Nogay Tatars together with the Don Cossacks were to provide support of the Caucasian policy of the Muscovian Czardom (Homan, 2002, pp. 12–14; Khalyymenko, 2010, pp. 56–58; Turanly, 2016, p. 215–216; Ivanics, 2015, pp. 53–73; Bozkurt, 2002, pp. 579–580). In such a way the sons of the executed khan tried, aspiring an alliance with the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks, to snatch the initiative from the government of the Crimean Khanate in relation of the above said reorientation of the foreign policy of that state formation. The Ukrainian Cossacks – Crimean Tatars Union established under those conditions got stronger later during the ruling of the grandson of Mehmed Giray II – the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray III (ruling: 1622/1623 to 1628).

The historical written sources, which we have studied, manifested that the Crimean Khanate during the ruling of Sultan Ahmed I took an active part in the war of the Sublime Porte with Austria and Iran. For the heroism having been demonstrated in the said war Khan Gazi Giray II (2nd ruling: 1596 to 1607) was awarded by Turkish Sultan with the title «the Sword Master» (Turanly, 2016, p. 216), while his generations, respectively received certain privileges, particularly the personal immunity. When the said Crimean Khan died, representatives of his kin (shirins, mansurs, sudjivites) proclaimed his son Toktamys Giray (ruling: 1607/1608 to 1609) to be the Governor of the Crimean Yurt. But another decision was made in the Sultan’s palace, and namely: the brother of Gazi Giray – Selamet Giray I was appointed the Khan (ruling: 1608 to 1610), and the descendants of Gazi Giray II, that is Mehmed Giray III and Shahin Giray – got respectively the kalgay and nuraddin titles. This fact happened to be also an internal political cause that became an imposing motive for activating the formation process of the Ukrainian Cossacks – Crimean Tatars Union (Turanly, 2016, pp. 214–233).

A new phase in the development of the military cooperation and political union of the Crimean Khanate with the Zaporozhian Host was between 1623 and 1624. The proof of the efficiency of the pro-Ukrainian foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate is the fact, that at the end of the said historical period the military and political cooperation between the Zaporozhian Host and the Crimean Khanate reached its highest point (Öztürk, 2018, pp. 26–34). Particularly, the large importance of that cooperation for strengthening of the position of the Ukrainian Cossacks statehood formation was proved by the following factors: the attack on 14 June 1623 of the Zaporozhian Cossacks on the territory of the Ottoman Empire located on the southern coast of the Black Sea, and the invasion, on 28 June the same year, of the military forces of the Zaporozhian Sich into the occupation of the Sublime Porte located in the Northern Black-Sea Area. In the beginning of July 1623 Zaporozhian Cossacks made a regular sea-march to the Turkish city of Trabzon and ruined it, after which they approached very closely the capital of the Sublime Porte – the

1 The Nogays is the name of a Turkic-language speaking people, whose nomination originated from an authoritative governor of the Golden Horde times – Khan Nogay (1270 – 1299).
2 Each Crimean Khan appointed a Kalgay, that is his Substitute.
3 Nureddin – a descendant by blood who presides in local courts, as wells heads small corps during military marches.
city of Istanbul. Then in 1624 the new governors of the Crimea, those were Mehmed and Shahin the Girays, being supported by Zaporozhian Cossacks, defeated the Turkish Ottoman military forces, whose aim was to punish the said governors for their insubmission. Understanding by the governing circles of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Crimean Khanate of a mutual usefulness of the military and political union is the fact, so, after resisting the attack of the Ottoman army, Shahin Giray and the heads of the Zaporozhian Host reached an agreement on defending each other against attacks and on providing joint military actions (Öztürk, 2004, p. 376–377; Ostapchuk, 1989, pp. 49–91). We note that Yury Mytsyk, a Ukrainian historian, qualified this historic event in the following way, after analysing some Polish archival documents as a coup d’etat, which resulted in getting the power in the Crimean Khanate by supporters of the Ukrainian Cossacks – Crimean Tatars Union: «In May 1623 a coup d’etat occurred in the Crimea, and the power was taken by Khan Salamat Giray’s son Magomet Giray III (ruling: 1610, 1623 – 1627), while his right hand was his brother – a famous Kalgay-Sultan Shahin Giray, who supported the Ukrainian-Crimean Union» (Mytsyk, 1996, p. 205–214). Such a re-orientation in the foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate was proved by an analysis of the contents of the written agreement signed between the Zaporozhian Host and the Crimean Khanate in December 1624, that officially set up a military and political union between the said state formations during 1624 – 1629. Particularly, this historical document includes the independence of the Zaporozhian Host representatives to recognise de jure the independence of the Ukrainian Cossacks as that of a subject of international relations (Brekhunenko, 2014, pp. 147–156). The information about the military and political union between the Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars, that we obtained from Ottoman written sources and from the Turkish Historiography, was proved by evidence of Ukrainian historians (Mytsyk, 2010, p. 330; Brekhunenko, 2011, pp. 424–444; Scherbak, 2006, p. 233, 241).

The mentioned event resulted in activating invasions of Budjak and Nogay Tatars in the Western territories of Ukraine (Mytsyk, 1996, pp. 20–206). The reason for those invasions was the fact, that at the time, when the contradiction between the Crimean Khanate and the Sublime Porte got shaper, there became more active the military and political activities of the said governor of the Nogay Tatars – Kantemur – in the interests of the Ottoman Empire. The results of such activities were as follows: 1) a significant decrease in the number of attacks of Zaporozhian Cossacks onto the territory of the Bogdan Country; 2) as an alternative force against the charismatic leaders of the Crimean Khanate, there were manifested the activities of Mehmed Giray III and Shahid Giray, who were not satisfied with the position of the Sublime Porte in relation of the appointment of the governors of the Crimean Khanate; 3) as Kantemur, for his heroic deeds in the Khotyn War, was appointed by Sultan Osman II Gendji, the Defender of «Özî»

«Özî, Özî, Özü» – this word was used to mean the River of Dnipro (« Özî Nehri »), Fortress of Ochakiv (« Özî Kalesi »), the Dnipro Cossacks (« Özî Kazakları »). In the Turkish Ottoman written documents we have studied this term is used in two semantic meanings: 1) the hydronimic (the River of Dnipro); 2) the toponimic (the Fortress of Ochakiv – the main administrative centre of the Dnipro Area) (Sâmi, p. 1068 – 1069).
The data, available in Turkish Ottoman written documents relating to the respective historical period, show that the formation process of the military and political union between the Zaporozhian Host and the Crimean Khanate accounted for strengthening the intensity of the military and sea-marches of the Ukrainian Cossacks against the Ottoman Empire. For instance, in 1623 Istanbul was again attacked by a Cossack Fleet, and in June 1624 Zaporozhian Cossacks on 150 sea-gull boats attacked the Turkish land occupation, after which they mastered some of that land occupation, located on the southern coast of the Black Sea, actually on the shore of the Bosphorus Strait. During this attack a lot of trading facilities were ruined and burnt. The next march of a 5,000-military and political detachment of Zaporozhian Cossacks headed by Olexiy Safran on 300 sea-gull boats was made in 1625. The attackers devastated the northern shore of the Peninsula of Asia Minor from the city of Trabzon to the city of Sinop. After a fierce fighting with the Turkish Fleet the Cossack military and naval forces were defeated and returned to their motherland. During the counter-attack of the Turkish military and naval forces in 1625 under the head of Rejep Pasha the Cossack Fleet was defeated. However, in spite of this defeat, the Cossack Fleet did not stop making sea marches during a few following years either. That made the Ottoman government delegate the «Özü» Defender – Murtaza Pasha – and the Turkish Fleet Commander – Hasan Pasha – so as to strengthen the defence and search for new allies (Öztürk, 2004, pp. 384–409).

Hence, in 1625 the activity of the Zaporozhian Cossacks invasions onto the Black-Sea occupied lands of the Sublime Porte reached a level unheard at that time, and there even occurred cases, when Cossacks commanders had agreed in those invasions with the intentions of the Crimean Tatars. But after oppressing the Ukrainian Cossacks by the Poles, which happened during 1625 – 1626, the activity of the military actions of the Zaporozhian Host against the Turks got down noticeably. Though the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire comprehended, that the said phenomenon was temporary. That is why the government got the advantage of the situation having set up for performing measures aimed at an improvement of the defensive potential of the frontiers of Turkey’s occupied land in the Lower-Dnieper Area. For example, a decision was made to construct in the mentioned regions two fortresses. The importance of such a construction with the aim of preventing in future invasions of armed detachments of Ukrainian Cossacks can be proved by the following fact. To overcome the problems with the material provisions and supplies for the implementation of that project, the government of the Sublime Porte re-distributed the taxes coming to the governmental treasury from the lands in the Lower-Dnieper Area, so as to use the collected funds for the construction of fortified structures, which were to protect the northern frontiers of the Empire (Ostapchuk, 1989, p. 92–125). By strengthening the borderline of its occupied lands in the Northern Black-Sea Area, the Ottoman government during 1627 and 1628 made a few military marches against the Ukrainian Cossacks, as well as completed the erection of fortified structures in the area of the Fortress of Ochakiv.

We may also characterise the historical period, we have studied, as a period of a military rise in the force of the Crimean Tatars, Nogay and Ukrainian Zaporozhian Cossacks on the Northern border of the Black Sea. In this relation the Turkish historian Ö. Öztürk states: «The Polish-Cossack and Ottoman-Cossack wars in the first quarter of the 17th century did remain their consequences. At the same time there was intensified an uprising in the Crimea against the Ottoman Empire. This event to a certain extent happened to become a cause for a joint counteraction of the [Ukrainian] Cossack and [Crimean] Tatar communities» (Öztürk, 2015, pp. 23–24). This historian underlines then that «At that time Muscovia, as if being neutral,
tried first of all in indirect ways to protect the Cossacks, aiming at setting those under its control. Because of the Cossacks attacks at the near-the-border territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Army under the commandment of Osman II started the Khotyn Military March (1621), which was a failure, as the Crimean Tatars were in rebellion against the Ottoman ruling and did not helped that seriously» (Öztürk, 2015, pp. 23–24). Developing his idea, Ö. Öztürk made the conclusion: «The ally relations between the Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars against the Ottoman control reached its significant level after the Khotyn Military March, and that lasted till 1627. At that time the Ottoman authorities had almost lost their influence in the Crimea, which had been occupied by the brothers Mehmed and Shagin Girays, who left their personal trace in the policy of that time. In addition, these brothers actively cooperated with the Zaporozhian Cossacks» (Öztürk, 2015, p. 24). Hence, the said facts enable us making the conclusion in terms of the reasons for a rise in the allied relations between the Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars, as well as in regard of the unsuccessful Khotyn Military March headed personally by the Turkish Sultan.

The textological analysis of the contents of texts in some official documents of the Ottoman government, which we have made, showed that the establishment of the military and political union between the Zaporozhian Host and Crimean Khanate was supposed by the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire to contradict not only to the foreign interests of the state, but also to the legal norms of the Crimean Khanate status having been set up yet under the ruling of Sultan Mehmed II Fatih. So the Ottoman government tried to settle the problem by dismissing Mehmed III Giray (Shahin Giray’s brother) from the khan’s throne and appointing Janibek Firay to the khan’s throne. After that both brothers, aiming at rising the resistance to the said measures of the Ottoman government, activated their searching to identify opportunities for setting up a political union between the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian Cossacks. Minding the point that the new appointed governor of the Crimean Khanate failed to oppose the pressure from Shahin Giray, increased by a support from the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Ottoman government had to recognise the power of Mehmed III Giray, who openly announced his support of the above said union, which lasted till 1628. After the allies managed to set up a joint control over the Crimean Khanate, in particular after the Ukrainian Cossacks again captured the city of Kafa, in the Crimean Khanate, a so called «Cossack tax» was introduced, which became a heavy burden for the population of this state formation (Öztürk, 2004, pp. 380–383). The name of the tax itself may imply, that a large share of the collected funds was got by the Ukrainian Cossacks.

About an essential source-related importance for a complete conceiving the problems associated with the political union between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars, that was accompanied by the complications rising in the relations between Bakhchisarai and Istanbul, long-lasting naval marches and wars against the Sublime Porte during 1614 – 1628, as well as by the construction of defensive facilities by the Sublime Porte in the Lower-Dnieper occupied lands of the said state, are some other documents kept in the Ottoman Archive. For example, it is «The Order to the judges of Silistra5, Nigbolu6, Vienne7» written on 6 June 1627, that informs of the construction of the Fortress of Tiagin (Doğan Geçidi) in the area of the Dniipro (Yıldırım, Atik, Çebecioglu..., 2001, 2 [3], p. 4)8. To provide assistance in this

5 There are meant the lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans.
6 There are meant the lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans – the modern city of Nikopol on the territory of Bulgaria, that is located on the southern bank of the Danube.
7 The capital of the state of the Austrian Habsburgs.
8 The modern village of Tiaginka.
construction, there were sent an army and officials from the regions of Silistra, Nigbolu and Vienna. Their Judges received respective orders – to provide an organised redlocation of the army in the place of its destination. Another document – «An Order to the Judge of Ackerman» (the date of the writing of this document was 6 June 1627) (Yıldırım, Atik, Cebecioğlu..., 2001, 4 [5], p. 4) states, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Dnipro Region prepared quite a lot of construction materials of wood for the construction of a fortress in the area of the city of Tatarbunary (Uzunçarşılı, 1995, Cilt III, 1. Kısım, p. 129). However, he was dismissed from the position, and the materials were sent to the Fortress of Ackerman. When it got known about that, an order was received from the Centre for the Judge of Ackerman and for the official, responsible for the delivery, to resend the said materials to the river of Dnipro for repairing the Fortress «Öz»12. It is worth of paying attention to the data fixed in the document under the title «An Order to the Beglerbeg of Ochakiv («Özî») Ibrahim (May His Happy Life Last Long!), who was the authorised governor of Silistra Sandjak» (Yıldırım, Atik, Cebecioğlu..., 2001, 64 [79], pp. 45–47; Yıldırım, Atik, Cebecioğlu..., 2001, 65 [80] p. 47; Yıldırım, Atik, Cebecioğlu..., 2001, 105 [123], pp. 73–74). The text of this document ran the Ottoman government had undertakeb urgent measures aimed at making a military march against the Union. The text of this document also informs about the preparation and implementation of repair works in the Fortress of Ochakiv, which was considered then to be one of the most important measures. Ibrahim Pasha was given the order, that it was he himself, who was to be in the state of constant readiness and, when Vizier Hasan Pasha came with his fleet, to unite with that one. As the theme of the study we have made was relating to a source-study, we believe it is necessary to provide below an adapted text of the considered historical chronicle document in English.

«An Order to the Beglerbeg of Ochakiv («Özî») Ibrahim (May His Happy Life Last Long!), who was the appointed governor of Silistra Sandjak, on the following: according a will of our Lord, this happy year, so as to make stronger the Fortress of Ochakiv, it is necessary to complete the repairing works and overcome the available defects and failures. To provide in this area order without drawbacks due to my great wish. An important work shall be mobilisation of a lot of combatants. Together with me at the high level there shall be those ones, who started on the march (except for the part-timers), and the ones, who is already on a deserved rest – from the older people and Military Commanders (sipags, officials, chavushes (commanders having ranks of officers, 15 combatants), Secretaries of my Divan and from the Executive Office [evidently, the one dealing with the land-relating issues], officials, chavushes, record-keepers [evidently, an officer in the army, who performed duties of the record clerk], apprentice-assistants of the secretaries, alabei-officials, and generally all the mentioned landlords and officials) – these ones shall be under your subordination. All the said people shall be mobilised in due time near yourself; the Chief Marchall-Commander of my respected Navy Fleet shall be officially appointed Commander-in-Chief of the military community which is to draw duties, while the seraskirs (army commanders), appointed by the latter ones, as well as the serdars (top commanders), shall be effective. When the World’s order from the Defender comes – my Vizier Hasan Pasha (May His strength supported by the Almighty Lord not stop!), be ready with your armed people in Ochakiv. The order I have issued personally,  

9 There is meant Mehmed Pasha. In 1620s Iskender Pasha was taking the said office.
10 A town in Odesa Oblast, Ukraine.
11 There is meant the Topcapy Palace located in Istanbul.
12 There is meant the Fortress of Ochakiv (In the Turkish-Ottoman it is spelt as «Özî», or «Özü»).
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which is a source of happiness, shall be valid. I order that …» (Turanly, 2016, pp. 221–225). The information obtained from «An Order (Yıldırım, Atik, Cebecioğlu..., 2001, p. 69–70) to the judges of the cities of Kafa, Sudak¹³, Taman¹⁴» dated from 30 June 1628, which tells us that «despite their official discharge from the then occupied posts, Mehmed and Shirin the Girays¹⁵, two brothers, did not recognise that decision¹⁶, so they decided to struggle against the Ottoman State, which had approved as its final decision the actions directed at a complete getting rid of the said brothers-rebels (Yıldırım, Atik, Cebecioğlu..., 2001, 101 [119] pp. 69–70). For reaching that aim a naval fleet was sent under the command of Hasan Pasha. At the same time from the Central Ottoman Control Headquarters orders were issued to the respective regional representatives, hereunder those ones were obliged to ensure observation by the people of the Crimea of the political course of the Sublime Porte» (Archive of the Topkapy Palace Museum (TSMA), 1642 – 1643, E. 0793; Aktan, 1995, p. 261). As it is seen from a written source we have studied (Kołodziejczyk, 2000, pp. 135–136), on 9 September 1630 an agreement consisting of seven articles was concluded between the Ottoman State and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Its main aim was settling «the Cossack problem», that is the maintenance of control over the most important facilities and headquarters of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the area of the Dnipro and, particularly, on the islands of this river, including here also Khortytsia Island. There was provided appointment of the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks by the Polish party. Under this agreement Kalgay Islam Giray III was to be freed from the Polish capture, while attacks on Poland by the Crimean and Nogay Tatars were to be stopped (Öztürk, 2004, pp. 396–397).

Our analysis of the said data obtained from written sources concerning the Ukrainian Cossacks – Crimean Tatars Military Union enables us to come to the conclusion, that, despite a certain fragmentary character of the written documents we have studied, on one hand, those ones bring us to the conclusion of a rise in the military and political impact of the Zaporozhian Host on the southern lands of Ukraine and on the Black-Sea shore, and on the other hand, there is obvious the fact, that the Sublime Porte had to take in consideration the presence of Ukrainian Cossacks in the said region. Establishment of the Ukrainian Cossacks – Crimean Tatars political Union was also promoted by the struggle for the throne, and in particular, by disputes and contradictions between the governments of the Khanate and the head of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a joint control of the Crimean Khanate and the introduction of «the Cossack tax», searching by the government of the Ottoman Empire ways for settling the problem connected with the said attacks of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, as well as the Nogay-Tatar factor in the settlement of the said problem prove the fact of a non-stop growing of the Ukrainian Cossacks significance within the ration of the military and political forces available in the Northern Black-Sea Area in the first half of the 17th century (Turanly, 2012, pp. 370–380).

Our sources-study processing of certain Turkish Ottoman written documents referred to the above said historical period revealed the fact, that these documents include a larger bulk of the data proving a growth of the military and political significance of the Zaporozhian Host at the time before the electing Bohdan Khmelnytsky the Hetman. A whole set of the documents we have studied is related to the history of the relations between the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Crimean Tatars, Don Cossacks and the Nogays during the period 1637 – 1646.

¹³ A town-fortress in the Crimea.
¹⁴ A town-fortress on Taman Peninsula (the water area in Kerch Strait).
¹⁵ They were inheritors of the Khan’s throne dissatisfied with the position of the Sublime Porte in relation of the appointment of governors for the Crimean Khanate.
¹⁶ The decision of the Sublime Porte.
and also about the Sultan’s and the Muscovia Tsar’s negotiations on a political settlement of these relations. Beginning from 1634, the Zaporozhian Cossacks intended, jointly with the Don Cossacks, to conquer the Turkish fortress of Azov, which they managed to implement in 1637. The Ukrainian Cossacks played almost the key role in the said military campaign; they set the task to turn the Fortress of Azov into a Cossack stronghold or a citadel (Brekhunenko, 1998, pp. 210–211). Preparation to the capture of the Fortress of Azov by Cossacks is associated in the Turkish historiography (Uzunçarşılı, 1995, Cilt III, 2. Kısım, p. 154) with the events that took place during the governing of Khan Inayet Giray (ruling: 1635 – 1638), when his brother, Kalgay Gümüşmeddin Giray, under the pretext of making a joint military march, managed to co-opt with him the army of the Nogay Tatars, who controlled all the area adjoining to the Fortress of Azov, and then he started towards the Fortress of Ackerman. Under such conditions the Zaporozhian Cossacks jointly with the Don Cossacks in 1637 made one more march to Azov. This military action resulted in capture of the Fortress of Azov, while its population went through a lot of suffering. At that time Ukrainian Cossacks detained Foma Kankauzen – an envoy from the Turkish Sultan – who was on his way to the Muscovian Tsar.

It should be noted, that activisation of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in capturing and keeping hold of Azov under their control became possible to a large extent, as the Cossacks felt winners in their historically long-lasting and endless struggle against the Poles. Particularly, in 1635 Hetman Ivan Sulyma (ruling: 1628 – 1629; 2nd ruling: 1630 – 1635) captured the Polish fortress of Kodak (Krypyakevych, 1990, p. 168, 345), while between 1637 and 1638, that is during the Polish-Ukrainian war, an uprising of Cossacks spread all over the whole Ukraine. Hence, the political impact of the Cossacks began to rise yet in the beginning of the military campaign in the autumn of 1632, which was connected with the conflict between the Moscow State and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Moscow Tsar expected that Muscovia would get under its control all the eastern Slavs’ lands, including also the territory of Ukraine. In January 1633 Patriarch Filaret informed the ambassador of the Sublime Porte, that «all the Zaporozhian Circassians relentlessly determined that they want to live and to be under the high state hand, while from the Lithuanian people they got detached» (Florya, 1996, pp. 443–450). This information proves Muscovian Czardom was practicing, among others, the religious factor too, so as to catch hold of the above said lands.

As for the further development of events near Azov is concerned, the analysis of texts in Turkish-Ottoman chronicles made by the German scholar Bugra Atsyz, revealed that the capture of the Fortress of Azov by the Zaporozhian Cossacks Host quite unexpectedly provoked a corresponding response from the government of the Sublime Porte, which sent against the Ukrainian Cossacks its Turkish Black-Sea Fleet and ordered the Crimean Sultan and the Governor of the city of Kafa that after coming of the Fleet to Azov in the spring of 1638 and capturing Kafa, they should get the fortress free. Fulfilling this order, the army of the Crimean Khan Bagadyr Giray began to keep Azov in seizure. However, the Zaporozhian Cossacks provided guarding this fortress from the sea-side using 53 seagul-boats. This fact made the Crimean Khan, between at about the end of December and the beginning of January 1639, to move his army from Azov onto Taman Peninsula. Arrival of the Turkish Fleet to the Fortress of Kerch forced Zaporozhian Cossacks to leave the Tuzla Island they had occupied (Kerch Strait) and move back from Azov. Regardless the victory of the united Turkish-Tatar Army over the Ukrainian Cossacks in a two-day battle and an unsuccessful try of the Zaporozhians in the summer of 1639, they broke through to the Black Sea, the Fortress of Azov remained
under their control. The seizure of this fortress by the Turkish Fleet lasted after that three months more yet and ended in failure.

The considered events resulted in the transformation of the «Cossack factor» into the most important aspect of the negotiations between the government of the Sublime Porte and envoys from the Moscow Tsar Mikhail, the former ones in 1640 arrived in Istanbul to greet the new Sultan Ibrahim I (ruling: 1640 – 1648). During the negotiations an agreement was achieved, according to which, in case the Tatar marches to be stopped to the Muscovia lands, the Fortress of Azov was to be returned to the Ottoman Empire. However, the Tatars did not stop their tries to return Azov to their power. The regular try of the Crimean Khan to capture Azov happened to be again not successful, and the same year Sultan-zade Mehmed Pasha was appointed in 1641 the head of a military operation aimed at returning Azov. Tsar Mikhail in April 1642 communicated to Hetman of the Don Cossacks his decision to transfer the said fortress to the Ottoman Empire. The Cossacks, being dissatisfied by that decision of the Tsar, set the fortress to fire and left it. Therefore, Azov again turned out in the hands of its former masters, and its Defender appointed by the Kafa governor became Islam Pasha. He captured the Fortress of Cherkes Kerman, where the headquarters of the Don Cossacks was located. The results of this military action was liberating 5,000 prisoned Moslems, and the Cossacks available there in the locality got imprisoned (Atsyz, 1977, p. 1‒15).

The Turkish traveller and chronicles-writer Evliya Chelebi wrote the following about the mentioned events: «After ruling of the Turkish Sultan IV (ruling: 1623 – 1640) the Ruses, who have been called before «the Muscovites», and were representatives of the yellow race, «raised their heads like a seven-headed dragon, and commenced to ruin the Crimean and Azov lands violating the quietness of the Ottoman governors. The Crimean Khan [Ahmed Giray] (ruling: 1641 – 1644) informed about that the Sultan Ibrahim [I], and after a brief discussion the Sadry-Azam [Kemankesh] Kara Mustafa Pasha was ordered to get down to the settlement of that problem, while the Sadry-Azam expressed his wish to carry out another military march». Then the chronicler informs, that «the Rus Cossacks [the Zaporozhian ones]» in the amount of 80,000 persons, that were subordinated to Muscovia, surrounded the Fortress of Azov. «They, the kuffar, will be burning in the hell after their death, after defeating the army of the Vizier and the Crimean Khan captured the Fortress of Azov. Then 80,000 of the kuffar were got billeted on the area of the fortress having taken in their possession all the material riches». Evliya Chelebi tells us also, that «the same year [1641] a Cossacks Fleet of 150 seagul-boats set off to the Black Sea and seized trading ships and traders from the seashore-located towns. At the same time, they ruined the fortress, settlements and towns» (Çelebi, 1896, pp. 113–114; Çelebi, 2007, pp. 17–30). The facts obtained from «The Book of Travellings» prove a large scale of the Muscovia State’s military actions against the Ottoman Empire, in which a great number of Zaporozhian Cossacks took part, including here the Cossacks Fleet. So, the Muscovia Czardom, after conquering Azov, improve its positions in the Black-Sea direction only owing to the Zaporozhian Host’s support of the military actions of its military forces.

Another chronicle-writer of the 17th century, and namely Gasan Vedji, informed of lasting sea-battles, which were going on between the Cossack and Turkish Fleets. It should be noted, that all the chronicle-writers we mentioned described very thoroughly the armies deployment place and the chronology of the military campaigns, in particular, that of the battle near Azov, as well as the consequences of that battle. The facts we have identified enable us to define this military conflict as a massive «Azov War». Besides, it should be outstressed,
that the Cosssack armed forces participated in that war on the side of Muscovia, and it was they, who were a lion’s share of the united army, which was fighting against the Ottoman Empire, and kept under its control the Fortress of Azov for four years (Vedjhi, 17th, pp. 28–30, p. 36; Başer, 2010, p. 229). These facts are proved by the information we have obtained from another written source: «At once Sultan Ibrahim [і] began to think, how to make the Black Sea safe from Cossack attackers, and so as to ensure a normal traffic of ships going to Istanbul. But the Fortress of Azov, located in the estuary of the river of Don, was in the hands of Cossacks, because its liberation required making a lot of strong efforts» (Kantemir, 1998, p. 301). Therefore, according to that piece of news, it was the Zaporozhian Host, that was the basic armed force that defended the Fortress of Azov. Concerning the problems we have studied, in particular the issue of the military and political activities of the Zaporozhian Cos- sackdom, the Ottoman archival document titled «Sultan Ibrahim’s [і] Message to the Great Vizier» (Turanly, 2016, p. 228–231; Pritsak, 1993, p. 183–184; Uzuņčarši, 1995, Cilt III, 1. Kısım, p. 223–239; Pakalin, 1993, Cilt II, p. 257–258) read, that, when a monetary reform was to be carried out, besides the money unit «akche» (Sâmi, 1989, p. 44) there were to be left in the circulation the old money units (Pakalin, 1993, Cilt II, p. 126). This document had no date fixed of its writing, however the facts included in that give grounds to consider that the date of writing that document should be during 1642 – 1643, that is after the final returning by Turkey under its control the lost lands. The source also includes data of the financial character, and particularly about the introduction of the monetary reform after the victory of the Ottoman Army over the Cossack-Muscovian army, however it also includes some information about certain social and political issues. Particularly, there was written about the situation in which the Cossacks happened to get: «...I, [Sultan Ibrahim і] received a good piece of news, which fills my soul with joy, because the ill-natured [Zaporozhian] Cossacks got in a serious situation, just the one they have deserved for» (Turanly, 2004, p. 477–481). These data support the fact of the serious social and economic situation of the Ukrainian Cos- sacks, in which those happened to get, after they, together with the Muscovian worriers, were defeated in the said war, and quite a lot of Cossacks having been taken prisoners.

An important point in the said document is a piece of information about holding in the Ottoman Empire a monetary reform: «...despite the introduction of the new money units, the old ones shall be used further too». The studied documents show the important situation of the Cossacks (the Zaporozhian ones and the Don ones), which those got in after in 1643 the Turkish army headed by the Vizier set up control over their formerly possessed lands and liberated Azov and other fortresses-castles in the said region: «Cherkes Kerman» (Çerkes Kerman) and «Metadje» (Metace) (TSMA, E. 0793). After the liberation and restoration of the Fortress of Azov the above said Kafa governor was appointed its Defender. There were also defeated other strongholds of the Don Cossacks, from which about 5,000 Moslem pris- oners were freed, while the Cossacks who were in that locality happened to be got prisoners themselves (TSMA, E. 0793). The said written document also fixed proofs of the fact, that in 1645 a Muscovian envoy repeatedly arrived in Istanbul with a letter from the Muscovian Tsar, which ran about the announcement by the new tsar Alexei. In that letter the Muscovia Tsar also complained about the attacks of Tatars and Turks from Kafa onto his possessed lands. In his turn, Sultan Ibrahim і, after greeting the newly-announced tsar, in his reply wrote, that as soon as the attacks of Cossacks stopped on the shore of the Black Sea, and the Muscovians began to pay the Crimean Khan the tribute, only then there would be observed everything, that the Muscovian governor desired in his letter to get from the Sultan. Mutual
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claims between the two governors lasted for some other following years too. Finally, to con-
tinue the friendly relations, the Turkish Sultan began to require from the Muscovian Tsar, that
the Don Cossacks should free the Ukrainian city of Cherkasy that had been captured, and he
also insisted, that the Muscovian people should not called themselves Cossacks (Turanly,
2010, p. 146–147). It should be noted, that those political events were taking place on the
eve of concluding in 1648 a Union between the Cossack-Hetmanic Ukraine and the Crimean
Khanate, particularly with the Ottoman Porte, and in the beginning of the National Liberating
Revolution under the head of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, which was lasting during the
second part of the 17th century.

Summing up the consideration of the data obtained from the Turkish-Ottoman written
documents we have studied in terms of strengthening the impact of the Zaporozhian Host,
it should be noted, that we have identified some additional information about the capture in
1637 by the Zaporozhian Host, jointly with the forces of the Muscovian Czardom, of the
city-fortress of Azov, which was for the Sublime Porte an important strategic point. It was for
that reason, that the Turkish Army, which wanted very much to restore its control over the for-
mer possessed lands, and so it was in this direction, that it concentrated its main forces. After
making a series of military actions during 1641 – 1643, Azov and some other fortresses were
returned under the control of the Ottoman Empire, while the Cossack armed forces turned
out to get in a serious economic and social situation. We should note, that after studying the
said problematic issue it becomes clear, that the Cossack factor was getting more and more
important in the political relations between the Zaporozhian Host, the Muscovian Czardom,
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman State. The arguments we have found
permit us to state, that during the first half of the 17th century «the Cossack problem» was
the point of special attention within the northern policy of the Ottoman government, which
is supported by a rise in the military and political significance of the Zaporozhian Host in the
international relations of that time. After consideration of archival and other proofs concern-
ing the Ukrainian Cossacks – Crimean Tatars Union, we may state the fact of growth of the
importance of the military actions of the Ukrainian Cossack Army in defending the southern
frontiers of Ukraine. The central power of the Ottoman State had to take into account the
forces of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and a set of respective decisions were made by the gov-
ernment of the Ottoman Empire directed at ensuring protection of its own interests. From the
undertaken measures we can single out the following ones: 1) mobilisation and radiolocation
of the Turkish Army Component from the Balkan countries to its new place of destination
in the north of the Black-Sea area; 2) sending to the Dnipro additional navy military forces
3) building new defensive structures. In this context an important geopolitical role was played
by the formation of a political union between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Ta-
tars, which was oriented politically against the Ottoman Empire.

Conclusions. The sources-based study we have carried out of contents of the Turkish
Ottoman written documents, where there are available data about the Cossack-Hetmanic
Ukraine in the first half of the 17th century and about its relationships with the Ottoman Em-
pire, gives us grounds to make the following conclusions: 1) the Khotyn Military Campaign
became a historical event, which noticeably changed the correlation between the military
and political forces in Eastern Europe and in the Northern Black-Sea Area, while the conse-
quences of that campaign were as follows: a) destabilisation of the domestic situation in the
Ottoman Empire, hence – a further decrease in the capabilities of that state to keep holding
its military and political positions in the above said regions; b) emergence of tendencies
to making actions in the foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate against the central power;
c) a further rise of the military power of the Zaporozhian Sich and transformation of the «Cossack factor» into an important component of the international relations in Eastern Europe and in the Northern Black-Sea Area; 2) a crisis in the domestic situation, which was one of the most negative consequences for the Ottoman Empire after the defeats of its military forces in the Khotyn Military campaign, resulted in incapability of this state to provide help to the Crimean Khanate in suppressing by that the protesting movement of the population, and that made the ruling circlers of the Crimean Khanate search a political union with the Zaporozhian Sich, that in the second quarter of the 17th century turned into one of the most powerful at that time military force, which both the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to think of and take in considerations in their activities. It was this fact that became a pre-condition for strengthening the military and political cooperation between the Cossack-Hetmanic Ukraine and the Crimean Ulus. However, such a scenario of the events made it possible a development of the cultural relations between these countries which requires making further studies.

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