Taras Kuzio
Department of Political Science National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and Non-Resident Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

## Populism in Ukraine and Europe: Similar but Also Different

The term populist has been applied to a heterogeneous group of political groups ranging from the anti-globalisation left to the nationalist right opposed to immigration, those who see globalisation as Americanisation, and advocates of a third way between capitalism and socialism.

The existence of populism on the left and right in European politics is visibly seen in Britain where open and disguised support for Brexit exists in the Conservative and Labour party respectfully. Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn opposed UK membership of the EU in the 1970s and provided weak support for the Remain camp in the Brexit referendum.

Populist political parties have moved from the margins to the mainstream since the 1990s in Europe and the US and are in power in coalitions in many EU member states. In its early years, France's Front National, the British National Party (BNP) and some other political parties were kinked to skinheads and racist attacks but in the last two decades this has become less frequent. Modern-day populist nationalist parties have become more successful because they have adopted a more respectable image; the UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) has been described as 'BNP in suits.' Front National moderated its image under the leadership of Marie Le Pen in a similar manner to the transition of the neo-Nazi SNPU (Social National Party of Ukraine) to the populist-nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party in 2004 under the leadership of Oleh Tyahnybok. Violence is occasionally used by populist nationalist parties today in Europe, such as during anti-migrant rallies in August-September 2018 in Germany, but not as frequent as in the past. The Party of Regions never could shake off its criminal roots and penchant for violence. During Yanukovych's presidency in 2010-2014, violence in the Ukrainian parliament and through the use of vigilantes on the streets were the precursor to the massive use of state-led violence against protestors during the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity (Shukan, 2013, Leshchenko, 2014, Kuzio, 2014b, 2015).

Ivan Krastev (2006) identifies four key areas for populism. These include anti-corruption rhetoric, anti-elite sentiments, hostility to privatisation, and efforts to reverse the social inequalities arising from the transition from a communist economic system to a market economy. All four of these factors are to be found in Ukrainian populism, especially the first two factors. Social inequalities have dramatically grown since 1991 in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, coupled with in a decline in average life expectancy, visibly high levels of corruption and stagnating standards of living. All of these factors have mobilised support for Ukrainian populists (Protsenko, 2018).

The first section of this article will discuss populism from a theoretical and comparative perspective. The second section will discuss how Ukrainian populism is both different and similar to populism found in Europe. Immigration, nationalism, Islam and the EU are important factors found in European but not in Ukrainian populism. Ukrainian and European populists have similar traits in being anti-globalist, their radical rhetoric against corruption, elites and the 'establishment,' their undemocratic nature, weak support for reforms, being economical with the truth and chameleons on ideology and keen to instrumentalise crises as a way of securing power.

## 1. Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Populism

There is a diverse scholarly literature on populism that has attempted to grapple with a vague concept that encompasses the left and right of the political spectrum. Most of the scholarly work on populism has focused on Latin America and more recently on Europe with little written on the former USSR and barely no comparative work between Eurasia and Europe. There is little study of populism in Ukraine in its own right (Kuzio, 2010, 2012).

Cas Muddes' (2004) definition of populism is the most cited and focuses on, 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.' Anti-elitist and anti-establishment rhetoric permeates all forms of populism in Europe and Ukraine. Nevertheless, contradictions exist between this anti-establishment rhetoric and elitist leaders as practically all political parties in Ukraine are financed by oligarchs.

Ideology is a factor in European populism but not in Ukraine where political parties are weak, rarely ideologically driven and many of them are oligarchic-funded election projects (Kuzio, 2014a). Populist parties with charismatic leaders have greater chances to be electorally successful but these are rarely found in Ukraine. In the US and Europe, previously marginal and extreme right parties and ideologies have taken over the center-right or come to power in coalitions with them. Opposition to immigration and multiculturalism has spread from the far right to mainstream centre-right political parties (Kaufmann, 2018, p.224). In Ukraine, the nationalist right remains unpopular and the leaders of Ukraine's center-right political parties have repeatedly changed.

Pierre Ostiguy (2017) writes that in dividing the population into 'corrupt' elites and the 'people,' populists often accuse the former of being controlled by foreign powers. The IMF and EU are both viewed as undemocratic international organisations which threaten the national sovereignty of states.

Paul Taggart (2017) has discussed how crises lead to an increase in the popularity of populists. Ukraine has experienced economic, political and military crises since becoming independent in 1991 and each of these have been used by populists to mobilise votes. Ukrainian populists are adept at what Benjamin Moffit (2015) points to as the instrumentalisation of perceived crises and their exaggeration without the hard evidence to back up widely inaccurate claims. Ukrainian populists routinely use radical criticism of the 'authorities' without providing alternative policies and by manipulating or providing false data (Skubenko, 2017).

Populism in Europe can be seen as a reaction against rapid change with citizens feeling they are no longer in control of their destinies. Kaufmann (2018, p.224) believes it is wrong for liberals to believe that populism is supported by those left behind by globalisation because, 'populism stems, first and foremost, from ethnocultural anxiety.' Such feelings produce nostalgia for an earlier 'golden era.' 'The ideology of the moment is nativist nostalgia' (Polakow-Suransky, 2017). Populists in Ukraine and post-Soviet states promote nostalgia for the stability that existed in the USSR. Masha Gessen (2016, p.383) reminds us that the Nazi's and Soviets promised stability to camouflage their intention of 'creating a state of permanent instability.'

*Batkivshchina* (Fatherland) and Party of Regions and Opposition Bloc play on the frustrations and anger of 'transition losers' who are the basis for the support of both political forces. Yet, both political forces were and remain funded by 'transition winners' (oligarchs, tycoons) who used political office to become 'gentrified' (Kuzio 2014b). The poorest twenty percent of Ukraine's population will vote for Yulia Tymoshenko in the 2019 elections. These include Ukrainians with low incomes or who receive

the minimum wage, live in rural areas and small towns, and receive social welfare. (Bekeshkina, 2018).

For the Party of Regions, while the transition from gold chains, sports suits, and leather jackets to expensive suits and ostrich skin shoes took place, old habits of mass corruption and the wonton use of violence could not be so easily jettisoned. The Party of Regions relied on Soviet paternalism to mobilise voters who prioritised the economy and 'stability' over democracy. Patrimonial political culture in the Donbas and Crimea, and in other parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, perpetuated a paternalistic dependency of the working classes on elites and in so doing elevated collectivism over individualism and personal efficacy. The Party of Regions combined left-wing paternalism, Soviet nostalgia, and big business into a successful political machine (Kuzio, 2015, Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015).

For Eurasian authoritarian leaders, such as former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian President Vladimir Putin, stability represents discipline and the ability to get things done. The Party of Regions abhorred 'chaos' and described Viktor Yushchenko presidency as 'orange lawlessness.' Stability is a key element of 'democracy,' Yanukovych adamantly believed. The Party of Regions 2006 election program prioritised 'stability, well-being, and development perspectives' and Prime Minister Yanukovych promised he would install 'order' in the country. The Party of Regions 2007 pre-term election programme was titled 'Stability and Well Being' and during the campaign, Yanukovych emphasised his party's principles as the 'renewal of justice and victory to the political forces which work for stability.' A U.S. diplomatic cable from Kyiv reported, 'Yanukovych repeated again and again that the priority for the Party of Regions is stability' (Ukraine: Yanukovych Suggests Regions Won't Accept Orange, 2007). Party of Regions parliamentary coalitions were called Stability and Well Being (2006–2007) and Stability and Reforms (2010–2012). In the 2012 election campaign, the Party of Regions used billboards with 'From Stability to Prosperity,' 'Stability Has Been Achieved!' and 'Chaos Has Been Overcome. Stability Has Been Achieved!'

Scholars have emphasised the anti-democratic nature of populists (Berman, 2016). Jan-Werner Müller (2015) writes it is, 'crucial to understand that populists are not simply anti-elitist: they are also necessarily anti-pluralist.' Stefan Rummens (2017) adds that the most dangerous feature of populism is a firm believe only they are right and a disrespect for alternative opinions.

Populists are often derisory about formal politics and parliaments believing them to be 'corrupt,' controlled by an unaccountable elite and not reflecting the will of the 'people.' Ukrainian populists are weak on parliamentary attendance and voting. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine calculated that in May 2018, Tymoshenko and Opposition Bloc MP Yuriy Boyko attended only one and six percent respectively of parliamentary proceedings (Committee of Voters, 2018).

## 2. Populism in Ukraine and Europe

Populism in Ukraine, and the former USSR, displays characteristics that are commonly found in Europe as well as those that make it different. This section first discusses how populism in Ukraine does not possess four characteristics commonly found in European populists (Mylovanov, 2015). These include hostility to immigration, electorally popular populist-nationalists, anti-Islamic xenophobia, and the EU viewed as a threat to national sovereignty.

Nostalgia in Europe and the US for the white nation-state that allegedly existed before the influx of Asian and Islamic immigrants is different to the nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Although both are based on a longing for the past, nostalgia for European populists and nationalists is a throwback to the pre-immigrant era when their countries were more ethnically homogenous, coloured and

Islamic minorities did not exist, men were in charge and women knew their place in the social and family hierarchy. In Europe, this nostalgia is found among the older generation and 'globalisation losers.' Nostalgia for a more ethnically homogenous nation promoted by populist nationalists is often a counter-reaction to multiculturalism and immigration that are seen to be weakening the bonds of the nation-state. None of the above factors are applicable to Ukraine.

Immigration is not an issue in Ukrainian elections because the country is a transit route for migrants seeking to travel to Western Europe. Those fleeing wars, conflicts and socio-economic hardship do not view Ukraine as a place to settle as asylum seekers travelling from Asia use the former USSR and Ukraine as transit routes to reach the EU. Ukraine has 1.7 million Internally Displaced Persons from the Donbas who have fled the war and resettled in other regions. Ukraine is not a member of the EU and has no quotas for refugees and asylum seekers of the kind that have led to the growth of support for populist nationalists in Italy, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Austria and Germany. Racism against Roma exists, and racist attacks do occasionally occur against black and Asian people, but these are rare.

European populist nationalists, fascist and neo-Nazi parties, as well as the far-left, are pro-Russian and pro-Putin which is not the case in Ukraine even prior to 2014. Pro-Russian sentiments are especially pronounced in Austria (FPO [Freedom Party of Austria]), France (Front National), Germany (AfD [Alternative Germany]), Italy (Northern League), Belgium (VB [Flemish Block]) and Greece (Golden Dawn). Italy's Northern League, which has been described by Anton Shekhovtsov (2018, p.141) as a 'Russian front organization in Italy' came third in Italy's 2018 election and polled the highest number of votes in their four-member election coalition. European populist nationalist political forces came to power because of frustrations with established political parties support for high levels of immigration and failure of multiculturalism to integrate immigrants.

Pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine have different roots to those in Europe. Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, the pro-Russian camp was monopolised by the Party of Regions and Communist Party of Ukraine with their bases of support in Russian speaking eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly, the Donbas and Crimea. Their reasons for being pro-Russian had nothing to do with the factors driving pro-Russian orientations of European populist nationalists and were a product of three factors. These included Soviet nostalgia, Soviet and Russophile views of history and corrupt business and energy ties between Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs.

In Ukraine, nostalgia has a different reference point, that of the Soviet Union. As in the EU, it is also prevalent among the older generation and 'transition losers' but only in some regions and primarily among ethnic Russians. Nostalgia for the USSR was mainly found in the Donbas and Crimea where a Soviet identity remained popular. 21 percent of Ukrainians would like to see the revival of the USSR with the highest proportions in the east (26 percent) and south (29 percent) with a greater proportion in the above 60 age group (40 percent) and among ethnic Russians (36 percent) (Kulchytskyy and Mishchenko, 2018, 187-188).

Ukraine has one of the lowest levels of electoral support for ethnic nationalist parties in Europe. In Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania nationalist political forces are highly popular; the only neighbour of Ukraine which is an exception is Belarus. In Poland the populist nationalist Law and Justice party commands 40-50 percent support while xenophobic populist nationalists swept the Hungarian elections in April 2018.

Many Ukrainian political parties pursue populist policies, but few are ethnic nationalists. In seven parliamentary elections held since 1994, nationalists have only been elected on a single occasion

in 2012 when the *Svoboda* party received ten percent, far lower than for populist-nationalists in many EU member states. During the midst of Russian aggression against Ukraine nationalists did not win electoral support in the 2014 elections when the Svoboda party, the most active and oldest of Ukraine's nationalistic parties, came seventh with 4.7 percent thereby failing to cross the five percent threshold to enter parliament. Nationalist candidates have never entered the second round of presidential elections. Patriotism rather than ethnic nationalism is more prevalent in Ukraine with popular opinion showing high levels of negativity to Russian leaders but not to Russian citizens (Perspektyvy Ukrayinsko-Rosiyskykh Vidnosyn, 2015).

Hostility to Islam and migrants from Islamic countries is not an issue in Ukraine as migrants do not seek asylum in Ukraine and there is no large Islamic community. Ukrainian dissidents in the Soviet era and contemporary democrats and nationalists have long been allies of Crimean Tatars in what they perceive as their common anti-Russian struggle. Crimean Tatar leaders have been elected to parliament in Rukh (abbreviation for Popular Movement for Restructuring), Our Ukraine and the Petro Poroshenko bloc. Since Russia's annexation of the Crimea and repression of Crimean Tatar leaders and institutions their alliance with Ukraine has grown stronger (Kuzio, 2018a, c).

Anti-EU sentiment in Ukraine was low and has dramatically fallen since 2014. Antipathy to the EU was found among supporters of Ukraine joining the CIS Customs Union (since 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union) but support has collapsed to under ten percent as a consequence of Russia's military aggression (Kulchytskyy and Mishchenko, 2018). Support for Ukraine to adopt the 'Russian model of development' is very low with 69-71 percent opposed to this throughout Ukraine, including 56 percent of Russian speakers (Kulchytskyy and Mishchenko, 2018, pp. 184, 183). Ukrainian nationalists are negatively disposed towards LGBT rights which they see as being imposed upon Ukraine by the EU. Nevertheless, they do not attack the EU or Ukraine's path of European integration.

Ukrainian nationalists differ from their European counterparts in being pro-NATO and not anti-American. In Ukraine, support for NATO membership has grown since 2014 after Russian aggression became a trigger for unprecedented changes in public attitudes to foreign policies. Russia's military aggression showed to Ukrainians they could not protect their sovereignty singlehandedly and needed powerful allies. Since 2014, proponents of NATO membership - politicians, civil society activists and journalists - are in the driving seat while their opponents are disillusioned and disheartened by Russian aggression. Resistance to NATO membership is therefore passive while supporters are active and supported by President Poroshenko, Ukrainian parliament and government.

Until 2014, support for NATO membership was opposed by a powerful constituency and had very little support in Russian-speaking eastern and southern Ukraine, the Donbas and Crimea. Russia's military aggression changed this by increasing support for NATO membership to 60-70 percent of those taking part in a referendum. The biggest change has been in the east where support has grown from 12 to 32 percent and south where it has increased from 7 to 33 percent. Even in the Donbas, support for NATO membership stands at 12 percent in a region where it had practically no support prior to 2014 (Kulchytskyy and Mishchenko, 2018).

Anti-Americanism was insignificant in Ukraine and was only present in the Donbas and Crimea where it was linked to the prevalence of Soviet identities, nostalgia for the USSR and a pro-Russian foreign policy orientation (Gessen, 2017, pp.270, 361, 468-469, Kuzio, 2011).

For Ukrainian democrats and nationalists, the threat to their country's sovereignty comes from Russia, not the EU (Perspektyvy Ukrayinsko-Rosiyskykh Vidnosyn, 2015). The ideological divide

in Ukraine was not between defending national sovereignty and EU membership, as in Europe, but between integration into Europe or integration into Moscow-led and Russian-dominated Eurasia.

Russia's aggression in 2014 changed Ukraine's political landscape by removing the dichotomy of choosing an orientation between Eurasia or Europe. Polarity in Ukrainian foreign policy integration is no longer a feature of Ukrainian politics with support for EU and NATO membership above 60 percent and that for Eurasian integration below 10 percent. The pro-Russian and pro-Eurasian vector of Ukrainian foreign policy has collapsed while public support for EU and NATO membership has risen. The collapse of Russian soft power is particularly noticeable among Ukrainian youth, representing the future of the country, two thirds of who believe Ukraine and Russia are in a state of war (Zarembo, 2017, pp. 53-54). Similar views of Ukraine and Russia at war can be found among all age groups in Ukraine with the highest among young people and lowest among the over 60s. Widespread opposition to Ukraine adopting the 'Russian model of development' is an outgrowth of Russia associated by Ukrainians with 'aggression' (65.7 percent), 'cruelty' (56.9 percent) and 'dictatorship' (56.9 percent) (Razumkov, 2018).

The EU's Eastern Partnership, launched in 2009, offers six former Soviet republics integration without membership, or 'enlargement-light' (Popescu and Wilson, 2009). Of these six countries, only three – Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – are pursuing Association Agreements with the EU. In addition, Ukraine has signed a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) and a visa free regime with the Schengen zone.

Six issues commonly found in European populists are also found among Ukrainian populists.

First, anti-globalisation has not yet been an election issue for post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine (Ostiguy, 2017). Populists in Ukraine and Europe often accuse the authorities and 'liberal establishment' respectfully of being controlled by foreign powers. 'Pro-Western' (Tymoshenko, Anatoliy Grytsenko, Oleh Lyashko) and 'pro-Russian' populists (Vadym Rabinovych, Boyko) criticise the IMF for imposing heavy demands on the government in return for financial assistance. Tymoshenko's *Batkivshchina* party, Radical Party (led by Lyashko) and the Opposition Bloc (former Party of Regions) routinely attack the IMF. 'Today global financial clans have infiltrated our National Bank of Ukraine, ministries and departments, and have usurped at least 60% of Ukraine's sovereignty. This external management is taking place through Ukraine's puppet leadership' Tymoshenko (2018a) said. Typically, Tymoshenko is vague about who these interests are in order to maintain her 'pro-Western' image she has to stress she is not anti-American or anti-EU.

Second, radical rhetoric against corrupt elites and the 'liberal establishment' (Mudde, 2004). Tymoshenko, who is often described as Ukraine's leading and long-term populist, has always used radical rhetoric against 'corrupt' authorities and oligarchs. Tymoshenko said during the XII National Prayer Breakfast in Washington DC that, 'we should love God and love people. It's a simple answer' (Tymoshenko, 2018d) with presumably her understood as being God fearing and all other Ukrainian politicians as Godless.

Anti-corruption rhetoric is central to European and Ukrainian populist discourse. While Ukraine's politicians routinely attack corruption and oligarchs the weakness of Ukrainian political parties has ensured their only source of funding is big business. This has produced low levels of public trust in the anti-corruption claims found in programmes of presidential candidates and political parties. Tymoshenko, for example, has only participated in 55 per cent of votes on corruption and as low as 34 per cent on banking reforms and 13 per cent on energy, two sectors in Ukraine traditionally rife with corruption.

In a June 2018 vote (Ukrainian Parliament, 2018) the Popular Front and Poroshenko Bloc voted unanimously for the law creating the important Anti-Corruption Court which is aimed at breaking the bottleneck in criminal prosecutions of elites hitherto blocked by Ukraine's corrupt judicial system. Only 2 (out of 21) Radical Party and 14 (out of 20) *Batkivshchina* MP's voted for the law while the Opposition Bloc unanimously opposed it. Tymoshenko said, 'The adoption of the law on the High Anti-Corruption Court is deception, just like the pathetic reform of the judicial system, health care system and pension system' (Tymoshenko. 2018e).

Third, scholars have emphasised the anti-democratic nature of populists (Müller, 2015, Rummens, 2017). The Economist (2018) asked, 'Is Donald Trump above the law?' Populists in Poland and Hungary have been criticised by the EU for undemocratic practices.

Populists in Ukraine threaten democracy in three ways. The first is their lack of transparency, use of deception and being economical with the truth which reduces public trust in state institutions and increases cynicism. The second is their penchant for a 'strong hand' and authoritarian road to 'stability.' The third is through their nostalgia for the Soviet Union and authoritarian paternalism. Ukrainian populists, both 'pro-Western' and 'pro-Russian,' hold authoritarian and undemocratic traits commonly found in European populists. These include making decisions without listening to advice, believing everybody else is wrong, and using populism for the goal of attaining maximum power.

The Party of Regions promoted nostalgia for the Soviet Union, was authoritarian and sought a monopolisation of power. Until 2004, the Party of Regions maintained a monopoly of power in the Donbas where politics resembled the 'managed democracy' found in Putin's Russia (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2009). From 2005, the Party of Regions expanded its 'managed democracy' model from the Donbas throughout eastern and southern Ukraine and the Crimea and from 2010, when Yanukovych was elected, attempted to expand its monopolisation over Ukraine.

Two potential populist presidential candidates have emerged from the Opposition Bloc – gas lobby tycoon Boyko and oligarch Rabinovych. Rabinovych has created yet another election project, the For Life party with funding from Viktor Medvedchuk, a rather odious oligarch with close ties to Russia and implicated in Yushchenko's poising during the 2004 elections. The Godparents of Medvedchuk's two children are Putin and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.

Tymoshenko's authoritarian leadership was revealed to US Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor by Viktor Pynzenyk (2010) who resigned as Finance Minister from her 2007-2010 government. Pynzenyk said that Tymoshenko had poor leadership skills, made decisions without listening to advice and, 'She also was overly confident in her own decisions and believed everyone else is wrong.' Pynzenyk added, 'Tymoshenko simply wanted to consolidate power in her own hands;' that is, populism was a means for her to achieve maximum power. This view of Tymoshenko as an authoritarian politician is commonly held in Ukraine and worked against her in the 2010 elections when she received three million fewer votes than Viktor Yushchenko in December 2004. Some three factors accounted for this. First, disillusionment with 'orange' political leaders after five years of public squabbling by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. Second, Ukrainian voters saw her as a bigger threat to Ukraine's democracy than the authoritarian Yanukovych. Third, some agreed with Yushchenko's call to vote against both, which hurt Tymoshenko more as his advice was listened to by 'orange' voters.

On 15 June, Tymoshenko launched her 2019 election campaign with a 'New Deal for Ukraine' congress in which she called for the creation of an All-Ukrainian Civic Association (Tymoshenko, 2018f) that would have, 'strong influential status so that it can influence real processes in the management

of the state' (Tymoshenko, 2018b). Proposals at the 'New Deal' congress included five true statements as well as five manipulations, one exaggeration and two lies (Slipchenko, Krymeniuk, Zhaga, Batoh, Skubenko, Stelmakh, Zhyharevych, Rasumkova, Fedorenko, Hatsko, Chernenko, Shkarpova, 2018). The 'New Deal' proposals resemble those introduced by Nicolás Maduro, successor to military officer and President Hugo Chavez, a socialist populist who ruled Venezuela from 1999-2013. Chavez and Maduro are anti-democratic leaders who have ruined the country's once strong economy. The proposal to create an All-Ukrainian Civic Association resemble that of the Constituent National Assembly created to bypass the Venezuelan parliament whose members were elected in a fraudulent vote condemned by forty Latin American and Western countries (Kuzio, 2018b).

Referendums do not enhance democracies and can actually lead to chaos, political instability and uncertainty. Britain's referendum on Brexit was a disaster leading the country into the unknown. 52 percent, a bare majority of only 4 percent over the Remain voters, are deciding the future of Britain's relationship to the EU putting the economy, people's lives, travel and trade all at risk. Netherlands is an even better example of a country having the mechanism to hold referendums promoted by Dutch citizens. The April 2016 referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was won by opponents with a vote of 32 percent - only 2 percent above the minimum threshold for turnout to allow the results to be valid. Referendums in Ukraine could be used by Russia and its Ukrainian proxies to call for 'special status' for the Donbas, membership of the Eurasian Economic Union and elevating Russian to a second state language. Added to this is the possibility of Russian hacking the referendum results to change them in Moscow's favour, as it is feared Russia hacked the Brexit referendum.

Former Defence Minister Grytsenko often appears in public and on television in military uniform which he associates with 'order' and 'stability' while others view it as his penchant for authoritarianism. In a recent interview Grytsenko (2018) praised former dictator Augusto Pinochet for his accomplishments in Chile confusing 'authoritative' with 'authoritarian' (Kuzio, 2018b).

Former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili's Ukrainian citizenship was revoked, and he was deported to Poland. Saakashvili had turned his personal conflict with President Poroshenko into an attempt to create a populist alliance with Tymoshenko and military veterans to foment political instability and revolution ahead of the 2019 elections. Saakashvili has a mixed political reputation and legacy in Georgia and Ukraine. On the one hand, he has been praised for reducing corruption in Georgia while at the same time, his democratic record is poor. US President George W. Bush turned a blind eye to Saakashvili's authoritarianism because of geopolitical reasons as Saakashvili was a strong supporter of NATO membership, US-led liberal internationalism, colour revolutions and the US-led invasion of Iraq. Saakashvili's presidency was marked by authoritarianism in five areas (Levitsky and Way, 2010, pp.227-228). These included:

1. Media freedom: the media were harassed with tax raids against opposition television channels, he pressured the judiciary to open criminal prosecutions against journalists and attempted to close television programmes critical of himself.
2. Judicial system: the judiciary was packed with his own cronies.
3. Fighting corruption: there was selective application of anti-corruption laws.
4. Political repression: extreme police violence was used against anti-presidential protestors.
5. Election fraud: state administrative resources were abused during election campaigns.

*Svoboda, Pravyy Sektor* and National Corps support exclusive Ukrainian ethnic nationality policies and at the same time, similar to populist nationalists in Europe, back leftist socio-economic policies on

issues such as privatisation and state management of the economy. *Ukrop* and the Radical Party are the latest in a long line of fake nationalist parties created by the Ukrainian authorities and oligarchs to poach voters. Oligarch Ihor Kolomoysky's Dnipropetrovsk clan established the fake nationalist party *Ukrop* to attract veterans of the Russian-Ukrainian war and nationalist firebrands. The Radical Party was originally established by the 'gas lobby' to counter Tymoshenko. As this kind of party funding is opaque it is impossible to fully determine the ties between the Radical party and oligarchic groups. The latest financier of the Radical Party is oligarch Kolomoyskyy who has formed an election alliance with Tymoshenko against President Poroshenko. Pryvat bank was nationalised in late 2016 after which an investigation revealed Kolomoysky and his oligarchic allies had laundered $5.5 billion through the bank.

Fourth, populists provide weak support or are opposed to reforms, particularly those 'imposed' by the IMF and EU. Vox Ukraine ranked the Popular Front loyal to former Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko Bloc with providing the highest number of votes for reforms. Vox Ukraine writes that without the support of these two factions, 'there could not be in practice the adoption of any laws' (Nis do Nosa 2018). *Samopomich* (Self-Reliance), led by Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyy and traditionally viewed by Western scholars as the most pro-reform faction in the Ukrainian parliament is ranked third by Vox Ukraine, a Ukrainian think tank and NGO (Nis do Nosa, 2018).

Vox Ukraine ranked Tymoshenko a low 38 per cent on their Index of Support for Reform (Nis do Nosa, 2018). Vox Ukraine calculates that over the four years of the current parliament, Tymoshenko has participated in less than a third (30 per cent) of votes and her average support for reformist policies is only slightly higher at 36 per cent. *Batkivshchina* is ranked fifth in parliamentary factions voting for reforms, lower than the Radical Party and just above the 'pro-Russian' Opposition Bloc (Nis do Nosa, 2018).

Of the five ostensibly 'pro-Western' parliamentary factions, two populist *Batkivshchina* and Radical Parties have the poorest attendance record and their votes for reforms are by far the weakest. *Batkivshchina* and the Radical Party did not support judicial, pension or healthcare reforms. *Batkivshchina* led the way calling for the resignation of (Ukrainian-American) Minister of Health Ulana Suprun who has been successful in reducing corruption in the purchasing of medical supplies and reforming this sector (Tymoshenko, 2017a).

Ukraine is the only country in central-eastern Europe with a land sale moratorium that has produced a corrupt grey economy in land sales. In May and August 2018 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled the moratorium violates the property rights of farmers. The World Bank (2017) believes the lifting of the moratorium would boost agricultural output by $15 billion. Of Ukraine's parliamentary parties, *Batkivshchina* is by far the most vocally opposed to land reform and its 2017 brochure was headlined 'Halt the Theft of Land!' that linked land privatisation to crime and corruption. Tymoshenko leads a campaign to collect signatures for Ukraine to hold a referendum on land reform (Yaremko, Lukomska, and Nizalov 2017).

Land privatisation is opposed by Tymoshenko/*Batkivshchina*, Opposition Bloc and leftist forces, such as the Socialist Party of Ukraine. Of these three populist forces, Tymoshenko has been the most vocal Ukrainian politician calling for an extension of the existing moratorium on land sales, warning otherwise 'there will be a huge civil war by the agrarian mafia against farmers' (Tymoshenko, 2017b). A *Batkivshchina* brochure entitled 'Halt the Theft of Land!' plays on all the traditional myths and stereotypes linked to an open land market through an association with crime, corruption and Russian aggression

against Ukraine. A land market is at times equated with an approaching famine or worse. There are no pros and cons listed for voters to decide the merits or disadvantages of a land market and instead, 'society receives a subconscious negative emotional link to the subject' (Shkarpova, 2017).

Tymoshenko is opposed to any foreign investment in gas pipelines, Western or Russian. Vox Ukraine wrote that Tymoshenko's hyperbole portrays European management of the country's gas pipelines as a major defeat for Ukrainian national security (Shist mifiv pro ukrayinsku HTS, 2018).

Tymoshenko claimed that the pipelines were being transferred in secret to an unknown foreign entity. In reality it is the Ukrainian government that decides on the outcome of the tender by foreign companies (ten European companies have already expressed an interest) who seek to manage 49 percent of Ukraine's gas pipelines. This is then ratified by parliament. *Batkivshchina* voted unanimously for the law on the gas market (although Tymoshenko missed the vote). The foreign company chosen by the government can only be a member of the Energy Community or the US. As Russia is not a member of the Energy Community, and has always been strongly opposed to it, no Russian company can participate in the tender. Therefore, Tymoshenko's claims that there is no guarantee the pipelines could not be transferred to Russian state gas company Gazprom's control is unfounded. Ukraine's legislation and the Energy Community requires the splitting into separate parts of the state gas company *Naftohaz Ukrainy* to de-monopolise the gas sector; meaning gas pipelines would no longer be managed by *Naftohaz Ukrayiny*. Ukraine's gas pipelines will continue to remain in state hands, but their management would be undertaken by a foreign company. There is no plan for the Ukrainian government to privatise the pipelines to foreign owners and pipelines managed by a foreign company would remain in state hands.

Tymoshenko obfuscates the difference in the pursuit of a populist agenda portraying herself as the 'defender' of Ukrainian sovereignty and national security facing down nefarious corrupt elites ready to betray Ukraine. Her economic nationalism on energy issues contrasts with her low attendance rate in only ten percent of votes on legislation related to energy independence (KKD Deputata, 2017). While opposing the 'pro-Russian' gas lobby, Tymoshenko has long been an ally of oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyy and when prime minister permitted the Pryvat group to take control of the state oil refining company *UkrNafta*. This allowed the *Pryvat* business group to cream off huge profits that should have gone to the Ukrainian government budget. (Leshchenko, 2015). State oil refining company *UkrNafta* was taken back into Ukrainian government control in 2014-2015.

Fifth, populists are chameleons and draw on different ideologies to mobilise electoral support, as clearly seen during Britain's Brexit referendum and the 2016 US presidential elections. This is especially prevalent in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries where political parties are weak, or oligarch election projects and ideology is fluid. Ukraine's populists are labelled 'pro-Western' or 'pro-Russian' while sometimes supporting similar populist policies.

Real political parties do not exist in Ukraine or throughout the former USSR (Kuzio, 2014a), with the possible exception of the three Baltic states. Political parties in Ukraine are short-term election projects (e.g. *Ukrop*), insurance clubs for business and criminal leaders who fear criminal accusations (Party of Regions), leader's fans clubs (e.g. *Batkivshchina*) or fake technical parties (e.g. Radical Party) aimed at poaching voters from others (Wilson, 2005). Ukrainian political parties which are electorally successful receive state funding, but the majority are reliant for the bulk of their financing upon big business and oligarchs. Membership dues play a minimal role in party financing in Ukraine.

*Batkivshchina* is a member of the center-right European People's Party, yet her rhetoric and party platform are populist rather than conservative and the party's niche policies often resemble

Ukraine's now moribund Socialist Party. In half of parliamentary votes, *Batkivshchina* and the Radical Party have voted the same as the Opposition Bloc and both appeal to similar voters at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2018). Only half of Fatherland's 20 MPs have consistently voted for reforms (Nis do Nosa (2018). The Opposition Bloc were and remain financed by Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs while at the same time they and their Party of Regions predecessors espoused a Soviet-style populist paternalism. The political face of corrupt tycoons (Party of Regions) financed the ostensible face of the proletariat (Communist Party) (Kuzio, 2015).

Outright lies, deception and exaggeration are commonly found in populist rhetoric with the most extreme case of this phenomenon the twitter rantings of US President Donald Trump. Vox Ukraine ranked Ukrainian politicians by their willingness to be truthful in its 'liars' and 'manipulators' survey (Skubenko, 2017). Vox Ukraine ranked the top five as Tymoshenko in first place, followed by Opposition Bloc MP's Rabinovych, Boyko and Oleksandr Vilkul and, surprisingly, leader of the *Samopomich* parliamentary faction Oleh Berezyuk (Shkarpova, 2018).

Sixth, crises are used by populists to mobilise public sentiment against elites and the 'establishment' (Taggart, 2004, Moffit, 2015). Ukraine has experienced multiple economic, political and military crises since becoming independent in 1991 and each of these crises has been exploited by populists to mobilise votes. In 2010, voters elected Yanukovych after five years of crisis and political instability when Yushchenko's presidency was dominated by his bitter and public quarrels with Tymoshenko.

## 3. Conclusion

Since 2014, Ukraine has been at war with Russia while at the same time seeking to overcome a deep economic crisis and implement unpopular reforms. The extent of the unpopularity of these reforms introduced since 2014 can be gauged by the collapse of support for Yatsenyuk's Popular front which led to the decision to not participate in local elections held in 2015. Populists, both 'pro-Western' and 'pro-Russian,' have sought to capitalise on public disgruntlement over unpopular reforms and frustration at the lack of end in sight for the on-going war with Russia. Tymoshenko and Grytsenko have criticised the low number of high-ranking elites who have been criminally prosecuted - which the Anti-Corruption Curt is meant to rectify and Tymoshenko criticised. They have also claimed, without producing evidence, that President Poroshenko's team are financially benefitting from the prolongation of the war through corruption in military orders. Neither Tymoshenko or Grytsenko have put forward realistic alternatives to the president's policies towards Russia's military aggression. Tymoshenko's long association with Russian President Putin is seen as a reason for her willingness to compromise with Russia (Arel 2008). In both Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and Ukraine's on-going war with Russia, Tymoshenko has been reluctant to criticise Putin. Meanwhile it is feared that Grytsenko, because of his military background, would pursue a more aggressive attempt to forcibly re-take the occupied territories in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine leading to an all-out Russian-Ukrainian war.

Populism in Ukraine is different in four ways to populism in Europe. Immigration is not an issue in Ukrainian elections as migrants do not seek to stay in Ukraine. Ethnic nationalists are electorally unpopular and the political parties that exist are anti-Russian – unlike their European counterparts. Islam is not an issue in electoral politics as there is no large Islamic minority in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Crimean Tatars aligned with Ukrainian groups in the Soviet and contemporary eras. Ukrainians support EU membership and see Russia, not the EU, as the threat to their country's sovereignty.

At the same time, populists in Ukraine are similar in six other ways. Populists in Ukraine and Europe are anti-globalist, directing their venom at the IMF and other international financial organisations. Populists everywhere use radical rhetoric against corrupt elites, the 'liberal establishment' and authorities. Populists in Ukraine, Europe and the US are authoritarian and a potential threat to democracy. Populists provide weak or no support for reforms which they believe are unfairly imposed by outside powers. Populists in Ukraine, Europe and the US are prone to using untruths, exaggerations, manipulations and are ideological chameleons. Finally, populists instrumentalise crises to mobilise voters.

## 4. Literature

**Bekeshkina, Iryna (2018)**: Interview, In: The Ukrainian Week, 29 June. http://ukrainianweek.com/Society/216145 (accessed: 1. August 2018).

**Berman, Sheri (2016)**: Populism Is Not Fascism. But It Could Be a Harbinger. In: Foreign Affairs, 17 October. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-17/populism-not-fascism (accessed: 1. July 2018).

**Committee of Voters (2018)**: http://www.cvu.org.ua/nodes/view/type:news/slug:try-holovy-fraktsii-propustyly-polovynu-holosuvan-u-travni-kvu

**Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2018)**: Election ratings in May 2018. Online. Available at: https://dif.org.ua/article/viborchi-reytingi-traven-2018408346 (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Gessen, Masha (2017)**: The Future is History. How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia. Granta. London.

**Grytsenko, Anatolii (2018)**: Interview. Online. Available at: https://daily.rbc.ua/ukr/show/anatoliy-gritsenko-nuzhno-boyatsya-avtoritarnogo-1524633586.html (accessed: 1. June 2018).

**Kaufmann, Eric (2018)**: Good Fences Make Good Politics. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 5, pp. 224-231.

**KKD deputata (2018)**: Yak otsinyty vnesok kozhnoho obrantsya u pidtrymku reform. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/ipr/ (accessed: 12. September 2018).

**Krastev, Ivan (2006)**: The New Europe: Respectable Populism, Clockwork Liberalism. Open Democracy, 21 March 2006. Online. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/new_europe_3376.jsp (accessed: 1. May 2018).

**Kryshtanovskaya, Olga and Stephen White (2009)**: The Sovietization of Russian Politics. In: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 283-309.

**Kudelia, Serhiy, and Taras Kuzio (2015)**: Nothing personal: explaining the rise and decline of political machines in Ukraine. In: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 250-278.

**Kulchytskyy, Stanislav and Mykhaylo Mishchenko (2018)**: Ukrayina na Porozi Obyednanoyi Yevropy. Razumkov Centre: Kyiv. Online. Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2018-Ukr_na_porozi...pdf (accessed: 11. July 2018).

**Kuzio, Taras (2010)**: Populism in Ukraine in Comparative European Context. In: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 3-18.

**Kuzio, Taras (2011)**: Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine. Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. In: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 221-232.

**Kuzio, Taras (2012)**: Democratic Revolutions from a Different Angle. Social Populism and National Identity in Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution. In: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 41-54.

**Kuzio, Taras (2014a)**: Impediments to the Emergence of Political Parties in Ukraine. In: Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp.309-323.

**Kuzio, Taras (2014b)**: Crime, Politics and Business in 1990s Ukraine. In: Communist and Post-Communist Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 195-210.

**Kuzio, Taras (2015)**: The Rise and Fall of the Party of Regions Political Machine. In: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 174-186.

**Kuzio, Taras (2017b)**: Putin's War Against Ukraine. Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime. Chair of Ukrainian Studies. Toronto.

**Kuzio, Taras (2018a)**: Western Historians of Russia and Crimea. Why Do They Continue to Use Imperialist and Racist Frameworks? Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, 18/02. Online. Available at: http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Kuzio_Western_Historians_of_Russia_and_Crimea.pdf (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Kuzio, Taras (2018b)**: Ukraine is not Russia or Venezuela. New Eastern Europe, 26 June. Online. Available at: http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/06/26/ukraine-not-russia-venezuela/ (accessed: 28. June 2018).

**Kuzio, Taras (2018c)**: Russia–Ukraine Crisis. The Blame Game, Geopolitics and National Identity. In: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 462-473.

**Leshchenko, Serhiy (2014)**: Mezhyhirskyy Syndrom. Diahnoz vladi Viktora Yanukovycha. Bright Star Publishing, Kyiv.

**Leshchenko, Serhiy (2015)**: Zmova. Yak Tymoshenko viddala Kolomoyskomu "Ukrnaftu". Ukrayinska Pravda blog, 24 January 2015. Online. Available at: https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/54c2e096b59b3/ (accessed: 16. May 2018).

**Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way (2010)**: Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

**Moffitt, Benjamin (2015)**: How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crises in Contemporary Populism. In: Government and Opposition, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 33-53.

**Müller, Jan-Werner (2015)**: Parsing Populism: Who is and who is not a populist in these days? In: Juncture, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp.80-89.

**Mudde, Cas (2004)**: The Populist Zeitgeist. In: Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 541-563.

**Mylovanov, Tymofiy (2015)**: The Rise of Populism in Ukraine. Vox Ukraine, 15 July 2015. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/en/the-rise-of-populism-in-ukraine/ (accessed: 31. July 2018).

**Nis do Nosa (2018)**: Yakyy deputat buv naykorysnishym dlya reform protyahom syomoyi sesii. Vox Ukraine, 27 February 2018. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/uk/nis-do-nosa-yakij-deputat-buv-najkorisnishim-dlya-reform-protyagom-somoyi-sesiyi/ (accessed: 23. April 2018).

**Ostiguy, Pierre (2017)**: Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach. In: Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and P. Ostiguy eds.: The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 73-100.

**Perspektyvy Ukrayinsko-Rosiyskykh Vidnosyn (2015)**: Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, nos. 8-9. Online. Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/ukr/NSD157-158_2015_ukr.pdf (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Polakow-Suransky, Sasha (2017)**: Go Back to Where You Come From: The Backlash Against Immigration and the Fate of Western Democracy. Hurst Books: London.

**Popescu, Nico and Andrew Wilson (2009)**: The Limits of Enlargement-Lite. European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood. Council on Foreign Relations: London. Online. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR14_The_Limits_of_Enlargement-Lite._European_and_Russian_Power_in_the_Troubled_Neighbourhood.pdf (accessed: 12. July 2018).

**Protsenko, Vitalii (2018)**: The Economics of Pain and Injustice. How Ukrainians Turned Into a "Left-wing" Nation. Vox Ukraine, 13 June 2018. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/en/the-economics-of-pain-and-injustice-how-ukrainians-turned-into-a-leftwing-nation/ (accessed: 29. September 2018).

**Pynzenyk, Viktor (2010)**: Former Insider Calls Her Destructive. Wants Her Out of Power. Wikileaks, 24 October 2010. Online. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10KYIV278_a.html (accessed: 12. June 2018).

**Razumkov Center (2018)**: Razumkov Center Newsletter, No. 51. Online. Available at: http://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/newsletter/Newsletter_51.pdf (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Rummens, Stefan (2017)**: Populism as a threat to liberal democracy. In: Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and P. Ostiguy eds.: The Oxford Handbook of Populism: Oxford, pp.554-570.

**Shkarpova, Olena (2017)**: 0 out of 10: Manipulation in Each and Every Statement. VoxCheck of AUA Batkivshchina's Brochure, Vox Ukraine, 30 June.2017. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/en/0-out-of-10-manipulation-in-each-and-every-statement-voxcheck-of-aua-Batkivshchina-s-brochure/ (accessed: 29. September 2018).

**Shkarpova, Olena (2018)**: Theory of Lying. First-ever Ranking of Populists and Liars in Ukrainian Politics. VoxUkraine. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/longreads/lie-theory/index-en.html (accessed: 29. September 2018).

**Shekhovtsov, Anton (2018)**: Russia and the Western Far Right. Tango Noir. Routledge: Abingdon & New York, NY.

**Shist mifiv pro ukrayinsku HTS (2018)**: VoxCheck zayav Yulii Tymoshenko. Vox Ukraine, 10 April 2018. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/uk/shist-mifiv-pro-ukrayinsku-gts-voxcheck-zayav-yuliyi-timoshenko/ (accessed 29. September 2018).

**Shukan, Ioulia, (2013)**: Intentional disruptions and violence in Ukraine's Supreme Rada. political competition, order, and disorder in a post-Soviet chamber, 2006–2012. In: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 439-456.

**Slipchenko, Svitlana, Oleksiy Krymeniuk, Yulia Zhaga, Yar Batoh, Maksym Skubenko, Maryna Stelmakh, Oksana Zhyharevych, Kateryna Rasumkova, Roksolana Fedorenko, Valentyn Hatsko, Vyacheslav Chernenko, and Olena Shkarpova (2018)**: Novyy kurs na pravdu? Pro shcho Yulia Tymoshenko hovoryla pid chas svoho vystupu na forumi. Faktchek. Vox Ukraine, 19 June 2018. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/uk/novij-kurs-na-pravdu-pro-shho-yuliya-timoshenko-govorila-pid-chas-svogo-vistupu-na-forumi-faktchek/ (accessed: 25. June 2018).

**Skubenko, Maksym (2017)**: Yulia Tymoshenko. Antolohiya Manipulyatsiy. Vox Ukraine, 21 November 2017. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/uk/yuliya-timoshenko-antologiya-manipulyatsij/ (accessed: 29. September 2018).

**Taggart, Paul (2004)**: Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe. In: Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 269-288.

**The Economist (2018)**: Is Donald Trump above the law?' 23 August. Online. Available at: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/08/23/is-donald-trump-above-the-law (accessed: 25. August 2018).

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2017a)**: We are against the government's proposed pension, medical and land reforms because they will destroy Ukrainians. 19 June 2017. Online. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/news-en/we-are-against-the-government-s-proposed-pension-medical-and-land-reforms-because-they-will-destroy-ukrainians/ (accessed: 14. July 2018).

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2017b)**: Land moratorium must be approved before review of 2018 State Budget. 5 December 2017. Online. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/news-en/land-moratorium-must-be-approved-before-review-of-2018-state-budget/ (accessed: 1. February 2018).

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2018a)**: External management amounts to usurpation of Ukraine's sovereignty. Online. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/news-en/external-management-amounts-to-usurpation-of-ukraine-s-sovereignty/ (accessed: 15. September 2018).

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2018b)**: My zrobyly pershyy krok – poperedu tryvala robota na stanovlennya novoyi Ukrayny. 15 June 2018. Online. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/news/my-zrobyly-pershyj-krok-poperedu-tryvala-robota-na-stanovlennya-novoyi-ukrayiny/

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2018c)**: Hromadyanam slid nadaty realne parvo zakonodavchoyi initsiatyvy ta provedennya referendum za narodnoyi initsiatyvy. 15 June 2018. Online. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/news/gromadyanam-slid-nadaty-realne-pravo-zakonodavchoyi-initsiatyvy-ta-provedennya-referendumu-za-narodnoyi-initsiatyvy/ (accessed: 18. June 2018).

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2018d)**. Comments at the Washington DC Prayer Meeting. On line. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/news-en/we-must-learn-to-make-decisions-in-favor-of-god-and-people/ (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2018e)**. Comment on the Anti-Corruption Court. Online. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/news-en/ukraine-needs-an-independent-anti-corruption-court-not-deception-by-the-president/

**Tymoshenko, Yulia (2018f)**. Speech to New Course congress. On line. Available at: https://www.tymoshenko.ua/news/natsionalna-asambleya-samovryadnosti-maye-staty-natsionalnym-arbitrom-i-sovistyu/ (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Ukrainian Parliament (2018)**. Vote for the Anti-Corruption Court on 7 June 2018. Online. Available at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_golos?g_id=18885 (accessed: 9. October 2018).

**Ukraine: Yanukovych Suggests Regions Won't Accept Orange (2007)**: Wants Yushchenko to Agree to Broad Coalition, Wikileaks. 4 October 2007. Online. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KYIV2522_a.html (accessed: 12. June 2018).

**Yaremko, Vitalia, Iryna Lukomska and Denys Nizalov (2017)**: What Political Parties Say about the Land Reform – and What the Voters Hear. Vox Ukraine, 22 August 2017. Online. Available at: https://voxukraine.org/en/what-political-parties-say-about-the-land-reform-and-what-the-voters-hear/ (accessed: 10. May 2018).

**Wilson, Andrew (2005)**: Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Yale University Press: London and New Haven.

**World Bank (2017)**: Ukraine Can Boost Annual Output by US$15 Billion with Land Reform. 2 October 2017. Online. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2017/10/02/ukraine-can-boost-annual-output-us15-billion-with-land-reform (accessed: 10. July 2018).

**Zarembo, Kateryna (Ed.) (2017)**: Ukrayinske Pokolinnya Z: tsinnosti ta orientyry. New Europe Center. Online. Available at: http://neweurope.org.ua/analytics/ukrayinske-pokolinnya-z-tsinnosti-ta-oriyentyry/ (accessed: 12. September 2018).

**Taras Kuzio**

Taras Kuzio is a Professor in the Department of Political Science, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. His previous positions were at the University of Alberta, George Washington University, University of Toronto, and Chief of Mission to the NATO Information and Documentation Office in Ukraine.

Taras Kuzio is the author and editor of seventeen books, including (with Paul D'Anieri) *The Sources of Russia's Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order* (2018), *Putin's War Against Ukraine. Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime* (2017), *Ukraine. Democratization, Corruption and the New Russian Imperialism* (2015), *From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution* (2009), and *Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism* (2007). He is the author of five think tank monographs, including *The Crimea: Europe's Next Flashpoint?* (2010). He has authored 38 book chapters and 100 scholarly articles on post-communist and Ukrainian politics, democratic transitions, colour revolutions, nationalism, and European studies. Taras Kuzio has been invited to be the Guest Editor of *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, East European Politics and Society, Demokratizatsiya, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Nationalities Papers, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, and *Problems of Post-Communism*.

Dr. Taras Kuzio's current research is on nationalism, populism and European integration, Ukrainian politics, national identity and the Russian-Ukrainian war. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Birmingham, England, an MA in Soviet and East European Area Studies from the University of London, and a BA in Economics from the University of Sussex. He held a Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Yale University.