електоральну базу, потрібно мати доступ до персональної інформації виборців. Звичайно, у нагоді стануть списки партійних прихильників і дані агітаційних мереж, але найбільшу увагу варто звернути на соціальні мережі та форуми. Для розширення кола прихильників часто використовують соціальну інтернет-ініціативу, яка формує певне цільове ядро, проте у подальшому, перетворюється на партійний проект. І тут виникає питання етичного аспекту використання зібраної персональної інформації у політичних цілях.

Наступна проблема, з якою зіштовхуються спеціалісти: оцінка параметрів «картки виборця» та їх кількість. Враховуючи невеликий досвід практичного застосування Big Data, важко здійснити політичну кластеризацію. Проведення такої роботи потребує великого обсягу часу. Специфіка політичного процесу України полягає у тому, що виборчі кампанії розгортаються стрімко, за 1-2 роки партійні суб’єкти до них не готовіся. Якщо такий підхід не зміниться, то використання технологій Big Data стане скоріше виключенням, ніж правилом.

Окрім того, українська інтернетізація ще не стала тотальною, особливо у селах, відповідно, технології Big Data будуть ефективними лише тоді, коли їх застосування поєднувати з традиційними «польовими структурами», щоб включати для аналізу настрої тих людей, які знаходяться офлайн. Цілком логічно, що спочатку технології Big Data будуть поширюватися у великих містах, де слабко працюють традиційні методи «польових» агітаційних заходів.

Останньою масштабною проблемою щодо технологій Big Data є інтерпретація даних. Наразі часто наголошують на тому, що зібрані в інтернеті дані є не репрезентативними, це вирішується шляхом внесення даних в систему, зібраних агітаційною мережею. Але для формування окремого порядку денної для кожної із цільових груп потрібно розуміти які канали збори інформації будуть давати динаміку, як її оцінювати і яким чином корегувати політичну програму.

Однозначно, що технології Big Data дають великі можливості для радикальних змін у політичному процесі, але їх практично-інструментальне освоєння знаходиться ще на початкових етапах.

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WHAT HAPPENED TO SURVEY DATA AFTER EUROMAIDAN?

Looking closely at Ukrainian survey data after Euromaidan, we discover that data from different research centers differs unprecedentedly. Nowadays we occasionally see unusual discrepancies even in political surveys, which have always been closely watched by media, politicians and general public in Ukraine. The key reason for this
is in changes in sampling approaches which happened after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the war in the Eastern part of Ukraine.

Firstly, most centers are unable to survey Crimea after its annexation. Thus, new data may or may not include Crimea. This reason for discrepancies is very easy to take notice of since professional press-releases mention whether a particular survey included Crimea.

Secondly, the situation becomes more complicated when it comes to Luhansk and Donetsk Regions. Sampling practices may differ even within one center, depending on resources and customer’s preferences. There are several approaches to working with these regions.

1. To exclude Donetsk and Luhansk regions entirely from the survey.
2. To include only those their parts which are under the Ukrainian control at the time of the survey. Here confusion starts since the controlled area is not fixed in time: thus, surveys representative for the adult Ukrainian population on controlled territories are not necessarily representative for exactly the same territories due to the changing border of those territories.
3. To include the controlled territories and some parts of the territories that are not controlled by Ukraine: only those where a research center managed to arrange the work of local interviewers. In other words, no research center is able to survey the whole uncontrolled territory but, in some surveys, some parts of Eastern uncontrolled territories are covered. Since different parts are covered in different survey, we once again have a situation when results are representative for different populations.

Thirdly, the greatest confusion happens at the stage when data are collected and weights are applied to datasets. Centers usually use demographic «weights» to calibrate their datasets: if there are any slightest discrepancies between the state population statistics and data, coefficients are applied. Before Euromaidan, this practice used to be relatively straightforward: since most surveys contain electoral questions, researchers were likely to prefer the most recent data of the State Electoral Commission as weights for their datasets to make sure their results had the best chances to forecast electoral choices. However, weights have never been mentioned in any press releases.

Nowadays, the decisive question is, “What kind of weights should be applied in the situation when there are no exact recent data for the population on uncontrolled territories?” There are cases when, aiming to keep data comparable in time, a center might use data before(!) the military conflict as weights for uncontrolled territories. Needless to say, such weights do not correspond to the current situation: there has been a considerable migration of people from the East of Ukraine since the war had started.

Moreover, aiming for comparison in time, yet unable to survey population on uncontrolled territories, a polling organization might extrapolate data from controlled territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions to the uncontrolled ones. This creates even a greater confusion since there are no reasons to believe that views of the population remaining on occupied territories are the same as of those who stay in those parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions that are controlled by Ukraine.

The critical part of this confusion is that, as of today, weights are not declared by research centers in their press releases and analytical reports. Hence, even the most
A competent and inquisitive reader does not have any information on how the data were weighted in a particular survey. This challenge is not unique to Ukraine but is particularly pressing nowadays in our society due to the diversity of currently applied dataset weights. Potentially, having datasets, survey specialists could explore weights and experiment with them to understand to which extent data discrepancies are caused by differences in weights; however, as of today, most polling centers in Ukraine do not make datasets publicly accessible even when data are not commercially owned.

Don Kalb

THEORY FROM THE EAST:
FROM DOUBLE POLARIZATION TO CRYPTO FASCISM

Western media have for long designated postsocialist transition toward democratic capitalism as a success. That was a liberal conceit, pointed out by critics for a long time, the truth of which is now coming out in the form of right wing, neonationalist populism. The explanation of that populism is not an essentialist one. Histories of anti-Semitism and fascism in the region do not explain it, though they do, unfortunately, inform it. The explanation is a class driven one. Capitalist transition was deeply disruptive and painful and left seriously polarized societies in its wake. EU accession did deliver some benefits and subsidies, but the actual social impact of capitalist markets was infinitely stronger and more consequential. This was not only because the benefits and subsidies came very late in the process, half a generation after 1989, and were small in comparison to what the EU had distributed to the post-fascist Mediterranean countries from the mid-80s. Postsocialism integrated into global and EU capitalism as a dependent neoliberal project in the full sense of that term, a project that was organized to institutionalize downward pressures on living standards and subdue voice and bargaining. The simultaneity with the rise of East Asia magnified the outcomes. The effect was what Jonathan Friedman has called “double polarization”, the dialectical production of widening social divides paired with deepening cultural divisions and consequent identity politics. While these relational processes were happening everywhere in Europe and the US, laying the foundation for the Brexit, Trump, and Le Pen disasters, the sheer dimensions of the process in CEE have made the region a locus classicus from which we should learn: Hence Theory from the East. Since the class dimension could not be expressed and acted upon, the new political Right turned class issues into culture arguments and declared protection of cultural boundaries the new project. Neonationalism as a popular as well as an electoral and geopolitical force was the upshot. The protection and resurrection of domestic hierarchies and the control over external borders the most direct political outcome.