ХУТИНУКРАИНА ПУЙ
ПОНАДУСЕ
Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Ukrainian Power Elites

Oleh Ivanov
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”

Abstract:
The article presents the preconditions and empirical limitations for implementation of ideal-type deliberative democratic decision making in foreign relations sphere which exist in Ukraine. Communicative representation theory explains the stability of the Ukrainian public system in the foreign policy dimension (Ukraine-Russia relations case) through the functionality of foreign policy determined by elites, social tension and conflict of orientations in the transformation period. Politicians’ communication is generalized through media-strategies: the hidden (nomenclatura-styled), ambivalent, and confrontational. A computer algorithm for structural and morphological analysis of large amounts of text data (Ukrainian and Russian messages on official web-sites) created. Text corpuses are transformed into the semantic network of an issue, combined with all of the attributes which an analyst may be interested in (time, place, author, potential audience, etc.). For the analysis of large number (hundreds) of surveys with different sample size and different wording of questions the technique of thematic clustering of questions with the use of content analysis applied.

Keywords:
representation, communication, power elite, international relations, Ukraine, Russia, political orientations
Introduction

Ukraine is one of the central powers in the post-Soviet area due to many reasons, which can be combined under general conception of “transboundary” or “cleft” country (Huntington, 1993). West-East communication in a broad sense is going through Ukrainian territory. Main energy corridors – gas and oil pipes, airways, as well as informational and cultural exchange are among examples of this communication.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the military conflict in Donbas region, the transboundary role of Ukraine transformed into the frontier of European security zone (Blockmans, 2015). Therefore, the strengthening of Ukraine is not the sole interest of its people, but also among key preconditions of European Union even existence (Snyder, 2015).

“Strengthening” for transition state means not only the development of the military, but also the acceleration of modern European democratic structures formation and consolidation of the socio-political system of Ukraine. Studying of democracy in Ukraine and social mechanisms of its functioning requires the development of indicators of implementation of citizens will by the power elites, i.e the level of publics-elites consolidation. Without conceptual and especially methodological tools for studying of representative democracy in Ukraine, we have to rely on expert estimates and statements of political leaders about the quality of people’s representation. Modern representative democracy crisis (Piattoni, 2013; Poguntke, Roßteutscher, Schmitt-Beck, & Zmerli, 2015) requires theoretical and empirical reconsideration of political representation itself.

Among the key obstacle of society consolidation towards democratic reforming is the inefficiency of public communications which leads to the impossibility of making consensus decisions involving power elites, experts, and the public. For instance, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology study shows that publics tend to exaggerate the scale of corruption mainly due to its representation in media, but not due to their own experience (KMIC, 2016, pp. 27-63). The scholar and analytical problem in this area is the lack of knowledge about the mechanisms of representation in the public discourse of politics, lack of reliable tools for measuring the level of representation and integrated operating model of communication links between the subjects of social and political processes in the framework of representative democracy.

The sharpest and the most manipulative is socio-political discourse around issues which divide society into groups which are comparable in size but opposite in views. Since 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine foreign policy vector became such an issue. Leading candidates started to manipulate through pro-/anti-Russian sentiments (Birch, 1995). This political technology has been used in each campaign for more than a decade already (Frye, 2015; Хмелько, 2006).

Taking all these arguments altogether, we think that studying of the representation of citizens’ foreign policy orientations by Ukrainian power elites is timely and relevant for government communication policy development. Our study based on tools developed and data gathered during our Ph.D. thesis study (Іванов, 2012) as well as new data collected for the period after the Euromaidan revolution.

The main goal of our study is to explore the peculiarities and dynamics of representation of foreign policy preferences of the general public and particular electoral groups in public communication of power elites in Ukraine.

We will reach that goal through the following steps:
1. show the explanatory power of social representation theories for the study of political representation in transitional society;
2. consider political communication as a unifying mechanism of social systems of modern societies and examine the suitability of communication paradigm of representation for the study of democratic development;
3. propose the conceptual model of communicative representation in foreign policy domain;
4. propose a quantitative method of comparative analysis of aggregated Ukrainian survey data and public communication of power elites data coded via computer-aided content analysis tools;
5. compare Yushchenko’s presidency period and after Euromaidan period using methodology developed by the author.

**Theoretical background and conceptual model of representation via communication**

The topic of political representation is quite broad and connected with several spheres of social research (see the diagram below).

*Scheme 1. Theoretical prerequisites for studying political representation*

Source: Ivanov (2011)
First of all, if we talk about representation, we have to address the general theory of social representation. The study of the various types of representations at the highest level – in culture and society – traditionally associated with Durkheim’s concept of “collective representations” (Дюркгейм, 1996, pp. 6–74). The largest contribution to the study of this phenomenon has been made by the French School of Sociology and one of its leading representatives, Serge Moscovici. It was he who used the term “social representation” for the first time in 1961 to study the perception and use of ideas of psychoanalysis in France in sense of collective “processing” of social object by the community in order to improve behavior and communication (Moscovici, 1963). Moscovici defined social representations as a system of values, ideas, and practices with a twofold function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly, to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history (Moscovici, 1973, pp. ix-xiv).

Moscovici, unlike Durkheim, understood representation as an active process, not just as the display and reproduction of some external reality. There is a symbolic space of development and coordination of the various versions of representations because all people have the opportunity to creatively change the way of representation so that every person is a social agent in this process. He recognizes the possible coexistence of competing, sometimes entirely mutually exclusive versions of the perception of reality as part of the same community and culture (Howarth, Foster, & Dorrer, 2004). His follower, Sandra Jovchelovitch proposes to consider social representation as a space that connects individuals and society, as well as object and subject of the action into the one system, and as rooted in areas of origin (Jovchelovitch, 1996).

Martin Bauer and George Gaskell (1999) offered to formalize social representations in a model consisting of three components: subjects – bearers of social representations (for instance, experts, journalists, politicians or other people’s representatives); objects, actions or ideas that are represented (for instance, government policy attitudes); project-image of the social group for which social representation matters (for instance, groups of interest, electoral groups, etc.). This conceptualization is called “Toblerone model” of social representations – from the name of Swiss chocolate “Toblerone”, which has an elongated triangular-pyramidal shape. Let us keep these three components in mind as we will use them in our model of communicative representation.

Political representations are of doubly complex nature, as they are related to issues of power, democracy, elites. Studying representation in political sphere presupposes following the framework of delegation and functioning of citizens’ representatives. As a sacred legal concept (Гадамер, 1988) representation is authorized representation. In the analysis of representations in political sphere, two general approaches could be distinguished: delegative and representative. Within delegative approach the main carrier of power is a social group which delegates their representatives, therefore, the actions of the latter should always be guided by the position of those who nominated them. The elected persons cannot develop their own policy, but should only meet the desires of the electorate. Such an approach is closer to the American political tradition in which the greatest possible control over the public authorities is the part of liberal rights and freedoms guarantees (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, & Goldman, 2008). A representative approach presumes that voters give all
the power to those who represent them. Politicians decide what actions they can do for the benefits of the represented social groups. This approach is typical for European political tradition in which the effectiveness and the power of the ruling elite take precedence over the individualistic vision of human freedom.

Within those two general approaches, Pitkin (1967) proposed to classify four types of political representations theories:

► formalistic (or institutional) – the key mechanism is the rotation of representatives;
► symbolic (representative, as a symbolic embodiment represented);
► descriptive theories consider the degree of objective similarity between a representative and represented: similar social background, physical appearance etc.;
► substantive theories are about actions of representatives and how they meet the interests of the represented.

Still all formal-legal approaches do not consider the ability of politicians to respond to public opinion fluctuations. This problem was initially approached in theories of politics as a vocation. Max Weber (1919) distinguishes political (focused on electoral preferences) and bureaucratic (linked to standards and development of tactical solutions) types of governing. This theory was empirically verified in a study by Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, Bert Rockman (1981), in which it was found that hybrid forms of government exist, and “creative dialogue” between elites of various types are presented as a condition for good governance. In this context, specific areas of policy (e.g. international relations) and transitional societies were not studied. In electoral democracies, which are characterized by the compliance with the minimum standards of government representatives’ elections, political communication is of special importance. Therefore, the theory of political representation in the context of the Ukrainian political system can be meaningfully verified only in a study of specific areas of policy, communication and interaction between the publics and elites.

How do we assess political communication potential for the democracy development and political system consolidation? In terms of the theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1987) communication is a factor of social solidarity and democratic decision-making, if it is rational, and if there is a culture of pluralism in society, as well as some common interests (implemented through the “invisible hand of the market”). Ideal-type representation presumes (Dahl, 1989, p. 307) the following:

a) the presence of socially important issues in public discourse;
b) their unequivocal formulation and evaluation by stakeholders;
c) the availability of basic values that enable communication;
d) communication between power elites and the public which is two-sided and leads to unambiguous regulatory decisions;
e) the process is continuous, the rules are changed according to the new circumstances.

The first conceptual model within the communicative approach to foreign policy domain has been applied in studies of international conflicts and integration at the Stanford University (Holsti, North, & Brody, 1969). Its effectiveness for the analysis of negotiation in crisis environment has been proven, thus, as a first approximation, we can use it to explore the interstate communication between Ukraine and Russia. However, a significant drawback of this model is its disregard of internal processes in each country involved in this communicative system. Potential interactions between non-state (or, more precisely, out-of-power, non-elite) actors (publics) in
the communications space are ignored too. In addition, media are absent as independent actors that can influence if not the content of the communication, then, at least, the placement of accents (“agenda setting”) in international relations at the public level. This lack is postulated *a priori*: any media within this model is only a tool of power elites, through which they carry out communication with the publics.

A wider view of the problem is suggested by Matthew Baum and Philip Potter (2008). Their conceptual model partially overcomes the disadvantages of the simplified two-tile “behavioral” Stanford school model. The authors conclude that today almost all parts of the interaction at the international level are studied. However, there are no empirical studies that have combined within a single conceptual and methodological approach all of the data about interactions in a specific period and for specific actors. Also, we must note that this model represents the interaction in terms of one country. We understand that the authors had in mind the possibility of mirroring elements of models for 2 or more actors. Furthermore, we assume the possibility of links between elements of two “mirror” models (see Scheme 2).

**Scheme 2.** The theoretical model of interaction between media, public opinion and foreign policy: the interstate context

Source: Ivanov (2011)
Note that Baum and Potter do not take into account the impact of foreign actors on the domestic media of the studied countries. Media systems of Russia and Ukraine through the last 25 years were rather related, so assuming such complete independence would be incorrect. Therefore, the existence of such influence we also show in Scheme 2. In the same way, we do not neglect the influence of foreign media upon the country’s ruling elite. So the relationship here is two-sided.

The main object of our attention is the representation of foreign policy orientations of Ukraine’s population by power elites Ukraine, so we do not intend to operationalize the whole conceptual scheme outlined above. Our conceptual scheme shows the relationship between public opinion and the ruling elite in the most detailed way. However, we consider all the elements of the theoretical model, which directly affect the present communication (see Scheme 3).

Scheme 3. A conceptual scheme.

Source: Ivanov (2011)
Thus, this conceptual model is useful to study the level of representation of foreign policy orientations of Ukraine's population (1) by power elites (2). Foreign policy orientations of the population can be studied using quantitative opinion polls (3), which is also the channel of communication through which thoughts and orientations of the population can be perceived by power elites. Representation of popular orientations by elites can be studied through content analysis of their public communication. There is also a difference from the original model: we do not consider the media as the sole actor. Baum and Potter noted (p. 40) that modern researchers consider the media from the two opposite positions: either as an independent actor that shapes public opinion on foreign policy and often modifies the initial communication intentions of the publics’ representatives; or as a “transmission mechanism” that transmits the position of the elite to the public. We argue that the media can be both.

Independent media communicates with the public, interpreting statements of politicians in its own manner, and selecting the most important (according to journalists) expressions, thus creating “agenda”. Here we will consider the independence of journalism in Ukraine and Russia, as a topic for a separate study. Just take into account that media can be independent, and partly is. However, there is a special type of media, which in any state, regardless of its level of democracy, is meant to represent the official views of politicians in full, with accents that are important for politicians, with a minimum of additional interpretation. These are information outlets of political forces and their leaders: official pages of politicians and political parties on the Internet, newspapers, video and audio recorded by the public relations assistants of politicians. These media directly reflect the intentions of politicians and, which is important, select a media presentation of specific policy positions, which the latter considers the most “right”.

If we want to study representation by power elites, but not its interpretation by media, the best of the available options is the content analysis of official media, totally controlled by political leaders (4). We propose to analyze the official websites of politicians. On the one hand, this is the most dynamic type of media that will quickly respond to changing situations and promptly submit politician’s statement on a particular issue, and on the other – the Internet is an integral media that combines text, video, audio and still images. The official websites of politicians are practically ready databases of politicians’ expressions, both exclusive – placed only on these sites, and copied materials from the other media – newspapers, radio, television, Internet resources. Clearly, the official website will not copy materials, which, according to politician and his or her team, distort their position. And if they are, these materials go only with “appropriate” comments.

Political leaders, expressing a position on foreign policy have to take into account the potential position of the leaders of the opponent countries. Thus, there is communication between them, including public communication (5). It is an external factor that affects the way the elite represent the orientations of the population. Here we also offer to analyze official websites of political leaders in both countries. But as this is a two-way communication, then we use a two-sided “stimulus-response” model described above. In order to follow trends of reciprocal influence between political leaders, opposing each other, this interaction should be arranged across the timeline. This will allow, on a certain level of reliability, to conduct the causal analysis of communication acts of politicians.

Finally, we consider public opinion in Russia as an external factor affecting the content of communication between political leaders of
both countries and the opinion of Ukraine’s population through social relations between the two nations. The overall analysis of the representation and the environment that affects it should take place inseparable from the socio-political and historical context of international relations, i.e. the events taking place in the international sphere (6).

In sum, the proposed conception of analysis covers four relationships (or 6 if bilateral ties count as 2) in the model of international relations, including the media, public opinion, the ruling elite and the historical context of the events:

1. the relationship between the foreign policy publics’ orientations and the content of public communication of elites (elite’s representation of voters); analyzed through quantitative analysis of public opinion surveys, quantitative content analysis of public statements by politicians and multivariate time series analysis (analysis of survey data and speech coding within a dynamic statistical model);
2. the interaction between the positions of power elites of Ukraine and Russia in the framework of public communication on the international level; analyzed through quantitative content analysis of public statements by politicians and multivariate time series analysis;
3. the potential impact of the public opinion in the opponent countries;
4. the potential effects of context (events).

In this article, we will only verify the first type of relationship. The others are considered in our dissertation for the Yushchenko presidency period (Іванов, 2012) and can be applied in further research.

Method
In this section we present basic terms, the period of our analysis, sample of actors and messages, technique of automated content-analytical coding, statistical apparatus for the representations assessment.

We use the terms in the following meaning:

A message is a publicly expressed opinion statement, which contains an attitude to certain issues, and is limited by clear time frame and / or place.

Communication strategy is a potentially realizable way to achieve certain goals through communicative acts. It is characterized by a specific manipulation with ideas and judgments available in public discourse, for example, their opposing, association, suppression. The expected purpose of a communicative action in our study’s context is the support of politician by communication recipients.

Target electorates are the voters who are most likely to support a particular politician or political party, and on which they rely, wanting to keep or gain the power.

Attitudes are a support (direct or indirect), a denial (direct or indirect) or assertions of neutrality regarding certain issues. 

► Direct support – expressed statements that directly reflect the specific orientation of the public.
► Indirect support – expressed statements that deny the content of the statement that is not supported by the public.

Foreign policy orientations of the population – the general attitude to foreign policy vector. It includes consent with a need or unacceptability of convergence between states or unification of certain countries, international communities and other actors in intergovernmental politics. It also covers attitudes to actions of subjects of international politics and their representatives, credibility to foreign countries representatives. In this study, an external entity of international politics is Russia and organizations to which it belongs or which are led by it.
**Power elites** are persons who control the highest authorities in the country or are in parliamentary opposition and exercise the greatest impact on the particular state institutions.

We compare two periods of modern Ukrainian history: Yushchenko’s presidency and the period after the Euromaidan. Both periods characterized by the presence of pro-Western state leaders (Kuzio, 2015; Tudoroiu, 2007). However, during Yushchenko’s presidency “orange” politicians failed to consolidate Ukrainian population around Western foreign policy vector (Геополітичні орієнтації населення і безпека України, 2009, р. 47). After the Euromaidan, for the first time, the supporters of European integration overwhelm the supporters of the union with Russia (Sakhno, 2015). Obviously, there was no Russian military aggression during Yushchenko’s presidency, which is a considerable factor of influence upon Russia image in Ukraine. Still, we should compare power elites communication in both periods to see if there any arguments which are different from “external enemy” rhetoric which is not enough for sustainable European society development.

Our data originate from two specific time spans: from August 1, 2005 till August 31, 2008 (3 years) and from February 22, 2014 till February 29, 2016 (more than 2 years). The reason for the first time span is that we have week-by-week public opinion polls of the Ukrainian adult population for this period. As a rule, these polls contained questions about respondents’ geopolitical orientations. This time span represents Yushchenko’s presidency at the height of his power. The reason for the second time span is that on 22 of February 2014 Ukrainian parliament removed president Yanukovych from the office. The same day Turchynov became new acting president, thus, new western-oriented authorities came to power in Ukraine. This period of modern Ukrainian history continues till now. On 29 of February 2016 we finished data collection for this research (both opinion polls and communication data).

Polls were conducted with structured individual interviews by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), the Razumkov Center, and Fund “Democratic initiatives” in 90–132 settlements in all regions of Ukraine and Crimea. The sample is representative for Ukraine, for 24 regions and Crimea. The number of respondents varies from 1019 to 2040. With the method of personal (face-to-face) interviews were surveyed respondents who were at least 18 years old at the time of interview. The error margin excluding the effect of design with a probability of 95% does not exceed 2,3–3,5% (depending on the sample).

For the analysis we selected answers to questions that are connected with Russia, its representatives, organizations to which it belongs or which are led by it, foreign and domestic issues in Ukraine for which its representatives have expressed their views. Some of them repeated from study to study, others were unique for a particular poll. To measure the foreign policy orientations, we used 34 variables (including responses to multiple choice questions). Examples of the statements assessed by the respondents are the following:

► The threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia is one of the three major threats to Ukraine in the coming year.

► Would you support the completion of Ukraine’s participation in the activities of

---

1 The supporters of Yushchenko during 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections.

2 After the annexation of Crimea and starting of the hostilities in Donbas region the data from these regions are not strictly representative. After 18 March 2014 there were no reliable data from Ukrainian sociological organizations based in Crimea. And the data from Donbas is representative enough only for territories under Ukrainian Army control.
Eurasian Economic Union on the principles of multi-level and multi-speed integration?

► Do you expect the establishment of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with Russia from the Ukrainian government?
► Whom do you support in the Georgian-Russian conflict?
► Integration with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States should be the central area of Ukrainian foreign policy.

A full list of questions’ wordings in the Ukrainian language can be found in the supplement of our Ph.D. thesis (Ivanov, 2012, pp. 317–326).

Typically, during the first period a survey was conducted every week, but not always. Also, not all questionnaires included all relevant issues. Therefore, in the comparative analysis of surveys and messages only 86 data sets were involved (in total for both periods), and the comparison with the results of statements of politicians coding was conducted monthly with accumulated frequencies.

For the second period we calculated index variable which consists of three components:
► exclusive support of joining the European Union;
► exclusive support of joining the non-military union with Russia;
► other positions.

By “other positions” we mean “joining both”, “joining neither”, “hard to say” or “refuse to answer”.

This index was calculated from the following questions:
► How would you vote on the referendum about Ukraine membership in EU? – “For”, “Against”, “Would not take part in referendum”, “Hard to say”.
► If there was a referendum about which union should Ukraine join, how you would vote? – “Join the EU”, “Join the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan”, “Join neither, but maintain good relations with both”, “Hard to say”.

To identify target electorates we used the question “How would you vote if the presidential elections took place in Ukraine next Sunday?”. It was repeated in all polls we used for our analysis.

In accordance with our conceptual model and operational definition of power elites, we selected the following politicians whose messages should be collected. For the first period: President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko (in office from 23.01.2005 till 25.03.2010); leader of one of the two most powerful political forces at the time – Yulia Tymoshenko; the leader of the most powerful opposition political forces at the time – Viktor Yanukovych. The particular reasons are the following:
► The President of Ukraine is the head of Ukrainian state and according to its legal framework is the most influential official. The President represents Ukraine at the highest level in foreign relations and directs the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
► Yulia Tymoshenko was the Prime Minister of Ukraine twice over the period and for the longest time of all premiers of this period: from 04.02.2005 till 08.09.2005 and from 18.12.2007 till 11.03.2010, i.e. 55% of the time of this period. The Prime Minister of Ukraine has a key influence on the economic content of foreign relations. Under the Constitution that was in force during the study period, the Prime Minister could be appointed only by a parliamentary coalition, thus was independent enough from the President. In addition, Tymoshenko was a BYuT, the second largest parliamentary faction, leader.
► Viktor Yanukovych was the leader of the largest opposition faction in Parliament at
the time of Yushchenko’s presidency – the Party of Regions. He was the Prime Minister of Ukraine from 04.08.2006 till 18.12.2007 (27% of the time). Russia expected his victory in the presidential election in 2004: Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin congratulated Viktor Yanukovych on his victory before election results were officially announced. Therefore, the role of this politician can be considered special.

For the second period we also choose to analyze messages of politicians who, on the one hand, are the most influential and, on the other, have alternative views on foreign relations. They are:
► Olexander Turchynov – from 22.04.2014 till 29.07.2014 was Head of the Ukrainian parliament, and from 23.02.2014 till 07.06.2014 was acting president of Ukraine.
► Petro Poroshenko – from 07.06.2014 till now is the President of Ukraine.
► The reasons to include the messages of these two are the same as for Yushchenko.
► Arseniy Yatsenyuk – from 27.02.2014 till 14.04.2014 was the Prime Minister of Ukraine. The reason to include his messages is the same as for Tymoshenko when she was a prime minister.
► Yulia Tymoshenko – the leader of the most popular (KMIC, 2016) pro-Western opposition (Zawada, 2016) faction.
► Yuriy Boiko – the leader of the largest opposition faction “Opposition block”, which mainly consists of the former Party of Regions members. We also include all messages of other representatives of this block which appears on its official web-site.

In total we collected 27,818 messages. The sources were the following:

Table 1. Sources of messages data collection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politician</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Date of copy</th>
<th>Total messages saved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yuschenko</td>
<td><a href="http://www.president.gov.ua/">http://www.president.gov.ua/</a></td>
<td>27.01.2010</td>
<td>10,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanukovych</td>
<td><a href="http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/">http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/</a></td>
<td>19.10.2010</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turchynov</td>
<td><a href="http://www.turchynov.com/">http://www.turchynov.com/</a></td>
<td>20.05.2016</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poroshenko</td>
<td><a href="http://www.president.gov.ua/">http://www.president.gov.ua/</a></td>
<td>20.05.2016</td>
<td>5,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tymoshenko (second period)</td>
<td><a href="https://www.tymoshenko.ua/">https://www.tymoshenko.ua/</a></td>
<td>20.05.2016</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiko and other “Opposition block”</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.05.2016</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representatives</td>
<td><a href="http://opposition.org.ua/uk/">http://opposition.org.ua/uk/</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Firstly we used lemmatized word form “Russ*” (the word covers Russia, the Russian Federation, Russian and others in all possible grammatical forms). In this way were selected 1106 messages by Yushchenko, 446 – by Tymoshenko and 478 – by Yanukovych. Next were selected messages related to issues present in questionnaires. The whole list of keywords used in this procedure is given in Appendix E.3 of our Ph.D. thesis (Іванов, 2012, pp. 328–329). We used both Ukrainian and Russian counterparts.

Selected messages were analyzed using the algorithm of structural-morphological analysis developed by us. First, we used a specially structured common lexical dictionary (for Ukrainian and Russian language) instead of a predefined analytical dictionary. The dictionary is based on POS-tagging projects (Nguyen, 2015; Rysin, 2016) and structured as a matrix, which serves as a grid, within which the program is “reading ” the analyzed text.

Matrix is conceptually shown in Table 2. The rows correspond to all the words, which are different in meaning and morphological characteristics (as in any ordinary lexical dictionary). Column A contains a numeric code of each word, which serves as an internal reference to a word within the dictionary. Column B contains the lemma of the word, i.e. the unchangeable part of it. Column C contains the original form of the word, i.e. the form that the program uses for presenting the results of calculation.

Columns D1... Dk and D'1 ... D'j contain pairs of words and their grammatical identifiers, such as gender, number, etc. In this case (1 ... k) and (1 ... j) is the complete paradigm of each token. Each form ID consists of a unique combination of numbers for each row.

Table 2. Analytical dictionary structuration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D1..k</th>
<th>D'1..j</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Word index</td>
<td>Lemma</td>
<td>Original form</td>
<td>Form of a particular time, gender, number, etc.</td>
<td>Code of grammatical form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1...n</td>
<td>Lemma+xx</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lemma+xx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of morphological characteristics</td>
<td>Synonyms</td>
<td>Antonyms</td>
<td>Contextual synonyms, defined by the user</td>
<td>Contextual antonyms, defined by the user</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the standardization of internal dictionary links, each form identifier is presented as an n-digit number, where n — the number of all possible forms of all parts of the language. This code consists of numbers starting with 1 representing the value of each grammatical characteristic, and 0 — to indicate the unsuitability of a characteristic for a particular part of speech.

Column E contains morphological identifiers of each word, which is a part of speech tag. Here we use the same coding principle, but with different values. This allows the analyst to present frequency analysis results in the form of significant categories of words. In any European language nouns denote some concepts or phenomena, adjectives denote characteristics of these concepts or phenomena, verbs denote the action of certain subject-nouns, etc. So, during the first stage of text data processing, we can figure out which concepts (nouns) are in the text and what are their frequency.

Columns F and J refer to lexical synonyms and antonyms in the form of their index in the matrix. Thus, the “value clusters”, i.e. words with all their synonymous, can be calculated and summarized. The last two columns — J and I are user-defined contextual synonyms to be automatically transcoded into the corresponding index words. In order to identify these contextual synonyms, we can count the frequency of meaningful words and deduce that some of them are synonymous. In this case, of course, there are no strict rules of synonymization. However, if, say, we have in one text the word “president” and his name, we can say that the word “president” and this name are contextually synonymous.

Besides the sole functionality of each column, we can benefit from their combined use. Using the comparison of indexes and positional analysis at the level of sentences we tried to solve one of the problems of automated content analysis: “Is a word directly connected to other words, if they occur in the same sentence?”. Method of determining the direct connection involves two consecutive steps: (1) identifying the position of each significant word around keyword (word under analysis) within a sentence by fixing the relative position of spaces and continuous sequences of letters and parallel reconciliation with matrix vocabulary; (2) comparing morphological code of a keyword with meaningful words near it. The rule of meaningful connection is the following: if a keyword and one of the nearest meaningful words have similar codes and there are no other words with the same code between them, these words relate grammatically and meaningfully. The similarity of values means that no value starting from 1, cannot be compared with zero, which means the unsuitability of certain characteristics for a given word.

Identified relations were manually coded as positive or negative statements on selected issues (values from polls). Then a triangulation was performed on a subsample of 100 messages: it was recorded by two other coders. The procedure was repeated until the reliability of coding reached the required level (Krippendorf’s α = 0.77).

As a result of the coding we received data matrix with the following variables:
- a) the date of the message;
- b) a variable which relates to the message,
- c) modus of the message in regard to a variable (favorable or negational)
- d) the recipient of the message.

The last variable allows to check the possible impact of addressee type on a message content. We define 5 types of recipients:
- a) Southeast region. It is the addressee of public statements in the Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea.
b) Central West region. It is the addressee of public statements in Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky, Transcarpathian, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr, Vinnitsa, Kirovograd, Cherkasy, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv.

c) The entire population of Ukraine. It is the addressee of any media messages in nationwide scale.

d) The West. It is the addressee of public statements in Western and Central Europe, Eastern Europe members of the European Union, North America, Georgia.

e) East and Russia. It is the addressee of public expression in the countries of CSTO.

These types defined by the electoral characteristics of these regions and geopolitical division (Ivanov, 2016).

The last but not least is transforming surveys and content analysis results to a common measuring scale. The respective algorithm is conceptually presented in table 3.

---

Table 3. Messages vs public opinions comparison algorithm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral group</th>
<th>Statement X</th>
<th>Power elite representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>n(+) &gt; n(−) ∧ p ≥0.05 ∧ 0∗&lt;50%</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−</td>
<td>n(+) &lt; n(−) ∧ p ≥0.05 ∧ 0∗&lt;50%</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td>`0∗&gt;50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 The Collective Security Treaty Organization led by Russia.
If the number of people who approve certain statements (choosing a certain answer to the question) is greater than the number of people who deny certain statements (or choose the opposite answer), and the difference is significant at p≤0.05, while the number of those who chose the answer “do not know” or refused to answer is less than half of valid sample set (ignoring missing values), then this statement is considered to be supported. It can be equated to the favorable statement of a politician. Similarly were determined negative statements that are equated to the negative statements of politicians.

If the number of people who approve certain statements (choosing a certain answer to the question) does not differ on a statistically significant level, the number of people who deny the specific statement (choose the opposite answer) and / or the number of those who chose option “do not know” or refused to answer more than half of valid sample set (ignoring missing values), the attitude to this statement is considered ambivalent. Such statements are equated to the absence of favorable or negative statements (“silence”) for the comparable period (we used 1-month frame) or to the equity of favorable and negative statements (“communicative ambiguity”) for the comparable period.

Approval, denial or ambivalence we define for each variable, for all Ukraine’s population and for the target electorate of each politician. To determine the key statements that unite the electorate of each politician (the factor of orientations) and the population as a whole, we have combined all the data sets by the key variable of electoral preferences and conducted a factor analysis on the variables that determine the foreign policy orientation. The electorate was divided into supporters of pro-Western politicians (Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Turchynov, Poroshenko) and supporters of pro-Russia politicians (Yanukovych and “Opposition block”). Thus was obtained a solution that explained 43% of the variance. We also determined statements that unite the majority of Ukraine’s population, and the approval of which continued over time. These variables were used in the further comparative analysis to identify whether politicians represent the two largest electoral groups and the population as a whole.

As we analyzed time series of data, we faced the challenge of the small data “saturation” in each of the comparable periods. To overcome the problem we applied the following algorithm to compare the preferences of voters (citizens) and statements of politicians in the time dimension:

a) after each relevant survey it is assumed that target electorate’s orientations remained unchanged until the next survey detected the change;
b) target electorate’s orientations compared with the statements of politicians on a daily basis using the Granger causality test (Granger, 1969), which allows us to estimate the likelihood of policy of orientation expression at different delay of reaction (lags) between the point when public opinion on a particular issue became known and representation (or denial) of this opinion by a politician;
c) comparisons are grouped by the factor of orientations;
d) within each group we leave only the most probable causal relation for each point on the scale of lags.

Results

First period

Western and all-Ukraine publics were the most popular addresses among Ukrainian politicians during the first period (see table 4). Among Tymoshenko’s messages about foreign policy
the highest percentage of publications were in the Western media. In the Russian media there were mostly articles in liberal and opposition press. Others were in national newspapers and regional media of the central-western region. Yushchenko’s statement mainly focused on the population of Ukraine and the West. Among the recipients of Yanukovych’s statements there was a significant percentage of the Russian publics, which he tried to convince in his commitment to Russia.

Table 4. Addressees of the messages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Addressee</th>
<th>Coded statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tymoshenko</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-Western</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine in general</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-East</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern-Southern</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yushchenko</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern-Southern</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central-Western</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine in general</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-East</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanukovych</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine in general</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern-Southern</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-East</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unexpectedly Yanukovych’s messages to his target voters – residents of the southeastern region – are missing on the official site of the Party of regions⁵. Although he could use rather tough statements in concordance with the preferences of the target audiences, after the 2004 elections Yanukovych’s team began to filter out material that could give rise of criticism of his position from the general publics. The factor of “Blue-white” (Yanukovych’s electorate) orientations included the following statements:
- Russian should be state language;
- The problem of the language is real;
- Ukraine should join with Russia in economic union (ЕЭП);
- Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities;
- In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported;
- Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities;
- For cheaper gas national interests can be partly sacrificed;
- We can trust president of Russia;
- Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.

The factor of “Orange” (Yushchenko and Tymoshenko electorates) orientations included only two statements:
- Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity;
- Russia intervene Ukrainian internal affairs.

All-Ukraine orientations are the following:
- Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange;
- With his visit to Ukraine Putin support Yanukovych;
- Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.

Firstly, let us compare the aggregated data of population, two electoral groups, and politicians’ positions on every issue. The surveys were aggregated by the number of approvals / objections for the entire study period. For the statements the most frequent modus is presented. In both cases equal number or frequency is presented as ambivalence. To illustrate representations of foreign policy statements by politicians we use the coloring scheme: green-colored text means approval of a statement, red color – its disapproval, black color – missing of a position or ambivalence.

Thus, Yanukovych’s representation was the following:
- There is a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia.
- The Russian language should be state language.
- The problem of language is real.
- Ukraine should join with Russia in the economic union (ЕЭП).
- Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities.
- Improvement of relations with Russia will make gas cheaper.
- NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.
- NATO membership will worsen relations with Russia.
- Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity.
- In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported.
- Integration with Russia and CIS should be supported.
- For cheaper gas national interests can be partly sacrificed.
- Current gas price indicates good relations with Russia.
- Recognition Holodomor as genocide will worsen relations with Russia.
- We can trust the president of Russia.

⁵ Remember that we analyzed 2010 version of this site.
Russia worsens relations between countries.
Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange.
With his visit to Ukraine Putin support Yanukovych.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means no borders check.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means equal conditions for work in Russia.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means new projects in business, science and culture.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means protection of Russian language in Ukraine.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means protection of Ukrainian language in Russia.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means simultaneous entrance to WTO.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means no trade restrictions from Russia.
Russia will raise price of gas for Ukraine.
Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.
Ukrainian Orthodox church should be under Moscow patriarchy.
Ukraine should give its gas transporting system under Russia control for cheaper gas.

Yushchenko represented foreign policy in the following manner:
There is a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia.
The Russian language should be state language.
The problem of language is real.
Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities.

NATO membership will reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russia.
NATO membership will worsen relations with Russia.
Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity.
In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported.
Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities.
Current gas price indicates good relations with Russia.
We can trust the president of Russia.
Russia worsens relations between countries.
Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means no borders check.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means equal conditions for work in Russia.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means new projects in business, science and culture.
Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means protection of Ukrainian language in Russia.
Russia will raise the price of gas for Ukraine.
Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.
Ukrainian Orthodox church should be under Moscow patriarchy.

The other statements were suppressed or presented ambivalently.

Tymoshenko clearly represented the following statements:
There is a threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine from Russia.
The Russian language should be state language.
► Good relations with Russia are among the top priorities for state authorities.
► NATO membership will reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.
► NATO membership will worsen relations with Russia.
► Gas tariffs grow because of RosUkrEnergo activity.
► In Georgia-Russia conflict Russia should be supported.
► Integration with Russia and CIS should be among priorities.
► For cheaper gas national interests can be partly sacrificed.
► Current gas price indicate good relations with Russia.
► Russia worsens relations between countries.
► Ukraine-Russia relations will improve after top-level visits interchange.
► With his visit to Ukraine Putin support Yanukovych.
► Improvement of Ukraine-Russia relations means stabilization of gas price.
► Russia will rise price of gas for Ukraine.
► Ukraine should join the geopolitical union of Russia and Belarus.
► Ukraine should give its gas transporting system to Russia for cheaper gas.

We can see that Yanukovych represented his target electorate in 7 of 9 statements, Yushchenko – only in the statement about intervention in Ukrainian internal affairs, Tymoshenko represented all “orange” electorate orientations.

To analyze representation in time dimension we applied Granger causality test to standardized survey and coded communication data (see Method section). The results are illustrated in the following figures 1–3. The red line represents the probability that publics’ orientations influence the content of the messages (p-value). The blue line represents lag, i.e. time span in days between survey and communicative reaction. The green line stands for Fisher statistic values.

**Figure 1. Tymoshenko: “blue-white” orientations factor**

![Figure 1](image1)

**Figure 2. Tymoshenko: “orange” orientations factor**

![Figure 2](image2)
The analysis of time series indicates that Tymoshenko used “contrasted” communication strategy, i.e. systematic denial of the “blue-white” factor. At the same time, high levels of representation of the whole population caused primarily by sequential repeating of the thesis about the need to stabilize gas prices as a sign of improving relations with Russia.

Yushchenko better represented the “Orange” factor of orientations. He quickly responded to changes in public opinion of his electorate and the society as a whole.

As for Yanukovych, time series analysis found no causality at any level of probability for any delay in response for all factors. This means that Yanukovych in public communications presented on the Party of regions official website, did not try to systematically respond to changes in the orientations of the population.
**Second period**

The distinctive feature of the second period is the presentation of Russia as an aggressor by most public speakers in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia was officially recognized as the aggressor by the Ukrainian parliament (Верховна Рада України, 2015). This was a strong factor of influence on both public orientations and public communication of power elites. Pro-Russian sentiments and messages became stigmatized as “separatists’” and socially undesirable. Still, there were differences in foreign orientations of the publics and their representations by the politicians.

First of all, it is notable that Opposition block tried to conceal foreign relations topic and focus itself on domestic issues: only 36 relevant messages were collected for the entire period (see Table 1 above). The differences in aggregated counts for pro-Russian, ambivalent and pro-European messages for all communicators are presented in table 5.

Table 5. Representation of foreign policy orientations during after the Euromaidan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communicator</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pro-Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition block</td>
<td>2,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poroshenko</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tymoshenko</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turchynov</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yatsenyuk</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We must note that “pro-Russian” messages in no case meant support of Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, or the will to join the union with Russia. They include statements like the following: “With peaceful Russia that treats us with respect, you need to trade and cooperate.” Ambivalent statements include positive assessment of the talks with Vladimir Putin while condemning the aggression of the Russian Federation.

Yet the population of Ukraine is much less united than the elite. While the majority of publics supports joining the European Union after February 2014, this percentage is only above 50% and is not stable (see the diagram below).

Figure 7. Changes in geopolitical orientations of Ukrainian adult population

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
This means that the elites did not fully represent publics' orientations, especially in electoral groups dimension (see table 6).

**Table 6. Representation of foreign policy orientations in time dimension**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lag (in months)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>F-statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition block</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,011703</td>
<td>0,0846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,0914</td>
<td>0,8988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,57</td>
<td>0,91234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target electorate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poroshenko</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,36</td>
<td>0,01577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,10</td>
<td>0,3439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,08</td>
<td>0,3753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,93</td>
<td>0,04411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,58</td>
<td>0,06801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,68</td>
<td>0,2228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,24</td>
<td>0,4402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target electorate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poroshenko</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,52</td>
<td>0,02443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,21</td>
<td>0,1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>0,4039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,32</td>
<td>0,8629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tymoshenko</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,3445</td>
<td>0,2535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,9896</td>
<td>0,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,0519</td>
<td>0,04625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,0086</td>
<td>0,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,7109</td>
<td>0,1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,1714</td>
<td>0,06733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0,94774</td>
<td>0,6024</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 No causality at any level of probability for any delay in response.
We can see that Opposition block, Tymoshenko, and Turchynov better represented the general population of Ukraine, then their target electorates. Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, on the contrary, were more ideologically oriented in their public messages. Still, Tymoshenko reacted more quickly to changes in orientations of her electorate, then other politicians.

The communication strategy used by Yanukovych and Opposition block we call “nomenclature strategy”, the strategy of Tymoshenko during the first period is a “radical-sensitive”, and the strategy of Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko during the second period is a “compromise”. Neither of them is ideal for the rapid change of society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target electorate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,57395</td>
<td>0,4909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turchynov

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target electorate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,57395</td>
<td>0,4909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yatsenyuk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General population</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,9793</td>
<td>0,09135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,051864</td>
<td>0,9495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0,31337</td>
<td>0,8156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,125</td>
<td>0,9721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target electorate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,058577</td>
<td>0,8101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,26301</td>
<td>0,7704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0,8572</td>
<td>0,4756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,38521</td>
<td>0,8166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0,52356</td>
<td>0,7547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0,22331</td>
<td>0,9579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0,041766</td>
<td>0,9993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

Comparing two periods of modern Ukrainian history – after the Orange revolution and after Euromaidan – we can say that after February 2014 the changes in both publics’ foreign policy orientations and their representation by power elites are significant.

The publics became much more unite in their European aspirations and this was consistently represented by power elites. However, several features remain common for both periods. These features may transform into threats for sustainable European development of Ukrainian society.

The position of the Ukrainian government in relations with Russia independent of foreign influences make impossible the complete representation of constantly changing foreign policy orientations of different electoral groups. However, ignoring the latter in times
of crisis and a sharp abandoning of isolationism can lead to a confrontation within the country. During the first period politicians represented mainly their electoral groups, while during the last two years they move to representation of the general public.

Ukrainian politicians differ in terms of the level of representation and sensitivity to changes in public opinion. For the first period the rating in descending order was the following: Tymoshenko, Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych. For the second period, Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk became more representative. Tymoshenko was more radically focused on the electorate, which changed during the second period. Yushchenko less represented the population in general, with a level of representation decreased from the beginning of his presidency to the dissolution of Parliament, when his target electorate orientation has become more rigid. Most sensitive to the circumstances of communication in the first period was Yanukovych, who changed the content of communication according to the audience, used neutral statements or suppressed disputable messages. We can see that Opposition block uses the same strategy, which could be the hidden threat in case of the aggravation of economic and military crisis.

Social tensions and conflicts of the orientations in the transformation are functional, while the formation of foreign policy is essentially elitist. The contradictions that exist regarding the foreign policy direction, on the one hand, contribute to the structuring the political forces, on the other – to creating a stable balance in which disproportionate strengthening of one of the groups is compensated by mobilizing their opponents. Such interaction has both positive and negative effects on social development. On the one hand, it hinders the development of any vector of foreign policy, but on the other – potentially improves the quality of the implementation of this vector by the rotation of elites. As a result, it is possible to develop a model of foreign relations, which somehow satisfy all groups. ⚠️

**Oleh Ivanov**, PhD. is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, and analyst at the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Ukraine. In 2012, defended “summa cum laude” PhD thesis “Representation of People’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the Public Communication of Power Elites.” Scholar interests cover political sociology, sociology of mass communication, military sociology, and content-analytical methodology.

Since 2014 is a member of the Editorial Board of the international peer-reviewed journal “Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal” which is published collaboratively by MacEwan University (Canada), and the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (Ukraine). Since 2016 is a deputy head of the Young Scholars Association at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.

**Affiliation:**
Department of Sociology, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”.

E-mail: ivanovov@ukma.edu.ua

**Bibliography:**


Верховна Рада України. (2015). Постанова про Звернення Верховної Ради України до
Spółeczne reprezentacje orientacji zagranicznych Ukraińców w dyskursie publicznym ukraińskich elit politycznych

Streszczenie:
Artykuł przedstawia warunki konieczne (a także empiryczne ograniczenia), które pozostają niezbędne do wdrożenia w sferze ukraińskiej polityki zagranicznej demokratycznego i deliberatywnego procesu decyzyjnego. Teoria reprezentacji wyjaśnia stabilność ukraińskiego systemu społecznego w tym wymiarze (np. w odniesieniu do relacji między Ukrainą a Rosją) poprzez to, jak polityka ta była kształtowana w okresie transformacji ustrojowej przez elity, napięcia społeczne oraz konflikty dotyczące kierunku rozwoju państwa. Komunikacja polityczna upowszechniana jest poprzez określone strategie dyskursywne: ukryte (formułowane w stylu właściwym dla nomenklatury), ambiwalentne oraz konfrontacyjne. Dla strukturalnej i morfologicznej analizy tych strategii utworzono określony algorytm komputerowy, obejmujący znaczny ilość danych (wiadomości obecnych na ukraińskich i rosyjskich stronach rządowych). Korpusy badanych tekstów zostały przekształcone w semantyczną sieć dotyczącą danego zagadnienia, połączoną z tymi wszystkimi cechami, które stanowili przedmiot zainteresowania samego badacza (np. czas, miejsce, autor, potencjalna liczba odbiorców itd.). Z kolei do badania dużej liczby sondazy przeprowadzonych na różnych próbach i z użyciem odmiennych pytańastosowano technikę tematycznego skupiania pytań za pomocą analizy zawartości.

Słowa kluczowe:
representation, communication, elite, public opinion, international relations, Ukraine, Russia, foreign policy orientations.